BEFORE
THE
ILLINOIS
POLLUTION
CONTROL
BOARD
PEOPLE
OF
THE
STATE
OF
ILLINOIS
)
ECEVED
L.ERK’S
OFFICE
Complainant,
)
FF8
0
‘
2009
v.
)
PCB
No.
)
(Enforcement)
PACKAGING
PERSONIFIED,
Inc.,
)
an
Illinois
Corporation,
)
)
Respondent.
)
RESPONDENT’S
EXPERT
WITNESS
DISCLOSURE
Packaging
Personified,
Inc.
(“Respondent”)
by
and
through
its
attorneys,
Drinker
Biddle
&
Reath
LLP,
submits
the
following
witness
list
and
expert
reports
in
accordance
with
the
hearing
officer’s
directive.
Respondent’s
Expert
Witness
List
1.
Christopher
McClure,
of
Navigant
Consulting,
will
be
testifying
as
the
Respondent’s
expert
witness
in
connection
with
the
economic
benefit
penalty
calculation.
Mr.
McClure’s
is
expected
to
testify
in
accordance
with
his
expert
report
which
is
enclosed
herein,
as
Attachment
A,
which
includes
an
analysis
of
the
compliance
alternatives
available
to
Respondent
and
an
analysis
of
the
economic
benefit
associated
with
each
respective
alternative.
2.
Richard
Trzupek,
Principal
Consultant
of
Mostardi
Platt
Environmental,
will
be
testifying
as
the
Respondent’s
expert
consultant
witness
in
connection
with
the
environmental
compliance
issues
at
the
Respondent’s
facility.
Mr.
Trzupek
is
expected
to
testify
in
accordance
with
his
expert
report
which
is
ericlosed
herein,
as
Attachment
B,
which
includes
the
historical
CHOI/
25296668.1
analysis
of
the
activities
undertaken
by
Respondent
to
comply
with
the
Flexographic
Printing
Rules.
Respectfully
submitted,
PACKAGING
PERSONIFIED,
INC.
By:
One
of
Its
Attorneys
Dated:
February
4,
2009
Roy
M.
Harsch
Lawrence
W.
Falbe
Yesenia
Villasenor-Rodriguez
Drinker
Biddle
&
Reath
LLP
191
North
Wacker
Drive
-
Suite
3700
Chicago,
IL
60606-1698
(312)
569-1441
(Phone)
(312)
569-3441
(Facsimile)
CHO1/
25296668.1
CERTIFICATE
OF
SERVICE
The
undersigned
certifies
that
copies
of
the
foregoing
were
served
upon:
Paula
Wheeler
Assistant
Attorney
General
Office
of
the
Illinois
Attorney
General
69
West
Washington
Street
—
Floor
Chicago,
IL
60602
Bradley
P.
Halloran
Hearing
Officer
Illinois
Pollution
Control
Board
James
R.
Thompson
Center
100W.
Randolph
Street
-
Suite
11-500
Chicago,
IL
60601
John
T.
Therriault
Illinois
Pollution
Control
Board
James
R.
Thompson
Center
100W.
Randolph
St.
-
Suite
11-500
Chicago,
IL
60601
by
Hand
Deliver
on
this
4
th
day
of
February
2009.
CHOI/
25296668.1
IN
THE
MATTER
OF:
PEOPLE
OF
THE
STATE
OF
ILLINOIS
V.
PACKAGING
PERSONIFIED,
INC.
PCB
04-16
EXPERT
REPORT
OF
CHRISTOPHER
MCCLURE
February
3,
2009
ATTACHMENT
A
NAVIGANT
CONSULTING
INTRODUCTION
&
QUALIFICATIONS
My
name
is
Christopher
McClure.
My
business
address
is
30
South
Wacker
Drive,
Suite
3100,
Chicago,
Illinois
60606.
I
am
a
Director
at
Navigant
Consulting
Inc.,
a
CPA
and
hold
a
Master
of
Business
Administration
Degree.
My
curriculum
vitae
is
found
at
Exhibit
1.
My
hourly
billing
rate
for
this
engagement
is
$450.
Navigant
Consulting
Inc.
is
an
international
consulting
firm
of
approximately
2,000
professional
which
include
Certified
Public
Accountants,
Masters
of
Business
Administration,
engineers
of
various
disciplines,
information
management
professionals
and
others
with
accounting,
economic
and
finance
experience,
including
expertise
in
environmental
matters.
Prior
to
joining
Navigant
Consulting
Inc.
in
2004,
I
was
employed
by
LECG,
a
global
expert
services
firm.
Prior
to
LECG,
I
was
employed
by
the
international
public
accounting
and
consulting
firm
of
Arthur
Andersen.
I
am
experienced
in
the
financial,
economic,
and
accounting
theories
and
methods
necessary
to
perform
the
analysis
in
this
matter.
My
experience
includes
compiling
claims
for
litigation
and
contribution
actions,
developing
cost
allocation
models,
assisting
parties
in
the
recovery
of
remediation
costs
from
their
insurance
companies,
and
performing
a
variety
of
other
types
of
accounting
and
financial
analyses.
I
have
calculated
economic
benefit
penalty
amounts
using
the
EPA
BEN
approach
on
three
occasions
and
also
testified
at
an
Illinois
Pollution
Control
Board
hearing.
This
report
is
limited
to
analyzing
the
potential
economic
benefit
penalty
component
only
to
possibly
be
imposed
by
the
Board
pursuant
to
Section
42
(h)(3)
of
the
Illinois
Environmental
Protection
Act
and
does
not
address
any
potential
gravity
component.
The
analysis
presented
in
this
report
is
based
on
currently
available
documents
and
information
and
is
subject
to
change
based
on
the
review
of
additional
information
that
may
be
provided.
I
reserve
the
right
to
revise
this
report.
I
understand
depositions
of
witnesses
may
continue
2
beyond
the
date
of
this
report.
I
understand
that
this
report
may
be
supplemented
by
deposition
and
trial
testimony.
If
this
matter
proceeds
to
trial,
selected
pages
of
the
documents
and
information
relied
upon
may
be
used
as
exhibits.
Additionally,
I
may
prepare
graphical
or
illustrative
exhibits
based
on
the
documents
and
information
relied
upon
and
my
analysis
of
those
documents
and
information.
CASE
BACKGROUND
Navigant
Consulting
Inc.
was
retained
by
Drinker
Biddle
&
Reath
LLP,
outside
counsel
for
Packaging
Personified,
Inc.,
(“Packaging”)
to
provide
analyses
related
to
the
amount
of
economic
benefit
penalty
that
could
possibly
be
imposed
onPackaging
by
the
Illinois
Pollution
Control
Board
(“Board”)
in
the
enforcement
action
brought
the
Illinois
Attorney
General
on
behalf
of
the
Illinois
Environmental
Protection
Agency
and
the
(collectively
“Government”)
in
the
matter
People
of
the
State
of
Illinois
v.
Packaging
Personified,
Inc.,
PCB
04-16.
The
financial
penalties
could
arise
from
the
Government’s
allegation
that
Packaging
enjoyed
an
economic
benefit
by
delaying
compliance
with
the
Volatile
Organic
Material
(“VOM”)
capture
and
control
requirements
outlined
in
35
Illinois
Administrative
Code
(“IAC”)
Section
218.401
-
“Flexographic
and
Rotogravure
Printing.”
Packaging
Personified
is
a
printing
company
located
in
Carol
Stream,
IL.
It
utilizes
printing
presses
with
inks
containing
organic
solvents
that
emit
as
VOM
during
the
printing
process.
A
Government
inspection
of
Packaging
Personified’s
facility
in
2002
revealed
that
one
of
its
four
printing
presses
was
non
compliant.
Packaging
Personified
decommissioned
the
non
compliant
press
in
December
2002
to
reach
compliance.
Packaging
Personified
should
have
been
in
compliance
in
January
1997.
At
that
time,
there
were
multiple
compliance
options
available
to
the
company.
These
compliance
options
and
their
associated
costs
are
as
follows:
3
Compliance
Option
#1—
Adjusted
Standard
Pursuant
to
the
authority
of
Section
28.1
of
the
Environmental
Protection
Act
(415
ILCS
5/28.1(1998)),
Packaging
Personified
could
have
applied
for
an
adjusted
standard
that
would
have
eliminated
the
need
for
a
compliance
system.
Packaging
Personified’s
competitors
such
as
Formel
Industries,
mc,
BEMA,
Inc.
and
Vonco
Products,
Inc.
received
adjusted
standards.
The
total
cost
of
receiving
the
adjusted
standard
is
estimated
at
$30,000
(in
2007
dollars),
consisting
primarily
of
legal
and
consulting
fees
to
complete
the
application
process.
Compliance
Option
#2—
Install
RTO
Packaging
Personified
ultimately
spent
$250,000
on
an
RTO
in
late
2003,
but
that
device
was
substantially
larger
than
needed
for
compliance
because
it
was
built
in
anticipation
of
future
expansion
and
the
installation
of
additional
presses.
The
installed
RTO
was
large
enough
to
accommodate
three
presses.
The
lower
cost
compliance
alternative
for
the
company
was
to
purchase
and
install
a
used
RTO
that
could
be
obtained
for
$75,000
and
maintained
for
an
annual
cost
(labor,
utilities)
of
$16,362,
based
on
the
best
estimates
of
the
company’s
engineering
consultants,
Mostardi
Platt
Environmental
(in
2007
dollars).
Compliance
Option
#3—
Decommission
I
Relocate
press
to
Michigan
Packaging
Personified
could
have
easily
complied
by
decommissioning
the
non
compliant
press
and
moving
itto
the
company’s
facility
in
Michigan.
Packaging
Personified
ultimately
did
decommission
the
press
in
December
2002
and
relocated
it
to
the
Michigan
facility
in
December
2004.
The
estimated
cost
for
this
option
is
$15,000
(in
2007
dollars),
based
on
Packaging
Personified’s
actual
expenditures.
The
following
table
summarizes
the
economic
benefit
of
non
compliance
Packaging
Personified
could
have
enjoyed
under
each
of
the
three
compliance
options.
The
exhibits
attached
to
this
report
provide
greater
detail
of
the
economic
benefit
calculations
of
these
three
compliance
options.
4
Compliance
Option
Economic
Benefit
1.
Adjusted
Standard
$33,707
2.
Install
RTO
$119,020
3.
Decommission
/
Relocate
press
to
Michigan
$16,853
DOCUMENTS
CONSIDERED
The
documents
I
considered
in
my
analysis
include:
•
EPA
BEN
user
manual
•
Cost
estimates
prepared
by
Mostardi
Platt
Environmental
for
RTO
purchase
and
annual
operating
costs
•
Correspondence
between
Illinois
EPA
and
Drinker,
Biddle
&
Reath
LLP
dated
June
12,
2007
and
November
24,
2008
•
Cases
andliterature
addressing
the
use
of
discount
rates
in
enforcement
actions
ILLINOIS
EPA
REPORT
I
have
reviewed
the
November
21,
2008
Economic
Benefit
Analysis
report
prepared
by
the
the
Illinois
EPA’s
analyst,
Mr.
Gary
Styzens.
Mr.
Styzens
estimated
an
economic
benefit
of
$711,274,
an
amount
which
I
find
to
be
significantly
overstated
for
several
reasons,
including:
•
Mr.
Styzens’
analysis
fails
to
consider
thatPackaging
Personified
had
compliance
alternatives
in
addition
to
theinstallation
of
an
RTO,
as
I
have
outlined
in
this
report.
•
Mr.
Styzens
fails
to
consider
that
the
RTO
ultimately
installed
by
Packaging
Personified
was
three
times
larger
than
the
one
required
to
reach
compliance
so
the
cost
estimate
he
uses
for
delayed
capital
expenditures
is
unduly
high.
•
Mr.
Styzens
incorrectly
utilizes
an
unusually
high
avoided
annual
operating
cost
averaging
$86,000
per
yearthat
he
derived
generically
rather
than
researching
more
accurate
costs
that
match
the
size
of
the
RTO
that
Packaging
Personified
would
have
installed.
The
annual
avoided
costs
actually
approximate
$16,000
per
year.
5
•
Mr.
Styzens
failed
to
terminate
the
period
of
non
compliance
at
the
end
of
2002
when
PackagingPersonified
decommissioned
the
press.
Instead,
he
continues
to
penalize
the
company
for
an
additional
year
and
then
calculates
interest
on
this
incorrect
benefit
amount.
ECONOMIC
BENEFIT
PENALTY
BACKGROUND
The
United
States
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(“EPA”)
employs
a
civil
penalty
program
to
help
ensure
that
regulated
entities
comply
with
environmental
regulations.
These
civil
penalty
figures
are
based
on
the
EPA’s
February
16,
1984,
generic
penalty
policy
which
was
codified
in
theGeneralEnforcement
Policy
Compendium
as
P.T.
1—i
and
P.T.
1-2.
A
copy
of
this
is
found
as
Exhibit
5.
These
civil
penalties
seek
to
recapture
the
economic
benefit
that
an
entity
may
have
gained
from
delaying
or
avoiding
compliance
with
regulations.
The
EPA
holds
that
economic
benefit
recapture
helps
level
the
economic
playing
field
amongst
all
regulated
entities,
serve
as
incentives
to
protect
the
environment
and
public
health,
and
help
deter
future
violations.
EPA
civil
penalties
have
two
main
components:
gravity
and
economic
benefit.
The
gravity
component
reflects
the
seriousness
of
the
violation
while
the
economic
benefit
component
focuses
on
the
violators
economic
gain
from
noncompliance.
This
economic
benefit
can
accrue
to
the
violator
in
three
basic
ways:
(1)
delaying
necessary
pollution
control
expenditures;
(2)
avoiding
necessary
pollution
control
expenditures;
and/or
(3)
obtaining
an
illegal
competitive
advantage.
The
EPA
designed
the
BEN
computer
model
in
1984
to
calculate
the
economic
benefit
from
these
first
two
types
of
economic
gain.
The
EPA
has
solicited
comments
from
the
public
on
multiple
occasions,
acknowledging
that
the
actual
computer
model
is
still
being
refined.
As
such,
the
EPA
provides
that
experts
calculating
the
economic
benefit
mayuse
the
BEN
model
or
6
other
analytical
tools
(e.g.
customized
computer
spreadsheets,
calculators)
as
needed.
The
EPA
is
more
adamant
regarding
the
methodology
for
calculating
economic
benefit,
stating
in
the
Federal
Register
Volume
64,
Number
117
dated
June
18,
1999,
that
the
EPA
believes
“that
BEN
is
by
far
the
best
approach
available
for
calculating
economic
benefit
derived
from
delayed
and/or
avoided
costs.”
A
copy
of
this
is
found
at
Exhibit
6.
In
addition
to
the
Federal
Register,
the
EPA
publishes
a
BEN
User
Manual
that
provides
guidance
on
the
theory
and
methodology
for
calculating
the
economic
benefit
penalty
as
well
as
technical
computer
instructions
for
using
the
BEN
Model.
The
EPA
BEN
User
Manual
outlines
the
variables
required
to
calculate
economic
benefit.
It
also
provides
examples
of
a
number
of
issues
that
can
arise
in
the
calculation
of
economic
benefit,
including
offsets
for
byproduct
recovery
and
certain
types
of
good
faith
expenditures
that
did
not
lead
to
compliance.
These
examples
are
explored
in
more
detail
in
the
analysis
section
of
this
testimony.
It
is
important
to
note
that
the
EPA
BEN
User
Manual
clearly
distinguishes
between
the
economic
benefit
and
the
gravity
components
of
civil
penalties.
It
explicitly
states
on
page
A-i
that
“economic
benefit
is
“no
fault”
in
nature:
a
defendant
need
not
have
deliberately
chosen
to
delay
compliance
(for
financial
or
any
other
reasons),
or
in
fact
even
have
been
aware
of
its
noncompliance,
for
it
to
have
accrued
the
economic
benefit
of
noncompliance.”
It
goes
on
provide
an
example
on
page
4-3
of
how
certain
issues
are
“legal
distinctions
that
may
impact
the
gravity
component
but
not
the
economic
benefit.”
The
distinction
is
a
significant
one
and
the
EPA
BEN
User
Manual
highlights
it
to
stress
that
the
two
penalty
theories
are
separate
and
impressions
regarding
the
gravity
of
the
noncompliance
should
not
influence
the
economic
benefit
calculation.
7
EXHIBIT
1
CHRISTOPHER
T.
MCCLURE
Christopher
McClure
Director
Navigant
Consulting
30
S.
Wacker
Drive
#3100
Chicago,
Illinois
60606
Tel:
312.583.6986
cmcclure@navigantconsulting.com
Professional
History
•
Navigant
Consulting,
Inc.
2004
to
present
•
LECG,
LLC
2002—2004
•
Andersen
1995
-
2002
Education
•
M.B.A
Kellogg
School
of
Management
Northwestern
University
•
8.5.
Accounting/Finance
Trinity
University
Professional
Certifications
•
Certified
Public
Accountant
(CPA)
•
Certified
Fraud
Examiner
(CFE)
•
Certified
in
Financial
Forensics
(CFF)
Professional
Associations
•
Texas
Society
of
CPAs
•
AICPA
•
ACFE
Christopher
McClure
is
a
Director
in
the
Chicago
office
of
Navigant
Consulting,
Inc.
Mr.
McClure’s
work
focuses
on
forensic
accounting
investigations,
insurance
related
matters,
commercial
litigation,
and
product
liability
matters.
He
has
conducted
forensic
accounting
investigations
for
numerous
SEC
registrants
and
quantified
damages
in
commercial
litigation.
He
has
also
supervised
numerous
engagements
involving
insurance
policy
analyses,
allocation
methodologies,
economic
benefit
modeling
for
EPA
negotiations,
insurance
carrier
settlements,
and
other
coverage
issues.
Experience
Mr.
McClure
has
been
called
upon
to
assist
companies
with
independent
investigations
related
to
allegations
of
stock
options
backdating,
earnings
management,
revenue
recognition
violations,
and
other
accounting
improprieties.
In
addition
to
his
knowledge
of
accounting
and
general
business
issues,
Mr.
McClure
has
significant
experience
with
various
forensic
database
software
packages
and
other
methods
of
efficiently
analyzing
and
disseminating
important
content
from
large
populations
of
emails,
electronic
files,
and
recorded
phone
conversations.
Mr.
McClure
has
developed
significant
expertise
in
insurance
matters
related
to
asbestos,
environmental,
other
toxic
torts.
He
has
managednumerous
engagements
focused
on
insurance
coverage
litigation
in
various
industries
including
manufacturing,
energy,
chemical,
and
utility.
He
has
quantified
the
damages
associated
with
a
number
of
significant
claims
for
the
purposes
of
negotiating
policy
commutations,
structured
settlements,
and
coverage-in-place
agreements,
as
well
as
establishing
bankruptcy
trust
funds.
Mr.
McClure
has
also
quantified
damages
in
the
context
of
business
interruption,
most
recently
for
clients
recovering
from
the
events
of
the
September
11
terrorist
attacks
on
New
York.
Mr.
McClure
also
has
extensive
experience
performing
allocations
of
insurance
damages
to
coverage
under
a
variety
of
methodologies
including
All
Sums,
Carter-Wallace,
Stonewall,
and
Owens-Illinois,
as
well
as
numerous
other
permutations.
He
has
used
various
computer
software
tools
and
techniques
to
calculate
and
analyze
allocation
results
using
different
8
assumptions
for
trigger,
occurrence,
coverage
defenses,
and
other
important
allocation
variables.
Insurance,
Environmental,
and
Product
Liability
Experience
>>
Analyzed
historic
and
projected
future
asbestos
liabilities
for
a
boiler
manufacturer
in
bankruptcy.
Utilized
client
data
and
Manville
Trust
information
to
project
future
liabilities
under
numerous
scenarios.
Conducted
hundreds
of
allocation
sensitivities
considering
various
product/non-product
claim
splits,
state
law
changes,
trigger
periods,
and
liability
amounts.
Utilized
the
analysis
in
the
negotiation
of
policy
buybacks
with
several
U.S.
and
foreign
insurance
carriers.
Engaged
by
one
of
the
world’s
largest
oil
companies
to
analyze
the
potential
economic
benefits
resulting
from
delayed
expenditures
for
environmental
protection
system
implementations
at
a
large
refinery.
Performed
detailed
cost
modeling
of
time
value
of
deferred
capital
expenditures,
avoided
operational
costs,
and
foregone
economic
benefits
to
support
client
negotiations
with
the
EPA.
>>
Assisted
a
Fortune
100
client
seeking
reimbursement
from
the
US
Government
for
over
$100
million
in
remediation
costs
under
CERCLA.
Involved
cost
compilation,
analysis,
and
presentation
to
the
US
Government
as
well
as
support
of
depositions
and
expert
testimony.
Analyzed
historic
and
future
asbestos
and
environmental
exposures
for
a
tire
manufacturer
for
use
in
policy
commutations.
Gathered,
organized,
and
allocated
damages
across
hundreds
of
insurance
policies
under
various
scenarios.
Conducted
archaeology
to
locate
critical
insurance
policy
evidence.
Formulated
presentations
given
to
the
London
Market
Insurers
as
well
as
numerous
domestic
insurance
carriers.
Developed
strategic
operating
scenarios,
analyzed
financial
damages,
and
compiled
business
interruption
claim
for
a
World
Trade
Center
banking
client
impacted
by
the
events
of
Sept
11,
2001.
Reviewed
insurance
coverage
language,
collected
cost
data,
modeled
lost
revenue
for
various
divisions,
and
developed
numerous
damage
scenarios
for
use.
in
settlement
negotiations.
Engaged
by
one
of
the
world’s
largest
petrochemical
companies
to
pursue
insurance
recovery
for
historic
environmental
pollution
claims.
Involved
the
accumulation
of
invoices
and
creation
of
a
cost
database
to
support
over
$300
million
in
remedial
expenditures.
Also
required
projection
of
future
cleanup
costs
at
numerous
sites
as
well
as
analysis
of
Natural
Resource
Damages
and
Property
Value
Diminution
claims.
9
Engaged
by
a
major
chemical
company
to
review
and
forecast
liabilities
for
asbestos,
silica,
and
other
products
claims.
Involved
a
comprehensive
review
of
client’s
historic
production
as
well
as
exhaustive
corporate
history
research.
Utilized
Manville
Trust
and
Nicholson
study
in
the
formulation
of
products
and
premises
liability
forecasts.
Generated
numerous
liability
scenarios
and
allocated
the
damages
under
several
scenarios
to
client’s
historic
insurance
coverage
to
assist
in
negotiating
a
coverage-in-place
agreement.
Accounting
Investigations
&
Litigation
Experience
Assisted
counsel
in
the
defense
of
a
multi-national
professional
services
firm
related
to
allegations
of
negligence
in
the
performance
of
the
annual
financial
audit
at
a
Fortune
100
company
at
which
one
of
the
largest
frauds
in
U.S.
history
occurred.
Involved
scrutinizing
annual
audit
workpapers
and
procedures
to
fully
analyze
the
complexity
of
the
fraud
and
build
a
defense
strategy
for
the
services
firm.
>>
Assisted
counsel
to
numerous
companies
faced
with
both
formal
and
informal
SEC
inquiries
into
historic
option
granting
processes.
These
engagements
involved
interviews
of
company
board
members
and
executives,
analysis
of
option
granting
procedures,
and
review
of
hundreds
of
thousands
of
emails
and
electronic
documents.
The
results
of
these
analyses
were
reported
to
the
SEC,
the
companies’
outside
auditors,
and
the
Board
of
Directors
and
also
used
in
financial
restatements.
Remediation
plans
were
also
created
to
assist
the
companies
with
improving
internal
controls.
>>
Assisted
counsel
to
an
SEC
registrant
with
an
independent
investigation
of
improper
accounting
entries
and
financial
reporting
errors
and
manipulations.
This
engagement
focused
on
the
analysis
of
numerous
corporate
reserve
accounts
across
multiple
years,
interviews
with
management,
and
the
review
of
over
50,000
emails
to
identify
and
quantify
amounts
for
the
restatement
of
the
company’s
financials.
The
investigation
involved
significant
interaction
with
the
corporate
management,
auditors,
and
the
SEC.
>>
Assisted
counsel
to
the
audit
committee
of
an
SEC
registrant
with
an
investigation
of
accounting,
financial
reporting,
and
operational
issues
raised
by
a
corporate
whistleblower.
The
investigation
involved
significant
interaction
with
the
company’s
outside
auditor,
the
Illinois
Commerce
Commission,
and
the
SEC.
This
engagement
also
required
the
analysis
and
organization
of
over
60,000
phone
call
recordings,
50,000
emails,
and
over
100,000
pages
of
hardcopy
documents.
>>
Assisted
counsel
to
the
seller
engaged
in
a
post-acquisition
dispute
arbitration
focusing
on
the
calculation
of
annual
revenue
earn-out
amounts
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
purchase
agreement.
Involved
analyzing
buyer’s
revenue
recognition
principles
and
methods
for
allocating
expenses
across
multiple
acquisitions.
10
>>
Assisted
in
the
compilation
and
analysis
of
the
books
and
records
of
ten
acquisitions
performed
by
an
SEC
registrant
over
the
last
five
years.
Responsible
for
identifying
material
accounting
issues
and
reporting
them
to
the
CFO
of
the
company
for
inclusion
in
the
company’s
ongoing
financial
restatement
process.
>>
Evaluated
the
financial
implications
of
a
multi-billion
dollar
international
merger
for
one
of
the
worlds
largest
retailers
—
included
revenue•
and
cash
flow
projections,
operational
analyses,
and
sensitivity
modeling
that
considered
currency
fluctuations
and
the
impact
of
political
and
economic
policy
changes
Engaged
by
a
Fortune
50
energy
firm
to
assist
in
the
redesign
of
its
executive
staff
following
a
major
merger.
Involved
mapping
and
redesigning
accounting
and
financial
processes
and
internal
controls
and
working
with
corporate
executives
to
identify
opportunities
for
greater
efficiency.
Project
resulted
in
annual
savings
of
over
$200
million
for
the
client.
Publications
and
Speaking
Engagements
•
Author
of
“Coping
with
FASB
Interpretation
No.
47
-.
Accounting
for
Conditional
Asset
Retirement
Obligations”.
American
Bar
Association,
Fall
2007.
•
Presenter
of
“White
Collar
Investigations
Update:
Trends
and
Best
Practices”
—
AICPA
webinar
series,
April
2008.
•
Author
of
“Gatekeepers:
A
Balancing
Act
for
Corporate
Counsel”
—
Navigant
Consulting
Inc.
Investigations
Quarterly
Magazine,
Summer
200&
Testimony
/
Alternative
Dispute
Resolution
Experience:
•
Provided
deposition
testimony
and
testimony
at
the
Pollution
Control
Board
hearing
in
2008
in
an
Illinois
EPA
economic
benefit
penalty
matter.
(People
of
the
State
of
Illinois
v.
Toyal
America,
Inc.
f/k/a
Alcan-Toyo
America,
Inc.,
PCB
2000-211)
11
Packaging
Personified,
Inc.
Economic
Benefit
Calculation
Exhibit
2
Scenario
Scenario:
Description
1
Adjusted
Standard
Total
Avoided
Operation
Costs/(Benefits)
$28,258
L
KEY
Total
Economic
Benefit!
(Detriment)
$33,707
M
A
The
estimated
capital
expenditures
deflated
to
1997.
B
Costs
permanently
avoided
by
delaying
compliance
C
Estimate
of
the
monthly
lost
benefit
not
realized
by
delaying
compliance
D
Depreciation
that
would
have
been
taken
on
amount
in
column
A
E
Sum
of
B+C+D
F
Tax
impact
of
item
E
G
E+F
H
Actual
dollars
spent
I
1=
Previous(I-f-K)+Current(A+G-H)
J
Risk-free
T-Bill
rate
to
inflate
dollars
to
the
date
of
compliance
K
Amount
earned
on
the
cumulative
deferred
spending
L
Sum
of
columns
B+C,
represents
the
total
avoided
cost
or
(benefit)
from
the
delay
M
Total
economic
benefit
(delayed
+
avoided)
1998
1999
00
2000
2002
2001
54
0
0
1997
1
0
28,258
0
0
28,258
(10,455)
17,803
0
17,803
2
00
0
00
18,805
3
00000
19,755
0
0
00
0
0
0
0
pendmg
0
0
0
0
00
6
0
00
00000
0
28,258
0
0
28,258
(10,455)
17,803
0
0
0
5.05%
5.63%
5.08%
3.49%
6.11%
2.00%
0
20,759
0
22,796
22,027
$1,002
$950
$1,268
$1,004
$769
$456
$5,449
Privileged
and
Confidential-
Prepared
at
the
Request
of
Counsel
Page
1
of
4
Packaging
Personified,
Inc.
Economic
Benefit
Calculation
Exhibit
2
Scenario
Scenario:
Description
Installation
2
of
a
Regenerative
Thermal
Oxidizer
(RTO)
70,645
15,412
0
15,504
0
15,597
0
15,691
0
15,785
0
15,880
70,645
93,870
0
(9,419)
5,993
(2,217)
3,776
0
(9,419)
6,085
(2,251)
3,834
0
(9,419)
6,178
(2,286)
3,892
0
(9,419)
6,272
(2,321)
3,951
0
(9,419)
6,366
(2,355)
4,011
0
(9,419)
6,461
(2,390)
4,071
0
(56,516)
37,354
(13,820)
23,534
0
74,421
5.63%
0
82,445
5.05%
0
90,500
5.08%
0
99,048
6.11%
0
109,111
3.49%
0
116,989
2.00%
0
$4,190
$4,163
$4,597
$6,052
$3,808
$2,340
$25,150
Total
Avoided
Operation
Costs!(Benef
its)
$93,870
L
KEY
Total
Economic
Benefit!
(Detriment)
$119,020
M
A
The
estimated
capital
expenditures
deflated
to
1997.
B
Costs
permanently
avoided
by
delaying
compliance
C
Estimate
of
the
monthly
lost
benefit
not
realized
by
delaying
compliance
0
Depreciation
that
would
have
been
taken
on
amount
in
column
A
E
Sum
of
B+C+D
F
Tax
impact
of
item
E
G
El-F
H
Actual
dollars
spent
I
I’
Previous(I+K)+Current(A÷G-H)
J
Risk-free
T-Bill
rate
to
inflate
dollars
to
the
date
of
compliance
K
Amount
earned
on
the
cumulative
deferred
spending
L
Sum
of
columns
B÷C,
represents
the
total
avoided
Cost
or
(benefit)
from
the
delay
M
Total
economic
benefit
(delayed
+
avoided)
1997
1998
1999
2001
2000
2002
1
2
3
4
5
6
Privileged
and
Confidential-
Prepared
at
the
Request
of
Counsel
Page
2
of
4
Packaging
Personified,
Inc.
Economic
Benefit
Calculation
Exhibit
2
Scenario
Scenario:
Description
Decommission
3
I
Relocate
Press
Total
Avoided
Operation
Costsl(Benefits)
$14,129
L
KEY
Total
Economic
Benefit
/
(Detriment)
$16,853
M
The
estimated
capital
expenditures
deflated
to
1997.
Costs
permanently
avoided
by
delaying
compliance
Estimate
of
the
monthly
lost
benefit
not
realized
by
delaying
compliance
Depreciation
that
would
have
been
taken
on
amount
in
column
A
Sum
of
B+C÷D
Tax
impact
of
item
E
H
Actual
dollars
spent
I
1=
Previous
(I÷K)+Current(A+G-H)
J
Risk-free
T-Bill
rate
to
inflate
dollars
to
the
date
of
compliance
K
.
Amount
earned
on
the
cumulative
deferred
spending
L
Sum
of
columns
BC,
represents
the
total
avoided
cost
or
(benefit)
from
the
delay
M
Total
economic
benefit
(delayed
+
avoided)
21
0
0
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
14,129
0
0
0
3
4
65
00
14,129
0
00
0
0
0
0000
14,129
(5,228)
8,901
00
00
0
0
0
0000
0
0
0
0
0
14,129
0000
(5,228)
00
0
0
8,901
0
8,901
0
9,402
0
9,877
0
10,379
0
11,013
0
11,397
0
5.05%
5.63%
5.08%
6.11%
3.49%
2.00%
$475
$501
$634
$502
$384
$228
$2,724
BA
F
EDC
G
E÷F
Privileged
and
Confidential-
Prepared
at
the
Request
of
Counsel
Page
3
of
4
Packaging
Personified,
Inc
Exhibit
2
Economic
Benefit
Calculation
Inflation
Calculations
PCI
Inflation
I
0.60%
I
(Avg
1996-2002)
Annual
One-Time
Expenditure
2007
$
30,000
2006
$
29,821
2005
$
29,643
2004
$
29,466
2003
$
29,291
2002
$
29,116
2001
$
28,942
2000
$
28,770
1999
$
28,598
1998
$
28,428
1997
$
28,258
$
74,553
$
16,264
$
$
74,108
$
16,167
$
$
73,666
$
16,071
$
$
73,227
$
15,975
$
$
72,790
$
15,880
$
$
72,356
$
15,785
$
$
71,924
$
15,691
$
$
71,495
$
15,597
$
$
71,069
$
15,504
$
$
70,645
$
15,412
$
14,911
14,822
14,733
14,645
1996
381.7
__________
Average
0.60%
One-Time
Recurring
One-Time
Expenditure
Cost
Expenditure
$
75,000
$
16,362
$
15,000
14,558
2002
395.6
0.33%
14,471
2001
394.3
0.05%
14,385
2000
394.1
0.90%
14,299
1999
390.6
0.28%
14,214
1998
389.5
0.78%
14,129
1997
386.5
1.26%
Privileged
and
Confidential-
Prepared
at
the
Request
of
Counsel
Page
4
of
4
Page
1
A
Caution
As
of:
Sep
05,
2008
LEXSEE
72
F.
SUPP.
2D
810
UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
WCI
STEEL,
INC.,
Defendant.
CASE
NO.
4:98-CV-1082
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
FOR
THE
NORTHERN
DISTRICT
OF
OHIO,
EASTERN
DIVISION
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
October
22,
1999,
Decided
October
22,
1999,
Filed
DISPOSITION:
[**1J
United
States
request
for
in
junctive
relief
denied.
CASE
SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL
POSTURE:
Plaintiff
United
States
filed
a
motion
for
injunctive
relief
against
defendant
steel
company,
alleging
that
defendant
was
subject
to
the
Re
source
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act,
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
et
seq.,
because
it
treated,
stored,
and
disposed
of
hazardous
waste
at
its
steelmaking
facility
without
a
permit
or
interim
status.
OVERVIEW:
Plaintiff
United
States
filed
a
motion
for
injunctive
relief
against
defendant
steel
company,
alleg
ing
that
defendant
was
subject
to
Resource
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act
(RCRA),
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
et
seq.,
because
it
treated,
stored,
and
disposed
of
hazardous
waste
at
its
steelmaking
facility
without
a
permit
or
in
terim
status.
It
was
undisputed
that
defendant
had
neither
a
permit
nor
interim
status,
plus
the
court
found
that
the
wastewater
treated,
stored,
and
disposed
of
by
defendant
exhibited
the
hazardous
waste
characteristic
of
corrosiv
ity;
thereby,
subjecting
defendant
to
RCRA.
In
imposing
a
$
1
million
civil
penalty
upon
defendant,
the
court
con
sidered
the
fact
that
defendant
had
made
efforts
to
reduce
pollution,
no
harm
to
human
health
or
the
environment
had
resulted,
and
plaintiff
had
unduly
delayed
the
litiga
tion.
Moreover,
because
plaintiff
failed
to
show
any
im
.minent
threat
to
public
health
or
the
environment,
its
motion
for
injunctive
relief
was
denied.
OUTCOME:
The
court
denied
plaintiff
United
States’
motion
for
injunctive
relief,
because
plaintiff
failed
to
show
any
imminent
threat
to
public
health
or
the
envi
ronment
resulting
from
defendant
steel
company’s
non
compliance
with
the
Resource
Conservation
and
Recov
ery
Act;
however,
it
did
impose
upon
defendant
a
civil
penalty
of$
I
million.
CORE
TERMS:
pond,
hazardous
waste,
wastewater,
sampling,
hazardous,
steel,
s.u,
influent,
waste
manage
ment,
probe,
treatment
plant,
measurement,
impound
ment,
corrosivity,
surface,
corrosive,
sludge,
economic
benefit,
closure,
acid,
grab,
meter,
solid
wastes,
inspec
tion,
box,
pickle,
liquor,clean,
injunctive,
disposed
LexisNexis(R)
Headnotes
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Permits
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances>
Treatment,
Storage
&
Disposal
[HN1J
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6925(a)
prohibits
the
operation
of
any
facility
that
treats,
stores,
or
disp.oses
of
hazardous
wastes,
except
in
accordance
with
a
permit.
Moreover,
a
party
receiving
a
permit
to
store
or
dispose
of
hazardous
waste
must
thereafter
comply
with
the
requirements-
of
the
permits.
Page
2
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Enforcement>
Civil
Penalties
Environmental
Law
>
Solid
Wastes
>
Resource
Recov
ery
&
Recycling
[HN2j
If
certain
requirements
are
met,
the
Resource
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act,
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
et
seq.,
allows
states
to
operate
hazardous
waste
regulatory
programs
in
lieu
of
the
federal
program.
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6926(b).
Even
where
a
state
is
given
authority
to
operate
such
a
regulatory
program,
the
United
States
retains
the
right
to
enforce
the
state-authorized
programs.
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6928(a)(2).
Civil
Procedure
>
Remedies
>
Injunctions
>
Permanent
Injunctions
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Enforcement
>
Injunctive
Relief
Environmental
Law
>
Solid
Wastes
>
Resource
Recov
ery
&
Recycling
[HN3}
Under
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6928(a),
the
United
States
may
file
a
civil
action
in
federal
district
court
to
obtain
appropriate
relief,
including
a
temporary
or
permanent
injunction
upon
obtaining
information
that
any
person
has
violated
or
is
violating
any
requirement
of
the
Re
source
Conservation
and
RecOvery
Act,
42
U.S.C.S,
§
6901
et
seq.
If
a
violation
is
shown,
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6928(g)
provides
for
a
civil
penalty
in
an
amount
not
to
exceed
$
27,500
per
day
of
noncompliance
for
each
vio
lation.
Civil
Procedure
>
Pretrial
Matters>
General
Overview
Environmental
Law
>
Solid
Wastes
>
Resource
Recov
ery
&
Recycling
Governments
>
Legislation
>
Statutes
of
Limitations>
Pleading
&
Proof
[1TN4J
The
United
States
has
the
burden
to
establish
each
of
the
elements
of
liability
under
the
Resource
Conserva
tion
and
Recovery
Act,
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
et
seq.
In
showing
liability,
the
applicable
statute
of
limitations,
28
U.S.C.S.
§
2462,
stops
any
claim
for
penalty
for
a
viola
tion
before
May
11,
1993.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
General
Overview
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances>
Treatment,
Storage
&
Disposal
Environmental
Law
>
Solid
Wastes
>
Resource
Recov
ery
&
Recycling
[ENS]
To
establish
a
violation
of
the
Resource
Conser
vation
and
Recovery
Act
(RCRA),
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
et
seq.,
the
United
States
must
prove
fourgeneral
elements:
(1)
that
the
defendant
is
a
“person”
within
the
meaning
of
the
RCRA;
(2)
that
the
defendant
has
a
“facility’
within
the
meaning
of
the
RCRA;
(3)
that
the
defendant
did
not
have
a
permit
or
interim
status
for
the
treatment,
storage,
or
disposal
of
hazardous
waste;
and
(4)
that
the
defen
dant
treated,
stored,
or
disposed
of
hazardous
waste.
Enviromnental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Identification
&
Listing
of
Hazardous
Wastes
Environmental
Law
>
Solid
Wastes
>
Resource
Recov
ery
&
Recycling
[HN6]
The
Resource
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act
(RCRA),
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
et
seq.,
controls
the
release
of
a
“hazardous
waste.”
If
a
substance
exhibits
certain
characteristics,
industrial
wastewaters
are
subject
to
regulation
under
the
RCRA.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Identification
&
Listing
of
Hazardous
Wastes
[RN7]
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6921
provides
two
ways
in
which
a
waste
will
be
considered
“hazardous.”
First,
a
waste
will
be
classified
as
“hazardous”
where
the
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(EPA)
has
specifically
listed
the
waste
as
hazardous.
By
regulation,
the
EPA
has
listed
a
number
of
wastes
as
hazardous.
40
C.F.R.
§
261.31-
261.33
(1989).
The
EPA
will
also
classify
a
waste
as
“hazardous”
if
it
has
one
or
more
of
the
characteristics
of
ignitability,
corrosivity,
reactivity,
or
toxicity.
40
C.F.R.
§
26l.21-.26l.24.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Identification
&
Listing
of
Hazardous
Wastes
[HN8]
Corrosiveness
is
the
property
that
enables
a
sub
stance
to
dissolve
material
with
which
it
comes
in
con
tact.
Improperly
managed
corrosive
wastes
can
pose
a
substantial
present
or
potential
danger
to
human
health
and
the
environment.
Under
40
C.F.R.
§
261.22
and
Ohio
Admin.
Code
§
3745-51-22,
a
waste
is
corrosive
if
it
is
aqueous
and
has
a
pH
of
two
standard
units
or
less,
or
greater
than
or
equal
to
12.5
standard
units.
Where
a
surface
impoundment
contains
aqueous
water
with
a
pH
of
two
standard
units
or
less,
on
at
least
one
occasion,
the
water
in
the
surface
impoundment
is
hazardous
waste.
Page
3
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Identification
&
Listing
of
Hazardous
Wastes
[HN9]
See
40
C.F.R.
§
261.22(a)(1).
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Identification
&
Listing
of
Hazardous
Wastes
Environmental
Law
>
Solid
Wastes
>
Resource
Recov
ery
&
Recycling
[RN
10]
Under
the
regulations,
the
United
States
must
show
that
a
defendant
violated
the
Resource
Conserva
tion
and
Recovery
Act
(RCRA),
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
et
seq.,
via
a
“representative
sample”
of
the
water.
RCRA
regulations
define
“representative
sample”
as
a
sample
of
a
universe
or
whole
(e.g.,
waste
pile,
lagoon,
groundwa
ter)
which
can
be
expected
to
exhibit
the
average
proper
ties
of
the
universe
or
whole.
40
C.F.R.
§
260.10.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Enforcement>
Criminal
Prosecutions
[RN1
1]
While
an
Environmental
Protection
Agency-
approved
test
of
a
material
will
be
persuasive
evidence
as
to
whether
the
material
is
hazardous
waste,
the
United
States
is
not
required
to
prove
this
element
through
test
data.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances>
CERCLA
&
Superfund>
General
Overview
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
C’onservation
&
Recoveiy
Act
>
General
Overview
[RN
12]
Failure
to
adhere
to
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(EPA)-approved
test
methods
does
not
stop
a
finding
of
hazardous
substances.
Furthermore,
failure
to
rigidly
adhere
to
EPA-approved
test
methods
does
not
render
the
sampling
evidence
inadmissible.
Any
devia
tion
from
EPA
guidelines
goes
to
the
weight
of
the
evi
dence
and
not
its
admissibility.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Identification
&
Listing
of
Hazardous
Wastes
Environmental
Law
>
Solid
Wastes
>
Resource
Recov
ery
&
Recycling
[HN13]
To
show
that
wastewater
contains
hazardous
substances
and
is,
as
a
result,
subject
to
the
cradle-to-
grave
restrictions
of
the
Resource
Conservation
and
Re
covery
Act,
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
et
seq.,
the
United
States
must
show,
via
representative
samples,
only
that
the
sur
face
impoundment
contained
aqueous
water
with
a
pH
of
two
standard
units
or
less,
on
at
least
one
occasion.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
General
Overview
[H1
14]
In
order
to
be
valid,
sampling
must
show
that
it
is
random,
that
is,
that
every
unit
of
the
population
(e.g.,
every
location
in
a
lagoon
used
to
store
a
solid
waste)
has
a
theoretically
equal
chance
of
being
sampled
and
meas
ured,
thus
ensuring
that
the
sample
is
representative
of
the
population.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Identification
&
Listing
of
Hazardous
Wastes
Environmental
Law
>
Solid
Wastes
>
Resource
Recov
ery
&
Recycling
[HN1S]
Lime-neutralized
spent
pickle
liquor
is
exempt
from
the
Resource
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act’s,
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
et
seq.,
hazardous
waste
regulations
under
the
iron
and
steel
industry
exemption
in
40
C.F.R.
§
261
.3(c)(2)(ii)(A).
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
General
Overview
[HN16]
See
40
C.F.R.
§
260.10.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Identification
&
Listing
of
Hazardous
Wastes
Environmental
Law
>
Solid
Wastes
>
Resource
Recov
ery
&
Recycling
[HNI7J
Under
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6925(a),
(e)
and
Ohio
Rev.
Code
§
3734.02(F),
3734.04,
the
owner
and
operator
of
a
hazardous
waste
management
unit
is
prohibited
from
operating
a
hazardous
waste
management
unit
except
in
accordance
with
a
permit
issued
pursuant
to
the
Resource
Conservation
Recovery
Act,
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
et
seq.,
unless
the
facility
has
interim
status.
Enviro,imental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
•
Enforcement>
Civil
Penalties
[HN18]
Under
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6928(a)
and
40
C.F.R.
§
270.1(b),
a
party
may
not
store
hazardous
waste
in
a
sur
face
impoundment
without
a
permit
or
interim
status.
Page
4
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
General
Overview
[HN19J
Under
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6925(j),
surface
impound
ments
existing
on
November
8;
1984,
were
required
to
meet
minimum
technological
requirements
unless
granted
an
exemption
by
the
Environmental
Protection
Agency
or
the
state.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
General
Overview
[HN2O]
Under
40
C.F.R.
§
264.112
andOhio
Admin
Code
§
3745-55-12,
the
owner
or
operator
of
a
hazardous
waste
management
unit
is
required
to
have
a
written
clo
sure
plan.
The
closure
plan
must
identify
the
steps
needed
to
perform
a
partial
or
final
closure
of
the
facility.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>.
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
General
Overview
Environmental
Law>
Water
Quality
>
Safe
Drinking
Water
Act
>
National
Drinking
Water
Regulations
[HN2I]
Under
40
C.F.
R.
§
264.140
-264.151
and
Ohio
Admin.
Code
§
3745-55-40
to
3745-55-51,
the
owner
or
operator
of
a
hazardous
waste
management
facility
is
required
to
have
a
detailed
written
estimate
in
current
dollars
of
the
cost
of
closing
hazardous
waste
manage
ment
units.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
‘onservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
General
Overview
Real
Property
Law>
Water
Rights>
Groundwater
[HN221
The
owner
or
operator
of
a
surface
impound
ment
is
required
to
install,
operate,
and
maintain
a
groundwater
monitoring
system
which
satisfies
the
crite
ria
contained
at
40
C.F.R.
Pt.
264,
subpt.
F,
and
Ohio
Admin.
Code
§
3745-54-90
to
3745-54-99,
3745-55-01
to
3745-55-02.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Enforcement>
Civil
Penalties
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Enforcement
>
Injunctive
Relief
Environmental
Law
>
Solid
Wastes
>
Resource
Recov
ery
&
Recycling
[HN23]
Under
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6928(a),
(g),
a
United
States
district
court
has
the
power
to
enjoin
a
defendant
and
to
impose
civil
penalties
for
each
violation
of
the
Resource
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act,
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
et
seq.,
and
the
hazardous
waste
management
pro
gram
forthe
state.
The
district
court
can
impose
penalties
of
up
to
$
25,000
per
day
for
each
day
of
violation
prior
to
January
30,
1997
and
$
27,500
for
each
day
of
viola
tion
thereafter.
In
determining
the
appropriate
civil
pen
alties,
the
district
court
considers
the
seriousness
of
the
violation,
what
efforts
were
made
to
comply
with
regula
tions,
the
harm
caused
by
the
violation,
the
economic
benefit
derived
from
noncompliance,
the
defendant’s
ability
to
pay,
the
United
States’
conduct,
and
the
clarity
of
the
obligation
involved.
In
determining
the
penalty,
the
district
court
exercises
its
discretion.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Enforcement>
Civil
Penalties
Environmental
Law
>
Solid
Wastes
>
Resource
Recov
ery
&
Recycling
[HN24]
Where
a
proven
violation
of
the
Resource
Con
servation
and
Recovery
Act,
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
et
seq.,
does
not
result
in
the
creation
of
a
situation
with
the
po
tential
to
seriously
harm
the
environment,
civil
penalties
have
been
substantially
reduced.
Environmental
Law
>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
General
Overview
Environmental
Law
>
Solid
Wastes
>
Resource
Recov
ery
&
Recycling
Governments
>
Legislation
>
Statutes
of
Limitations
>
Time
Limitations
[HN25j
The
Resource
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act,
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
et
seq.,
encompasses
both
current
and
continuing
violations,
even
if
the
latter
originated
in
activities
occurring
before
the
applicable
date
of
the
stat
ute.
However,
the
assessment
of
a
civil
fine
for
a
viola
tion
occurring
prior
to
May
11,
1993,
is
limited
by
the
federal
statute
of
limitations
found
in
28
U.S.C.S.
§
2462.
Environmental
Law
>
Litigation
&
Administrative
Pro
ceedings>
General
Overview
Governments
>
Legislation
>
Statutes
of
Limitations>
Time
Limitations
[HN26]
See
28
U.S.C.S.
§
2462.
Environmental
Law
>
Litigation
&
Administrative
Pro
ceedings>
General
Overview
Page
5
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
[RN27]
Courts
shall
respond
to
the
Environmental
Pro
tection
Agency’s
undue
agency
delay
by
reducing
penal
ties
in
an
enforcement
action
in
order
to
counteract
any
incentive
the
agency
might
have
to
place
itself
in
a
supe
rior
litigating
position.
Civil
Procedure
>
Equity
>
Adequate
Remedy
at
Law
Civil
Procedure
>
Remedies
>
Injunctions
>
Elements
>
Irreparable
Harm
Environmental
Law
>
Litigation
&
Administrative
Pro
ceedings>
General
Overview
[HN28]
Normally,
to
obtain
injunctive
relief,
a
party
must
prove
that
there
is
no
adequate
remedy
at
law,
that
the
plaintiff
may
suffer
an
irreparable
injury
if
an
injunc
tion
is
not
granted,
and
that
the
balance
of
the
equities
justifies
an
injunction.
However,
when
the
United
States
brings
the
action
and
shows
that
an
activity
endangers
public
health,
injunctive
relief
is
proper
without
under
taking
a
balancing
of
the
equities.
In
cases
of
public
health
legislation,
the
emphasis
shifts
from
consideration
of
irreparable
injury
to
concern
for
the
general
public
interest.
Environmental
Law>
Hazardous
Wastes
&
Toxic
Sub
stances
>
Resource
Conservation
&
Recovery
Act
>
Enforcement
>
Injunctive
Relief
Environmental
Law
>
Litigation
&
Administrative
Pro
ceedings>
General
Overview
Environmental
Law
>
Solid
Wastes
>
Resource
Recov
ery
&
Recycling
[HN29]
In
deciding
whether
the
strong
remedy
of
injunc
tive
relief
shall
be
given,
a
United
States
district
court
is
most
concerned
with
whether
this
relief
is
necessary
to
stop
the
danger
that
might
result
from
violations
of
the
Resource
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act,
42
U.S.C.S.
§
6901
etseq.
COUNSEL:
For
UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA,
plaintiff:
Arthur
I.
Harris,
Esq.,
Office
Of
The
U.S.
At
torney,
Cleveland,
OH.
For
UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA,
plaintiff:
Francis
J.
Biros,
Esq.,
Department
Of
Justice,
Washington,
DC.
For
UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA,
plaintiff:
Lois
J.
Schiffer,
Esq.,
Department
Of
Justice,
Washington,
DC.
For
UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA,
plaintiff:
Frank
Bentkover,
Esq.,
Drenaye
Houston,
Esq.,
Matthew
A.
Fogelson,
Esq.,
Department
Of
Justice,
Washington,
DC.
For
WCI
STEEL,
INC.,
defendant:
Van
Carson,
Esq.,
Lisa
R.
Duffett,
Esq.,
Ellen
Seibenschuh,
Esq.,
Lisa
D.
Sutton,
Esq.,
Squire,
Sanders
&
Dempsey,
Cleveland,
OH.
For
WCI
STEEL,
INC.,
defendant:
Vincent
Atriano,
Esq.,
Squire,
Sanders
&
Dempsey,
Columbus,
OH.
JUDGES:
Hon.
James
S.
Gwin,
U.S.
District
Court
Judge.
OPINION
BY:
James
S.
Gwin
OPINION
[*812]
FINDINGS
CONCLUSIONS
OF
LAW
OF
FACT
AND
In
this
action,
the
Plaintiff
United
States
alleges
that
three
wastewater
ponds
at
[*8
13]
Defendant
WCI
Steel’s
Warren,
Ohio
steelmaking
facility
(Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A)
are
hazardous
waste
units,
and
as
such
are
sub
ject
to
regulation
under
the
Resource
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act
(“RCRA”),
[*
*2]
42
U.S.C.
§
6901
et
seq.
As
grounds
for
this
allegation,
the
United
States
claims
that
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
once
contained
wastewa
ter
having
a
pH
‘of
2.0
standard
units
(“s.u.”)
or
lower,
and
thus
had
a
cOrrosive
characteristic.
2
1
The
measure
of
pH
provides
an
estimate
of
the
acidic
agent
(hydrogen
ion)
and
the
basic
agent
(hydroxide
ion).
2
The
United
States’
complaint
alleges,
inpart:
24.
One
or
more
of
the
surface
impound
ments
at
the
facility,
including
Ponds
5,
6
and
6A,
have
contained
wastewaters
which
exhibited
a
pH
of
2
or
less
during
the
time
period
relevant
to
this
Complaint.
25.
Wastewaters
flowing
into,
contained
in,
or
flowing
out
of
Ponds
5,
6
and
6A
have
exhib
ited
the
characteristic
of
corrosivity
and
are
a
hazardous
waste
within
the
meaning
of
40
C.F.R.
§
261.20
and
261.22.
26.
Ponds
5,
6
and
6A
at
the
facility
are
haz
ardous
waste
management
units
as
defined
by
40
C.F.R.
§
260.10,
and
O.A.C.
§
3747-50-
10(A)(49)
and
are
subject
to
regulation
as
haz
ardous
waste
management
units
subject
to
the
provisions
of
RCRA
and
the
O.A.C.
Complaint,
PP
24-26.
[**3]
Plaintiff
United
States
filed
this
action
on
May
11,
1998.
To
establish
WCI’s
use
of
corrosive
sub
stances,
the
United
States
principally
relies
upon
sam
pling
it
did
in
May
and
June
1993
and
upon
data
supplied
by
WCI
in
early
1994.
Page
6
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
The
parties
having
waived
a
jury,
this
matter
went
to
trialbefore
this
Court.
After
observing
the
demeanor
of
the
witnesses
and
considering
the
parties’
evidence
and
arguments,
the
Court
makes
the
following
findings
of
fact
and
conclusions
of
law.
I.
FINDiNGS
OF
FACT
A.
History
of
WCI
Steel
The
Defendant
WCI
Steel,
Inc.
(“WCI”)
is
an
Ohio
corporation
with
its
principal
place
of
business
at
1040
Pine
Avenue,
Warren,
Ohio.
At
this
facility,
Defendant
WCI
operates
the
last
remaining
integrated
steel
mill
in
the
Mahoning
River
Valley.
3
All
of
the
United
States’
claims
relate
to
WCI’s
Warren
facility.
WCI
Warren
facility
manufactures
hot
rolled
strip
steel,
pickled
and
oiled
hot
rolled
steel
strip,
cold
rolled
steel,
and
coated
flat
steel
products.
Employing
approxi
mately
2,200
[**4j
employees,
WCI
is
the
largest
steel
employer
in
the
Mahoning
Valley.
Steel
production
began
at
the
Warren
facility
in
1912.
Beginning
in
the
1930s,
Republic
Steel
Corpora
tion
owned
the
facility.
In
1984,
Republic
Steel
Corpora
tion
merged
with
J&L
Steel
Corporation
to
form
LTV
Steel
Company.
In
1988,
LTV
Steel
Company
.went
into
bankruptcy.
With
little
potential
to
operate
profitably,
the
bankruptcy
trustee
decided
to
sell
the
Warren
facility
to
Defendant
WCI
for
an
insignificant
price
compared
with
the
facility’s
physical
assets.
4
On
August
31,
1988,
Warren
Consolidated
In
dustries,
Inc.,
acquired
the
facility
from
LTV
Steel
Company.
In
December
1991,
Warren
Con
solidated
Industries,
Inc.
changed
its
corporate
name
to
WCI
Steel,
Inc.
In
August
1988,
Defendant
WCI
purchased
the
War
ren
facility
during
a
time
of
major
decline
in
United
States
integrated
steelmaking
production.
By
saving
the
facility
from
shutdown,
WCI
greatly
benefitted
its
work
ers
and
the
Warren,
Ohio,
community.
5
Product
had
declined
by
nearly
50%
in
a
dec
ade.
The
year
WCI
purchased
the
Warren
facility
marked
the
seventh
consecutive
year
of
loss
for
the
steel
industry.
[**5]
After
purchasing
the
Warren
facility,
Defen
dant
WCI
made
major
investments
in
production
equip
ment
and
facilities.
WCI
spent
more
than
$
300
million
on
capital
improvements.
These
capital
expenditures
also
reduced
the
amounts
of
pollution.
[*8141
B.
Wastewater
System
At
its
Warren
Ohio,
facility,
WCI
has
a
system
for
the
collection
and
treatment
of
wastewater
generated
in
its
steel
production.
The
WCI
steel
facility
first
collects
wastewater
from
manufacturing
areas.
This
wastewater
is
then
distributed
to
Pond
5
through
a
system
of
under
ground
sewers,
pumps,
and
pipes.
After
settling
and
oil
separation
processes
take
place
in
Pond
5,
WCI
conveys
the
wastewater
to
Pond
6.
From
Pond
6,
WCI
pumps
the
wastewater
across
the
Mahoning
River
to
a
central
treatment
plant.
In
1986,
LTV
installed
Pond
6A
to
intercept
and
col
lect
seepage
from
Pond
6
before
it
reached
the
Mahoning
River.
The
seepage
collected
in
Pond
6A
is
pumped
back
into
Pond
6.
WCI
primarily
intends
the
pond
system
to
equalize
flow
to
the
central
treatment
plant,
to
give
storm
water
surge
protection,
and
to
allow
the
skimming
of
a
substan
tial
portion
of
oil
from
the
wastewater.
Taken
together,
the
areal
extent
of
the
Ponds
is
[**61
slightly
more
than
one
acre.
This
wastewatertreatment
system
was
constructed
before
WCI
purchased
the
Warren
facility
in
1988.
Ponds
5
and
6
have
been
in
use
at
the
Defendant’s
facility
since
before
1950.
Pond
6A
was
added
in
1986.
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
have
been
in
continuous
use
to
the
current
date.
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
are
each
unlined
earthen
surface
impoundments.
6
At
relevant
times,these
surface
im
poundments
were
not
equipped
with
impermeable
liners.
6
40
C.F.R.
§
260.10,
defmes
a
“surface
im
poundment”
as:
a
facility
or
part
of
a
facility
which
is
a
natural
topographic
de
pression,
man-made
excavation,
or
diked
area
formed
primarily
of
earthen
materials
(although
it
may
be
lined
with
man-made
materi
als),
which
is
designed
to
hold
an
accumulation
of
liquid
wastes
of
wastes
containing
free
liquids,
and
which
is
not
an
injection
well.
Ex
amples
of
surface
impoundments
are
holding,
storage,
settling,
and
aeration
pits,
ponds
and
lagoons.
Spent
pickle
liquor
is
listed
by
U.S.
EPA
as
a
corro
sive
[**7]
and
toxic
hazardous
waste
under
RCR.A
regu
lations
at
40
C.F.R.
§
261.32.
However,
if
the
acid
was
Page
7
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
neutralized
by
the
addition
of
lime,
then
the
pickle
liquor
would
be
exempt
from
RCRAs
hazardous
waste
regula
tions
under
the
iron
and
steel
industry
exemption
in
40
C.F.R.
§
26l.3(c)(2)(ii)(A).
7
40
CFR
§
261.3(c)(2)(ii)
provides,
in
part:
(ii)
The
following
solid
wastes
are
not
haz
ardous
even
though
they
are
generated
from
the
treatment,
storage,
or
disposal
of
a
hazardous
waste,
unless
they
exhibit
one
or
more
of
the
characteristics
of
hazardous
waste:
(A)
Waste
pickle
liquor
sludge
generated
by
lime
stabilization
of
spent
pickle
liquor
from
the
iron
and
steel
industry
(SIC
Codes
331
and
332).
By
its
nature,
the
steel
industry
often
uses-corrosive
materials.
WCI
uses
spent
hydrochloric
pickling
acids,
acidic
rinse
waters,
and
acidic
fume
scrubber
wastewa
ters.
Occasionally,
WCI
would
inadvertently
release
quantities
of
these
substances.
When
such
spills
oc
curred,
they
more
often
occurred
near
the
[**8]
picklers
than
anywhere
else.
The
picklers
provided
secondary
containment
for
the
acid
tubs,
designed
to
retain
acid
leaks
or
spills.
WCI
experienced
leaks
from
the
acidtubs
on
an
infrequent
basis.
When
such
leaks
occurred,
WCI
sought
to
isolate
and
neutralize
the
spilled
acid,
or
“pickle
liquor.”
Before
1993,
WCI
used
a
procedure
of
manually
adding
lime
to
the
wastewaters
whçn
the
wastewater
pH
fell
to
between
3
and
4
s.u.
as
measured
by
the
influent
probe
at
the
central•
treatment
plant.
Under
this
proce
dure,
employees
would
add
a
certain
number
of
50-
pound
bags
of
lime
to
the
wastewater.
As
to
this
deci
sion,
Environmental
Engineer
Richard
Gradishar
usually
decided
how
many
bags
to
add
based
upon
the
pH
of
the
wastewater.
However,
WCI
did
not
conduct
any
testing
to
learn
whether
the
lime
succeeded
in
neutralizing
the
acid.
[*8
15]
In
the
early
1990s,
WCI
considered
replac
ing
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
with
a
second-hand
four
million
gallon
above-ground
tank.
WCI
obtained
a
permit
from
the
EPA
to
install
the
tank.
After
obtaining
this
permit,
WCI
discovered
that
the
tank
was
no
longer
in
usable
condition.
Defendant
WCI
therefore
did
not
complete
the
project.
C.
History
of
Environmental
Review
[**9]
With
this
action,
the
Plaintiff
United
States
alleges
that
WCI
was
subject
to
RCRA
because
it
dealt
with
hazardous
substances
without
a
permit.
Defendant
WCI
does
not
have
a
permit
issued
pursuant
to
42
U.S.C.
§
6925
and
6926
to
manage,
treat,
or
store
hazardous
wastes
in
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A.
Nor
does
WCI
qualify
for
interim
status
under
§
6925,
which
would
temporarily
exempt
WCI
from
the
permit
requirement.
8
In
order
to
qualify
for
such
interim
status,
a
facility
had
to
demonstrate
that:
1)
it
wasin
exis
tence
on
November
19,
1980;
2)
it
had
complied
with
Section
3010(a)
of
RCRA
concerning
notifi
cation
of
hazardous
waste
activity;
and
3)
it
had
made
an
application
for
a
permit,
Section
3005(e)
of
RCRA,
42
U.S.C.
§
6925(e).
Here,
WCI
nei
ther
provided
notice
of
its
hazardous
waste
activ
ity
nor
made
an
application
for
a
permit.
Shortly
after
purchasing
the
WCI
facility
in
1988,
Defendant
WCI
applied
for
a
National
Pollutant
Dis
charge
Elimination
System
Permit.
[**10]
After
ap
proving
this
application,
the
Ohio
EPA
allowed
WCI
to
use
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
as
sedimentation
units
under
the
Clean
Water
Act.
However,
the
permit
did
not
authorize
WCI
to
treat,
store,
or
dispose
of
hazardous
wastes
in
Ponds
5,
6,
or
6A.
Defendant
WCI
next
applied
for
and
received
an
EPA
Part
B
permit,
authorizing
the
storage
of
spent
pickle
liquor
processed
through
tanks.
The
EPA
Part
B
permit
required
WCI
to
manage
hazardous
waste
only
according
to
the
permit’s
provisions.
The
Part
B
permit
forbade
any
management
of
hazardous
waste
not
author
ized
by
the
permit
or
otherwise
exempted
by
law.
In
par
ticular,
the
Part
B
permit
did
not
authorize
WCI
to
treat,
store
or
dispose
of
spent
pickle
liquor
or
corrosive
char
acteristic
wastes
in
Ponds
5,
6,
or
6A.
As
part
of
its
Part
B
permit,
Defendant
WCI
in
stalled
groundwater
monitoring
wells
near
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
in
April
1998.
The
results
from
these
wells
do
not
indicate
that
the
Ponds
adversely
affect
the
ground
water.
Within
Ohio,
the
Ohio
EPA
administers
the
RCRA
hazardous
waste
management
program
as
the
U.S.
EPA’s
delegee
under
authorization
by
the
U.S.
EPA.
As
the
U.S.
EPA’s
authorized
delegee,
the
Ohio
EPA
had
au
thority
[**l
1]
to
inspect
WCI’s
facility
and
to
decide
whether
WCI
met
the
standards
of
RCRA
and
analogous
Ohio
law.
9
On
June
30,
1989,
the
Ohio
EPA
was
granted
final
authorization
to
administer
and
enforce
the
RCRA
program
as
the
U.S.
EPA’s
authorized
delegee
pursuant
to
Section
3006
of
RCRA.
Since
1981,
the
Ohio
EPA
has
conducted
at
least
twelve
hazardous
waste
compliance
inspections
of
the
facility.
In
conducting
these
inspections,
the
Ohio
EPA
had
access
to
all
WCI
facilities.
At
the
time
of
the
in
spections,
WCI
told
the
Ohio
EPA
that
these
surface
impoundments
were
used
as
solid
waste
management
Page
8
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
units
for
waste
waters
from
the
cold
rolling,
coated
prod
ucts,
and
pickling
operations.
°
After
conducting
these
reviews,
the
Ohio
EPA
has
never
alleged
or
determined
that
the
Ponds
were
hazardous
waste
units
under
RCRA.
10
Testimony
of
Ohio
EPA
employee
Kristen
Switzer
at
27-28.
[**12]
II.
Sampling
A.
Consultant
Sampling
As
indicated,
the
Plaintiff
United
States
alleges
that
WCI
handled
corrosive
wastes
that
were
hazardous.
Be
cause
it
has
scant
sampling
data
of
its
own,
the
United
States
[*816]
relies
upon
studies
undertaken
by
others
at
various
times.
Defendant
WCI
employed
engineers
who
took
sam
ples
on
at
least
two
occasions.
On
June
20,
1989,
Dun
can,
Lagnese
&
Associates
conducted
hourly
sampling
of
the
wastewater
in
the
surface
impoundments.
Of
twenty-four
grab
samples
collected
by
these
engineers,
twenty-one
had
a
pH
value
of
2.0
s.u.
or
below.
These
samples
were
not
taken
as
part
of
a
sampling
plan
of
the
whole
ponds.
11
One
sample
was
gathered
every
hour
for
twenty-four
hours.
In
1990,
WCI’s
contractor,
Remcor,
Inc.,
sampled
the
sludges
in
Ponds
5
and
6
following
a
formal
sam
pling
plan.
After
conducting
this
sampling,
Remcor
found
the
sludges
were
not
corrosive
or
hazardous.
In
October
1993,
engineers
Killam
Associates
con
ducted
a
study
for
WCI.
While
doing
this
study,
Killam
collected
[**13]
three
grab
samples
from
the
bosh
box
that
channels
wastewater
to
the
surface
impoundments.
The
three
samples
collected
by
Killam
had
pH
values
of
1.3,
1.7
and
2.0
s.u.,
respectively.
After
completing
this
sampling
of
the
bosh
box,
Killam
Associates
gave
the
opinion
that
the
pH
of
the
wastewater
in
the
surface
im
poundments
was
between
1.9
and
2.0
s.u.
These
Killam
Associates
samples
were
not
taken
as
part
of
a
sampling
plan
that
sought
to
find
the
average
properties
of
the
whole
ponds.
B.
1993
U.S.
EPA
Multimedia
Inspection
Beginning
on
May
12,
1993,
the
U.S.
EPA
con
ducted
a
‘multimedia”
inspection
of
WCI’s
facility
under
the
Clean
Water
Act,
the
Clean
Air
Act,
RCRA,
and
the
Toxic
Substances
Control
Act.
During
this
inspection,
the
U.S.
EPA
collected
a
grab
sample
of
wastewater
be
ing
pumped
from
Pond
6A
to
Pond
6.
U.S.
EPA
took
the
sample
from
the
flow
of
the
wastewater
as
it
entered
Pond
6.
The
field
measurements
of
this
sample
revealed
a
pH
of
1.81
s.u.,
below
the
regulatory
limit
of
2.0
s.u.
On
June
15,
1993,
the
U.S.
EPA
inspectors
returned
and
took
another
grab
sample
of
water
from
Pond
6A.
The
sample’s
pH
was
above
2.0
s.u.
During
this
June
1993
inspection,
the
U.S.
EPA
also
[**14]
collected
a
sample
of
wastewater
from
a
process
that
uses
acid
pickle
liquor
to
treat
steel.
The
U.S.
EPA
field
measurements
of
this
sample
showed
a
pH
of
1.65
s.u.
The
U.S.
EPA
also
collected
a
grab
sample
from
wastewater
flowing
from
Pond
6
at
the
point
where
it
comrningles
with
wastewater
from
the
Basic
Oxygen
Furnace.
The
field
measurements
of
the
sample
showed
a
pH
of
1.67
s.u.
C.
Central
Treatment
Plant
Aeration
Influent
Probe
WCI’s
wastewaters
are
pumped
from
Pond
6
to
an
inlet
box
outside
the
central
treatment
plant.
In
support
of
its
claim
that
WCI’s
wastewater
was
corrosive,
the
United
States
principally
relies
upon
WCI’s
own
pH
readings
taken
at
the
influent
probe
outside
the
central
treatment
plant.
While
EPA
regulations
did
not
require
WCI
to
monitor
the
pH
at
the
central
treatment
plant,
it
nonethe
less
did
so.
To
treat
its
wastewater,
WCI
has
measured
the
pH
of
the
wastewater
as
itflows
through
the
central
treatment
plant.
At
this
point,
the
influent
box
receives
wastewater
from
Pond
6
and
other
process
sources.
To
make
these
measurements,
WCI
uses
several
pH
probes
that
continuously
monitor
the
pH
of
the
wastewa
ter
as
it
flows
through
the
central
treatment
plant.
[**15]
WCI
put
one
inflow
pH
probe
at
the
aeration
influent
box.
The
pH
meter
at
the
aeration
influent
box
measures
the
pH
of
the
wastewater
as
it
flows
from
Pond
6
into
the
central
treatment
plant.
WCI
submerges
this
probe
in
the
flow
of
the
wastewater
as
it
enters
the
aeration
influent
box.
2
12
The
pH
meter
used
by
WCI
to
measure
the
pH
of
Pond
6
influent
wastewater
is
a
glass
membrane
electrode
selective
for
hydrogen
ion
in
combination
with
a
pH
meter.
The
pH
meter
used
by
WCI
to
measure
Pond
6
influent
pH
is
equipped
with
a
microprocessor
that
handles
the
mathematics
of
the
measurement.
The
pH
meter
used
by
WCI
to
measure
the
pH
of
Pond
6
influ
ent
wastewater
displays
the
numerical
pH
value.
[*8
17]
At
least
once
a
week,
WCI
Combustion
De
partment
personnel
calibrate
the
pH
meter
used
to
meas
ure
the
pH
of
Pond
6
influent
wastewater.
Defendant
Page
9
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
WCI
argues
that
the
method
used
to
calibrate
this
probe
resulted
in
inaccurate.
EPA
guidelines
recommend
a
two-standard
calibra
tion
technique
to
calibrate
pH
meters.
To
calibrate
[**
16]
the
probe,
the
Combustion
Department
personnel
use
two
buffer
solutions
with
specified
pH.
Typically,
they
use
buffer
solutions
with
pH
of
2.0
and
4.0.
In
contrast,
pH
calibration
is
better
done
using
a
neutral
buffer
solu
tion
of
7.0
with
a
second
solution
with
pH
of
either
4.0
or
10.0.
It
is
unlikely
that
the
maintenance
crew
could
achieve
completely
accurate
probe
calibrations
using
the
buffer
solutions
with
pH
of
2.0
and
4.0.
Amounts
of
oil
and
grease
were
usually
in
the
wastewater
influent
as
it
enters
the
central
treatment
plant.
The
oil
and
grease
can
quickly
coat
a
pH
probe,
rendering
its
readings
less
accurate.
Oil
and
grease
can
foul
a
probe
if
they
are
present
in
sufficient
concentra
tion.
Because
of
the
presence
of
oil
and
grease
in
the
wastewater
flowing
into
the
central
treatment
plant,
plant
operators
cleaned
the
influent
pH
probe
by
removing
the
submerged
probe
from
the
flow
of
the
wastewater
and
dipping
the
probe
in
acid.
The
operators
cleaned
the
in-
fluent
pH
probe
in
an
acid
solution
once
per
shift,
or
three
times
per
day.
Though
a
brief
exposure
to
an
acid
solution
can
effectively
clean
mineral
deposits
from
a
pH
electrode,
it
is
not
an
effective
cleaning
agent
for
[**17]
oil
and
grease
deposits.
These
problems
make
the
influ
ent
probe
readings
less
accurate.
Defendant
WCI
recorded
the
readings
from
the
pH
meters
at
the
aeration
influent
box
every
two
hours
from
September
1,
1988
to
February
22,
1995,
and
every
hour
from
February
23,
1995
to
July
31,
1998.
Between
September
1,
1988
and
July
31,
1998,
WCI’s
central
treatment
plant
operators
recorded
more
than
11,000
pH
values
of
2.0
s.u.
or
less
for
Pond
6
wastewater
entering
the
central
treatment
plant.
Such
readings
occurred
on
1,361
different
days.
At
least
one
reading
of
1.7
s.u.
or
less
occurred
on
577
different
days.
Also,
the
central
treatment
plant
operators
recorded
at
least
31
pH
measurements
of
12.5
s.u.
or
above
for
Pond
6
wastewater
entering
the
central
treatment
plant.
Taken
as
a
whole,
these
measurements
did
not
significantly
vary
from
1989
to
December
1993.
In
December
1993,
WCI
installed
an
automated
lime
slurry
injection
system
at
the
No.
9
Lift
Station.
For
a
period,
this
lime
injection
system
reduced,
but
did
not
completely
stop
pH
readings
of
2.0
s.u.
or
less.
13
The
system
has
now
eliminated
measurements
with
a
pH
of
2.0
s.u.
or
less
at
the
influent
probe
to
the
central
treat
ment[**18]
plant.
13
After
installation
of
the
lime
injection
system
in
December
1993,
central
treatment
plant
opera
tors
recorded
an
additional
358
measurements
on
77
separate
days
of
2.0
s.u.
or
less
for
the
waste-
water
in
Pond
6
over
the
next
two
years.
D.
Grab
Samples
Beyond
measurements
madewith
the
influent
probe,
the
central
treatment
plant
operators
also
recorded
grab
sample
pH
measurements
for
Pond
6
wastewater
asit
entered
the
aeration
influent
box
at
the
central
treatment
plant.
WCI
made
197
pH
measurements
via
such
grab
samples.
Operators
took
these
samples
by
placing
a
labo
ratory
beaker
in
the
flow
of
the
wastewater
as
it
enters
the
aeration
influent
box.
The
central
treatment
plant
operators
then
measure
the
pH
of
the
grab
samples
with
a
bench
meter
in
the
central
treatment
[*818]
plant
office.
The
taking
of
grab
samples
is
a
method
for
checking
the
accuracy
of
in-line
pH
probes.
These
grab
samples
showed
pH
readings
of
2.0
s.u.
or
less
on
many
occasions.
E.
Sludge
Sampling
Several
samples
of
sludge
from
Pond
[**l9]
6
were
also
tested
for
pH
values.
In
October
1985,
an
LTV
con
tractor
tested
30
samples
of
sludge
from
Ponds
5
and
6
and
found
an
average
pH
of
the
sludges
to
be
6.3,
with
all
measurements
falling
within
the
range
of
5.5
to
7.5.
In
1990,
a
WCI
contractor
sampled
the
sludges
in
Ponds
5
and
6
and
found
they
were
nonhazardous.
And
in
1996
and
1998,
sampling
performed
by
a
WCI
con
sultant
again
found
the
pH
of
the
Ponds’
sludges
ranged
between
5.4
s.u.
and
10.9
s.u.
Thus,
there
is
no
evidence
that
any
sludge
from
Ponds
5
or
6
was
ever
hazardous.
Only
wastewater
measurements
indicate
potential
corrosiveness.
Having
set
forth
relevant
findings
of
fact,
the
Court
now
offers
its
conclusions
of
law.
III.
CONCLUSIONS
OF
LAW
A.
Overview
of
RCRA
The
Resource
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act,
42
U.S.C.
§
6901
et
seq.
(“RCRA”)
was
enacted
in
1976
to
regulate
the
treatment,
storage,
transportation,
and
dis
posal
of
hazardous
wastes.
RCRA
seeks
to
ensure
that
such
wastes
are
“managed
in
a
manner
which
protects
human
health
and
the
environment.’
42
U.S.C.
§
6902(a)(4)
and
(b).
Subtitle
C
of
RCRA
establishes
a
comprehensive
federal
regulatory
program
for
[**20]
the
management
of
hazardous
waste.
42
U.S.C.
§
692
1-
6939.
Page
10
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
[1{Nlj
42
U.S.C.
§
6925(a)
prohibits
the
operation
of
any
facility
that
treats,
stores,
or
disposes
of
hazardous
wastes,
except
in
accordance
with
a
permit.
United
States
v.
Heuer,
4
F.3d
723,
730
(9th
Cir.
1993)
(‘It
is
funda
mental
that
an
entity
which
performs
a
hazardous
waste
activity
for
which
a
permit
is
required
under
RCR.A
may
not
legally
perform
that
activity
unless
it
has
a
permit
for
the
relevant
activity.”).
Moreover,
a
party
receiving
a
permit
to
store
or
dispose
of
hazardous
waste
must
there
after
comply
with
the
requirements
of
the
permits.
[HN2]
If
certain
requirements
are
met,
RCRA
al
lows
states
to
operate
hazardous
waste
regulatory
pro
grams
in
lieu
of
the
federal
program.
42
U.S.C.
§
6926(b).
Even
where
a
state
is
given
authority
to
operate
such
a
regulatory
program,
the
United
States
retains
the
right
to
enforce
the
state
authorized
programs.
42
U.S.C.
§
6928(a)(2).
On
June
30,
1989,
the
U.S.
EPA
granted
final
authorization
to
the
State
of
Ohio
to
administer
and
enforce
the
State’s
hazardous
waste
program
in
[**2
1]
the
State
of
Ohio.
42
U.S.C.
§
6926(b).
The
Ohio
EPA
administers
the
RCRA
program
within
Ohio.
[HN3]
Under
42
U.S.C.
§
6928(a),
the
United
States
may
file
a
civil
action
in
federal
district
court
to
obtain
appropriate
relief,
including
a
temporary
or
permanent
injunction
upon
obtaining
information
that
any
person
has
violated
or
is
violating
any
requirement
of
RCRA.
If
a
violation
is
shown,
42
U.S.C.
§
6928(g)
provides
for
a
civil
penalty
in
an
amount
not
to
exceed
$
27,500
per
day
of
noncompliance
for
each
violation.
14
42
U.S.C.
§
6928(g)
provides
for
a
civil
pen
alty
in
an
amount
not
to
exceed
$
25,000
per
day
of
noncompliance
for
each
violation.
This
amount
has
been
adjusted
pursuant
to
the
U.S.
EPA
Civil
Monetary
Penalty
Inflation
Adjustment
Rule,
to
$
27,500
per
day.
[11N4]
The
Plaintiff
United
States
has
the
burden
to
establish
each
of
the
elements
of
liability
under
RCRA.
In
showing
liability,
the
applicable
statute
[**22]
of
limitations,
28
U.S.C.
§
2462,
stops
any
claim
for
pen
alty
for
a
violation
before
May
11,
1993.
15
Pretrial
Order,
Unéontroverted
Fact
No.
3.
[*8
19]
[HN5I
To
establish
a
violation
of
RCRA,
the
United
States
must
prove
four
general
elements:
(1)
that
WCI
is
a
“person”
within
the
meaning
of
RCRA;
(2)
that
WCI’s
Warren,
Ohio
steel
plant
is
a
“facility”
within
the
meaning
of
RCRA;
(3)
that
WCIdid
not
have
a
per
mit
or
interim
status
for
the
treatment,
storage,
or
dis
posal
of
hazardous
wastein
the
ponds;
and
(4)
that
WCI
treated,
stored,
or
disposed
of
hazardous
waste
in
the
ponds.
United
States
v.
T
&
S
Brass
&
Bronze
Works,
Inc.,
681
F.
Supp.
314,
317
(D.S.C.
1988);
United
States
v.
Conservation
Chemical
Co.,
733
F.
Supp.
1215,
1220
(N.D.
md.
1989).
Defendant
WCI
acknowledges
that
it
is
a
“person”
within
the
meaning
of
42
U.S.C.
§
6903(15)
and
that
WCI’s
integrated
steel
plant,
and
all
buildings,
structures,
and
surface
impoundments
[*
*23]
located
there,
com
prise
a
“facility”
within
the
meaning
of
40
C.F.R.
§
260.10.
WCI
also
concedes
it
did
not
have
a
permit
for
the
treatment,
storage,
or
disposal
of
hazardous
waste.
WCI
disputes
only
that
it
treated,
stored
or
disposed
of
hazardous
waste.
The
Court
now
addresses
the
standards
by
which
hazardous
waste
is
identified.
The
Court
then
determines
whether,
upon
applying
these
standards,
WCI
has
vio
lated
RCRA.
B.
Standards
for
Determining
“Hazardous
Waste”
1.
Regulatory
Classification
and
Corrosivity
[HN6]
RCRA
controls
the
release
of
a
“hazardous
waste.”
If
a
substance
exhibits
certain
characteristics,
industrial
wastewaters
are
subject
to
regulation
under
RCRA.
[HN7]
UnitedStates
v.
Dean,
969
F.2d
187,
194
(6th
Cir.
1992).
42
U.S.C.
§
6921
provides
two
ways
in
which
a
waste
will
be
considered
“hazardous.”
First,
a
wastewill
be
classified
as
“hazardous”
where
the
EPA
has
specifi
cally
listed
the
waste
as
hazardous.
Byregulation,
the
EPA
has
listed
a
number
of
wastes
as
hazardous.
40
C.F.R.
§
261.31-261.33
(1989).
For
example,
spent
pickle
liquor,
which
the
United
States
claims
WCI
dis
charged
into
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A,
is
a
listed
hazardous
[**24]
waste
under
40
C.F.R.
§
261.32.
The
EPA
will
also
classify
a
waste
as
“hazardous”
if
it
has
one
or
more
of
the
characteristics
of
ignitability,
corrosivity,
reactivity,
or
toxicity.
40
C.F.R.
§
261.21-
.24.
Here,
the
United
States
claims
that
WCI
stored
or
disposed
of
corrosive
waste.
[HN8]
Corrosiveness
is
the
property
that
enables
a
substance
to
dissolve
material
with
which
it
comes
in
contact.
Improperly
managed
corrosive
wastes
can
pose
a
substantial
present
or
potential
danger
to
human
health
and
the
environment.
As
explained
in
further
detail
below,
under
40
C.F.R.
§
261.22
and
O.A.C.
§
3745-51-22,
a
waste
is
corrosive
if
it
is
aqueous
and
has
a
pH
of
2.0
s.u.
or
less
or
greater
than
or
equal
to
12.5
s.u.
Where
a
surface
im
poundment
contains
aqueous
water
with
a
pH
of
2.0
s.u.
or
less,
on
at
least
one
occasion,
the
water
in
the
surface
impoundment
is
hazardous
waste.
The
United
States
here
principally
contends
that
substances
in
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
are
corrosive,
as
having
had
pH
of
2.0
s.u.
or
less.
Page
11
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F.
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*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
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**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
As
noted
above,
42
U.S.C.
§
6925(a)
prohibits
the
operation
of
any
facility
that
treats,
stores,
or
disposes
of
hazardous
wastes,
except
in
accordance
with
[**25]
a
permit.
United
States
v.
Heuer,
4
F.3d
723,
730
(9th
Cir.
1993).
Moreover,
a
party
receiving
a
permit
to
store
or
dispose
of
hazardous
waste
must
thereafter
comply
with
the
requirements
of
the
permits.
If
WCI
treated,
stored,
or
disposed
of
waste
at
the
Warren
facility,
it
was
required
under
RCRA
to
have
a
permit
to
do
so.
It
is
undisputed
that
WCI
had
no
permit
to
treat,
store,
or
dispose
of
hazardous
waste.
Therefore,
if
the
Court
finds
WCI
maintained
hazardous
waste
at
its
Warren
facility,
WCI
has
violated
RCRA
and
is
subject
to
fines
under
RCRA.
[*820]
The
parties
offer
differing
views
regarding
how
the
Court
should
determine
whether
hazardous
waste
is
treated,
stored,
or
disposed
of
at
WCI’s
Warren
facility.
Defendant
WCI
says
the
evidence
offered
by
the
United
States
is
insufficient
to
support
a
finding
that
WCI
maintains
hazardous
waste
at
the
facility
because
the
substances
at
the
site
were
improperly
sampled.
The
United
States
contends
that
even
if
the
available
samples
do
not
conform
to
a
specific
methodology
described
in
RCRA’s
regulations,
the
weight
of
evidence
supports
its
contention
that
WCI
treated,
stored,
or
disposed
of
haz
ardouswaste
at
the
Warren
[*
*26]
facility.
The
Court
now
examines
whether
RCRA’s
regula
tions
require
a
particular
sampling
methodology.
2.
Sampling
Methodology
The
United
States
claims
WCI
violated
RCRA’s
prohibitions
against
hazardous
waste
by
maintaining
“corrosive”
waste
at
the
Warren
facility.
The
regulations
currently
define
“corrosivity”
in.the
following
way:
[HN9]
Sec.
261.22
Characteristic
of
corrosivity.
(a)
A
solid
waste
exhibits
the
character
istic
of
corrosivity
if
a
representative
sample
of
the
waste
has
either
of
the
fol
lowing
properties:
(1)
It
is
aqueous
and
has
a
pH
less
than
or
equal
to
2
or
greater
than
or
equal
to
12.5,
as
determined
by
a
pH
meter
us
ing
Method
9040
in
“Test
Methods
for
Evaluating
Solid
Waste,
Physi
cailChemical
Methods,”
EPA
Publication
SW-846,
as
incorporated
by
reference
in
Sec.
260.11
of
this
chapter.
40
C.F.R.
§
26l.22(a)(l)
(emphasis
added).
Plaintiff
United
States
asserts
that
WCI
violated
RCRA
by
main-
taming
wastewater
with
a
pH
of
less
than
or
equal
to
2.
[HN1O]
Under
the
regulations,
the
United
States
must
show
such
violation
via
a
“representative
sample”
of
the
water.
RCRA
regulations
define
“representative
sample”
as
“a
sample
of
a
universe
or
whole
(e.
[**27]
g.,
waste
pile,
lagoon,
groundwater)
which
can
be
expected
to
ex
hibit
the
average
properties
of
the
universe
or
whole.”
40
C.F.R.
§
260.10.
This
definition
has
remained
unchanged
since
originally
promulgated
by
U.S.
EPA
in
1980.
45
Fed.
Reg.
33066,
33075
(May
19,
1980).
This
defmition
suggests
that
a
finding
of
a
RCRA
violation
must
depend
upon
reliable
and
accurate
sam
pling.
WCI
urges
that
the
Court
interpret
the
regulations
to
require
a
particular
sampling
method
before
results
may
be
viewed
as
a
reliable
and
accurate
indication
of
corrosivity.
WCI
says
that
the
sampling
method
used
makes
a
difference
because
the
Pond
substances
were
heterogeneous.
16
Therefore,
unless
an
appropriate
sam
pling
method
is
used,
WCI
says
the
results
will
not
re
flect
“the
average
properties
of
the
universe
or
[*821]
whole.”
WCI
says
that
the
sampling
presented
here
by
the
Plaintiff
United
States
does
not
meet
the
require
ments
adopted
in
the
EPA’s
own
regulations.
16
In
an
October
1985
study,the
engineering
firm
Duncan,
Lagnese
&
Associates
sampled
sludge
from
Ponds
5
and
6.
It
reported
that
the
waste
in
the
Ponds
was
heterogeneous,
due
to
“considerable
variation
from
point
to
point
for
all
parameters
measured.”
Exh.
CJ.
Expert
Charles
Blumenscheim
testified
credibly
on
this
issue:
Q.
Do
you
know
whether
the
waste
material
in
the
ponds
at
WCI
is
homogeneous
or
heteroge
neous?
A.
In
my
opinion
it
is
not
ho
mogeneous
its
heterogeneous.
Q.
And
what’s
the
basis
for
that
opinion?
***
A.
These
the
water
entering
this
pond
5,
the
way
the
pond
is
configured,
this
is
a
classic
exam
ple
of
what
we
call
plug-flow
re
gion.
In
the
term
of
art.
But
what
it
means
is
that
as
the
water
enters
the
pond,
it
will
move
down
the
pond
as
a
river
would
flow,
if
you
can
just
visualize
this
as
a
river
Page
12
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F.
Supp.
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810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
and
any
water
entering
here
will
move
down
this
pond
in
segments.
There
is
no
mixers
in
this
to
make
it
homogeneous,
and
as
the
water
enters
this
pond
and
then
ulti
mately
leaves
the
pond,
enters
the
pipeline
and
enters
this
pond
and
again
this
water
will
move
through
this
pond
to
these
pumps
and
be
pumped
out
and
any
water
here
again
will
enter
this
pond
and
be
pumped
to
this
pond
so
this
is
a
classic
example
of
a
plug
flow
re
gion.
[**28]
In
contrast,
the
United
States
first
disputes
that
a
sample
needs
to
reflect
the
average
properties
of
the
whole.
Further,
the
United
States
argues
that
adop
tion
of
a
sampling
plan,
and
sampling
in
conformity
with
such
a
plan,
is
not
a
prerequisite
to
showing
a
violation
of
RCRA.
The
United
States
says
that
the
failure
to
adopt
a
sampling
plan
and
to
comply
with
that
plan
goes
to
the
weight
of
the
evidence,
rather
than
its
admissibility.
17
Plaintiff
United
States
proposed
conclusion
of
law
No.
24b.
Thus,
the
Court
must
first
determine
whether
a
sam
ple
needs
to
reflect
the
average
properties
of
the
whole.
As
to
this
issue,
the
United
States’
argument
would
turn
the
language
of
40
CFR
§
261.22
and
40
C.F.R.
§
260.10
on
its
head.
40
CFR
§
261.22
says
corrosivity
is
deter
mined
based
upon
a
‘representative
sample
of
the
waste.”
40
C.F.R.
§
260.10
says
the
sample
must
reflect
“the
average
properties
of
the
universe
or
whole.”
In
ar
guing
that
this
Court
disregard
the
ponds
as
a
whole,
the
United
States
pushes
[**29]
aside
its
own
regulations.
The
Court
therefore
finds
that
the
samples
must
be
representative
of
the
whole
pond
before
a
RCRA
viola
tion
may
be
found.
The
key
issue
is
what
sampling
method
will
produce
a
“representative
sample”
of
the
ponds
and
whether
the
methods
used
here
produce
a
suf
ficiently
reliable
picture
of
the
average
properties
of
the
ponds
as
a
whole.
Defendant
WCI
argues
that
Plaintiff
United
States
does
not
give
evidence
of
representative
samples
because
it
failed
to
use
the
proper
testing
method
found
in
Test
Methods
for
Evaluating
Solid
Waste,
PhysicallChemical
Methods,
EPA
Publication
SW-846
(“SW-846”).
WCI
says
use
of
Method
9040,
as
specified
in
the
Second
Edi
tion
of
SW-846,
is
required.
In
contrast,
the
United
States
claims
that
samples
not
taken
in
conformity
with
Method
9040
can
satisfy
the
requirement
that
samples
exhibit
the
average
properties
of
the
universe
or
whole.
First,
the
United
States
contests•
the
applicability
of
Method
9040.
The
United
States
ar
gues
thai
before
1993,
Method
5.2,
as
set
forth
in
the
First
Edition
of
SW-846,
was
the
method
for
deciding
whether
a
waste
was
corrosive.
Method
5.2’s
sampling
requirements
are
less
strict
than
the
requirements
[**30]
suggested
by
Defendant
WCI.
Method
5.2
does
not
spec
ify
methods
for
determining
the
number
of
samples
needed
to
obtain
the
average
properties
of
the
universe
or
whole.
In
contrast,
Method
9040
does.
Alternatively,
the
United
States
says
that
SW-846
intends
only
to
give
guidance,
not
to
mandate
require
ments.
As
a
guidance
document,
the
United
States
says
SW-846
affords
flexibility
to
use
alternative
test
meth
ods.
To
decide
this
issue,
the
Court
first
considers
the
general
applicability
of
Method
9040.
During
the
rele
vant
periods,
RCRA
regulations
have
always
referenced
certain
test
methods
that
are
to
be
use
to
support
a
find
ing
of
“corrosivity,”
and,
by
extension,
the
presence
of
hazardous
waste.
40
C.F.R.
§
260.11
(citing
test
meth
ods);
40
C.F.R.
§
261.22(a)(l)
(defining
“corrosivity”).
As
the
language
of
§
260.11
has
altered
Over
the
years,
the
parties
dispute
which
test
method
applied
during
the
relevant
period.
The
United
States
argues
that
until
August
31,
1993,
40
C.F.R.
§
261.22(a)(1)
required
use
of
Method
5.2,
as
set
forth
in
the
First
Edition
of
SW-846.
‘
Specifically,
until
August
31,
1993,
Section
261.22
provided,
in
perti
nent
part:
(a)
A
solid
waste
exhibits
[**3
1]
the
characteristic
of
corrosivity
if
a
represen
tative
[*
822]
sample
of
the
waste
has
ei
ther
of
the
following
properties:
(1)
It
is
aqueous
and
has
a
pH
less
than
or
equal
to
2
or
greater
than
or
equal
to
12.5,
as
determined
by
a
pH
meter
us
ing
either
an
EPA
test
method
or
an
equivalent
test
method
approved
by
the
Administrator....
The
EPA
test
method
for
pH
is
specfied
as
Method
5.2
in
“Test
Methods
for
Evaluation
of
Solid
Waste,
Physical/Chemical
Methods”
(incorpo
rated
by
reference,
see
260.11).
40
C.F.R.
§
26l.22(a)(1)
(1993
edition)
(emphasis
added).
18
40
C.F.R.
§
260.11
and
261.22(a)(1)
(1988-
1993
Editions).
Page
13
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
The
Second
Edition
of
SW-846
was
formally
adopted
as
part
of
Section
260.11
on
September
21,
1982.
‘
The
Second
Edition
of
SW-846
contains
a
“Con
version
Table’
which
correlates
the
section
and
method
numbers
used
in
the
First
Edition
of
SW-846
with
“the
location
of
their
replacements”
in
the
Second
Edition.
SW-846
describes
this
conversion
table
as
giving
“the
replacements”
of
the
methods
[**32]
used
in
the
First
Edition
of
SW-846.
In
this
Table,
Method
5.2
is
ex
pressly
replaced
with
Method
9040.
However,
the
lan
guage
of
the
regulation,
40
C.F.R.
§
261.22(a)(l),
re
tained
its
reference
to
Method
5.2
even
as
it
referred
par
ties
to
SW-846.
The
Second
Edition
of
SW-846,
and
the
conversion
table
within
it,
remained
in
effect
until
Au
gust
31,
1993,
when
the
Third
Edition
of
SW-846
was
adopted.
19
47
Fed.
Reg.
41562
(1982).
20
58
Fed.
Reg.
46040
(1993).
Defendant
WCI
points
out
that
the
Second
Edition
of
SW-846’s
cross-index
supports
the
conclusion
that
Method
5.2
was
replaced
by
Method
9040.
Also,
soon
after
the
formal
adoption
of
the
Second
Edition
of
SW-
846,
the
U.S.
EPA
issued
a
Technical
Amendment
which
also
noted
the
change
from
Method
5.2
to
Method
9040.
48
Fed.
Reg.
15256
(1983).
Further,
WCI
also
points
to
communication
made
in
1993
by
the
EPA
at
the
time
it
adopted
the
Third
Edition
of
SW-846.
In
August
1993,
the
Agency
formally
clarified
that
“the
[**33]
EPA
method
number
for
pH
is
incorrectly
referenced
in
Sec
tion
261.22(a)(l)
as
Method
5.2.
Therefore,
the
Agency
is
deleting
the
reference
to
Method
5.2
in
that
section
and
replacing
it
with
the
correct
reference
to
Method
9040.”
58
Fed.
Reg.
46047
(1993).
Thus,
the
EPA
changed
the
regulations
to
reflect
what
had
already
been
indicated
in
SW-846
for
years:
that
Method
9040
replaced
Method
5.2
In
short,
WCI
argues
that
even
though
the
regula
tions
did
not
specifically
mention
Method
9040
until
1993,
40
C.F.R.
§
26l.22(a)(l)
always
defmed
corrosiv
ity
by
reference
to
SW-846,
in
which
Method
9040
re
placed
5.2.
Therefore,
WCI
argues
that
Method
9040
applied
from
atleast
1984
to
August
1993.
WCI
makes
a
strong
argument
that
Method
9040
was
effective
for
the
times
relevant
here.
However,
as
suming
the
applicability
of
Method
9040,
the
Court
finds
that
strict
adherence
to
Method
9040
is
not
required
to
show
that
WCI
violated
RCRA.
Reliability
and
accuracy
of
samples
may
be
shown
by
methods
other
than
Method
9040.
Arguing
otherwise,
WCI
contends
that
corrosivity
can
only
be
established
if
the
Plaintiff
United
States
shows
that
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
had
a
pH
of
2.0
or
less
using
[**34]
a
pH
meter
in
accordance
with
Method
9040.
To
comply
with
Method
9040,
WCI
says
sampling
must
follow
a
statistically-valid
sampling
plan
prepared
in
accordance
with
Section
One
of
SW-846.
Method
9040,
§
6.1.
However,
relevant
language
in
SW-846
belies
WCI’s
argument.
SW-846
provides
that
a
sampling
plan
is
more
statistically
valid
if
it
provides
for
“some
form
of
random
sampling”
so
that
‘every
unit
of
the
population
(e.g.
every
location
in
a
lagoon
used
to
store
a
solid
waste)
has
a
theoretically
equal
chance
of
being
sampled
and
meas
ured,”
thus
ensuring
that
“the
sample
[*823]
is
repre
sentative
of
the
population.”
Section
One,
SW-846,
Sec
ond
Edition,
§
1.1.2.
“Sampling
precision
is
most
commonly
achieved
by
taking
an
appropriate
number
of
samples
from
the
popu
lation.”
Section
One,
SW-846,
Second
Edition
(emphasis
added).
SW-846
provides
a
statistical
equation
to
be
used
in
determining
the
“appropriate
number
of
samples.”
21
Compliance
with
the
statistical
calculations
in
SW-846
establishes
“a
scientifically
credible
sampling
plan”
for
characterizing
waste.”
Id.
at
Section
1.
Specifically,
SW-
846
says
that
“solid
wastes
contained
in
a
landfill
or
la
goon
are
[usually]
[**35]
best
sampled
using
the
three-
dimensional
random
sampling
strategy.”
Id.
(emphasis
added).
21
Table
1,
Equation
8,
in
Section
One
of
SW-
846.
SW-846
also
says
that
“lagooned
waste
that
is
either
liquid
or
semisolid
is
often
best
sampled
using
the
meth
ods
recommended
for
large
tanks.”
In
describing
the
method
used
for
sampling
large
tanks,
SW-846
says
“a
representative
set
of
samples
is
best
obtained
using
the
three-dimensional
simple
random
sampling
strategy
de
scribed
in
Section
1.4.1.”
In
Section
1.4.1
of
SW-846,
the
EPA
says:
The
number
of
samples
required
for
re
liable
sampling
will
vary
depending
on
the
distribution
of
the
waste
components
in
the
container.
As
a
minimum
with
un
known
waste,
a
sufficient
number
and
dis
tribution
of
samples
should
be
taken
to
address
any
possible
versicle
anomalies
in
the
waste.
SW-846
at
1.4.1.
Under
these
provisions,
sampling
of
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
should
involve
“a
three-dimensional
grid
of
sampling
points
and
then
using
random
number
tables
or
genera
tors
[**36]
to
select
points
for
sampling.”
Id.
at
1.4.4.
Page
14
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
As
indicated,
Method
9040
suggests
that
sampling
should
be
done
consistent
with
a
sampling
plan
involving
a
sufficient
number
of
samples.
While
such
sampling
is
preferred,
WCI
does
not
show
that
the
Plaintiff
United
States
cannot
proceed
absent
sampling
in
conformity
with
Method
9040.
Other
courts
have
come
to
similar
conclusions.
In
United
States
v.
Self
2
F.3d
1071
(10th
Cir.
1993),
the
defendant,
facing
criminal
charges,
argued
that
the
gov
ernment
failed
to
present
evidence
that
certain
hazardous
wastes
were
sampled
in
accord
with
an
EPA-approved
test
method.
Rejecting
this
argument,
the
Tenth
Circuit
held
that
[HN1
1]
“while
an
EPA-approved
test
of
the
material
would
have
been
persuasive
evidence
as
to
whether
the
material
was
hazardous
waste,
the
govern
ment
was
not
required
to
prove
this
element
through
test
data.”
Id.
at
1086.
To
like
effect,
in
United
States
v.
Baytank,
Inc.,
934
F.2d
599
(5th
Cir.
1991),
the
government
brought
a
criminal
claim
under
RCRA.
In
that
case,
the
govern
ment
did
not
have
sampling
of
the
relevant
drums,
nor
other
sampling
taken
in
conformity
with
EPA
[**37]
regulations.
Instead,
it
relied
upon
company
documents
and
testimony
from
persons
in
contact
with
the
relevant
drums.
In
finding
the
evidence
sufficient
to
support
a
criminal
conviction,
the
Fifth
Circuit
held:
The
govermnent
admits
no
drum
sam
ples
were
taken,
but
relies
on
Baytank
re
cords,
and
testimony
as
to
its
practices
at
the
times
charged,
to
show
that
the
drums
were
used
to
Store
the
‘slops’
or
residue
of
hazardous
chemicals
that
had
been
ex
tracted
either
for
sampling
or
line
clean
ing
purposes.
We
agree
that
these
docu
ments,
including
drum
inventories,
a
haz
V
ardous
waste
log,
and
internal
memo
randa,
as
well
as
the
testimony
at
trial,
all
amply
demonstrate
that
many
of
these
drums
containing
hazardous
wastes
were
stored
for
longer
than
90
days.
Id.
at
614.
Other
courts
have
held
that
the
[HN12]
failure
to
adhere
to
SW-846’s
precise
framework
[*824]
does
not
stop
a
finding
of
hazardous
substances.
See,
e.g.,
United
States
v.
Taylor,
802
F.
Supp.
116,
119
(W.D.
Mich.
1992),
vacated
on
other
grounds,
8
F.3d
1074
(6th
Cir.
1993)
(sample
analyzed
under
a
test
method
not
ap
proved
by
EPA
sufficient
to
establish
threat
of
contami
nation
[**38]
under
CERCLA).
Further,
failure
to
rig
idly
adhere
to
SW-846
does
not
render
the
sampling
evi
dence
inadmissible.
People
v.
Hale,
29
Cal.
App.
4th
730,
734
(1994)
(“We
discern
no
per
se
rule
which
automatically
precludes
the
introduction
of
evidence
of
disposal
of
hazardous
waste
just
because
the
gathering
of
the
sample
does
not
follow
every
jot
and
tittle
of
the
EPA
manual.”).
Any
deviation
from
the
guidance
goes
to
the
weight
of
the
evidence
and
not
its
admissibility.
People
v.
Sangani,
22
Cal.
App.
4th
1120,
1136-1137
(1994)
(“Failure
to
follow
precise
regulatory
or
statutory
re
quirements
for
laboratory
tests
generally
does
not
render
the
test
results
inadmissible,
but
instead
goes
to
the
weight
accorded
to
the
evidence.”).
22
22
Courts
show
deference
to
the
interpretation
of
regulation
given
by
administrative
agencies
charged
with
their
enforcement.
United
States
of
America
v.
Mobil
Oil
C’orporation,
1997
WL
1048911
(E.D.N.Y.
1997).
In
Mobil
Oil,
the
company
sought
to
offer
evidence
not
in
confor
mity
with
the
regulations
given
by
the
U.S
EPA.
Rejecting
Mobil’s
evidence,
the
court
set
forth
a
standard
of
review
applicable
to
a
claim
that
the
sampling
methods
utilized
are
invalid.
Under
the
court’s
test,
it
is
not
enough
for
WCI
simply
to
“offer[]
an
alternative
reading
of
the
law.”
Id.
at
*9•
Instead,
WCI
must
establish
that
EPA’s
inter
pretation
is
“plainly
erroneous”
and
that
WCI’s
reading
is
“compelled
by
the
regulation’s
plain
language’
or
the
Administrator’s
intent
at
the
time
the
regulation
was
promulgated.”
Id.
(quoting
Thomas
Jefferson
University
Hospital
v.
Shalala,
512
U.S.
504,
512,
129
L.
Ed.
2d
405,
114
S.
Ct.
2381
(1994)).
[**39]
Consequently,
although
Method
9040
con
trolled
sampling
before
1993,
the
Court
finds
that
strict
adherence
with
Method
9040,
including
grid
sampling
pursuantto
a
plan,
is
not
required
to
show
that
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
were
corrosive.
While
sampling
done
in
con
formity
with
Method
9040
is
preferable
and
more
per
suasive,
evidence
not
conforming
with
the
sampling
pro
visions
of
SW-846
can
support
a
finding
that
WCI
gen
erated
hazardous
substances
subject
to
RCRA.
3.
Required
Showing
V
[HN13]
To
show
that
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
contained
hazardous
substances
and
were,
as
a
result,
subject
to
the
cradle-to-grave
restrictions
of
RCRA,
the
Plaintiff
United
States
must
show,
via
representative
samples,
only
that
the
surface
impoundment
contained
aqueous
water
with
a
pH
of
2.0
s.u.
or
less,
on
at
least
one
occa
sion.
United
States
v.
Conservation
Chemical
Co.,
733
F.
Supp.
1215,
1224
(N.D.
md.
1989)
(finding
that
an
aqueous
solid
waste
exhibits
the
characteristic
of
corro
sivity
if
it
is
properly
tested
and
found
to
have
a
pH
less
than
or
equal
to
2
“on
at
least
one
occasion”);
State
v.
PVS
Chemicals,
Inc.,
50
F.
Supp.
2d
171
(W.D.N.Y.
Page
15
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
1998)
(finding
discharges
of
acidic
water
[*
*40]
that
fell
below
pH
of
2
on
4
occasions
out
of
51
samples
taken
over
course
of
6
years
was
hazardous).
[RN
14]
In
order
to
be
valid,
sampling
must
show
that
it
is
random,
that
is,
that
‘every
unit
of
the
popula
tion
(e.g.,
every
location
in
a
lagoon
used
to
store
a
solid
waste)
has
a
theoretically
equal
chance
of
being
sampled
and
measured,”
thus
ensuring
that
“the
sample
is
repre
sentative
of
the
population.”
Section
One,
SW-846,
Sec
ond
Edition,
at
1.1.2.
With
these
principles
in
mind,
the
Court
examines
the
samples
presented
by
the
government
as
evidence
of
RCRA
violations.
C.
Assessment
of
Samples
In
claiming
that
Defendant
WCI’s
Pond
5,
6,
and
6A
are
subject
to
regulation
under
RCRA,
the
United
States
relies
upon
a
limited
number
of
testings
done
by
U.S.
EPA
personnel
and
the
large
number
of
tests
recorded
by
Defendant
WCI’s
personnel
[*825]
at
the
intake
to
the
central
treatment
plant.
WCI
says
the
limited
number
of
samples
taken
by
the
U.S.
EPA
are
insufficiently
representative
of
the
ponds
to
serve
as
proof
of
a
violation.
WCI
also
says
the
11,000
samples
it
recorded
are
insufficiently
representa
tive
of
wastewaters
held
in
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
because
the
measuring
probes
were
miscalibrated.
[*
*41]
Be
cause
none
of
the
samples
the
governmentrelies
on
were
taken
pursuant
to
Method
9040,
WCI
says
there
is
insuf
ficient
evidence,
that
it
maintained
hazardous
waste
at
the
Warren
facility.
As
discussed,
the
Court
fmds
Method
9040
prefer
able
for
showing
a
RCRA
violation,
but
it
is
not
the
ex
clusive
means
with
which
the
government
can
support
its
case.
The
Court
must
now
determine
whether
the
avail
able
samples
provide
a
reliable
indicator
that
WCI
main
tained
hazardous
waste
at
the
Warren
facility.
Plaintiff
United
States
shows
sampling
performed
by
WCI
at
the
influent
to
Pond
6.
The
government
produced
WCI’s
internal
“Turn
Audit”
forms
reflecting
pH
meas
urements
taken
between
1988
and
1998.
WCI
tested
over
300
samples
a
month
at
Pond
6
during
these
years.
23
The
turn
audit
forms
indicate
that
over
11,000
samples
taken
during
these
years
had
a
pH
of
2.0
or
less.
24
WCI’s
op
erators
made
readings
of
2.0
s.u.
or
less
for
Pond
6
wastewater
entering
the
central
treatment
plant
on
1,361
separate
days,
including
577
days
during
which
readings
of
1.7
s.u.
were
taken
at
the
influent
probe.
23
In
July
1990,
WCI
took
240
samples.
In
every
other
month
during
the
ten-year
period,
WCI
took
more
than
300
samples.
24
There
were
only
13
readings
of
2.0
or
less
in
1995
and
none
in
1996
through
1998.
Therefore,
the
bulk
of
the
low
pH
readings
date
from
1988
to
1994.
During
several
months,
virtually
all
the
samples
in
dicated
low
pH
levels.
In
May
1991,
96.7%
of
the
369
samples
taken
that
month
indicated
a
pH
level
of
2.0
or
below.
In
August
1991,
99.2%
of
the
372
samples
taken
that
month
registered
at
2.0
or
below,
with
297
samples
reflecting
a
pH
of
1.7
or
below.
In
May
1993,
90.9%
of
the
372
samples
taken
that
month
had
a
pH
level
of
2.0
or
below,
with
268
samples
reading
1.7
or
below.
At
the
rate
WCI
pumps
water
out
of
the
pond,
there
is
a
complete
turnover
of
pond
water
every
three
to
four
days.
Thus,
months
duringwhich
low
pH
levels
were
the
norm
provide
strong
evidence
that
the
samples
were
rep
resentative
of
the
pond
water
as
a
whole
during
that
time
and
that
the
water
contained
hazardous
waste.
Though
WCI
levels
valid
criticism
at
the
reliability
of
the
influent
pH
probe,
the
measurements
obtained
from
the
probe
are
nevertheless
probative
of
the
waster-
water’s
hazardous
nature.
An
extremely
large
[**43]
number
of
influent
probe
pH
readings
show
corrosivity,
including
many
readings
with
very
acidic
pH
levels.
Even
if
the
pH
calibration
were
not
precise,
any
error
was
unlikely
to
account
for
the
extremely
low
pH
read
ings.
This
is
so
because
pH
is
measured
on
a
logarithmic
scale:
as
pH
measurements
move
down
the
scale,
the
measure
of
acidity
in
a
substance
increases
exponen
tially.
A
substance
with
a
pH
of
1.8
s.u.
has
twice
the
hydrogen
ion
(or
acid)
concentration
of
a
substance
with
a
pH
of
2.0
s.u..
The
difference
between
the
measure
ment
units
is
.2.
But
because
of
the
logarithm,
the
.2
dif
ference
between
1.6
and
1.8
represents
a
greater
increase
in
acidity
level
than
does
the
.2
difference
between
1.8
and
2.0.
Therefore,
even
if
WCI’s
probes
were
not
cali
brated
precisely
in
relation
to
2.0,
the
extremely
low
readings
represent
strong
evidence
of
acidity
because
they
representsuch
exponential
change
in
acid
levels.
Indeed,
even
SW-846
notes
that
when
measurements
fall
far
below
the
threshold
allowed
level,
a
method
with
lower
accuracy
and
precision
is
tolerable:
[*826]
It
is
now
apparent
that
a
judgment
must
be
made
as
to
the
degree
of
sam
pling
accuracy
and
precision
that
is
re
quired
[**44]
to
reliably
estimate
the
chemical
characteristics
of
a
solid
waste
for
the
purpose
of
comparing
those
char-
[**42]
Page
16
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
acteristics
to
applicable
regulatory
thresh
olds.
Generally,
high
accuracy
and
high
precision
are
required
if
one
or
more
chemical
contaminants
of
a
solid
waste
is
present
at
a
concentration
that
is
close
to
the
applicable
regulatory
threshold.
Alter
natively,
relatively
low
accuracy
and
low
precision
can
be
tolerated
if
the
contami
nants
of
concern
occur
at
levels
far
below
or
far
above
their
applicable
thresholds.
SW-826,
§
1.1.1,
P
3
(emphasis
added).
Although
high
accuracy
and
precision
is
preferred,
the
reading
of
1.3,
for
example,
reliably
shows
corrosivity
even
if
taken
through
a
less
than
ideal
sampling
method
because
it
falls
so
far
below
the
threshold
of
2.0.
The
United
States
does
not
rely
solely
on
the
meas
urements
from
the
influent
probe.
The
United
States
gives
evidence
from
a
WCI
consultant
engineer
who
took
grab
sample
pH
measurements
on
October
14
and
15,
1993,
which
showed
pH
of
2.0
or
lower
at
the
bosh
box
location.
25
Importantly,
one
of
these
samples
had
the
extremely
low
pH
value
of
1.3
s.u.
while
another
had
the
extremely
low
value
of
1.7
s.u.
[**45]
Also,
a
large
number
of
grab
bag
samples,
tested
on
bench
pH
meters,
indicate
corrosivity.
Finally,
although
limited,
U.S.
EPA
sampling
shows
corrosivity.
25
Consultant
Killam
collected
three
grab
sam
ples
from
the
bosh
box
that
channels
wastewater
to
the
surface
impoundments.
The
three
samples
had
pH
values
of
1.3,
1.7
and
2.0
s.u.,
respec
tively.
In
light
of
the
substantial
evidence
presented
by
the
United
States,
the
Court
finds
that
during
periods
of
WCI’s
ownership,
the
wastewater
treated,
stored,
and
disposed
of
by
WCI
in
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
exhibited
the
hazardous
waste
characteristic
of
corrosivity,
within
the
meaning
of
40
C.F.R.
§
261.22.
Thus,
WCI
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
were
subject
to
RCRA.
However,
the
Government
fails
to
show
spent
pickle
liquor,
subject
to
RCRA,
was
deposited
into
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A.
The
Court
finds
thatWCI
always
neutralized
any
spent
pickle
liquor
or
acidspillage
with
excess
lime.
[HN15]
Lime-neutralized
spent
pickle
liquor
is
exempt
from
the
RCRA’s
hazardous
waste
regulations
under
the
[**46]
iron
and
steel
industry
exemption
in
40
C.F.R.
§
261
.3(c)(2)(ii)(A).
IV.
Violations
of
RCRA
The
Court
has
determined
that
there
is
sufficient
evidence
that
WCI
treated,
stored,
or
disposed
of
hazard-
ous
waste
at
its
Warren
facility.
Maintaining
such
haz
ardous
waste
triggers
several
requirements
under
RCRA.
As
detailed
below,
WCI’s
failure
to
comply
with
these
requirements
subjects
it
to
penalties
under
RCRA.
A.
First
Claim
for
Relief
[HNI6J
40
C.F.R.
§
260.10
provides,
in
part:
[A]
“Hazardous
waste
management
unit”
is
a
contiguous
area
of
land
on
or
in
which
hazardous
waste
is
placed,
or
the
largest
area
in
which
there
is
significant
likelihood
of
mixing
hazardous
waste
constituents
in
the
same
area.
Examples
of
hazardous
waste
management
units
in
clude
a
surface
impoundment,
a
waste
pile,
a
land
treatment
area,
a
landfill
cell,
an
incinerator,
a
tank
and
its
associated
piping
and
underlying
containment
sys
tern
and
a
container
storage
area.
40
CFR
§
260.10.
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
at
the
WCI’s
War
ren
facility
are
hazardous
waste
management
units.
As
hazardous
waste
management
units,
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
are
subject
to
the
provisions
of
RCP.A
and
analogous
state
law.
[HNI7]
Under
[**47]
42
U.S.C.
§
6925(a)
and
(e)
and
Ohio
Rev.
Code
§
3734.02(F)
and
3734.04,
the
owner
and
operator
of
a
hazardous
waste
management
unit
is
prohibited
from
[*827]
operating
a
hazardous
waste
management
unit
except
in
accordance
with
a
permit
issued
pursuant
to
RCRA,
unless
the
facility
had
interim
status.
The
wastewater
treated,
stored,
and
disposed
of
through
the
impoundments
was
a
“solid
waste,”
under
40
C.F.R.
§
261.2(a)(2).
During
periods
from
1988
to
1993,
the
wastewater
stored
and
disposed
of
by
WCI
in
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A,
wasalso
hazardous
waste
because
it
exhib
ited
the
characteristic
of
corrosivity,
having
a
pH
of
2
or
less.
Further,
Defendant
WCI
has
neither
a
permit
issued
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
42
U.S.C.
§
6925,
nor
does
WCI
have
interim
status.
Defendant
WCI’s.
Operation
of
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
without
a
permit
and
without
interim
status
violates
RCRA
and
the
federally
approved
hazardous
waste
man
agement
program
for
the
State
of
Ohio.
Each
day
that
WCI
operated
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
without
a
permit
or
without
interim
status
is
a
separate
violation
of
RCRA.
B.
Second
Claim
for
Relief
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
were
hazardous
waste
manage
ment
[**48]
units
during
periods
from
1988
to
1993.
Page
17
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
WCI
operated
these
hazardous
waste
management
units
without
including
these
hazardous
waste
management
units
in
any
RCRA
Part
A
application,
as
required
by
40
C.F.R.
§
270.13
and
O.A.C.
§
3645-50-43,
and
without
amending
any
RCRA
Part
A
application.
Each
day
that
Defendant
operated
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
without
including
these
hazardous
waste
manage
ment
units
in
any
Part
A
application
and
without
amend
ing
any
Part
A
application
is
a
separate
violation
of
42
U.S.C.
§
6930
and
O.A.C.
§
3745-50-43.
C.
Third
Claim
for
Relief
WCI
operated
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
as
hazardous
waste
management
units
without
including
these
hazard
ous
waste
management
units
in
any
RCRA
Part
B
appli
cation,
and
without
amending
any
RCRA
Part
B
applica
tion
to
include
information
pertaining
to
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A.
40
C.F.R.
§
270.14
and
O.A.C.
§
3745-50-44.
Each
day
that
WCI
operated
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
as
hazardous
waste
management
units
without
including
these
hazardous
waste
management
units
in
any
RCRA
Part
B
application,
and
without
amending
any
RCRA
Part
B
application
to
include
information
pertaining
to
Ponds
5,
6
and
6A
is
a
separate
violation.
[*
*49]
D.
FourthClaim
for
Relief
[HN18]
Under
42
U.S.C.
§
6928(a)
and
40
C.F.R.
§
270.1(b),
a
party
also
may
not
store
hazardous
waste
in
a
surface
impoundment
without
a
permit
or
interim
status.
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
are
“surface
impoundments”
within
the
meaning
of
40
C.F.R.
§
260.10.
[l{Nl9]
Under
42
U.S.C.
§
6925(j),
surface
im
poundments
existing
on
November
8,
1984,
were
re
quired
to
meet
minimum
technological
requirements
unless
granted
an
exemption
by
the
U.S.
EPA
or
the
State.
26
WCI
did
not
receive
interim
status.
As
a
facility
that
did
not
have
a
permit
and
did
not
have
interim
status,
WCI
was
required
to
cease
accepting
hazardous
waste
and
commence
closure.
40
C.F.R.
§
265.1(b).
As
explained
earlier,
the
Court
finds
that
WCI
continued
to
receive
hazardous
waste
after
it
was
not
eligible
to
do
so.
In
continuing
to
receive
hazardous
substances,
WCI
vio
lated
RCRA.
26
42
U.S.C.
§
6924(o).
WCI
continued
accepting
hazardous
wastes
at
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A,
[**50]
even
though
it
failed
to
meet
the
technological
requirements
of
42
U.S.C.
§
6924(o)(1)(A).
WCI
failed
to
close
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
as
required
by
40
C.F.R.
§
264.228
and.O.A.C.
§
3745-56-
28.
Each
day
that
WCI
continued
accepting
hazardous
wastes
at
Ponds
5,
6
and
6A,
even
though
it
failed
to
meet
the
technological
requirements
of
42
U.S.C.
§
6924(o)(1)(A)
isa
separate
violation.
[*828]
E.
Fifth
Claim
for
Relief
[FfN2O]
Under
40
C.F.R.
§
264.112
and
O.A.C.
§
3745-55-12,
WCI,
as
the
owner
or
operator
of
a
hazard
ous
waste
management
unit,
was
required
to
have
a
writ
ten
closure
plan.
The
closure
plan
must
identify
the
steps
needed
to
perform
a
partial
or
final
closure
of
the
facility.
Defendant
WCI
failed
to
have
a
written
closure
plan
that
identified
the
steps
necessary
to
perform
partial
or
final
closure
of
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A.
WCI
thus
violated
RCRA
closure
requirements
described
at
40
C.F.R.
§
264.112
and
O.A.C.
§
3745-55-12.
Each
day
that
WCI
failed
to
have
a
written
closure
plan
that
identified
the
steps
necessary
to
perform
partial
or
final
closure
of
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
is
a
separate
viola
tion.
F.
Sixth
Claim
for
Relief
[1{N21]
Under
40
C.F.
[**51]
R.
§
264.140
-
264.15
1
and
O.A.C.
§
3745-55-40
-
3745-55-5
1,
WCI,
as
the
owner
or
operator
of
a
hazardous
waste
manage
ment
facility,
was
required
to
have
a
detailed
written
estimate
in
current
dollars
of
the
cost
of
closing
hazard
ous
waste
management
units.
WCI
was
also
required
to
comply
with
the
financial
assurance
provisions
of
40
C.F.R.
§
264.143
and
O.A.C.
§
3745-55-43.
Defendant
WCI
has
failed
to
comply
with
the
clo
sure
costs
and
financial
assurance
requirements
of
40
C.F.R.
Part
264
and
O.A.C.
§
3745-55-40
-
3745-55-51.
Each
day
that
WCI
failed
to
have
and
maintain
a
detailed
written
estimate,
in
current
dollars,
of
the
cost
of
closing
hazardous
waste
management
units
to
comply
with
the
financial
assurance
requirements
is
a
separate
violation.
G.
Seventh
Claim
for
Relief
[HN22]
The
owner
or
operator
of
a
surface
im
poundment
is
required
to
install,
operate,
and
maintain
a
ground-water
monitoring
system
which
satisfies
the
cri
teria
contained
at
40
C.F.R.
Part
264,
Subpart
F,
and
O.A.C.
§
3745-54-90
-
3745-54-99
and
3745-55-01
-
3745-55-02.
During
periods
after
November
8,
1988,
WCI
failed
to
install,
operate,
and
maintain
a
ground
water
mOnitoring
system
that
meets
the
requirements
[*
*52]
of
40
C.F.R.
Part
264,
Subpart
F,
and
O.A.C.
§
3745-54-90
-
3745-55-02.
Thefailure
to
operate
such
a
ground-water
monitor
ing
system
violates
RCRA
and
the
federally
approved
Page
18
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR.
20169
hazardous
waste
management
program
for
the
State
of
Ohio.
H.
Eighth
Claim
for
Relief
At
times
from
1988
to
1993,
Defendant
WCI
dis
posed
of
corrosive
hazardous
waste,
having
a
pH
of
less
than
or
equal
to
2.0,
from
Ponds
5,
6
or
6A,
which
did
not
meet
the
treatment
standards
specified
at
O.A.C.
§
3745-59-40
-
3745-59-43,
in
violation
of
40
C.F.R.
§
268.32
and
268.35(a)
and
O.A.C.
§
3745-59-32
and
3745-59-35(A).
In
disposing
of
such
waste,
WCI
violated
RCP.A
and
the
federally
approved
hazardous
waste
management
program
for
the
State
of
Ohio.
V.
Penalty
[HN23J
Under
42
U.S.C.
§
6928(a)
and
(g),
this
Court
has
power
to
enjoin
WCI
and
to
impose
civil
pen
alties
for
each
violation
of
RCRA
and
the
hazardous
waste
management
program
for
the
State
of
Ohio.
This
Court
can
impose
penalties
up
to
$
25,000
per
day
for
each
day
of
violation
prior
to
January
30,
1997
and
$
27,500
for
each
day
of
violation
thereafter.
In
determining
the
appropriate
civil
penalties,
the
Court
considers
the
seriousness
of
[**53j
the
violation,
what
efforts
were
made
to
comply
with
regulations,
the
harm
caused
by
the
violation,
the
economic
benefit
de
rived
from
noncompliance,
the
violator’s
ability
to
pay,
the
government’s
conduct,
and
the
clarity
of
the
obliga
tion
involved.
United
States
v.
Ekco
Housewares,
Inc.,
62
F.3d
806,
815
(6th
Cii.
1995).
In
determining
the
penalty,
this
Court
exercises
its
discretion.
Id.
(citing
[*829)
United
States
v.
Midwest
Suspension
and
Brake,
49
F.3d
1197,
1205
(6th
Cir.
1995)).
A.
WCI’s
Past
Compliance
and
Seriousness
of
the
Viola
tion
From
the
time
it
assumed
operation
of
the
Warren
facility
in
1988,
WCI
has
denied
that
it
managed
hazard
ous
wastes
in
Ponds
5,
6
and
6A.
Because
it
denied
its
management
of
hazardous
wastes,
WCI
failed
to
provide
notice
to
the
U.S.
EPA
and
the
State
that
it
managed
haz
ardous
wastes
in
Ponds
5,
6
and
6A
and
failed
to
obtain
any
permit
or
interim
status
under
RCRA
for
manage
ment
of
the
hazardous
waste
it
maintained
in
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A.
42
U.S.C.
§
6925(a)
prohibits
the
treatment,
storage
or
disposal
of
hazardous
waste
except
in
accordance
with
an
authorized
permit.
Ekco
Housewares,
Inc.,
62
F.3d
at
809.
[**54J
The
receipt
of
a
permit,
and
compliance
with
that
permit
are
at
the
core
of
the
federal
hazardous
waste
management
system.
United
States
v.
Heuer,
4
F.3d
723,
730
(9th
Cir.
1993)
(“It
is
fundamental
that
an
entity
which
performs
a
hazardous
waste
activity
for
which
a
permit
is
required
under
RCRA
may
not
legally
perform
that
activity
unless
it
has
a
permit
for
the
rele
vant
activity.”).
WCI’s
failure
to
obtain
a
permit
and
to
comply
with
that
permit
disregards
RCRA’s
“cradle-to-
grave’
regulatory
structure
overseeing
the
safe
treatment,
storage
and
disposal
of
hazardous
waste.”
United
Tech
nologies
Corp.
v.
EPA,
261
U.S.
App.
D.C.
226,
821
F.2d
714,
716
(D.C.
Cir.1987).
Yet,
WCI
has
made
capital
investments
that
have
improved
environmental
quality.
By
1992,
WCI
had
in
vested
$
135
million
in
a
continuous
caster
and
ladle
metallurgical
facility
that
lowered
costs
and
improved
environmental
performance.
27
In
addition,
WCI
used
a
vigorous
recycling
program
and
eliminated
about
80,000
tons
of
materials
that
formerly
went
to
a
landfill.
In
1996,
the
Ohio
EPA
reported
that:
“WCI
has
achieved
an
86
percent
reduction
in
their
toxic
chemical
releases
from
{**55]
1988
to
1994
.
.
.
1994
was
WCI’s
most
productive
year
in
their
eight-year
history.
The
facility
increased
production
by
5.8
percent
over
1993
while
reducing
toxic
release
conmiission
by
32.9
percent.”
In
March
1999,
the
Environmental
Defense
Fund
placed
WCI
in
the
top
third
of
twenty
integrated
steel
mills
in
the
nation
for
its
pollution
control
efforts.
27
The
continuous
caster
and
ladle
facility
eliminated
approximately
a
hundred
tons
of
air
pollutants
per
year.
In
summary,
while
Defendant
WCI
failed
to
comply
with
RCRA
requirements
as
to
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A,
it
otherwise
made
efforts
to
reduce
pollution.
B.
Discussion
of
Harm
Caused
by
Noncompliance
The
Court
finds
no
credible
evidence
of
harm
caused
by
Defendant
WCI’s
RCRA
violations.
First,
though
long-term
effects
of
hazardous
wastewater
may
be
re
flected
in
the
sludge
that
collects
in
the
beneath
the
wastewater,
the
Plaintiff
United
States
does
not
allege
that
sludge
in
the
Ponds
ever
had
a
pH
of
2.0
or
below.
Second,
monitoring
wells
placed
downstream
[**561
from
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
show
no
impact
on
the
envi
ronment
resulting
from
the
use
of
these
ponds
as
waste-
water
treatment
units.
Finally,
the
United
States
does
not
allege
that
the
Ponds
currently
contain
wastewater
with
a
pH
of
2.0
or
below.
[HN24]
Where
a
proven
violation
of
RCRA
does
not
result
in
“the
creation
of
a
situation
with
the
potential
to
seriously
harm
the
environment,”
civil
penalties
have
been
substantially
reduced.
United
States
v.
Lacks
Indus
tries,
Inc.,
1990
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
7650,
1990
WL
261387,
*4
(W.D.
Mich.
June
22,
1990).
Thus,
in
deter-
Page
19
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
mining
an
appropriate
penalty,
this
Court
takes
into
con
sideration
the
fact
that
WCI’s
use
of
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
has
not
resulted
in
any
harm
to
human
health
or
the
envi
ronment.
[*8301
C.
Economic
Benefit
and
Costs
Saved
The
Court
also
considers
the
economic
benefit
de
rived
by
WCI
as
the
result
of
its
failure
to
comply
with
RCRA.
On
this
issue,
the
parties
sharply
disagree.
The
Plaintiff
United
States
says
that
WCI
benefitted
because
it
avoided
expending
monies
to
close
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A,
including
dredging,
disposal
of
dredged
materi
als,
and
backfilling
the
ponds.
The
United
States
argues
that
WCI
benefitted
because
it
was
otherwise
required
to
install
[**57]
tanks
to
store
wastewater
with
low
pH;
to
set
up
a
groundwater
monitoring
program;
and
to
provide
a
closure
and
post
closure
plan
together
with
necessary
financial
assurance.
The
United
States
says
WCI
delayed
or
avoided
expending
monies
for
these
purposes
and
received
an
economic
benefit.
In
seeking
to
quantify
this
benefit,
the
United
States
says
the
benefit
should
be
measured
as
the
current
value
of
the
capital
cost
of
the
various
expenditures
needed
to
avoid
RCRA
violations,
and
the
annual
operating
costs
that
would
have
attended
earlier
compliance,
all
ex
pressed
in
today’s
dollars.
Plaintiff
United
States
claims
that
Defendant
WCI
received
a
total
economic
benefit
of
approximately
$
9.1
million.
According
•to
the
United
States,
the
delayed
capital
expenditures
gave
WCI
a
$
6,427,000
benefit
and
the
avoidance
of
operating
and
maintenance
costs
gave
WCI
a
$
2,631,000
benefit.
In
reaching
its
position
that
WCI
obtained
economic
benefit
of
$
9.1
million,
the
United
States
relies
on
sev
eral
core
assumptions.
The
United
States
relies
upon
the
argument
that
remediation
required
moving
the
majority
of
the
sludges
from
their
current
locations
and
depositing
them
in
a
toxic
waste
disposal
[**58]
site.
If
the
sludge
did
not
have
to
be
removed,
WCI
did
not
receive
the
benefit
of
$
2,615,102
for
the
dredging
and
backfilling
of
the
impoundments
and
$
3,696,690
for
its
disposal.
The
Court
finds
credible
WCI’s
testimony
that
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
are
subject
to
a
risk-
based
closure
that
gives
consideration
to
human
health
and
the
environ
ment.
Under
such
a
closure,
the
sludge
would
be
left
in
place,
it
would
be
stabilized,
and
a
cover
would
be
placed
upon
it.
Such
a
risk-based
closure
might
involve
moving
the
sludges
from
Ponds
6
and
6A
to
Pond
5,
and
then
putting
a
cover
on
Pond
5.
A
risk-based
closure
would
be
significantly
less
expensive
than
the
dredging
and
removal
plan
proposed
by
the
United
States.
Dr.
Kenneth
Wise
testified
credibly
that
a
risk-based
resulted
in
a
present
value
economic
benefit
of
$
732,065,
includ
ing
the
cost
of
a
storage
tank.
D.
Present
Value
Determination
As
to
the
economic
benefit
derived
by
WCI
from
de
layed
compliance
with
RCRA,
the
parties
also
dispute
what
rate
should
be
used
to
determine
the
present
value
of
the
benefit.
The
Plaintiff
United
States
claims
that
this
Court
should
use
a
weighted
average
cost
of
capital
rate
of
8.5
percent
for
both
[**59]
past
amounts
benefitted
and
for
future
benefits.
In
contrast,
the
Defendant
WCI
suggests
that
the
rate
should
be
different
for
both
past
and
future
benefit.
For
past
costs,
WCI
suggests
the
use
of
an
after-tax,
risk-free
rate
is
correct.
WCI
argues
that
no
uncertainty
attends
the
amount
and
the
risk-free
return
is
the
only
economic
benefit
that
a
company
earns
from
delaying
an
expendi
ture.
WCI
argues
that
any
return
above
the
risk-free
rate
does
not
reflect
delay,
but
instead
reflects
risk.
As
to
future
benefit,
WCI
says
there
is
uncertainty.
Future
benefits
are
not
risk
free.
As
a
result,
WCI
says
a
discount
rate
reflecting
this
risk
should
be
used.
Specifi
cally,
WCI
argues
that
future
benefits
should
be
com
puted
by
using
an
after-tax
corporate
borrowing
rate.
WCI
suggests
a
9.6%
rate
should
be
used,
based
upon
the
current
yield
of
WCI
bonds.
[*83
1]
The
central
issue
is
whether
a
rate
reflecting
risk
should
be
used
as
to
past
benefits
or
obligations.
Any
return
above
the
risk-free
rate
is
earned
not
from
delay
but
by
assuming
risk,
and
therefore
is
not
properly
considered
economic
benefit
from
noncompliance.
Be
cause
this
amount
is
known
and
the
existence
and
sol
vency
of
the
party
is
also
[**60]
known,
it
is
inappropri
ate
to
increase
the
rate
to
reflect
risk.
As
to
this
issue,
the
Court
finds
Defendant
WCI’s
argument
to
be
more
per
suasive.
After
observing
the
testimony
of
all
the
experts,
the
Court
finds
WCI’s
expert
Kenneth
Wise
most
credi
ble.
Indetermining
economic
benefit,
the
Court
therefore
finds
an
after-tax,
risk-free
rate
is
correct.
B.
Period
for
Determination
of
Economic
Benefit.
For
determining
economic
benefit,
the
Plaintiff
United
States
says
that
computation
should
accrue
from
the
initial
dates
of-
noncompliance
until
actual
compli
ance
is
achieved.
Thus,
the
United
States
argues
that
economic
benefit
should
be
calculated
from
November
1988,
the
first
date
of
noncompliance.
[11N25]
RCRA
encompasses
both
current
and
con
tinuing
violations,
even
if
the
latter
originated
in
activi
ties
occurring
before
the
applicable
date
of
the
statute.
State
v.
PVS
Chemicals,
Inc.,
50
F.
Supp.
2d
171,
180
Page
20
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
(W.D.N.Y.
1998).
Thus,
there
is
little
doubt
that
the
Court
may
consider
WCI’s
conduct
prior
to
May
11,
1993,
to
determine
whether
WCI
is
subject
to,
and
vio
lated,
RCRA.
However,
the
assessment
of
a
civil
fine
for
such
a
violation
is
limited
by
the
federal
statute
of
[**61]
limi
tations
found
in
[HN26]
28
U.S.C.
§
2462:
Except
as
otherwise
provided
by
Act
of
Congress,
an
action,
suit
or
proceeding
for
the
enforcement
of
any
civil
fine,
..
.
[or]
penalty.
..
shall
not
be
entertained
unless
commenced
within
five
years
from
the
date
when
the
claim
first
accrued.
28
U.S.C.
§
2462.
Thus,
while
the
economic
benefit
WCI
received
from
violating
RCRA
prior
to
May
11,
1993
may
be
relevant
to
an
examination
of
the
extent
of
the
violations,
the
scope
of
injunctive
relief,
and
WCI’s
good
faith
in
remedying
known
violations,
it
is
not
determina
tive
of
this
Court’s
assessment
of
a
fine.
F.
Ability
to
Pay
The
Plaintiff
United
States
and
Defendant
WCI
dis
pute
WCI’s
ability
to
pay
a
substantial
penalty.
The
United
States
argued
that
WCI
could
and
should
pay
a
penalty
of
$
34
million.
In
major
part,
the
United
States
bases
this
position
upon
certain
high
dividends
that
WCI
paid
its
corporate
owner
in
recent
years.
WCI
challenges
its
ability
to
pay
such
a
penalty
with
impunity.
WCI
says
it
needs
to
invest
$
40
million
in
capital
annually
and
this
investment
would
be
impaired
by
such
a
penalty.
WCI
has
made
[**62]
profits
in
some
recent
years.
However,
it
faces
increased
competition,
especially
dur
ing
business
downturns,
from
numerous
competitors.
First,
cheap
Asian
steel
has
flooded
the
U.S.
and
world
markets.
As
a
result,
U.S.
steel
imports
increased
33%
from
1997
to
1998,
despite
the
fact
that
1997
itself
re
corded
high
imports.
As
a
result
of
these
imports
and
the
consequent
competition,
prices
will
remain
low,
with
lower
profit
margins.
28
28
Hot
rolled
steel
prices
declined
from
$
25.32
per
100
pounds
in
1995
to
$
22.46
in
1996,
to
$
18.12
in
1997,
and
to
about
$
14
in
1998.
Second,
mini-mill
capacity
has
also
increased,
re
sulting
in
lower
prices
and
margins.
This
problem
is
likely
to
continue.
Third,
this
price
competition
with
resulting
pressure
on
margins
has
occurred
during
a
time
of
economic
ex
pansion.
When
the
inevitable
downturn
occurs,
the
pres
sure
on
produèers
will
increase.
As
an
unaffiliated
opera
tion,
WCI
will
likely
face
[*832]
even
greater
pressure
during
the
next
contraction.
Operating
income,
after
taking
[**63]
away
unre
lated
financial
expenses,
declined
from
$
77
million
(S
58
per
ton)
in
1997
to
$
62
million
(S
44
per
ton)
in
1998.
For
the
most
recent
quarter,
ending
January
31,
1999,
WCI’s
operating
income
was
a
$
613,000
loss
compared
to
a
$
14,279,000
profit
in
the
first
quarter
of
the
previous
year.
Capital
expenditures
declined
from
$
39.9
million
in
1997,
to
$
35.4
million
in
1996,
to
$
15.6
million
in
1998.
Taken
as
a
whole,
the
Court
finds
that
Defendant
WCI
does
not
have
ability
to
pay
any
significant
penalty
and
remain
extant
in
the
long
term.
Simply
put,
the
Court
credits
testimony
that
WCI
faces
long
odds
for
survival
in
an
industry
characterized
by
excess
capacity,
unre
strained
dumping
by
foreign
producers,
and
uncertain
future
demand
in
the
next
downturn.
G.
The
Government’s
Conduct
In
fashioning
a
penalty,
the
Court
considers
the
gov
ernment’s
conduct.
Since
1981,
the
Ohio
EPA
has
con
ducted
at
least
twelve
hazardous
waste
compliance
in
spections
of
the
WCI
facility.
After
making
these
inspec
tions,
the
Ohio
EPA
did
not
allege
that
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
were
hazardous
waste
units
subject
to
RCRA.
In
1993,
the
Ohio
EPA
gave
WCI
a
RCRA
Part
B
permit
for
the
storage
of
acid
prior
[**64]
to
recycling.
The
U.S.
EPA
also
inspected
WCI’s
facility
under
the
Clean
Water
Act
and
RCRA
in
1990,
1991,
and
1992.
After
conducting
these
inspections,
the
U.S.
EPA
inspectors
did
not
allege
that
the
Ponds
were
hazardous
waste
units.
Beginning
in
May
1993,
the
U.S.
EPA
made
a
“mul
timedia”
inspection
at
WCI’s
Warren
facility.
This
mul
timedia
inspection
was
made
under
the
Clean
Water
Act,
the
Clean
Air
Act,
RCRA,
and
the
Toxic
Substances
Control
Act.
Shortly
after
conducting
this
inspection,
the
U.S.
EPA
requested
documents
from
WCI.
By
early
spring,
1994,
Defendant
WCI
had
produced
documents
requested
by
the
U.S.
EPA.
With
this
produc
tion,
WCI
gave
the
U.S.
EPA
the
“Turn
Audits”
forms
recording
the
readings
from
the
pH
meters
located
at
the
aeration
influent
box,
the
aeration
tank,
the
rapid
mix
tank,
and
the
No.
3
clarifier.
This
data
reflected
readings
every
two
hours
from
September
1,
1988.
The
Turn
Au
dits
also
reflected
the
records
of
the
grab
sample
pH
measurements
for
Pond
6
influent
wastewater.
Despite
having
this
most
important
evidence
in
early
1994,
the
government
delayed
filing
this
action
until
Page
21
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
May
11,
1998.
The
government
delayed
filing
even
though
it
had
filed
a
Clean
[**65]
Water
Act
action
against
WCI
in
June
1995.
29
The
U.S.
EPA
delayed
fil
ing
even
though
the
EPA
and
WCI
had
reached
a
settle
ment
of
the
Clean
Water
Act
suit
in
April
1998
and
even
though
that
settlement
made
provision
for
the
remedia
tion
of
Pond
6
and
to
fill
in
Pond
6A.
29
United
States
v.
WCI
Steel,
Inc.,
Civil
Action
No.
4:95CV1442
(N.D.
Ohio).
As
described
above,
the
government
delayed
resolu
tion
of
this
dispute.
First,
the
government
delayed
inves
tigation
of
WCI’s
wastewater
handling
methods
despite
knowledge
that
WCI
used
processes
that
are
acidic.
While
RCRA
requires
self-reporting,
the
government’s
inattention
delayed
this
action.
Second,
even
when
it
had
suspicion
and
necessary
information,
the
United
States
delayed
this
action
more
than
four
years.
Moreover,
it
delayed
this
action
despite
expending
large
resources
for
discovery
in
the
1995
Clean
Water
Act
case
and
despite
settlement
efforts
in
that
case.
The
government’s
delay
and
the
government’s
split
ting
of
causes
of
action
are
taken
into
account
[**66]
in
setting
the
penalty
imposed
upon
WCI.
[HN27]
United
States
v.
Bethlehem
Steel
Corp.,
829
F.
Supp.
1047,
1056-58
(N.D.
md.
1993).
“Courts
should
respond
to
EPA’s
undue
agency
delay
by
reducing
penalties
in
an
enforcement
action
[*833]
in
order
to
counteract
any
incentive
the
agency
might
have
to
place
itself
in
a
supe
rior
litigating
position.”
United
States
v.
Marine
Shale
Processors,
81
F.3d
1329,
1337
(5th
Cu.
1996).
H.
Penalty
Finding
The
United
States
requests
a
per
diem
penalty
for
each
violation.
This
Court
will
not
do
so
as
it
is
within
this
Court’s
discretion
to
determine
the
total
amount
of
penalty
that
WCI
should
pay.
However,
the
Court
con
siders
the
total
days
of
violation
in
setting
the
penalty.
Bethlehem
Steel
Corp.,
829
F.
Supp.
at
1056
(citing
United
States
(EPA)
v.
Environmental
Waste
Control,
Inc.,
710
F.
Supp.
1172,
1242
(ND.
md.
1989)).
The
Court
does
not
assume
a
$
25,000
or
$
27,500
per
day
fine
but
rather
views
the
evidence
in
total
to
determine
a
single
penalty.
In
setting
the
penalty,
the
Court
recog
nizes
that
deterrence
is
the
major
purpose
of
a
civil
pen
alty.
Id.
After
considering
Defendant
[**67]
WCI’s
viola
tions,
the
economic
benefit
it
has
obtained,
the
govern
ment’s
undue
delay
in
bringing
this
action,
the
Court
hereby
assesses
a
civil
penalty
against
WCI
in
the
amount
of
$
1
million.
I.
Injunctive
Relief
42
U.S.C.
§
6928(a)
gives
the
Plaintiff
United
States
the
power
to
file
a
civil
action
to
obtain
appropri
ate
relief.
The
relief
sought
can
include
a
temporary
or
permanent
injunction.
{HN28]
Normally,
to
obtain
injunctive
relief
a
party
must
prove
that
there
is
no
adequate
remedy
at
law,
that
the
plaintiff
may
suffer
an
irreparable
injury
if
an
injunc
tion
is
not
granted
and
that
the
balance
of
the
equities
justifies
an
injunction.
However,
when
the
government
brings
the
action
and
shows
that
an
activity
endangers
public
health,
injunctive
relief
is
proper
without
under
taking
a
balancing
of
the
equities.
Environmental
De
fense
Fund,
Inc.
v.
Lamphiei,
714
F.2d
331,
337-38
(4th
Cir.1983);
United
States
v.
Bethlehem
Steel
Corp.,
38
F.3d
862,
868
(7th
Cir.
1994).
In
cases
of
public
health
legislation,
the
emphasis
shifts
from
consideration
of
irreparable
injury
to
concern
for
the
general
public
inter
est.
Id.
The
United
[**68]
States
does
not
allege
that
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
currently
contain
wastewater
with
a
pH
of
2.0
or
below.
There
have
been
no
influent
probe
readings
of
2.0
or
below
after
1995.
The
sludge
lining
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
does
not
have
a
pH
of
2.0
or
lower
and
there
is
no
evidence
that
it
ever
did
have
such
a
low
pH.
Conse
quently,
the
United
States’
request
for
injunctive
relief
does
not
purport
to
correct
ongoing
conditions
that
pose
any
type
of
public
health
risk
or
risk
to
the
environment.
[1{N29]
In
deciding
whether
the
strong
remedy
of
injunctive
relief
should
be
given,
the
Court
is
most
con
cerned
with
whether
this
relief
is
necessary
to
stop
the
danger
that
might
result
from
violations
of
RCRA.
Spe
cifically,
is
injunctive
relief
necessary
to
stop
WCI
from
receiving,
handling,
or
disposing
of
corrosive
wastes
into
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A?
In
circumstances
where
no
evidence
shows
that
corrosive
wastes
have
been
present
in
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A
since
at
least
1995,
the
Court
finds
that
in
junctive
relief
is
not
necessary.
As
desëribed
above,
the
Plaintiff
United
States
filed
an
action
in
June
1995,
alleging
Clean
Water
Act
viola
tions
with
regard
Ponds
5,
6,
and
6A.
With
regard
to
that
action,
the
United
[**69]
States
used
the
same
basic
evidence
that
it
uses
in
this
case.
The
United
States
then
settled
this
Clean
Water
Act
case.
As
part
of
this
settle
ment,
the
United
States
agreed
to
a
Consent
Decree.
In
that
Consent
Decree,
the
United
States
agreed
that
WCI
should
install
a
liner
in
Pond
6
and
to
fill
in
Pond
6A.
Given
the
United
States’s
agreement
that
WCI
install
a
liner,
it
is
inconsistent
to
now
argue
that
Pond
6
must
be
closed
to
preserve
public
health.
Finding
that
the
Plaintiff
United
States
fails
to
show
any
imminent
threat
to
health
or
the
environment,
the
Page
22
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
*;
1999
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17436,
**;
49
ERC
(BNA)
1685;
30
ELR
20169
Court
denies
the
United
States
request
for
injunctive
re
lief.
[*8341
VI.
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
stated
herein,
the
Court
assesses
a
$
1
million
fine
against
Defendant
WCI.
The
Court
finds
injunctive
relief
inappropriate
in
this
case.
Accordingly,
this
action
is
terminated
pursuant
to
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
58.
IT
IS
SO
ORDERED.
Date:
October
22,
1999
Hon.
James
S.
Gwin
U.S.
District
Court
ORDER
The
Court
has
entered
its
findings
of
fact
and
con
clusions
of
law
in
the
above-captioned
case.
For
the
rea
Sons
set
forth
therein,
the
Court
orders
Defendant
WCI
Steel,
Inc.
to
pay
a
civil
fine
of
S
I
million.
Finding
that
WCI’s
RCRA
[**70]
violations
pose
no
threat
to
the
public
health,
the
Court
denies
the
United
States’
request
for
injunctive
relief.
Accordingly,
this
action
is
terminated
pursuant
to
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
58.
IT
IS
SO
ORDERED.
Date:
October
22,
1999
Hon.
James
S.
Gwin
U.S.
District
Court
Judicial
Review
of
Discount
Rates
Used
in
Regulatory
Cost-Benefit
Analysis
Edward
R.
Morrisont
Executive
orders,
statutes,
andprecedent
increasingly
re
quire
cost-benefit
analysis
of
regulations.
Presidential
executive
orders
have
long
required
executive
agencies
to
submit
regulatory
impact
analyses
1
to
the
Office
of
Management
and
Budget
(“0MB”)
before
issuing
regulations,
2
and
recent
federal
legislation
exhibits
a
trend
toward
mandatory
cost-benefit
analysis.
For
ex
ample,
the
Toxic
Substances
Control
Act,
3
the
Federal
Insecticide,
Fungicide
and
Rodenticide
Act,
4
and
the
recent
Safe
Drinking
Water
Act
Amendments
5
require
the
Environmental
Protection
Agency
to
balance
costs
and
benefits
in
regulating
chemicals
and
pesticides.
In
1995,
Congress
passed
the
Unfunded
Mandates
Act,
requiring
cost-benefit
analysis
of
all
significant
federal
regulations
that
require
expenditures
by
state,
local,
or
tribal
governments.
7
Additionally,
Congress
has
proposed
several
bills
t
B.S.
1994
University
of
Utah;
AM.
(Economics)
1997,
The
Univeristy
of
Chicago;
Ph.D.
(Economics)
Candidate
2000,
J.D.
Candidate
2000,
The
University
of
Chicago.
A
regulatory
impact
analysis
assesses
the
potential
costs
and
benefits
(both
mone
tary
and
nonmonetary)
of
a
rule.
EQ
12291,
46
Fed
Reg
13193,
13194
(1981).
The
report
contains
a
“description
of
alternative
approaches
that
could
substantially
achieve
the
same
regulatory
goal
at
lower
cost,
together
with
an
analysis
of
this
potential
benefit
and
costs
and
a
brief
explanation
of
the
legal
reasons
why
such
alternatives,
if
proposed,
could
not
be
adopted.”
Id.
Although
previous
administrations
issued
executive
orders
encouraging
agencies
to
consider
the
economic
impact
of
proposed
regulations,
President
Reagan’s
executive
order,
EQ
12291,
46
Fed
Reg
13193,
was
the
first
to
require
cost-benefit
analysis.
Section
2
of
EQ
12291
required
agencies
to
ensure
that
the
social
benefits
of
a
proposed
regulation
exceed
its
social
costs.
Id.
In
1993,
President
Clinton
issued
EQ
12866,
58
Fed
Reg
51735
(1993),
which
generally
affirms
the
approach
of
the
Reagan
order.
Unlike
Reagan’s
order,
how
ever,
EQ
12866
§
1(b)
merely
endorses
cost-benefit
analysis
as
a
tool
for
evaluating
regula
toryoptions
and
does
not
require
that
benefits
outweigh
costs.
58
Fed
Reg
at
51735-36.
See
generally
Richard
H.
Pildes
and
Cass
R.
Sunstein,
Reinventing
the
Regulatory
State,
62
U
Chi
L
Rev
1,
3-7
(1995)
(comparing
the
different
approaches
of
the
Reagan
and
Clinton
executive
orders);
QMB,
Draft
Report
to
Congress
on
the
Costs
and
Benefits
of
Fed
eral
Regulations,
62
Fed
Reg
39352,
39355-57
(1997)
(describing
the
development
of
regulatory
analyses
in
successive
administrations).
15
USC
§
2605(c)(l)
(1994).
7
USC
§
136(bb)
(1994).
42
USCA
§
300g-l(b)(3)
(1991
&
Supp
1998).
6
Pub
L
No
104-4,
109
Stat
48
(1995),
codified
at
2
USCA
§
1501
et
seq
(1997).
2
USCA
§
1532(a).
1333
1334
The
University
of
Chicago
Law
Review
[65:1333
that
would
require
federal
agencies
to
apply
cost-benefit
analysis
to
all
rules.
8
This
trend
raises
important
questions
about
the
methods
agencies
use
to
conduct
cost-benefit
analysis.
To
perform
the
analysis,
an
agency
must
first
quantify
the
stream
of
costs
and
benefits
that
a
regulation
will
generate
in
current
and
future
pe
riods.
9
Quantification,
however,
is
not
enough.
Because
of
the
time
value
of
money
(that
is,
a
dollar
today
can
be
invested
to
yield
more
than
a
dollar
tomorrow),
costs
and
benefits
in
different
periods
are
different
“goods”
and
are
not
strictly
comparable.
Therefore,
the
agency.
must
choose
a
discount
rate
that
will
con
vert
future
sums
into
present
values.
It
can
then
use
these
pres
ent
values
to
compute
the
net
benefit
(or
“net
present
value”)
of
the
regulation.
Discount
rates
fundamentally
influence
judgments
about
the
need
for
and
the
effectiveness
of
cost-benefit
analysis.In
1986,
0MB
economist
John
Morrall
documented
extreme
variation
in
the
value
that
regulations
implicitly
place
on
humanlife.’
0
On
the
low
end,
a
National
Highway
Traffic
Safety
Administration
(“NHTSA”)
regulation
cost
$100,000
per
life
saved;”
on
the
high
end,
an
Occupational
Safety
and
Health
Administration
(“OSHA”)
rule
cost
$72
billion
per
life
saved.’
2
Although
this
study
has
greatly
influenced
recent
congressional
and
academic
proposals
for
regulatory
reform,’
3
emerging
scholarship
shows
that
Morrall’s
results
depended
critically
on
the
discount
rate
he
See,
for
example.
Risk
Assessment
and
Cost-Benefit
Act
of
1995,
HR
1022,
104th
Cong,
1st
Sess
(Feb
23,
1995);
Regulatory
Improvement
Act
of
1997,
S
981,
105th
Cong,
2d
Sess
(June
27.
1997).
See
generally
Cass
R.
Sunstein,
Congress.
Constitutional
Moments,
and
the
Cost-Benefit
State,
48
Stan
L
Rev
247,
269-86
(1996)
(describing
regulatory
reform
efforts
of
the
104th
Congress);
Thomas
0.
McGarity,
The
Expanded
Debate
over
the
Future
of
the
Regulatory
State,
63
U
Chi
L
Rev
1463,
1528-32
(1996)
(same).
This
Comment
ignores
“incommensurability”
issues—whether
the
value
of
life
or
other
nonmonetary
benefits
can
be
measured
“along
a
single
metric
without
doing
violence
to
our
considered
judgments
about
how
these
goods
are
best
characterized.”
Cass
R.
Sun-
stein,
Incommensurability
and
Valuation
in
Law,
92
Mich
L
Rev
779,
796
(1994)
‘°
John
F.
Morrall
III,
A
Review
of
the
Record,
Regulation
25,
30
table
4
(Nov/Dec
1986).
Initial
Federal
Motor
Vehicle
Safety
Standards,
32
Fed
Reg2408.
2414-15
(1967).
Occupational
Exposure
to
Formaldehyde,
50
Fed
Reg
50412
(1985).
‘
See,
for
example,
Lisa
Heinzerling,
Regulatory
Costs
of
Mythic
Proportions,
107
Yale
L
J
1981
(1998).
Heinzerling
notes,
id
at
1983
n
2,
that
Morrall’s
statistics
underlie
Ste
phen
Breyer,
Breaking
the
Vicious
Circle:
Toward
Effective
Risk
Regulation
24-27
(Har
vard
1993).
For
other
commentary
relying
on
Morrall’s
work,
see
Pildes
and
Sunstein,
62
U
Chi
L
Rev
at
105
&
n
363
(cited
in
note
2);
John
D.
Graham,
The
Risk
Not
Reduced,
3
NYU
Envir
L
J
382,
398
n
79
(1994);
W.
Kip
Viscusi,
Equivalent
Frames
of
Reference
for
Judging
Risk
Regulation
Policies,
3
NYU
Envir
L
J
431,
449-50
n
42
(1994).
19981
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1335
chose,
which
differed
markedly
from
the
rates
NHTSA
and
OSHA
actually
employed.
14
The
Morall
study
is
just
one
example
of
how
small
variations
in
the
discount
rate
can
have
very
large
effects
on
the
results
of
cost-benefit
analysis.
Consider,
for
example,
a
proposed
regula
tion
that
will
generate
$100
in
benefits
in
fifty
years.
The
present
value’
5
of
this
benefit
is
$61
at
a
1
percent
discount
rate,
$14
at
4
percent,
$3
at
7
percent,
and
less
than
$1
at
10
percent.
Unfortu
nately,
despite
the
importance
of
the
discount
rate
in
cost-benefit
analysis,
few
standards
guide
agency
practice.
Although
0MB
has
issued
discount
rate
guidelines
since
1972,16
discount
rates
vary
significantly
within
and
across
agencies.
Few
courts
have
reviewed
agency
discount
rates,
in
part
be
cause
relatively
few
statutes
require
agencies
to
conduct
cost-
benefit
analysis,
and
in
part
because
there
are
no
meaningful
standards
of
review
for
courts
to
apply.
When
courts
have
ad
dressed
the
issue,
they
have
either
deferred
to
agency
discretion
or
imposed
their
own
judgments
about
discounting.
The
absence
of
standards
for
discounting
is
particularly
troubling
as
cost-
benefit
analysis
has
played
an
ever
greater
role
in
new
legisla
tion.
Although
several
legal
scholars
have
discussed
this
problem,
none
has
considered
how
economic
theory
can
assist
courts
in
re
viewing
agency
discount
rates.’
7
This
Comment
develops
a
framework
for
judicial
review
of
an
agency’s
choice
of
discount
rate.
Part
I
discusses
the
striking
variation
in
the
discount
rates
agencies
use.
Part
II
analyzes
the
economic
theory
of
discounting
and
develops
a
simple
conceptual
framework
for
evaluating
particular
discount
rates.
Finally,
Part
III
uses
this
conceptual
framework
to
establish
a
standard
of
re
“
See
Heinzerling,
107
Yale
L
J
at
1984-85
(cited
in
note
13).
The
general
formula
for
computing
the
present
value
(in
discrete
time)
of
asum
X
paid
in
n
years,
where
the
discount
rate
is
r,
is
X/(l
+
r)°.
Thus,
when
the
discount
rate
is
5
percent,
the
present
value
of
$100
paid
in
50
years
is
100/(1
+
.05)5°
=
$8.72.
6
See
0MB,
Benefit-Cost
Analysis
of
Federal
Programs;
Guidelines
and
Discounts,
57
Fed
Reg
53519,
53520
(1992),
replacing
and
rescinding
0MB
Circular
No
A-94,
Discount
Rate
to
be
Used
in
Evaluating
Time-Distributed
Costs
and
Benefits
(Mar
27,
1972).
‘
One
article
has
explored
the
appropriate
discount
rate
policy
for
regulatory
agen
cies.
Daniel
A.
Farber
and
Paul
A.
Hemmersbaugh,
The
Shadow
of
the
Future:
Discount
Rates,
Later
Generations,
and
the
Environment,
46
Vand
L
Rev
267
(1993).
The
authors,
however,
do
not
address
the
appropriate
standard
ofjudicial
review.
Other
commentators
have
discussed
agency
discount
rates
without
reference
to
judicial
review.
See,
for
exam
ple,
Heinzerling,
107
Yale
L
J
at
2043-56
(cited
in
note
13);
Bradford
C.
Mank,
Protecting
the
Environment
for
Future
Generations:
A
Proposal
for
a
Republican
Superagency,
5
NYU
Envir
L
J
444,
460-62
(1996).
See
also
Cass
R.
Sunstein,
BehavioralAnalysis
of
Law,
64
U
Chi
L
Rev
1175,
1193-94
(1997).
1336
The
University
of
Chicago
LawReview
[65:1333
view
that
courts
may
apply
when
reviewing
an
agency’s
choice
of
discount
rate.
I.
AGENCY
PRACTICE:
LARGE
VARIATION
WITHIN
AND
ACROSS
AGENCIES
Agencies
exhibit
striking
inconsistencies
in
their
use
of
dis
count
rates.
Not
only
do
different
agencies
use
significantly
dif
ferent
rates,
but
often
a
single
agency
employs
very
different
rates
for
various
regulations.
Administrative
records
offer
little
explanation
for
this
variation.
In
an
effort
to
standardize
agency
cost-benefit
analysis,
0MB
has
issued
discount
rate
guidelines
since
l972.’
The
most
recent
guidelines,
published
in
1992,
recommend
a
7
percent
real’
9
dis
count
rate
for
analysis
of
all
“public
investments
and
regulatory
programs
that
provide
benefits
and
costs
to
the
general
public.”
20
0MB
asserts
that
this
rate
“approximates
the
marginal
pretax
rate
of
return
on
an
average
investment
in
the
private
sector
in
recent
years.”
21
However,
0MB.
acknowleliges
that
alternative
rates
may
be
appropriate
in
some
cases.
22
OMB’s
guidelines
appear
to
have
had
little
effect
on
the
dis
count
rates
that
agencies
actually
uáe.
23
This
is
evident
in
Tables
I
and
2
(following
this
Comment),
which
survey
the
discount
rates
agencies
have
employed
during
the
past
five
years.
Table
1
focuses
on
long-term
regulations
that
provide
costs
or
benefits
over
thirty
or
more
years.
Some
agencies,
such
as
the
Department
of
Housing
and
Urban
Development
(“HUD”)
and
the
Food
and
Drug
Administration
(“FDA”),
have
used
a
relatively
low
rate
of
3
percent;
others,
such
as
the
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(“EPA”)
and
the
Bureau
of
Reclamation,
have
employed
rates
in
excess
of
7
percent.
Further,
individual
agencies
have
used
differ
ent
rates
for
different
regulations.
The
EPA,
for
example,
em-
8
See
0MB,
Benefit-Cost
Analysis
of
Federal
Programs,
57
Fed
Reg
at
53520
(cited
in
note
16).
A
real
discount
rate
(as
opposed
to
a
nominal
rate)
excludes
the
premium
for
ex
pected
inflation.
20
0MB,
Benefit-Cost
Analysis
of
Federal
Programs,
57
Fed
Reg
at
53522-23
(cited
in
note
16).
Prior
to
1992,
0MB
recommended
a
10
percent
rate.
0MB,
Guidelines
and
Dis
count
Rates
for
Benefit-Cost
Analysis
of
Federal
Programs.
57
Fed
Reg
35613,
35613-14
(1992).
2
0MB,
Benefit-Cost
Analysis
of
Federal
Programs,
57
Fed
Reg
at
53523
(cited
in
note
16).
22
An
agency,
however,
must
gain
0MB
permission
to
use
alternative
discount
rates,
such
as
the
“shadow
price
of
capital,”
instead
of
the
recommended
7
percent
rate.
Id.
0MB
has
acknowledged
as
much.
See
0MB,
Draft
Report
to
Congress,
62
Fed
Reg
at
39379
(cited
in
note
2),
where
0MB
notes
that
the
EPA
did
not
use
the
recommended
dis
count
rate
in
conducting
its
analysis
of
its
lead-based
paint
rule.
19981
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1337
ployed
a
3
percent
discount
rate
for
regulations
of
lead-based
paint
but
used
7
and
10
percent
rates
for
regulations
of
drinking
water
and
emissions
from
locomotives.
This
variation
in
discount
rates
has
profound
effects
on
the
analysis
of
long-term
regula
tions.
Consider
the
HUD
regulation
of
lead-based
paint
24
While
that
regulation
had
net
benefits
of
$1,080.2
million
at
a
3
percent
discount
rate,
it
had
net
benefits
of
only
$39
million
at
a
7
per
cent
rate.
25
Although
HUD
acknowledged
this,
it
favored
the
3
percent
rate
merely
because
the
regulation
affected
future
gen
erations
26
Slightly
less
inconsistency
characterizes
agency
analyses
of
short-term
regulations
that
yield
benefits
and
costs
within
the
next
twenty
years.
Table
2
shows
that
most
agencies
use
discount
rates
between
7
and
10
percent.
However,
there
is
still
significant
variation:
several
agencies,
such
as
the
EPA
27
and
the
FDA,
28
have
used
3
percent
rates.
The
administrative
record
offers
little
explanation
for
the
selection
of
discount
rates.
Many
agencies
employ
discount
rates
without
discussing
the
theoretical
or
political
reasons
for
choos
ing
a
particular
rate.
29
This
seems
particularly
true
for
the
EPA.
3
°
II.
THE
THEORY
OF
DISCOUNT
RATES
Scholars
have
long
debated
what
discount
rate
is
appropriate
for
regulations
and
other
public
projects.
The
debate
has
ethical,
political,
and
economic
dimensions.
On
one
level,
scholars
debate
the
threshold
issue
of
whether
it
is
sound
public
policy
for
regula
HUD,
Requirements
for
Notification,
Evaluation
and
Reduction
of
Lead-Based
Paint
Hazards
in
Federally
Owned
Residential
Property
and
Housing
Receiving
Federal
Assis
tance,
61
Fed
Reg
29170
(1996).
Id
at
29189.
Id.
HUD
noted
that
EPA
also
uses
a
3
percent
rate.
Id.
See
EPA.
Comprehensive
Guideline
for
Procurement
of
Products
Containing
Recov
ered
Materials,
62
Fed
Reg
60962,
60970
(1997)
(employing
a
3
percent
rate
over
a
ten-
year
period).
See
Department
of
Health
and
Human
Services,
Tobacco
Regulation
forSubstance
Abuse
Prevention
and
Treatment
Block
Grants,
61
Fed
Reg
1492,
1504,
1506
(1996)
(pre
senting
benefit-cost
analysis
results
using
both
3
and
7
percent
discount
rates).
‘
Rare
exceptions
include
the
Department
of
Energy’s
regulation
on
energy
conserva
tion
standards
for
consumer
products,
see
Department
of
Energy,
Energy
Conservation
Program
for
Consumer
Products,
58
Fed
Reg
47326,
47333-35
(1993),
and
the
National
Oceanic
and
Atmospheric
Administration
rules
on
natural
resource
damage
assessments,
see
Department
of
Commerce,
National
Oceanic
and
Atmospheric
Administration,
Natu
ral
Resource
Damage
Assessments,
61
Fed
Reg
440,
453-54
(1996),
where
the
agencies
jus
tify
their
decisions
to
depart
from
0MB
guidelines.
See
discussion
in
Part
111G.
°
See,
for
example,
EPA,
Protection
of
Stratospheric
Ozone;
Labeling,
58
Fed
Reg
8136,
8163
(1993)
(offering
alternative
conclusions
using
a
2
percent
and
7
percent
rate
without
providing
an
explanation
for
using
either
discount
rate).
1338
The
University
of
Chicago
LawReview
[65:1333
tory
agencies
to
discount
future
benefits,
especially
when
those
benefits
accrue
to
future
generations.
On
another
level,
given
the
choice
to
discount
future
costs
and
benefits,
the
debate
becomes
more
economic.
Here
scholars
disagree
whether
regulatory
agen
cies
should
derive
the
appropriate
discount
rate
from
rates
of
re
turn
in
financial
markets
or
from
a
normative
model
of
intergenerational
social
welfare.
This
Part
surveys
both
levels
of
the
debate.
Part
A
addresses
the
ethical,
political,
and
economic
debate
over
the
threshold
de
cision
to
discount
future
costs
and
benefits,
demonstrating
that
sound
public
policy
requires
a
regulatory
agency
to
discount
fu
ture
sums.
Part
B
surveys
the
economic
and
political
debate
over
the
appropriate
discount
rate.
Finally,
Part
C
synthesizes
the
discussion
in
this
Part
and
develops
a
simple
conceptual
frame
work
for
choosing
and
evaluating
discount
rates.
A.
The
Philosophical
Approach
to
Discount
Rates
Philosophers,
3
’
legal
scholars,
32
and
several
economists
33
have
questioned
the
ethical
and
logical
theory
underlying
the
decision
to
discount
future
costs
and
benefits
to
future
generations.
A
strong
intuition
suggests
that
individual
lives
today
are
no
more
or
less
valuable
than
lives
in
the
future.
34
Just
as
a
person’s
life
should
not
be
treated
as
less
valuable
because
the
person
lives
one
hundred
miles
away,
so
too
a
life
should
not
be
treated
as
less
valuable
because
it
will
exist
one
hundred
years
in
the
future.
Thus
philosophers
and
some
economists
have
argued
that
a
zero
discount
rate
should
be
used
when
evaluating
projects
with
consequences
that
may
benefit
or
harm
future
generations.
35
This
See,
for
example,
Derek
Parfit,
Rationality
and
Time,
1983/84
Proceedings
of
the
Aristotelian
Society
47,
79-81
Derek
Parfit,
Energy
Policy
and
the
Further
Future:
The
Social
Discount
Rate,
in
Douglas
MacLean
and
Peter
C.
Brown,
eds,
Energy
and
the
Fu
ture
31-37
(Rowman
and
Littlefield
1983):
John
Rawls,
A
Theory
of
Justice
284-303
(Belknap
1971).
32
See,
for
example,
Farber
and
Hemmersbaugh,
46
Vand
L
Rev
at
289-300
(cited
in
note
17);
Mank,
5
NYU
Envir
L
J
at
448-50,
460-62
(cited
in
note
17).
See,
for
example,
R.F.
Harrod,
Towards
a
Dynamic
Economics:
Some
Recent
Devel
opments
of
Economic
Theory
and
their
Application
to
Policy
37-40
(Macmillan
1948);
AC.
Pigou,
The
Economics
of
Welfare
24-26
(Macmillan
4th
ed
1932);
F.P.
Ramsey,
A
Mathe
matical
Theory
of
Saving,
in
J.M.
Keynes
and
D.H.
MacGregor,
eds,
The
Economic
Jour
nal:
The
Journal
of
the
Royal
Economic
Society
543
(Macmillan
1928);
Robert
M.
Solow,
The
Economics
of
Resources
or
the
Resources
of
Economics,
64
Am
Econ
Rev:
Papers
and
Proceedings
1,
7-14
(1974).
See
Bruce
A.
Ackerman,
Social
Justice
in
the
Liberal
State
203
(Yale
1980).
‘
See
id
at
203;
Harrod,
Towards
a
Dynamic
Economics
at
45
(cited
in
note
33);
Parfit,
Energy
Policy
at
31,
36-37
(cited
in
note
31);
Ramsey,
A
Mathematical
Theory
of
Saving
at
554
(cited
in
note
33);
Solow,
64
Am
Econ
Rev:
Papers
and
Proceedings
at
9
(cited
in
note
33).
1998]
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1339
approach
recognizes
that
harms
to
future
generations
deserve
no
less
protection
than
harms
to
the
current
generation.
As
the
re
nowned
economist
Frank
Ramsey
explained:
‘
[I]t
is
assumed
that
we
do
not
discount
later
enjoyments
in
comparison
with
earlier
ones,
a
practice
which
is
ethically
indefensible
and
arises
merely
from
the
weakness
of
the
imagination.”
36
Some
commentators
go
further,
arguing
that
the
“present
generation
has
a
fiduciary
responsibility
to
see
that
future
gen
erations
enjoy
a
parity
of
social
value
and
opportunity.”
37
This
fi
dueiary
duty
implies
that
the
welfare
of
future
generations,
espe
cially
nearer
ones,
should
be
treated
on
par
with
(that
is
to
say,
not
discounted
relative
to)
the
welfare
of
the
current
generation.
38
This
argument
for
zero
discounting,
however,
does
not
deny
the
time
value
of
money—that
a
dollar
tomorrow
is
worth
less
than
a
dollar
today
(because
a
dollar
can
be
invested
today
and
yield
more
than
a
dollar
tomorrow).
Indeed,
proponents
of
zero
discount
rates
likely
would
agree
that
society
should
discount
a
monetary
sum
payable
to
future
generations.
Society
can
be
queath
that
benefit
to
future
generations
simply
by
investing
a
smaller
sum
in
financial
markets
today.
Rather,
proponents
of
zero
discounting
argue
that
regulators
should
not
discount
non-
monetary
benefits
to
future
generations.
Putting
aside
difficult
commensurability
problems,
society
cannot
bequeath
these
bene
fits
to
future
generations
merely
by
investing
in
financial
mar
kets.
This
is
especially
true
for
environmental,
health,
and
other
less
tangible
benefits
that
future
generations
may
be
unable
to
“buy,”
because
previous
generations
caused
irreversible
damage
to
the
resources
that
provide
these
benefits.
For
example,
if
cur
rent
society
improperly
stores
nuclear
waste
and
leakage
causes
the
death
of
a
child
in
some
future
generation,
no
sum
will
enable
the
parent
to
“buy”
back
the
child’s
life.
While
reasonable,
the
ethical
intuition
that
the
state
should
not
discount
benefits
to
future
generations
suffers
from
two
weaknesses.
First,
this
ethical
standard
can
beget
apparently
un
ethical
results.
If
the
current
generation
is
morally
obligated
to
treat
the
welfare
of
future
generations
on
par
with
its
own
wel
fare,
then
logic
dictates
that
the
current
generation
has
a
duty
to
undertake
almost
any
sacrifice,
short
of
starvation,
to
benefit
the
Ramsey,
A
Mathematical
Theory
of
Saving
at
261
(cited
in
note
33).
Mank,
5
NYU
Envir
L
J
at
448
(cited
in
note
17),
referring
to
Ackerman,
Social
Jus
tice
at
203
(cited
in
note
34).
See
also
Rawis,
A
Theory
of
Justice
at
284-93
(cited
in
note
31);
Mark
Sagoff,
The
Economy
of
the
Earth:
Philosophy,
Law
and
the
Environment
63
(Cambridge
1988).
See
Farber
and
Hemmersbaugh,
46
Vand
L
Rev
at
298-99
(cited
in
note
17).
1340
The
University
of
Chicago
LawReview
[65:1333
future.
39
By
foregoing
consumption
today
and
investing
in
proj
ects
that
provide
a
stream
of
benefits
for
future
generations,
the
current
generation
suffers
a
finite
sacrifice
but
generates
an
infi
nite
benefit
(due
to
zero
discounting)
for
the
future.
4
°
Indeed,
the
moral
intuition
of
zero
discounting
implies
that
it
may
be
optimal
for
the
current
generation
to
save
two-thirds
or
more
of
its
an
nual
income.
4
’
This
is
unacceptable,
however,
for
“individuals
are
not
morally
required
to
subscribe
fully
to
morality,
at
any
cost
to
themselves.”
42
Further,
while
the
argument
against
discounting
seems
compelling
where
future
harms
(such
as
the
death
of
a
child)
are
irreversible,
this
argument
is
too
powerful.
Most,
if
not
all,
regulations
today
seek
to
prevent
some
form
of
irreversible
damage
in
the
future,
perhaps
in
future
generations.
Therefore,
even
the
argument
against
discounting
irreversible
damage
would
generate
excessive
sacrifice
today.
Second,
the
moral
intuition
of
zero
discounting
rests
on
the
questionable
assumption
that
government
policy
should
be
based
on
moral
introspection
rather
than
individuals’
actual
behavior.
Unless
there
is
evidence
that
the
current
generation
is
not
suffi
cientl.y
altruistic
toward
future
generations
(evidence
of
a
market
failure),
the
observed
behavior
of
individuals
may
be
the
most
re
liable
indicator
of
the
beliefs
and
values
that
should
dictate
policy
choices
in
a
democracy.
Relative
to
the
government,
parents
(the
current
generation)
probably
have
superior
information
about
op
timal
investments
in
the
welfare
of
their
children
future
genera
tions).
Further,
even
if
surveys
indicate
that
a
majority
of
the
members
of
the
current
generation
favors
a
zero
discount
rate,
this
finding
is
not
persuasive
if
individuals
in
society
behave
as
if
they
discount
the
future.
43
Discounting
may
be
a
good
description
See
Kenneth
J.
Arrow,
Discounting,
Morality,
and
Gaming
3-8,
working
paper
(Dec
24,
1996),
available
online
at
<http://www-econ.stanford.edulecon/wk-workp/swp970004.
html>
(visited
July
6,
1998).
See
id
at
5.
See
id
at
6-7,
developing
a
simple
model
ofoptimal
investment
and
saving
in
a
world
that
lasts
forever.
Empirical
estimates
of
the
model’s
parameters
suggest
that
the
optimal
savings
rate
is
two-thirds
or
greater.
Id
at
2.
Philosophers
and
legal
scholars
reject
this
criticism,
claiming
that
it
con
fuses
intergenerational
efficiency
and
intergenerational
equity.
See
Tyler
Cowen
and
Derek
Parfit.
Against
the
Social
Discount
Rate,
in
Peter
Laslett
and
James
S.
Fishkin,
eds,
Justice
between
Age
Groups
and
Generations
148-49
(Yale
1992);
Farber
and
Hem
mersbaugh,
46
Vand
L
Rev
at
291-92
(cited
in
note
17).
In
reality,
society
maximizes
two
objectives:
total
welfare
and
intergenerational
equity.
See
Cowen
and
Parfit,
Against
the
Social
Discount
Rate
at
149
(“[W]e
should
not
simply
aim
for
the
greatest
net
sum
of
bene
fits.
We
should
have
a
second
moral
aim:
that
these
benefits
be
fairly
shared
between
dif
ferent
generations.”),
citing
Rawls,
A
Theory
of
Justice
at
297-98
(cited
in
31).
‘°
For
a
well-known
statement
of
this
principle
of
economic
modeling,
see
Milton
Friedman,
The
Methodology
of
Positive
Economics,
in
Kurt
R.
Leube,
ed,
The
Essence
of
19981
Regulatory
Disco
unt
Rates
1341
of
individual
behavior,
and
a
good
guide
for
public
policy,
re
gardless
of
whether
individuals
believe
they
discount
the
future
or
not.
44
B.
The
Economic
Approach
to
Discount
Rates
Economic
theory
offers
two
principal
theories
for
discounting
costs
and
benefits
to
future
generations:
the
opportunity
cost
of
capital
(“0CC”)
and
the
social
rate
of
time
preference
(“SRTP”).
Both
theories
provide
strong
political
and
ethical
support
for
posi
tive
discount
rates.
However,
economists
disagree
whether
the
CCC
or
SRTP
should
guide
regulators.
45
Although
the
two
theo
ries
are
logically
consistent,
4
°
they
generate
very
different
dis
count
rates
in
practice.
The
SRTP
yields
relatively
low
rates,
around
1
to
3
percent.
47
In
contrast,
the
0CC
generally
produces
rates
in
excess
of
5
percent.
48
This
Part
introduces
the
two
theo
ries
and
reviews
the
major
issues
underlying
the
debate.
1.
Opportunity
cost
of
capital.
a)
The
economic
theory.
The
cost
of
a
public
investment
is
not
merely
the
value
of
the
resources
consumed.
It
also
includes
the
opportunity
cost
of
those
resources.
The
opportunity
cost
re
flects
the
value
of
the
next
best
use
of
the
resources,
such
as
in
vestment
in
the
private
sector.
Consider,
for
example,
a
proposed
regulation
that
costs
$1
million
today
and
promises
to
reduce
Friedman
16
1-66
(Hoover
Institution
1987).
Kenneth
J.
Arrow
has
demonstrated
that
this
is
actually
the
case
in
Intergenerational
Equity
and
the
Rate
of
Discount
in
Long-Term
Social
Investment
19-20,
working
paper
(Dec
1995),
available
online
at
<http:Ilwww-econ.stanford.edu/econ/workp/
swp97005.html>
(visited
July
5,
1998).
Even
in
a
world
where
each
generation
wants
to
treat
all
future
generations
equally,
every
generation
will
behave
as
if
it
discounts
the
fu
ture.
This
occurs
because,
as
the
philosophical
critique
recognizes,
no
generation
will
make
excessive
sacrifices
for
the
future.
Every
generation
is
slightly
selfish.
Consequently,
each
generation
strategically
decides
how
many
resources
to
transfer
to
the
next
genera
tion.
given
that
the
nextgenerations
may
decide
not
to
transfer
these
resources
to
the
fur
ther
future.
The
result
of
this
strategic
interaction
is
a
savings
rate
that
corresponds
to
a
positive
rate
of
discount
on
the
welfare
of
future
generations.
See
id
at
3-10.
6
See
Robert
C.
Lind,
A
Primer
on
the
Major
Issues
Relating
to
the
Discount
Rate
for
Evaluating
National
Energy
Options,
in
Robert
C.
Lind,
ed,
Discounting
for
Time
and
Risk
in
Energy
Policy
27
(Resources
for
the
Future
1982).
‘
See
Kenneth
J.
Arrow,
et
al,
Intertemporal
Equity.
Discounting
and
Eco.iomic
Effi
ciency.
in
James
P.
Bruce,
Hoesung
Lee,
and
Erik
F.
Haites,
eds,
Climate
Change
1995
131-33
(Cambridge
1996);
Richard
D.
Morgenstern,
Conducting
an
Economic
Analysis:
Rationale.
Issues,
and
Requirements,
in
Richard
D.
Morgenstern,
ed,
Economic
Analyses
at
EPA:
Assessing
Regulatory
Impact
36
(Resources
for
the
Future
1997).
See
Arrow,
et
al,
Intertemporal
Equity
at
132-33
(cited
in
note
47);
Morgenstern,
Conducting
an
Economic
Analysis
at
36
(cited
in
note
47).
1342
The
University
of
Chicago
Law
Review
[65:1333
pollutants
that
will
cause
damaging
climate
change
in
fifty
years.
If
nothing
is
done
to
control
the
pollutants
today,
fifty
years
from
now
future
society
will
suffer
damage
requiring
$10
million
in
abatement
costs.
At
first
blush,
the
regulation
appears
attractive:
a
$1
million
investment
avoids
a
$10
million
expenditure
in
the
future.
No
conclusion
about
the
desirability
of
the
regulation
can
be
drawn,
however,
without
considering
the
next
best
use
of
the
$1
million
investment
today.
If
the
resources
could
be
invested
in
an
asset,
such
as
a
long-term
bond
with
a
5
percent
return,
soci
ety
would
be
better
served
if
the
government
avoided
the
regula
tion:
the
bond
would
yield
over
$10
million
in
fifty
years,
49
leaving
future
generations
with
more
than
enough
resources
to
combat
the
environmental
damage.
In
other
words,
at
a
5
percent
dis
count
rate,
the
proposed
regulation
does
not
pass
the
cost-benefit
test
because
it
has
a
negative
net
present
value.
A
standard
measure
of
the
opportunity
cost
of
a
public
in
vestment
is
the
interest
rate
on
assets
with
similar
risk
and
du
ration
in
private
financial
markets.
Public
investment
generally
displaces
private
investment
because
it
takes
resources
out
of
the
private
sector,
either
directly
(through
taxes)
or
indirectly
(through
the
private
costs
of
complying
with
regulations)
Pri
vate
assets,
therefore,
represent
the
next
best
investment
oppor
tunities
for
the
resources
used
for
public
investments.
5
’
The
fundamental
intuition
underlying
the
CCC
approach
is
that
the
government
should
choose
projects
that
maximize
the
re
sources
available
to
future
generations,
not
those
that
maximize
particular
aspects
of
future
welfare,
such
as
environmental
well
being.
Because
the
current
generation
cannot
know
the
economic
constraints
facing
future
generations,
it
is
better
for
the
current
generation
to
invest
in
their
general
well-being
by
choosing
the
projects
with
the
highest
rates
of
return.
As
proponents
of
this
approach
argue:
Insofar
as
we
today
should
consider
the
welfare
of
future
generations,
our
duty
lies
not
in
leaving
them
exactly
the
so
cial
and
environmental
life
we
think
they
ought
to
have,
but
rather
in
making
it
possible
for
them
to
inherit
a
climate
of
open
choices—that
is,
in
leaving
behind
a
larger
level
of
gen
eral
fluid
resources
to
be
redirected
as
they,
not
we,
see
fit.
52
The
actual
payoff
of
the
bond
would
be
($l,000000)x(1.05)5°=$
11,467,340.
See,
for
example,
Arrow,
Intergenerational
Equity
at
7
(cited
in
note
44);
William
J.
Baumol,
On
the
Social
Rate
of
Discount,
58
Am
Econ
Rev
788,
789-93
(1968).
See
generally
Discounting
an
Uncertain
Future,
FEEM
Newsletter
24
(Dec
1997).
52
Arrow,
et
al,
Intertemporal
Equityat
133
(cited
in
note
47),
quoting
Aaron
Wildav
1998]
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1343
b)
Applying
the
economic
theory.
The
0CC
is
a
descriptive
approach
to
the
choice
of
a
social
discount
rate.
53
The
approach
assurns
that
the
price
system—in
particular,
the
rate
of
return
available
in
financial
markets—accurately
reflects
the
scarcity
of
resources,
expectations
about
the
future,
and
societal
preferences
regarding
future
consumption
vis-à-vis
current
consumption.
The
0CC
approach
makes
no
assumptionabout
what
the
social
dis
count
rate
should
be.
The
0CC
approach,
however,
is
complicated
and
may
not
be
appropriate
for
evaluating
all
public
projects.
Critics
have
identi
fied
several
limitations
to
the
0CC
approach.
To
begin,
the
CCC
is
not
directly
observable.
Rates
of
return
in
financial
markets
in
clude
premia
for
risk,
54
the
expected
rate
of
inflation,
and
taxes
that
should
not
affect
the
social
discount
rate.
Scholars
have
shown
that
once
these
factors
are
subtracted,
the
discount
rate
(in
real
terms)
will
generally
exceed
5
percent,
but
it
may
be
as
low
as
1
percent.
55
The
particular
rate
will
vary
over
time
and
will
change
with
expectations
regarding
the
welfare
of
future
genera
tions.
Critics,
however,
note
that
it
is
very
difficult
to
adjust
ob
served
rates
of
return
for
taxation,
risk,
and
other
factors.
56
sky,
Searching
for
Safety
216
(Transaction
Books
1988).
See
Arrow,
et
al,
Intertemporal
Equity
at
132-33
(cited
in
note
47).
Although
risk-averse
investors
demand
a
premium
to
compensate
for
the
risk
of
an
asset,
most
scholars
agree
that
no
such
premium
is
necessary
for
government
investments
because
(1)
the
government’s
investment
portfolio
(its
collection
of
regulations
and
in
vestments)
is
sufficiently
broad
to
eliminate
most
diversifiable
risk,
see
Baumol,
58
Am
Econ
Rev
at
794
(cited
in
note
50),
and
(2)
even
if
a
government
investment
is
risky,
the
cost
of
risk-bearing
is
trivial
when
it
is
spread
among
taxpayers,
see
Kenneth
J.
Arrow
and
Robert
C.
Lind,
Uncertainty
and
the
Evaluation
of
Public
In
vestment
Decisions,
60
Am
Econ
Rev
364,
3
70-74
(1970).
‘
See
Arrow,
et
al,
Intertemporal
Equity
at
133
(cited
in
note
47);
Raymond
J.
Kopp
and
Paul
R.
Portney,
Mock
Referenda
for
Intergenerational
Decisionmaking,
5
Discussion
Paper
97-48
(Resources
for
the
Future
1997),
available
online
at
<http://www.rff.org?
disc_papersfPDF_
files/9748.pdf>
(visited
July
5,
1998).
See
Richard
H.
Thaler
and
George
Loewenstein,
Intertemporal
Choice,
in
Richard
H.
Thaler,
ed,
The
Winner’s
Curse:
Paradoxes
and
Anomalies
of
Economic
Life
105-06
(Princeton
1996).
Additionally,
some
scholars
object
to
the
use
of
the
0CC
when
an
agency
evaluates
benefits
to
future
generations
because
financial
markets
generally
do
not
offer
assets
that
pay
Out
in
future
generations.
See
Farber
and
Hemmersbaugh,
46
Vand
L
Rev
at
296-97
(cited
in
note
17);
FEEM
Newsletter,
Discounting
at
24-25
(cited
in
note
51).
The
0CC
makes
most
sense
where
financial
markets
offer
assets
with
term
structures
that
are
similar
to
regulations
that
agencies
are
considering.
In
such
situations,
the
agency
can
di
rectly
compare
the
payoff
of
the
regulation
to
the
payoff
of
the
asset.
Where
the
regulation
involves
intergenerational
welfare,
financial
markets
are
unhelpful
and
therefore
the
0CC
approach
is
inappropriate.
This
objection,
however,
merely
points
out
a
complication
of
the
0CC;
it
does
not
undermine
the
approach.
Financial
markets
will
exist
in
future
genera
tions,
so
there
are
trading
strategies
whereby
individuals
could
invest
sequentially
in
pri
vate
assets
that
collectively
have
a
duration
comparable
to
the
long-term
public
project.
The
expected
rate
of
return
on
this
strategy
would
be
one
logical
discount
rate
for
the
public
investment.
1344
The
University
of
Chicago
Law
Review
[65:1333
Additionally,
critics
note
that
the
0CC
approach
assumes
that
public
projects
and
regulations
divert
resources
(via
taxa
tion)
from
capital
markets.
To
the
contrary,
evidence
suggests
that,
in
the
absence
of
taxation,
members
of
society
would
invest
only
a
fraction
of
their
resources
in
credit
markets
57
and
would
consume
the
rest.
Therefore,
to
the
extent
that
regulations
are
fi
nanced
by
resources
that
would
otherwise
be
consumed,
the
0CC
may
overstate
the
appropriate
rate
of
discount.
Instead,
the
SRTP,
which
measures
the
rate
at
which
society
is
willing
to
trade
current
and
future
consumption,
may
be
closer
to
the
rele
vant
rate.
58
These
considerations
have
led
some
economists
to
conclude
that
the
appropriate
discount
rate
may
vary
with
the
type
of
regulation
or
public
project
and
how
it
is
financed.
When
the
gov
ernment
relies
on
debt
to
finance
the
regulation,
the
0CC
pro
vides
more
accurate
results.
59
When
government
relies
on
taxes,
however,
a
combination
of
the
0CC
approach
and
the
SRTP
ap
proach
may
be
more
appropriate.
60
At
least
one
economist,
how
ever,
has
questioned
this
notion
that
the
discount
rate
should
vary
with
the
government’s
source
of
funds.
61
Whether
the
state
uses
debt
or
taxes
to
finance
regulations,
it
is
essentially
impos
ing
a
tax
on
production
by
diverting
inputs
from
productive
proc
esses
(firms).
Therefore,
the
appropriate
discount
rate
will
always
be
the
0CC.
2.
Social
rate
of
time
preference.
a)
The
economic
theory.
While
the
0CC
relies
on
observable
behavior
to
derive
the
social
discount
rate,
the
SRTP
relies
on
theory
to
derive
that
rate.
Standard
economic
theory
hypothe
sizes,
62
and
empirical
evidence
confirms,
63
that
individuals
value
See
Arrow,
Intergenerational
Equity
at
9
(cited
in
note
44).
“
See
id;
see
also
Lind,
A
Primer
on
the
Major
Issues
at
29-32
(cited
in
note
46);
Joel
D.
Scheraga,
Perspectives
on
Goverhnient
Discounting
Policies,
18
J
Envir
Econ
&
Mgmt
S
65,
S-67
(1990).
The
SRTP
is
discussed
in
the
following
Part.
See,
for
example.
Scheraga,
18
J
Envir
Econ
&
Mgmt
at
S-65
(cited
in
note
58).
The
appropriate
discount
rate
would
be
a
weighted
average
of
the
rates
derived
from
the
0CC
and
SRTP
approaches,
where
the
weights
are
approximately
equal
to
the
propor
tion
of
funds
that
displaces
Tnvestment
(for
the
0CC-based
rate)
and
the
proportion
that
displaces
consumption
(for
the
SRTP-based
rate).
See
Larry
A.
Sjaastad
and
Daniel
L.
Wisecarver,
The
Social
Cost
of
Public
Finance,
85
J
Pol
Econ
513,
514-16
(1977).
See
Baumol,
58
Am
Econ
Rev
at
79
1-92
(cited
in
note
50).
See
generally
Maureen
L.
Cropper
and
Frances
G.
Sussman,
Valuing
Future
Risks
to
Life,
19
J
Envir
Econ
&
Mgmt
160,
173-74
(1990)
(applying
standard
theory
to
the
problem
of
valuing
future
risks
to
life);
Andreu
Mas-Colell,
Michael
D.
Whinston,
and
Jerry
R.
Green,
Microeconomic
Theory
732-36
(Oxford
1995)
(describing
standard
theory
of
intertemporal
choice
and
the
theory
underlying
discounting).
1998]
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1345
current
consumption
more
than
future
consumption.
The
rate
at
which
a
person
will
trade
(via
a
hypothetical
asset)
current
for
fu
ture
consumption
is
known
as
the
individual
rate
of
time
prefer
ence.
Analogously,
the
social
rate
of
time
preference
represents
the
rate
at
which
members
of
society,
on
average,
are
willing
to
trade
current
benefits
for
future
benefits.
The
appropriate
meas
ure
of
the
SRTP,
however,
depends
on
the
government’s
theory
of
intergenerational
welfare:
different
models
of
welfare
imply
dif
ferent
measures
of
the
SRTP.
Most
welfare
models,
in
which
the
current
government
chooses
projects
to
maximize
the
joint
welfare
of
all
generations,
show
that
the
SRTP
can
be
written
as
the
sum
of
two
compo
nents:
pure
time
preference
and
the
growth
rate
of
per
capita
in
come.
64
Pure
time
preference
is
a
measure
of
preferences,
reflect
ing
each
generation’s
desire
(or
impatience)
to
receive
benefits
sooner
rather
than
later.
65
The
more
impatient
the
present
gen
eration,
the
higher
the
discount
rate
on
benefits
to
future
genera
tions.
The
growth
rate
of
per
capita
income
is
a
measure
of
scar
city,
reflecting
the
relative
incomes
of
different
generations.
66
The
higher
the
income
of
future
generations
relative
to
the
current
generation
(that
is,
the
higher
the
growth
rate
of
per
capita
in
come),
the
higher
the
discount
on
benefits
to
future
generations.
The
pure
time
preference
component
is
controversial
because
it
might
reflect
myopia,
a
special
affinity
for
nearer
generations,
or
some
other
defect
in
“our
telescopic
faculty”
that
should
not
guide
government
decisions
about
intergenerational
welfare.
67
This
criticism
is
valid
insofar
as
the
observed
“myopia”
of
the
cur
rent
generation
imposes
some
negative
externality
on
future
gen
See,
for
example,
Michael
J.
Moore
and
W.
Kip
Viscusi,
Discounting
Environmental
Health
Risks:
New
Evideiice
and
Policy
Implications,
18
J
Envir
Econ
&
Mgmt
S-51,
S-61
(1990)
(providing
evidence
that
workers
discount
future
job-related
health
and
safety
haz
ards
at
a
2
percent
rate);
Thaler
and
Loewenstein,
Intertemporal
Choice
at
92
(cited
in
note
56)
(discussing
evidence
that
discount
rates
vary
with
age,
irrespective
of
whether
the
future
outcome
is
a
gain
or
loss,
or
whether
the
size
of
the
gain
or
loss
is
large
or
small).
See
Arrow,
et
al,
Intertemporal
Equity
at
134-35
(cited
in
note
47).
There
the
authors
illustrate
a
popular
welfare
model:
a
continuous-time
welfare
function,
where
the
welfare
of
each
generation
is
additively
separable.
In
this
model,
the
optimality
conditions
for
public
investment
yield
the
expression:
+pg=SRTP.
Here,
tX
is
a
measure
of
pure
time
preference
(impatience”),
g
is
the
growth
rate
of
per
capita
income,
and
p
is
a
scale
factor
equal
to
the
elasticity
of
marginal
utility
with
respect
to
consumption
(for
simplicity,
this
scale
factor
can
be
treated
as
constant
and
ignored).
While
A
is
constant
over
time,
pg
will
vary
with
per
capita
income.
The
higher
the
rate
of
income
growth,
g,
thehigher
is
the
so
cial
rate
of
discount
r.
See
id
at
131,
136.
See
id.
6
Pigou,
The
Economics
of
Welfare
at
25
(cited
in
note
33).
1346
The
University
of
Chicago
LawReview
[65:1333
erations,
who
would
pay
the
current
generation
to
be
less
myopic
if
such
payments
were
possible.
Thus,
the
government
should
override
societal
preferences
in
favor
of
intergenerational
wel
fare.
68
However,
given
that
individuals
are
altruistic
toward
fu
ture
generations
(for
example,
children
and
grandchildren),
it
is
unclear
when
the
preferences
of
the
current
generation
will
exert
a
negative
externality
on
future
generations.
69
•
In
contrast,
the
SRTP’s
dependence
on
economic
growth
has
strong
economic
and
ethical
justifications.
If
future
generations
will
be
better
off
than
the
current
generation,
optimal
resource
allocation
suggests
that
the
current
generation
should
favor
pub
lic
investments
with
immediate
payoffs
over
those
that
benefit
fu
ture
generations.
7
°
Similarly,
the
ethical
notion
that
one
genera
tion
should
not
sacrifice
excessively
for
another
implies
that
regulatory
agencies
should
discount
benefits
to
future
genera
tions—who
will
be
better
off
than
current
citizens
anyway—when
evaluating
potential
projects.
7
’
b)
Applying
the
economic
theory.
The
SRTP
is
a
prescriptive
approach
to
the
social
discount
rate.
It
assumes
that
society
should
maximize
an
arbitrarily
chosen
intergenerational
welfare
function,
72
and
then
derives
the
social
discount
rate
from
the
op
timality
conditions
of
that
function.
This
approach,
however,
raises
at
least
three
controversial
ethical,
political,
and
economic
issues.
First,
while
the
CCC
approach
relies
on
observable
economic
behavior,
the
SRTP
rejects
such
evidence
in
favor
of
normative
models
of
intergenerational
welfare.
Thus
the
SRTP
implicitly
assumes
a
market
failure:
financial
markets
provide
a
poor
indi
cator
of
society’s
willingness
to
invest
in
particular
projects
(such
as
climate
control)
that
benefit
future
generations.
73
The
source
of
this
market
failure
is
unclear.
The
failure
may
result
from
infor
mation
problems,
such
as
the
current
generation’s
inability
to
as-
Many
economists
do
not
believe
that
myopic
societal
preferences
justify
government
intervention.
See,
for
example,
Kopp
and
Portney,
Mock
Referenda
at
5
(cited
in
note
55).
See
also
Arrow,
et
al,
Interteinporal
Equity
at
136
(cited
in
note
47),
where
the
authors
note
that
a
nonzero
pure
rate
of
time
preference
may
be
defensible
because
“as
a
matter
of
description,
the
current
generation
gives
less
value
to
consumption
of
future
generations.’
69
Once
we
account
for
altruism,
the
societal
discount
rate
will
be
a
function
of
the
rate
of
intergenerational
altruism.
See
Gary
S.
Becker,
A
Treatise
on
the
Family
162-69
(Har
vard
Enlarged
ed
1991).
See
Arrow,
eta!,
Intertemporal
Equity
at
131,
136-37
(cited
in
note
47).
See
id
at
136.
12
See,
for
example,
the
welfare
function
discussed
in
note
64.
‘°
See
Sjaastad
and
Wisecarver,
85
J
Pol
Econ
at
5
15-16
(cited
in
note
60).
19981
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1347
sess
the
costs
to
future
generations
(for
example,
pollution
miti
gation,
medical
costs,
and
risks
of
mortality)
if
a
particular
regu
lation
is
not
imposed.
74
Alternatively,
the
market
failure
may
re
flect
myopia:
members
of
the
current
generation
may
not
care
sufficiently
about
(or
maynot
be
sufficiently
altruistic
toward)
fu
ture
generations,
who
would
be
willing
to
pay
members
of
the
current
generation
to
invest
in
particular
projects.
75
In
either
case,
however,
the
government
likely
cannot
test
whether
the
market
failure
is
sufficiently
serious
to
warrant
the
normative
approach
of
the
SRTP,
which
effectively
overrides
observed
socie
tal
preferences
in
favor
of
a
particular
welfare
model.
Second,
even
assuming
market
failures
warrant
the
SRTP
approach,
it
is
unclear
whether
an
agency
can
identify
an
appro
priate
intergenerational
welfare
function
and
whether
that
func
tion
will
generate
discount
rates
that
yield
better
outcomes
than
rates
derived
by
the
0CC
approach.
7
°
Critics
claim
that
even
the
most
simple
(and
popular)
welfare
functions
yield
unreasonable
discount
rates
that
are
“glaringly
inconsistent”
with
the
observed
behavior
of
governments.
77
Further,
if
the
SRTP
yields
a
social
discount
rate
that
differs
from
the
rate
based
on
the
0CC—
thereby
forcing
society
to
invest
at
a
rate
that
differs
from
market
rates—government
regulation
may
not
have
its
intended
effect
on
future
generations.
Society
today
can
only
control
the
welfare
of
the
immediately
succeeding
generation.
78
If
government
today
at
tempts
to
influence
further
generations
by
investing
in
irreversi
ble
projects
(such
as
climate
control
technology),
intermediate
generations
will
merely
reduce
their
investments
in
the
future
if
they
believe
that
the
original
investment
was
excessive.
Such
a
reduction
in
investments
is
particularly
likely
to
occur
if
techno
logical
changes
have
made
the
original
investments
worthless.
79
See,
for
example,
Amartya
K.
Sen,
Approaches
to
the
Choice
of
Discount
Rates
for
Social
Benefit-Cost
Analysis,
in
Lind,
ed,
Discounting
for
Time
and
Risk
at
349-50
(cited
in
note
46).
Id
at
349.
See
Arrow,
et
al.
Intertemporal
Equity
at
131-33
(cited
in
note
47).
“
Id
at
132.
The
authors
further
note
that
a
“discount
rate
of
2%
implies
far
more
in
vestment
than
actually
occurs
in
any
country
now,
and
thus
would
require
a
big
jump
in
savings
rates
to
finance.”
Id
at
133.
‘
See
Richard
A.
Epstein,
Justice
Across
the
Generations,
67
Tex
L
Rev
1465,
1482
(1989)
Arrow,
Discounting,
Morality,
and
Gaming
at
12
(cited
in
note
39).
‘
This
is
a
variant
of
the
theory
of
Ricardian
Equivalence,
which
states
that
govern
ment
generally
cannot
force
one
generation
to
save
for
the
next
by
imposing
a
tax
or
in
vesting
in
long-term
assets.
This
forced
saving
will
be
“undone”
as
members
of
the
first
generation
reduce
their
private
bequests
to
future
generations.
For
the
basic
theory
of
RI
cardian
Equivalence,
see
Robert
J.
Barro,
Are
Government
Bonds
Net
Wealth?,
82
J
Pol
Econ
1095
(1974).
1348
The
University
of
Chicago
Law
Review
[65:1333
Contrary
to
the
beliefs
of
some
commentators,
8
°
economic
theory
provides
strong
support
for
the
principle
that
current
society
best
serves
future
generations
by
choosing
investments
that
maximize
general
welfare
in
the
future,
not
by
choosing
investments
that
protect
future
societies
against
particular
problems.
81
Finally,
even
if
a
regulator
can
identify
a
proper
intergenerational
welfare
function,
the
regulator
faces
complex
methodological
problems.
Consider
the
simple
welfare
function
that
describes
the
SRTP
as
a
function
of
pure
time
preference
and
the
growth
rate
of
per
capita
income.
Scholars
debate
how
to
measure
these
components
of
the
SRTP.
Although
the
typical
ap
proach
is
to
derive
the
components
from
studies
of
individual
be
havior,
studies
in
behavioral
economics
show
that
individual
time
preference
may
vary
with
age,
income,
the
type
of
future
payoff
(that
is
to
say,
whether
the
payoff
is
a
gain
or
loss,
or
whether
it
involves
risk
to
future
lives),
and
the
amount
of
time
until
the
payoff.
82
Indeed,
some
studies
indicate
that
the
SRTP
may
be
much
higher
than
scholars
have
generally
believed
and
may
even
exceed
the
0CC.
83
The
SRTP
theory
offers
no
guidance
here.
Additionally,
once
an
agency
computes
the
SRTP,
it
faces
significant
difficulties
in
applying
the
rate.
84
Unlike
the
0CC,
the
SRTP
is
an
appropriate
discount
rate
for
future
consumption.
Thus,
an
administrative
agency
must
convert
all
costs
and
bene
fits
of
a
proposed
regulation
into
consumption
equivalents;
as
in
the
0CC
approach,
the
costs
of
a
proposed
regulation
include
the
private
investment
that
it
displaces.
85
3.
A
conceptual
framework.
As
a
threshold
matter,
it
seems
unreasonable
for
agencies
not
to
discount
benefits
to
future
generations
in
their
cost-benefit
analyses
of
proposed
rules.
To
begin,
without
a
discount
rate,
the
analysis
fails
to
account
for
the
opportunity
cost
of
resources
that
are
diverted
from
private
investment
toward
investment
in
the
‘°
See
Farber
and
Hemmersbaugh,
46
Vand
L
Rev
at
298-99
(cited
in
note
17).
See
Arrow,
Discounting.
Morality,
and
Gaming
at
12
(cited
in
note
39).
See
generally
Thaler
and
Loewenstein,
Intertemporal
Choice
at
92-106
(cited
in
note
56).
See
id.
See
also
Robert
C.
Lind,
Reassessing
the
Government’s
Discount
Rate
Policy
in
Light
of
New
Theory
and
Data
in
a
World
Economy
with
a
High
Degree
of
Capital
Mo
bility,
18
J
Envir
Econ
&
Mgmt
S-8,
S-19
(1990),
in
which
the
author
points
to
evidence
that
credit
card
debtors
pay
interest
rates
in
excess
of
16
percent.
See
Morgenstem,
Conducting
an
Economic
Analysis
at
36
(cited
in
note
47);
Scher
aga,
18
J
Envir
Econ
&
Mgmt
at
S-66
(cited
in
note
58).
See
Lind,
A
Primer
on
the
Major
Issues
at
39-55
(cited
in
note
46);
Lind,
18
3
Envir
Econ
&
Mgmt
at
S-li
(cited
in
note
83).
1998]
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1349
proposed
rule.
Having
no
discount
rate
may
lead
the
agency
to
adopt
rules
that
reduce
the
welfare
of
future
generations,
because
the
resources
could
have
been
invested
in
assets
with
higher
rates
of
return.
Additionally,
a
zero
discount
rate
biases
cost-
benefit
analysis
in
favor
of
rules
that
impose
excessive
sacrifices
on
the
current
generation.
Finally,
a
zero
discount
rate
is
incon
sistent
with
the
observable
behavior
of
individuals,
which
is
ar
guably
the
best
guide
for
policy
in
a
democratic
state.
The
choice
of
discount
rate
is
primarily
a
matter
of
policy
and
secondarily
a
matter
of
methodology.
86
Policy
judgments
largely
dictatethe
choice
between
the
two
competing
approaches
to
dis
counting.
The
CCC
approach
assumes
that
succeeding
genera
tions
will
be
in
the
best
position—because
of
superior
informa
tion—to
deal
with
environmental,
health,
or
other
problems.
Therefore,
the
optimal
regulatory
policy
is
to
maximize
the
wealth
of
succeeding
generations.
In
contrast,
the
SRTP
approach
assumes
that
current
society
may
be
in
a
better
position
to
deal
with
particular
problems,
such
as
global
warming
and
nuclear
waste
storage.
Thus,
the
SRTP
overrides
market
prices
and
chooses
seemingly
suboptimal
investments
(relative
to
prevailing
market
rates
of
return)
to
ensure
that
future
generations
do
not
suffer
these
risks.
Thus,
agency
choice
between
the
0CC
and
SRTP
approaches
should
be
based,
in
part,
on
a
determination
whether
current
society
is
in
a
better
position
to
deal
with
long-
term
problems.
Methodological
issues
determine
the
relative
costs
of
apply
ing
the
0CC
or
SRTP
approaches.
While
the
0CC
approach
re
quires
detailed
information
about
alternative
financial
assets
and
adjustments
for
taxes,
risk,
and
inflationary
expectations,
the
SRTP
requires
complex
estimates
of
parameters
such
as
the
pure
rate
of
time
preference
and
the
growth
rate
of
per
capita
income.
87
Additionally,
the
SRTP
approach
requires
an
agency
to
determine
the
precise
effects
of
the
regulation
on
future
consumption.
Al
though
the
regulation
may
raise
future
consumption
by
improv
ing
air
quality
or
other
public
goods,
the
project
may
also
lower
future
consumption
by
diverting
funds
from
private
investment.
The
agency
must
subtract
this
“opportunity
cost”
of
the
regula
tion,
which
raises
precisely
the
same
issues
as
in
the
0CC
ap
proach
(specifically,
the
agency
must
adjust
market
rates
of
re
turn
for
risk,
taxes,
inflation,
and
other
distortions).
This
is
also
described
in
Arrow,
et
al,
Intertemporal
Equity
at
134
(cited
in
note
47).
M
Additionally,
as
shown
in
note
64.
the
SRTP
also
requires
an
estimate
of
a
scale
fac
tor
representing
the
elasticity
of
marginal
utility
with
respect
to
per
capita
income.
1350
The
University
of
Chicago
LawReview
[65:1333
On
balance,
policy
and
methodology
issues
favor
the
0CC
over
the
SRTP.
Because
the
current
generation
cannot
know
the
resource
constraints
or
preferences
of
future
generations,
regula
tors
take
large
gambles
with
scarce
resources
when
they
follow
the
SRTP
approach
and
invest
in
particular
environmental,
en
ergy,
or
other
projects
that
have
lower
returns
than
assets
in
fi
nancial
markets.
Like
the
Maithusian
predictions
of
over
population,
88
these
gambles
may
prove
mistaken
because
they
are
based
on
incomplete
information
about
market
failures
in
finan
cial
markets
and
the
capabilities
of
future
generations
to
contend
with
environmental
and
other
harms.
Future
generations
would
be
better
served
(and
better
able
to
contend
with
future
harms)
if
the
government
invests
in
rules
that
maximize
their
general
wel
fare
and
enable
them
to
make
their
own
choices
regarding
the
environment,
energy,
and
other
public
goods.
Additionally,
methodological
issues
favor
the
0CC
approach
because
it
is
much
simpler
to
calculate.
and
apply.
89
While
the
0CC
relies
on
observable
financial
market
data,
the
SRTP
re
quires
that
the
regulator
select
a
particular
welfare
function,
de
rive
an
expression
for
the
social
discount
rate,
and
identify
em
pirical
analogues
for
the
parameters
of
the
discount
rate.
Addi
tionally,
the
regulator
must
convert
all
benefits
and
costs
(in
cluding
opportunity
costs)
into
consumption
equivalents.
III.
JUDICIAL
REVIEW
OF
AGENCY
DISCOUNT
RATES
Very
few
courts
have
reviewed
agency
discount
rates.
When
courts
have
reached
the
issue,
they
have
either
deferred
to
agency
discretion
9
°
or
imposed
their
own
judgment
about
dis
counting.
9
’
No
court
has
developed
a
meaningful
standard
of
re
view
for
agency
choice
of
discount
rates.
This
is
troubling
because
legislation
increasingly
requires
cost-benefit
analysis.
As
such
legislation
is
enacted,
courts
will
encounter
challenges
to
the
methods—including
discount
rates—agencies
use
to
conduct
the
See
generally
Gary
S.
Becker,
Human
Capital:
A
Theoretical
a,d
Empirical
Analy
sis
with
Special
Reference
to
Education
3
23-25
(Chicago
3d
ed
1993).
See
Raymond
J.
Kopp,
Alan
J.
Krupnick,
and
Michael
Toman,
Cost-Benefit
Analysis
and
Regulatory.
Reform:
An
Assessment
of
the
Science
and
the
Art
41,
available
online
at
<http://www.rff.orgldisc_papers/PDF_files/97
19.pdf>
(visited
July
5,
1998);
Morgenstern,
Conducting
an
Economic
Analysis
at
36-37
(cited
in
note
47).
°
See,
for
example,
Ohio
vDepartment
of
Interior,
880
F2d
432,
465
(DC
CIr
1989)
(de
ferring
to
Department’s
choice
of
discount
rate,
which
is
“first
and
foremost
a
policy
choice”).
91
See,
for
example,
Corrosion
Proof
Fittings
v
EPA,
947
F2d
1201,
1218
(5th
Cir
1991),
citing
popular
press—
What
Price
Posterity?,
The
Economist
73
(Mar
23,
1991)—for
the
principle
that
if
EPA
discounts
future
costs,
it
must
also
discount
future
benefits.
19981
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1351
analysis.
Judicial
review
will
prevent
arbitrary
agency
decisions
and
ensure
that
statutory
cost-benefit
requirements
have
force.
Without
standards
to
cabin
agency
discretion,
cost-benefit
analy
sis
may
become
mere
window
dressing,
providing
a
veneer
of
sci
entific
backing
for
agencies’
arbitrary
choices.
92
This
Part
proposes
a
standard
for
judicial
review.
First,
Part
A
briefly
indicates
when
a
court
should
review
agency
discount
rates.
Part
B
then
shows
that
significant
uncertainty
surrounds
the
standard
of
review
that
courts
should
apply
to
discount
rates.
In
an
effort
to
resolve
the
uncertainty,
this
Part
proposes
a
stan
dard
of
review
based
on
the
conceptual
framework
developed
in
Part
II.
Finally,
Part
C
illustrates
the
proposed
standard
of
re
view
by
applying
it
to
discount
rates
that
agencies
have
employed
in
recent
cost-benefit
analyses.
A.
When
Judicial
Review
Is
Appropriate
A
court
will
review
agency
discount
rates
when
either
the
underlying
statute
requires
cost-benefit
analysis
or
the
agency
relies
on
such
analysis
to
justify
a
rule,
adjudication,
or
exercise
of
discretion.
Statutes
increasingly
contain
direct
or
indirect
requirements
for
traditional
cost-benefit
analysis
or
a
less
rigorous
comparison
of
the
costs
and
benefits
of
a
regulation.
Direct
requirements
ap
pear
in
such
statutes
as
the
Toxic
Substances
Control
Act
(“TSCA”),
which
requires
the
agency
to
consider
“reasonably
as
certainable
economic
consequences
of
the
rule,”
93
and
the
Federal
Insecticide,
Fungicide
and
Rodenticide
Act
(“FIFRA”),
which
re
quires
the
agency
to
promulgate
regulations
of
toxins
after
con
sidering
the
environmental,
economic,
and
social
impact
of
the
regulations.
94
Similarly,
the
Energy
Policy
and
Conservation
Act
(“EPCA”)
requires
the
Department
of
Energy
to
assess
whether
an
energy
conservation
regulation
is
economically
justified,
95
and
See,
for
example.
Scheraga,
18
J
Envir
Econ
&
Mgmt
at
S-66
(cited
in
note
58)
(The
author,
an
EPA
official,
noted
that
“many
discounting
procedures
are
subject
to
manipula
tion.
.
.
This
can
lead
to
manipulation
of
the
outcomes
by
some
clever
(Or
perhaps
igno
rant)
analyst.”).
15
usc
§
2605(c)(l)
(“In
promulgating
any
rule
under
..
.
this
section
with
respect
to
a
chemical
substance
or
mixture,
the
Administrator
shall
consider
and
publish
a
state
ment
with
respect
to
.
.
.
the
reasonably
ascertainable
economic
consequences
of
the
rule,
after
consideration
of
the
effect
on
the
national
economy,
small
business,
technological
in
novation,
the
environment,
and
public
health.”).
7
USC
§
136(bb)
defines
an
“unreasonable
adverse
effect
on
the
environment”
as
“any
unreasonable
risk
to
man
or
the
environment,
taking
into
account
the
economic,
so
cial.
and
environmental
costs
and
benefits
of
the
use
of
any
pesticide.”
42
usc
§
6295(o)(2)(B)(i)(I)
(1994)
(providing
that
the
Department
of
Energy
must
1352
The
University
of
Chicago
LawReview
[65:1333
the
1996
Amendments
to
the
Safe
Drinking
Water
Act
(“SDWA”)
explicitly
require
cost-benefit
96
and
risk-risk
97
analysis
of
all
ma
jor
drinking
water
regulations.
Additionally,
under
the
Un
funded
Mandates
Act,
98
all
federal
agencies
must
conduct
cost-
benefit
analysis
of
any
rule
requiring
significant
(over
$100
mil
lion)
expenditures
by
state,
local,
or
tribal
governments.
99
Indirect
requirements
for
cost-benefit
analysis
appear
in
statutes
mandating
reasonable
regulations,
such
as
regulations
that
are
“reasonably
necessary”
or
that
reduce
an
“unreasonable
risk.”
InAmerican
Textile
Manufacturers’
Institute,
Inc
v
Dono
van(the
Cotton
Dust
,‘°°
the
Supreme
Court
noted
that
Con
gress
likely
intends
cost-benefit
analysis
where
a
statute
uses
the
phrase
“unreasonable
risk.”
91
Similarly,
many
lower
courts
have
found
requireffients
for
cost-benefit
analysis
in
statutory
lan
guage
calling
for
“reasonably
necessary”
regulations.’°
2
Where
statutes
contain
such
direct
or
indirect
language
re
quiring
cost-benefit
analysis,
courts
can
and
should
review
the
methods
that
agencies
use,
especially
their
choice
of
discount
rate.
In
Corrosion
Proof
Fittings
v
EPA,’°
3
the
Fifth
Circuit
re
viewed
the
EPA’s
choice
of
discount
rate
under
the
TSCA,’°
4
and
in
Natural
Resources
Defense
Council,
Inc
v
Herrington,’°
5
the
D.C.
Circuit
reviewed
the
agency’s
discount
rate
in
a
rulemaking
consider,
among
other
things,
“the
economic
impact
of
the
standard
on
manufacturers
and
on
the
consumers
of
products
subject
to
such
standard”).
42
USCA
§300g-l
(b)(3)
(C)(i)
provides
that
‘[wihen
roposing
any
national
primary
drinking
water
regulation
that
includes
a
maximum
contaminant
level,
the
Administrator
shall”
analyze
the
costs
of
complying
with
the
regulation
and
“[t]he
incremental
costs
and
benefits
associated
with
each
alternative
maximum
contaminant
level
considered.”
Id
§
300g-l
(b)
(3)
(C)
(i)
(VI)
(requiring
the
Administrator
to
consider
[amy
increased
health
risk
that
may
occur
as
the
result
of
compliance,
including
risks
associated
with
co
occurring
contaminants”).
2
USCA
§
1501
et
seq.
2
USCA
§
1532(a).
‘°°452
US
490
(1981).
‘Id
at
510
n
30.
However,
in
the
same
decision,
theCourt
noted
that
statutory
lan
guagecalling
for
regulation
“to
the
extent
feasible”
creates
no
obligation
to
conduct
such
analysis.
Id
at
509.
For
further
discussion
of
statutory
language
that
may
or
may
not
re
quire
cost-benefit
analysis,
see
Cass
R.
Sunstein.
Interpreting
Statutes
in
the
Regulatory
State,
103
Harv
L
Rev
405,
419,435
(1989).
‘°‘See,
for
example,
National
Grain
and
Feed
Association
v
OSHA,
866
F2d
717,
728
(5th
Cir
1988);
United
Automobile
Workers
v
OSHA,
938
F2d
1310,
1319
(DC
Cir
1991)
(“Cost-benefit
analysis
is
certainly
consistent
with
the
language”
of
the
statute,);
Alabama
Power
Co
v
OSHA,
89
F2d
740,
746
(11th
Cir
1996)
(“Although
the
agency
does
not
have
to
conduct
an
elaborate
cost-benefit
analysis,
it
does
have
to
determine
whether
the
benefits
expected
from
the
standard
bear
a
reasonable
relationship
to
the
costs
imposed
by
the
standard,”),
citing
American
Petroleum
Institute
v
OSHA,
581
F2d
493,
503
(5th
Cir
1978).
103947
F2d
1201
(5th
Cir
1991).
‘°
4
Id
at
1218.
‘°768
FZd
1355
(DC
Cir
1985).
1998]
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1353
pursuant
to
the
EPCA.’°
6
Similarly,
in
Ohio
vDepartment
of
Inte
rior,
107
the
D.C.
Circuit
reviewed
the
agency’s
choice
of
discount
rate
in
a
rulemaking
pursuant
to
the
Superfund
Act
(“CER
CLA”)
,108
These
cases—as
well
as
the
Administrative
Procedure
Act
(“APA”)
‘°
9
—make
clear
that
it
is
appropriate
for
a
court
to
re
view
the
reasonableness
of
agency
cost-benefit
analysis.
Similarly,
judicial
review
is
appropriate
when
an
agency
re
lies
on
cost-benefit
analysis
in
a
rulemaking,
adjudication,
or
ex
ercise
of
discretion,
even
when
the
underlying
statute
does
not
require
such
analysis.
Case
law”°
and
the
APA”
require
the
court
to
review
such
agency
action
for
reasonableness
under
the
“arbitrary
and
capricious”
test.
This
implies
that
the
court
can
and
should
review
the
methods—especially
the
choice
of
discount
rate—that
the
agency
used
to
perform
the
cost-benefit
analysis.”
2
This
Comment,
however,
focuses
on
cases
where
the
underlying
statute
contains
a
requirement
for
cost-benefit
analysis.
B.
The
Standard
of
Review
Judicial
review
of
discount
rates
involves
two
levels
of
analy
sis.
First,
a
court
will
consider
whether
the
agency
action—the
‘
091d
at
14
12-14.
‘°880
F2d
432
(DC
Cir
1989).
‘°
8
1d
at
465.
5
Usc
§
706(2)
(A)
(1994)
(specifying
the
arbitrary
and
capricious
test
forjudicial
re
view
ofagency
actions).
‘°See,
for
example,
Motor
Vehicle
Manufacturers
Association
v
State
Farm
Mutual
Automobile
Insurance
Co,
463
US
29,
33-34
(1983)
(finding
that
NHTSA
abused
its
discre
tion
to
issue
motor
vehicle
safety
standards
that
“shall
be
practicable,
shall
meet
the
need
for
motor
vehicle
safety,
and
shall
be
stated
in
objective
terms”);
Citizens
to
Preserve
Over-
ton
Park,
Inc
v
Volpe,
401
US
402,
416
(1971)
(applying
arbitrary
and
capricious
test
to
agency
discretion
where
the
statute
required
the
agency
to
consider
“feasible
and
prudent”
alternatives);
National
Coalition
Against
Misuse
of
Pesticides
v
Thomas,
809
F2d
875,
882-
83
(DC
Cir
1987)
(finding
that
EPA
abused
its
discretion
to
promulgate
pesticide
tolerance
levels
“to
the
extent
necessary”).
5
USC
§
706(2)
(A).
2
Arguably
the
APA
implies
that
the
choice
of
discount
rate
is
insulated
from
judicial
review
because
it
is
“committed
to
agency
discretion
by
law.”
5
USC
§
701
(a)(2)
(1994).
In
this
case
there
is
“no
law
to
apply,”
Overton
Park,
401
US
at
410
(citation
omitted);
that
is,
there
is
no
statutory
standard
against
which
a
court
may
judge
the
agency’s
use
of
its
dis
cretion.
See
generally,
Richard
J.
Pierce,
Jr.,
Sidney
A.
Shapiro,
and
Paul
R.
Verkuil,
Ad
ministrative
Law
and
Process
§
5.3
at
12429
(Foundation
2d
ed
1992).
However,
this
ap
proach
is
controversial
among
scholars.
Compare
Raoul
Berger,
Administrative
Arbitrari
ness
and
Judicial
Review,
65
Colum
L
Rev
55,
77-83
(1965)
(arguing
that
the
“no
law
to
apply”
rationale
does
not
preclude
judicial
review
for
abuse
of
discretion),
with
Kenneth
C.
Davis,
4
Administrative
Law
Treatise
§
28.16
at
80-81
(West
1958)
(arguing
that
where
there
is
“no
law
to
apply,”
even
abuse
of
discretion
is
not
reviewable).
Additionally,
courts
regularly
review
the
reasonableness
of
agency
discretion
under
the
“arbitrary
and
capri
cious”
test
even
when
the
underlying
statute
conveys
broad
discretionary
power.
See,
for
example,
State
Farm,
463
US
at
42-43,
51-57;
Overton
Park,
401
US
at
411-4
13,
417.
1354
The
University
of
Chicago
Law
Review
[65:1333
decision
to
discount
and
the
choice
of
a
particular
discount
rate—
represents
an
interpretation
of
the
underlying
statute
that
the
agency
administers.”
3
This
raises
a
question
of
law,
subject
to
the
two-step
standard
of
review
in
Chevron
USA,
Inc
v
Natural
Re
sources
Defense
Council,
Inc.’
‘‘
If
the
agency
action
raises
no
question
of
law,
the
court
will
review
the
agency
decision
for
abuse
of
discretion
under
the
arbitrary
and
capricious
test.”
5
As
this
Part
demonstrates,
the
threshold
decision
to
discount
argua
bly
isa
question
of
law.
In
contrast,
the
choice
of
a
particular
dis
count
rate
is
largely
a
matter
of
agency
discretion.
This
Part
first
considers
the
question
of
law
and
argues
that
courts
generally
have
reached
the
right
conclusion
when
they
have
found
that
an
agency
acts
unreasonably
if
it
fails
to
discount
future
costs
and
benefits.
Next,
the
Part
considers
the
question
of
agency
discretion,
showing
that
courts
have
been
unable
to
ar
ticulate
a
meaningful
test
to
determine
whether
the
agency’s
choice
of
discount
rate
is
arbitrary
and
capricious.
The
Part
con
cludes,
therefore,
by
offering
a
meaningful
test
and
demonstrat
ing
how
a
court
would
employ
the
framework
in
Part
II
to
take
a
“hard
look”
at
an
agency’s
choice
of
discount
rate.
1.
Review
of
agency
statutory
interpretation:
The
decision
to
discount
future
costs
and
benefits.
Chevron
established
the
well-known
standard
of
review
for
questions
of
law.”
6
A
court
will
defer
to
an
agency’s
interpretation
of
a
statute
if
the
interpretation
is
not
contrary
to
the
intent
of
the
statute
(Chevron
Step
One)
and
if
it
is
reasonable
(Chevron
Step
Two).”
7
The
court
will
apply
“traditional
tools
of
statutory
construction”
to
infer
Congress’s
intent.”
8
It
will
test
the
reason
ableness
of
the
agency
interpretation
by
determining
whether
the
agency
considered
all
statutorily
relevant
factors
and
ignored
statutorily
irrelevant
factors.”
9
This
test
of
reasonableness,
how
3
A
statutory
interpretation
(a
question
of
law)
is
reviewable
under
5
USC
§
706(2)
(C).
467
US
837,
842-45
(1984).
IS
Courts
may
review
agency
discretion
under
5
usc
§
706(2)
(A),
(D).
116467
US
at
837.
“Id
at
842-45.
See
also
Ohio,
880
F2d
at
464
(‘As
petitioners
point
to
no
CERCLA
provision
addressing
the
precise
question
in
issue
(the
choice
of
discount
rate),
their
bur
den
is
to
show
that
the
imposition
of
the
discount
rate
was
unreasonable
or
contrary
to
the
statutory,
purpose.”).
‘“Chevron,
467
US
at
843
n
9.
See
also
INS
v
Cardozo
Fonseca,
480
US421,
446-50
(1987)
(employing
tools
of
statutory
construction);
Babbitt
v
Sweet
Hone
Chapter
of
Com
munitiesfora
Great
Oregon,
515
US
687,
703-05
(1995)
(same).
“
9
See
Chevron,
467
US
at
845;
State
Farm,
463
US
at
42-44.
1998]
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1355
ever,
tends
to
be
quite
similar
to
the
arbitrary
and
capricious
standard
of
review
that
courts
apply
to
agency
discretion.’
2
°
Thus,
when
courts
encounter
challenges
to
agency
discount
rates,
Chevron
Step
One
implies
that
they
must
first
interpret
the
statute
in
question
to
determine
Congress’s
intent.
However,
most
statutes—such
as
TSCA
and
FIFRA—offer
no
particular
standards
for
conducting
cost-benefit
analysis,
evidencing
no
con
gressional
intent
as
to
the
appropriate
methods
for
choosing
a
discount
rate.
This
forces
courts
to
proceed
to
the
next
level
of
analysis—
Chevron
Step
Two—and
examine
the
reasonableness,
of
the
agency,
decision.
Thus,
in
the
few
cases
where
courts
have
reviewed
an
agency’s
decision
to
discount
future
costs
and
benefits,
they
have
focused
on
the
reasonableness
of
the
decision,
not
on
whether
the
decision
is
consistent
with
the
purpose
of
the
statute.
In
Corro
sion
Proof
Fittings,
for
example,
the
court
found
that
the
EPA
would
act
unreasonably
if
it
failed
to
discount
future
benefits:
“Because
the
EPA
must
discount
costs
to
perform
its
evaluations
properly,
the
EPA
also
should
discount
benefits
to
preserve
an
apples-to-apples
comparison,
even
if
this
entails
discounting
benefits
of
a
non-monetary
‘‘
Similarly,
in
Ohio,
the
court
found
that
the
Department
of
the
Interior
did
not
act
un
reasonably
when
it
followed
0MB
guidance
and
discounted
future
benefits.’
22
In
neither
case,
however,
did
the
court
articulate
a
standard
of
reasonableness.
In
Corrosion
Proof
Fittings,
the
court
held
simply
that
an
agency
cannot
discount
costs
without
dis
counting
benefits;’
23
in
Ohio,
the
court
deferred
to
the
agency’s
decision
because
it
was
“first
and
foremost
a
policy
choice.”
24
Although
they
lack
coherent
explanations,
Corrosion
Proof
Fittings
and
Ohio
reach
the
correct
conclusion:
discounting
is
reasonable;
not
discounting
is
arbitrary.’
25
However,
the
courts
in
these
cases
could
have
reached
the
same
conclusion
more
simply
by
relying
on
the
language
of
the
underlying
statutes
(Chevron
Step
One).
A
plain
reading
of
statutory
language
requiring
an
‘agency
to
consider
“the
reasonably
ascertainable
economic
conse
quences
of
the
rule,
after
consideration
for
the
effect
on
the
na
‘°See
Ronald
M.
Levin
The
Anatomy
of
Chevron:
Step
Two
Reconsidered,
72
chi-Kent
L
Rev
1253,
1266-77
(1997)
(demonstrating
that
analysis
of
a
question
of
law
under
Chev
ron
Step
Two
is
very
similar
to—indeed,
may
be
identical
to—arbitrary
and
capricious
re
view).
947
F2d
at
1218.
122880
F2d
at
465.
‘947
F2d
at
1218.
880
F2d
at
465.
2
See
the
discussion
in
Part
II.
1356
The
University
of
Chicago
LawReview
[65:1333
tional
economy”
26
suggests
that
the
agency
should
use
reasonable
methods
for
evaluating
the
costs
and
benefits
of
a
regulation.
This
is
precisely
the
conclusion
in
Gas
Appliance
Manufacturers
Association,
Inc
v
Department
of
Energy,’
27
where
the
D.C.
Circuit
considered
a
statute
requiring
that
regulations
be
“adequately
analyzed
in
terms
of
.
.
.
economic
cost
and
benefit,
and
impact
upon
affected
groups.”
28
The
court
found
that
this
language
re
quired
the
agency
to
use
reasonable
methods
in
its
cost-benefit
analysis.’
29
As
demonstrated
in
Part
II,
reasonable
cost-benefit
analysis
includes
positive
discount
rates
for
future
costs
and
benefits.
2.
Review
of
agency
discretion:
The
choice
of
a
particular
discount
rate.
Most
courts
treat
the
choice
of
discount
rate
as
a
matter
of
agency
discretion.’
3
°
Unless
the
underlying
statute
calls
for
strin
gent
review,’
3
’
courts
will
apply
the
APA’s
“arbitrary
and
capri
cious”
standard
of
review
to
the
agency’s
choice.’
32
The
Supreme
Court
has
interpreted
this
standard
as
requiring
that
courts
take
a
“hard
look”
at
the
agency’s
decision,
inquiring
whether
the
agency
provided
a
detailed
explanation,
investigated
reasonable
alternatives,
and
considered
statutorily
relevant
factors
and
ig
nored
statutorily
irrelevant
factors.’
33
Although
th
standard
of
review
calls
for
a
“hard
look,”
most
courts
have
taken
a
“soft
look”
34
at
agency
discount
rates.
In
Cor
‘
20
TSCA,
15
Usc
§
2605(c)
(1)
(D).
127998
F2d
1041
(DC
cir
1993).
‘
Id
at
1044,
quoting
the
Energy
Conservation
Standards
for
New
Buildings
Act
of
1976,
42
USC
§
6839
(1988),
repealed
by
the
Energy
Policy
Act
of
1992,
Pub
L
No
102-486,
Title
I
§
101(a)(2),
106
Stat
2776,
2783.
29998
F2d
at
1045-46.
‘°See,
for
example,
Corrosion
Proof
Fittings,
947
F2d
at
1218
n
19
(concluding
that
the
EPA’s
choice
of
a
3
percent
real
discount
rate
was
not
unreasonable);
Ohio,
880
F2d
at
465
n
46
(deferring
to
agency
choice
of
10
percent
rate);
Northern
California
Power
v
FERC,
37
F3d
1517,
1522-23
(DC
Cir
1994)
(“It
was
.
.
.
entirely
proper
for
the
Commis
sion
to
calculate
the
present
value
.
.
.
using
a
discount
rate
that
focused
on
the
consum
ers’
value
of
money.”).
31
TSCA,
for
example,
provides
for
substantial
evidence
review,
15
USC
§
2618(c)(1)(B)(i).
‘
2
See
5
USC
§
706(Z)(A);
Overton
Park,
401
US
at
4
13-16.
33
See,
for
example,
State
Farm,
463
US
at
43-44:
Vermont
Yankee
Nuclear
Power
Corp
vNatural
Resources
Defense
Council,
mc,
435
US
519,
549-55
(1978);
Overton
Park,
401
US
at
415-17.
See
also
Scenic
Hudson
Preservation
Conference
v
FPC,
354
F2d
608,
617-
18,
620-22
(2d
Cir
1965).
“‘The
term
“soft
look”
is
borrowed
from
Richard
J.
Pierce,
Judicial
Review
of
Agency
Actions
in
a
Period
of
Diminishing
Agency
Resources,
49
Admin
L
Rev
61,
90
(1997)
(char
acterizing
Judge
Easterbrook’s
dissent
in
Salameda
v
INS,
70
F3d
447
(7th
Cir
1995),
as
the
‘soft
look”
position).
19981
Regulatory
Disco
unt
Rates
1357
rosion
Proof
Fittings,
for
example,
the
Fifth
Circuit
deferred
to
the
EPA’s
choice
of
a
3
percent
discount
rate
because
“historically
the
real
rate
of
interest
has
tended
to
vary
between
2%
and
“1:35
The
court
did
not
consider
alternative
measures
of
the
dis
count
rate,
nor
did
it
inquire
whether
the
EPA
applied
this
rate
appropriately.
Similarly,
in
Ohio,
the
D.C..
Circuit
deferred
to
the
Department
of
Interior’s
choice
of
a
10
percent
discount
rate
be
cause
the
choice
was
“first
and
foremost
a
policy
choice.”
36
De
spite
this
conclusion,
the
court
noted
that
the
agency
would
need
to
provide
a
“reasonable
justification”
if
it
revised
its
discount
rate
in
the
future,although
it
gave
no
indication
what
such
ajus
tification
would
be)
7
The
D.C.
Circuit
has
attempted
to
harden
the
prevailing
“soft
look”
by
inquiring
into
the
theory
underlying.
agency
discount
rates.
In
Northern
California
Power
Agency
vFERC,’
8
the
parties
disputed
whether
the
appropriate
discount
rate
should
reflect
the
average
discount
rate
of
members
of
society
(which
FERC
advo
cated)
or
the
cost
of
borrowing
for
city
governments
(which
the
plaintiff
municipalities
advocated).’
39
After
reviewing
the
basic
theory
of
discounting
and
citing
a
popular
textbook,’
4
°
the
court
concluded
that
the
appropriate
rate
should
reflect
the
discount
rate
of
members
of
society.’
4
’
The
court,
however,
did
not
inquire
whether
FERC’s
particular
rate
(15
percent)
was
a
good
measure
of
the
appropriate
social
discount
rate.
Similarly,
in
Herrington,
the
D.C.
Circuit
invalidated
the
dis
count
rate
that
the
Department
of
Energy
(“DOE”)
had
used
in
cost-benefit
analysis
of
energy
efficiency
standards.’
42
Applying
hard
look
review,
the
court
found
that
the
DOE
failed
to
explain
how
it
derived
this
rate.
In
stark
contrast
to
its
approach
in
Ohio,
the
D.C.
Circuit
held
that
the
agency
could
not
rely
on
0MB
guidelines
to
justify
its
choice:
“The
disputed
0MB
circular
is
es
sentially
a
general
instruction
to
government
agencies
and
does
not
explain
the
reasoning
behind
the
discount
rate
it
recom
“947
F2d
at
1218
n
19.
‘88O
F2d
at
465.
‘
311d
at
465
n
46.
‘37
F3d
1517
(DC
Cir
1994).
‘
391d
at
1522-23.
‘
401d
at
1523,
citing
E.J.
Mishan,
Cost
BenefitAnalysis
176
(Praeger
1976).
“‘Id
(“Additionally,
when
determining
the
net
present
benefit
of
a
project,
a
discount
rate
that
reflects
society’s,
as
opposed
to
an
individual’s,
preferences
is
commonly
used.
It
was
therefore
entirely
proper
for
the
Commission
to
calculate
the
present
value
of
the
net
benefits
of
the
projects
using
a
discount
rate
that
focused
on
the
consumers’
value
of
money.”)
(citations
omitted).
2768
F2d
at
1410-14.
1358
The
University
of
Chicago
Law
Review
[65:1333
mends.”
43
The
court
stressed
that
the
“major
consequences
of
the
discount
rate
made
it
particularly
important
that
DOE
fix
the
rate
carefully
and
explain
its
decision
intelligibly.”
44
Although
Herrington
critically
examined
the
DOE’s
decision,
the
case
is
similar
to
other
“soft
look”
cases
because
the
court
offers
no
stan
dard
of
review
for
agency
discount
rates.
These
casesshow
that,
even
where
courts
attempt
to
take
a
hard
look
at
agency
discount
rates,
their
inquiry
generally
ends
after
testing
whether
the
agency
has
provided
at
least
a
“tolera
bly
terse”
45
explanation
for
its
choice.
Courts
do
not
address
the
other,
“harder”
elements
of
this
review:
whether
the
agency
ad
dressed
reasonable
alternatives
and
whether
it
considered
statu
torily
relevant
factors
and
ignored
statutorily
irrelevant
factors.
Courts’
“soft
look”
review
of
discount
rates
seems
perverse
when
they
will
apply
a
strict
hard
look
review
to
other
elements
of
agency
cost-benefit
analysis.’
46
The
problem
appears
to
be
that
courts
lacka
coherent
framework
for
reviewing
the
agency
choice
of
discount
rate.
In
evaluating
the
choice
of
a
discount
rate,
courts
should
un
dertake
a
three-step
analysis.
First,
as
Herrington
requires,
a
court
must
find
at
least
a
“tolerably
terse”
explanation
of
the
agency’s
choice
of
discount
rate.
Second,
the
court
should
inquire
whether
the
agency
considered
reasonable
alternatives.
As
ex
plained
in
Part
II,
the
choice
between
the
0CC
and
the
SRTP
ap
proaches
is
primarily
a
matter
of
policy
and
secondarily
a
matter
of
methodology.’
47
The
court
should
find
that
an
agency
abused
its
discretion
if
it
failed
to
acknowledge
these
alternative
approaches
and
explain
why,
in
its
view,
policy
and
methodology
favor
one
approach
over
another.
Requiring
such
an
explanation
ensures
not
only
that
the
agency’s
decision
has
a
rational
basis,
but
that
the
agency
recognizes
and
responds
to
the
social
(and
administra
tive)
costs
and
benefits
of
a
particular
approach.’
48
“
3
1d
at
1413.
“Id
at
1414.
“Id
at
1413,
quoting
Greater
Boston
Television
Corp
vFCC,
444
F2d
841,
852
(DC
Cir
1970).
“See,
for
example,
Competitive
Enterprise
Institute
v
NHTSA,
956
F2d
321,
323-27
(DC
Cir
1992),
where
the
Court
found
that
NHTSA
acted
arbitrarily
by
not
considering
the
risk-risk
tradeoffs
of
new
fuel
economy
standards.
For
analysis
of
this
case,
see
Cass
R.
Sunstein,
Health-Health
Tradeoffs,
63
U
Chi
L
Rev
1533,
1565-67
(1996).
“See
note
86
and
accompanying
text.
“This
is
precisely
the
goal
of
hard
look
review,
as
explained
by
the
Supreme
Court
in
State
Farm,
where
the
Court
stated
that
“the
agency
must
examine
the
relevant
data
and
articulate
a
satisfactory
explanation
for
its
action
including
a
‘rational
connection
between
the
facts
found
and
the
choices
made.’
.
.
In
reviewing
that
explanation,
we
must
‘con
sider
whether
the
decision
was
based
on
a
consideration
of
relevant
factors
and
whether
1998]
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1359
Finally,
given
the
agency’s
choice
between
the
0CC
and
SRTP,
courts
should
examine
whether
the
agency
properly
ap
plied
the
chosen
method.
The
0CC
and
SRTP
involve
very
differ
ent
methodologies.
If
an
agency
applies
the
0CC,
it
must
consider
whether
the
financial
markets
offer
assets
or
trading
strategies
with
term
structures
similar
to
the
proposed
regulation.
Addi
tionally,
the
agency
must
adjust
the
market
rates
of
return
for
taxes,
risk,
inflation,
and
distortions
due
to
credit
constraints.
Finally,
the
agency
should
consider
whether
the
regulation
di
verts
resources
from
investment
or
consumption.
In
contrast,
if
an
agency
applies
the
SRTP,
a
court
should
ask
whether
the
agency
converted
the
future
benefits
of
the
regulation
into
con
sumption
equivalents.
Additionally,
the
agency
should
reduce
fu
ture
benefits
to
account
for
the
fact
that
the
regulation
may
di
vert
resources
from
private
investment
and
thereby
lower
future
consumption.
149
Hard
look
review
of
agency
discount
rates
would
not
take
the
choice
of
a
discount
rate
out
of
the
hands
of
administrative
agen
cies,
which
possess
greater
competence
than
courts
in
this
area.
Nor
would
hard
look
review
tax
judicial
resources
or
require
judges
to
develop
special
expertise.
Rather,
hard
look
review
of
agency
choice
of
discount
rates
asks
a
series
of
simple
questions
that
courts
generally
ask
when
reviewing
agency
discretion:
Is
there
a
record?’
5
°
Did
the
agency
explain
its
choice
between
the
relevant
alternatives,
the
SRTP
and
0CC?’
5
’
Did
the
agency
con
sider
the
relevant
factors
in
applying
either
method?
152
Admittedly,
hard
look
review
of
agency
discount
rates
will
raise
both
the
cost
of
judicial
review
and
the
cost
of
conducting
cost-benefit
analysis.
However,
the
costs
of
judicial
review
will
there
has
been
a
clear
error
ofjudgment.”
463
US
at
43
(citationsomitted).
“
5
Hard
look
review
should
be
particularly
strict
when
an
agency
applies
the
SRTP.
This
method
raises
more
difficult
policy
issues
and
Creates
more
complex
methodological
problems
than
the
0CC.
Most
academic
studies
indicate
that
agencies
have
very
little
ex
perience
applying
this
method.
See
Kopp,
Krupnick,
and
Toman,
Cost-Benefit
Analysis
and
Regulatory
Reform
at
41
(cited
in
note
89).
‘°See,
for
example,
State
Farm,
463
US
at
43
(‘We
will
...
uphold
a
decision
of
less
than
ideal
clarity
if
the
agency’s
path
may
reasonably
be
discerned.”)
(citations
omitted);
SEC
v
Chenery,
318
US
80,
94
(1943)
(“[T]he
orderly
functioning
of
the
process
of
review
requires
that
the
grounds
upon
which
the
administrative
agency
acted
be
clearly
disclosed
and
adequately
sustained.”).
See,
for
example,
State
Farm,
463
US
at
43
(“Normally,
an
[agency
decision]
would
be
arbitrary
and
capricious
if
the
agency
.
.
.
entirely
failed
to
consider
an
important
as
pect
of
the
problem.”);
Scenic
Hudson,
354
F2d
at
624-25
(“The
record
as
it
comes
to
us
fails
markedly
to
make
out
a
case
for
the
[agency
decision]
on,
among
other
matters,
costs,
public
convenience
and
necessity,
and
absence
of
reasonable
alternatives.”).
52
See,
for
example,
Overton
Park,
401
US
at
416
(“[T]he
court
must
consider
whether
the
[agency]
decision
was
based
on
a
consideration
of
the
relevant
factors,”).
1360
The
University
of
Chicago
Law
Review
[65:1333
rise
only
because
courts
to
date
have
not
given
serious
considera
tion
to
agency
discount
rates.
This
increased
cost
is
not
problem
atic,
because
both
the
APA’
53
and
case
law’
54
require
the
level
of
serious
consideration
implied
by
hard
look
review.
Additionally,
although
hard
idok
review
will
impose
costs
on
agencies
by
requiring
them
to
prepare
detailed
explanations
of
their
discount
rate
choices,
these
added
costs
are
outweighed
by
the
benefits
to
society
from
more
careful,
reasoned
consideration
of
the
methods
used
in
cost-benefit
analysis.
A
primary
goal
of
cost-benefit
analysis
is
to
help
agencies
identify
the
advantages
and
disadvantages
of
various
regulatory
strategies
and
thereby
allocate
their
scarce
budgetary
resources
toward
regulations
that
best
promote
social
welfare.’
55
By
rationalizing
and
disciplining
agency
decision
making,
cost-benefit
analysis
promotes
the
regulatory
efficiency
as
well
as
the
political
accountability
of
agencies.’
56
Yet,
when
agencies
lack
meaningful
standards
for
conducting
the
analysis,
cost-benefit
analysis
is
subject
to
ma
nipulation,
may
be
ridden
with
error,
and
has
the
appearance
of
mere
window
dressing.
157
Hard
look
review,
therefore,
strength
ens
cost-benefit
analysis
by
giving
agencies
strong
incentives
to
develop
consistent
and
theoretically
sound
methods
of
analysis.
C.
Applying
the
Standard
of
Review
to
Agency
Discount
Rates
Hard
look
review
would
significantly
alter
the
way
agencies
select
discount
rates.
As
this
Part
illustrates,
many
recent
dis
count
rate
choices
by
agencies
would
not
survive
judicial
review
under
this
standard.
Perhaps
the
most
interesting
application
of
hard
look
review
would
involve
OMB’s
guidelines
for
discount
rates.
Applying
this
standard,
a
court
would
find
that
an
agency
cannot
rely
on
0MB
guidelines
to
justify
its
choice
of
discount
rate.
Although
0MB
adopts
the
0CC
approach
and
provides
an
adequate
explanation
for
this
choice,
thereby
surviving
the
first
two
levels
of
analysis
under
hard
look
review,
0MB
fails
the
third
level
of
analysis,
be-
5
Usc
§
7.06(2)
(A)
(requiring
courts
to
set
aside
agency
action
that
is
arbitrary,
Ca
pricious,
an
abuse
of
discretion,
or
otherwise
not
in
accordance
with
the
law’).
“
See
text
accompanying
notes
138-44.
“For
analysis
of
the
pathologies
of
administrative
decisionmking
in
the
absence
of
effective
cost-benefit
analysis,
see
Breyer,
Breaking
the
Vicious
Circle
at
10-29
(cited
in
note
13)
and
Cass
R.
Sunstein,
Free
Markets
and
Social
Justice
289-94
(Oxford
1997).
See
also
Thomas
0.
McGarity
and
Sidney
A.
Shapiro.
OSHA
‘s
Critics
and
Regulatory
Reform,
31
Wake
Forest
L
Rev
587,
622-32
(1996)
(discussing
the
costs
and
benefits
of
cost-benefit
analysis).
See
Sunstein,
48
Stan
L
Rev
at
252-53
(cited
in
note
8).
See,
for
example,
Scherega,
18
J
Envir
Econ
&
Mgmt
at
S-66
(cited
in
note
58).
1998]
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1361
cause
it
does
not
sufficiently
explain
its
application
of
the
0CC
approach.
In
particular,
0MB
advocates
a
7
percent
discount
rate,
unadjusted
for
taxes
or
risk.’
58
Likewise,
EPA
discount
rates
generally
would
not
survive
hard
look
review.
The
agency
chooses
radically
different
discount
rates
for
different
regulations,
generally
providing
no
explanation
for
this
variation.’
59
Indeed,
EPA
practice
appears
arbitrary
be
cause
it
often
chooses
relatively
high
discount
rates
(between
7
and
10
percent)
for
regulations
imposing
future
costs’
6
°
and
low
rates
(around
3
percent)
for
regulations
creating
future
bene
fits.
16
’
Because
the
agency
offers
no
coherent
explanation
for
these
choices,
its
discount
rates
would
fail
the
second
level
of
analysis
under
hard
look
review.
In
contrast,
a
recent
DOE
regulation
likely
would
survive
hard
look
review.
The
agency
provided
detailed
justification
of
its
discount
rate
in
a
rule
setting
energy
conservation
standards
for
certain
major
household
appliances.’
62
After
reviewing
the
theo
retical
and
practical
aspects
of
both
the
SRTP
and
the
CCC,
the
Department
tentatively
advocated
the
0CC
approach,
noting
that
“consideration
must
be
given
to
the
opportunity
costs
of
devoting
more
economic
resources
to
the
production
and
purchase
of
more
energy-efficient
appliances
and
fewer
national
resources
to
other
alternative
types
of
investment.”
63
Not
all
agency
choices
are
as
simple
to
evaluate
under
hard
look
review.
A
harder
case
appears
in
a
recent
regulation
by
the
National
Oceanic
and
Atmospheric
Administration
(“NOAA”),
where
the
agency
established
standards
for
valuing
damages
to
natural
resources
and
the
costs
of
mitigating
those
damages.’
64
There
NOAA
considered
both
the
SRTP
and
0CC,
explaining
the
See
notes
18-20
and
accompanying
text.
EPA
generally
offered
no
explanations
for
the
regulations
in
Tables
1
and
2.
Consider,
for
example,
EPA,
Protection
of
Stratospheric
Ozone,
58
Fed
Reg
at
8163
(cited
in
note
30).
°See,
for
example,
EPA,
Control
of
Air
Pollution
from
New
Motor
Vehicles
and
New
Motor
Vehicle
Engines:
Voluntary
Standards
for
Light-Duty
Vehicles,
62
Fed
Reg
31192,
31215
(1997)
(applying
a
10
percent
discount
rate
to
pollution
credits
that
the
agency
will
give
to
manufacturers
of
automobiles):
EPA,
Amended
Proposed
Test
Rule
for
Hazardous
Air
Pollutants,
62
Fed
Reg
67466,
67477
(1997)
(using
a
7
percent
discount
rate
to
annu
alize
initial
regulatory
costs).
6
See,
for
example.
EPA,
LEAD;
Requirements
for
Lead-Based
Paint
Activities
in
Tar
get
Housing
and
Child-Occupied
Facilities,
61
Fed
Reg
45778,
45808
(1996)
(using
a
3
per
cent
discount
rate
for
core”
analysis
of
future
benefits).
‘
DOE,
Energy
Conservation
Program,
58
Fed
Reg
at
47333-35
(cited
in
note
29).
at
47335.
‘Department
of
Commerce,
NOAA,
Natural
Resource
Damage
Assessments,
61
Fed
Reg
at
450-57
(cited
in
note
29).
1362
The
University
of
Chicago
Law
Review
[65:1333
theory
and
methodological
issues
underlying
each
alternative.’
65
The
agency
ultimately
advocated
a
3
percent
discount
rate
for
valuing
damages
to
natural
resources
because
the
rate
is
reason
ablein
light
of
existing
estimates
of
the
SRTP,
the
rate
is
close
to
the
real
after-tax
rate
of
return
on
riskiess
Treasury
bills,
and
a
relatively
low
discount
rate
may
be
appropriate
for
goods
(natural
resources)
that
are
not
traded
in
a
market.’
66
Unfortunately,
however,
NOAA
also
concluded—without
a
coherent
explana
tion—that
different
discount
rates
should
apply
to
the
benefits
(the
value
of
damages
to
natural
resources)
and
costs
(mitigation
of
damages)
of
restoring
natural
resources.
While
the
agency
ad
vocated
the
SRTP
for
benefits,’
67
it
supported
the
relatively
high
0CC
rate
for
costs.’
68
This
illogical
decision
should
fail
hard
look
review.
CONCLUSION
The
discount
rate
is
a
critical
element
of
cost-benefit
analy
sis.
The
value
of
cost-benefit
analysis
in
improving
regulatory
de
cisions
depends,
in
large
part,
on
the
reasonableness
of
the
dis
count
rate.
Small
variations
in
the
discount
rate
can
significantly
bias
the
analysis.
Despite
the
importance
of
the
discount
rate,
courts
have
failed
to
develop
a
standard
of
review
for
agency
dis
count
rate
choices.
This
is
particularly
troubling
in
light
of
evi
dence
that
agency
practice
exhibits
wide-ranging,
and
generally
unexplained,
variation
in
discount
rates.
Not
only
do
different
agencies
employ
different
rates,
butthe
same
agency
will
some
times
apply
different
rates
to
different
regulations
without
ex
planation.
This
Comment
seeks
to
strengthen
cost-benefit
analysis
by
providing
a
framework
for
judicial
review
of
agency
discount
rates.
As
a
threshold
matter,
courts
should
find,
as
a
matter
of
law,
that
an
agency
acts
unreasonably
if
it
fails
to
discount
future
costs
and
benefits,
even
if
they
accrue
to
future
generations.
Ad
ditionally,
courts
should
take
a
“hard
look”
at
agency
discount
rates
and
ask
three
basic
questions:
Is
there
a
record
for
the
agency’s
choice?
Did
the
agency
explain
its
choice
between
the
al
ternative
approaches
to
discounting,
the
SRTP
and
0CC?
Did
the
agency
consider
the
relevant
factors
in
applying
the
chosen
method?
While
these
questions
are
standard
fare
in
hard
look
re
5
Id
at
453-54.
9d.
‘°‘Id
at
454.
9d
at
456.
1998]
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1363
view,
they
would
represent
a
significant
advance
in
judicial
re
view
of
discount
rates.
More
importantly,
hard
look
review
would
provide
strong
incentives
for
agencies
to
adopt
morally
and
eco
nomically
sensible
discount
rates.
1364
The
University
of
Chicago
LawReview
[65:1333
1998]
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1365
1366
The
University
of
Chicago
Law
Review
[65:1333
1998]
Regulatory
Disco
unt
Rates
1367
1368
The
University
of
Chicago
LawReview
[65:1333
1998]
Regulatory
Discount
Rates
1369
O.\Wth,k\L,w
NOTES
THE
USE
OF
THE
DISCOUNT
RATE
IN
EPA
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS
The
U.S.
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(“EPA”)
is
responsi
ble
for
protecting
the
public
health
and
environment.
Beginning
in
the
late
1960s
and
early
1970s,
Congress
delegated
this
responsibility
and
authority
to
the
EPA
through
several
environmental
protection
statutes.
Under
these
statutes,
the
EPA
promulgates
and
enforces
a
number
of
regulations
designed
to
reduce
emissions
of
pollutants
in
order
to
protect
public
health
and
the
environment
including,
air,
wa
ter
and
land.’
As
a
result,
a
national
system
of
environmental
regula
tions
has
replaced
nuisance
suits
and
the
common
law
as
the
primary
means
of
ensuring
environmental
quality.
2
According
to
those
who
support
the
development
of
a
national
regulatory
system
for
environmental
protection,
common
law
liability
and
nuisance
litigation
are
incapable
of
controlling
pollution
in
a
complex
modern
industrial
society.
On
the
other
hand,
there
are
indi
viduals
who
advocate
a
decentralization
of
environmental
manage
ment
and
policy,
if
not
a
complete
return
to
nuisance
litigation,
be
cause
they
believe
the
current
national
system
fails
to
achieve
envi
ronmental
prGtection
in
an
efficient,
cost-effective
manner.
3
Notwith
standing
this
important
debate,
this
Note
presumes
that
the
national
See
Federal
Water
Pollution
Control
Act
(“CWA”)
of
1972,
33
U.S.C.
§
125
1-1387
(1994);
Resource
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act
(“RCRA”)
of
1976,
42
U.S.C.
§
6901-
6992k
(1994);
Clean
Air
Act
(“CAA”)
of
1970,
42
U.S.C.
§
7401-7671
q
(1994).
2
See
STEPHEN
G.
BRaYER
ET
AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW
AND
REGULATORY
POLICY
351(4th
ed.
1999)
(asserting
that
a
dramatic
trend
beginning
in
the
I
960s
was
the
development
of
several
national
environmental
protection
statutes).
See
also
JESSE
DUKEMINIER
&
JAMES
E.
KRIER,
PROPERTY
776-77
(4th
ed.
1998)
(describing
the
dominant
role
of
the
federal
govern
ment
in
environmental
regulation
since
1970);
Allison
Rittenhouse
Hayward,
Common
Law
Remedies
and
the
UST
Regulations,
21
B.C.
ENVTL.
AFF.
L.
REv.
619,
630
(1994)
(explaining
that
with
the
enactment
of
statutes
such
as
the
CAA,
the
CWA,
and
RCRA,
pollution
became
regulated
by
comprehensive
federal
laws
and
regulations).
Perhaps
no
case
has
been
cited
more
than
Booinr
v.
Atlantic
Cement
Co.,
257
N.E.2d
870
(N.Y.
1970),
for
the
proposition
that
common
law
nuisance
actions
can
be
used
to
effi
ciently
address
environmental
pollution
problems.
In
Boomer,
the
court
awarded
permanent
damages,
instead
of
an
injunction,
to
plaintiffs
in
a
private
nuisance
suit
after
balancing
the
harm
to
theplaintiffs’
property
against
thebeneficial
effects
of
the
defendants’
cement
plant.
Id.
1009
D:\Wb,6\Lw
Rviw\vol52_nombr4\PodoI,ky.doc
1010
CASE
WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW
[Vol.
52:1009
regulatory
system
will
not
be
phased
out
or
discontinued.
However,
many
firms
delay
or
do
not
comply
with
EPA
regulations.
Through
out
the
remainder
of
this
Note,
the
terms
“delayed
compliance”
and
“noncompliance”
are
used
interchangeably.
The
environmental
protection
statutes
grant
the
EPA
the
authority
to
seek
civil
penalties
for
delayed
or
noncompliance.
A
critical
com
ponent
of
civil
penalties
is
the
economic
benefits
of
delayed
compli
ance.
4
Often
there
is
a
significant
time
lag
between
the
occurrence
of
a
violation
and
enforcement
followed
by
a
penalty
payment.
During
this
interval
a
firm
may
use
the
avoided
costs
of
noncompliance
to
ward
its
next
best
alternative
investment(s).
A
discount
rate
is
used
to
estimate
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
as
of
the
penalty
payment
date.
The
EPA
advocates
using
the
weighted
average
cost
of
capital
(“WACC”)
based
on
the
principle
that
the
economic
benefits
of
de
layed
compliance
include
potential
risk-related
profits
from
alterna
tive
investment(s).
Risk-related
profits
are
potential
profits
that
com
pensate
a
firm
for
risk
associated
with
its
alternative
investment.
Pre
viously,
most
courts
accepted
the
EPA
position.
5
However,
in
a
re
centcase,
United
States
v.
WCI
Steel,
Inc.,
6
the
U.S.
District
Court
for
the
Northern
District
of
Ohio
accepted
the
alternative
argument
that
the
risk-free
rate
was
the
appropriate
discount
rate.
7
Use
of
the
risk-
free
rate
does
not
capture
potential
risk-related
profits.
8
The
resolution
to
this
potentially
emerging
split
among
the
courts
is
important
for
several
reasons.
First,
the
two
discount
rates
result
in
substantially
different
estimates
of
the
present
value
of
economic
See
CWA,
33
U.S.C.
§
1319(d);
RCRA,
42
U.S.C.
§
6928(a)(3);
CAA,
42
U.S.C.
§
74
l
3
(eXI).
See
United
States
v.
Smithfield
Foods,
Inc.,
972
F.
Supp.
338,
349
(ED.
Va:
1997),
aff’d,
191
F.3d
516,
531
(4th
Cit.1999),
cert.
denied,
531
U.S.
813
(2000)
(affirming
the
district
court’s
use
of
the
WACC
to
estimate
the
present
value
of
economic
benefit
from
avoiding
the
cost
of
compliance).
See
also
United
States
v.
Roll
Coater,
Inc.,
[19911
21
Envtl.
L.
Rep.
(Envtl.
L.
Inst.)
21,073,
21,075
(S.D.
md.
1991)
(finding
use
of
WACC
discount
factor
more
appropriate
than
alternative
methods).
6
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810
(ND.
Ohio
1999).
Id.
at
830-3
1
(holding
that
the
risk-free
discount
rate
rather
than
the
WACC
is
the
cor
rect
rate
to
use
in
estimating
the
present
value
of
the
economic
benefits
of
noncompliance
and
that
any
profits
earned
in
excess
of
the
risk-free
rate
are
earned
not
from
noncompliance,
but
by
assuming
risk).
Whether
the
WACC
or
risk-free
rate
is
used,
adjustments
for
related
tax
effects
must
be
made.
See
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
Calculation
of
the
Economic
Benefit
of
Noncom
pliance
in
EPA’s
Civil
Penalty
Enforcement
Cases,
64
Fed.
Reg.
32,948,
32,950
(proposed
June
18,
1999)
(explaining
that
EPA
accounts
for
tax
effects
by
using
after-tax
cash
flows
to
estimate
economic
benefits
of
delayed
compliance);
Kenneth
T.
Wise
et
al.,
EPA
‘s
New
BEN
Model:
A
Change
for
the
Better?,
1993
Toxics
L.
REP.
1125,
1127
(explaining
that
the
after-tax
risk-free
rate
is
used
in
actual
calculations
to
account
for
interest
earned
on
avoided
costs
that
were
tax
able).
\Lw
Riw\,d52_m,n,b4\Pod,kky.do
20021
THE
DISCOUNTK4TE
IN
EPA
ENFORCEMENTACTIONS
1011
benefits
of
noncompliance.
If
the
risk-free
rate
is
employed,
the
esti
mate
can
be
lower
by
an
order
of
magnitude,
which
may,
as
a
result,
encourage
forum
shopping
in
order
to
ensure
that
a
“friendly”
court
hears
the
case.
9
Second,
the
same
group
of
expert
economists
has
appeared
before
different
courts
in
support
of
these
two
approaches,
resulting
in
divergent
judicial
determinations
as
to
which
rate
is
ap
propriate.
Third,
the
literature
in
support
of
both
the
risk-free
rate
and
the
WACC
as
applied
to
environmental
regulatory
noncompliance
tends
to
be
dominated
by
those
who
are
either
interested
parties
or
expert
witnesses
in
litigation.
Finally,
unlike
previous
assessments,
this
Note
investigates
which
discount
rate
is
correct
in
light
of
the
legal
doctrine
of
temporary
takings
and
the
underlying
structure
and
purpose
of
damages
in
tort
actions.
Interestingly,
this
emerging
split
appears
to
be
part
of
a
larger
debate
among
the
courts
about
the
ap
propriate
rate
for
pre-judgment
interest
to
be
applied
to
damage
awards.
10
The
remaining
sections
of
this
Note
are
as
follows:
Part
I
ex
plains
the
important
role
of
civil
penalties
and
the
discount
rate
in
enforcing
environmental
regulations,
given
the
purpose
of
imposing
regulations;
Part
II
explains
the
general
role
of
the
discount
rate
in
estimating
present
value;
Part
III
outlines
the
mechanics
of
estimating
present
value
using
the
WACC
and
risk-free
rate;
Part
IV
shows
that
economic
and
financial
theory
support
using
the
risk-free
discount
rate;
Part
V
demonstrates
that
temporary
takings
and
tort
law
are
con
gruent
with
economic
and
financial
theory
supporting
the
risk-free
discount
rate;
and
Part
VI
recommends
an
approach
for
the
appropri
ate
accounting
of
economic
benefits
and
potential
risk-related
profits
from
noncompliance
in
the
context
of
civil
penalties.
I.
CIVIL
PENALTIES,
REGULATION,
AND
THE
EcoNoMic
BENEFIT
OF
DELAYED
OR
NONCOMPLIANCE
The
critical
question
this
Note
addresses
is
which
discount
rate,
the
risk-free
rate
or
the
WACC,
should
be
used
to
determine
the
pre
sent
value
of
ex
post
economic
benefits,
or
those
benefits
a
firm
en
joys
from
the
time
of
delayed
or
noncompliance
through
the
penalty
Of
course
jurisdictional
requirements
may
restrict
a
firm’s
ability
to
forum
shop.
‘°
Compare
Blanton
v.
Anzalone,
760
F.2d
989,
992-93
(9th
Cir.
1985)
(holding
that
the
interest
rate
on
52-week
U.S.
Treasury
Bills
to
be
applied
to
post-judgment
interest
civil
money
judgments
in
federal
courts,
as
required
under
28
U.S.C.
§
1961,
should
also
be
applied
to
pre
judgment
interest
in
an
ERISA
suit
unless
the
trial
court
finds
that
a
different
rate
is
appropri
ate),
with
Smith
v.
Am.
Int’l
Life
Assurance
Co.,
50
F.3d
956,
958
(11th
Cir.
1995)
(holding
that
because
the
language
of
28
U.S.C.
§
1961
only
addresses
post-judgment
interest,
determina
tion
of
the
pre-judgment
interest
rate
in
an
ERISA
suit
is
left
to
the
discretion
of
the
district
court
subject
only
to
a
review
for
abuse
of
discretion).
D:\Wbie\Lw
1012
CASE
WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW
[Vol.
52:1009
payment
date.
For
the
reasons
developed
throughout
this
Note,
the
conclusion
is
that
the
appropriate
discount
rate
to
use
is
the
risk-free
discount
rate
(or
a
firm’s
cost
of
debt
if
it
faced
more
than
a
mere
probability
of
bankruptcy
during
the
period
of
noncompliance).
The
risk-free
rate
separates
economic
benefits
due
to
the
illicit
act
of
vio
lating
a
regulation
from
potential
risk-related
returns.
Noncompliance
with
EPA
regulations
defeats
the
very
purpose
of
the
regulation,
which
is
the
protection
of
human
health
and
the
envi
ronment.
Society
is
therefore
unable
to
capture
the
increase
in
social
well-being.
It
is
then
necessary
to
ensure
compliance
through
the
im
position
of
civil
penalties.
Penalizing
firms
through
the
imposition
of
a
civil
penalty
that
includes
economic
benefits
of
delayed
compliance
deters
the
target
firm
(i.e.,
specific
deterrence)
and
other
firms
(i.e.,
general
deterrence)
from
similar
violations
in
the
future.
11
In
order
to
understand
the
important
role
that
civil
penalties
play
in
environmental
protection,
a
brief
explanation
for
imposing
regula
tions
is
needed.
Regulations
are
imposed
to
correct
for
market
fail
ures
such
as
negative
externalities.’
2
In
the
context
of
pollution,
nega
tive
externalities
exist
as
firms
fail
to
internalize
the
external
cost
of
pollution
as
a
result
of
their
production
process.
Consequently,
the
quantity
of
goods
and
services
consumed
exceeds
the
optimal
level.
The
optimal
level
is
where
the
marginal
social
benefits
equal
mar
ginal
social
costs.
This
is
displayed
in
Figure
1.
Q’
represents
the
socially
optimal
level
of
output
of
good
or
service
Q
when
a
firm
in
ternalizes
all
costs
of
production,
including
pollution
damages
im
posed
on
others.
The
associated
market
price
is
P’’.
Qo
represents
output
when
a
firm
fails
to
internalize
the
external
cost.
The
associ
ated
market
price
is
Po.
The
distance
between
points
B
and
C
repre
sents
the
marginal
externality
cost.
The
failure
to
internalize
the
cost
of
pollution
is
shown
in
Figure
1.
D
is
the
marginal
willingness
to
pay,
which
represents
the
value
of
Q
to
consumers.
MCp,
the
marginal
private
cost,
which
is
less
than
MCs,
the
marginal
social
cost,
characterizes
the
firm’s
cost
of
produc
1
See
United
States
v.
Smithfield
Foods,
Inc.,
191
F.3d
516,
529
(4th
Cir.
1999),
cert.
denied,
531
US.
813
(2000)
(stating
that
the
economic
benefit
component
of
a
civil
penalty
is
to
prevent
violators
from
obtaining
a
competitive
advantage
through
noncompliance);
United
States
v.
Bethlehem
Steel
Corp.,
829
F.
Supp.
1047,
1057
(ND.
md.
1993)
(discussing
in
the
context
of
a
RCRA
violation
“that
the
major
purpose
of
a
civil
penalty
is
deterrence”).
2
See
TOM
TIETENBERO,
ENVIRONMENTAL
AND
NATURAL
RESOURCE
ECONOMICS
53-54
(3d
ed.
1992)
(describing
the
problem
of
externalities
as
causing
a
market
failure
because
prices
do
not
adjust
to
account
for
pollution).
See
also
SCOTT
J.
CALLAN
&
JANET
M.
THOMAS,
ENVI
RONMENTAL
ECONOMICS
AND
MANAGEMENT:
THEORY,
POLICY,
AND
APPLICATIONS
81-84
(1996)
(defining
a
negative
externality
as
a
spillover
effect
from
either
production
or
consump
tion
that
extends
outside
the
market
and
affects
third
parties
who
are
neither
the
consumer
nor
the
producer).
fl:\Wth,k\Lw
doc
2002]
THE
DISCOUNTRATE
IN
EPA
ENFORCEMENTACTIONS
1013
tion.
The
marginalsocial
cost
of
production
represents
the
cost
of
producing
goods
and
services
after
a
firm
internalizes
the
cost
of
pol
lution.
13
In
Figure
1,
the
area
ABCE
represents
the
benefits
of
im
proved
public
health
and
environmental
quality
as
a
result
of
a
firm
internalizing
the
cost
of
pollution.
The
EPA
promulgates
and
enforces
environmental
protection
regulations
in
order
to
force
firms
to
internalize
pollution
costs.’
4
The
cost
of
production
changes
from
MCp
to
MCs.
Triangle
ACE
is
lost
profits
as
the
quantity
of
Q
produced
and
sold
falls
from
Qo
to
Q*
due
to
this
increase
in
cost.
The
difference
between
these
two
areas,
triangle
ABC,
is
the
net
gain
in
social
well-being.
Figure
1
Social
Cost
of
Pollution
$/unit
.
MCs
MCp
B
P*
Po
.
.
C
Q*
Qo
Q
‘
See
TIETENBERG,
supra
note
12,
at
52
(defining
MCp
as
the
cost
of
production
ex
cludng
the
cost
of
pollution
and
MCs
as
the
social
cost
of
production
that
includes
the
cost
of
pollution).
‘
See
RH.
Coase,
The
Problem
of
Social
Cost,
3
J.L.
&
Ec0N.
1
(1960)
(arguing
that
in
the
absence
of
transaction
costs,
polluters
and
non-polluters
will
internalize
the
cost
associated
with
negative
externalities
through
bargaining
and
negotiation
rather
than
government
interven
tion).
However,
due
to
the
large
number
of
affected
parties,
the
Coase
Theorem’s
assumption
of
zero-transactions
costs
does
not
hold
true
for
most,
if
not
all,
environmental
issues
EPA
regu
lates.
See
ROBERT
C.
ELLICKSON,
ORDER
WITHOUT
LAW:
How
NEIGHBORS
SETTLE
DISPUTES
280
(1991)
(describing
Coase’s
assumption
of
zero
transactions
costs
as
unrealistic).
Relatedly,
the
Coase
Theorem
does
not
address
another
situation
where
environmental
regulation
is
re
quired,
where
there
are
potential
“free-riders”
who
may
seek
the
benefits
of
pollution
reductions
without
incurring
any
of
the
associated
transactions
costs.
D:\Wb,i\L
1014
CASE
WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW
[Vol.
52:1009
II.
ECONOMIC
BENEFIT
OF
DELAYED
OR
NONCOMPLIANCE
AND
THE
ROLE
OF
THE
DISCOUNT
RATE
For
simplicity,
assume
here
and
throughout
the
rest.
of
this
Note
that
the
economic
benefits
of
delayed
or
noncompliance
are
ex
post
relative
to
the
penalty
payment
date.’
5
A
firm
derives
economic
bene
fits
from
noncompliance
with
environmental
regulations
by
avoiding
the
commitment
6f
financial
resources
for
pollution
control.
Eco
nomic
benefits
are
derived
from
two
sources:
(1)
avoided
capital
in
vestments
required
for
the
purchase
and
installation
of
pollution
con
trol
equipment
(e.g.,
scrubbers
to
remove
sulfur
emissions
from
fossil
fuel
combustion),
and
(2)
avoided
operation
and
maintenance
ex
penses
as
a
result
of
the
initial
choice
not
to
install
pollution
control
equipment.
A
firm
may
apply
these
funds
toward
other
investments
until
a
civil
penalty
is
paid
and
compliance
is
required.
The
role
of
the
discount
rate
is
to
determine
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
from
noncompliance
because
there
is
a
lag
be
tween
a
violation,
enforcement,
and
payment
of
a
penalty.
The
pre
sent
value
is
estimated
by
applying
the
compounded
discount
rate
to
the
avoided
cost
from
the
initial
date
of
delayed
compliance
through
the
penalty
payment
date.
A
court
may
choose
the
WACC
or
the
risk-free
discount
rate.
With
the
decision
in
United
States
v.
WCI
Steel,
Inc.,
courts
have
taken
divergent
positions
on
which
rate
is
cor
rect.’
6
III.
ESTIMATING
PRESENT
VALUE
OF
ECONOMIC
BENEFIT:
RJSK
FREE
RATE
VS.
WACC
The
mechanics
of
estimating
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
using
the
risk-free
rate
and
applying
its
retrospective
ex
post
analysis
are:
°
In
reality,
we
may
have
to
account
for
economic
benefits
that
would
be
expected
to
accrue
ex
ante,
or
after
the
penalty
payment
date.
For
these
benefits
those
who
advocate
use
of
the
risk-free
rate
for
ex
post
benefits
relative
to
the
penalty
payment
date
agree
with
the
EPA
that
the
WACC
should
be
used
to
discount
ex
ante
benefits
relative
to
the
penalty
payment
to
their
present
value
as
of
the
penalty
payment
date.
See
Stewart
C.
Myers
et
al.,
The
BEN
Model
and
the
Calculation
of
Economic
BenefitS
(Mar.
1997)
(prepared
for
the
BEN
Coalition
and
the
Synthetic
Organic
Chemical
Manufacturers
Association)
(explaining
that
ex
post
analyses
may
have
to
account
for
future
cash
flows
whose
value
is
not
known
with
certainty,
such
as
the
cost
of
equipment
replacement
based
on
necessary
replacement
cycles)-(on
file
with
author).
6
In
rare
instances,
courts
have
applied
discount
rates
solely
based
on
the
cost
of
equity
capital.
See
Atlantic
States
Legal
Found.
Inc.
v.
Universal
Tool
&
Stamping
Co.,
786
F.
Supp.
743,
751
(N.D
md.
1992).
However,
this
Note
does
not
consider
this
discount
rate,
as
even
the
EPA
believes
it
should
not
be
used
to
determine
the
present
value
of
the
economic
benefits
of
delayed
compliance
in
enforcement
cases.
See
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
Calculation
of
the
Economic
Benefit
of
Noncompliance
in
EPA’s
Civil
Penalty
Enforcement
Cases,
64
Fed.
Reg.
32,948,
32,959
(proposed
June
18,
1999).
D\Wthi\L
2002]
THE
DISCOUNT
RATE
IN
EPA
ENFORCEMENTACTIONS
1015
ppd
PVPCE
1
i=i
Cj,ontime
(l+k)
[1]
Equation
I,
where
PVPCE
1
is
the
present
value
of
pollution
con
trol
expenditures,
represents
the
present
value
of
pollution
control
expenditures
for
on
time
compliance
with
an
EPA
regulation
as
of
the
penalty
payment
date
(“ppd”).
time
is
the
cost
of
compliance
that
would
have
been
incurred
for
each
period
i.
Additionally,
k
is
the
risk-free
discount
rate
and
is
used
to
determine
the
present
value
of
Ci,on
time
as
of
ppd.
ppd
PVPCE
2
=
j=i
Cj,ieiay’
(l+k)
[2]
Equation
2
represents
the
present
value
of
pollution
control
ex
penditures
in
the
case
of
delayed
or
noncompliance
after
the
EPA
has
required
a
firm
to
comply,
also
as
of
the
penalty
payment
date.
C
3
delay
is
the
cost
of
compliance
incurred
in
each
period
from
j
through
the
date
on
which
the
penalty
is
paid.
k
is
the
risk-free
discount
rate
and
is
used
to
determine
the
present
value
of
Cj
delay
as
of
ppd.
The
pre
sent
value
of
the
economic
benefit
is
then
calculated
by
subtracting
the
value
of
equation
2
from
equation
1.
The
mechanics
the
EPA
employs
to
estimate
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
using
the
WACC
and
applying
its
prospective
ex
ante
analysis
to
ex
post
benefits
through
the
penalty
payment
date
are:
ppd
PVPCE
3
=
Ci,ontime/(l+k)’
[31
Equation
3
represents
the
present
value
of
pollution
control
ex
penditures
for
on
time
compliance
with
an
EPA
regulation
as
of
the
original
noncompliance
date.
Similar
to
the
risk-free
analysis,
C
0
time
is
the
cost
of
compliancethat
would
have
been
incurred
for
each
pe
riod
i
through
ppd.
However,
the
discount
rate,
k,
which
is
used
to
determine
the
present
value
of
time
as
of
the
original
noncom
pliance
date
is
the
WACC
rather
than
the
risk-free
rate.
ppd
PVPCE
4
=
t
Cj,delay/(1
[4]
Riw\oI52_n4\PodoIky.doc
1016
CASE
WESTERNRESERVE
LAWRE
VIEW
[Vol.
52:1009
Equation
4
represents
the
present
value
of
pollution
control
ex
penditures
in
the
case
of
delayed
or
noncompliance
after
the
EPA
has
compelled
a
firm
to
comply,
also
as
of
the
original
noncompliance
date.
Cj,delay
is
the
cost
of
compliance
that
is
incurred
for
each
period
and
s
is
the
number
of
periods
from
the
initial
date
of
noncompliance
until
compliance
begins.
After
subtracting
the
value
of
equation
4
from
equation
3,
the
last
step
in
the
EPA’s
analysis
is
to
apply
the
WACC
and
bring
this
value
forward
to
determine
the
present
value
of
economics
benefit
as
of
the
penalty
payment
date.
The
choice
of
analytical
framework
and
thus
k
is
critical,
given
the
power
of
compounding,
because
a
small
change
in
the
magnitude
of
k
can
result
in
a
significant
difference
in
the
estimate
of
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
from
delayed
compliance.
TheWACC
is
significantly
higher
than
the
risk-free
rate.
A
court’s
decision
to
use
the
WACC
or
risk-free
rate
results
in
estimates
of
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
that
are
orders
of
magnitude
apart.
17
However,
this
choice
must
be
based
not
on
whether
one
favors
higher
or
lower
esti
mates,
but
on
economic,
financial,
andlegal
theory,
and
how
such
theory
comports
with
the
purpose
of
deterrence
underlying
the
impo
sition
of
civil
penalties.
A
review
of
relevant
decisions
shows
that
except
for
thç
court
in
WCI
Steel,
courts
provide
no
explanations
based
on
economic
or
financial
theory
regarding
their
choice
of
dis
count
rate.
18
IV.
EcoNoMIc
AND
FINANCIAL
THEORY
JUSTIFIES
THE
RISK-FREE
DISCOUNT
RATE
Having
described
the
options
for
estimating
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
of
noncompliance,
it
is
now
necessary
to
assess
which
choice
is
correct
based
on
economic
and
financial
theory.
The
WACC
is
a
firm’s
weighted
average
cost
of
capital.
Typically,
a
firm’s
cost
of
capital
is
divided
into
the
cost
of
debt
(e.g.,
interest
on
corporate
bonds)
and
the
cost
of
equity
(i.e.,
rate
of
return
on
firm’s
‘
See
United
States
v.
WCI
Steel,
Inc.,
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
830-31
(ND.
Ohio
1999)
(showing
that
controlling
for
the
type
of
remediation
required
for
RCRA
sludge
management
violations,
the
estimated
present
value
of
the
economic
benefit
using
the
WACC
was
$2.8
mil
lion,
while
the
estimate
was
only
$732,000
using
the
risk-free
rate).
See
also
Robert
H.
Furh
man,
A
Discussion
of
Technical
Problems
with
EPA
‘S
BEN
Model,
I
ENVTL.
LAW.
561,
576-79
(1995)
(outlining
several
articles
that
assert
that
the
risk-free
discount
rate
is
correct
and
using
a
hypothetical
example
demonstrating
that
the
WACC
results
in
an
estimated
present
value
of
economic
benefits
of
noncompliance
of
approximately
$1.1
million,
while
the
risk-free
rate
results
in
an
estimate
of
$485,000).
18
See
United
States
v.
Smithfield
Foods,
tnc.,
972
F.
Supp.
338,
349
nIl
(E.D.
Va.
1997),
off
d
191
F.3d
516
(4th
Cir.
1999),
cert.
denied,
531
U.S.
813
(2000)
(stating
that
the
court
was
simply
more
persuaded
by
the
testimony
of
the
economic
expert
supporting
use
of
the
WACC).
D\Wth’\L
20021
THE
DISCOUNTRATE
IN
EPA
ENFORCEMENTACTIONS
1017
stock)
based
upon
a
firm’s
capital
structure.
The
cost
of
capital
repre
sents
the
cost
of
financing
pollution
control
equipment
purchases
to
comply
with
environmental
protection
regulations
or
the
opportunity
cost
of
foregone
investments
because
of
such
purchases.’
9
A
rational
profit-maximizing
company
might
choose
not
to
comply
with
a
regu
lation
if
it
could
earn
a
rate
of
return
equal
to
the
WACC,
especially
because
pollution
control
equipment
yields
no
actual
monetary
in
come
to
a
firm.
2
°
Consequently,
proponents
of
the
WACC
assert
that
only
by
usingthis
discount
rate
can
all
earnings
be
disgorged
and
the
violator
made
indifferent
when
deciding
between
compliance
and
noncompliance.
2
’
The
WACC
includes
a
risk
premium
that
captures
and
compen
sates
those
who
provide
capital
resources
to
a
firm.
22
The
EPA
rec
ognizes
the
presence
of
a
risk
premium
in
a
firm’s
cost
of
capital
in
the
EPA’s
own
internal
guidance
documents.
23
The
risk
is
due
to
the
uncertainty
of
future
cash
flows
or
profits
that
an
investment
may
generate.
The
economic
benefits
of
noncompliance
are
estimated
from
the
perspective
of
a
firm
making
the
initial
decision
not
to
com
ply
and
use
the
avoided
costs
for
an
alternative
investment
expected
to
earn
a
rate
of
return
at
least
as
large
as
the
WACC.
However,
if
the
amount
of
cash
flow
is
known,
there
is
no
risk
and
thus
no
need
to
include
a
risk
premium
in
the
discount
rate.
In
fact,
this
is
the
very
point
of
those
who
support
using
the
risk-free
rate
because,
by
definition,
enforcement
actions
are
taken
after
the
avoided
costs
of
delayedcompliance
are
known.
The
EPA
implicitly
9
See
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
Calculation
of
the
Economic
Benefit
of
Non
compliance
in
EPA’s
Civil
Penalty
Enforcement
Cases,
64
Fed.
Reg.
at
32,958.
20
Id.
at32,949.
21
Id.
at
32,963-64
(explaining
that
capturing
all
of
the
economic
benefits
and
retuming
the
violator
to
the
financial
position
prior
to
noncompliance
requires
accounting
for
the
rate
of
retum
a
company
earns
on
the
alternative
investments
made
in
lieu
of
purchasing
and
maintain
ing
pollution
control
equipment).
22
See
Myers
et
al.,
supra
note
15,
at
9
(describing
the
cost
of
capital
as
reflecting
the
risk
and
uncertainty
of
future
cash
flows
of
an
investment).
See
also
WALTER
NICHOLSON,
MICRO-
ECONOMIC
THEORY:
BASIC
PRINCIPLES
ANO
EXTENSIONS
250
(5th
ed.
1992)
(explaining
that
the
variance
in
potential
outcomes
for
an
activity
proxies
the
economic
concept
of
risk);
Wise
et
al.,
supra
note
8,
at
1127
(explaining
that
the
cost
of
capital
incorporates
the
risk
of
an
invest
ment);
Kenneth
T.
Wise
et
al.,
EPA
‘s
“BEN”
Model:
Challenging
Excessive
Penalty
Calcula
tions,
1992
TOXICS
L.
REP.
1492,
1495
n.
14
(discussing
that
the
WACC
is
a
risk-adjusted
dis
count
rate
in
order
to
account
for
uncertainty
in
the
amount
of
future
cash
flows).
As
applied
to
the
firm
in
the
case
of
delayed
compliance,
the
activity
of
investing
avoided
costs
has
more
than
one
potential
outcome.
The
outcome
may
yield
a
high
rate
of
return,
providing
the
firm
with
a
significant
payoff.
On
the
other
hand,
the
investment
may
fail,
leaving
the
firm
with
a
loss.
The
risk
premium
in
the
WACC
is
the
compensation
the
firm,
and
thus
its
investors,
receive
for
the
willingness
to
take
the
risk.
29
See
U.S.
EPA,
GUIDELINES
FOR
PPEPARING
ECONOMIC
ANALYSES
ch.
9
(2000)
(cx
plaining
that
analyses
of
the
economic
impact
of
future
regulatory
compliance
costs
on
firms
must
use
the
firms’
private
costs
of
capital
that
reflect
risk).
D\Wb,,\Lw
1018
CASE
WESTERNRESERVELAWREVJEW
[Vol.
52:1009
acknowledges
the
accuracy
of
this
statement.
24
Consequently,
there
is
no
uncertainty
in
the
amount
of
avoided
costs,
and
to
compound
for
ward
using
the
WACC
wouldeffectively
compensate
the
EPA
for
risk
when
no
such
risk
exists.
25
The
economic
benefits
of
noncompli
ance
are
estimated
from
an
ex
post
perspective
based
on
a
firm’s
ac
tual
avoided
costs.
The
use
of
the
WACC
to
estimate
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
would
compensate
the
government
for
risk
that
it
did
not
bear.
26
The
financial
theory
of
applying
the
risk-free
discount
rate
to
noncompliance
finds
its
roots
in
the
literature
on
tort
law
advocating
use
of
the
risk-free
rate
to
estimate
the
present
value
of
damages
for
wrongs
committed
in
the
past.
27
Like
an
award
for
past
damages
in
tort,
the
avoided
cost
has
occurred
in
the
past
and
is
thus
known
and
certain.
The
amount
of
the
avoided
cost
need
only
be
compounded
by
the
risk-free
rate
up
to
the
penalty
payment
date
to
account
for
the
pure
time
value
of
money.
The
risk-free
rate
paradigm
does
not
deny
that
a
firm
might
earn
risk-related
profits,
or
what
some
might
refer
to
as
profits
from
arbitrage.
However,
it
distinguishes
such
profits
from
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
of
noncompliance.
24
See
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
Calculation
of
the
Economic
Benefit
of
Non
compliance
in
EPA’s
Civil
Penalty
Enforcement
Cases,
64
Fed.
Reg.
at
32,958
(showing
that
the
amount
of
the
estithated
financial
gain
from
initial
delay
is
the
same,
and
is
known
and
certain
under
either
approach).
25
See
Myers
Ct
al.,
supra
note
15,
at
10
(“Assume
the
benefits
of
delayed
compliance
have
been
identified.
These
benefits
are
now
fixed
past
cash
flows—there
is
no
risk
in
hind
sight.
The
only
remaining
step
is
to
bring
those
cash
flows
to
the
present.
.
.
.
[T]he
risk-free
rate
should
be
used.
Using
any
higher
rate
would
compensate
the
government
for
risks
it
has
not
incurred.”).
See
also
Wise
et
al.,
supra
note
8,
at
1127
(explaining
that
the
amount
of
past
cash
flows
are
known
and
thus
risk-free,
requiring
the
use
of
a
risk-free
discount
rate
to
deter
mine
present
value);
Wise
et
al.,
supra
note
22,
at
1495
n.14
(asserting
that
there
is
no
uncer
tainty
associated
with
past
cash
flows,
and
thus
a
risk-free
discount
rate
must
be
used
to
estimate
the
present
value).
26
See
United
States
v.
WCI
Steel,
Inc.,
72
F.
Supp.
2d.
810,
831
(ND.
Ohio
1999)
(“The
central
issue
is
whether
a
rate
reflecting
risk
should
be
used
as
to
past
benefits
or
obligations.
Any
return
above
the
risk-free
rate
is
earned
not
from
delay
but
by
assuming
risk,
and
therefore
is
not
properly
considered
economic
benefit
from
noncompliance.
Because
this
amount
is
known
and
the
existence
and
solvency
of
the
party
is
also
known,
itis
inappropriate
to
increase
the
rate
to
reflect
risk.”).
See
also
Myers
et
al.,
supra
note
15,
at
10
(explaining
that
a
company
could
place
funds
that
would
otherwise
be
used
for
environmental
regulatoiycompliance
in
a
risky
investment,
but
that
any
return
over
the
risk-free
rate
is
compensation
for
bearing
the
risk,
not
a
benefit
from
noncompliance).
27
See
R.F.
Lanzillotti
&
AK.
Esquibel,
Measuring
Damages
in
Commercial
Litigation,
5
J.
ACCOUNTING,
AUDITING
&
FINANCE
125,
134
(1990)
(“In
the
case
of
past
lost
profits
since
the
materialized
cash
flows
are
certain,
the
risk-free
rate
should
be
used
to
bring
the
past
lost
profits
to
present
value.”).
See
also
Franklin
M.
Fisher
&
R.
Craig
Romaine,
Janis
Joplin
‘s
Yearbook
and
the
Theory
of
Damages,
5
J.
ACCOUNTING,
AUDITING
&
FmiA.NCE
145,
153-56
(1990)
(arguing
that
making
a
plaintiff
whole
for
a
lost
profit
or
destroy6d
asset,
where
compen
sation
is
paid
at
a
future
point,
requires
a
damage
award
equal
to
the
value
of
the
lost
profit
or
destroyed
asset
as
of
the
time
of
injury
compounded
forward
to
the
award
payment
date
using
a
risk-free
discount
rate
to
account
only
for
the
time
value
of
money).
0
\Wb\Lw
20021
THE
DISCOUNTRATE
IN
EPA
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS
1019
Indeed,
the
EPA’s
advocacy
of
the
WACC
disregards
the
essen
tial
point
of
the
retrospective
ex
post
view.
The
risk-free
discount
rate
is
correct
because
of
certainty
in
the
amount
of
the
avoided
costs.
Judge
Posner’s
decision
in
Douglass
v.
Hustler
Magazine,
Inc.
28
ad
dressed
an
economic
expert’s
estimate
of
the
present
value
of
the
plaintiff’s
lost
future
earnings
due
to
invasion
of
her
privacy
as
a
re
suit
of
an
illegal
publication
of
photos
of
her
in
Hustler
Magazine.
Regarding
this
estimate,
Posner
wrote:
One
[problem)
is
that
in
discounting
to
present
value
the
economist
failed
to
correct
for
the
extreme
riskiness
of
the
earnings
stream
for
which
he
was
trying
to
find
a
present
value.
An
award
of
damages
is
a
sum
certain.
If
it
is
in
tended
to
replace
a
stream
of
earnings
that
is
highly
uncer
tain—surely
an
understatement
in
discussing
[future]
earn
ings
in
the
field
of
entertainment—then
risk
aversion
should
be
taken
into
account
in
computing
the
discount
(interest)
rate.
The
riskless
rate
.
.
.
would
be
the
proper
rate
if
the
earnings
stream
that
the
damages
award
was
intended
to
re
place
was
one
that
would
have
been
obtained
with
certainty.
29
Unlike
the
plaintiff’s
future
earnings
in
Douglass,
the
economic
benefit
of
delayed
compliance
is
known
and
certain.
Clearly,
the
risk-
free
rate
should
be
used
to
estimate
its
present
value.
Any
return
over
the
risk-free
rate
is
compensation
for
bearing
risk,
not
an
economic
benefit
of
noncompliance.
In
addition,
consider
the
position
of
a
firm
that
has
decided
not
to
comply
with
an
environmental
regulation.
Other
than
putting
avoided
costs
under
the
mattress,
the
only
way
for
a
firm
to
ensure
that
the
funds
derived
from
delayed
compliance
will
be
available
to
pay
the
civil
penalty
is
to
place
them
in
a
risk-free
investment
such
as
a
treas
ury
bond.
3
°
If
a
firm
places
the
funds
in
a
risk-bearing
investment,
any
return
over
the
risk-free
rate
is
the
reward
for
willingness
to
ac
cept
the
risk.
If
the
risky
venture
fails
and
all
of
the
funds
are
lost,
the
EPA
will
not
waive
the
company’s
compliance
requirement,
and
will
likely
impose
some
form
of
fine
anyway.
In
short,
the
risk-free
rate
is
appropriate
since
the
EPA
bears
no
risk
from
delayed
compliance.
A
related
criticism
of
employing
the
risk-free
rate
is
that
it
may
result
in
a
negative
estimate
of
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
‘°
769
F.2d
1128
(7th
Cir.
1985).
Id.
at
1143
(citation
omitted).
°
See
Myers
et
al.,
supra
note
15,
at
10
(“[F]rom
the
vidlator’s
point
of
view:
what
can
the
violator
do
with
the
money
during
the
period
of
noncompliance
without
taking
on
the
risk
of
losing
all
or
a
portion
of
it?
The
only
answer
is
to
invest
in
a
risk
free
security.”).
Dr\Wb,j\L3w
Rev
w\volS2
number4\Fodolky.dee
1020
CASE
WESTERN
RESER
yE
LA
WRE
VIEW
[Vol.
52:1009
from
delayed
compliance.
The
EPA
provides
an
example
in
which
the
use
of
the
WACC
results
in
a
positive
economic
benefit,
whereas
the
use
of
the
risk-free
rate
results
in
a
negative
estimate
of
economic
benefits.
3
’
An
unstated
assumption
is
that
a
firm
must
obtain
positive
benefits
from
delayed
or
noncompliance.
However,
there
is
no
ra
tionale
in
economic
or
financial
theory
to
substantiate
this
assump
tion.
There
is
no
reason
that
delaying
expenditures
must
result
in
a
positive
financial
gain.
A
priori,
given
the
number
of
financial
variables
that
can
affect
expenditures,
including
potential
changes
in
their
value
over
time,
the
difference
between
on
time
and
delayed
expenditures
for
pollution
control
is
intuitively
indeterminate.
For
example,
consider
the
choice
as
to
when
to
purchase
a
home.
One
might
choose
to
purchase
a
home
today
at
current
prices
and
interest
rates,
or
delay
the
purchase
hoping
that
interest
rates
or
purchase
prices,
or
both,
will
decrease.
Unfortunately,
it
is
possible
that
a
“negative”
benefit
may
result,
as
only
one
or
perhaps
neither
factor
will
decrease
or
even
possibly
in
crease.
When
the
present
value
of
the
two
total
purchase
costs
is
compared,
there
may
be
a
negative
benefit.
Consider
the
position
of
those
who
did
not
purchase
a
home
in
the
early
1990s,
prior
to
the
substantial
increase
in
housing
prices
that
occurred
in
the
late
1990s.
Instinctively,
under
such
a
scenario,
even
after
accounting
for
possi
ble
tax
benefits
of
owning
a
home,
it
would
not
be
shocking
that
a
buyer
might
experience
a
negative
financial
gain
due
to
his
delayed
purchase.Thus,
it
should
not
be
surprising
that
a
firm
might
experi
ence
a
similar
“negative”
benefit
from
delaying
expenditures
on
pol
lution
control
equipment.
Notwithstanding
the
conceptual
power
of
using
the
risk-free
rate
for
ex
post
benefits,
one
critical
assumption
underlies
the
use
of
this
discount
rate.
This
assumption
is
that
a
firm
does
not
face
any
risk
of
bankruptcy.
32
As
discussed
below,
if
a
firm
has
faced
more
than
a
negligible
risk
of
bankruptcy
during
the
period
of
delayed
compli
ance,
use
of
the
risk-free
rate
would
be
inappropriate.
A
firm
3
s
cost
of
debt,
or
the
interest
rate
charged
for
borrowing
funds
from
a
bank
or
through
a
bond
issue,
becomes
the
appropriate
discount
rate.
33
The
avoided
costs
due
to
delay
are
fixed
and
known
and
thus
equivalent
to
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
Calculation
of
the
Economic
Benefit
of
Noncompli
ance
in
EPA’s
Civil
Penalty
Enforcement
Cases,
64
Fed.
Reg.
32,948,
32,959
(proposed
June
18,
1999):
32
See
Myers
et
al.,
supra
note
15,
at
10.
D
See
GABRIEL
HAWAWINI
&
CLAUDE
VIALLET,
FINANCE
FOR
ExEcuTives:
MANAGING
VALUE
FOR
CREATION
303-04
(1999)
(defining
the
cost
of
debt
as
either
the
interest
rate
a
bank
charges
a
firm
in
exchange
for
a
loan
or
the
market
yield
to
maturity
for
bonds
the
firm
has
issued).
D\Wh,i,\L
Reiw\voI52nu4\odol,ky.do
2002]
THE
DISCOUNT
RATE
IN
EPA
ENFORCEMENTACTIONS
1021
a
debt
obligation.
The
only
uncertainty
is
the
risk
of
default,
which
banks
and
bondholders
include
in
either
the
interest
charged
or
re
quired
yield.
Synonymous
with
a
typical
borrower
and
a
bank,
a
firm
is
in
effect
the
borrower
and
the
government
is
the
lender.
34
More
over,
due
to
the
tax
deductibility
of
interest
payments,
firms
tend
to
prefer
debt
financing
to
equity
financing
through
the
sale
of
stock.
35
If
a
firm
has
multiple
debt
obligations,
a
weighted
average
of
the
in
terest
rates
or
yield
to
maturities
should
be
used
to
determine
a
firm’s
average
cost
of
debt.
There
is
no
clear
line
that
dictates
when
courts
or
the
EPA
should
employ
the
cost
of
debt
as
compared
to
the
risk-free
rate
to
determine
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits.
There
is
some
probability
greater
than
zero
that
any
firm,
even
the
most
financially
secure,
may
have
faced
bankruptcy
during
the
period
of
noncompliance.
How
ever,
it
is
inequitable
to
assert
that
the
cost
of
debt,
instead
of
the
risk-
free
rate,
should
be
used
in
all
cases.
Courts
must
make
this
determi
nation
on
a
case-by-case
basis
using
all
of
the
relevant
evidence
pre
sented.
Such
evidence
may
include
information
concerning
a
firm’s
liquidity,
36
the
market
yield
of
a
firm’s
bonds,
37
and
the
yield
spread
between
the
market
yield
of
a
firm’s
bonds
over
a
government
bond
with
the
same
maturity.
38
Courts
may
also
consider
the
overall
eco
nomic
state
of
the
industry
to
which
a
firm
belongs.
The
expost
ret
rospective
analysis
remains
the
same,
regardless
of
whether
the
risk-
free
rate
or
cost
of
debt
is
used.
This
Note
will
presume
that
a
court
should
apply
the
risk-free
discount
rate
unless
there
is
more
than
a
negligible
probability
of
a
firm
having
faced
bankruptcy
during
the
period
of
noncompliance.
39
See
Myers
et
aL,
supra
note
15,
at
10.
If
the
firm
has
multiple
debt
obligations,
includ
ing
either
bank
loans
and/ormultiple
bond,
issues,
a
weighted
average
of
the
interest
rates
or
yield
to
maturities
should
be
used
to
determine
the
firm’s
average
cost
of
debt.
See
HAWAWINI
&
VIALLET,
supra
note
33,
at
372.
See
Ed.
at
67
(describing
a
firm’s
liquidity
as
its
ability
to
meet
its
“recurrent
cash
obli
gations
towards
various
creditors”
and
noting
that
a
firm
that
is
illiquid
is
technically
bankrupt).
‘
See
Ed.
at
281
(explaining
that
the
market
yield
is
a
measure
of
a
firm’s
credit
risk
and
is
used
by
bond
rating
agencies
such
as
Standard
&
Poor’s
or
Moody’s
to
rate
a
firm’s
overall
credit
risk).
See
id.
at
282
(discussing
that
large
or
growing
yield
spreads
indicate
that
the
firm
is
a
credit
risk).
J.
Huston
McCulloch,
an
economist
at
Ohio
State
University,
and
Menahem
Spiegel,
an
economist
at
Rutgers
University,agreed
that
either
the
risk-free
rate
or
cost
of
debt
was
the
appropriate
discount
rate
to
use
to
determine
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
of
delayed
or
noncompliance
prior
to
the
penalty
payment
date.
However,
in
their
opinion,
the
cost
of
debt
should
be
used
unless
a
firm
had
escrowed
the
initial
avoided
costs
in
a
secureinvestment
in
a
risk-free
treasury
such
as
U.S.
government
T-Bills,
because
all
firms
have
some
probability
of
entering
bankruptcy.
1022
CASE
WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW
[Vol.
52:1009
V.
LEGAL
FRAMEWORKS
JUSTIFYING
THE
RISK-FREE
RATE
OVER
THE
WACC
This
section
demonstrates
that
twolegal
frameworks,
temporary
takings
and
tort
jurisprudence,
are
congruent
with
the
economic
and
financialtheory
for
using
the
risk-free
rate
to
estimate
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
in
enforcement
cases.
A.
Delayed
Compliance
Is
Synonymous
with
a
Temporary
Taking
Temporary
regulatory
takings
occur
when
a
government
regula
tion
has
temporarily
denied
the
owner
of
an
interest
the
ability
to
make
use
of
that
interest.
Analogously,
when
a
firm
delays
comply
ing
with
an
environmental
regulation,
it
temporarily
“takes”
the
pub
lic
interest
in
a
safe
and
clean
environment,
an
interest
described
in
Part
II,
until
appropriate
enforcement
actions
are
taken.
Significantly,
temporary
takings
litigation
demonstrates
that
for
a
temporary
inva
sion
of
another’s
interest,
damages
are
awarded
for
actual
damages
incurred
and
not
those
that
are
uncertain
or
based
on
speculation.
Moreover,
just
as
the
government’s
liability
is
limited
to
actual
dam
ages,
a
firm’s
liability
for
economic
benefits
measured
from
the
non
compliance
date
through
the
penalty
payment
date
should
be
limited
to
actual
economic
benefits.
The
risk-free
discount
rate
is
consistent
with
this
approach,
while
the
WACC
is
not.
In
First
English
Evangelical
Church
v.
County
of
Los
Angeles,
4
°
the
Supreme
Court
recognized
the
existence
of
compensable
tempo
rary
regulatory
takings
and
defined
takings
as
temporary
because
the
regulation
is
eventually
“invalidated
by
the
courts.”
41
Typically,
the
situation
is
the
government’s
denial
of
potential
future
development
to
a
landowner.
4
Though
the
SupremeCourt
in
First
English
Evan
gelical
Church
held
that
landowners
must
be
compensated,
it
did
not
prescribe
a
fixed
method
of
estimating
compensation.
43
Subsequently,
courts
have
ruled
that
those
subject
to
temporary
takings
are
entitled
to
actual
damages
only.
In
Corrigan
v.
City
of
Scottsdale,
44
while
addressing
the
damages
to
which
the
plaintiff
property
owner
was
entitled
due
to
an
invalid
zoning
ordinance,
the
40
482
U.S.
304
(1987).
‘
See
id.at3lO.
42
See
J.
Margaret
Tretbar,
Calculating
Compensation
for
Temporary
Regulatory
Takings,
42
U.
KAN.
L.
REv
201,
207
(1993)
(“[Tjhe
effect
of
an
ultimately
invalid
regulation
prohibit
ing
development
of
property
held
for
future
use
is
often
simply
a
delay
in
development
or
an
impairment
of
the
landowner’s
ability
to
plan
for
future
development.”).
See
First
English
Evangelical
Church,
482
U.S.
at
321-22
(remanding
the
case
for
further
consideration
without
defining
how
to
estimate
the
amount
of
compensation
to
which
the
landowner
was
entitled).
720
P.2d
513
(Ariz.
1986).
D’.Web,a\L
Rviw\I52n,b,r44doI,kydo
2002]
THE
DISCOUNTRATE
IN
EPA
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS
1023
court
emphasized
that
the
plaintiff
was
entitled
only
to
provable
ac
tual
damages.
45
Similarly,
in
both
Yuba
Natural
Resources,
Inc.
v.
United
States
46
and
Poirier
v.
Grand
Blanc
Townshi,
47
the
courts
denied
lost
profits
as
part
of
the
plaintiffs
damage
award
because
such
profits
were
speculative.
48
In
Yuba
and
Poirier,
the
courts
stated
that
the
compensation
the
plaintiff
was
entitled
to
for
actual
damages
was
best
measured
by
the
fair
value
of
what
was
taken,
which
did
not
include
lost
profits.
49
Like
the
government
regulations
in
Corrigan,
Yuba,
and
Poirier,
firms
that
delay
compliance
with
EPA
regulations
and
pollute
the
en
vironment
temporarily
“take”
the
public
interest
in
environmental
quality.
This
“taking”
occurs
until
the
EPA
takes
enforcement
actions
to
force
compliance.
As
the
plaintiffs
in
the
temporary
takings
cases
are
entitled
to
damages
from
the
government,
the
EPA
is
entitled
to
economic
benefits
of
noncompliance.
However,
just
as
the
plaintiffs
in
the
temporary
takings
cases
are
entitled
only
to
actual
damages
and
were
foreclosed
from
receiving
compensation
for
speculative
profits,
the
EPA
should
be
entitled
only
tO
actual
economic
benefits,
which
is
consistent
with
the
language
and
intent
of
the
environmental
protec
tion
statues.
5
°
Applying
the
concepts
of
actual
economic
benefits
re
quires
the
use
of
the
risk-free
discount
rate
to
estimate
the
present
value
of
avoided
costs
from
delayed
compliance
whose
value
is
known
and
certain
[Tjhe
language
in
environmental
statutes
and
court
opinions
indicates
an
intent
to
remove
the
actual
economic
benefit
as
sociated
with
noncompliance.
The
approach
most
consistent
with
the
statutes
and
opinions
would
take
advantage
of
all
available
information
to
determine
the
actual
economic
bene
fit,
not
the
expected
economic
benefit
at
the
noncompliance
date.
The
calculations
would
use
actual
data
from
the
past
(cx
post)
and
expected
data
from
the
future
(cx
ante)
to
value
the
on-time
and
delay
cases
as
of
the
present.
51
Based
on
the
economic
and
financial
theory
described
in
Part
IV,
the
analysis
in
the
quotation
requires
that
the
risk-free
discount
rate
be
applied
to
the
known
and
certain
ex
post
avoided
costs
to
estimate
the
L
Id.
at
519
(stating
that
such
actual
damages
must
be
provable
to
a
reasonable
certainty).
46
904
F.2d
1577
(Fed.
Cir.
1990).
481
N.W.2d
762
(Mich.
Ct.
App.
1992).
See
Yuba,
904
F.2d
at
1581-82;
Foirier,
481
N.W.2d
at
766.
See
Yuba,
904
F.2d
at
1581-82;
Poirier,
481
N.W.2d
at766.
But
see
Wheeler
v.
City
of
Pleasant
Grove,
833
F.2d
267,
270-71
(11th
Cir.
1987)
(holding
that
plaintiffs
in
temporary
takings
cases
are
entitled
to
a
market
rate
of
retum
or
foregone
expected
profits).
See
Myers
etal.,
supra
note
15,
at7.
“
Id.at7.
D;\Wb,ie\L
ReASol52_numbr4\PodoIky.do
1024
CASE
WESTERNRESERVELAWREVJEW
[Vol.
52:1009
present
value
of
economic
benefits
of
delayed
compliance
through
the
penalty
payment.
In
so
doing,
the
EPA
is
proscribed
from
collecting
speculative
economic
benefits
that
may
have
never
materialized.
Though
not
a
temporary
takings
case,
Independent
Bulk
Trans
port,
Inc.
v.
Vessel
MORANIA
ABA
CO
52
demonstrates
why
the
risk-
free
discount
rate
is
appropriate
for
estimating
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
in
EPA
enforcement
cases.
In
Independent
Bulk,
prior
to
obtaining
an
award
for
damages,
the
plaintiff
was
required
to
expend
funds
to
repair
his
ship,
which
the
defendant’s
ship
had
dam
aged
in
a
collision.
3
The
plaintiff
had
requested
prejudgment
interest
equal
to
its
cost
of
borrowing
funds.
54
In
response,
the
court
stated:
Plaintiff’s
position
that
prejudgment
interest
should
be
de
termined
through
proof
of
what
the
particular
plaintiff
actu
ally
paid
to
borrow
money
during
the
relevant
period
is
in
error.
Consideration
of
the
precise
credit
circumstances
of
the
victim
would
inject
a
needless
variable
into
these
cases.
Plaintiff
is
entitled
to
the
income
which
the
monetary
dam
ages
would
have
earned,
and
that
should
be
measured
by
in
terest
or
short-term,
risk-free
obligations
.
Clearly,
the
Independent
Bulk
court
established
that
plaintiffs
are
entitled
to
be
compensated
for
the
cost
of
money
based
on
risk-free
investments
for
known
ex
post
damages.
The
EPA’s
position
that
the
present
value
of
ex
post
economic
benefits
should
be
calculated
using
the
WACC
is
inconsistent
with
the
court’s
position.
B.
Similar
Goal
and
Comparable
Structure
of
Civil
Penalties
and
Damage
Awards
in
Tort
Cases
The
minimum
goal
of
EPA
enforcement
actions,
in
order
to
deter
future
regulatory
violations,
is
to
make
a
firm
completely
indifferent
toward
compliance
and
noncompliance.
However,
this
does
not
jus
tify
the
artificial
estimation
of
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
using
the
WACC.
In
torts,
punitive
damages
are
designed
to
ensure
that
defendants
are
not
better
off
after
the
legal
process
has
con
cluded.
56
As
discussed
below,
the
assessment
of..an
appropriate
“pu
52
676
F.2d
23
(2d
Cir.
1982).
Id.
at
24-25.
‘
Id.
at27.
“
Id.
See
also
W.
Pac.
Fisheries,
Inc.
v.
Cent
Nat’l
Ins.
Group
of
Omaha,
730
F.2d
1280,
1288-89
(9th
Cir,
1982)
(approving
of
the
rationale
in
Independent
Bulk
while
deciding
an
analogous
case,
which
according
to
the
court
had
been
captured
in
application
of
the
risk-free
rate
for
post
judgment
interest
under
28
U.S.C
§
1961
and
thus
such
rate
was
also
appropriately
applied
as
prejudgment
interest
unless
substantial
evidence
required
use
of
a
different
rate).
See
David
D.
Haddock
et
al.,
An
Ordinary
Economic
Rationale
for
Extraordinary
Legal
Sanctions,
78
CAL.
L.
Rev.
1,
27
(1990)(asserting
that
the
amount
of
punitive
damages
depends
O\Wth,\Lw
Rw\voI52nmbr4\Po&kky.doc
20021
THE
DISCOUNTRATE
IN
EPA
ENFORCEMENTACTIONS
1025
nitive”
component
of
civil
penalties
is
the
correct
approach
from
a
legal
as
well
as
an
economic
and
financial
perspective.
In
tort
cases,
compensatory
damages
are
directed
at
deterrence.
57
This
is
the
prevailing
view
among
the
courts.
58
Further,
the
purpose
of
punitive
damages
is
punishment
and
deterrence.
59
In
Kalavity
v.
United
States,
6
°
the
court
stated:
“Damages
are
‘punitive’
when
awarded
separately
for
the
sole
purpose
of
punishing
a
tortfeasor
who
inflicted
injuries
‘maliciously
or
wantonly,
and
with
circumstances
of
contumely
and
indignity.”
6
’
Further,
the
court
in
0
‘Gilvie
v.
Inter
national
Flaytex,
Inc.
62
explained
that
punitive
damages
are
imposed
for
willful
or
wanton
conduct
in
order
to
restrain
and
deter
others
from
similar
actions.
63
Thus,
it
is
inaccurate
for
the
EPA
to
assert
that
on
the
particular
circumstances
of
a
case
with
respect
to
the
defendant,
not
the
plaintiff).
See
also
Robert
D.
Cooter,
Economic
Analysis
of
Punitive
Damages,
56
S.
CAL.
L
Ray.
79,
89-90
(1982)
(explaining
that
punitive
damages
are
justified
by
the
need
to
deter
and
punishthose
who
intentionally
commit
egregious
harms);
Jason
Johnston,
Punitive
Liability:
A
New
Paradigm
of
Efficiency
in
Tort
Law,
87
COLUM.
L.
REv.
1385,
1388-89
(1987)
(arguing
that
courts
have
a
propensity
to
underestimate
damages
and
that
properly-set
punitive
damages
can
overcome
these
errors
and
provide
defendants
with
appropriate
incentives
and
help
achieve
optimal
levels
of
deterrence).
See
Kalavity
v.
United
States,
584F,2d
809,
811(6th
Cir.
1978)
(explaining
that
ordi
nary
tort
damages
serve
both
a
compensatory
and
deterrent
function).
See
MARSHALL
S.
SHAPO,
BASIC
PRINCIPLES
OF
TORT
LAW
342-43
(1999)
(explaining
that
the
prevailing
view
among
courts
is
that
the
purpose
of
compensatory
damages
is
both
to
compensate
the
plaintiff
and
deter
the
defendant).
The
minority
view
is
that
the
purpose
of
compensatory
damages
is
to
compensate
victims
and
that
punishment
and
deterrence
emanate
solely
from
punitive
damages.
See
Vanskike
v.
ACF
Indus.,
Inc.,
665
F.2d
188
(8th
Cir.
1981)
(asserting
that
there
is
a
distinction
between
compensatory
and
punitive
damages,
and
that
if
punishment
and
deterrence
are
to
be
achieved
it
must
be
done
through
a
separate
award
of
puni
tive
damages).
See
Pac.
Mut.
Life
Ins.
Co.
v.
Haslip,
499
U.S.
1,
21(1991)
(describing
the
purpose
of
punitive
damages
as
deterrence);
O’Gilvie
v.
Int’l
Playtex,
Inc.,
821
F.2d
1438,
1446(10th
Cir.
1987)
(same);
Kalavity
v.
United
States,
584
F.2d
809,
811(6th
Cir.
1978)
(describing
the
sin
gular
purpose
of
punitive
damages
is
punishment
and
deterrence);
In
re
Exxon
Valdez,
No.
A89-0095-CV,
1995
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
12952,
at
*3
(D.
Alaska
Jan.
27,
1995)
(explaining
that
punitive
damages
are
to
deter
conduct);
Green
Oil
Co.
v.
Hornsby,
539
So.2d
218,
222
(Ala.
1989)
(holding
that
the
purpose
of
punitive
damages
is
not
compensate
but
to
deter
behavior);
Wangen
v.
Ford
Motor
Co.,
294
N.W.2d
437,
450
(Wis.
1980)
(same).
See
also
SHAPO,
supra
note
58,
at
3
58-59
(describing
the
role
of
punitive
damages
as
serving
to
punish
the
defendant
and
provide
specific
and
general
deterrence
that
have
a
“heightened
behavior
controlling
ef
fect”).
69
584
F.2d
809
(6th
Cir,
1978).
63
Id.
at
811
n.1
(citing
Milwaukee
R.R.
v.
Arms,
91
U.S.
489,
493
(1875)).
See
also
Roginsky
v.
Richardson-Merrel,
Inc.,
378
F.2d
832,
842-43
(2d
Cir.
1967)
(describing
the
con
duct
that
New
York
courts
have
found
to
support
punitive
damages
as
wanton,
malicious,
or
gross
and
outrageous);
Leichtamer
v.
Am.
Motors
Corp.,
424
N.E.2d
568,
580
(Ohio
1981)
(asserting
that
in
Ohio
punitive
damages
may
be
awarded
for
actual
malice
or
malice
that
may
be
inferred
from
intentional,
reckless,
willful,
or
gross
conduct).
62
821
F.2d
1438
(10th
Cir.
1987).
63
Id.
at
1446.
DAWb,\Lw
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1026
CASE
WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW
[Vol.
52:1009
the
only
“appropriate”
focus
in
a
tort
action
is
compensating
the
vic
64
tim.
Importantly,
the
Supreme
Court
has
recognized
the
significant
de
terrent
effect
of
civil
penalties
on
noncompliance.
In
Friends
of
the
Earth,
Inc.
v.
Laidlaw
Environmental
Services,
65
the
Court
explained
that
the
purpose
of
a
civil
penalty
for
violation
of
the
Clean
Water
Act
is
deterrence.
66
Deterrence
provides
incentives
not
only
for
current
violators
to
come
into
compliance,
but
also
for
the
current
violator
and
others
to
avoid
future
violations.
67
Given
that
courts
apply
these
factors
for
violations
of
many
of
the
environmental
protection
stat
utes,
it
is
clear
that
a
purpose
of
civil
penalties
is
deterrence.
Civil
penalties
have
two
components:
economic
benefits
of
de
layed
compliance
and
a
dollar
penalty
to
account
for
the
severity
of
the
violation,
including
the
violator’s
willfulness
in
delaying
or
not
complying
with
a
regulation.
68
According
to
the
EPA,
the
economic
benefit
portion
of
a
civil
penalty
constitutes
“a
critically
important
element
of
deterrence.”
69
The
additional
dollar
penalty
is
imposed
over
and
above
economic
benefits
in
EPA
enforcement
actions
to
ac
count
for
the
severity
of
the
violation
and
deter
future
violations.
70
While
using
the
risk-free
rate
may
leave
the
violating
firm
with
some
net
gain
due
to
potential
risk-related
profits,
such
profits
are
derived
from
accepting
risk
and
should
not
be
included
in
the
estimate
of
pre
sent
value
of
economic
benefits.
The
fact
that
a
violating
firm
may
derive
some
financial
gain
after
accounting
for
the
economic
benefits
64
See
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
Calculation
of
the
Economic
Benefit
of
Non
compliance
in
EPA’s
Civil
Penalty
Enforcement
Cases,
64
Fed.
Reg.
32,948,
32,958
(proposed
June
18,
1999).
65
528U.S.
167(2000).
Id.
at706.
‘
Id.
at
707.
Though
beyond
the
scope
of
this
Note,
another
potential
explanation
for
imposing
civil
penalties
is
retribution.
See
id.
at
706.
See
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
PUB.
No.
300-F-00-002,
LEVELING
THE
PLAYiNG
FIELD
1
(2000),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/oecalore/med/.
See
also
Hayward,
supra
note
2,
at
648-49
(explaining
that
the
EPA
seeks
civil
penalties
to
deter
polluters
from
violating
regulations
and
resolves
environmental
problems
by
removing
the
economic
benefit
as
well
as
imposing
further
penalties
over
and
above
the
economic
benefit).
69
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
Calculation
of
the
Economic
Benefit
of
Noncompli
ance
in
EPA’s
Civil
Penalty
Enforcement
Cases,
64
Fed.
Reg
at
32,958.
See
also
EPA,
LEVEL
ING
THE
PLAYING
FIELD,
supra
note
68,
at
3
(asserting
that
federal
courts
have
almost
unani
mously
recognized
the
importance
of
economic
benefit
in
setting
civil
penalties
that
will
deter
firms
from
violating
environmental
protection
regulations
in
the
future).
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
Calculation
of
the
Economic
Benefit
of
Noncompli
ance
in
EPA’s
Civil
Penalty
Enforcement
Cases,
64
Fed.
Reg.
at
32,958
n.2l.
See
also
EPA,
LEVELING
THE
PLAYING
FIELD,
supra
note
68,
at
3
(explaining
that
federal
courts
impose
a
punitive
component
of
civil
penalties
over
and
above
economic
benefits
to
achieve
the
goal
of
deterrence).
D\Wb\L
Riw\voI52_numbr4\PodoI,ky.do
2002]
THE
DISCOUNTRATE
IN
EPA
ENFORC’EMENTACTIONS
1027
is
analogous
to
the
remedial
outcome
associated
with
compensatory
damages
as
applied
to
the
environment.
7
’
More
important,
the
dollar
penalty
plays
a
directly
analogous
role
to
punitive
damages
in
traditional
tort
cases,
which
are
used
to
make
the
defendant
indifferent
toward
committing
or
not
committing
an
illicit
act.
In
United
States
V.
Municipal
Authority
of
Union
Town
ship,
72
the
court
held
that
the
goal
of
a
civil
penalty
is
to
deter
viola
tors
through
the
imposition
of
an
economic
benefit
component
and
punitive
component
designed
to
account
for
the
willfulness
or
mali
ciousness
of
the
violator’s
activities.
7
The
court’s
language
in
Union
Township
is
directly
comparable
to
language
used
to
describe
the
un
derlying
rationale
for
punitive
damages
in
tort
cases.
Further,
the
factors
courts
and
the
EPA
use
to
assess
the
amount
of
the
“gravity,”
a
dollar
penalty
portion
of
the
civil
penalty
are
analogous
to
those
that
courts
employ
in
determining
the
reasonability
of
the
level
of
punitive
damages.
Specifically,
the
factors
are:
(I)
seriousness
of
violations;
(2)
the
economic
benefit
from
the
violation;
(3)
any
history
of
violations;
(4)
good
faith
efforts
to
comply
with
the
applicable
requirements;
(5)
the
economic
impact
of
the
penalty
on
the
violator;
and
(6)
such
other
matters
as
justice
may
require.
74
Factor
(2)
accounts
for
the
economic
benefit
portion
of
the
civil
penalty,
while
factors
(1),
(3),
and
(4)
represent
the
gravity
factors.
Factor
(5)
assesses
the
ability
of
violators
to
pay
a
penalty
that
may
be
imposed.
The
EPA’s
internal
policies
for
establishing
the
level
of
See
Haddock
Ct
al.,
supra
note
56,
at
17-18
(explaining
that
in
thin
markets
such
as
environmental
quality,
where
transactions
do
not
occur
on
a
Continuous
basis
through
a
regular
market,
the
awarding
of
compensatory
damages
leaves
a
defendant
with
a
net
gain).
72
929
F.
Supp.
800
(MD.
Pa.
1996),
afJ’d,
150
F.3d
259
(3d
Cir.
1998),
‘u
Id.
at803-05.
See
also
UnitedStates
v.
Bethlehem
Steel
Corp.,
829
F.
Supp.
1047,
1057
(N.D.
md.
1993)
(explaining
that
the
“major
purpose
of
a
civil
penalty
[under
RCRA]
is
deterrence”).
N
See
CWA,
33
U.S.C.
§
309(d)
(1994).
See
also
United
States
v.
WCI
Steel,
Inc.,
72
F.
Supp.
2d
810,
828
(ND.
Ohio
1999)
(showing
that
the
factors
to
be
considered
underCWA
are
the
same
under
RCR.A).
D:\Wb,L
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1028
CASE
WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW
[Vol.
52:1009
civil
penalties
are
consistent
with
those
the
courts
follow.
75
For
ex
ample,
the
factors
the
EPA
considers
in
determining
the
amount
of
civil
penalties
to
pursue
under
section
311
(b)(3)
of
the
Clean
Water
Act
are:
(1)
the
nature,
extent,
and
degree
of
success
of
any
efforts
of
the
violator
to
minimize
or
mitigate
the
effects
of
the
discharge;
(2)
any
history
of
prior
violations;
(3)
any
other
penalty
for
the
same
incident;
(4)
any
other
matters
as
justice
may
require;
(5)
the
economic
impact
of
the
penalty
on
the
violator;
(6)
the
seriousness
of
the
violation
or
violations;
(7)
the
degree
of
culpability
involved;
(8)
the
economic
benefit
to
the
violator,
if
any,
resulting
from
the
violation.
76
EPA
guidance
documents
contain
a
disclaimer
that
they
are
for
internal
purposes
only
and
thus
do
not
create
enforceable
rights
by
parties
in
litigation
with
the
EPA.
77
Nevertheless,
courts
may
con
sider
them
in
determining
the
final
penalty
amount.
78
This
is
conss
tent
with
the
doctrine
that
the
final
amount
of
a
civil
penalty
is
subject
The
EPA’s
generic
civil
penalty
policy
for
determining
the
amount
of
a
penalty
the
agency
intends
to
seek
essentially
parallels
the
factors
that
courts
consider.
See
EPA,
LEVELING
THE
PLAYING
FIELD,
supra
note
68,
at
1
(describing
recovery
of
the
economic
benefit,
plus
a
gravity
penalty,
as
the
foundation
of
EPA
civil
penalty
policy).
76
See
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
CIVIL
PENALTY
POLICY
FOR
SECTION
31
l(b)(3)
AND
SECTION
31
1(j)
OF
THE
CLEAN
WATER
ACT
(1998)
(providing
an
example,
pur
suant
to
§
31
l(b)(8)
of
the
Clean
Water
Act,
as
amended
by
33
U.S.C.
§
l321(b)(8)),
at
http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/water/3llpen.html
(last
visited
Mar.
30,
2002).
See
Bamett
M.
Lawrence,
EPA
‘s
Civil
Penalty
Policies:
Making
the
Penalty
Fit
the
Violation,
22
ENVTL.
L.
Rap.
10,529,
10,531
(1992)
(discussing
that
the
EPA’s
intemal
guid
ance
documents
cannot
be
cited
to
create
rights
in
legal
actions
involving
the
EPA
and
may
be
changed
at
any
time
without
public
notice).
78
See
Friends
of
the
Earth,
Inc.
v.
Laidlaw
Envtl.
Serv.,
Inc.,
956
F,
Supp.
588,
610-11
(D.S.C.
1997)
(taking
into
account
the
defendant’s
own
legal
costs,
along
with
the
plaintiff’s
legal
costs
that
the
defendant
is
responsible
for,
in
setting
the
ultimate
penalty
to
be
paid).
D:\W,b,i\Lw
2002]
THE
DISCOUNT
RA
TE
IN
EPA
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS
1029
to
the
discretion
of
trial
courts.
79
Further,
plaintiffs
in
citizens’
suits
may
use
EPA
guidelines
to
decide
upon
a
negotiated
penalty
with
a
firm
that
has
violated
environmental
quality
statutes
and
EPA
regula
tions.
8
°
In
PacJIc
Mutual
Life
Insurance
Co.
v.
Haslip,
8
’
the
Supreme
Court
held
that
a
set
of
factors
established
by
the
Alabama
Supreme
Court
(the
Hammond
factors)
provides
a
sufficient
and
meaningful
review
of
the
reasonability
of
punitive
damage
awards.
82
These
fac
tors
are:
(I)
whether
there
is
a
reasonable
relationship
between
the
puni
tive
damages
award
and
the
harm
likely
to
result
from
the
defendant’s
conduct
as
well
as
the
harm
that
actually
occurred;
(2)
the
degree
of
reprehensibility
of
the
defendant’s
conduct,
the
duration
of
that
conduct,
the
defendant’s
awareness,
any
concealment,
and
the
existence
and
frequency
of
similar
past
conduct;
(3)
the
profitability
to
the
defendant
of
the
wrongful
conduct
and
the
desirability
of
removing
that
profit
and
of
having
the
defendant
also
sustain
a
loss;
(4)
the
“financial
position”
of
the
defendant;
(5)
all
the
costs
of
litigation;
(6)
the
imposition
of
criminal
sanctions
on
the
defendant
for
its
conduct,
these
to
be
taken
in
mitigation;
and
(7)
the
existence
of
other
civil
awards
against
the
defendant
for
the
same
conduct,
these
to
be
taken
in
mitigation.
83
See
Tull
v.
United
States
481
U.S.
412,
426-27
(1987)
(holding
that
the
setting
of
final
civil
penalty
amounts
under
CWA
is
left
to
the
discretiod
of
trial
judges).
See
also
United
States
v.
Smithfield
Foods,
Inc.,
191
F.3d
516,
529
(4th
Cir.
1999)
(asserting
that
the
trial
court’s
valuation
of
the
civil
penalty
is
reviewed
only
for
abuse
of
discretion);
United
States
v.
Bethlehem
Steel
Corp.,
829
F.
Supp.
1047,
1055
(ND.
md.
1993)
(explaining
that
assessment
of
the
amount
of
a
civil
penalty
is
determined
based
on
the
court’s
“informed”
discretion).
°
See
Lawrence,
supra
note
77,
at
10,531.
‘
499
U.S.
1(1991).
Id.
at
21-22.
‘
Id.
at2l.
D:\Wbe\L
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\vv
5rnrnbvr4\PodoI,ky.dvv
1030
CASE
WESTERN
RESERVE
LAWRE
VIEW
[Vol.
52:1009
The
Hammond
factors
are
analogous
to
guidance
that
other
courts
have
offered
in
assessing
the
reasonability
of
the
level
of
punitive
damages.
In
0
‘Gilvie
v.
International
Playtex.,
Inc.,
84
the
court
stated
that
under
Kansas
law:
In
assessing
punitive
damages
the
nature,
extent,
and
enor
mity
of
the
wrong,
the
intent
of
the
party
committing
it,
and
all
circumstances
attending
the
transaction
involved
should
be
considered.
Any
mitigating
circumstances
which
may
bear
upon
any
of
the
above
factors
may
be
considered
to
re
duce
such
damages.
In
fixing
an
award
of
punitive
damages
a
jury
may
consider
the
amount
of
actual
damages
recovered,
defendant’s
financial
condition
and
the
probable
litigation
expenses.
85
Although
there
are
some
differences,
the
factors
set
forth
in
the
civil
penalty
sections
of
the
environmental
protection
statutes
and
internal
EPA
guidance
documents
demonstrate
a
remarkable
similar
ity.
Clearly,
the
purpose
and
method
for
assessing
damage
awards
in
tort
law
and
civil
penalties
in
enforcement
cases,
especially
the
puni
tive
component,
are
very
much
the
same.
Thus,
if
the
EPA
believes
that
a
civil
penalty
should
include
a
finn’s
potential
risk-related
prof
its,
the
agency
should
present
the
requisite
proof
and
seek
the
imposi
tion
of
an
appropriate
dollar
penalty.
VI.
INCORPORATING
ECONOMIC
BENEFITS
AND
POTENTIAL
RISK-
RELATED
OR
SECOND
ORDER
PROFITS
INTO
CIVIL
PENALTIES
DUE
TO
DELAYED
OR
NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH
ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS
Both
the
courts
and
the
EPA
should
universally
adopt
use
of
the
risk-free
rate,
a
new
approach
to
incorporating
the
present
value
of
economic
benefit
and
second
order
returns
from
noncompliance
with
environmental
regulations.
Both
financial
and
legal
theory
demon
strate
that
the
present
value
of
economic
benefits
from
the
noncom
pliance
date
through
the
penalty
payment
date
should,
as
the
court
in
UnitedStates
v.
WCI
Steel
ruled,
be
calculated
using
the
risk-free
in
terest
rate
from
the
initial
date
of
noncompliance
through
the
penalty
payment
date.
821
F.2d
1438
(10th
Cir.
1987).
85
Id.
at
1446-47
(citations
omitted).
See
also
Wangen
v.
Ford
Motor
Co.,
294
N.W.2d
437,
461
(Wis.
1980)
(explaining
that
either
a
trial
or
appellate
court
has
the
power
to
reduce
punitive
damages
to
a
fair
and
reasonable
amount,
and
that
a
plaintiff
whose
award
of
punitive
damage
is
reduced
may
accept
the
lower
amount
or
a
new
trial).
D\W,b,\L
2002]
THE
DISCOUNTRATE
IN
EPA
ENFORCEMENTACTJONS
1031
Nevertheless,
health
and
environmental
quality
policy
concerns
suggest
that
courts
and
the
EPA
may
consider
a
firm’s
potential
risk-
related
profits
in
setting
the
level
of
the
gravity
component
of
a
civil
penalty.
Indeed,
some
reasonable
amount
of
punitive
or
gravity
pen
altymay
need
to
be
added
to
the
economic
benefits
of
delayed
or
noncompliance
in
order
to
attain
the
appropriate
level
of
deterrence.
86
The
courts
can
consider
potential
risk-related
profits
through
the
“such
other
matters
as
justice
may
require”
factor
contained
in
envi
ronmental
statutes.
The
EPA
may
adopt
such
a
feature
by
amending
its
current
civil
penalty
guidelines.
However,
this
recommended
approach
would
require
both
the
courtsand
the
EPA
to
justify
the
inclusion
of
potential
risk-related
profits
as
part
of
a
civil
penalty
on
a
case-by-case
basis.
This
recom
mendation
is
consistent
with
the
underlying
premise
of
Judge
Pos
ner’s
opinion
in
assessing
the
plaintiff’s
claim
for
punitive
damages
in
Douglass:
“The
plaintiff
should
be
required
to
establish,
at
least
within
rough
limits,
the
profits
attributable
to
[the
defendant’s]
viola
tion
of
her
rights.”
87
CoNcLusIoN
This
Note
has
examined
whether
the
risk-free
discount
rate
or
the
WACC
should
be
used
to
estimate
the
present
value
of
the
economic
benefits
of
noncompliance
with
environmental
regulations
that
are
ex
post
relative
to
the
penalty
payment
date.
Financial
and
economic
theory,
along
with
the
legal
jurisprudence
in
temporary
takings
and
the
structure
and
purpose
of
civil
penalties,
dictates
thern
use
of
the
risk-free
rate.
Use
of
the
risk-free
rate
separates
economic
benefits
due
to
the
illicit
act
of
violating
a
regulation
from
the
ability
to
invest
wisely.
As
part
of
a
civil
penalty,
a
court
and
the
EPA
may
find
that
deterrence
requires
penalizing
firms
beyond
the
present
value
of
eco
nomic
benefits,
through
the
imposition
of
a
punitive
component
in
cluding
potential
profits
earned
from
bearing
the
risk
of
alternative
investments
rather
than
complying
with
environmental
regulations.
Thus,
it
is
recommended
that
the
courts
consider
the
need
to
include
See
Lynn
M.
Dodge,
Economic
Benefit
in
Environmental
Civil
Penalties:
Is
BEN
too
Gentle?,
77
U.
DET.
MERCY
L.
REv.
543,
552-54
(2000)
(arguing
that
civil
penalties
should
include
wrongful
profits
earned
as
a
result
of
noncompliance
with
environmental
regulations).
87
Douglass
v.
Hustler
Magazine,
Inc.,
769
F.2d
1128,
1145(7th
Cir.
1985).
See
also
Dan
C.
Dobbs,
Deterrence-Measured
Remedies,
40
ALA.
L.
REv.
831,
866
n.9l
(1989)
(“But
while
extracompensatory
liability
might
be
triggered
on
the
basis
of
such
a
common
sense
estimate
[that
misconduct
is
profitablej,
the
measure
of
that
liability
is
another
matter
and
requires
proof.”).
1032
CASE
WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW
[Vol.
52:1009
potential
risk-related
profits
through
the
“such
other
matters
as
justice
may
require”
factor.
MICHAEL
J.
PODOLSKYt
I
would
very
much
like
to
thank
Professor
Jonathan
L.
Entin,
Professor
Marc
R.
Poirier,
and
Professor
Menahem
Spiegel
for
their
suggestions
and
comments.
All
remaining
errors
are
the
responsibility
of
the
author.
BEN
USER’S
MANUAL
Multimedia
Enforcement
Division
(2248-A)
Office
of
Regulatory
Enforcement
Office
of
Enforcement
and
Compliance
Assurance
United
States
Environmental
Protection
Agency
401
M
Street,
SW
Washington,
D.C.
20460
September
1999
THIS
MANUAL
IS
RELEASABLE
IN
ITS
ENTIRETY
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This
document
was
prepared
under
the
technical
direction
of
Mr.
Jonathan
Libber,
BEN/ABEL
Coordinator,
Office
of
Enforcement,
U.S.
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(EPA).
Technical
assistance
was
provided
under
contract
to
EPA
by
Industrial
Economics,
Incorporated
(JEc)
of
Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
MAILING
LIST
ADDITION
If
you
would
like
to
receive
updated
materials,
and
you
work
for
a
federal,
state
or
local
government
environmental
agency,
please
e-mail
your
name,
government
mailing
address,
and
government
phone
number
to
benabel@indecon.com.
If
you
have
any
questions
about
updates,
contact
the
EPA
enforcement
economics
toll-free
helpline
at
888-ECON-SPT
(326-6778).
If
you
are
a
member
of
the
public
and
would
like
to
obtain
these
materials,
download
them
from
the
U.S.
EPA’s
web
site
at
http://es.epa.gov/oeca.
(This
address
may
have
changed
by
the
time
you
read
this
manual.
To
obtain
the
current
address,
you
can
call
the
helpline
at
888-ECON-SPT.)
September
1999
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
.
Chapter
1
A.
Overview
1-1
B.
Context
and
Theory
of
Economic
Benefit
1-2
C.
Summary
of
BEN
Methodology
1-2
D.
How
to
Use
this
Manual
1-3
USING
THE
COMPUTER
PROGRAM
Chapter
2
A.
Structure
of
the
Computer
Program
2-1
B.
Installing
BEN
2-2
C.
Data
Entry
2-5
D.
Calculating
and
Printing
Results
2-6
E.
Exiting
and
Saving
2-7
DATA
REQUIREMENTS
Chapter
3
A.
Case
Screen
3-2
1.
Case
Name,
Office/Agency,
Analyst
Name
3-2
a.
Case
Name
3-3
b.
Office/Agency
3-3
c.
Analyst
Name
3-3
2.
Entity
Type,
State,
Customized
Taxes
3-3
a.
Entity
Type
3-3
b.
State
3-4
c.
Customized
Tax
Rate
3-4
3.
Competitive
Advantage
3-5
4.
Penalty
Payment
Date
3-7
5.
Creating/Adding,
Copying
and
Removing
Runs
3-7
B.
Run
Input
Screen
3-8
1.
Compliance
Cost
Components
3-9
a.
Capital
Investment
3-9
b.
One-Time
Nondepreciable
Expenditure
3-10
c.
Annually
Recurring
Costs
3-11
2.
Cost
Estimate
Dates
3-1
1
3.
Noncompliance
and
Compliance
Dates
3-12
•C.
Options
3-13
1.
Discount/Compound
Rate
3-14
2.
Inflation
Indices
and
Projected
Inflation
Rate
3-15
3.
Capital
Investment
Replacement
Cycles
and
Useful
Life
3-17
4.
Avoided
vs.
Delayed
3-18
5.
Tax
Deductibility
of
One-Time,
Nondepreciable
Expenditure
3-18
D.
SpecificCost
Estimates
3-18
1.
Separate
Cost
Estimates
for
Noncompliance
and
Compliance
Dates
.
3-21
2.
Inflation
Data
More
Appropriate
thanBEN’s
3-23
September
1999
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
(continued)
ISSUES
THAT
ARISE
WITH
BEN
Chapter
4
A.
Common
Violator
Arguments
4-1
B.
Characterizing
Compliance
Scenarios
4-3
DETAILED
CALCULATIONS
Appendix
A
A.
Theory
and
Overview
A-i
B.
Calculations
and
Spreadsheet
A-2
1.
Inputs
and
Variables
A-3
2.
Discount/Compound
Rate
Calculation
A—5
3.
Specific
Cost
Estimates
A-7
4.
Capital
and
One-Time
Costs
A-7
5.
Avoided
Annually
Recurring
Costs
A-i
i
6.
Economic
Benefit
Results
A-i
i
September
1999
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER
1
A.
OVERVIEW
The
U.S.
Environmental
Protection
Agency
developed
the
BEN
computer
model
to
calculate
the
economic
benefit
a
violator
derives
from
delaying
and/or
avoiding
compliance
with
environmental
statutes.
EPA
uses
the
model
to
assist
its
staff
in
developing
settlement
penalty
figures.
BEN
can
also
develop
testimony
for
trial
or
hearings,
but
an
expert
is
necessary
to
explain
its
methodology
and
calculations.
While
the
primary
purpose
of
the
BEN
model
is
to
calculate
the
economic
benefit
of
noncompliance,
the
model
can
also
calculate
the
after-tax
net
present
value
of
supplemental
environmental
projects
(SEP
‘
s)
that
involve
early
compliance.’
For
all
other
SEP’s.
you
should
use
the
PROJECT
model.
Calculating
economic
benefitusing
the
BEN
model
is
generally
the
first
step
in
developing
a
civil
penalty
figure
under
EPA’s
February
16,
1984,
generic
penalty
policy.
This
two
part
document
was
codified
in
the
General
Enforcement
Policy
Compendium
as
P.T.
1-1
and
P.T.
1-2.
Related
medium-specific
policies
have
been
developed
since
then
to
implement
the
1984
policy.
The
BEN
model
assists
in
fulfilling
one
of
the
main
goals
of
the
generic
policy.
That
goal
is
that
civil
penaltiesshould
at
least
recover
the
economic
benefit
from
noncompliance
to
ensure
that
members
of
the
regulated
community
have
a
strong
economic
incentive
to
comply
with
environmental
laws
on
time.
You
can
use
BEN
in
all
cases
to
measure
benefit
from
delayed
and/or
avoided
compliance,
except
for
Clean
Air
Act
Section
120
actions,
which
require
the
application
of
a
Section
120
specific
computer
model.
As
a
form
of
SEP,
a
defendant
may
offer
to
comply
with
an
environmental
regulation
significantly
earlier
than
is
required.
Such
a
SEPhas
associated
with
it
an
after-tax
net
present
value
that
is
the
maximum
amount
by
which
you
can
reduce
the
proposed
civil
penalty.
For
the
“compliance
date”
in
the
BEN
model,
enter
the
date
when
the
regulation
requires
compliance
of
the
defendant
(i.e.,
the
date
by
which
you
would
normally
expect
the
defendant
to
achieve
compliance).
For
BEN’s
“noncompliance
date,”
enter
the
datethat
the
defendant
is
proposing
for
its
early
compliance
(i.e.,
a
date
earlier
than
the
compliance
date
you
previously
entered).
Enter
all
other
inputs
normally.
BEN’s
“economic
benefit”
result
is
the
maximum
amount
by
which
you
should
mitigate
the
proposed
civil
penalty.
1-1
September
1999
BEN
is
easy
to
use,
and
designed
for
people
with
no
background
in
economics
or
financial
analysis.
Because
the
program
contains
standard
values
for
many
of
the
variables
needed
to
calculate
economic
benefit,
BEN
requires
only
a
small
number
of
user
inputs.
BEN
also
allows
the
user
to
modify
all
of
its
standard
values.
Data
requirements,
standard
values
and
modifications
are
described
in
detail
in
Chapter
3.
B.
CONTEXT
AND
THEORY
OF
ECONOMIC
BENEFIT
Compliance
with
environmental
regulations
usually
requires
a
commitment
of
financial
resources;
both
initially
(in
the
form
of
a
capital
investment
orone-time
nondepreciable
expenditure)
and
over
time
(in
the
form
of
annually
recurring
costs).
These
expenditures
might
result
in
better
protection
of
public
health
or
environmental
quality,
but
are
unlikely
to
yield
any
direct
financial
return.
Economic
benefit
represents
the
financial
gains
that
a
violator
accrues
by
delaying
and/or
avoiding
such
pollution
control
expenditures.
Funds
not
spent
on
environmental
compliance
are
available
for
other
profit-making
activities
or,
alternatively,
a
defendant
avoids
thecosts
associated
with
obtaining
additional
funds
for
environmental
compliance.
(This
concept
is
known
in
economics
as
opportunity
cost.)
Economic
benefit
calculates
the
amount
by
which
a
defendant
is
financially
better
off
from
not
having
complied
with
environmental
requirements
in
a
timely
manner.
Economic
benefit
is
“no
fault”
in
nature.
A
defendant
need
not
have
deliberately
chosen
to
delay
compliance
(for
financial
or
any
other
reasons),
or
in
facteven
have
been
aware
of
its
noncompliance,
for
it
to
have
accrued
the
economic
benefit
of
noncompliance.
The
appropriate
economic
benefit
calculation
should
represent
the
amount
of
money
that
would
make
the
violator
indifferent
between
compliance
and
noncompliance.
If
the
enforcement
agency
fails
to
recover
thiFough
a
civil
penalty
at
least
this
economic
benefit,
then
the
violator
will
retain
a
gain.
Because
of
the
precedent
of
this
retained
gain,
other
regulated
companies
may
see
an
economic
advantage
in
similar
noncompliance,
and
the
penalty
will
fail
to
deter
potential
violators.
Economic
benefit
does
not
represent
compensation
to
the
enforcement
agency
as
in
a
typical
“damages”
calculation
for
a
tort
case,
but
instead
is
the
minimum
amount
by
which
the
violator
must
be
penalized
so
as
to
return
it
to
the
position
it
would
have
been
in
had
it
complied
on
time.
C.
SUMMARY
OF
BEN
METHODOLOGY
BEN
calculates
the
economic
benefits
gained
from
delaying
and
avoiding
required
environmental
expenditures.
Such
expenditures
can
include:
(1)
Capital
investments
(e.g.,
pollution
control
equipment),
(2)
One-time
nondepreciable
expenditures
(e.g.,
setting
up
a
reporting
system,
or
acquiring
land),
(3)
Annually
recurring
costs
(e.g.,
operating
and
maintenance
costs).
Each
of
these
expenditures
canbe
either
delayed
or
avoided.
BEN’s
baseline
assumption
is
that
capital
investments
and
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditures
are
merely
delayed
over
the
period
of
1-2
September
1999
noncompliance,
whereas
annual
costs
are
avoided
entirely
over
this
period.
BEN
does
allow
you,
however,
to
analyze
any
combination
of
delayed
and
avoided
expenditures.
The
economic
benefit
calculation
must
incorporate
the
economic
concept
of
the
“time
value
of
money.”
Stated
simply,
a
dollar
today
is
worth
more
than
a
dollar
tomorrow,
because
you
can
invest
today’s,
dollar
to
start
earning
a
return
immediately.
Thus,
the
further
in
the
future
the
dollar
is,
the
less
it
is
worth
in
“present-value”
terms.
Similarly,
the
greater
the
time
value
of
money
(i.e.,
the
greater
the
“discount”
or
“compound”
rate
used
to
derive
the
present
value),
the
lower
the
present
value
of
future
costs.
To
calculate
a
violator’s
economic
benefit,
BEN
uses
standard
financial
cash
flow
and
net
present
value
analysis
techniques,
based
on
modern
and
generally
accepted
financial
principles.
First,
BEN
calculates
the
costs
of
complying
on-time
and
of
complying
late,
adjusted
for
inflation
and
tax
deductibility.
To
compare
the
on-time
and
delayed
compliance
costs
in
a
common
measure,
BEN
calculates
the
present
value
of
both
streams
of
costs,
or
“cash
flows,”
as
of
the
date
of
initial
noncompliance.
BEN
derives
these
values
by
discounting
the
annual
cash
flows
at
an
average
of
the
cost
of
capital
throughout
this
time
period.
BEN
can
then
subtract
the
delayed-case
present
value
from
the
on-time-case
present
value
to
detennine
the
initial
economic
benefit
as
of
the
noncompliance
date.
Finally,
BEN
compounds
this
initial
economic
benefit
forward
to
the
penalty
payment
date
at
the
same
cost
of
capital
to
determine
the
final
economic
benefit
of
noncompliance.
A
violator
may
gain
illegal
competitive
advantages
in
addition
to
the
usual
benefits
of
noncompliance.
These
may
be
substantial
benefits,
but
they
are
beyond
the
capability
of
BEN
or
any
computer
program
to
assess.
Instead
BEN
asks
you
a
series
of
questions
about
possible
illegal
competitive
advantages
so
that
you
may
identif’
cases
where
they
are
relevant.
EPA
is
in
the
process
of
developing
guidance
protocols
for
such
situations.
You
can
obtain
a
copy
of
these
protocols
from
EPA’s
enforcement
economics
toll-free
helpline
at
888-ECON-SPT.
Meanwhile,
if
illegal
competitive
advantage
is
an
issue
you
should
consult
an
expert
or
the
helpline.
B.
HOW
TO
USE
THIS
MANUAL
This
manual
provides
instructions
for
accessing,
operating
and
interpreting
results
from
the
BEN
program.
It
also
takes
you
step
by
step
through
a
BEN
case.
Chapter
2
outlines
the
procedures
for
installing
and
managing
the
model.
Chapter
3
describes
BEN’s
data
requirements,
default
values
and
opportunities
for
customization.
Chapter
4
addresses
common
issues
that
arise
when
using
BEN.
Appendix
A
contains
a
detailed
discussion
of
the
economic
rationale
and
computational
methods
used
in
BEN.
You
do
not
have
to
be
familiar
with
Appendix
A
to
use
BEN
or
this
manual.
1-3
September
1999
All
of
the
information
from
this
manual
except
Appendix
A
is
available
through
BEN’s
on
line
help
system.
The
help
system
is
context
sensitive
and
may
be
accessed
at
anytime
during
the
program
by
pressing
Fl.
It
may
also
be
accessed
using
the
Help
pull-down
menu
on
the
main
screen.
If
you
are
a
government
employee
(of
any
federal,
state
or
local
agency)
and
need
further
assistance
in
operating
the
program
or
understanding
the
results,
please
contact
the
EPA
enforcement
economics
toll-free
helpline
at
888-ECON-SPT
(326-6778)
or
benabel@indecon.com.
If
you
need
legal
or
policy
guidance,
please
contact
Jonathan
Libber,
the
BEN/ABEL
coordinator
at
202-5
64-
6
102,
or
e-mail
him
at
libber.jonathanepamail.epa.gov.
1-4
September
1999
USING
THE
COMPUTER
PROGRAM
CHAPTER
2
BEN
is
an
interactive
computer
program
that
runs
in
the
WindowsTM
operating
enviromTlent.
You
can
obtain
a
copy
of
BEN
from
EPA’s
web
site
(http:/Ies.epa.gov/oeca).
2
If
you
lack
internet
access
and
are
a
government
employee
(federal,
state,
or
local),
you
can
contact
EPA’s
enforcement
economics
toll-free
helpline
(8
88-ECON-SPT,
or
888-326-6778).
Chapter
2
contains
five
sections
describing
procedures
for
using
BEN.
Section
A
describes
the
structure
of
the
computer
program.
Section
B
explains
the
procedures
for
installing
the
program
on
your
computer.
Section
C
provides
data
format
requirements
and
additional
helpful
hints
for
entering
data
at
your
computer,
as
well
an
overview
of
error
messages.
Section
D
tells
you
how
to
calculate
and
print
results.
Section
B
explains
how
to
exit
the
program
and
save
files.
For
an
in-
depth
description
of
each
variable
and
recommended
sources
of
information,
see
Chapter
3.
A.
STRUCTURE
OF
THE
COMPUTER
PROGRAM
BEN
consists
of
five
different
screens:
mainlcase
screen,
run
screen,
options
screen,
specific
cost
estimates
screen,
and
results
screen.
In
general,
you
start
with
the
case
screen,
enter
data
on
separate
screens,
return
to
the
case
screen,
then
view
(and
print)
your
output
on
the
results
screen.
BEN
operates
like
any
standard
WindowsTM
application.
Use
the
mouse
or
the
Tab
and
Return
keys
to
move
between
cells
and
within
a
screen.
Hold
down
the
Shift
key
while
pressing
Tab
to
return
to
previous
entries.
When
you
first
open
BEN
the
case
screen
appears.
BEN
starts
up
with
a
blank
case
screen.
You
can
obtain
a
new
screen
at
any
time
by
selecting
“New”
from
the
File
menu,
or
using
the
Ctrl+N
shortcut.
To
toggle
between
cases,
select
the
appropriate
file
name
under
the
“Window”
menu.
2
This
address
may
have
changed
by
the
time
you
read
this
manual.
To
obtain
the
current
address,
you
can
call
the
helpline
at
888-ECONSPT.
2-1
September
1999
The
first
inputs
on
the
case
screen
are
case
name,
analyst
name
and
office/agency.
These
values
are
for
reference
only
and
do
not
affect
the
results.
Then
BEN
asks
for
the
violator’s
tax
status
and
state.
With
this
information
BEN
references
an
internal
database
and
automatically
calculates
the
relevant
marginal
tax
rates.
Here
you
have
the
opportunity
to
modify
taxes
by
pressing
the
[Customize
Taxes]
button.
Under
taxes
is
the
[Competitive
Advantage]
button.
Pressing
this
button
presents
you
with
questions
to
alert
you
to
the
presence
of
illegal
competitive
advantage.
At
the
bottom
of
the
screen,
BEN
requires
you
to
enter
the
penalty
payment
date.
The
right
side
of
the
case
screen
is
for
run
management.
Here
you
can
create
a
new
run,
enter
or
edit
run
data,
copy
a
run,
remove
a
run,
and
calculate
a
run.
Youcan
create
multiple
runs
for
each
case.
The
run
screen
is
where
you
enter
the
costs
of
compliance.
You,
must
enter
all
the
cost
data
and
cost
estimate
dates
for
a
run
before
you
can
calculate
economic
benefit.
From
the
run
screen
you
may
go
to
the
options
screen.
The
option
screen
allows
you
to
change
BEN’s
standard
values
for
the
discountlcompound
rate
and
inflation.
Here
you
can
also
alter
the
number
of
replacement
cycles,
useful
life
for
capital
equipment,
whether
a
cost
is
delayed
or
avoided,
and
tax
deductibility
of
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditures.
This
screen
contains
BEN’s
default
settings,
so
you
will
never
need
to
use
it
unless
you
customize
the
standard
values.
From
the
options
screen
you
may
go
to
the
specific
cost
estimates
screen.
This
screen
is
needed
only
under
certainrare
circumstances.
Here
you
can
adjust
BEN’s
assessment
of
on-time
and
delay
compliance
costs.
The
result
screen
is
reached
from
the
main
screen,
and
displays
the
results
of
BEN’s
calculation.
Here
you
have
three
options:
you
can
print
out
a
summary
of
the
BEN
calculation,
you
can
print
out
a
detailed
version
of
the
calculation,
andlor
you
can
return
to
the
run
screen.
Once
you
are
finished
with
a
calculation,
you
can
create,
edit
or
calculate
other
runs.
You
can
even
create
other
case
files,
and
toggle
between
them.
Before
you
exit
BEN
it
gives
you
the
option
of
saving
the
current
case,
plus
you
can
save
your
case
file
at
anytime
during
your
session.
The
case
is
saved
with
a
“.ben”
extension
in
the
folder
you
specify,
and
all
runs
are
automatically
saved
with
the
case.
At
any
time
during
your
use
of
the
model
you
can
access
the
context-sensitive
help
system
by
pressing
the
Fl
key,
just
as
in
any
Windows
application.
B.
INSTALLING
BEN
BEN
requires
a
personal
computer
running
the
Windows
operating
system
(version
3.1
or
higher).
In
addition,
for
optimal
formatting
of
various
data
entry
screens,
set
your
display
in
the
2-2
September
1999
control
panel
to
“small
fonts”
option.
(“Small
fonts”
is
the
Windows
default,
so
unless
your
display
settings
have
been
altered,
your
computer
should
be
set
appropriately.)
The
remainder
of
this
section
describes
how
to
install
BEN
from
EPA’s
website
or
from
floppy
disks
onto
a
local
network
or
stand-alone
PC.
Installing
BEN
will
automatically
install
the
PROJECT
model,
since
the
models
share
some
installation
files.
If
you
have
trouble
downloading
or
installing
the
model,
consult
your
local
computer
technician.
BEN
is
located
on
the
EPA
website
at
http://es.epa.gov/oeca.
3
To
install
BEN,
first
download
the
installation
file
to
your
computer
or
network,
then
run
the
file
and
follow
the
steps
listed
below
for
installing
it
from
a
set
of
disks.
The
installation
screens
will
appear
as
they
do
for
installation
from
a
disk,
although
you
will
not
be
prompted
for
a
second
disk.
If
you
have
access
to
the
installation
disks,
insert
Disk
1
and
run
“a:\setup.exe”
(or
“b:\setup.exe”
if
the
floppy
is
in
the
b:\
drive).
Then
click
[OK].
If
you
receive
a
warning
message
that
you
caimot
copy
a
file
because
it
is
in
use,
simply
click
[OK].
It
is
merely
notifying
you
that
the
file
the
installation
system
is
trying
to
copy
already
exists
on
your
computer
and
is
currently
open.
You
should
close
all
other
programs
before
installing
the
model.
To
do
so,
click
on
[Cancel],
close
the
programs
and
repeat
the
appropriate
steps
above.
Otherwise
click
[Next]
and
proceed
to
the
second
screen
as
shown
below:
This
address
may
have
changed
by
the
time
you
read
this
manual.
To
obtain
the
current
address,
you
can
call
the
helpline
at
888-ECON-SPT.
The
first
BEN
setup
screen
will
appear:
2-3
September
1999
Setup
will
rnstall
BEN
.
PRDJECT
in
the
foflowiri
dIrectory
T
install
to
this
dkectoy
click
Next.
A
10
install
toe
dittererit
directory
click
Browse
andselect
another
directoty
tq0
riot
to
install
BEN.ffiOIECT
bydic
iniancel
to
eiiIt
Setup.
4:
1
Destmnation.Directory
—..
JC:\BNPRJ
.
:
Cancel
The
second
screen
offers
you
the
opportunity
to
designate
a
directory
in
which
to
store
the
model.
The
default
directory
is
“c:\BENPRJ”
(assuming
that
your
local
hard
drive
is
c:\).
If
you
wish
to
save
the
model
to
a
different
directory,
press
[Browse]
and
choose
yourdesired
directory.
To
proceed
with
the
BEN/PROJECT
installation,
press
(Next].
The
next
setup
screen
allows
you
to
choose
a
program
folder
name
as
shown
below:
September1999
.1
type
a
flew
folder
name.
or
selectonIrom
the
ssdtin
Folders
list>
Click,
Nerdto
continue
f
I
I
I
rograrn
Folders
EingFoIdet
Accessories
uroupwise
D
lEc
Documents
lEc
Utilities
:
LiveNote
Novell
.
StartUp
:-:
—
(e
j
Next>
Cal
2-4
The
default
folder
name
is
EPA
Models,
which
you
may
alter.
To
continue
installation
press
INexti.
BEN/PROJECT
will
partially
install
and
then
prompt
you
for
Disk
2,
as
shown
below:
Setup
Needs
The
Next
Disk
r
Please
insert
the
next
disk.
Disk
2.
lIthe
fes
on
this
disk
can
be
found
7-f
in
another
location,
for
example.
in
another
drive,
enter
its
full
path
or
click
the
Browse
button
to
select
its
path.
Path:
-
Browse...
OK
cancel
If
the
files
are
not
on
Disk
2
you
may
type
their
location
or
use
browse
to
find
them.
Press
[OKj
when
the
path
is
correct.
If
the
program
is
on
two
disks,
simply
insert
Disk
2
and
press
[01(1.
The
setup
program
will
create
icons
for
BEN
and
PROJECT
and
finish
installing
them.
When
you
have
completed
the
installation
process,
you
should
reboot.your
computer
prior
to
using
the
BEN
model
or
any
other
software
package.
Once
BEN
has
been
loaded
onto
your
hard
drive,
simply
double-click
the
model
iconto
start
the
program.
If
you
are
running
WifldowsTM
95
or
higher,
and
did
not
change
the
default
directory
and
folder,
BEN
and
PROJECT
will
automatically
be
listed
on
the
start
menu
under
programs
in
the
“EPA
Models”
folder.
After
installing
the
model,
you
may
wish
to
create
a
subdirectory
for
storage
of
all
your
case
files.
Alternatively,
you
may
also
choose
to
save
your
case
files
in
any
pre-existing
directories
corresponding
to
different
cases
or
projects
C.
DATA
ENTRY
BEN
is
a
WindowsTMbased
computer
program.
Like
other
WindowsTMbased
programs
it
uses
the
mouse
or
the
Enter
and
Tab
keys
to
move
from
entry
to
entry
or
from
screen
to
screen.
Hold
down
the
Shift
key
while
pressing
Tab
to
return
to
previous
entries.
Each
screen
has
several
options
and
spaces
for
input.
BEN
will
accept
several
entry
formats.
Numerical
values
can
include
but
do
not
require
commas.
Monetary
values
may
include
decimals
but
will
be
rounded
to
the
nearest
dollar.
They
may
be
entered
with
or
without
dollar
signs.
Rates
or
percentages
should
be
entered
as
a
decimal
number
without
a
percent
symbol
(e.g.,
enter
0.20
to
represent
20
percent).
If
you
type
2.5
for
an
inflation
rate,
BEN
will
read
it
as
an
inflation
rate
of
250
percent.
2-5
September
1999
BEN
converts
all
dates
to
a
“l-Jan-1998”
format,
but
can
understand
almost
any
sensible
format.
If
you
enter
an
atypical
date
format,
besure
to
check
that
BEN
has
interpreted
it
as
you
intended.
If
you
do
not
enter
a
day,
BEN
will
assume
the
first
day
of
the
month.
Be
careful
to
use
only
number
keys
to
enter
numerical
values.
A
frequent
mistake
is
typing
the
lowercase
letter
L
instead
of
a
number
1.
Another
error
occurs
when
the
capital
letter
0
is
typed
instead
of
the
number
0
(zero).
BEN
will
tell
you
if
the
format
for
the
entry
is
incorrect.
If
this
happens,
correct
the
number
and
enter
it
again.
Some
inputs
are
limited
to
a
range
of
values.
If
an
entered
value
falls
out
of
this
range,
BEN
will
display
an
error
message
with
the
allowable
range
of
values.
Other
error
messages
will
appear
if
you
did
not
enter
data
in
a
required
field.
You
may
enter
variables
on
thesame
screen
in
any
order.
The
only
exception
to
this
is
that
you
must
have
entered
all
of
the
inputs
for
a
case
before
you
create
a
run.
Therefore
you
will
receive
non-entry
error
messages
only
when
moving
from
screen
to
screen
or
creating
a
run.
After
typing
your
entry
you
might
discover
that
you
have
typed
an
incorrect
letter
or
number.
Typing
errors
are
easy
to
correct:
simply
return
to
the
relevant
value
and
type
over
the
mistake.
Like
all
computer
programs,
BEN
follows
the
GIGO
protocol:
“Garbage
In,
Garbage
Out.”
Verifying
your
data
inputs
is
thereforeextremely
important.
D.
CALCULATING
AND
PRINTING
RESULTS
To
perform
an
economic
benefit
calculation,
select
the
desired
run
title
from
thelist
on
the
main
screen
and
press
[Calculate].
You
may
calculate
multiple
runs
and
display
the
results
simultaneously
by
selecting
multiple
run
titles
(i.e.,
select
a
run
and
then
click
on
subsequent
desired
runs,
while
simultaneously
holding
down
the
Control
key).
Anew
screen
will
display
a
summary
of
the
results.
You
can
may
print
either
a
summary
of
the
results
or
detailed
background
spreadsheet
pages.
The
“Summary”
option
will
print
only
the
information
contained
in
the
summary
results
screen.
The
“Detail”
option
will
print,
separately
for
each
run,
a
summary
page
and
spreadsheet
pages
that
include:
(1)
Illegal
Competitive
Advantage,
which
lists
possible
sources
of
additional
economic
benefit
(omitted
if
the
user
does
not
check
off
any
such
conditions
for
the
case
inputs);
(2)
Discount/Compound
Rate
Calculation,
which
provides
the
details
for
the
cost
of
capital
calculation
(omitted
if
the
user
overrides
BEN’s
calculations
on
the
Options
screen);
(3)
Calculations
for
Specific
Cost
Estimates,
which
essentially
prints
the
similarly
named
screen
(omitted
if
the
user
overrides
BEN’s
calculations
on
the
Options
screen);
and
(4)
Cash
Flow
(maximum
of
four
pages),
which
show
the
annual
cash
flow
and
net
present
value
calculations.
2-6
September
1999
For
more
information
on
interpreting
these
pages,
consult
Appendix
A
of
the
BEN
User’s
Manual,
or
call
EPA’s
toll-free
enforcement
economics
support
helpline
at
888-ECON-SPT
(326-6778).
Although
printing
is
done
from
the
output
screen,
the
printer
setup
is
controlled
by
the
pull-
down
menu
on
the
main
screen.
The
printer
setup
allows
you
to
shift
between
landscape
and
portrait
printing,
as
well
as
choose
more
advanced
options.
E.
EXITING
AND
SAVING
You
exit
BEN
just
like
any
other
standard
Windows
application.
From
the
main
screen,
select
Exit
under
the
File
pull-down
menu
at
the
top
left
corner
of
your
screen,
or
click
on
the
[x]
button
at
the
top
right
corner
of
your
screen.
You
can
also
double-click
on
the
BEN
icon
at
the
top
left
corner
of
your
screen.
BEN
will
ask
you
if
you
want
to
save
your
work
before
you
exit.
Be
sure
to
save
your
case(s)
before
you
exit.
You
save
a
case
by
selecting
“Save”
under
the
File
menu
(or
give
the
case
a
new
name
by
selecting
“Save
As...”),
or
the
Ctrl+S
shortcut.
BEN
cases
are
automatically
saved
with
the
extension
“.ben”and
can
be
accessed
using
the
“Open”
command
under
the
File
menu
or
the
Ctrl+O
shortcut.
You
can
save
cases
in
any
folder,
and
switch
between
different
folders
at
any
time.
Runs
are
automatically
saved
as
part
of
a
case.
2-7
September
1999
DATA
REQUIREMENTS
CHAPTER
3
To
run
BEN,
you
enter
certain
data,
including
the
entity’s
tax
status
and
state;
the
dates
for
penalty
payment,
noncompliance,
and
compliance;
and
the
compliance
cost
estimates
and
estimate
dates.
BEN
provides
standard
values
—
which
you
can
modify
—
for
tax,
inflation,
and
discount
rates,
as
well
as
the
capital
equipment’s
number
of
replacement
cycles
and
useful
life,
and
the
one
time
nondepreciable
expenditure’s
tax
deductibility.
This
chapter
explains
these
variables
(in
the
order
in
which
you
enter
them
in
BEN),
covering
the
criteria
for
developing
input
values
and
the
basis
for
the
standard
values.
Each
explanation
also
states
how
a
change
in
each
variable’s
value
will
affect
the
economic
benefit
result,
as
summarized
below
(holding
all
other
variables
constant).
Direction
Impact
on
Input
Item
of
Change
Economic
Benefit
Marginal
Tax
Rate
increase
decrease
Penalty
Payment
Date
later
increase
Cost
Estimates
increase
increase
Noncompliance
Date
later
decrease
Compliance
Date
later
increase
Discount/Compound
Rate
increase
increase
Number
of
Replacement
Cycles
increase
increase
Useful
Life
of
Capital
Equipment
increase
decrease
Projected
Rate
for
Future
Inflation
increase
varies
Cost
Index
for
Inflation
PCI
to
other
index
varies
Tax-Deductibility
of
One-Time,
tax
deductible
to
increase
Nondepreciable
Expenditure
not
tax
deductible
-
3-1
September
1999
A.
CASE
SCREEN
The
case
screen
shown
below
is
what
you
see
when
you
first
open
BEN.
This
is
where
you
enter
the
following
variables:
case
name,
office/agency,
analyst
name,
entity
tax
status,
state,
marginal
tax
rate,
penalty
payment
date,
and
run
name.
It
is
also
where
you
consider
questions
of
competitive
advantage.
The
right
side
of
the
case
screen
is
where
you
create,
edit,
calculate
and
remove
mns.
r
Case
.
-
Runs
Case
Name:
New
Run:
jExample
Case
I
-
-
-
Region.-
.
.
-
jReciionl
Analyst:
.
Existing
Runs:
.
j.
Analyst
-
-
-
.
Test
Run
2--CD
1/1/98
Taxes
Erity
-
.
-
.
.
.
--
(.
Not-Fot-Profit
.
.
.
Enter/Edit
iCCorporation
.
.•
.
I
r
For-Profit
0
ther
than
C-Corporation
.
.
.
-
I.
Copy
-
.
State:
.
•-
.
.
.
-
.-..
-
jMA
Customize
Taxesi
-
.
.
.:Renove
r
axes
Have
een
customize
.
.
.
.
.--
ompetitie
Advantage
.
.
.
:
Penalty
Payment
Date:
I
01
1998
I
.
.
-
1.
Case
Name,
Office/Agency,
Analyst
Name
Case
name,
office/agency
(formerly
EPA
Region),
and
analyst
name
are
the
first
three
inputs
in
BEN.
They
are
for
reference
purposes
only
and
do
not
affect
the
calculation.
Each
of
them
will
appear
along
with
the
current
date
on
the
bottom
of
every
page
of
the
results.
3-2
September
1999
a.
Case
Name
Case
name
is
the
first
input
in
BEN.
This
name
can
be
any
length
and
can
contain
letters,
spaces,
punctuation
and
numbers
(although
you
may
not
leave
it
blank).
It
will
appear
along
with
the
current
date,
analyst
name,
and
EPA
region
on
each
page
of
the
results.
Since
its
sole
purpose
is
documentation,
this
label
can
contain
anything
you
choose.
It
can
reflect
the
violator’.s
name
or
a
characteristic
of
the
specific
case
(e.g.,
“Payment
on
July
15,
1999”).
Each
case
can
contain
several
runs,
so
you
will
not
need
to
alter
the
case
name
to
save
individual
calculations.
b.
Office/Agency
Like
case
name,
office/agency
is
for
reference
purposes
only
(although
you
may
not
leave
it
blank).
It
will
appear
along
with
the
current
date,
case
name,
and
analyst
name
on
each
page
of
the
results.
A
pull
down
menu
to
the
right
of
the
cell
lists
all
ten
EPA
regions,
EPA
headquarters,
and
the
option
of
“other.”
You
may
also
type
in
a
different
entry.
c.
Analyst
Name
Like
case
name
and
office/agency,
analyst
name
is
for
reference
purposes
only
(although
you
may
not
leave
it
blank).
This
name
can
be
of
any
length
and
can
contain
letters,
spaces,
punctuation
and
numbers.
It
will
appear
along
with
the
current
date,
case
name,
and
EPA
region
on
each
page
of
the
results.
‘It
can
be
anything
you
choose,
but
it
is
most
appropriate
simply
to
enter
your
own
name.
2.
Entity
Type,
State,
Customized
Tax
Rate
BEN
needs
to
know
the
violator’s
tax
rate
to
calculate
economic
benefits,
as
compliance
costs
are
usually
tax-deductible.
Because
tax-deductible
expenses
and
depreciation
associated
with
capital
investments
reduce
taxable
income
they
result
in
tax
savings.
The
higher
the
tax
rate,
the
higher
the
tax
savings,
and
therefore
the
lower
the
economic
benefit
of
noncompliance.
BEN
uses
the
marginal
tax
rate
to
account
for
the
tax
effects
of
compliance
costs.
Changing
the
violator’s
state
or
tax
status
changes
the
violator’s
marginal
tax
rate
and
thus
alters
economic
benefit.
a.
Entity
Type
BEN
asks
you
to
designate
the
tax
filing
status
of
the
entity.
The
three
options
are:
Not-For
Profit,
C-Corporation,
or
For-Profit
Other
than
C-Corporation.
Choosing
the
correct
tax
status
is
critical,
because
it
determines
BEN’s
application
of
the
tax
rate
and
the
discount/compound
rate.
BEN
will
default
to
C-Corporation
status.
3-3
September
1999
A
C-Corporation
files
a
federal
tax
Form
1120
or
Form
1120-A.
These
companies
are
taxed
at
corporate
income
tax
rates.
Virtually
all
publicly
traded
companies
are
C-Corporations,
but
small
privately
held
firms
can
also
be
C-Corporations.
For-profit
entities
other
than
C-corporations
may
be
S-corporations,
partnerships,
or
sole
proprietorships
(e.g.,
a
corner
grocery
store).
These
entities
file
federal
tax
returns
other
than
1120
or
1120-A
(e.g.,
an
S-
corporation
files
a
Form
1120-S
and
a
ScheduleK
for
each
shareholder).
The
income
and
expenses
of
these
organizations
are
divided
among
the
shareholders
and
reported
on
their
individual
income
tax
returns.
Income
is
therefore
taxed
at
the
individual
income
tax
rate.
Not-for-profit
entities,
such
as
municipalities,
public
authorities,
and
charitable
organizations,
generally
have
a
tax-exempt
status.
When
you
indicate
that
the
violator
is
a
not-for-profit
entity,
BEN
sets
the
marginal
income
tax
rate
to
zero.
(Although
rare,
certain
not-for-profit
companies
are
subject
to
taxation.
You
should
verify
the
status
of
the
not-for-profit
in
question
and
adjust
the
tax
rates
accordingly.)
b.
State
This
is
the
state
in
which
the
entity
conducts
the
majority
of
its
business,
which
is
not
necessarily
the
state
in
which
it
is
incorporated.
Selecting
the
correct
state
is
important
because
BEN
uses
state-specific
tax
rates
in
its
calculations.
The
pull-down
menu
lists
all
fifty
states
plus
“AVG”
and
“BEN.”
“AVG”
is
an
average
of
all
state
tax
rates
(appropriate
if
the
nonoompliant
facilities
span
several
states).
“BEN”
is
similar
to
“AVG”,
but
instead
of
adjusting
the
state
average
each
year,
it
uses
one
state
average
for
the
period
1987-1992
and
another
for
1993
and
beyond.
This
option
is
appropriate
only
for
replicating
prior
calculations
from
the
DOS
version
of
BEN,
which
used
these
rates
as
its
standard
value.
c.
Customized
Tax
Rate
After
you
have
entered
the
tax
status
and
state
of
the
violator,
BEN
will
automatically
calculate
the
combined
marginal
income
tax
rate.
The
marginal
tax
rate
is
the
fraction
of
the
last
dollar
of
taxable
income
that
a
defendant
would
pay
to
federal
and
state
governments.
BEN
uses
the
marginal
tax
rate,
not
the
average
tax
rate
(i.e.,
total
tax
divided
by
total
taxable
income),
because
the
marginal
tax
rate
is
the
rate
that
applies
to
incremental
changes
in
the
violator’s
tax-deductible
expenses.
State
tax
rates
must
be
adjusted
to
reflect
the
fact
that
you
can
deduct
state
taxes
from
federal
taxable
income.
The
adjustment
is
made
by
multiplying
the
marginal
state
tax
rate
by
a
factor
equal
to
one
minus
the
marginal
federal
tax
rate,
as
shown
in
the
following
formula:
Combined
tax
rate
=
Federal
rate
+
[State
rate
x
(.1
-
Federal
rate)]
3-4
September
1999
State
income
taxes
do
not
include
sales
tax,
inventory
tax,
charter
tax,
or
taxes
on
property.
One-time
tax
payments,
such
as
taxes
on
the
purchase
of
equipment,
should
be
included
in
the
capital
investment
or
in
the
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditure.
If
the
tax
recurs
regularly,
then
it
should
be
included
in
the
annually
recurring
cost.
For
example,
sales
tax
would
be
included
in
the
capital
cost
while
property
tax
would
be
included
in
the
annual
cost.
You
may
have
information
that
supports
the
use
of
tax
rates
other
than
those
supplied
by
the
BEN
model
(e.g.,
the
entity
was
not
subject
to
the
highest
marginal
rate).
In
these
situations
you
can
modify
the
annual
rates
individually
by
pressing
[Customize
Taxes].
The
tax
customization
window
shown
below
will
appear
and
you
can
simply
type
in
your
customized
values.
t
Combined
=
Federal
+
EState
1
-
Federal))
Federal
M
Combined
1387
4.0%
3.5
40.30%
1988
34.0%
35%
40.30%
1383
34.0%
S.5
40.30%
1990
34.0%
9.5%
4030%
1931
4.0%
35%
40.30%
1932
4.0%
9.5
40.30%
1833
35.0%ø
9.5%
41.20%
1934
5.0
9.5%
41.20%
1935
5.0%
3.5.
41.20%.
1936
.OY
3.5%
41.20%
ote:
Changing
entity
or
state
on
the
previous
screen
will
result
inloss
of
tax
customization.
ancel
The
“Taxes
Have
Been
Customized”
box
on
the
case
screen
will
be
checked
when
modifications
have
been
made
to
the
tax
rates.
Similarly,
this
information
will
appear
in
the
BEN
run
results
and
print-out.
Note
that
once
tax
rates
are
modified,
re-designation
of
the
state
or
entity
tax
status
will
result
in
a
loss
of
the
customized
information.
3.
Competitive
Advantage
BEN
—
or
any
computer
model
—
is
incapable
of
calculating
economic
benefit
from
illegal
competitive
advantage,
leading
to
a
possible
underestimate
of
economic
benefit
in
certain
cases.
Therefore
BEN
provides
a
[Competitive
Advantage]
button
and
asks
questions
for
case
attributes
indicative
of
illegal
competitive
advantage,
providing
suggestions
for
furtherresearch
and
analysis.
3-5
September
1999
Youmust
read
the
competitive
advantage
screen
and
press
[OK]
before
BEN
will
allow
you
to
create
a
run.
J
I-
I
rD
I-
....
r
Ha
via
ator
developed
or
old
new
products
or
eivice
hIIe
in
noncompance
7
r
CouLd
vioLator
have
complied
cost-effectively
by
reducing
outpuk/Lhoughput?
0K____l
CnceI
Below
are
the
responses
that
appear
in
BEN’s
results
ifyou
check
a
question
box.
1
.
Did
violator
‘s
noncompliance
allow
it
to
begin
production
or
sales
sooner
than
it
should?
Violator
may
have
received
“early-mover
advantage”
by
beginning
production
or
sales
sooner
than
it
should.
2.
Did
violator
sellprohibitedproducts?
Violator’s
net
profits
from
illegally
sold
products
may
constitute
economic
benefit,
and
if
the
violator
continues
to
sell
similar
now-legal
products
in
same
market,
then
lasting
market
share
effect
may
constitute
an
additional
benefit.
3.
Are
compliance
costs
a
signfIcantpercentage
oftotaiproduction
costs?
Violator
may
have
benefitted
from
market
share
gains
by
undercutting
its
competitors
through
price
advantages
from
noncompliance.
.
4.
Does
violator
seliproducts
that
can
develop
“brand
loyalty
“
or
high
switching
costs?
Violator
may
have
benefitted
from
market
share
gains
because
it
sells
products
that
can
develop
“brand
loyalty”
or
high
switching
costs.
5
.
Has
violator
developed
or
sold
new
products
or
services
while
in
noncompliance?
Violator
may
have
gained
“early
mover”
market
share
and
been
able
to
discourage
competitors
by
keeping
prices
low,
since
it
developed
or
sold
new
products/services
while
in
noncompliance.
3-6
.
September
[999
6.
Could
violator
have
complied
cost-effectively
by
reducing
output/throughput?
Incremental
net
profit
from
higher
output/throughput
could
constitute
economic
benefit,
since
violator
could
have
complied
cost-effectively
by
output/throughput
reduction.
If
you
answer
affirmatively
to
any
of
these
questions,
further
research
and
analysis
is
necessary
to
determine
the
full
extent
of
the
violator’s
economic
benefit.
Youmight
wish
to
consult
U.S.
EPA’s
guidance
on
illegal
competitive
advantage,
or
contact
EPA’s
enforcement
economics
support
helpline,
at
888-ECONSPT
(326-6778).
4.
Penalty
Payment
Date
The
penalty
payment
date
is
the
date
you
expect
the
violator
to
.pay
the
civil
penalty.
Dates
may
be
entered
as
month/day/year
(i.e.,
7/31/98)
or
written
out
(i.e.,
July31,
1998).
BEN
will
accept
two-digit
years,
but
four-digit
years
are
preferable.
You
must
enter
dates
to
the
day.
BEN
automatically
calculates
the
final
economic
benefit
as
of
the
penalty
payment
date
and
assumes
that
the
violator
earns
a
return
on
the
benefit
until
that
date.
Therefore,
the
benefit
figure
increases
for
later
penalty
payment
dates,
holding
all
other
variables
constant.
A
considerable
time
lag
oflen
occurs
between
when
the
violator
signs
the
consent
decree
and
when
it
actually
pays
the
penalty.
If
the
violator
is
willing
to
transfer
the
entire
penalty
figure
to
an
interest-bearing
escrow
account
on
a
date
before
entry
of
the
consent
decree,
this
escrow
date
may
be
used
as
the
penalty
payment
date.
Upon
entry
of
the
consent
decree,
the
escrowed
penalty
plus
any
interest
should
accrue
to
the
enforcement
agency.
You
should
be
certain
that
the
violator
knows:
(1)
the
penalty
payment
date
used
in
your
economic
benefit
calculation;
and,
(2)
that
if
the
penalty
payment
date
is
actually
later
than
you
have
assumed,
the
economic
benefit
will
be
higher.
On
the
other
hand,
if
the
violator
settles
the
case
and
pays
its
penalty
prior
to
the
date
you
used
in
your
calculation,
or
if
it
agrees
to
escrow
the
economic
benefit
amount,
the
benefit
component
of
the
penalty
will
be
lower.
By
conveying
this
information
early
in
a
negotiation
with
a
violator,
you
will
give
the
violator
added
incentive
to
settle
promptly.
In
addition,
this
approach
will
allow
you
to
avoid
giving
the
violator
any
“unpleasant
surprises”
should
you
need
to
increase
the
benefit
component
as
a
result
of
a
delay
in
the
settlement.
5.
Creating/Adding,
Copying,
and
Removing
Runs
You
must
create
a
run
before
you
can
enter
compliance
cost
information.
To
add
a
new
run,
enter
the
run
name
under
“New
Run:”
and
press
[AddJ.
BEN
will
save
the
new
run
and
list
it
under
“Existing
Runs.”
Run
names
can
be
any
length
and
include
any
letter,
punctuation
or
number.
Each
case
may
contain
multiple
runs.
3-7
September
1999
To
copy
an
existing
run
select
the
run
you
wish
to
copy
from
the
list
of
existing
runs
and
press
[Copyl.
A
window
will
appear
asking
you
to
enter
a
name
for
the
new
run.
No
two
runs
can
have
the
same
name.
Enter
the
new
name
and
press
[OK]
to
save
the
new
run
or
[Cancel]
to
delete
it.
The
copy
will
contain
all
of
the
information
from
the
original.
Copies
are
particularly
useful
when
making
only
minor
changes
in
cost
information
from
run
to
run,
because
they
can
carry
over
consistent
data.
To
remove
a
run
select
it
from
the
existing
run
window
and
press
[Remove].
A
window
will
appear
asking
you
if
you
are
sure.
Press
[Yes]
and
the
run
is
deleted.
Remember
that
BEN
does
not
have
a
“trash
bin”
to
hold
deleted
runs,
so
you
will
have
no
way
to
retrieve
a
run
once
you
have
removed
it.
B.
RUN
INPUT
SCREEN
To
access
the
run
input
screen,
select
a
run
and
press
[Enter/Edit],
or
simply
double
click
on
the
run
name.
Here
you
enter
cost
estimates
for
three
possible
compliance
components:
capital
investments,
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditures
and
annually
recurring
costs.
Each
cost
component
requires
a
cost
estimate
and
an
estimate
date.
At
the
bottom
of
the
run
screen
you
must
enter
the
noncompliance
and
compliance
dates.
-
x
CompIince
Components
-.
Cost
Etimat
Esti
ate
Dat
Capital
Investment:
$1,000.000
1101
-Jan-i
932
One-Time,
Nondepeciable
penditure:
jsi
00.000
I
[ni
S32J
uaHy
Re
ring
Jsi
0.000
1101
ian-1
392
Dates
[Noncomplianc
:
I011932
I
Compliance
I011397
OK
Options
Cancel
j
3-8
September
1999
1.
Compliance
Cost
Components
This
is
where
you
enter
the
costs
of
the
equipment/labor/activities
necessary
to
achieve
compliance.
Engineers
and
technical
staff
in
your
enforcement
program
are
usually
aware
of
what
reasonable
costs
might
be
for
pollution
control
technologies
and
remedial
activities,
and
might
also
know
of
standard
cost
information
that
exists
in
publications.
Another
potential
source
of
information
is
the
violator,
who
might
willingly
giveyou
the
required
data.
Otherwise,
you
can
take
a
number
of
legal
approaches
to
obtain
the
data
from
the
violator.
The
EPA
usually
has
authority
to
request
the
necessary
information.
With
a
legal
issue
like
this
one,
the
appropriate
attorney(s)
should
also
be
consulted.
In
cases
wherecost
data
is
available,
but
the
required
compliance
measures
are
still
unclear,
two
general
guidelines
will
assist
you:
(1)
The
best
evidence
of
what
the
violator
shouldhave
done
to
prevent
the
violations
is
what
it
eventually
did
(or
will
do)
to
achieve
compliance.
This
rule
is
instructive
in
those
cases
where
the
violator
may
appear
to
be
installing
a
more
expensive
pollution
control
system
than
EPA
staff
believe
is
necessary
to
achieve
compliance.
In
such
situations,
the
proper
cost
inputs
in
the
BEN
model
are
usually
still
based
on
the
actual
(more
expensive)
system
being
installed.
This
is
because
the
EPA
should
not
second
guess
the
business
decisions
of
a
violator.
A
violator
often
will
have
sound
business
reasons
to
install
a
more
expensive
compliance
system
(e.g.,
it
may
be
more
reliable,
easier
to
maintain,
or
have
a
longer
useful
life).
(2)
Costs
not
truly
associated
with
pollution
control
efforts
to
remedy
the
violations
alleged
in
the
complaint
should
be
excluded
from
BEN
inputs,
but
the
violator
must
present
convincing
evidence
that
the
costs
were
not
associated
with
the
operation
of
the
pollution
control
system.
For
example,
if
the
violator
is
addingadditional
capacity
to
handlç
a
waste
stream
from
a
new
production
line,
the
incremental
costs
associated
with
treating
the
new
waste
stream
should
not
be
included
in
the
BEN
run
(based
on
the
assumption
that
the
additional
capacity
for
treatment
of
wastesfrom
new
production
was
not
needed
to
achieve
compliance
under
previous
levels
of
production).
Similarly,
if
the
violator
is
addingcapacity
to
accommodate
normal
anticipated
business
growth,
and
on-time
compliance
would
not
have
entailed
such
additional
capacity,
then
you
should
exclude
the
incremental
costs
of
the
additional
capacity.
Youmay
enter
compliance
costs
with
or
without
commas
or
dollar
signs.
BEN
will
accept
decimals
but
will
round
the
amount
to
the
nearest
whole
dollar.
Enter
a
zero
for
any
component
category
where
expenses
would
not
be
incuned.
All
else
being
equal,
larger
compliance
costs
will
result
in
a
higher
economic
benefit
of
noncompliance.
a.
Capital
Investment
The
capital
investment
cost
estimate
should
include
all
depreciable
investment
outlays
necessary
to
achieve
compliance.
Generally
these
are
expenditures
the
violator
delayed
making
(although
they
could
sometimes
be
avoided
altogether).
Enter
a
zero
if
no
capital
investment
was
3-9
September
1999
required
for
compliance.
Holding
all
other
inputs
constant,
the
economic
benefit
from
delay
will
be
greater
for
larger
capital
investment
outlays.
Depreciable
capital
investments
are
made
for
things
thatwear
out
such
as
buildings,
equipment
or
other
long-lived
assets.
Note
that
land
is
not
a
depreciable
capital
investment;
land
costs
should
instead
be
input
as
a
one-time
non-depreciable
expenditure.
Typical
environmental
capital
investments
include
groundwater
monitoring
wells,
stack
scrubbers,
and
wastewater
treatment
systems.
In
estimating
capital
cost,
keep
in
mind
this
includes
all
costs
associated
with
designing,
installing,
shipping,
and
purchasing
the
necessary
equipment
(including
sales
tax)
and
associated
facilities.
If
the
capital
investment
is
avoided
(i.e.,
the
violator
is
not
just
delaying
making
the
investment,
but
will
never
make
the
investment),
after
entering
all
the
required
information
on
the
run
inputs
screen,
on
the
options
screen
uncheck
the
“Delayed,
Not
Avoided”
box
and
set
the
replacement
cycles
to
0.
(If
a
replacement
cycle
has
also
been
avoided,
then
retain
the
default
cycle
of
1.)
If
you
have
capital
investment
costs
with
significantly
different
cost
estimate
dates,
you
should
perform
separate
runs
for
each,
which
you
can
add
together
to
produce
a
total
economic
benefit
result.
b.
One-Time,
Nondepreciable
Expenditure
This
category
includes
compliance
expenditures
that
need
to
be
made
only
once
and
are
non-
depreciable
(i.e.,
do
not
wear
out).
Enter
a
zero
if
no
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditure
was
required
for
compliance.
Holding
all
other
inputs
constant,
the
economic
benefit
from
delay
will
be
greater
for
larger
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditures.
Such
an
expenditurecould
be
purchasing
land,
setting
up
a
record-keeping
system,
removing
illegal
discharges
of
dredged
and
fill
material,
disposing
of
soil
from
a
hazardous-waste
site,
or
initial
training
of
employees.
However,
if
training
or
record
keeping
must
occur
over
time
and
regularly,
these
costs
should
be
entered
as
annually
recurring
costs.
If
the
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditure
involved
is
avoided
(i.e.,
the
violator
is
not
just
delaying
making
the
expenditure,
but
will
never
make
the
expenditure),
on
the
options
screen
uncheck
the
“Delayed,
Not
Avoided”
box.
Most
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditures
are
tax-deductible;
with
the
primary
exception
being
purchases
of
land.
Land
is
an
asset
and,
therefore,
cannot
be
deducted
as
an
expense
from
taxable
income.
BEN
assumes
that
the
expenditure
is
tax-deductible
unless
otherwise
specified.
To
change
this
assumption
uncheck
the
“Tax
Deductible”
box
on
the
options
screen.
3-10
September
1999
c.
Annually
Recurring
Costs
Annually
recurring
costs
are
costs
associated
with
operating
and
maintaining
pollution
control
equipment.
Enter
a
zero
if
no
(additional)
annual
costs
were
required
to
operate
the
necessary
pollution
control
equipment.
Holding
all
other
inputs
constant,
the
economic
benefit
from
delay
will
be
greater
for
larger
annually
recurring
costs.
This
cost
estimate
should
reflect
the
average
annual
incremental
cost
of
operating
and/or
maintaining
the
required
environmental
control
measures.
These
expenditures
should
include
any
changes
in
the
cost
of
labor,
power,
water,raw
materials
and
supplies,
recurring
training
of
employees,
and
any
change
in
annual
property
taxes
associated
with
operating
the
new
or
improved
pollution
control
equipment.
Note
that
annually
recurring
costs
may
be
negative
if
compliance
increases
efficiency.
Include
any
lease
payments
for
equipment,
but
not
expenses
such
as
annualized
capital
recovery,
interest
payments,
or
depreciation.
Any
operating
and
maintenance
(O&M)
offsetting
credits
should
also
be
considered
in
determining
the
incremental
annual
costs.
Suèh
credits
might
represent
actual
O&M
cost
savings:
heat
recovery,
product
or
byproduct
recovery,
and
so
forth.
To
be
included,
such
savings
must
be
proven
by
the
violator,
not
just
asserted.
For
example,
the
installation
of
new
pollution
control
equipment
may
reduce
certain
costs
(such
as
sludge
disposal)
associated
with
operations
during
the
noncompliance
period.
If
the
resulting
incremental
O&M
cost
is
negative,
the
net
cost
savings
may
be
used
in
determining
annual
costs.
Credit
is
given
only
for
annually
recurring
cost
savings
that
are
both
documented
and
directly
related
to
compliance.
Annual
costs
must
be
equal
for
each
year
of
the
violation,
differing
only
by
inflation,
to
enter
them
into
BEN.
If
they
vary
only
slightly,
you
can
enter
an
average
estimate
of
the
different
yearly
figures.
If
theyvary
significantly,
then
you
can
create
separate
runs
corresponding
to
the
different
years
of
the
violation.
Each
run’s
noncompliance
and
compliance
dates
should
reflect
the
beginning
and
ending
dates
for
the
year
of
the
specific
annual
cost.
If
the
annual
costs
are
delayed,
and
not
avoided,
then
enter
them
as
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditures.
You
can
either
enter
the
entire
sum
of
the
annual
costs
that
have
been
delayed
over
the
entire
noncompliance
period,
or
you
can
create
a
separate
run
for
each
year
of
delayed
costs.
Either
way,
the
noncompliance
date
should
be
the
midpoint
of
when
the
annual
costs
should
have
been
incurred
(i.e.,
the
midpoint
of
the
entire
noncompliance
period,
or
the
middle
of
the
year),
and
the
compliance
date
should
be
the
midpoint
of
when
the
costs
were
or
will
be
incurred.
2.
Cost
Estimate
Dates
Each
cost
estimate
needs
a
date,
reflecting
the
date
on
which
the
estimate
is
premised.
Dates
may
be
entered
as
month/day/year
(i.e.,
7/31/98)
or
written
out
(i.e.,
July31,
1998).
BEN
will
accept
two-digit
years,
but
four-digit
years
are
preferable.
You
must
enter
dates
to
the
day.
If
you
do
not
3-11
September1999
have
date
information
to
the
day,
use
the
day
that
falls
in
the
middle
of
the
time
frame
you
have.
For
example,
if
all
you
know
is
that
the
estimate
was
made
in
May
of
1998,
use
May
15,
1998
as
the
estimate
date.
If
all
you
know
is
that
the
estimate
was
made
in
1998,
use
July
1,
1998
as
the.estimate
date.
If
you
have
multiple
costs
for
the
same
component
with
different
dollar-years,
enter
them
as
separate
runs,
and
sum
the
results.
3.
Noncompliance
and
Compliance
Dates
For
all
dates
you
can
use
any
format,
but
be
sure
to
enter
the
year,
month,
and
day.
(If
you
do
not
enter
a
day,
BEN
will
assume
the
first
day
of
the
month.)
Also,
BEN
will
not
accept
any
dates
before
July
1,
1987.
The
noncompliance
date
is
generally
when
the
first
violation
of
the
environmental
requirement
occurred.
BEN
uses
this
as
the
proxy
for
when
the
violator
should
have
actually
incurred
the
expenditures
necessary
for
compliance.
Since
compliance
expenditures
must
often
occur
far
in
advance
of
actual
legal
compliance,
it
is
highly
conservative
to
use
the
date
by
when
the
violator
should
have
completed
installation
of
the
necessary
pollution
control
equipment
and
had
such
equipment
fully
operational.
The
benefit
from
delayed
and/or
avoided
expenditures
generally
increases
with
the
length
of
the
delay
period.
An
earlier
noncompliance
date
(holding
the
compliance
date
constant)
will,
in
virtually
all
cases;
increase
the
benefit
figure.
Hence,
if
you
were
to
use
the
actual
date
when
the
compliance
expenditures
would
have
been
incurred
—
if
this
information
were
available
—
the
economic
benefit
would
be
substantially
higher
than
how
EPA
typically
calculates
it.
The
compliance
date
is
when
the
violator
came
into
compliance
with
environmental
requirements
or
the
date
when
you
expect
the
violator
to
achieve
compliance.
BEN
once
again
uses
this
as
the
proxy
for
when
the
violator
actually
did
—
or
will—
incur
the
expenditures
necessary
for
compliance.
The
date
when
the
equipment
was
initially
installed
is
not
necessarily
sufficient:
the
violator
needs
to
be
in
compliance
(for
consistency
with
the
noncompliance
date),
and
have
already
incurred
all
of
the
capital
and
one-time
costs
and
started
to
incur
the
annual
costs.
(Often
a
significant
amount
of
time
is
required
to
“break-in”
the
equipment
and
adjust
it;
thus
the
compliance
date
is
when
compliance
is
actually
achieved.)
Remember
though
that
BEN
is
ultimately
concerned
with
financial
—
not
legal
—
dates:
your
object
should
be
to
“follow
the
money.”
(In
an
extreme
example,
if
a
violator
were
to
install
the
required
capital
equipment
—
yet
for
some
reason
not
operate
it
—
then
for
the
purposes
of
BEN’s
calculations
of
the
capital
investment
economic
benefit
the
violator
is
in
compliance.)
Using
the
legal
dates
of
noncompliance
and
compliance
can
be
a
useful
proxy,
and
will
keep
the
noncompliance
time
period
the
correct
length,
but
it
will
generally
underestimate
the
true
economic
benefit
(since
the
noncompliance
period
is
being
artificially
shifted
closer
to
the
penalty
payment
date).
3-12
September
1999
Note
that
in
economic
benefit
analyses,
the
compliance
date
must
occur
after
the
noncompliance
date.
A
later
compliance
date
(holding
the
noncompliance
date
constant)
will,
in
virtually
all
cases,
increase
the
economic
benefit
figure.
If
you
are
running
BEN
to
calculate
the
after-tax
net
present
value
of
an
“early
compliance”
supplemental
environmental
project,
then
enter
the
date
when
the
violator
will
comply
early
as
the
noncompliance
date,
and
the
date
when
the
violator
is
required
to
comply
as
the
compliance
date.
The
dates
are
a
major
consideration
in
the
BEN
analysis.
As
the
interval
of
non-compliance
increases,
the
economic
benefit
generally
increases.
For
each
month
that
the
violator
delays
compliance,
it
delays
capital
and
one-time
costs
and
avoids
operation
and
maintenance
expenses.
In
practice,
the
period
of
violation
is
sometimes
not
clear.
Proving
the
entire
period
of
violation
might
encounter
evidentiary
problems.
It
might
be
helpful
to
perform
several
different
BEN
runs
to
show
the
impact
of
different
violation
periods
on
economic
benefit.
Although
a
statute
of
limitations
may
apply
in
your
case,
it
shouldgenerally
affect
only
the
maximum
penalty
you
can
assess
(i.e.,
the
statutory
cap).
Since
you
are
only
trying
to
calculate
the
amount
the
violator
gained
by
violating
the
law,
you
may
go
beyond
any
statute
of
limitations,
as
long
as
you
do
not
exceed
the
statutory
cap.
Should
your
case
go
to
trial
or
hearing,
you
should
consult
your
legal
staff
before
going
forward
with
a
benefit
amount
based
on
the
earlier
violations.
Another
point
to
keep
in
mind
is
that
as
of
the
datethe
BEN
analysis
is
performed,
the
violator
might
not
yet
be
in
compliance.
Therefore,
you
must
make
an
assumption
regarding
the
date
of
eventual
compliance.
In
discussions
with
the
violator
about
the
BEN
calculation,
you
should
be
explicit
about
your
compliance
date
assumption.
Youshouldthen
make
clear
to
the
violator
that
further
delays
in
compliance
will
yield
a
higher
economic
benefit,
and
thus
a
higher
penalty.
Conversely,
earlier
compliance
will
yield
a
lower
penalty.
By
conveying
this
information
up
front,
you
will
give
the
violator
added
incentive
to
comply
early,
and
will
also
avoid
having
to
give
the
violator
any
“unpleasant
surprises”
should
you
have
to
increase
the
benefitcomponent
of
the
penalty.
C.
OPTIONS
The
standard
values
in
BEN
are
updated
annually
to
reflect
changes
in
interest
rates,
tax
law,
and
so
forth.
Although
these
values
are
updated,
the
assumptions
upon
which
they
are
based
remain
the
same.
If
the
case
you
are
analyzing
is
significantly
different
from
that
represented
by
the
standard
values,
you
may
wish
to
customize
some
of
the
optional
inputs.
In
particularly
complicated
cases,
you
might
also
want
to
consult
the
EPA
helpline
(888-ECON-SPT).
The
options
screen
allows
you
tO
modify
the
discount/compound
rate,
cost
indices
for
inflation,
number
of
replacement
cycles,
whether
a
cost
is
delayed
or
avoided,
the
useful
life
of
capital
equipment,
future
inflation
rate,
and
the
tax
deductibility
of
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditures.
You
should
customize
these
variables
only
if
you
have
reliable
information
to
substantiate
the
change.
3-13
September1999
Oicount/Coppound
Rate
110
3%
Capital
1nvetment,
—
Cost
lnder
for
Inflation
5
{PC1
j
r
Number
offReplacmentCycles
11
{Jseful
Life
of
aalEquipmnL
115
1
Projeoted
Rte
for
Future
1
“
IelayedNotAvotded
•
—•
-One
Time
Nondeprec,abtEtpendture
P1iaDeductibfe
f.
‘•
‘
Jlielaed
NotAided
12’
t•
r
I
.
,Costndex
f&
lnflatr.
—
1.
Discount
I
Compound
Rate
To
compare
the
on-time
and
delayed
compliance
costs
from
different
dates
in
a
common
measure,
BEN
adjusts
both
streams
of
costs
(i.e.,
“cash
flows”)
for
inflation
as
of
the
date
of
initial
noncompliance.
After
determining
the
initial
economic
benefit
as
of
the
noncompliance
date
(i.e.,
the,
difference
between
the
on-time-case
present
value
and
the
delay-case
present
value),
BEN
compounds
this
amount
forward
to
the
penalty
payment
date.
To
perform
these
present
value
calculations,
BEN
must
employ
a
discount/compound
rate
that
reflects
the
violator’s
“time
value
of
money.”
For
a
for-profit
entity’s
discount/compound
rate,
BEN
uses
the
weighted-average
cost
of
capital
(WACC)
for
a
typical
company,
reflecting
the
cost
of
debt
and
equity
capital
weighted
by
the
value
of
each
fmancing
source.
A
company
must
on
average
earn
a
rate
of
return
necessary
to
repay
its
debt
holders
(e.g.,
banks,
bondholders)
and
satisfy
its
equity
owners
(e.g.,
partners,
stock
holders).
While
companies
often
earn
rates
in
excess
of
their
WACC,
companies
that
do
not
on
average
earn
at
least
their
WACC
will
not
survive
(i.e.,
their
lenders
will
not
receive
their
principal
and/or
interest
payments,
and
their
owners
will
be
dissatisfied
with
their
returns).
The
WACC
represents
the
return
3-14
September
1999
a
company
can
earn
on
monies
not
invested
in
pollution
control,
or,
viewed
alternatively,
represents
the
avoided
costs
of
financing
pollution
control
investments.
Thus,
a
company
should
make
its
business
decisions
by
discounting
cash
flows
at
its
WACC,
and
BEN
follows
the
internal
analysis
a
company
will
normally
perform.
For
a
not-for-profit
discount/compound
rate,
BEN
uses
a
typical
municipality’s
cost
of
debt,
based
on
interest
rates
for
general
obligation
bonds.
You
can
view
BEN’s
discount/compound
rate
calculation
by
selecting
the
detail
printouts
after
you
calculate
a
run.
BEN
calculates
the
rate
in
each
year,
then
uses
the
average
of
the
annual
rate
over
the
period
from
the
year
of
initial
noncompliance
through
the
year
of
penalty
payment.
Each
yearEPA
appends
the
BEN
model
so
that
it
contains
another
year
of
data
for
the
annual
rates.
Some
violators
will
argue
for
rates
tailored
to
their
industry,
company,
or
specific
division,
or,
for
a
not-for-profit
entity,
actual
bond
issues
or
debt
ratings.
In
general,
you
should
involve
a
financial
analyst
or
contact
the
U.S.
EPA
enforcement
economics
toll-free,
helpline
at
888-
ECONSPT
(326-6778)
if
the
violator
raises
an
issue
about
the
cost
of
capital.
Also,
you
should
inform
the
violator
that
a
case-specific
cost
of
capital
could
result
in
a
higher
discount/compound
rate,
which
will
increase
the
economic
benefit
result.
If
you
customize
the
discount
rate,
be
sure
to
enter
it
as
a
decimal.
BEN
will
automatically
convert
it
to
a
percentage.
2.
Inflation
Indices
and
Projected
Inflation
Rate
For
actual
historical
inflation,
BEN
adjusts
each
cash
flow
from
the
date
of
the
cost
estimate
by
referencing
a
look-up
table
of
cost
index
values.
4
The
default
cost
index
is
the
Plant
Cost
Index,
from
the
magazine
Chemical
Engineering.
This
particular
index
may
not
be
appropriate
for
every
case.
Thus
BEN
offers
a
pull-down
menu
for
each
compliance
component
listing
other
available
cost
indices.
The
inflation
rate
for
each
compliance
cost
category
may
be
modified
individually
because
the
different
cost
categories
may
be
affected
by
different
inflationary
trends.
The
table
on
the
next
page
summarizes
the
optional
indices.
(EPA
modifies
the
BEN
model
each
year
to
include
‘
Unlike
the
earlier
DOS
version,
BEN
no
longer
applies
an
explicit
inflation
rate,
although
an
annualized
rate
could
be
imputed
from
the
model’s
data.
For
example,
suppose
a
$200
cost
estimate
from
1991
must
be
adjusted
for
inflation
to
the
same
day
in
1992.
The
1991
cost
index
value
is
100,
whereas
the
1992
index
value
is
103.
The
calculation
the
model
performs
is
$200
*
103
/
100
$206
(i.e.,
multiplying
the
original
cost
estimate
by
the
ratio
of
the
cost
index
values
from
the
date
on
which
the
cost
is
actually
incuned,
and
the
date
on
which
the
estimate’
is
made).
The
index
change
from
1991
to
1992
does
represent
an
annual
inflation
rate
of
three
percent
(i.e.,
103
/
100
=
1.03
-
1
0.03),
but
the
model
does
not
directly
apply
this
rate.
A
calculation
that
uses
the
ratio
of
the
index
values
is
both
more
precise
and
more
simple
than
one
that
calculates
multiple
annual
inflation
rates
over
different
periods
for
historical
costs.
3-15
September
1999
new
data
from
each
index.)
For
projected
future
inflation,
BEN
extrapolates
each
cost
index
forward
in
time
at
a
separate
forecasted
rate.
5
INFLATION
INDICES
Abbreviation
and
Full
Name
Description
Typical
Applications
BCI
Building
Cost
Index
building
costs;
based
on
1.128
tons
general
construction
costs,
Portland
cement,
1,088
bd.
ft.
2x4
especially
structures
lumber,
68.38
hrs.
skilled
labor
BEN
current
BEN
model’s
average
of
PCI’s
last
10
years;
i.e.,
replication
of
results
from
constant
inflation
rate
a
constant
1.8%
increase
each
year
current
BEN
model
version
CCI
Construction
Cost
construction
costs;
same
as
BCI,
general
construction
projects,
Index
except
200
hrs.
common
labor
especially
where
labor
costs
are
a
high
proportion
of
total•
costs
CPI
Consumer
Price
Index
representative
consumer
goods
compliance
somehow
involves
consumer
goods
ECIM
Employment
Cost
employment
costs
for
the
one-time
nondepreciable
Index:
Manufacturing
manufacturing
industry
expenditures
or
annual
costs
that
comprise
mainly
labor
ECTW
Employment
Cost
employment
costs
for
white
collar
same
as
ECIM,
except
Index:
White
Collar
labor
professional
labor
(e.g.,
.
permits)
PCI
Plant
Cost
Index
plant
equipment
costs
standard
value
In
addition
to
the
option
of
selecting
an
alternative
to
the
PCI,
BEN
offers
two
other
ways
to
modif,’
its
inflation
adjustments.
First,
BEN
uses
a
separate
projected
future
inflation
rate
for
any
additional
recurring
capital
replacement
cycles
after
the
first
one.
You
can
override
the
standard
value,
which
is
based
on
the
PCI
projected
rate
for
future
inflation.
i
you
modify
the
inflation
rate,
be
sure
to
enter
it
as
a
decimal.
BEN
will
automatically
convert
it
to
a
percentage.
This
is
based
upon
a
consensus
forecast
for
the
Consumer
Price
Index
(CPI)
and
each
individual
index’s
historical
relationship
to
the
CPI.
The
rationale
for
the
calibration
of
the
other
indices
to
the
CPI
is
that
the
CPI
has
widely
available
forecasts
for
projected
inflation,
but
the
others
do
not.
3-16
September
1999
Second,
on
the
“Specific
Cost
Estimates”
screen,
you
can
override
BEN’s
inflation
adjustments
for
the
capital
investment
and
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditure,
and
instead
enter
separate
estimates
for
these
compliance
costs
as
of
the
noncompliance
date,
compliance
date,
and
the
initial
recurring
cycle
start
dates.
This
customized
data
entry
can
represent
another
alternative
cost
index,
case-specific
inflation
assumptions,
or
entirely
different
actions
for
on-time
and
delayed
compliance.
3.
Capital
Investment
Replacement
Cycles
and
Usefnl
Life
You
can
specify
the
number
of
replacement
cycles
for
the
capital
equipment,
and
the
useful
life
of
the
equipment
(i.e.,
the
years
between
replacement
cycles).
A
violator
who
delays
installing
pollution
control
equipment
for,
say,
five
years,
benefits
not
only
by
delaying
the
initial
expenditure
five
years,
but
also
by
postponing
the
second
and
potentially
subsequent
replacement
cycles
by
the
same
five
years.
The
BEN
model
defaults
to
one
replacement
cycle,
although
you
can
specify
as
many
as
five.
Because
the
present
value
of
future
costs
decreases
rapidly
the
further
they
occur
from
the
present,
additional
replacement
cycles
after
the
first
cycle
typically
have
almost
no
significant
impact
upon
the
economic
benefit
result.
Not
all
capital
investments
need
to
be
replaced
at
the
end
of
their
useful
lives.
For
example,
groundwater
monitoring
wells
or
other
equipment
used
to
close
a
RCRA
site
may
not
need
to
be
replaced.
By
contrast,
water
and
air
pollution
control
equipment
are
typically
replaced
since
this
equipment
is
generally
needed
to
support
compliance
for
the
foreseeable
future.
Most
capital
investments
will
be
replaced.
In
identifying
equipment
as
a
one-time
purchase,
you
should
be
convinced
that
the
equipment
will
not
require
future
replacement.
If
this
is
indeed
the
case,
set
the
number
of
replacement
cycles
to
zero.
The
useful
life
determines
the
number
of
years
between
replacement
cyc1es
Equipment
with
a
long
useful
life
is
replaced
less
frequently
thanequipment
with
a
short
useful
life.
Assuming
the
same
investment
cost
per
replacement
cycle,
the
total
present
value
of
the
costs
of
replacement
for
the
longer-lived
equipment
would
be
lower
(since
each
subsequent
investment
occurs
later).
Therefore,
a
longer
useful
life
reduces
the
benefit
of
delaying
compliance
—
holding
all
other
inputs
constant
—
although
this
impact
might
be
offset
somewhat
if
the
shorter
useful
life
triggers
a
more
rapid
depreciation
schedule.
If
your
capital
investment
reflects
different
pieces
of
equipment
with
significantly
different
replacement
cycles
and/or
useful
lives,
you
need
to
create
separate
BEN
runs
for
the
differing
equipment.
You
can
add
together
the
results
from
the
two
calculations
to
determine
the
total
economic
benefit.
3-17
September
1999
4.
Avoided
vs.
Delayed
BEN’s
default
assumption
is
that
both
the
capital
investment
and
the
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditure
are
delayed,
not
avoided.
If
the
violator
will
instead
never
incur
such
compliance
costs,
then
uncheck
the
“Avoided,
Not
Delayed”
delayed
boxes.
Also,
for
an
avoided
capital
investment,
you
should
change
the
replacement
cycles
to
0,
unless
the
violator
has
avoided
not
only
the
initial
installation
but
also
its
replacement.
5.
Tax
Deductibility
of
One-Time
Nondepreciable
Expenditure
Most
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditures
are
tax-deductible;
with
the-primary
exception
being
purchases
Of
land.
Landis
an
asset
and,
therefore,
cannot
be
deducted
as
an
expense
from
taxable
income.
BEN
assumes
that
the
expenditure
is
tax-deductible
unless
you
uncheck
the
box.
D.
SPECIFIC
COST
ESTIMATES
The
specific
cost
estimate
screen
allowsyou
to
view
BEN’s
inflation
adjustments,
which
calculate
specific
cost
estimates
for
certain
dates,
extrapolating
from
the
original
single
cost
estimate
(whichyou
enter
on
the
earlier
screen
for
compliance
components
data).
This
screen
also
allows
you
to
override
BEN’s
calculations
for
the
specific
cost
estimates.
You
reach
the
specific
cost
estimates
screen
by
pressing
[Specific
Cost
Estimates]
at
the
bottom
of
the
options
screen.
All
data
except
for
the
specific
cost
estimates
are
“grayed
out”,
since
BEN
allows
to
you
override
only
the
final
estimates,
not
the
intermediate
calculations.
Changing
your
inputs
on
prior
screens,
however,
will
have
an
impact
on
the
“grayed-out”
data,
unless
you
click
[OK]
on
this
screen,
which
will
lock
in
your
inputs
on
prior
screens.
(BEN
takes
this
action
because
otherwise
it
would
not
know
whether
you
intended
subsequent
changes
to
prior
screens
to
affect
the
customized
data
you
have
entered
on
this
screen.)
Clicking
[OK]
on
this
screen
will
also
visually
erase
all
of
the
other
data
when
you
return
to
this
screen
in
the
future.
(BEN
takes
this
action
because
it
does
not
know
howmuch
of
the
other
data
you
incorporated
into
your
customized
specific
cost
estimates.)
BEN
displays
four
separate
columns
of
data,
corresponding
to
the
start
dates
of
the
on-time
compliance
scenario
(i.e.,
the
noncompliance
date),
the
delay
compliance
scenario
(i.e.,
the
compliance
date),
the
on-time
replacement
cycle
(i.e.,
the
noncompliance
date
plus
the
useful
life
of
capital
equipment),
and
the
delay
replacement
cycle
(i.e.,
the
compliance
date
plus
the
useful
life).
The
first
row
simply
provides
the
date
for
each
scenario,
as
calculated
above.
The
next
rows
are
divided
into
two
groupings:
the
first
for
capital
investments,
and
the
second
for
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditures.
3-18
September
1999
Each
grouping
starts
with
a
row
for
the
single
cost
estimate
you
originally
entered
on
the
basic
rim
input
screen.
The
second
row
then
displays
the
value
of
the
selected
cost
index
(the
Plant
Cost
Index
is
the
default)
as
of
the
cost
estimate
date,
and
the
third
row
displays
the
value
for
the
same
cost
index
as
the
specific
cost
estimate
date.
The
final
row
(as
the
operator
signs
between
the
rows
indicate)
is
equal
to
the
first
row
divided
by
the
second
row,
multiplied
by
the
third
row.
x
-
Compliance
Start
Replacement
Cycle
S1rt
On-Time
Oely
On-Time
Oel
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3-19
September
1999
If
you
click
[OKI
on
the
specific
cost
estimate
screen,
exit
it
and
then
later
return,
all
of
the
intermediate
calculations
will
be
blank,
and
only
the
final
specific
cost
estimates
will
appear:
Reasons
for
modifying
BEN’s
calculations
can
include
the
following,
but
be
prepared
to
-
document
your
actions
and
rationale.
3-20
September
1999
1.
Separate
Cost
Estimates
for
Noncompliance
and
Compliance
Dates
This
could
reflect
several
scenarios:
the
violator
obtained
a
cost
estimate
at
the
noncompliance
date,
even
though
it
did
not
comply
until
later;
technological
change
between
the
noncompliance
and
compliance
dates
implies
that
different
compliance
measures
were
available
at
the
two
dates;
or,
regulatory
change
over
time
mandated
different
compliance
measures
at
the
noncompliance
vs.
compliance
dates.
Under
such
scenarios,
use
the
most
recent
data
for
the
original
capital
cost
estimate
so
that
it
reflects
the
delay
compliance
scenario
(ensuring
that
any
future
capital
equipment
replacement
cycles
are
calculated
correctly).
Then,
override
the
specific
cost
estimate
in
the
first
column
(i.e.,
on-time
scenario
compliance
start)
with
the
correct
estimate.
In
the
example
below,
the
violator
obtained
a
cost
estimate
for
required
capital
investments
of
$100,000
at
the
date
of
noncompliance
(January
1,
1992),
but
because
of
technological
change
it
only
had
to
spend
$80,000
when
it
came
into
compliance
on
January
1,
1997.
The
user
entered
the
$80,000
estimate
(with
an
estimate
date
of
January
1,
1997)
as
the
capital
investment
cost
on
the
initial
input
screen.
The
specific
cost
estimate
screen
then
appears
as:
SPC2:
Specific
Cost
Estimates
3-21
September
1999
However,
had
the
violator
actually
complied
on
time
it
would
have
faced
a
capital
investment
of
$100,000
(the
estimate
it
received
in
1992),
not
$75,033
(the
specific
cost
estimate
as
calculated
from
the
1997
estimate).
To
reflect
this,
the
user
changed
the
on-time
compliance
specific
cost
estimate
to
$100,000.
SPC
2:
Specific
Cost
Estimates
3-22
September
1999
2.
Inflation
Data
More
Appropriate
than
BEN’s
Although
BEN
offers
many
other
alternative
cost
indices
in
addition
to
its
defaultPlant
Cost
Index,
occasionally
some
other
inflation
adjustment
may
be
necessary.
If
so,
override
whichever
specific
cost
estimates
you
believe
are
inaccurate.
(If
you
are
using
some
other
index,
you
might
want
to
create
a
spreadsheet
that
mimics
the
BEN
screen,
substituting
your
index’s
values
for
the
ones
on
the
screen)
In
the
following
example,
the
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditure
consists
mostly
of
chemicals.
A
subset
of
the
Producer
Price
Index
for
chemicals
will
give
a
more
precise
inflation
adjustment
than
the
various
indices
BEN
offers.
You
can
use
this
chemicalindex
to
adjust
the
original
cost
estimate
for
inflation
as
shown
in
the
table
below:
Specific
Cost
Estimate
Transportation
Equipment
Index
On-Time
Delay
(1/1/1992)
(1/1/1997)
Original
Cost
Estimate
100,000
100,000
Costlndex
Value
111.0
111.0
as
of
original
estimate
date
x
x
Costlndex
Value
111.0
116.9
as
of
specific
cost
estimate
date
=
=
Specific
Cost
Estimate
1,000,000
105,315
Once
you
have
calculated
the
appropriate
specific
cost
estimates,
you
can
incorporate
them
into
the
BEN
calculation
by
overriding
the
values
on
the
specific
cost
estimate
screen,
as
shown
on
the
next
page.
3-23
September
1999
ISSUES
THAT
ARISE
WITH
BEN
CHAPTER
4
Section
A
of
this
chapter
provides
guidance
for
addressing
common
arguments
made
by
violators.
Section
B
discusses
how
to
characterize
more
complicated
compliance
scenarios.
A.
COMMON
VIOLATOR
ARGUMENTS
1.
Cost
of
roof
on
new
treatment
building
should
be
excluded
since
roof
is
not
needed
to
operate
treatment
system.
In
virtually
all
cases
BEN
should
include
the
cost
of
the
roof
unless
the
violator
can
conclusively
prove
that
the
treatment
system
would
operate
just
as
effectively
and
efficiently
without
the
roof
(all
else
being
equal)
and
that
the
roof
is
not
a
customary
part
of
such
treatment
systems.
A
violator
can
almost
never
support
this
claim,
since
it
must
essentially
argue
that
installing
a
roof
was
a
waste
of
money
(serving
no
sensible
business
purpose).
2.
Cost
ofpainting
walls
and
landscaping
treatment
building
should
be
excluded
since
they
are
unnecessary
for
compliance.
While
such
items
may
not
be
directly
necessary
to
achieve
compliance,
if
these
items
are
normally
part
of
such
projects,
then
BEN
should
include
their
costs.
Such
expenditures
often
provide
intangible
and
tangible
benefits,
such
as
improving
the
appearance
of
the
facility,
reducing
erosion
and
dust,
preserving
the
building,
and
creating
a
more
attractive
environment
for
employees,
visitors,
and
customers.
Presumably
these
expenditures
would
have
been
necessary
for
on-time
compliance,
and
hence
the
violator
benefitted
by
delaying
them.
4-1
September
1999
3.
Cost
of
an
extra
(backup)
pump
should
be
excluded,
since
it
is
unlikely
ever
to
be
used.
While
the
pump
may
never
be
used,
if
reasonable
engineering
practice
would
include
an
extra
pump
(or
any
other
backup
systems),
then
BEN
should
include
its
cost.
Given
that
the
violator
did
(or
will)
purchase
the
extra
pump,
the
burden
is
on
the
violator
to
show
that
it
is
unnecessary
to
achieve
and
consistently
maintain
compliance.
Further,
even
if
the
cost
of
the
extra
pump
were
subtracted
from
the
capital
investment,
annual
operation
and
maintenance
costs
might
need
to
be
increased
to
reflect
the
greater
importance
of
maintaining
the
existing
pumps.
4
Cost
of
building
second
floor
above
treatment
plant
should
be
excluded
since
it
is
used
exclusively
for
purposes
unrelated
to
compliance.
If
the
second
floor
does
not
support
the
pollution
control
system,
then
the
incremental
cost
of
building
the
second
floor
may
be
subtracted
from
the
capital
investment.
5.
Cost
of
building
tertiary
treatment
system
should
be
excluded
since
only
primary
and
secondary
treatment
systems
were
necessary
to
remedy
violations.
If
the
tertiary
treatment
system
really
was
unnecessary
to
prevent
the
violations
alleged
in
the
complaint,
but
rather
is
necessary
for
achieving
compliance
with
future
standards,
then
subtract
its
cost
from
the
capital
investment.
Recall
that
the
capital
investment
should
reflect
the
pollution
control
system
that
was
necessary
to
remedy
the
violations
at
the
time
and
under
the
conditions
alleged
in
the
complaint.
The
violator,
however,
must
convince
EPA
that
the
additional
cost
is
truly
unrelated
to
remedying
the
violations
alleged
in
the
complaint.
6.
No
additional
labor
is
necessary
to
operate
new
pollution
control
system,
since
existing
employees
operating
old
system
will
operate
it.
If
the
existing
employees
were
operating
an
old
pollution
control
system
replaced
by
the
new
system,
then
this
claim
may
be
correct.
Presumably
the
total
labor
costs
associated
with
the
old
pollution
control
system
(replaced
by
the
new
system)
areless
than
or
equal
to
the
labor
costs
for
the
new
system.
If
the
new
system
is
more
efficient
to
operate,
even
less
labor
may
be
required.
Your
entry
for
annually
recurring
costs
should
reflect
this
and
can
even
be
negative.
7.
Labor
costs
for
new
system
are
really
zero
because
we
are
reassigning
workers
from
another
part
ofplant;
thus,
since
we
are
not
hiring
additional
workers
to
run
system,
we
have
no
incremental
labor
costs.
This
claim
is
not
correct
since
the
employees
who
will
operate
the
new
system
are
not
coming
from
the
old
pollution
control
system
that
is
being
replaced.
Rather,
they
are
coming
from
4-2
September
1999
another
part
of
the
facility
and
the
facility
will
be
deprived
of
the
productive
work
these
employees
were
doing.
If
the
violator
had
complied
on-time,
it
would
have
had
to
shift
these
employees
to
pollution
control
and
given
up
the
work
these
employees
otherwise
would
have
done
somewhere
else
(e.g.,
the
production
line)
during
the
period
of
noncompliance.
This
is
the
concept
of
opportunity
cost:
the
cost
of
resources
for
a
particular
use
is
measured
by
the
benefit
lost
in
forfeiting
their
most
profitable
alternative
use.
•B.
CHARACTERIZING
COMPLIANCE
SCENARIOS
1.
Violator
Spends
$100,000
on
System
that
Does
Not
Work.
The
violator
should
have
spent
$1,000,000
to
install
a
satisfactory
system,
but
instead
spent
$100,000
on-time
for
a
system
that
did
not
work.
If
the
system
did
not
result
in
compliance,
it
is
questionable
that
the
system’s
expenditures
were
in
fact
intended
for
compliance.
Unless
some
other
factor
is
present,
the
conect
entry
for
the
capital
cost
should
be
$1,000,000.
The
enforcement
team
might
find
that
the
violator
had
some
reasonable
basis
or
justification
for
selecting
the
inexpensive
technology.
If
the
violator
went
to
a
reputable
firm,
the
firm
recommended
the
system
that
failed,
and
the
violator’s
reliance
on
the
recommendation
was
reasonable,
then
you
should
offset
the
economic
benefit
by
the
after-tax
present
value
of
the
unsuccessful
expenditure.
You
could
use
BEN
to
calculate
this
offset,
although
remember
that
this
is
a
case-specific
judgement
for
the
litigation
team.
2.
System
“Works,
“But
Is
Too
Small.
The
violator
spent
$100,000
on-time
for
a
system
that
was
too
small
to
solve
the
pollution
problem,
but
the
existing
system
can
be
incorporated
into
the
fmal,
fully
sized
system.
The
Agency
should
subtract
from
the
total
required
investment
the
$100,000
already
spent;
the
BEN
capital
investment
input
would
be
$900,000.
The
reason
for
this
treatment
is
that
the
violator
gained
a
benefit
on
only
the
$900,000
that
it
did
not
spend,
not
the
$100,000
it
did
spend.
3.
Same
as
Scenario
2,
But
Violator
Has
Letter
from
Government
OfficiaiApp
roving
System.
While
the
violator
has
a
reason
for
being
out
of
compliance,
it
still
had
the
benefit
of
using
the
$900,000
for
other
purposes
while
it
was
in
violation.
Thus,
BEN’s
capital
investment
is
still
$900,000.
BEN
is
“no-fault”
in
nature.
Regardless
of
how
good
the
violator’s
excuse
is,
it
still
had
the
use
of
the
$900,000
over
the
period
of
the
violation.
The
only
difference
between
this
and
scenario
2
is
the
existence
of
an
arguable
approval
by
the
regulatory
agency,
but
this
is
a
legal
distinction,
not
an
economic
one,
possibly
affecting
the
gravity
component
of
the
penalty,
but
not
the
economic
benefit
component.
4-3
September
1999
4.
Violator
Complies
in
Stages.
The
violator
put
part
of
the
pollution
system
into
operation
(with
actual
pollution
reduction)
one
year
after
the
noncompliance
date
at
a
cost
of
$200,000.
One
year
later
(and
two
years
after
the
noncompliance
date),
the
violator
put
a
second
piece
of
the
system
costing
$300,000
into
operation
(which
resulted
in
additional
pollution
reduction).
Three
years
later
the
entire
system
was
in
operation,
and
the
final
piece
cost
$500,000.
If
on-time
compliance
could
have
been
achieved
in
one
stage
instead
of
three
(see
timeline
below),
create
three
separate
BEN
runs,
each
with
the
same
noncompliance
date:
•
$200,000
capital
investment,and
a
one-year
period
of
noncompliance;
•
$300,000
capital
investment,
and
a
two-year
period
of
noncompliance;
•
$500,000
capital
investment,
and
a
three-year
period
of
noncompliance.
As
the
violator
paid
for
each
component,
it
was
no
longer
delaying
the
purchase
of
that
equipment.
Add
the
results
from
the
three
runs
to
determine
the
total
economic
benefit.
HYPOTHETICAL
COMPLYING
FIRM’S
TIMELINE
(not
adjusted
for
inflation)
BEN’s
noncompliance
date:
7/119Z
7/1193
711794
7/1/95
I
I
Decision
Expenditures
to
comply
for
$1,000,000
on-time
NONCOMPLYING
FIRM’S
ACTUAL
TIMEUINE
BEN’s
compliance
dates
for.
Run
2:
7/1/92
7/1/93
7/1/94
7/1/95
7/1196
7/1/97
7/1/98
Decision
Expenditures
Expenditures
Expenditures
to
comply
for
Part
A
for
Part
B
for
Part
C
in
delayed
$200,000
$300,000
$500,000
fashion
4-4
September
1999
5.
System
is
Operational
at
Conclusion
of
Series
of
Expenditures.
This
is
similar
to
scenario
4
(where
the
violator
purchased
and
installed
the
various
system
components
over
three
years),
except
that
here
the
system
is
put
into
operation
only
after
all
of
its
components
are
installed,
instead
of
sequentially.
You
should
create
one
BEN
run
with
a
capital
investment
of
$1,000,000
and
a
three-year
noncompliance
period.
This
assumes
that
on-time
compliance
would
have
been
accomplished
the
same
way
as
delayed
compliance,
in
three
separate
stages.
For
both
on-time
and
delayed
compliance,
three
years
are
necessary
to
comply,
and
therefore
if
the
violator
had
complied
on
time
it
would
have
needed
to
start
three
years
before
the
compliance
date.
Note
that
BEN’s
calculation
here
is
based
upon
the
simplifying
assumption
that
all
the
money
was
spent
on
a
single
date,
i.e.,
the
day
compliance
was
achieved.
Instead
of
this
simplifying
assumption,
you
could
instead
create
three
separate
BEN
runs,
with
different
noncompliance
and
compliance
dates
(yet
hence
the
same-length
noncompliance
period).
This
will
yield
a
slightly
higher
BEN
result,
although
the
additional
complexity
may.
not
be
worth
the
additional
accuracy
(especially
if
the
noncompliance
period
is
long
relative
to
the
period
over
which
the
actual
expenditures
are
spread
out).
September
1999
HYPOTHETICAL
COMPLYING
FIRM’S
TU’4ELINE
(not
adjusted
for
inflation)
BEN’s
noncompliance
date:
7/1/92
7/1/93
7/1/94
7/1/95
Decision
Expenditures
Expenditures
Expenditures
to
comply
for
Part
A
for
Part
B
for
Part
C
on-time
$200,000
$300,000
$500,000
System
on-line
NONCOMPLVIt’G
FIRM’S
ACTUAL
TIMELINE
BEN’s
cp1iancedat
711192
7/1/93
7/1/94
7/1/95
7/1/96
7/1/97
711/98
I
I
I
Decision
Expenditures
Expenditures
Expenditures
to
comply
for
Part
A
for
Part
B
for
Part
C
-
in
delayed
$200,000
$300,000
$500,000
fashion
System
on-line
4-5
6.
Pollution
Control
Equipment
Will
Be
Leased,
Not
Purchased.
The
violator
is
actually
leasing
the
equipment
it
needs
to
comply
for
$125,000
per
year.
Ratherthan
entering
the
$1,000,000
as
a
capital
cost,
you
should
enter
a
zero
for
capital
investment
and
$125,000
as
an
annually
recurring
cost.
7.
Compliance
is
“Cheaper”
than
Noncompliance.
The
violator
comes
into
compliance
late
and
finds
that
it
has
been
saving
money
since
it
installed
the
new
technology.
This
may
occur
because
the
compliant
technology
allows
the
violator
to
recover
materials
and/or
reduce
operation
and
maintenance
costs.
BEN
produces
a
negative
result,
seemingly
confirming
that
the
violator
would
have
been
better
off
had
it
complied
on-time.
Other
factors
may
have
caused
the
violator
to
delay
compliance,
or
perhaps
the
violator
was
unaware
not
only
of
the
potential
cost
savings
from
compliance
but
also
the
status
of
its
noncompliance.
Be
wary
of
such
negative
economic
benefit
results!
For
example,
the
violator
might
have
felt
that
the
new
processes
and
technology
needed
to
comply
would
have
adversely
affected
its
product
quality.
In
that
case,
the
violator
probably
realized
an
economic
benefit
from
not
having
its
product
quality
adversely
affected
by
the
compliant
technology.
This
constitutes
illegal
competitive
advantage,
and
typically
requires
additional
research
into
the
alternative
compliance
scenarios
and
their
financial
impacts.
Even
if
the
economic
benefit
really
is
negative,
the
enforcement
team
should
carefully
consider
the
appropriate
gravity
component
of
the
penalty,
since
the
violations
might
still
be
serious,
despite
the
lack
of
economic
gain
to
the
violator.
4-6
September
1999
DETAILED
CALCULATIONS
APPENDIX
A
This
technical
appendix
explains
in
detail
how
the
BEN
computer
program
calculates
the
economic
benefit
a
violator
gains
from
delaying
or
avoiding
compliance
with
environmental
regulations.
The
first
section
is
an
introduction
to
the
theory
and
underlying
assumptions
of
BEN.
The
second
section
is
a
step-by-step
explanation
of
a
sample
economic
benefit
calculation.
A.
THEORY
AND
OVERVIEW
Economic
benefit
represents
the
financial
gains
that
a
violator
accrues
by
delaying
and/or
avoiding
pollution
control
expenditures.
Funds
not
spent
on
environmental
compliance
are
available
for
other
profit-making
activities
or,
alternatively,
a
defendant
avoids
the
costs
associated
with
obtaining
additional
funds
for
environmental
compliance.
(This
concept
is
known
in
economics
as
opportunity
cost.)
Economic
benefit
is
“no
fault”
in
nature:
a
defendant
need
not
have
deliberately
chosen
to
delay
compliance
(for
financial
or
any
other
reasons),
or
in
fact
even
have
been
aware
of
its
noncompliance,
for
it
to
have
accrued
the
economic
benefit
of
noncompliance.
The
appropriate
economic
benefit
calculation
should
represent
the
amount
of
money
that
would
make
the
violator
indifferent
between
compliance
and
noncompliance.
(BEN
implicitly
assumes
a
100-percent
probability
of
the
violator
payingthat
sum
of
money
in
the
form
of
a
civil
penalty,
but
as
that
probability
declines,
the
amount
of
money
increases
that
would
make
the
violator
indifferent
between
compliance
and
noncompliance.)
If
the
enforcement
agency
fails
to
recover
through
a
civil
penalty
at
least
this
economic
benefit,
then
the
violator
will
retain
a
gain.
Because
of
the
precedent
of
this
retained
gain,
other
regulated
companies
may
see
an
economic
advantage
in
similar
noncompliance,
and
the
penalty
will
fail
to
deter
potential
violators.
Economic
benefit
does
not
represent
compensation
to
the
enforcement
agency
as
in
a
typical
“damages”
calculation
for
a
tort
case,
but
instead
is
the
minimum
amount
by
which
the
violator
must
be
penalized
so
as
to
return
it
to
the
position
it
would
have
been
in
had
it
complied
on
time.
The
economic
benefit
calculation
must
incorporate
the
concept
of
the
“time
value
of
money.”
In
simple
terms,
a
dollar
yesterday
is
worth
more
than
a
dollar
today
since
yesterday’s
dollar
had
A-l
September
1999
investment
opportunities.
Thus,the
further
in
the
past
the
dollar
is,
the
more
it
is
worth
in
“present
value”
terms.
The
greater
the
timevalue
of
money
(i.e.,
the
greater
the
“discount”
or“compound”
rate),
the
more
valuepast
costs
have
in
present
value
terms.
Pollution
control
expenditures
can
include:
(1)
Capital
investments
(e.g.,
pollution
control
equipment),
(2)
One-time
nondepreciableexpenditures
(e.g.,
setting
up
a
reporting
system,
or
acquiring
land),
(3)
Annually
recurring
costs
(e.g.,
operating
and
maintenance
costs,
or
off-site
disposal
of
fluids
from
injection
wells).
Each
of
these
expenditures
can
be
either
delayedor
avoided.
s
baseline
assumption
is
thatcapital
investments
and
one-time
nondepreciable
expenditures
are
merely
delayed
over
the
period
of
noncompliance,
whereas
annual
costs
are
avoided
entirely
over
this
period.
BEN
does
allow
you,
however,
to
analyze
any
combination
of
delayed
and
avoided
expenditures.
BEN
derives
a
violator’s
economic
benefit
in
several
steps.
First
BEN
adjusts
compliance
costs
fromthe
cost
estimate
dateto
the
date
when
they
wouldhave
been
expended
had
the
violator
complied
on
time(on-time
scenario)
and
to
the
date
when
they
will
be
expended
as
the
violator
comes
into
compliance
(delayscenario).
Next
BEN
uses
these
costs
to
compute
the
total
cost
of
complying
on-timeand
of
complying
late,
adjusted
for
inflation,
depreciation
and
taxes.
BEN
also
calculates
the
present
value
of
both
scenarios
as
of
the
date
of
initial
noncompliance,
so
thatthey
can
be
compared
in
a
common
metric.
Then
BEN
subtractsthedelayed
scenario
present
value
from
the
on-time
scenario
present
value
to
determine
the
initial
economic
benefit
as
of
the
noncompliance
date.
Finally,
BEN
compounds
this
initial
economic
benefit
forward
to
the
penalty
payment
date.
A
violator
may
gain
illegal
competitive
advantages
in
addition
to
the
usual
benefits
of
noncompliance.
These
may
be
substantial
benefits,
but
they
are
beyond
the
capability
of
BEN
or
any
computer
program
to
assess.
Instead
BEN
asks
you
a
series
of
questionsabout
possible
illegal
competitive
advantages
so
that
you
may
identify
cases
where
they
are
relevant.
If
illegal
competitive
advantage
is
an
issue
you
should
consult
the
EPAenforcement
economics
toll-freehelpline
at
888-
ECON-SPT
(326-6778)
or
benabel@indecon.com.
If
you
need
legal
or
policy
guidance,
please
contactJonathan
Libber,
the
BEN/ABEL
coordinator
at
202-564-6102,
or
e-mail
him
at
libber.jonathan@epamail.epa.gov.
B.
CALCULATIONS
AND
SPREADSHEET
BEN
references
a
Microsoft
ExcelTM
spreadsheet
to
perform
all
of
its
economic
benefit
calculations,
although
you
do
not
need
Excel
to
run
BEN.
Thedata
you
enter
into
the
program
is
automatically
transfened
to
the
spreadsheet.
The
spreadsheet
calculates
economic
benefit
and
returns
the
result
to
the
program
for
output.
This
section
illustrates
a
BENcalculation
bytaking
you
step-by-step
throughrelevant
portions
of
the
underlying
spreadsheet.
Italicized
commentswithin
brackets
are
added
to
explain
the
calculations,
and
are
not
part
of
the
spreadsheet
itself.
A-2
September
1999
The
spreadsheet
is
in
your
BEN
folder
(on
your
C
drive
or
wherever
else
you
installed
BEN),
filename
“ben****.xls”.
(The
asterisks
represent
the
most
recent
year
for
which
EPA
has
performed
updates
for
the
spreadsheet.)
You
may
open
the
file,
but
it
has
beenwrite-protected
to
preserve
the
integrity
of
the
calculations.
This
spreadsheet
contains
necess.ary
formulas
and
background
information
like
tax
rates,
discount
rates,
and
inflation
indices.
The
background
information
will
be
updated
once
a
year,
but
the
calculations
themselves
will
remain
the
same.
1.
Inputs
and
Variables
The
first
section
of
the
spreadsheet
contains
the
variables
entered
by
the
user.
These
are
a
prerequisite
for
the
calculations.
The
following
page
lists
BEN’s
basic
inputs,
along
with
inputs
from
an
example
case.
Tax
rates
are
contained
in
the
spreadsheet
as
tables
that
contain
corporate
and
individual
tax
rates
and
state
tax
rates
from
1987to
2010,(with
rates
for
future
years
assumed
to
remain
the
same).
Annual
updateswill
keep
taxrates
current
andadd
future
years.
When
you
designate
a
state
and
tax
status
for
the
violator,
BEN
findsthe
appropriate
federal
and
state
tax
rates
and
calculates
a
combined
tax
rate.
State
taxes
are
deductible
from
federal
taxable
income,
so
the
combined
tax
rate
calculation
is:
Combined
=
Federal
+
(State
*
(1
-
Federal)).
The
spreadsheet
also
contains
a
table
for
the
BCI,
BEN,
CCI,CPI,
ECIM,
ECIW
and
PCI
inflation
indices.
(See
Chapter
3
for
a
complete
explanation
of
these
difference
indices.)
Inflation
indices
are
more
precise
than
an
annual
inflation
rate,
but
they
require
an
index
value
for
every
relevant
month.
Therefore,
BEN
contains
a
database
of
monthly
index
values
for
every
index
from
1987
to
2029.
Annual
updates
will
keep
indices
current
andadd
future
values.
For
projected
future
inflation,
BEN
extrapolates
eachcost
index
forward
in
time
at
a
separate
forecasted
rate,
which
is
based
upon
a
consensus
forecast
for
the
Consumer
Price
Index
(CPI)
and
each
individual
index’s
historical
relationship
to
the
CPI.
(The
rationale
for
the
calibration
of
the
other
indices
to
the
CPI
is
that
the
CPI
—
yet
not
the
more
specialized
indices
—
has
widely
available
forecasts
for
projected
inflation.)
A-3
September
1999
Inputs
Example
Comments
Case
Name
Example
Case
Analyst
Name
Jon
Analyst
EPA
Region
.
EPA
Region
I
Tax
Status
C-Corp
[Also
known
as
“Entity
Type
‘7
State
MA
Customized
Tax
Rates?
n
[You
may
customize
tax
rates,
in
which
case
BEN
will
use
the
Penalty
Payment
Date
(PPD)
01-Jan-1999
customized
rates
instead
of
its
internaltable]
Run
Name
Test
Run
DiscountlCompound
Rate
10.0%
[BEN
calculates
this
from
tax
status,
state,
&
relevant
dates]
Customized
DiscountlCompound
Rate?
n
[You
may
customize
the
discount
rate]
Customized
Specific
Cost
Estimates?
n
[You
may
customize
the
spec/Ic
cost
estimate
screen]
Capital
Investment:
Cost
Estimate
$1,000,000
Cost
Estimate
Date
01-Jan-1992
Cost
Index
for
Inflation
PCI
[You
may
choose
from
several
indices]
Cost
Index
Value
359.500
[This
is
the
index
value
as
of
the
cost
estimate
date]
Number
of
Replacement
Cycles
1
[This
is
the
default
value]
Useful
Life
of
Capital
Equipment
15
[This
is
the
default
value]
Projected
Rate
for
Future
Inflation
2.2%
[This
is
the
default
value]
One-Time,
Nondepreciable
Expenditure:
Cost
Estimate
$100,000
Cost
Estimate
Date
01-Jan-I
992
Cost
Index
for
Inflation
PCI
[You
may
choose
from
several
indices]
Cost
Index
Value
359.500
[This
is
the
index
value
as
of
the
cost
estimate
date]
Tax
Deductible?
Y
[This
is
the
default
setting]
Annually
Recurring
Costs:
Cost
Estimate
$10,000
Cost
Estimate
Date
01-Jan-1992
Cost
Index
for
Inflation
PCI
[You
may
choose
from
several
indices]
Cost
Index
Value
359.500
[This
is
the
index
value
as
of
the
cost
estimate
date]
Noncompliance
Date
(NCD)
01-Jan-1992
Compliance
Date
(CD)
01-Jan-1997
Question
I
n
[These
are
the
competitive
advantage
questions.
Ifyou
Question
2
n
answer
yes
to
any
of
them
a
warning
that
possible
illegal
Question
3
.
n
competitive
advantage
exists
appears
in
the
results.]
Question
4
n
Question
5
n
•
Question
6
n
A-4
•
September
1999
2.
Discount/Compound
Rate
Calculation
Once
the
entity
type
and
relevant
dates
have
been
entered,
BEN
can
then
calculate
the
violator’s
discountlcompound
rate.
This
is
based
on
entity
type
and
financialinformation
from
the
date
of
noncompliance
to
the
penalty
payment
date.
(An
industry-
or
company-specific
discountrate
can
be
calculated
by
experts,
butcannot
be
calculated
by
BEN.)
The
discount/compound
rate
quantifies
thetime
value
of
money.
BEN
discounts
and
compounds
all
cash
flows
at
the
cost
of
capital,
averaged
over
the
time
period
from
the
noncompliance
date
to
the
compliance
or
penalty
payment
date,
whichever
is
later.
For
a
for-profit
entity’s
discount/compound
rate,
BEN
uses
the
weighted-average
cost
of
capital
(WACC)
for
a
typical
company,
reflecting
the
cost
of
debt
and
equity
capital
weighted
by
the
value
of
each
financing
source.
A
company
must
on
average
earn
a
rate
of
return
necessary
to
repay
its
debt
holders
(e.g.,
banks,
bondholders)
and
satisfy
its
equity
owners
(e.g.,
partners,
stock
holders).
While
companies
often
earn
rates
in
excess
of
their
WACC,
companies
that
do
not
on
average
earn
at
least
their
WACC
will
not
survive
(i.e.,
their
lenders
will
not
receive
their
principal
andlor
interest
payments,
and
their
owners
will
bedissatisfied
with
their
returns).
The
WACC
represents
the
return
a
company
can
earn
on
monies
not
invested
in
pollution
control,
or,
viewed
alternatively,
represents
the
avoided
costs
of
financing
pollution
control
investments.
Thus,
a
company
should
make
its
business
decisions
by
discounting
cash
flows
at
its
WACC,
and
BEN
follows
the
internal
analysis
a
company
will
normally
perform.
For
a
not-for-profit
discount/compound
rate,
BEN
uses
a
typical
municipality’s
cost
of
debt,
based
on
interest
rates
for
general
obligation
bonds.
A-5
September
1999
DiscountlCompounci
Rate
Calculation
Notes:
(1)
Corporate
Bonds:
All
Industries;
Federal
Reserve
Bulletin,
Table
1.35.
[Average
industiy
cost
of
debt]
(2)
Combined
state/federal
marginal
tax
rates:
federal+(state*(1
-federal));
Federation
of
Tax
Administrators.
(3)
Calculated
as:
(1)
*
(100%-(2)).
(4)
Standard
&
Poor’s
Analyst’s
Handbook,
S&P
Industrials
Sample
Balance
Sheet,
Liabilities
section.
[Average
Industiy
debt
weight]
(5)
Federal
Reserve
Bulletin
Table
1.35.
[Used
as
a
risk-free
rate,
Capital
Asset
Pricing
Model
(CAPM)]
(6)
Beta
is
a
measure
of
risk
relative
to
the
overall
market.
[A
value
of
1.00
assumes
risk
is
same
as
overall
market]
(7)
Differences
of
historical
arithmetic
mean
returns
from
1926
to
prior
year;
Ibbotson
Associates
Handbook,
[Representing
expected
return
on
an
average
risk
investment]
(8)
Calculated
as
(6)
*
(7).
/This
equals
(7)for
average
risk,
because
average
risk
has
abeta
of]]
(9)
Calculated
as
(5)
+
(8).
[Risk-free
rate
of
return
plus
the
risk
premium]
(10)
Calculated
as
100%
-
(4).
[Totalfinancing
-
debt
=
equity
financing]
(11)
Calculated
as
(3)
*
(4)
+
(9)
*
(10).
[(Debt
cost
x
debt
weight)
+
(equity
cost
x
equity
rate)]
average
1992
to:
1998
10.0%
from:
[Final
result]
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
5-Year
Intermed.
Company
Cost
of
After-Tax
Debt
Treasury
Horizon
Risk
Equity
Equity
YEAR
Debt
Tax
Rate
Debt
Cost
Weight
Notes
Beta
Risk
Prem
Premium
Cost
Weight
Rate
1987
9.9%
40.3%
5.9%
43.0%
7.94%
1.00
7.7%
7.7%
15.6%
57.0%
1988
10.2%
40.3%
6.1%
52.0%
8.47%
1.00
7.3%
7.3%
15.8%
48.0%
1989
9.7%
40.3%
5.8%
49.0%
8.50%
1.00
7.4%
7.4%
15.9%
51.0%
1990
9.8%
40.3%
5.9%
50.0%
8.37%
1.00
7.8%
7.8%
16.2%
50.0%
1991
9.2%
40.3%
5.5%
49.0%
7.37%
1.00
7.5%
7.5%
14.9%
51.0%
1992
8.6%
40.3%
5.1%
47.0%
6.19%
1.00
7.7%
7.7%
13.9%
53.0%
9.8%
1993
7.5%
41.2%
4.4%
47.0%
5.14%
1.00
7.6%
7.6%
12.7%
53.0%
8.8%
1994
8.3%
41.2%
4.9%
44.0%
6.69%
1.00
7.6%
7.6%
14.3%
56.0%
10.2%
1995
7.8%
41.2%
4.6%
42.0%
6.38%
1.00
7.4%
7.4%
13.8%
58.0%
9.9%
1996
7.7%
41.2%
4.5%
37.0%
6.18%
1.00
7.8%
7.8%
14.0%
63.0%
10.5%
1997
7.5%
41.2%
4.4%
37.0%
6.22%
1.00
7.9%
7.9%
14.1%
63.0%
10.5%
1998
7.0%
41.2%
4.1%
37.0%
5.50%
1.00
8.2%
8.2%
13.7%
63.0%
10.2%
A-6
September
1999
3.
Specific
Cost
Estimates
After
the
compoundldiscount
rate,
BEN
calculates
specific
cost
estimates.
This
calculation
adjusts
costs
from
the
cost
estimate
date
to
the
date
on
which
they
should
have
been
spent(on-time
compliance
scenario)
and
thedate
on
which
they
will
be
spent
(delay
compliance
scenario).
These
calculations
are
visible
and
may
be
altered
on
the
specific
cost
estimates
screen.
(If
the
violatorwill
avoid
compliance
completely,
rather
than
simply
delay
it,
you
must
modify
this
screen
by
changing
the
delay
cost
of
compliance
to
zero.)
The
specific
cost
estimate
calculations
are
shown
below.
Calculations
for
Specific
CostEstimates
Compliance
Start:
Replacement
Cycle
Start:
On-Time
On-Time
Date:
01-Jan-I
992
01-Jan-I
997
01
-Jan-2007
01
-Jan-201
2
Capital
Investment:
Original
Cost
Estimate
$1,000,000
$1,000,000
$1,000,000
$1,000,000
PCI
Value
as
of
CostEstimate
Date,
359.500
359.500
359.500
359.500
O1-Jan-1992
x
x
x
x
PCI
Value
as
of
Specific
Estimate
Date
359.500
383.300
471
.943
526.192
Specific
Cost
Estimate,
$1,000,000
$1,066,203
$1,312,777
$1,463,677
reflecting
implicit
annualized
inflation
rate
of:
N/A
1.3%
1.8%
1.9%
One-Time,
Nondepreciable
Expenditure:
Original
Cost
Estimate
$100,000
$100,000
PCI
Value
as
of
Cost
Estimate
Date,
359.500
359.500
O1-Jan-1992
x
x
PCI
Value
as
of
Specific
Estimate
Date
359.500
383.300
Specific
Cost
Estimate,
$100,000
$106,620
reflecting
implicit
annualized
inflation
rate
of:
N/A
1.3%
Note
that
the
specific
cost
estimate
and
the
original
cost
estimate
arethe
samehere
for
the
“Compliance
Start:
On-Time”
scenario.
This
is
because
the
cost
estimate
was
made
on
the
on-time
date,
so
no
inflation
adjustment
was
needed.
4.
Capital
and
One-Time
Costs
Now
BENcan
calculate
the
total
costs
of
compliance
for
both
scenarios.
First
it
calculates
the
costs
of
compliance
as
of
the
on-time
and
delay
scenarios.
Then
BEN
adjusts
both
sets
of
costs
to
the
noncompliance
date
so
that
they
canbe
compared
to
each
other.
Each
scenario
is
divided
into
an
initial
cycle
and
a
replacement
cycle.
The
initial
cycle
covers
the
cost
of
installing
equipment,
while
the
replacement
cycle
covers
the
cost
of
replacing
that
A-7
September
1999
equipment
when
its
useful
life
is
over.
The
number
of
replacement
cycles
defaults
to
one,
and
the
useful
life
of
equipment
defaults
to
fifteen
years.
Because
of
the
time
value
of
money,
the
farther
in
the
future
costs
are,
the
less
value
they
have
in
present
terms.
Therefore,
replacement
cycles
after
the
first
one
have
almost
no
impact
on
economic
benefit.
They
are
cumulatively
calculated
from
the
value
of
the
first
replacement
cycle.
The
present
value
(as
of
the
noncompliance
date)
of
each
date’s
cash
flow
is
equal
to
the
cash
flow
multiplied
by
that
date’s
present
value
factor.
The
PV
factor
uses
the
discountJcompound
rate
to
determine
a
dollar’s
equivalent
value
in
noncompliance
date
dollars.
Therefore,
the
PV
factor
for
any
date
is
equal
to
the
sum
of
one
plus
the
discount/compound
rate,
raised
to
the
difference
in
the
number
of
years
(including
any
fractions)
between
that
date
and
the
noncompliance
date.
A-8
September
1999
A)
On-Time
Capital
&
One-Time
Costs:
Initial
Cycle
01-Jan-1992
01-Jul-i
992
01-Jul-i
993
0i-Jul-i994
01-Jul-1995
01-Jul-i
996
01-Jul-i
997
01-Jul-i
998
01-Jul-i
999
One-Time,
Nondepreciable
Expenditure
(100000)
[From
spec(flc
cost
estimates]
Capital
Investment
(1000,000)
[From
spec(f
Ic
cost
estimates]
Depreciation
0
(142,860)
(244,897)
(174,935)
(124,953)
(89,243)
(89,243)
(89,243)
(44,626)
MarginalTaxRate
40.3%
40.3%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
Net
After-Tax
Cash
Flow
(1,059,700)
57,573
100,898
72,073
51,481
36,768
36,768
36,768
18,386
PV
Factor:
Adjusts
Cash
Flow
to
NOD
1.0000
0.9536
0.8669
0.7881
0.7164
0.6511
0.5919
0.5381
0.4892
PV
Cash
Flow
as
of
NOD
(1.059,700)
54,900
87,468
56,800
36,883
23,941
21,765
19,786
8,995
Net
Present
Value
(NPV
as
of
NClTh
Initial
Cycle
Subsequent
Replacement
Cycles
Total
—
All
Cycles
($749,162)
($216,058)
($965,220)
[C’oinpanies
may
deduct
the
depreciation
of
capital
equipment
from
their
taxable
income.
Be/ow
is
the
standard
7-year
depreciation
schedule,
using
the
half-year
convention.]
Depreciation
14.2860%
24.4897%
17.4935%
12.4953%
8.9243%
8.9243%
8.9243%
4.4626%
(MACRS):
B)
Delay
Capital
&
One-Time
Costs:
Initial
Cycle
01-Jan-1997
01-Jul-i997
01-Jul-i998
Oi-JuI-1999
01-JuI-2000
Oi-Jul-2001
0i-JuI-2002
01-JuI-2003
01-JuI-2004
One-Time,
Nondepreciable
Expenditure
(106620)
[From
spec(fic
costestimates]
Capital
Investment
(1,066,203)
[From
specJIc
cost
estimates]
Depreciation
0
(152,318)
(261,110)
(186,516)
(133,225)
(95,151)
(95,151)
(95,151)
(47,580)
MarginalTaxRate
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
Net
After-Tax
Cash
Flow
(1,128,896)
62,755
107,577
76,845
54,889
39,202
39,202
39,202
19,603
PV
Factor:
Adjusts
Cash
Flow
to
NCD
0.6206
0.5919
0.5381
0.4892
0.4446
0.4042
0.3675
0.3341
0.3036
PV
Cash
Flow
as
of
NCD
(700,589)
37,148
57,891
37,593
24,405
15,846
14,405
13,096
5,952
Net
Present
Value
(NPV)
as
of
NCD:
Initial
Cycle
($494,254)
Subsequent
Replacement
Cycles
($149,541)
Total
--
All
Cycles
($643,796)
A-9
September
1999
A)
On-Time
Capital
&
One-Time
Costs:
First
Replacement
Cycle
One-Time,
Nondepreciable
Expenditure
Capital
Investment
Depreciation
Marginal
Tax
Rate
Net
After-Tax
Cash
Flow
PV
Factor:
Adjusts
Cash
Flowto
NCD
PV
Cash
Flow
as
of
NCD
Total
NPV
of
First
Replacement
Cycle
as
ofNCD
i”,
where
i
=
(1+futureinflation)l(1+discountrate)
“U”,
where
u
=
useful
life
of
capital
equipment
n”,
where
n
=
number
of
replacement
cycles
“f’,wheref=sum[from
i
=1
tol
njof:
rA(u
“(i-i))
Total
NPV
of
All
Replacement
Cycles
as
of
NCD
($216,058)
0.929
1
B)
Delay
Capital
&
One-Time
Costs:
First
Replacement
Cycle
15
O1-Jan-2012
O1-Jul-2012
01-Jul-2013
01-Jul-2014
01
-Jul-201
5
01-Jul-2016
01
-Jul-2017
01-Jul-201
8
01-Jul-201
9
One-Time,
Nondepreciable
Expenditure
0
Capital
Investment
(1463,677)
Depreciation
0
(209,101)
(358,450)
(256,048)
(182,891)
(130,623)
(130,623)
(130,623)
(65,318)
MarginalTaxRate
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
Net
After-Tax
Cash
Flow
(1,463,677)
86,150
147,681
105,492
75,351
53,817
53,817
53,817
26,911
PV
Factor:
Adjusts
Cash
Flow
to
NCD
0.1484
0.1416
0.1287
0.1170
0.1064
0.0967
0.0879
0.0799
0.0726
PV
Cash
Flow
as
of
NCD
(217,282)
12,195
19,005
12,342
8,014
5,202
4,729
4,299
1,954
Net
Present
Value
(NPV)
as
of
NCD:
Total
NPV
of
First
Replacement
Cycle
as
of
NCD
($149,541)
Total
NPV
of
All
Replacement
Cycles
as
of
NCD
($149,541)
[Calculated
using
the
same
formula
as
on-time
all
replacement
cycles
above]
01-Jan-2007
01-Jul-2007
01-Jul-2008
01-Jul-2009
01
-Jul-201
0
01-.JuI-201
1
01
-Jul-2012
01-Jul-201
3
01-Jul-2014
0
[Zerobecause
this
is
the
replacement
cycle,
and
one-time
costs
do
not
occur
again
by
definition]
(1,312,777)
[From
spec(fic
cost
estimates]
0
(187,543)
(321,495)
(229,651)
(164,035)
(117,156)
(117,156)
(117,156)
(58,584)
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
41.2%
(1,312,777)
77,268
132,456
94,616
67,583
48,268
48,268
48,268
24,137
0.2391
0.2281
0.2073
0.1885
0.1713
0.1558
0.1416
0.1287
0.1170
(313,940)
17,625
27,460
17,832
11,579
7,518
6,833
6,212
2,824
1
.0000
[This
is
where
the
value
offuture
replacement
cycles
is
calculated]
($216,058)
=
f
*
First
Replacement
Cycle
Depreciation
14.2860%
24.4897%
(MACRS):
17.4935%
12.4953%
8.9243%
8.9243%
8.9243%
4.4626%
A-1O
September
1999
5.
Avoided
Annually
Recurring
Costs
Annual
costs
are
avoided,
not
merely
delayed.
Therefore
BEN
does
not
need
to
calculate
and
compare
two
different
scenarios
for
annual
costs.
Instead,
it
computes
the
costs
avoided
each
year,
then
adjusts
those
costs
to
the
noncompliance
date.
Finally
it
adds
the
present
values
of
the
costs
avoided
each
year
to
compute
the
total
net
present
value
of
avoided
costs.
C)
Avoided
Annually
Recurring
Costs
PCI
value
as
of
cost
est
imate
date—
359.500
PCI
mid-point
value:
356.100
359.400
368.000
381.900
381.800
Period
of
Avoided
Annual
Costs;
From:
01-Jan-1992
0i-Jan-i993
0i-Jan-1994
Oi-Jan-1995
01-Jan-1996
To:
31
-Dec-i
992
31
-Dec-i
993
31
-Dec-i
994
31
-Dec-i
995
31
-Dec-i
996
Annual
Costs
Avoided
(9,933)
(9,997)
(10,236)
(10,623)
(10,649)
Marginal
Tax
Rate
40.3%
41.2%
4i.2%
4i.2%
4i.2%
Net
After-Tax
Cash
Flow
(5,930)
(5,878)
(6,019)
(6,246)
(6,262)
PV
Factor:
Adjusts
Cash
Flow
to
NCD
0.9535
0.8667
0.7879
0.7163
0.65ii
PV
Cash
Flow
as
of
NCD
(5,654)
(5,095)
(4,742)
(4,474)
(4077)
NPV
of
Avoided
Annual
Costs
as
of
NCD
($24,042)
Note
that
BEN
determines
the
cost
index
value
for
the
midpoint
of
the
period
in
question
to
account
for
inflation.
BEN
also
adjusts
the
annual
cost
for
any
partial
years.
6.
Economic
Benefit
Results
Now
that
BEN
has
computed
the
present
values
(PVs)
of
complying
on-time
and
complying
delayed,
it
compares
the
two.
Economic
benefit
is
the
PV
of
complying
on-time,
minus
the
PV
of
complying
delayed,
plus
the
PV
of
the
avoided
annually
recurring
costs.
The
initial
economic
benefit
is
calculated
as
of
the
noncompliance
date,
and
then
brought
forward
to
the
penalty
payment
date
at
the
discount/compound
rate.
The
initial
economic
benefit
is
multiplied
by
the
sum
of
one
plus
the
discount/compound
rate,
raised
to
the
difference
in
the
number
of
years
(including
any
fractions)
between
the
noncompliance
and
penalty
payment
dates.
Run
Name
=
Test
Run
Present
Values
as
of
Noncompliance
Date,
Oi-Jan-i992
A)
On-Time
Capital
&
One-Time
Costs
$965,220
[Sum
from
on-time
scenario
calculations]
B)
Delay
Capital
&
One-Time
Costs
$643,796
[Sum
from
delay
scenario
calculations]
C)
Avoided
Annually
Recurring
Costs
$24,042
[Sum
from
avoided
annually
recurring
cost
calculation]
D)
Initial
Economic
Benefit
(A-B+C)
$345,466
[Economic
benefit
as
of
the
date
of
noncompliance]
E)
Final’
Econ.
Ben.
at
Penalty
Payment
Date,
O1-Jan-1999
$673,567
[Final
result,
economic
benefit
as
of
the
venaltv
oavment
date!
A-il
September
1999
ExpertReport
February
3,2009
Flexographic
Presses
VOM
Emissions
Packaging
Personified,
Inc.
Prepared
by:
Richard
Trzupek
—
Principle
Consultant
Mostardi
Platt
Environmental
1520
Kensington
Road,
Suite
204
Oak
Brook,
Illinois
60523
Mostardi
Platt
Jj
e€
,
Prepared
for:
ATTACHMENT
B
Drinker
Biddle
&
Reath
LLP
191
North
Wacker
Drive,
Suite
3700
Chicago,
IL
60606-1698
MPH
Project
Number:
M06
1706
Page
1
of8
Expert
Report
Flexographic
Presses
VOM
Emissions
1.
Introduction
MPE
was
retained
to
evaluate
compliance
options
related
to
VOM
control
from
flexographic
presses
operated
by
Packaging
Personified,
Inc.
(“PPI”)
at
the
company’s
Carol
Stream,
Illinois
plant.
The
author’s
qualifications
for
performing
this
type
of
review
and
evaluation
are
described
inthe
cuniculum
vitae
attached
to
this
report.
My
hourly
billing
rate
for
this
project
is
$158
per
hour.
2.
Issue
History
and
Details
PPI
manufactures
polyethylene
packaging
used
in
a
variety
of
industries,
such
as
the
consumer
products,
food
and
medical
industries.
PPI
produces
polyethylene
film
on
site.
Flexographic
printing
presses
are
used
to
print
images
and
text
on
some
of
this
film,
according
to
customer
specifications.
Most
of
the
film
is
thenconverted
to
plastic
bags
which
are
shipped
in
bulk
to
PPI’s
customers.
The
flexographic
printing
presses
which
are
or
have
been
in
use
at
the
facility
are
described
as
follows:
•
Press
#1
—
This
press
was
installed
in
1992.
It
is
used
to
print
on
film,
using
low-VOM
water-based
inks.
Its
emissions
are
not
controlled
by
an
add-on
control
device.
o
Press
#2
—
This
press
was
installed
in
1992.
It
is
used
to
print
on
film,
using
low-VOM
water-based
inks.
Its
emissions
are
not
controlled
by
an
add-on
control
device.
o
Press
#4
—
This
press
was
installed
in
1992.
It
was
used
to
print
on
film,
using
VOM-based
inks.
Its
emissions
were
not
controlled
by
an
add-on
control
device.
It
was
decommissioned
in
December
2002
and
moved
to
PPI’s
Sparta,
Michigan
plant
in
December
2004.
•
Press
#5
-
This
press
was
installed
in
1995.
It
is
used
to
print
on
film,
using
VOM-based
inks.
Its
emissions
formerly
were
controlled
by
a
recirculating
drying
oven
which
destroyed
VOM
released
in
the
drying
process.
A
Permanent
Total
Enclosure
was
installed
in
November
2006
to
control
Page
2
of
8
fugitive
emissions
from
this
press.
A
Regenitive
Thermal
Oxidizer
(RTO)
was
installed
in
December
2006
to
provide
additional
control
of
VOM
emissions.
•
Press
#6
—
This
press
was
installed
in
December
2006.
It
is
used
to
print
on
film,
using
VOM-based
inks.
A
Permanent
Total
Enclosure
was
installed
in
December
2006
to
control
fugitive
emissions
from
this
press.
A
Regenerative
Thermal
Oxidizer
(RTO)
was
installed
in
December
2006
to
provide
control
of
VOM
emissions.
Much
of
the
film
produced
by
PPI
is
“high-slip”
film
that
contains
a
significant
amount
of
waxon
the
surface
of
the
film.
“High
slip”
is
an
important
consideration
for
many
customers,
in
order
to
ensure
that
their
packaged
products
move
freely
from
each
other
when
stored
or
on
display.
I
was
retained
by
PPI
to
evaluate
the
compliance
status
of
the
facility,
shortly
after
an
inspection
by
Illinois
EPA
revealed
that
emissions
units
at
the
facility
(Presses
#1,
#2,
#4
and
#5)
were
not
pennitted
under
Illinois
EPA’s
permit
program.
I
personally
inspected
all
of
the
presses,
reviewed
PPI
production
records,
observed
the
production
process,
interviewed
PPI
employees
and
reviewed
Material
Safety
Data
Sheets,
as
a
part
of
this
project.
I
concluded
that
Presses
#1
and
#2
were
in
compliance
with
the
control
requirements
of
35
IAC
218.401
(see
Section
3,
below)
by
virtue
of
using
water-based
inks
that
contained
no
more
than
25%
of
the
VOM
by
volume
of
the
volatile
content
of•
the
ink.
I
furtherconcluded
that
Press
#4
was
not
in
compliance
with
the
control
requirements
of
35
IAC
Section
218.401.
With
regard
to
Press
#5,
PPI
indicated
that
the
press
was
designed
with
a
recirculating
drying
oven
that
destroyed
Volatile
Organic
Material
(VOM)
released
from
the
solvent-
based
inks
used
on
the
press.
In
order
to
determine
whether
or
not
the
oven
destroyed
90%
or
more
of
the
VOM
emitted
before
control,
as
required
by
35
IAC
Section
218.401(c),
I
designed
andmanaged
an
emissions
test
program
to
measure
the
VOM
destruction
efficiency
of
the
oven.
This
test
was
conducted
following
USEPA
Methods
1,
2,
3
and
25A
(40
CFR,
Part
60,
Appendix
A).
Gas
flow
and
VOM
concentrations
were
measured
at
the
inlet
and
outlet
of
the
drying
oven
while
Press
#5
was
operating.
VOM
mass
emission
rates
at
the
inlet
and
outlet
of
the
oven
were
then
calculated,
based
on
these
measurements.
The
test
program
revealed
that
VOM
destruction
within
the
dryingoven
exceeded
99%.
I
did
not
directly
measure
the
VOM
capture
efficiency
of
Press
#5
as
part
of
this
test
program.
Measurement
of
VOM
capture
efficiencies
is
a
time
consuming
and
expensive
process,
and
neither
PPI
nor
I
felt
that
the
investment
in
time
and
the
cost
were
justified
at
that
time,
since
our
efforts
were
directed
toward
making
a
reasonable
determination
of
compliance
status
and
bringing
the
facility
into
compliance
as
quickly
as
possible.
In
order
to
meet
the
overall
control
efficiency
of
60%
applicable
to
Press
#5
(35
IAC
Section
218.401(c)),
given
a
destruction
efficiency
in
excess
of
99%,
the
VOM
capture
efficiency
of
Press
#5
would
have
to
exceed
60%.
,Page3of8
Based
onmy
inspection
of
Press
#5,
its
design
and
my
professional
experience
conducting
capture
efficiency
tests
on
similar
flexographic
printers,
it
was
my
professional
opinion
that
the
capture
efficiency
of
Press
#5
exceeded
60%.
It
is,
in
my
professional
opinion,
extremely
unlikely
that
the
capture
efficiency
of
Press
#5
would
not
meet
this
benchmark.
Press
#5
is
a
central
impression
(CI)
flexographic
press,
equipped
with
localized
pick-up
hoods
ateach
printing
station,
doctor
blades
to
minimize
ink
usage,
covered
ink
pans
and
a
drying
oven
operating
at
negative
pressure.
These
design
features
are
consistent
with
best
management
practices
used
in
the
flexographic
printing
industry
and
would
enable
the
Press
#5
to
achieve
high
capture
efficiencies.
Based
on
the
emissions
test
that
I
conducted
and
my
evaluation
of
the
VOM
capture
system,
it
was
and
is
my
professional
opinion
that
Press
#5
met
the
control
requirements
of
35
IAC
Section
218.401(c).
3.
Regulatory
Background
The
flexographic
printing
presses
at
PPI
are
subject
to
Flexographic
Printing
rules
found
at
35
IAC
Section
218.401
through
35
IAC
Section
218.404.
These
rules
provide
three
options
to
comply
with
emissions
limitations:
•
Use
of
compliant
inks
that
contain
no
more
than
40%
VOM
by
volume,
not
including
water
or
exempt
compounds,
or
that
contain
no
more
than
25%
of
VOM
by
volume
of
the
volatile
content
of
the
ink
(35
IAC
Section
218.401(a)),
or
•
Daily
weighted
averaging
across
multiple
printing
lines
to
demonstrate
compliance
with
the
above
VOM
content
limitations
(35
IAC
Section
218.410(b)),
or
•
Use
of
a
control
device
that
that
reduces
the
mass
emission
rate
of
captured
VOM
emissions
by
at
least
90%
and
use
of
a
capture
and
control
system
that
reduces
overall
VOM
emissions
by
at
least
60%
(35
IAC
Section
218.401(c)).
In
addition
to
the
above
compliance
options,
the
Illinois
Environmental
Protection
Act
(the
Act)
provides
for
a
mechanism
for
a
source
to
seek
relief
from
regulatory
requirements
by
seeking
an
Adjusted
Standard.
The
Illinois
EPA
and
Illinois
Pollution
Control
Board
(IPCB)
are
required
to
consider
a
number
of
factors
when
considering
a
petition
for
an
Adjusted
Standard
(415
ILCS
5/28.1
and
35
IAC
Section
104.400).
These
factors
include,
but
are
not
limited
to:
•
Evaluating
the
cost
of
control,
in
dollars
per
ton
of
pollutant
controlled,
on
an
annual
basis.
If
the
cost
of
control
exceeds
generally-accepted
guidelines
for
Reasonable
Available
Control
Technology
(RACT),
Illinois
EPA
and
the
IPCB
will
generally
consider
an
Adjusted
Standard
petition
more
favorably.
Page
4
of
8
•
Determining
the
technical
feasibility
of
compliance
options.
If
the
compliance
options
listed
in
the
regulation(s)
in
question
are
not
technically
feasible,
Illinois
EPA
and
the
IPCB
will
generally
consider
an
Adjusted
Standard
petition
more
favorably.
•
Considering
the
environmental
effect
of
granting
an
Adjusted
Standard.
If
it
can
be
shown
that
no
significant
environmental
harm
will
be
caused
by
granting
an
Adjusted
Standard,
Illinois
EPA
and
the
IPCB
will
generally
consider
an
Adjusted
Standard
petition
more
favorably.
4.
Compliance
History
Upon
discovering
non-compliance
with
35
IAC
Section
218.401
in
2002,
PPI
examined
the
compliance
options
available
to
the
company.
The
evaluation
revealed
the
following:
•
Required
permit
applications,
records
and
reports
had
not
been
filed
with
the
Illinois
EPA.
I
was
authorized
to
rectify
these
oversights
by
PPI.
Specifically
I
prepared
and,
where
appropriate,
submitted
to
the
Illinois
EPA
documents
which
include,
but
are
not
limited
to,
the
following:
a.
A
construction
permit
application
for
the
facility.
b.
An
operating
(CAAPP)
permit
application
for
the
facility.
c.
Retroactive
Annual
Emissions
Reports.
d.
Retroactive
Seasonal
Emissions
Reports.
e.
A
recordkeeping
system
in
accordance
with
35
IAC
Section
401
through
35
IAC
Section
404.
I
have
been
working
with
PPI
since
2002
to
ensure
that
they
are
in
compliance
with
applicable
rules,
periodically
reviewing
the
company’s
records
and
filing
required
reports
with
Illinois
EPA.
•
Presses
#1
and
#2
were
and
had
been
in
compliance
with
control
requirements
by
virtue
of
using
inks
that
met
the
VOM
content
limitations
set
forth
at
35
IAC
Section
218.401(b).
These
presses
process
low-slip
or
no-slip
film,
therefore
water-based
inks
could
be
and
were
used
for
printing.
•
Press
#5
was
and
had
been
in
compliance
by
virtue
of
a
recirculating
oven
that
destroyed
at
least
90%
of
captured
VOM
and
that
provided
overall
VOM
control
of
atleast
60%,
thus
meeting
the
requirements
of
35
IAC
Section
2
18.401(c).
Page
5
of
8
•
Press
#4
was
not
in
compliance
with
35
IAC
Section
218.401.
The
options
available
to
control
this
press
were:
a.
Pursuit
of
relief
through
an
Adjusted
Standard:
Illinois
EPA
indicated
that
it
would
not
support
PPI
if
the
company
pursued
an
Adjusted
Standard.
It
should
be
noted
that
PPI’s
processes
and
products
are
substantially
the
same
as
three
other
flexographic
printers
who
make
packaging
products
from
polyethylene
film:
Formel
Industries,
Inc.,
Bema,
Inc.
and
Vonco
Products,
Inc.
These
companies
were
granted
an
Adjusted
Standard
in
January
2001.
I
served
as
lead
consultant
for
the
three
companies
listed
above
during
the
Adjusted
Standard
process.
It
is
my
professional
opinion
that,
had
PPI
been
aware
of
the
Flexographic
Printing.rules,
and
had
PPI
joined
the
group
of
flexographic
printers
referenced
above,
PPI
would
also
have
been
granted
relief
in
the
form
of
an
Adjusted
Standard.
The
overall
cost
to
the
group
of
three
flexographic
printers
who
were
granted
the
Adjusted
Standard
was
approximately
$90,000,
split
roughly
evenly
between
attorney
fees
and
consultant
costs.
Each
company’s
share,
therefore
came
to
$30,000.
Had
Illinois
EPA
supported
PPI’s
request
to
receive
an
Adjusted
Standard,
it
is
my
professional
opinion
that
$30,000
represents
the
maximum
that
PPI
would
have
had
to
pay
its
consulting/legal
team.
The
reasons
for
this
are
twofold:
1)
much
of
the
language
needed
for
the
petition
to
be
filed
would
have
already
been
developed
from
the
previous
filing
and
was
publicly
available;
and
2)
although
some
site-specific
information
would
have
had
to
be
developed
for
PPI,
much
of
that
information
would
have
been
developed
in
order
to
submit
a
permit
application,
and
any
increased
costs
in
this
regard
would
not
be
enough
to
offset
the
cost-reduction
referenced.
b.
Move
Press
#4
to
PPI’s
Sparta,
Michigan
plant.
The
cost
of
moving
the
press
was
determined
to
be
approximately
$15,000.
c.
Purchase
of
an
add-on
control
system
(35
IAC
Section
218.40
1(c)):
This
option
was
technically
feasible.
Control
of
Press
#4
would
have
required
purchase
of
a
thermal
oxidizer
of
approximately
5,000
scfm
capacity.
A
used
thermal
oxidizer
of
this
size
was
found
and
it
was
determined
that
the
installed
cost
for
this
oxidizer
would
have
been
approximately
$75,000.
d.
Use
of
water-based
inks
(35
IAC
Section
218.401(a)):
This
option
was
not
technically
feasible,
because
Press
#4
was
used
to
print
high-slip
film
and
water-based
inks
do
not
adhere
to
high-slip
film.
e.
Cross-line
averaging
(35
IAC
Section
218.40
1(b)):
This
option
was
not
technically
feasible,
because
a
large
percentage
of
PPI’s
customer
base
Page
6
of
8
require
high-slip
film,
which
in
turn
requires
solvent-based
inks.
PPI
did
not
and
does
not
have
enough
business
for
low-slip
or
no-slip
film
to
utilize
enough
water-based
inks
such
that
cross-line
averaging
would
be
a
possible
compliance
solution.
PPI
chose
option
(b),
moving
Press
#4
to
the
Sparta,
Michigan
plant
in
December
2004
and
it
began
operation
there
in
February
2005.
Subsequently,
in
2006,
it
was
decided
to
purchase
a
new,
high-speed
flexographic
press
to
be
installed
at
the
Carol
Stream,
Illinois
facility.
This
was
designated
Press
#6.
This
decision
was
made,
in
part,
to
ensure
the
continuing
viability
of
the
Carol
Stream,
Illinois
plant.
As
a
part
of
this
project,
PPI
added
a
thermal
oxidizer
to
control
Press
#6
and
reconfigured
Press
#5
to
vent
to
the
thermal
oxidizer.
Press
#5
was
vented
to
the
thermal
oxidizer
in
order
to
eliminate
the
need
for
oven
recirculation,
which
improved
press
performance
and
allowed
for
higher
printing
speeds
with
a
wider
variety
of
inks.
The
project
also
increased
the
overall
VOM
emissions
reduction
efficiency
associated
with
Press
#5,
from
the
estimated
60%
before
installation
of
the
thermal
oxidizer
and
PTE
to
approximately
99%
afterward.
This
increase
in
overall
control
was
necessary
so
that
the
project
would
not
constitute
a
major
modification
and
trigger
NonAttainment
New
Source
Review.
The
thermal
oxidizer
was
rated
at
15,000
scfm,
large
enough
to
accommodate
a
third
press,
should
future
expansion
occur.
Finally,
PPI
also
decided
to
construct
a
Permanent
Total
Enclosure
(PTE)
to
capture
100%
of
VOM
emissions
from
Presses
#5
and
#6.
Although
a
PTE
is
not
required
under
applicable
rules,
PPI
voluntarily
took
this
action
so
as
to
ensure
continuous
compliance
and
to
further
reduce
VOM
emissions
from
the
facility.
PPI
applied
for
a
construction
permit
in
2006
with
the
Illinois
EPA.
This
application
requested
permission
to
install
Press
#6,
to
install
the
thermal
oxidizer,
to
construct
the
PTE
and
to
redirect
the
VOM
emissions
captured
from
Press
#5
to
the
thermal
oxidizer.
Illinois
granted
this
construction
permit,
date
October
10,
2006
(Application
No.:
06020062).
This
permit
limited
VOM
emissions
to
the
following:
•
Presses
#1
and
#2:
2.00
tons/year
•
Presses
#5
and
#6:
18.00
tons/year
•
Clean
up
solvents
and
other
materials:
4.90
tons/year
Total
VOM
emissions,
for
the
facility
as
a
whole,
were
thus
limited
to
24.90
tons
per
year.
Following
installation
of
the
thermal
oxidizer
and
construction
of
the
PTE,
an
emissions
test
was
conducted
by
ART
Environmental
of
Wauconda,
Illinois.
This
test
was
conducted
in
accordance
with
construction
permit
conditions.
A
test
protocol
was
submitted
to
and
accepted
by
Illinois
EPA,
and
Illinois
EPA
was
invited
to
witness
the
test
program.
The
test
program
demonstrated
that
the
thermal
oxidizer
was
destroying
over
90%
of
captured
VOM,
that
the
enclosure
constructed
around
Presses
#5
and
#6
met
the
criteria
for
a
PTE
Page
7
of
8
as
described
in
40
CFR
Part
51,
Appendix
M,
and
that
the
overall
control
efficiency
of
the
system
exceeded
60%.
Based
on
the
date
of
installation
for
Presses
#1,
#2,
#4
and
#5,
and
the
actual
VOM
emission
rates
calculated
based
on
historical
material
use
rates,
it
was
determined
that
PPI
had
never
triggered
Non-Attaimnent
New
Source
Review
(NANSR)
and
Illinois
EPA
verbally
agreed
with
this
determination.’
The
construction
permit
issued
in
2006
resulted
in
facility-wide
VOM
emissions
that
were
less
than
previous
emitted
and
that
were
below
the
Major
Source
Threshold
applicable
to
sources
in
the
Chicagoland
Ozone
Non-
Attainment
Area.
Accordingly,
NANSR
was
not
triggered
by
this
project
either.
-
As
part
of
the
construction
permit
application
filed
in
2006,
PPI
also
asked
Illinois
EPA
to
grant
the
facility
a
Federally
Enforceable
State
Operating
Permit
(FESOP).
Illinois
EPA
has
not
yet
granted
PPI
a
FESOP,
nor
has
Illinois
EPA
requested
additional
information
in
regard
to
this
application,
nor
has
Illinois
EPA
responded
to
requests
to
issue
the
FESOP.
The
above
report
represents
my
professional
opinion,
based
on
the
facts
known
to
me,
my
training
and
my
experience.
Diglaty
signed
by
Rich
Trzupek
R
Ich
=
Mostardi
Platt
Environmental
f
Reason:
I
am
the
author
ot
this
T
r-.
‘
“k
I
L_J
...
Date:
2009.02.03
16:55:41
-0600
fJ.
Richard
Trzupek,
Principle
Consultant
Mostardi
Platt
Environmental
Date
‘After
submission
of
PPI’s
emissions
history
to
Illinois
EPA,
several
meetings
and
teleconferences
were
held
with
Illinois
EPA
in
an
effort
to
reach
a
Compliance
Commitment
Agreement
(CCA).
During
at
least
one
of
these
discussions,
representatives
of
the
Illinois
EPA
verbally
indicated
that
PPI
was
not
then,
and
never
would
have
been,
subject
to
NANSR.
Page
8
of
8