BEFORE
    THE
    ILLINOIS
    POLLUTION
    CONTROL
    BOARD
    PEOPLE
    OF
    THE
    STATE
    OF
    ILLINOIS
    )
    ECEVED
    L.ERK’S
    OFFICE
    Complainant,
    )
    FF8
    0
    2009
    v.
    )
    PCB
    No.
    )
    (Enforcement)
    PACKAGING
    PERSONIFIED,
    Inc.,
    )
    an
    Illinois
    Corporation,
    )
    )
    Respondent.
    )
    RESPONDENT’S
    EXPERT
    WITNESS
    DISCLOSURE
    Packaging
    Personified,
    Inc.
    (“Respondent”)
    by
    and
    through
    its
    attorneys,
    Drinker
    Biddle
    &
    Reath
    LLP,
    submits
    the
    following
    witness
    list
    and
    expert
    reports
    in
    accordance
    with
    the
    hearing
    officer’s
    directive.
    Respondent’s
    Expert
    Witness
    List
    1.
    Christopher
    McClure,
    of
    Navigant
    Consulting,
    will
    be
    testifying
    as
    the
    Respondent’s
    expert
    witness
    in
    connection
    with
    the
    economic
    benefit
    penalty
    calculation.
    Mr.
    McClure’s
    is
    expected
    to
    testify
    in
    accordance
    with
    his
    expert
    report
    which
    is
    enclosed
    herein,
    as
    Attachment
    A,
    which
    includes
    an
    analysis
    of
    the
    compliance
    alternatives
    available
    to
    Respondent
    and
    an
    analysis
    of
    the
    economic
    benefit
    associated
    with
    each
    respective
    alternative.
    2.
    Richard
    Trzupek,
    Principal
    Consultant
    of
    Mostardi
    Platt
    Environmental,
    will
    be
    testifying
    as
    the
    Respondent’s
    expert
    consultant
    witness
    in
    connection
    with
    the
    environmental
    compliance
    issues
    at
    the
    Respondent’s
    facility.
    Mr.
    Trzupek
    is
    expected
    to
    testify
    in
    accordance
    with
    his
    expert
    report
    which
    is
    ericlosed
    herein,
    as
    Attachment
    B,
    which
    includes
    the
    historical
    CHOI/
    25296668.1

    analysis
    of
    the
    activities
    undertaken
    by
    Respondent
    to
    comply
    with
    the
    Flexographic
    Printing
    Rules.
    Respectfully
    submitted,
    PACKAGING
    PERSONIFIED,
    INC.
    By:
    One
    of
    Its
    Attorneys
    Dated:
    February
    4,
    2009
    Roy
    M.
    Harsch
    Lawrence
    W.
    Falbe
    Yesenia
    Villasenor-Rodriguez
    Drinker
    Biddle
    &
    Reath
    LLP
    191
    North
    Wacker
    Drive
    -
    Suite
    3700
    Chicago,
    IL
    60606-1698
    (312)
    569-1441
    (Phone)
    (312)
    569-3441
    (Facsimile)
    CHO1/
    25296668.1

    CERTIFICATE
    OF
    SERVICE
    The
    undersigned
    certifies
    that
    copies
    of
    the
    foregoing
    were
    served
    upon:
    Paula
    Wheeler
    Assistant
    Attorney
    General
    Office
    of
    the
    Illinois
    Attorney
    General
    69
    West
    Washington
    Street
    Floor
    Chicago,
    IL
    60602
    Bradley
    P.
    Halloran
    Hearing
    Officer
    Illinois
    Pollution
    Control
    Board
    James
    R.
    Thompson
    Center
    100W.
    Randolph
    Street
    -
    Suite
    11-500
    Chicago,
    IL
    60601
    John
    T.
    Therriault
    Illinois
    Pollution
    Control
    Board
    James
    R.
    Thompson
    Center
    100W.
    Randolph
    St.
    -
    Suite
    11-500
    Chicago,
    IL
    60601
    by
    Hand
    Deliver
    on
    this
    4
    th
    day
    of
    February
    2009.
    CHOI/
    25296668.1

    IN
    THE
    MATTER
    OF:
    PEOPLE
    OF
    THE
    STATE
    OF
    ILLINOIS
    V.
    PACKAGING
    PERSONIFIED,
    INC.
    PCB
    04-16
    EXPERT
    REPORT
    OF
    CHRISTOPHER
    MCCLURE
    February
    3,
    2009
    ATTACHMENT
    A
    NAVIGANT
    CONSULTING

    INTRODUCTION
    &
    QUALIFICATIONS
    My
    name
    is
    Christopher
    McClure.
    My
    business
    address
    is
    30
    South
    Wacker
    Drive,
    Suite
    3100,
    Chicago,
    Illinois
    60606.
    I
    am
    a
    Director
    at
    Navigant
    Consulting
    Inc.,
    a
    CPA
    and
    hold
    a
    Master
    of
    Business
    Administration
    Degree.
    My
    curriculum
    vitae
    is
    found
    at
    Exhibit
    1.
    My
    hourly
    billing
    rate
    for
    this
    engagement
    is
    $450.
    Navigant
    Consulting
    Inc.
    is
    an
    international
    consulting
    firm
    of
    approximately
    2,000
    professional
    which
    include
    Certified
    Public
    Accountants,
    Masters
    of
    Business
    Administration,
    engineers
    of
    various
    disciplines,
    information
    management
    professionals
    and
    others
    with
    accounting,
    economic
    and
    finance
    experience,
    including
    expertise
    in
    environmental
    matters.
    Prior
    to
    joining
    Navigant
    Consulting
    Inc.
    in
    2004,
    I
    was
    employed
    by
    LECG,
    a
    global
    expert
    services
    firm.
    Prior
    to
    LECG,
    I
    was
    employed
    by
    the
    international
    public
    accounting
    and
    consulting
    firm
    of
    Arthur
    Andersen.
    I
    am
    experienced
    in
    the
    financial,
    economic,
    and
    accounting
    theories
    and
    methods
    necessary
    to
    perform
    the
    analysis
    in
    this
    matter.
    My
    experience
    includes
    compiling
    claims
    for
    litigation
    and
    contribution
    actions,
    developing
    cost
    allocation
    models,
    assisting
    parties
    in
    the
    recovery
    of
    remediation
    costs
    from
    their
    insurance
    companies,
    and
    performing
    a
    variety
    of
    other
    types
    of
    accounting
    and
    financial
    analyses.
    I
    have
    calculated
    economic
    benefit
    penalty
    amounts
    using
    the
    EPA
    BEN
    approach
    on
    three
    occasions
    and
    also
    testified
    at
    an
    Illinois
    Pollution
    Control
    Board
    hearing.
    This
    report
    is
    limited
    to
    analyzing
    the
    potential
    economic
    benefit
    penalty
    component
    only
    to
    possibly
    be
    imposed
    by
    the
    Board
    pursuant
    to
    Section
    42
    (h)(3)
    of
    the
    Illinois
    Environmental
    Protection
    Act
    and
    does
    not
    address
    any
    potential
    gravity
    component.
    The
    analysis
    presented
    in
    this
    report
    is
    based
    on
    currently
    available
    documents
    and
    information
    and
    is
    subject
    to
    change
    based
    on
    the
    review
    of
    additional
    information
    that
    may
    be
    provided.
    I
    reserve
    the
    right
    to
    revise
    this
    report.
    I
    understand
    depositions
    of
    witnesses
    may
    continue
    2

    beyond
    the
    date
    of
    this
    report.
    I
    understand
    that
    this
    report
    may
    be
    supplemented
    by
    deposition
    and
    trial
    testimony.
    If
    this
    matter
    proceeds
    to
    trial,
    selected
    pages
    of
    the
    documents
    and
    information
    relied
    upon
    may
    be
    used
    as
    exhibits.
    Additionally,
    I
    may
    prepare
    graphical
    or
    illustrative
    exhibits
    based
    on
    the
    documents
    and
    information
    relied
    upon
    and
    my
    analysis
    of
    those
    documents
    and
    information.
    CASE
    BACKGROUND
    Navigant
    Consulting
    Inc.
    was
    retained
    by
    Drinker
    Biddle
    &
    Reath
    LLP,
    outside
    counsel
    for
    Packaging
    Personified,
    Inc.,
    (“Packaging”)
    to
    provide
    analyses
    related
    to
    the
    amount
    of
    economic
    benefit
    penalty
    that
    could
    possibly
    be
    imposed
    onPackaging
    by
    the
    Illinois
    Pollution
    Control
    Board
    (“Board”)
    in
    the
    enforcement
    action
    brought
    the
    Illinois
    Attorney
    General
    on
    behalf
    of
    the
    Illinois
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency
    and
    the
    (collectively
    “Government”)
    in
    the
    matter
    People
    of
    the
    State
    of
    Illinois
    v.
    Packaging
    Personified,
    Inc.,
    PCB
    04-16.
    The
    financial
    penalties
    could
    arise
    from
    the
    Government’s
    allegation
    that
    Packaging
    enjoyed
    an
    economic
    benefit
    by
    delaying
    compliance
    with
    the
    Volatile
    Organic
    Material
    (“VOM”)
    capture
    and
    control
    requirements
    outlined
    in
    35
    Illinois
    Administrative
    Code
    (“IAC”)
    Section
    218.401
    -
    “Flexographic
    and
    Rotogravure
    Printing.”
    Packaging
    Personified
    is
    a
    printing
    company
    located
    in
    Carol
    Stream,
    IL.
    It
    utilizes
    printing
    presses
    with
    inks
    containing
    organic
    solvents
    that
    emit
    as
    VOM
    during
    the
    printing
    process.
    A
    Government
    inspection
    of
    Packaging
    Personified’s
    facility
    in
    2002
    revealed
    that
    one
    of
    its
    four
    printing
    presses
    was
    non
    compliant.
    Packaging
    Personified
    decommissioned
    the
    non
    compliant
    press
    in
    December
    2002
    to
    reach
    compliance.
    Packaging
    Personified
    should
    have
    been
    in
    compliance
    in
    January
    1997.
    At
    that
    time,
    there
    were
    multiple
    compliance
    options
    available
    to
    the
    company.
    These
    compliance
    options
    and
    their
    associated
    costs
    are
    as
    follows:
    3

    Compliance
    Option
    #1—
    Adjusted
    Standard
    Pursuant
    to
    the
    authority
    of
    Section
    28.1
    of
    the
    Environmental
    Protection
    Act
    (415
    ILCS
    5/28.1(1998)),
    Packaging
    Personified
    could
    have
    applied
    for
    an
    adjusted
    standard
    that
    would
    have
    eliminated
    the
    need
    for
    a
    compliance
    system.
    Packaging
    Personified’s
    competitors
    such
    as
    Formel
    Industries,
    mc,
    BEMA,
    Inc.
    and
    Vonco
    Products,
    Inc.
    received
    adjusted
    standards.
    The
    total
    cost
    of
    receiving
    the
    adjusted
    standard
    is
    estimated
    at
    $30,000
    (in
    2007
    dollars),
    consisting
    primarily
    of
    legal
    and
    consulting
    fees
    to
    complete
    the
    application
    process.
    Compliance
    Option
    #2—
    Install
    RTO
    Packaging
    Personified
    ultimately
    spent
    $250,000
    on
    an
    RTO
    in
    late
    2003,
    but
    that
    device
    was
    substantially
    larger
    than
    needed
    for
    compliance
    because
    it
    was
    built
    in
    anticipation
    of
    future
    expansion
    and
    the
    installation
    of
    additional
    presses.
    The
    installed
    RTO
    was
    large
    enough
    to
    accommodate
    three
    presses.
    The
    lower
    cost
    compliance
    alternative
    for
    the
    company
    was
    to
    purchase
    and
    install
    a
    used
    RTO
    that
    could
    be
    obtained
    for
    $75,000
    and
    maintained
    for
    an
    annual
    cost
    (labor,
    utilities)
    of
    $16,362,
    based
    on
    the
    best
    estimates
    of
    the
    company’s
    engineering
    consultants,
    Mostardi
    Platt
    Environmental
    (in
    2007
    dollars).
    Compliance
    Option
    #3—
    Decommission
    I
    Relocate
    press
    to
    Michigan
    Packaging
    Personified
    could
    have
    easily
    complied
    by
    decommissioning
    the
    non
    compliant
    press
    and
    moving
    itto
    the
    company’s
    facility
    in
    Michigan.
    Packaging
    Personified
    ultimately
    did
    decommission
    the
    press
    in
    December
    2002
    and
    relocated
    it
    to
    the
    Michigan
    facility
    in
    December
    2004.
    The
    estimated
    cost
    for
    this
    option
    is
    $15,000
    (in
    2007
    dollars),
    based
    on
    Packaging
    Personified’s
    actual
    expenditures.
    The
    following
    table
    summarizes
    the
    economic
    benefit
    of
    non
    compliance
    Packaging
    Personified
    could
    have
    enjoyed
    under
    each
    of
    the
    three
    compliance
    options.
    The
    exhibits
    attached
    to
    this
    report
    provide
    greater
    detail
    of
    the
    economic
    benefit
    calculations
    of
    these
    three
    compliance
    options.
    4

    Compliance
    Option
    Economic
    Benefit
    1.
    Adjusted
    Standard
    $33,707
    2.
    Install
    RTO
    $119,020
    3.
    Decommission
    /
    Relocate
    press
    to
    Michigan
    $16,853
    DOCUMENTS
    CONSIDERED
    The
    documents
    I
    considered
    in
    my
    analysis
    include:
    EPA
    BEN
    user
    manual
    Cost
    estimates
    prepared
    by
    Mostardi
    Platt
    Environmental
    for
    RTO
    purchase
    and
    annual
    operating
    costs
    Correspondence
    between
    Illinois
    EPA
    and
    Drinker,
    Biddle
    &
    Reath
    LLP
    dated
    June
    12,
    2007
    and
    November
    24,
    2008
    Cases
    andliterature
    addressing
    the
    use
    of
    discount
    rates
    in
    enforcement
    actions
    ILLINOIS
    EPA
    REPORT
    I
    have
    reviewed
    the
    November
    21,
    2008
    Economic
    Benefit
    Analysis
    report
    prepared
    by
    the
    the
    Illinois
    EPA’s
    analyst,
    Mr.
    Gary
    Styzens.
    Mr.
    Styzens
    estimated
    an
    economic
    benefit
    of
    $711,274,
    an
    amount
    which
    I
    find
    to
    be
    significantly
    overstated
    for
    several
    reasons,
    including:
    Mr.
    Styzens’
    analysis
    fails
    to
    consider
    thatPackaging
    Personified
    had
    compliance
    alternatives
    in
    addition
    to
    theinstallation
    of
    an
    RTO,
    as
    I
    have
    outlined
    in
    this
    report.
    Mr.
    Styzens
    fails
    to
    consider
    that
    the
    RTO
    ultimately
    installed
    by
    Packaging
    Personified
    was
    three
    times
    larger
    than
    the
    one
    required
    to
    reach
    compliance
    so
    the
    cost
    estimate
    he
    uses
    for
    delayed
    capital
    expenditures
    is
    unduly
    high.
    Mr.
    Styzens
    incorrectly
    utilizes
    an
    unusually
    high
    avoided
    annual
    operating
    cost
    averaging
    $86,000
    per
    yearthat
    he
    derived
    generically
    rather
    than
    researching
    more
    accurate
    costs
    that
    match
    the
    size
    of
    the
    RTO
    that
    Packaging
    Personified
    would
    have
    installed.
    The
    annual
    avoided
    costs
    actually
    approximate
    $16,000
    per
    year.
    5

    Mr.
    Styzens
    failed
    to
    terminate
    the
    period
    of
    non
    compliance
    at
    the
    end
    of
    2002
    when
    PackagingPersonified
    decommissioned
    the
    press.
    Instead,
    he
    continues
    to
    penalize
    the
    company
    for
    an
    additional
    year
    and
    then
    calculates
    interest
    on
    this
    incorrect
    benefit
    amount.
    ECONOMIC
    BENEFIT
    PENALTY
    BACKGROUND
    The
    United
    States
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency
    (“EPA”)
    employs
    a
    civil
    penalty
    program
    to
    help
    ensure
    that
    regulated
    entities
    comply
    with
    environmental
    regulations.
    These
    civil
    penalty
    figures
    are
    based
    on
    the
    EPA’s
    February
    16,
    1984,
    generic
    penalty
    policy
    which
    was
    codified
    in
    theGeneralEnforcement
    Policy
    Compendium
    as
    P.T.
    1—i
    and
    P.T.
    1-2.
    A
    copy
    of
    this
    is
    found
    as
    Exhibit
    5.
    These
    civil
    penalties
    seek
    to
    recapture
    the
    economic
    benefit
    that
    an
    entity
    may
    have
    gained
    from
    delaying
    or
    avoiding
    compliance
    with
    regulations.
    The
    EPA
    holds
    that
    economic
    benefit
    recapture
    helps
    level
    the
    economic
    playing
    field
    amongst
    all
    regulated
    entities,
    serve
    as
    incentives
    to
    protect
    the
    environment
    and
    public
    health,
    and
    help
    deter
    future
    violations.
    EPA
    civil
    penalties
    have
    two
    main
    components:
    gravity
    and
    economic
    benefit.
    The
    gravity
    component
    reflects
    the
    seriousness
    of
    the
    violation
    while
    the
    economic
    benefit
    component
    focuses
    on
    the
    violators
    economic
    gain
    from
    noncompliance.
    This
    economic
    benefit
    can
    accrue
    to
    the
    violator
    in
    three
    basic
    ways:
    (1)
    delaying
    necessary
    pollution
    control
    expenditures;
    (2)
    avoiding
    necessary
    pollution
    control
    expenditures;
    and/or
    (3)
    obtaining
    an
    illegal
    competitive
    advantage.
    The
    EPA
    designed
    the
    BEN
    computer
    model
    in
    1984
    to
    calculate
    the
    economic
    benefit
    from
    these
    first
    two
    types
    of
    economic
    gain.
    The
    EPA
    has
    solicited
    comments
    from
    the
    public
    on
    multiple
    occasions,
    acknowledging
    that
    the
    actual
    computer
    model
    is
    still
    being
    refined.
    As
    such,
    the
    EPA
    provides
    that
    experts
    calculating
    the
    economic
    benefit
    mayuse
    the
    BEN
    model
    or
    6

    other
    analytical
    tools
    (e.g.
    customized
    computer
    spreadsheets,
    calculators)
    as
    needed.
    The
    EPA
    is
    more
    adamant
    regarding
    the
    methodology
    for
    calculating
    economic
    benefit,
    stating
    in
    the
    Federal
    Register
    Volume
    64,
    Number
    117
    dated
    June
    18,
    1999,
    that
    the
    EPA
    believes
    “that
    BEN
    is
    by
    far
    the
    best
    approach
    available
    for
    calculating
    economic
    benefit
    derived
    from
    delayed
    and/or
    avoided
    costs.”
    A
    copy
    of
    this
    is
    found
    at
    Exhibit
    6.
    In
    addition
    to
    the
    Federal
    Register,
    the
    EPA
    publishes
    a
    BEN
    User
    Manual
    that
    provides
    guidance
    on
    the
    theory
    and
    methodology
    for
    calculating
    the
    economic
    benefit
    penalty
    as
    well
    as
    technical
    computer
    instructions
    for
    using
    the
    BEN
    Model.
    The
    EPA
    BEN
    User
    Manual
    outlines
    the
    variables
    required
    to
    calculate
    economic
    benefit.
    It
    also
    provides
    examples
    of
    a
    number
    of
    issues
    that
    can
    arise
    in
    the
    calculation
    of
    economic
    benefit,
    including
    offsets
    for
    byproduct
    recovery
    and
    certain
    types
    of
    good
    faith
    expenditures
    that
    did
    not
    lead
    to
    compliance.
    These
    examples
    are
    explored
    in
    more
    detail
    in
    the
    analysis
    section
    of
    this
    testimony.
    It
    is
    important
    to
    note
    that
    the
    EPA
    BEN
    User
    Manual
    clearly
    distinguishes
    between
    the
    economic
    benefit
    and
    the
    gravity
    components
    of
    civil
    penalties.
    It
    explicitly
    states
    on
    page
    A-i
    that
    “economic
    benefit
    is
    “no
    fault”
    in
    nature:
    a
    defendant
    need
    not
    have
    deliberately
    chosen
    to
    delay
    compliance
    (for
    financial
    or
    any
    other
    reasons),
    or
    in
    fact
    even
    have
    been
    aware
    of
    its
    noncompliance,
    for
    it
    to
    have
    accrued
    the
    economic
    benefit
    of
    noncompliance.”
    It
    goes
    on
    provide
    an
    example
    on
    page
    4-3
    of
    how
    certain
    issues
    are
    “legal
    distinctions
    that
    may
    impact
    the
    gravity
    component
    but
    not
    the
    economic
    benefit.”
    The
    distinction
    is
    a
    significant
    one
    and
    the
    EPA
    BEN
    User
    Manual
    highlights
    it
    to
    stress
    that
    the
    two
    penalty
    theories
    are
    separate
    and
    impressions
    regarding
    the
    gravity
    of
    the
    noncompliance
    should
    not
    influence
    the
    economic
    benefit
    calculation.
    7

    EXHIBIT
    1
    CHRISTOPHER
    T.
    MCCLURE
    Christopher
    McClure
    Director
    Navigant
    Consulting
    30
    S.
    Wacker
    Drive
    #3100
    Chicago,
    Illinois
    60606
    Tel:
    312.583.6986
    cmcclure@navigantconsulting.com
    Professional
    History
    Navigant
    Consulting,
    Inc.
    2004
    to
    present
    LECG,
    LLC
    2002—2004
    Andersen
    1995
    -
    2002
    Education
    M.B.A
    Kellogg
    School
    of
    Management
    Northwestern
    University
    8.5.
    Accounting/Finance
    Trinity
    University
    Professional
    Certifications
    Certified
    Public
    Accountant
    (CPA)
    Certified
    Fraud
    Examiner
    (CFE)
    Certified
    in
    Financial
    Forensics
    (CFF)
    Professional
    Associations
    Texas
    Society
    of
    CPAs
    AICPA
    ACFE
    Christopher
    McClure
    is
    a
    Director
    in
    the
    Chicago
    office
    of
    Navigant
    Consulting,
    Inc.
    Mr.
    McClure’s
    work
    focuses
    on
    forensic
    accounting
    investigations,
    insurance
    related
    matters,
    commercial
    litigation,
    and
    product
    liability
    matters.
    He
    has
    conducted
    forensic
    accounting
    investigations
    for
    numerous
    SEC
    registrants
    and
    quantified
    damages
    in
    commercial
    litigation.
    He
    has
    also
    supervised
    numerous
    engagements
    involving
    insurance
    policy
    analyses,
    allocation
    methodologies,
    economic
    benefit
    modeling
    for
    EPA
    negotiations,
    insurance
    carrier
    settlements,
    and
    other
    coverage
    issues.
    Experience
    Mr.
    McClure
    has
    been
    called
    upon
    to
    assist
    companies
    with
    independent
    investigations
    related
    to
    allegations
    of
    stock
    options
    backdating,
    earnings
    management,
    revenue
    recognition
    violations,
    and
    other
    accounting
    improprieties.
    In
    addition
    to
    his
    knowledge
    of
    accounting
    and
    general
    business
    issues,
    Mr.
    McClure
    has
    significant
    experience
    with
    various
    forensic
    database
    software
    packages
    and
    other
    methods
    of
    efficiently
    analyzing
    and
    disseminating
    important
    content
    from
    large
    populations
    of
    emails,
    electronic
    files,
    and
    recorded
    phone
    conversations.
    Mr.
    McClure
    has
    developed
    significant
    expertise
    in
    insurance
    matters
    related
    to
    asbestos,
    environmental,
    other
    toxic
    torts.
    He
    has
    managednumerous
    engagements
    focused
    on
    insurance
    coverage
    litigation
    in
    various
    industries
    including
    manufacturing,
    energy,
    chemical,
    and
    utility.
    He
    has
    quantified
    the
    damages
    associated
    with
    a
    number
    of
    significant
    claims
    for
    the
    purposes
    of
    negotiating
    policy
    commutations,
    structured
    settlements,
    and
    coverage-in-place
    agreements,
    as
    well
    as
    establishing
    bankruptcy
    trust
    funds.
    Mr.
    McClure
    has
    also
    quantified
    damages
    in
    the
    context
    of
    business
    interruption,
    most
    recently
    for
    clients
    recovering
    from
    the
    events
    of
    the
    September
    11
    terrorist
    attacks
    on
    New
    York.
    Mr.
    McClure
    also
    has
    extensive
    experience
    performing
    allocations
    of
    insurance
    damages
    to
    coverage
    under
    a
    variety
    of
    methodologies
    including
    All
    Sums,
    Carter-Wallace,
    Stonewall,
    and
    Owens-Illinois,
    as
    well
    as
    numerous
    other
    permutations.
    He
    has
    used
    various
    computer
    software
    tools
    and
    techniques
    to
    calculate
    and
    analyze
    allocation
    results
    using
    different
    8

    assumptions
    for
    trigger,
    occurrence,
    coverage
    defenses,
    and
    other
    important
    allocation
    variables.
    Insurance,
    Environmental,
    and
    Product
    Liability
    Experience
    >>
    Analyzed
    historic
    and
    projected
    future
    asbestos
    liabilities
    for
    a
    boiler
    manufacturer
    in
    bankruptcy.
    Utilized
    client
    data
    and
    Manville
    Trust
    information
    to
    project
    future
    liabilities
    under
    numerous
    scenarios.
    Conducted
    hundreds
    of
    allocation
    sensitivities
    considering
    various
    product/non-product
    claim
    splits,
    state
    law
    changes,
    trigger
    periods,
    and
    liability
    amounts.
    Utilized
    the
    analysis
    in
    the
    negotiation
    of
    policy
    buybacks
    with
    several
    U.S.
    and
    foreign
    insurance
    carriers.
    Engaged
    by
    one
    of
    the
    world’s
    largest
    oil
    companies
    to
    analyze
    the
    potential
    economic
    benefits
    resulting
    from
    delayed
    expenditures
    for
    environmental
    protection
    system
    implementations
    at
    a
    large
    refinery.
    Performed
    detailed
    cost
    modeling
    of
    time
    value
    of
    deferred
    capital
    expenditures,
    avoided
    operational
    costs,
    and
    foregone
    economic
    benefits
    to
    support
    client
    negotiations
    with
    the
    EPA.
    >>
    Assisted
    a
    Fortune
    100
    client
    seeking
    reimbursement
    from
    the
    US
    Government
    for
    over
    $100
    million
    in
    remediation
    costs
    under
    CERCLA.
    Involved
    cost
    compilation,
    analysis,
    and
    presentation
    to
    the
    US
    Government
    as
    well
    as
    support
    of
    depositions
    and
    expert
    testimony.
    Analyzed
    historic
    and
    future
    asbestos
    and
    environmental
    exposures
    for
    a
    tire
    manufacturer
    for
    use
    in
    policy
    commutations.
    Gathered,
    organized,
    and
    allocated
    damages
    across
    hundreds
    of
    insurance
    policies
    under
    various
    scenarios.
    Conducted
    archaeology
    to
    locate
    critical
    insurance
    policy
    evidence.
    Formulated
    presentations
    given
    to
    the
    London
    Market
    Insurers
    as
    well
    as
    numerous
    domestic
    insurance
    carriers.
    Developed
    strategic
    operating
    scenarios,
    analyzed
    financial
    damages,
    and
    compiled
    business
    interruption
    claim
    for
    a
    World
    Trade
    Center
    banking
    client
    impacted
    by
    the
    events
    of
    Sept
    11,
    2001.
    Reviewed
    insurance
    coverage
    language,
    collected
    cost
    data,
    modeled
    lost
    revenue
    for
    various
    divisions,
    and
    developed
    numerous
    damage
    scenarios
    for
    use.
    in
    settlement
    negotiations.
    Engaged
    by
    one
    of
    the
    world’s
    largest
    petrochemical
    companies
    to
    pursue
    insurance
    recovery
    for
    historic
    environmental
    pollution
    claims.
    Involved
    the
    accumulation
    of
    invoices
    and
    creation
    of
    a
    cost
    database
    to
    support
    over
    $300
    million
    in
    remedial
    expenditures.
    Also
    required
    projection
    of
    future
    cleanup
    costs
    at
    numerous
    sites
    as
    well
    as
    analysis
    of
    Natural
    Resource
    Damages
    and
    Property
    Value
    Diminution
    claims.
    9

    Engaged
    by
    a
    major
    chemical
    company
    to
    review
    and
    forecast
    liabilities
    for
    asbestos,
    silica,
    and
    other
    products
    claims.
    Involved
    a
    comprehensive
    review
    of
    client’s
    historic
    production
    as
    well
    as
    exhaustive
    corporate
    history
    research.
    Utilized
    Manville
    Trust
    and
    Nicholson
    study
    in
    the
    formulation
    of
    products
    and
    premises
    liability
    forecasts.
    Generated
    numerous
    liability
    scenarios
    and
    allocated
    the
    damages
    under
    several
    scenarios
    to
    client’s
    historic
    insurance
    coverage
    to
    assist
    in
    negotiating
    a
    coverage-in-place
    agreement.
    Accounting
    Investigations
    &
    Litigation
    Experience
    Assisted
    counsel
    in
    the
    defense
    of
    a
    multi-national
    professional
    services
    firm
    related
    to
    allegations
    of
    negligence
    in
    the
    performance
    of
    the
    annual
    financial
    audit
    at
    a
    Fortune
    100
    company
    at
    which
    one
    of
    the
    largest
    frauds
    in
    U.S.
    history
    occurred.
    Involved
    scrutinizing
    annual
    audit
    workpapers
    and
    procedures
    to
    fully
    analyze
    the
    complexity
    of
    the
    fraud
    and
    build
    a
    defense
    strategy
    for
    the
    services
    firm.
    >>
    Assisted
    counsel
    to
    numerous
    companies
    faced
    with
    both
    formal
    and
    informal
    SEC
    inquiries
    into
    historic
    option
    granting
    processes.
    These
    engagements
    involved
    interviews
    of
    company
    board
    members
    and
    executives,
    analysis
    of
    option
    granting
    procedures,
    and
    review
    of
    hundreds
    of
    thousands
    of
    emails
    and
    electronic
    documents.
    The
    results
    of
    these
    analyses
    were
    reported
    to
    the
    SEC,
    the
    companies’
    outside
    auditors,
    and
    the
    Board
    of
    Directors
    and
    also
    used
    in
    financial
    restatements.
    Remediation
    plans
    were
    also
    created
    to
    assist
    the
    companies
    with
    improving
    internal
    controls.
    >>
    Assisted
    counsel
    to
    an
    SEC
    registrant
    with
    an
    independent
    investigation
    of
    improper
    accounting
    entries
    and
    financial
    reporting
    errors
    and
    manipulations.
    This
    engagement
    focused
    on
    the
    analysis
    of
    numerous
    corporate
    reserve
    accounts
    across
    multiple
    years,
    interviews
    with
    management,
    and
    the
    review
    of
    over
    50,000
    emails
    to
    identify
    and
    quantify
    amounts
    for
    the
    restatement
    of
    the
    company’s
    financials.
    The
    investigation
    involved
    significant
    interaction
    with
    the
    corporate
    management,
    auditors,
    and
    the
    SEC.
    >>
    Assisted
    counsel
    to
    the
    audit
    committee
    of
    an
    SEC
    registrant
    with
    an
    investigation
    of
    accounting,
    financial
    reporting,
    and
    operational
    issues
    raised
    by
    a
    corporate
    whistleblower.
    The
    investigation
    involved
    significant
    interaction
    with
    the
    company’s
    outside
    auditor,
    the
    Illinois
    Commerce
    Commission,
    and
    the
    SEC.
    This
    engagement
    also
    required
    the
    analysis
    and
    organization
    of
    over
    60,000
    phone
    call
    recordings,
    50,000
    emails,
    and
    over
    100,000
    pages
    of
    hardcopy
    documents.
    >>
    Assisted
    counsel
    to
    the
    seller
    engaged
    in
    a
    post-acquisition
    dispute
    arbitration
    focusing
    on
    the
    calculation
    of
    annual
    revenue
    earn-out
    amounts
    in
    accordance
    with
    the
    provisions
    of
    the
    purchase
    agreement.
    Involved
    analyzing
    buyer’s
    revenue
    recognition
    principles
    and
    methods
    for
    allocating
    expenses
    across
    multiple
    acquisitions.
    10

    >>
    Assisted
    in
    the
    compilation
    and
    analysis
    of
    the
    books
    and
    records
    of
    ten
    acquisitions
    performed
    by
    an
    SEC
    registrant
    over
    the
    last
    five
    years.
    Responsible
    for
    identifying
    material
    accounting
    issues
    and
    reporting
    them
    to
    the
    CFO
    of
    the
    company
    for
    inclusion
    in
    the
    company’s
    ongoing
    financial
    restatement
    process.
    >>
    Evaluated
    the
    financial
    implications
    of
    a
    multi-billion
    dollar
    international
    merger
    for
    one
    of
    the
    worlds
    largest
    retailers
    included
    revenue•
    and
    cash
    flow
    projections,
    operational
    analyses,
    and
    sensitivity
    modeling
    that
    considered
    currency
    fluctuations
    and
    the
    impact
    of
    political
    and
    economic
    policy
    changes
    Engaged
    by
    a
    Fortune
    50
    energy
    firm
    to
    assist
    in
    the
    redesign
    of
    its
    executive
    staff
    following
    a
    major
    merger.
    Involved
    mapping
    and
    redesigning
    accounting
    and
    financial
    processes
    and
    internal
    controls
    and
    working
    with
    corporate
    executives
    to
    identify
    opportunities
    for
    greater
    efficiency.
    Project
    resulted
    in
    annual
    savings
    of
    over
    $200
    million
    for
    the
    client.
    Publications
    and
    Speaking
    Engagements
    Author
    of
    “Coping
    with
    FASB
    Interpretation
    No.
    47
    -.
    Accounting
    for
    Conditional
    Asset
    Retirement
    Obligations”.
    American
    Bar
    Association,
    Fall
    2007.
    Presenter
    of
    “White
    Collar
    Investigations
    Update:
    Trends
    and
    Best
    Practices”
    AICPA
    webinar
    series,
    April
    2008.
    Author
    of
    “Gatekeepers:
    A
    Balancing
    Act
    for
    Corporate
    Counsel”
    Navigant
    Consulting
    Inc.
    Investigations
    Quarterly
    Magazine,
    Summer
    200&
    Testimony
    /
    Alternative
    Dispute
    Resolution
    Experience:
    Provided
    deposition
    testimony
    and
    testimony
    at
    the
    Pollution
    Control
    Board
    hearing
    in
    2008
    in
    an
    Illinois
    EPA
    economic
    benefit
    penalty
    matter.
    (People
    of
    the
    State
    of
    Illinois
    v.
    Toyal
    America,
    Inc.
    f/k/a
    Alcan-Toyo
    America,
    Inc.,
    PCB
    2000-211)
    11

    Packaging
    Personified,
    Inc.
    Economic
    Benefit
    Calculation
    Exhibit
    2
    Scenario
    Scenario:
    Description
    1
    Adjusted
    Standard
    Total
    Avoided
    Operation
    Costs/(Benefits)
    $28,258
    L
    KEY
    Total
    Economic
    Benefit!
    (Detriment)
    $33,707
    M
    A
    The
    estimated
    capital
    expenditures
    deflated
    to
    1997.
    B
    Costs
    permanently
    avoided
    by
    delaying
    compliance
    C
    Estimate
    of
    the
    monthly
    lost
    benefit
    not
    realized
    by
    delaying
    compliance
    D
    Depreciation
    that
    would
    have
    been
    taken
    on
    amount
    in
    column
    A
    E
    Sum
    of
    B+C+D
    F
    Tax
    impact
    of
    item
    E
    G
    E+F
    H
    Actual
    dollars
    spent
    I
    1=
    Previous(I-f-K)+Current(A+G-H)
    J
    Risk-free
    T-Bill
    rate
    to
    inflate
    dollars
    to
    the
    date
    of
    compliance
    K
    Amount
    earned
    on
    the
    cumulative
    deferred
    spending
    L
    Sum
    of
    columns
    B+C,
    represents
    the
    total
    avoided
    cost
    or
    (benefit)
    from
    the
    delay
    M
    Total
    economic
    benefit
    (delayed
    +
    avoided)
    1998
    1999
    00
    2000
    2002
    2001
    54
    0
    0
    1997
    1
    0
    28,258
    0
    0
    28,258
    (10,455)
    17,803
    0
    17,803
    2
    00
    0
    00
    18,805
    3
    00000
    19,755
    0
    0
    00
    0
    0
    0
    0
    pendmg
    0
    0
    0
    0
    00
    6
    0
    00
    00000
    0
    28,258
    0
    0
    28,258
    (10,455)
    17,803
    0
    0
    0
    5.05%
    5.63%
    5.08%
    3.49%
    6.11%
    2.00%
    0
    20,759
    0
    22,796
    22,027
    $1,002
    $950
    $1,268
    $1,004
    $769
    $456
    $5,449
    Privileged
    and
    Confidential-
    Prepared
    at
    the
    Request
    of
    Counsel
    Page
    1
    of
    4

    Packaging
    Personified,
    Inc.
    Economic
    Benefit
    Calculation
    Exhibit
    2
    Scenario
    Scenario:
    Description
    Installation
    2
    of
    a
    Regenerative
    Thermal
    Oxidizer
    (RTO)
    70,645
    15,412
    0
    15,504
    0
    15,597
    0
    15,691
    0
    15,785
    0
    15,880
    70,645
    93,870
    0
    (9,419)
    5,993
    (2,217)
    3,776
    0
    (9,419)
    6,085
    (2,251)
    3,834
    0
    (9,419)
    6,178
    (2,286)
    3,892
    0
    (9,419)
    6,272
    (2,321)
    3,951
    0
    (9,419)
    6,366
    (2,355)
    4,011
    0
    (9,419)
    6,461
    (2,390)
    4,071
    0
    (56,516)
    37,354
    (13,820)
    23,534
    0
    74,421
    5.63%
    0
    82,445
    5.05%
    0
    90,500
    5.08%
    0
    99,048
    6.11%
    0
    109,111
    3.49%
    0
    116,989
    2.00%
    0
    $4,190
    $4,163
    $4,597
    $6,052
    $3,808
    $2,340
    $25,150
    Total
    Avoided
    Operation
    Costs!(Benef
    its)
    $93,870
    L
    KEY
    Total
    Economic
    Benefit!
    (Detriment)
    $119,020
    M
    A
    The
    estimated
    capital
    expenditures
    deflated
    to
    1997.
    B
    Costs
    permanently
    avoided
    by
    delaying
    compliance
    C
    Estimate
    of
    the
    monthly
    lost
    benefit
    not
    realized
    by
    delaying
    compliance
    0
    Depreciation
    that
    would
    have
    been
    taken
    on
    amount
    in
    column
    A
    E
    Sum
    of
    B+C+D
    F
    Tax
    impact
    of
    item
    E
    G
    El-F
    H
    Actual
    dollars
    spent
    I
    I’
    Previous(I+K)+Current(A÷G-H)
    J
    Risk-free
    T-Bill
    rate
    to
    inflate
    dollars
    to
    the
    date
    of
    compliance
    K
    Amount
    earned
    on
    the
    cumulative
    deferred
    spending
    L
    Sum
    of
    columns
    B÷C,
    represents
    the
    total
    avoided
    Cost
    or
    (benefit)
    from
    the
    delay
    M
    Total
    economic
    benefit
    (delayed
    +
    avoided)
    1997
    1998
    1999
    2001
    2000
    2002
    1
    2
    3
    4
    5
    6
    Privileged
    and
    Confidential-
    Prepared
    at
    the
    Request
    of
    Counsel
    Page
    2
    of
    4

    Packaging
    Personified,
    Inc.
    Economic
    Benefit
    Calculation
    Exhibit
    2
    Scenario
    Scenario:
    Description
    Decommission
    3
    I
    Relocate
    Press
    Total
    Avoided
    Operation
    Costsl(Benefits)
    $14,129
    L
    KEY
    Total
    Economic
    Benefit
    /
    (Detriment)
    $16,853
    M
    The
    estimated
    capital
    expenditures
    deflated
    to
    1997.
    Costs
    permanently
    avoided
    by
    delaying
    compliance
    Estimate
    of
    the
    monthly
    lost
    benefit
    not
    realized
    by
    delaying
    compliance
    Depreciation
    that
    would
    have
    been
    taken
    on
    amount
    in
    column
    A
    Sum
    of
    B+C÷D
    Tax
    impact
    of
    item
    E
    H
    Actual
    dollars
    spent
    I
    1=
    Previous
    (I÷K)+Current(A+G-H)
    J
    Risk-free
    T-Bill
    rate
    to
    inflate
    dollars
    to
    the
    date
    of
    compliance
    K
    .
    Amount
    earned
    on
    the
    cumulative
    deferred
    spending
    L
    Sum
    of
    columns
    BC,
    represents
    the
    total
    avoided
    cost
    or
    (benefit)
    from
    the
    delay
    M
    Total
    economic
    benefit
    (delayed
    +
    avoided)
    21
    0
    0
    1997
    1998
    1999
    2000
    2001
    2002
    14,129
    0
    0
    0
    3
    4
    65
    00
    14,129
    0
    00
    0
    0
    0
    0000
    14,129
    (5,228)
    8,901
    00
    00
    0
    0
    0
    0000
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    14,129
    0000
    (5,228)
    00
    0
    0
    8,901
    0
    8,901
    0
    9,402
    0
    9,877
    0
    10,379
    0
    11,013
    0
    11,397
    0
    5.05%
    5.63%
    5.08%
    6.11%
    3.49%
    2.00%
    $475
    $501
    $634
    $502
    $384
    $228
    $2,724
    BA
    F
    EDC
    G
    E÷F
    Privileged
    and
    Confidential-
    Prepared
    at
    the
    Request
    of
    Counsel
    Page
    3
    of
    4

    Packaging
    Personified,
    Inc
    Exhibit
    2
    Economic
    Benefit
    Calculation
    Inflation
    Calculations
    PCI
    Inflation
    I
    0.60%
    I
    (Avg
    1996-2002)
    Annual
    One-Time
    Expenditure
    2007
    $
    30,000
    2006
    $
    29,821
    2005
    $
    29,643
    2004
    $
    29,466
    2003
    $
    29,291
    2002
    $
    29,116
    2001
    $
    28,942
    2000
    $
    28,770
    1999
    $
    28,598
    1998
    $
    28,428
    1997
    $
    28,258
    $
    74,553
    $
    16,264
    $
    $
    74,108
    $
    16,167
    $
    $
    73,666
    $
    16,071
    $
    $
    73,227
    $
    15,975
    $
    $
    72,790
    $
    15,880
    $
    $
    72,356
    $
    15,785
    $
    $
    71,924
    $
    15,691
    $
    $
    71,495
    $
    15,597
    $
    $
    71,069
    $
    15,504
    $
    $
    70,645
    $
    15,412
    $
    14,911
    14,822
    14,733
    14,645
    1996
    381.7
    __________
    Average
    0.60%
    One-Time
    Recurring
    One-Time
    Expenditure
    Cost
    Expenditure
    $
    75,000
    $
    16,362
    $
    15,000
    14,558
    2002
    395.6
    0.33%
    14,471
    2001
    394.3
    0.05%
    14,385
    2000
    394.1
    0.90%
    14,299
    1999
    390.6
    0.28%
    14,214
    1998
    389.5
    0.78%
    14,129
    1997
    386.5
    1.26%
    Privileged
    and
    Confidential-
    Prepared
    at
    the
    Request
    of
    Counsel
    Page
    4
    of
    4

    Page
    1
    A
    Caution
    As
    of:
    Sep
    05,
    2008
    LEXSEE
    72
    F.
    SUPP.
    2D
    810
    UNITED
    STATES
    OF
    AMERICA,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    WCI
    STEEL,
    INC.,
    Defendant.
    CASE
    NO.
    4:98-CV-1082
    UNITED
    STATES
    DISTRICT
    COURT
    FOR
    THE
    NORTHERN
    DISTRICT
    OF
    OHIO,
    EASTERN
    DIVISION
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    October
    22,
    1999,
    Decided
    October
    22,
    1999,
    Filed
    DISPOSITION:
    [**1J
    United
    States
    request
    for
    in
    junctive
    relief
    denied.
    CASE
    SUMMARY:
    PROCEDURAL
    POSTURE:
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    filed
    a
    motion
    for
    injunctive
    relief
    against
    defendant
    steel
    company,
    alleging
    that
    defendant
    was
    subject
    to
    the
    Re
    source
    Conservation
    and
    Recovery
    Act,
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.,
    because
    it
    treated,
    stored,
    and
    disposed
    of
    hazardous
    waste
    at
    its
    steelmaking
    facility
    without
    a
    permit
    or
    interim
    status.
    OVERVIEW:
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    filed
    a
    motion
    for
    injunctive
    relief
    against
    defendant
    steel
    company,
    alleg
    ing
    that
    defendant
    was
    subject
    to
    Resource
    Conservation
    and
    Recovery
    Act
    (RCRA),
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.,
    because
    it
    treated,
    stored,
    and
    disposed
    of
    hazardous
    waste
    at
    its
    steelmaking
    facility
    without
    a
    permit
    or
    in
    terim
    status.
    It
    was
    undisputed
    that
    defendant
    had
    neither
    a
    permit
    nor
    interim
    status,
    plus
    the
    court
    found
    that
    the
    wastewater
    treated,
    stored,
    and
    disposed
    of
    by
    defendant
    exhibited
    the
    hazardous
    waste
    characteristic
    of
    corrosiv
    ity;
    thereby,
    subjecting
    defendant
    to
    RCRA.
    In
    imposing
    a
    $
    1
    million
    civil
    penalty
    upon
    defendant,
    the
    court
    con
    sidered
    the
    fact
    that
    defendant
    had
    made
    efforts
    to
    reduce
    pollution,
    no
    harm
    to
    human
    health
    or
    the
    environment
    had
    resulted,
    and
    plaintiff
    had
    unduly
    delayed
    the
    litiga
    tion.
    Moreover,
    because
    plaintiff
    failed
    to
    show
    any
    im
    .minent
    threat
    to
    public
    health
    or
    the
    environment,
    its
    motion
    for
    injunctive
    relief
    was
    denied.
    OUTCOME:
    The
    court
    denied
    plaintiff
    United
    States’
    motion
    for
    injunctive
    relief,
    because
    plaintiff
    failed
    to
    show
    any
    imminent
    threat
    to
    public
    health
    or
    the
    envi
    ronment
    resulting
    from
    defendant
    steel
    company’s
    non
    compliance
    with
    the
    Resource
    Conservation
    and
    Recov
    ery
    Act;
    however,
    it
    did
    impose
    upon
    defendant
    a
    civil
    penalty
    of$
    I
    million.
    CORE
    TERMS:
    pond,
    hazardous
    waste,
    wastewater,
    sampling,
    hazardous,
    steel,
    s.u,
    influent,
    waste
    manage
    ment,
    probe,
    treatment
    plant,
    measurement,
    impound
    ment,
    corrosivity,
    surface,
    corrosive,
    sludge,
    economic
    benefit,
    closure,
    acid,
    grab,
    meter,
    solid
    wastes,
    inspec
    tion,
    box,
    pickle,
    liquor,clean,
    injunctive,
    disposed
    LexisNexis(R)
    Headnotes
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Permits
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances>
    Treatment,
    Storage
    &
    Disposal
    [HN1J
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6925(a)
    prohibits
    the
    operation
    of
    any
    facility
    that
    treats,
    stores,
    or
    disp.oses
    of
    hazardous
    wastes,
    except
    in
    accordance
    with
    a
    permit.
    Moreover,
    a
    party
    receiving
    a
    permit
    to
    store
    or
    dispose
    of
    hazardous
    waste
    must
    thereafter
    comply
    with
    the
    requirements-
    of
    the
    permits.

    Page
    2
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    *;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Enforcement>
    Civil
    Penalties
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Solid
    Wastes
    >
    Resource
    Recov
    ery
    &
    Recycling
    [HN2j
    If
    certain
    requirements
    are
    met,
    the
    Resource
    Conservation
    and
    Recovery
    Act,
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.,
    allows
    states
    to
    operate
    hazardous
    waste
    regulatory
    programs
    in
    lieu
    of
    the
    federal
    program.
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6926(b).
    Even
    where
    a
    state
    is
    given
    authority
    to
    operate
    such
    a
    regulatory
    program,
    the
    United
    States
    retains
    the
    right
    to
    enforce
    the
    state-authorized
    programs.
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6928(a)(2).
    Civil
    Procedure
    >
    Remedies
    >
    Injunctions
    >
    Permanent
    Injunctions
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Enforcement
    >
    Injunctive
    Relief
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Solid
    Wastes
    >
    Resource
    Recov
    ery
    &
    Recycling
    [HN3}
    Under
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6928(a),
    the
    United
    States
    may
    file
    a
    civil
    action
    in
    federal
    district
    court
    to
    obtain
    appropriate
    relief,
    including
    a
    temporary
    or
    permanent
    injunction
    upon
    obtaining
    information
    that
    any
    person
    has
    violated
    or
    is
    violating
    any
    requirement
    of
    the
    Re
    source
    Conservation
    and
    RecOvery
    Act,
    42
    U.S.C.S,
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.
    If
    a
    violation
    is
    shown,
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6928(g)
    provides
    for
    a
    civil
    penalty
    in
    an
    amount
    not
    to
    exceed
    $
    27,500
    per
    day
    of
    noncompliance
    for
    each
    vio
    lation.
    Civil
    Procedure
    >
    Pretrial
    Matters>
    General
    Overview
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Solid
    Wastes
    >
    Resource
    Recov
    ery
    &
    Recycling
    Governments
    >
    Legislation
    >
    Statutes
    of
    Limitations>
    Pleading
    &
    Proof
    [1TN4J
    The
    United
    States
    has
    the
    burden
    to
    establish
    each
    of
    the
    elements
    of
    liability
    under
    the
    Resource
    Conserva
    tion
    and
    Recovery
    Act,
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.
    In
    showing
    liability,
    the
    applicable
    statute
    of
    limitations,
    28
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    2462,
    stops
    any
    claim
    for
    penalty
    for
    a
    viola
    tion
    before
    May
    11,
    1993.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    General
    Overview
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances>
    Treatment,
    Storage
    &
    Disposal
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Solid
    Wastes
    >
    Resource
    Recov
    ery
    &
    Recycling
    [ENS]
    To
    establish
    a
    violation
    of
    the
    Resource
    Conser
    vation
    and
    Recovery
    Act
    (RCRA),
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.,
    the
    United
    States
    must
    prove
    fourgeneral
    elements:
    (1)
    that
    the
    defendant
    is
    a
    “person”
    within
    the
    meaning
    of
    the
    RCRA;
    (2)
    that
    the
    defendant
    has
    a
    “facility’
    within
    the
    meaning
    of
    the
    RCRA;
    (3)
    that
    the
    defendant
    did
    not
    have
    a
    permit
    or
    interim
    status
    for
    the
    treatment,
    storage,
    or
    disposal
    of
    hazardous
    waste;
    and
    (4)
    that
    the
    defen
    dant
    treated,
    stored,
    or
    disposed
    of
    hazardous
    waste.
    Enviromnental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Identification
    &
    Listing
    of
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Solid
    Wastes
    >
    Resource
    Recov
    ery
    &
    Recycling
    [HN6]
    The
    Resource
    Conservation
    and
    Recovery
    Act
    (RCRA),
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.,
    controls
    the
    release
    of
    a
    “hazardous
    waste.”
    If
    a
    substance
    exhibits
    certain
    characteristics,
    industrial
    wastewaters
    are
    subject
    to
    regulation
    under
    the
    RCRA.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Identification
    &
    Listing
    of
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    [RN7]
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6921
    provides
    two
    ways
    in
    which
    a
    waste
    will
    be
    considered
    “hazardous.”
    First,
    a
    waste
    will
    be
    classified
    as
    “hazardous”
    where
    the
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency
    (EPA)
    has
    specifically
    listed
    the
    waste
    as
    hazardous.
    By
    regulation,
    the
    EPA
    has
    listed
    a
    number
    of
    wastes
    as
    hazardous.
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.31-
    261.33
    (1989).
    The
    EPA
    will
    also
    classify
    a
    waste
    as
    “hazardous”
    if
    it
    has
    one
    or
    more
    of
    the
    characteristics
    of
    ignitability,
    corrosivity,
    reactivity,
    or
    toxicity.
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    26l.21-.26l.24.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Identification
    &
    Listing
    of
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    [HN8]
    Corrosiveness
    is
    the
    property
    that
    enables
    a
    sub
    stance
    to
    dissolve
    material
    with
    which
    it
    comes
    in
    con
    tact.
    Improperly
    managed
    corrosive
    wastes
    can
    pose
    a
    substantial
    present
    or
    potential
    danger
    to
    human
    health
    and
    the
    environment.
    Under
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.22
    and
    Ohio
    Admin.
    Code
    §
    3745-51-22,
    a
    waste
    is
    corrosive
    if
    it
    is
    aqueous
    and
    has
    a
    pH
    of
    two
    standard
    units
    or
    less,
    or
    greater
    than
    or
    equal
    to
    12.5
    standard
    units.
    Where
    a
    surface
    impoundment
    contains
    aqueous
    water
    with
    a
    pH
    of
    two
    standard
    units
    or
    less,
    on
    at
    least
    one
    occasion,
    the
    water
    in
    the
    surface
    impoundment
    is
    hazardous
    waste.

    Page
    3
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    *;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Identification
    &
    Listing
    of
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    [HN9]
    See
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.22(a)(1).
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Identification
    &
    Listing
    of
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Solid
    Wastes
    >
    Resource
    Recov
    ery
    &
    Recycling
    [RN
    10]
    Under
    the
    regulations,
    the
    United
    States
    must
    show
    that
    a
    defendant
    violated
    the
    Resource
    Conserva
    tion
    and
    Recovery
    Act
    (RCRA),
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.,
    via
    a
    “representative
    sample”
    of
    the
    water.
    RCRA
    regulations
    define
    “representative
    sample”
    as
    a
    sample
    of
    a
    universe
    or
    whole
    (e.g.,
    waste
    pile,
    lagoon,
    groundwa
    ter)
    which
    can
    be
    expected
    to
    exhibit
    the
    average
    proper
    ties
    of
    the
    universe
    or
    whole.
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    260.10.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Enforcement>
    Criminal
    Prosecutions
    [RN1
    1]
    While
    an
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency-
    approved
    test
    of
    a
    material
    will
    be
    persuasive
    evidence
    as
    to
    whether
    the
    material
    is
    hazardous
    waste,
    the
    United
    States
    is
    not
    required
    to
    prove
    this
    element
    through
    test
    data.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances>
    CERCLA
    &
    Superfund>
    General
    Overview
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    C’onservation
    &
    Recoveiy
    Act
    >
    General
    Overview
    [RN
    12]
    Failure
    to
    adhere
    to
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency
    (EPA)-approved
    test
    methods
    does
    not
    stop
    a
    finding
    of
    hazardous
    substances.
    Furthermore,
    failure
    to
    rigidly
    adhere
    to
    EPA-approved
    test
    methods
    does
    not
    render
    the
    sampling
    evidence
    inadmissible.
    Any
    devia
    tion
    from
    EPA
    guidelines
    goes
    to
    the
    weight
    of
    the
    evi
    dence
    and
    not
    its
    admissibility.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Identification
    &
    Listing
    of
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Solid
    Wastes
    >
    Resource
    Recov
    ery
    &
    Recycling
    [HN13]
    To
    show
    that
    wastewater
    contains
    hazardous
    substances
    and
    is,
    as
    a
    result,
    subject
    to
    the
    cradle-to-
    grave
    restrictions
    of
    the
    Resource
    Conservation
    and
    Re
    covery
    Act,
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.,
    the
    United
    States
    must
    show,
    via
    representative
    samples,
    only
    that
    the
    sur
    face
    impoundment
    contained
    aqueous
    water
    with
    a
    pH
    of
    two
    standard
    units
    or
    less,
    on
    at
    least
    one
    occasion.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    General
    Overview
    [H1
    14]
    In
    order
    to
    be
    valid,
    sampling
    must
    show
    that
    it
    is
    random,
    that
    is,
    that
    every
    unit
    of
    the
    population
    (e.g.,
    every
    location
    in
    a
    lagoon
    used
    to
    store
    a
    solid
    waste)
    has
    a
    theoretically
    equal
    chance
    of
    being
    sampled
    and
    meas
    ured,
    thus
    ensuring
    that
    the
    sample
    is
    representative
    of
    the
    population.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Identification
    &
    Listing
    of
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Solid
    Wastes
    >
    Resource
    Recov
    ery
    &
    Recycling
    [HN1S]
    Lime-neutralized
    spent
    pickle
    liquor
    is
    exempt
    from
    the
    Resource
    Conservation
    and
    Recovery
    Act’s,
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.,
    hazardous
    waste
    regulations
    under
    the
    iron
    and
    steel
    industry
    exemption
    in
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261
    .3(c)(2)(ii)(A).
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    General
    Overview
    [HN16]
    See
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    260.10.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Identification
    &
    Listing
    of
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Solid
    Wastes
    >
    Resource
    Recov
    ery
    &
    Recycling
    [HNI7J
    Under
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6925(a),
    (e)
    and
    Ohio
    Rev.
    Code
    §
    3734.02(F),
    3734.04,
    the
    owner
    and
    operator
    of
    a
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    unit
    is
    prohibited
    from
    operating
    a
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    unit
    except
    in
    accordance
    with
    a
    permit
    issued
    pursuant
    to
    the
    Resource
    Conservation
    Recovery
    Act,
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.,
    unless
    the
    facility
    has
    interim
    status.
    Enviro,imental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Enforcement>
    Civil
    Penalties
    [HN18]
    Under
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6928(a)
    and
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    270.1(b),
    a
    party
    may
    not
    store
    hazardous
    waste
    in
    a
    sur
    face
    impoundment
    without
    a
    permit
    or
    interim
    status.

    Page
    4
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    *;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    General
    Overview
    [HN19J
    Under
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6925(j),
    surface
    impound
    ments
    existing
    on
    November
    8;
    1984,
    were
    required
    to
    meet
    minimum
    technological
    requirements
    unless
    granted
    an
    exemption
    by
    the
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency
    or
    the
    state.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    General
    Overview
    [HN2O]
    Under
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    264.112
    andOhio
    Admin
    Code
    §
    3745-55-12,
    the
    owner
    or
    operator
    of
    a
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    unit
    is
    required
    to
    have
    a
    written
    clo
    sure
    plan.
    The
    closure
    plan
    must
    identify
    the
    steps
    needed
    to
    perform
    a
    partial
    or
    final
    closure
    of
    the
    facility.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >.
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    General
    Overview
    Environmental
    Law>
    Water
    Quality
    >
    Safe
    Drinking
    Water
    Act
    >
    National
    Drinking
    Water
    Regulations
    [HN2I]
    Under
    40
    C.F.
    R.
    §
    264.140
    -264.151
    and
    Ohio
    Admin.
    Code
    §
    3745-55-40
    to
    3745-55-51,
    the
    owner
    or
    operator
    of
    a
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    facility
    is
    required
    to
    have
    a
    detailed
    written
    estimate
    in
    current
    dollars
    of
    the
    cost
    of
    closing
    hazardous
    waste
    manage
    ment
    units.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    ‘onservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    General
    Overview
    Real
    Property
    Law>
    Water
    Rights>
    Groundwater
    [HN221
    The
    owner
    or
    operator
    of
    a
    surface
    impound
    ment
    is
    required
    to
    install,
    operate,
    and
    maintain
    a
    groundwater
    monitoring
    system
    which
    satisfies
    the
    crite
    ria
    contained
    at
    40
    C.F.R.
    Pt.
    264,
    subpt.
    F,
    and
    Ohio
    Admin.
    Code
    §
    3745-54-90
    to
    3745-54-99,
    3745-55-01
    to
    3745-55-02.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Enforcement>
    Civil
    Penalties
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Enforcement
    >
    Injunctive
    Relief
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Solid
    Wastes
    >
    Resource
    Recov
    ery
    &
    Recycling
    [HN23]
    Under
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6928(a),
    (g),
    a
    United
    States
    district
    court
    has
    the
    power
    to
    enjoin
    a
    defendant
    and
    to
    impose
    civil
    penalties
    for
    each
    violation
    of
    the
    Resource
    Conservation
    and
    Recovery
    Act,
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.,
    and
    the
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    pro
    gram
    forthe
    state.
    The
    district
    court
    can
    impose
    penalties
    of
    up
    to
    $
    25,000
    per
    day
    for
    each
    day
    of
    violation
    prior
    to
    January
    30,
    1997
    and
    $
    27,500
    for
    each
    day
    of
    viola
    tion
    thereafter.
    In
    determining
    the
    appropriate
    civil
    pen
    alties,
    the
    district
    court
    considers
    the
    seriousness
    of
    the
    violation,
    what
    efforts
    were
    made
    to
    comply
    with
    regula
    tions,
    the
    harm
    caused
    by
    the
    violation,
    the
    economic
    benefit
    derived
    from
    noncompliance,
    the
    defendant’s
    ability
    to
    pay,
    the
    United
    States’
    conduct,
    and
    the
    clarity
    of
    the
    obligation
    involved.
    In
    determining
    the
    penalty,
    the
    district
    court
    exercises
    its
    discretion.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Enforcement>
    Civil
    Penalties
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Solid
    Wastes
    >
    Resource
    Recov
    ery
    &
    Recycling
    [HN24]
    Where
    a
    proven
    violation
    of
    the
    Resource
    Con
    servation
    and
    Recovery
    Act,
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.,
    does
    not
    result
    in
    the
    creation
    of
    a
    situation
    with
    the
    po
    tential
    to
    seriously
    harm
    the
    environment,
    civil
    penalties
    have
    been
    substantially
    reduced.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    General
    Overview
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Solid
    Wastes
    >
    Resource
    Recov
    ery
    &
    Recycling
    Governments
    >
    Legislation
    >
    Statutes
    of
    Limitations
    >
    Time
    Limitations
    [HN25j
    The
    Resource
    Conservation
    and
    Recovery
    Act,
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.,
    encompasses
    both
    current
    and
    continuing
    violations,
    even
    if
    the
    latter
    originated
    in
    activities
    occurring
    before
    the
    applicable
    date
    of
    the
    stat
    ute.
    However,
    the
    assessment
    of
    a
    civil
    fine
    for
    a
    viola
    tion
    occurring
    prior
    to
    May
    11,
    1993,
    is
    limited
    by
    the
    federal
    statute
    of
    limitations
    found
    in
    28
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    2462.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Litigation
    &
    Administrative
    Pro
    ceedings>
    General
    Overview
    Governments
    >
    Legislation
    >
    Statutes
    of
    Limitations>
    Time
    Limitations
    [HN26]
    See
    28
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    2462.
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Litigation
    &
    Administrative
    Pro
    ceedings>
    General
    Overview

    Page
    5
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    *;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    [RN27]
    Courts
    shall
    respond
    to
    the
    Environmental
    Pro
    tection
    Agency’s
    undue
    agency
    delay
    by
    reducing
    penal
    ties
    in
    an
    enforcement
    action
    in
    order
    to
    counteract
    any
    incentive
    the
    agency
    might
    have
    to
    place
    itself
    in
    a
    supe
    rior
    litigating
    position.
    Civil
    Procedure
    >
    Equity
    >
    Adequate
    Remedy
    at
    Law
    Civil
    Procedure
    >
    Remedies
    >
    Injunctions
    >
    Elements
    >
    Irreparable
    Harm
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Litigation
    &
    Administrative
    Pro
    ceedings>
    General
    Overview
    [HN28]
    Normally,
    to
    obtain
    injunctive
    relief,
    a
    party
    must
    prove
    that
    there
    is
    no
    adequate
    remedy
    at
    law,
    that
    the
    plaintiff
    may
    suffer
    an
    irreparable
    injury
    if
    an
    injunc
    tion
    is
    not
    granted,
    and
    that
    the
    balance
    of
    the
    equities
    justifies
    an
    injunction.
    However,
    when
    the
    United
    States
    brings
    the
    action
    and
    shows
    that
    an
    activity
    endangers
    public
    health,
    injunctive
    relief
    is
    proper
    without
    under
    taking
    a
    balancing
    of
    the
    equities.
    In
    cases
    of
    public
    health
    legislation,
    the
    emphasis
    shifts
    from
    consideration
    of
    irreparable
    injury
    to
    concern
    for
    the
    general
    public
    interest.
    Environmental
    Law>
    Hazardous
    Wastes
    &
    Toxic
    Sub
    stances
    >
    Resource
    Conservation
    &
    Recovery
    Act
    >
    Enforcement
    >
    Injunctive
    Relief
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Litigation
    &
    Administrative
    Pro
    ceedings>
    General
    Overview
    Environmental
    Law
    >
    Solid
    Wastes
    >
    Resource
    Recov
    ery
    &
    Recycling
    [HN29]
    In
    deciding
    whether
    the
    strong
    remedy
    of
    injunc
    tive
    relief
    shall
    be
    given,
    a
    United
    States
    district
    court
    is
    most
    concerned
    with
    whether
    this
    relief
    is
    necessary
    to
    stop
    the
    danger
    that
    might
    result
    from
    violations
    of
    the
    Resource
    Conservation
    and
    Recovery
    Act,
    42
    U.S.C.S.
    §
    6901
    etseq.
    COUNSEL:
    For
    UNITED
    STATES
    OF
    AMERICA,
    plaintiff:
    Arthur
    I.
    Harris,
    Esq.,
    Office
    Of
    The
    U.S.
    At
    torney,
    Cleveland,
    OH.
    For
    UNITED
    STATES
    OF
    AMERICA,
    plaintiff:
    Francis
    J.
    Biros,
    Esq.,
    Department
    Of
    Justice,
    Washington,
    DC.
    For
    UNITED
    STATES
    OF
    AMERICA,
    plaintiff:
    Lois
    J.
    Schiffer,
    Esq.,
    Department
    Of
    Justice,
    Washington,
    DC.
    For
    UNITED
    STATES
    OF
    AMERICA,
    plaintiff:
    Frank
    Bentkover,
    Esq.,
    Drenaye
    Houston,
    Esq.,
    Matthew
    A.
    Fogelson,
    Esq.,
    Department
    Of
    Justice,
    Washington,
    DC.
    For
    WCI
    STEEL,
    INC.,
    defendant:
    Van
    Carson,
    Esq.,
    Lisa
    R.
    Duffett,
    Esq.,
    Ellen
    Seibenschuh,
    Esq.,
    Lisa
    D.
    Sutton,
    Esq.,
    Squire,
    Sanders
    &
    Dempsey,
    Cleveland,
    OH.
    For
    WCI
    STEEL,
    INC.,
    defendant:
    Vincent
    Atriano,
    Esq.,
    Squire,
    Sanders
    &
    Dempsey,
    Columbus,
    OH.
    JUDGES:
    Hon.
    James
    S.
    Gwin,
    U.S.
    District
    Court
    Judge.
    OPINION
    BY:
    James
    S.
    Gwin
    OPINION
    [*812]
    FINDINGS
    CONCLUSIONS
    OF
    LAW
    OF
    FACT
    AND
    In
    this
    action,
    the
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    alleges
    that
    three
    wastewater
    ponds
    at
    [*8
    13]
    Defendant
    WCI
    Steel’s
    Warren,
    Ohio
    steelmaking
    facility
    (Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A)
    are
    hazardous
    waste
    units,
    and
    as
    such
    are
    sub
    ject
    to
    regulation
    under
    the
    Resource
    Conservation
    and
    Recovery
    Act
    (“RCRA”),
    [*
    *2]
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.
    As
    grounds
    for
    this
    allegation,
    the
    United
    States
    claims
    that
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    once
    contained
    wastewa
    ter
    having
    a
    pH
    ‘of
    2.0
    standard
    units
    (“s.u.”)
    or
    lower,
    and
    thus
    had
    a
    cOrrosive
    characteristic.
    2
    1
    The
    measure
    of
    pH
    provides
    an
    estimate
    of
    the
    acidic
    agent
    (hydrogen
    ion)
    and
    the
    basic
    agent
    (hydroxide
    ion).
    2
    The
    United
    States’
    complaint
    alleges,
    inpart:
    24.
    One
    or
    more
    of
    the
    surface
    impound
    ments
    at
    the
    facility,
    including
    Ponds
    5,
    6
    and
    6A,
    have
    contained
    wastewaters
    which
    exhibited
    a
    pH
    of
    2
    or
    less
    during
    the
    time
    period
    relevant
    to
    this
    Complaint.
    25.
    Wastewaters
    flowing
    into,
    contained
    in,
    or
    flowing
    out
    of
    Ponds
    5,
    6
    and
    6A
    have
    exhib
    ited
    the
    characteristic
    of
    corrosivity
    and
    are
    a
    hazardous
    waste
    within
    the
    meaning
    of
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.20
    and
    261.22.
    26.
    Ponds
    5,
    6
    and
    6A
    at
    the
    facility
    are
    haz
    ardous
    waste
    management
    units
    as
    defined
    by
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    260.10,
    and
    O.A.C.
    §
    3747-50-
    10(A)(49)
    and
    are
    subject
    to
    regulation
    as
    haz
    ardous
    waste
    management
    units
    subject
    to
    the
    provisions
    of
    RCRA
    and
    the
    O.A.C.
    Complaint,
    PP
    24-26.
    [**3]
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    filed
    this
    action
    on
    May
    11,
    1998.
    To
    establish
    WCI’s
    use
    of
    corrosive
    sub
    stances,
    the
    United
    States
    principally
    relies
    upon
    sam
    pling
    it
    did
    in
    May
    and
    June
    1993
    and
    upon
    data
    supplied
    by
    WCI
    in
    early
    1994.

    Page
    6
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    *;
    1999
    U.S.
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    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    The
    parties
    having
    waived
    a
    jury,
    this
    matter
    went
    to
    trialbefore
    this
    Court.
    After
    observing
    the
    demeanor
    of
    the
    witnesses
    and
    considering
    the
    parties’
    evidence
    and
    arguments,
    the
    Court
    makes
    the
    following
    findings
    of
    fact
    and
    conclusions
    of
    law.
    I.
    FINDiNGS
    OF
    FACT
    A.
    History
    of
    WCI
    Steel
    The
    Defendant
    WCI
    Steel,
    Inc.
    (“WCI”)
    is
    an
    Ohio
    corporation
    with
    its
    principal
    place
    of
    business
    at
    1040
    Pine
    Avenue,
    Warren,
    Ohio.
    At
    this
    facility,
    Defendant
    WCI
    operates
    the
    last
    remaining
    integrated
    steel
    mill
    in
    the
    Mahoning
    River
    Valley.
    3
    All
    of
    the
    United
    States’
    claims
    relate
    to
    WCI’s
    Warren
    facility.
    WCI
    Warren
    facility
    manufactures
    hot
    rolled
    strip
    steel,
    pickled
    and
    oiled
    hot
    rolled
    steel
    strip,
    cold
    rolled
    steel,
    and
    coated
    flat
    steel
    products.
    Employing
    approxi
    mately
    2,200
    [**4j
    employees,
    WCI
    is
    the
    largest
    steel
    employer
    in
    the
    Mahoning
    Valley.
    Steel
    production
    began
    at
    the
    Warren
    facility
    in
    1912.
    Beginning
    in
    the
    1930s,
    Republic
    Steel
    Corpora
    tion
    owned
    the
    facility.
    In
    1984,
    Republic
    Steel
    Corpora
    tion
    merged
    with
    J&L
    Steel
    Corporation
    to
    form
    LTV
    Steel
    Company.
    In
    1988,
    LTV
    Steel
    Company
    .went
    into
    bankruptcy.
    With
    little
    potential
    to
    operate
    profitably,
    the
    bankruptcy
    trustee
    decided
    to
    sell
    the
    Warren
    facility
    to
    Defendant
    WCI
    for
    an
    insignificant
    price
    compared
    with
    the
    facility’s
    physical
    assets.
    4
    On
    August
    31,
    1988,
    Warren
    Consolidated
    In
    dustries,
    Inc.,
    acquired
    the
    facility
    from
    LTV
    Steel
    Company.
    In
    December
    1991,
    Warren
    Con
    solidated
    Industries,
    Inc.
    changed
    its
    corporate
    name
    to
    WCI
    Steel,
    Inc.
    In
    August
    1988,
    Defendant
    WCI
    purchased
    the
    War
    ren
    facility
    during
    a
    time
    of
    major
    decline
    in
    United
    States
    integrated
    steelmaking
    production.
    By
    saving
    the
    facility
    from
    shutdown,
    WCI
    greatly
    benefitted
    its
    work
    ers
    and
    the
    Warren,
    Ohio,
    community.
    5
    Product
    had
    declined
    by
    nearly
    50%
    in
    a
    dec
    ade.
    The
    year
    WCI
    purchased
    the
    Warren
    facility
    marked
    the
    seventh
    consecutive
    year
    of
    loss
    for
    the
    steel
    industry.
    [**5]
    After
    purchasing
    the
    Warren
    facility,
    Defen
    dant
    WCI
    made
    major
    investments
    in
    production
    equip
    ment
    and
    facilities.
    WCI
    spent
    more
    than
    $
    300
    million
    on
    capital
    improvements.
    These
    capital
    expenditures
    also
    reduced
    the
    amounts
    of
    pollution.
    [*8141
    B.
    Wastewater
    System
    At
    its
    Warren
    Ohio,
    facility,
    WCI
    has
    a
    system
    for
    the
    collection
    and
    treatment
    of
    wastewater
    generated
    in
    its
    steel
    production.
    The
    WCI
    steel
    facility
    first
    collects
    wastewater
    from
    manufacturing
    areas.
    This
    wastewater
    is
    then
    distributed
    to
    Pond
    5
    through
    a
    system
    of
    under
    ground
    sewers,
    pumps,
    and
    pipes.
    After
    settling
    and
    oil
    separation
    processes
    take
    place
    in
    Pond
    5,
    WCI
    conveys
    the
    wastewater
    to
    Pond
    6.
    From
    Pond
    6,
    WCI
    pumps
    the
    wastewater
    across
    the
    Mahoning
    River
    to
    a
    central
    treatment
    plant.
    In
    1986,
    LTV
    installed
    Pond
    6A
    to
    intercept
    and
    col
    lect
    seepage
    from
    Pond
    6
    before
    it
    reached
    the
    Mahoning
    River.
    The
    seepage
    collected
    in
    Pond
    6A
    is
    pumped
    back
    into
    Pond
    6.
    WCI
    primarily
    intends
    the
    pond
    system
    to
    equalize
    flow
    to
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant,
    to
    give
    storm
    water
    surge
    protection,
    and
    to
    allow
    the
    skimming
    of
    a
    substan
    tial
    portion
    of
    oil
    from
    the
    wastewater.
    Taken
    together,
    the
    areal
    extent
    of
    the
    Ponds
    is
    [**61
    slightly
    more
    than
    one
    acre.
    This
    wastewatertreatment
    system
    was
    constructed
    before
    WCI
    purchased
    the
    Warren
    facility
    in
    1988.
    Ponds
    5
    and
    6
    have
    been
    in
    use
    at
    the
    Defendant’s
    facility
    since
    before
    1950.
    Pond
    6A
    was
    added
    in
    1986.
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    have
    been
    in
    continuous
    use
    to
    the
    current
    date.
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    are
    each
    unlined
    earthen
    surface
    impoundments.
    6
    At
    relevant
    times,these
    surface
    im
    poundments
    were
    not
    equipped
    with
    impermeable
    liners.
    6
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    260.10,
    defmes
    a
    “surface
    im
    poundment”
    as:
    a
    facility
    or
    part
    of
    a
    facility
    which
    is
    a
    natural
    topographic
    de
    pression,
    man-made
    excavation,
    or
    diked
    area
    formed
    primarily
    of
    earthen
    materials
    (although
    it
    may
    be
    lined
    with
    man-made
    materi
    als),
    which
    is
    designed
    to
    hold
    an
    accumulation
    of
    liquid
    wastes
    of
    wastes
    containing
    free
    liquids,
    and
    which
    is
    not
    an
    injection
    well.
    Ex
    amples
    of
    surface
    impoundments
    are
    holding,
    storage,
    settling,
    and
    aeration
    pits,
    ponds
    and
    lagoons.
    Spent
    pickle
    liquor
    is
    listed
    by
    U.S.
    EPA
    as
    a
    corro
    sive
    [**7]
    and
    toxic
    hazardous
    waste
    under
    RCR.A
    regu
    lations
    at
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.32.
    However,
    if
    the
    acid
    was

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    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    neutralized
    by
    the
    addition
    of
    lime,
    then
    the
    pickle
    liquor
    would
    be
    exempt
    from
    RCRAs
    hazardous
    waste
    regula
    tions
    under
    the
    iron
    and
    steel
    industry
    exemption
    in
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    26l.3(c)(2)(ii)(A).
    7
    40
    CFR
    §
    261.3(c)(2)(ii)
    provides,
    in
    part:
    (ii)
    The
    following
    solid
    wastes
    are
    not
    haz
    ardous
    even
    though
    they
    are
    generated
    from
    the
    treatment,
    storage,
    or
    disposal
    of
    a
    hazardous
    waste,
    unless
    they
    exhibit
    one
    or
    more
    of
    the
    characteristics
    of
    hazardous
    waste:
    (A)
    Waste
    pickle
    liquor
    sludge
    generated
    by
    lime
    stabilization
    of
    spent
    pickle
    liquor
    from
    the
    iron
    and
    steel
    industry
    (SIC
    Codes
    331
    and
    332).
    By
    its
    nature,
    the
    steel
    industry
    often
    uses-corrosive
    materials.
    WCI
    uses
    spent
    hydrochloric
    pickling
    acids,
    acidic
    rinse
    waters,
    and
    acidic
    fume
    scrubber
    wastewa
    ters.
    Occasionally,
    WCI
    would
    inadvertently
    release
    quantities
    of
    these
    substances.
    When
    such
    spills
    oc
    curred,
    they
    more
    often
    occurred
    near
    the
    [**8]
    picklers
    than
    anywhere
    else.
    The
    picklers
    provided
    secondary
    containment
    for
    the
    acid
    tubs,
    designed
    to
    retain
    acid
    leaks
    or
    spills.
    WCI
    experienced
    leaks
    from
    the
    acidtubs
    on
    an
    infrequent
    basis.
    When
    such
    leaks
    occurred,
    WCI
    sought
    to
    isolate
    and
    neutralize
    the
    spilled
    acid,
    or
    “pickle
    liquor.”
    Before
    1993,
    WCI
    used
    a
    procedure
    of
    manually
    adding
    lime
    to
    the
    wastewaters
    whçn
    the
    wastewater
    pH
    fell
    to
    between
    3
    and
    4
    s.u.
    as
    measured
    by
    the
    influent
    probe
    at
    the
    central•
    treatment
    plant.
    Under
    this
    proce
    dure,
    employees
    would
    add
    a
    certain
    number
    of
    50-
    pound
    bags
    of
    lime
    to
    the
    wastewater.
    As
    to
    this
    deci
    sion,
    Environmental
    Engineer
    Richard
    Gradishar
    usually
    decided
    how
    many
    bags
    to
    add
    based
    upon
    the
    pH
    of
    the
    wastewater.
    However,
    WCI
    did
    not
    conduct
    any
    testing
    to
    learn
    whether
    the
    lime
    succeeded
    in
    neutralizing
    the
    acid.
    [*8
    15]
    In
    the
    early
    1990s,
    WCI
    considered
    replac
    ing
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    with
    a
    second-hand
    four
    million
    gallon
    above-ground
    tank.
    WCI
    obtained
    a
    permit
    from
    the
    EPA
    to
    install
    the
    tank.
    After
    obtaining
    this
    permit,
    WCI
    discovered
    that
    the
    tank
    was
    no
    longer
    in
    usable
    condition.
    Defendant
    WCI
    therefore
    did
    not
    complete
    the
    project.
    C.
    History
    of
    Environmental
    Review
    [**9]
    With
    this
    action,
    the
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    alleges
    that
    WCI
    was
    subject
    to
    RCRA
    because
    it
    dealt
    with
    hazardous
    substances
    without
    a
    permit.
    Defendant
    WCI
    does
    not
    have
    a
    permit
    issued
    pursuant
    to
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6925
    and
    6926
    to
    manage,
    treat,
    or
    store
    hazardous
    wastes
    in
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A.
    Nor
    does
    WCI
    qualify
    for
    interim
    status
    under
    §
    6925,
    which
    would
    temporarily
    exempt
    WCI
    from
    the
    permit
    requirement.
    8
    In
    order
    to
    qualify
    for
    such
    interim
    status,
    a
    facility
    had
    to
    demonstrate
    that:
    1)
    it
    wasin
    exis
    tence
    on
    November
    19,
    1980;
    2)
    it
    had
    complied
    with
    Section
    3010(a)
    of
    RCRA
    concerning
    notifi
    cation
    of
    hazardous
    waste
    activity;
    and
    3)
    it
    had
    made
    an
    application
    for
    a
    permit,
    Section
    3005(e)
    of
    RCRA,
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6925(e).
    Here,
    WCI
    nei
    ther
    provided
    notice
    of
    its
    hazardous
    waste
    activ
    ity
    nor
    made
    an
    application
    for
    a
    permit.
    Shortly
    after
    purchasing
    the
    WCI
    facility
    in
    1988,
    Defendant
    WCI
    applied
    for
    a
    National
    Pollutant
    Dis
    charge
    Elimination
    System
    Permit.
    [**10]
    After
    ap
    proving
    this
    application,
    the
    Ohio
    EPA
    allowed
    WCI
    to
    use
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    as
    sedimentation
    units
    under
    the
    Clean
    Water
    Act.
    However,
    the
    permit
    did
    not
    authorize
    WCI
    to
    treat,
    store,
    or
    dispose
    of
    hazardous
    wastes
    in
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    or
    6A.
    Defendant
    WCI
    next
    applied
    for
    and
    received
    an
    EPA
    Part
    B
    permit,
    authorizing
    the
    storage
    of
    spent
    pickle
    liquor
    processed
    through
    tanks.
    The
    EPA
    Part
    B
    permit
    required
    WCI
    to
    manage
    hazardous
    waste
    only
    according
    to
    the
    permit’s
    provisions.
    The
    Part
    B
    permit
    forbade
    any
    management
    of
    hazardous
    waste
    not
    author
    ized
    by
    the
    permit
    or
    otherwise
    exempted
    by
    law.
    In
    par
    ticular,
    the
    Part
    B
    permit
    did
    not
    authorize
    WCI
    to
    treat,
    store
    or
    dispose
    of
    spent
    pickle
    liquor
    or
    corrosive
    char
    acteristic
    wastes
    in
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    or
    6A.
    As
    part
    of
    its
    Part
    B
    permit,
    Defendant
    WCI
    in
    stalled
    groundwater
    monitoring
    wells
    near
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    in
    April
    1998.
    The
    results
    from
    these
    wells
    do
    not
    indicate
    that
    the
    Ponds
    adversely
    affect
    the
    ground
    water.
    Within
    Ohio,
    the
    Ohio
    EPA
    administers
    the
    RCRA
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    program
    as
    the
    U.S.
    EPA’s
    delegee
    under
    authorization
    by
    the
    U.S.
    EPA.
    As
    the
    U.S.
    EPA’s
    authorized
    delegee,
    the
    Ohio
    EPA
    had
    au
    thority
    [**l
    1]
    to
    inspect
    WCI’s
    facility
    and
    to
    decide
    whether
    WCI
    met
    the
    standards
    of
    RCRA
    and
    analogous
    Ohio
    law.
    9
    On
    June
    30,
    1989,
    the
    Ohio
    EPA
    was
    granted
    final
    authorization
    to
    administer
    and
    enforce
    the
    RCRA
    program
    as
    the
    U.S.
    EPA’s
    authorized
    delegee
    pursuant
    to
    Section
    3006
    of
    RCRA.
    Since
    1981,
    the
    Ohio
    EPA
    has
    conducted
    at
    least
    twelve
    hazardous
    waste
    compliance
    inspections
    of
    the
    facility.
    In
    conducting
    these
    inspections,
    the
    Ohio
    EPA
    had
    access
    to
    all
    WCI
    facilities.
    At
    the
    time
    of
    the
    in
    spections,
    WCI
    told
    the
    Ohio
    EPA
    that
    these
    surface
    impoundments
    were
    used
    as
    solid
    waste
    management

    Page
    8
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    *;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    units
    for
    waste
    waters
    from
    the
    cold
    rolling,
    coated
    prod
    ucts,
    and
    pickling
    operations.
    °
    After
    conducting
    these
    reviews,
    the
    Ohio
    EPA
    has
    never
    alleged
    or
    determined
    that
    the
    Ponds
    were
    hazardous
    waste
    units
    under
    RCRA.
    10
    Testimony
    of
    Ohio
    EPA
    employee
    Kristen
    Switzer
    at
    27-28.
    [**12]
    II.
    Sampling
    A.
    Consultant
    Sampling
    As
    indicated,
    the
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    alleges
    that
    WCI
    handled
    corrosive
    wastes
    that
    were
    hazardous.
    Be
    cause
    it
    has
    scant
    sampling
    data
    of
    its
    own,
    the
    United
    States
    [*816]
    relies
    upon
    studies
    undertaken
    by
    others
    at
    various
    times.
    Defendant
    WCI
    employed
    engineers
    who
    took
    sam
    ples
    on
    at
    least
    two
    occasions.
    On
    June
    20,
    1989,
    Dun
    can,
    Lagnese
    &
    Associates
    conducted
    hourly
    sampling
    of
    the
    wastewater
    in
    the
    surface
    impoundments.
    Of
    twenty-four
    grab
    samples
    collected
    by
    these
    engineers,
    twenty-one
    had
    a
    pH
    value
    of
    2.0
    s.u.
    or
    below.
    These
    samples
    were
    not
    taken
    as
    part
    of
    a
    sampling
    plan
    of
    the
    whole
    ponds.
    11
    One
    sample
    was
    gathered
    every
    hour
    for
    twenty-four
    hours.
    In
    1990,
    WCI’s
    contractor,
    Remcor,
    Inc.,
    sampled
    the
    sludges
    in
    Ponds
    5
    and
    6
    following
    a
    formal
    sam
    pling
    plan.
    After
    conducting
    this
    sampling,
    Remcor
    found
    the
    sludges
    were
    not
    corrosive
    or
    hazardous.
    In
    October
    1993,
    engineers
    Killam
    Associates
    con
    ducted
    a
    study
    for
    WCI.
    While
    doing
    this
    study,
    Killam
    collected
    [**13]
    three
    grab
    samples
    from
    the
    bosh
    box
    that
    channels
    wastewater
    to
    the
    surface
    impoundments.
    The
    three
    samples
    collected
    by
    Killam
    had
    pH
    values
    of
    1.3,
    1.7
    and
    2.0
    s.u.,
    respectively.
    After
    completing
    this
    sampling
    of
    the
    bosh
    box,
    Killam
    Associates
    gave
    the
    opinion
    that
    the
    pH
    of
    the
    wastewater
    in
    the
    surface
    im
    poundments
    was
    between
    1.9
    and
    2.0
    s.u.
    These
    Killam
    Associates
    samples
    were
    not
    taken
    as
    part
    of
    a
    sampling
    plan
    that
    sought
    to
    find
    the
    average
    properties
    of
    the
    whole
    ponds.
    B.
    1993
    U.S.
    EPA
    Multimedia
    Inspection
    Beginning
    on
    May
    12,
    1993,
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    con
    ducted
    a
    ‘multimedia”
    inspection
    of
    WCI’s
    facility
    under
    the
    Clean
    Water
    Act,
    the
    Clean
    Air
    Act,
    RCRA,
    and
    the
    Toxic
    Substances
    Control
    Act.
    During
    this
    inspection,
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    collected
    a
    grab
    sample
    of
    wastewater
    be
    ing
    pumped
    from
    Pond
    6A
    to
    Pond
    6.
    U.S.
    EPA
    took
    the
    sample
    from
    the
    flow
    of
    the
    wastewater
    as
    it
    entered
    Pond
    6.
    The
    field
    measurements
    of
    this
    sample
    revealed
    a
    pH
    of
    1.81
    s.u.,
    below
    the
    regulatory
    limit
    of
    2.0
    s.u.
    On
    June
    15,
    1993,
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    inspectors
    returned
    and
    took
    another
    grab
    sample
    of
    water
    from
    Pond
    6A.
    The
    sample’s
    pH
    was
    above
    2.0
    s.u.
    During
    this
    June
    1993
    inspection,
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    also
    [**14]
    collected
    a
    sample
    of
    wastewater
    from
    a
    process
    that
    uses
    acid
    pickle
    liquor
    to
    treat
    steel.
    The
    U.S.
    EPA
    field
    measurements
    of
    this
    sample
    showed
    a
    pH
    of
    1.65
    s.u.
    The
    U.S.
    EPA
    also
    collected
    a
    grab
    sample
    from
    wastewater
    flowing
    from
    Pond
    6
    at
    the
    point
    where
    it
    comrningles
    with
    wastewater
    from
    the
    Basic
    Oxygen
    Furnace.
    The
    field
    measurements
    of
    the
    sample
    showed
    a
    pH
    of
    1.67
    s.u.
    C.
    Central
    Treatment
    Plant
    Aeration
    Influent
    Probe
    WCI’s
    wastewaters
    are
    pumped
    from
    Pond
    6
    to
    an
    inlet
    box
    outside
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant.
    In
    support
    of
    its
    claim
    that
    WCI’s
    wastewater
    was
    corrosive,
    the
    United
    States
    principally
    relies
    upon
    WCI’s
    own
    pH
    readings
    taken
    at
    the
    influent
    probe
    outside
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant.
    While
    EPA
    regulations
    did
    not
    require
    WCI
    to
    monitor
    the
    pH
    at
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant,
    it
    nonethe
    less
    did
    so.
    To
    treat
    its
    wastewater,
    WCI
    has
    measured
    the
    pH
    of
    the
    wastewater
    as
    itflows
    through
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant.
    At
    this
    point,
    the
    influent
    box
    receives
    wastewater
    from
    Pond
    6
    and
    other
    process
    sources.
    To
    make
    these
    measurements,
    WCI
    uses
    several
    pH
    probes
    that
    continuously
    monitor
    the
    pH
    of
    the
    wastewa
    ter
    as
    it
    flows
    through
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant.
    [**15]
    WCI
    put
    one
    inflow
    pH
    probe
    at
    the
    aeration
    influent
    box.
    The
    pH
    meter
    at
    the
    aeration
    influent
    box
    measures
    the
    pH
    of
    the
    wastewater
    as
    it
    flows
    from
    Pond
    6
    into
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant.
    WCI
    submerges
    this
    probe
    in
    the
    flow
    of
    the
    wastewater
    as
    it
    enters
    the
    aeration
    influent
    box.
    2
    12
    The
    pH
    meter
    used
    by
    WCI
    to
    measure
    the
    pH
    of
    Pond
    6
    influent
    wastewater
    is
    a
    glass
    membrane
    electrode
    selective
    for
    hydrogen
    ion
    in
    combination
    with
    a
    pH
    meter.
    The
    pH
    meter
    used
    by
    WCI
    to
    measure
    Pond
    6
    influent
    pH
    is
    equipped
    with
    a
    microprocessor
    that
    handles
    the
    mathematics
    of
    the
    measurement.
    The
    pH
    meter
    used
    by
    WCI
    to
    measure
    the
    pH
    of
    Pond
    6
    influ
    ent
    wastewater
    displays
    the
    numerical
    pH
    value.
    [*8
    17]
    At
    least
    once
    a
    week,
    WCI
    Combustion
    De
    partment
    personnel
    calibrate
    the
    pH
    meter
    used
    to
    meas
    ure
    the
    pH
    of
    Pond
    6
    influent
    wastewater.
    Defendant

    Page
    9
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    *;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC(BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    WCI
    argues
    that
    the
    method
    used
    to
    calibrate
    this
    probe
    resulted
    in
    inaccurate.
    EPA
    guidelines
    recommend
    a
    two-standard
    calibra
    tion
    technique
    to
    calibrate
    pH
    meters.
    To
    calibrate
    [**
    16]
    the
    probe,
    the
    Combustion
    Department
    personnel
    use
    two
    buffer
    solutions
    with
    specified
    pH.
    Typically,
    they
    use
    buffer
    solutions
    with
    pH
    of
    2.0
    and
    4.0.
    In
    contrast,
    pH
    calibration
    is
    better
    done
    using
    a
    neutral
    buffer
    solu
    tion
    of
    7.0
    with
    a
    second
    solution
    with
    pH
    of
    either
    4.0
    or
    10.0.
    It
    is
    unlikely
    that
    the
    maintenance
    crew
    could
    achieve
    completely
    accurate
    probe
    calibrations
    using
    the
    buffer
    solutions
    with
    pH
    of
    2.0
    and
    4.0.
    Amounts
    of
    oil
    and
    grease
    were
    usually
    in
    the
    wastewater
    influent
    as
    it
    enters
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant.
    The
    oil
    and
    grease
    can
    quickly
    coat
    a
    pH
    probe,
    rendering
    its
    readings
    less
    accurate.
    Oil
    and
    grease
    can
    foul
    a
    probe
    if
    they
    are
    present
    in
    sufficient
    concentra
    tion.
    Because
    of
    the
    presence
    of
    oil
    and
    grease
    in
    the
    wastewater
    flowing
    into
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant,
    plant
    operators
    cleaned
    the
    influent
    pH
    probe
    by
    removing
    the
    submerged
    probe
    from
    the
    flow
    of
    the
    wastewater
    and
    dipping
    the
    probe
    in
    acid.
    The
    operators
    cleaned
    the
    in-
    fluent
    pH
    probe
    in
    an
    acid
    solution
    once
    per
    shift,
    or
    three
    times
    per
    day.
    Though
    a
    brief
    exposure
    to
    an
    acid
    solution
    can
    effectively
    clean
    mineral
    deposits
    from
    a
    pH
    electrode,
    it
    is
    not
    an
    effective
    cleaning
    agent
    for
    [**17]
    oil
    and
    grease
    deposits.
    These
    problems
    make
    the
    influ
    ent
    probe
    readings
    less
    accurate.
    Defendant
    WCI
    recorded
    the
    readings
    from
    the
    pH
    meters
    at
    the
    aeration
    influent
    box
    every
    two
    hours
    from
    September
    1,
    1988
    to
    February
    22,
    1995,
    and
    every
    hour
    from
    February
    23,
    1995
    to
    July
    31,
    1998.
    Between
    September
    1,
    1988
    and
    July
    31,
    1998,
    WCI’s
    central
    treatment
    plant
    operators
    recorded
    more
    than
    11,000
    pH
    values
    of
    2.0
    s.u.
    or
    less
    for
    Pond
    6
    wastewater
    entering
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant.
    Such
    readings
    occurred
    on
    1,361
    different
    days.
    At
    least
    one
    reading
    of
    1.7
    s.u.
    or
    less
    occurred
    on
    577
    different
    days.
    Also,
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant
    operators
    recorded
    at
    least
    31
    pH
    measurements
    of
    12.5
    s.u.
    or
    above
    for
    Pond
    6
    wastewater
    entering
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant.
    Taken
    as
    a
    whole,
    these
    measurements
    did
    not
    significantly
    vary
    from
    1989
    to
    December
    1993.
    In
    December
    1993,
    WCI
    installed
    an
    automated
    lime
    slurry
    injection
    system
    at
    the
    No.
    9
    Lift
    Station.
    For
    a
    period,
    this
    lime
    injection
    system
    reduced,
    but
    did
    not
    completely
    stop
    pH
    readings
    of
    2.0
    s.u.
    or
    less.
    13
    The
    system
    has
    now
    eliminated
    measurements
    with
    a
    pH
    of
    2.0
    s.u.
    or
    less
    at
    the
    influent
    probe
    to
    the
    central
    treat
    ment[**18]
    plant.
    13
    After
    installation
    of
    the
    lime
    injection
    system
    in
    December
    1993,
    central
    treatment
    plant
    opera
    tors
    recorded
    an
    additional
    358
    measurements
    on
    77
    separate
    days
    of
    2.0
    s.u.
    or
    less
    for
    the
    waste-
    water
    in
    Pond
    6
    over
    the
    next
    two
    years.
    D.
    Grab
    Samples
    Beyond
    measurements
    madewith
    the
    influent
    probe,
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant
    operators
    also
    recorded
    grab
    sample
    pH
    measurements
    for
    Pond
    6
    wastewater
    asit
    entered
    the
    aeration
    influent
    box
    at
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant.
    WCI
    made
    197
    pH
    measurements
    via
    such
    grab
    samples.
    Operators
    took
    these
    samples
    by
    placing
    a
    labo
    ratory
    beaker
    in
    the
    flow
    of
    the
    wastewater
    as
    it
    enters
    the
    aeration
    influent
    box.
    The
    central
    treatment
    plant
    operators
    then
    measure
    the
    pH
    of
    the
    grab
    samples
    with
    a
    bench
    meter
    in
    the
    central
    treatment
    [*818]
    plant
    office.
    The
    taking
    of
    grab
    samples
    is
    a
    method
    for
    checking
    the
    accuracy
    of
    in-line
    pH
    probes.
    These
    grab
    samples
    showed
    pH
    readings
    of
    2.0
    s.u.
    or
    less
    on
    many
    occasions.
    E.
    Sludge
    Sampling
    Several
    samples
    of
    sludge
    from
    Pond
    [**l9]
    6
    were
    also
    tested
    for
    pH
    values.
    In
    October
    1985,
    an
    LTV
    con
    tractor
    tested
    30
    samples
    of
    sludge
    from
    Ponds
    5
    and
    6
    and
    found
    an
    average
    pH
    of
    the
    sludges
    to
    be
    6.3,
    with
    all
    measurements
    falling
    within
    the
    range
    of
    5.5
    to
    7.5.
    In
    1990,
    a
    WCI
    contractor
    sampled
    the
    sludges
    in
    Ponds
    5
    and
    6
    and
    found
    they
    were
    nonhazardous.
    And
    in
    1996
    and
    1998,
    sampling
    performed
    by
    a
    WCI
    con
    sultant
    again
    found
    the
    pH
    of
    the
    Ponds’
    sludges
    ranged
    between
    5.4
    s.u.
    and
    10.9
    s.u.
    Thus,
    there
    is
    no
    evidence
    that
    any
    sludge
    from
    Ponds
    5
    or
    6
    was
    ever
    hazardous.
    Only
    wastewater
    measurements
    indicate
    potential
    corrosiveness.
    Having
    set
    forth
    relevant
    findings
    of
    fact,
    the
    Court
    now
    offers
    its
    conclusions
    of
    law.
    III.
    CONCLUSIONS
    OF
    LAW
    A.
    Overview
    of
    RCRA
    The
    Resource
    Conservation
    and
    Recovery
    Act,
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6901
    et
    seq.
    (“RCRA”)
    was
    enacted
    in
    1976
    to
    regulate
    the
    treatment,
    storage,
    transportation,
    and
    dis
    posal
    of
    hazardous
    wastes.
    RCRA
    seeks
    to
    ensure
    that
    such
    wastes
    are
    “managed
    in
    a
    manner
    which
    protects
    human
    health
    and
    the
    environment.’
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6902(a)(4)
    and
    (b).
    Subtitle
    C
    of
    RCRA
    establishes
    a
    comprehensive
    federal
    regulatory
    program
    for
    [**20]
    the
    management
    of
    hazardous
    waste.
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    692
    1-
    6939.

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    **;
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    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    [1{Nlj
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6925(a)
    prohibits
    the
    operation
    of
    any
    facility
    that
    treats,
    stores,
    or
    disposes
    of
    hazardous
    wastes,
    except
    in
    accordance
    with
    a
    permit.
    United
    States
    v.
    Heuer,
    4
    F.3d
    723,
    730
    (9th
    Cir.
    1993)
    (‘It
    is
    funda
    mental
    that
    an
    entity
    which
    performs
    a
    hazardous
    waste
    activity
    for
    which
    a
    permit
    is
    required
    under
    RCR.A
    may
    not
    legally
    perform
    that
    activity
    unless
    it
    has
    a
    permit
    for
    the
    relevant
    activity.”).
    Moreover,
    a
    party
    receiving
    a
    permit
    to
    store
    or
    dispose
    of
    hazardous
    waste
    must
    there
    after
    comply
    with
    the
    requirements
    of
    the
    permits.
    [HN2]
    If
    certain
    requirements
    are
    met,
    RCRA
    al
    lows
    states
    to
    operate
    hazardous
    waste
    regulatory
    pro
    grams
    in
    lieu
    of
    the
    federal
    program.
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6926(b).
    Even
    where
    a
    state
    is
    given
    authority
    to
    operate
    such
    a
    regulatory
    program,
    the
    United
    States
    retains
    the
    right
    to
    enforce
    the
    state
    authorized
    programs.
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6928(a)(2).
    On
    June
    30,
    1989,
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    granted
    final
    authorization
    to
    the
    State
    of
    Ohio
    to
    administer
    and
    enforce
    the
    State’s
    hazardous
    waste
    program
    in
    [**2
    1]
    the
    State
    of
    Ohio.
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6926(b).
    The
    Ohio
    EPA
    administers
    the
    RCRA
    program
    within
    Ohio.
    [HN3]
    Under
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6928(a),
    the
    United
    States
    may
    file
    a
    civil
    action
    in
    federal
    district
    court
    to
    obtain
    appropriate
    relief,
    including
    a
    temporary
    or
    permanent
    injunction
    upon
    obtaining
    information
    that
    any
    person
    has
    violated
    or
    is
    violating
    any
    requirement
    of
    RCRA.
    If
    a
    violation
    is
    shown,
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6928(g)
    provides
    for
    a
    civil
    penalty
    in
    an
    amount
    not
    to
    exceed
    $
    27,500
    per
    day
    of
    noncompliance
    for
    each
    violation.
    14
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6928(g)
    provides
    for
    a
    civil
    pen
    alty
    in
    an
    amount
    not
    to
    exceed
    $
    25,000
    per
    day
    of
    noncompliance
    for
    each
    violation.
    This
    amount
    has
    been
    adjusted
    pursuant
    to
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    Civil
    Monetary
    Penalty
    Inflation
    Adjustment
    Rule,
    to
    $
    27,500
    per
    day.
    [11N4]
    The
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    has
    the
    burden
    to
    establish
    each
    of
    the
    elements
    of
    liability
    under
    RCRA.
    In
    showing
    liability,
    the
    applicable
    statute
    [**22]
    of
    limitations,
    28
    U.S.C.
    §
    2462,
    stops
    any
    claim
    for
    pen
    alty
    for
    a
    violation
    before
    May
    11,
    1993.
    15
    Pretrial
    Order,
    Unéontroverted
    Fact
    No.
    3.
    [*8
    19]
    [HN5I
    To
    establish
    a
    violation
    of
    RCRA,
    the
    United
    States
    must
    prove
    four
    general
    elements:
    (1)
    that
    WCI
    is
    a
    “person”
    within
    the
    meaning
    of
    RCRA;
    (2)
    that
    WCI’s
    Warren,
    Ohio
    steel
    plant
    is
    a
    “facility”
    within
    the
    meaning
    of
    RCRA;
    (3)
    that
    WCIdid
    not
    have
    a
    per
    mit
    or
    interim
    status
    for
    the
    treatment,
    storage,
    or
    dis
    posal
    of
    hazardous
    wastein
    the
    ponds;
    and
    (4)
    that
    WCI
    treated,
    stored,
    or
    disposed
    of
    hazardous
    waste
    in
    the
    ponds.
    United
    States
    v.
    T
    &
    S
    Brass
    &
    Bronze
    Works,
    Inc.,
    681
    F.
    Supp.
    314,
    317
    (D.S.C.
    1988);
    United
    States
    v.
    Conservation
    Chemical
    Co.,
    733
    F.
    Supp.
    1215,
    1220
    (N.D.
    md.
    1989).
    Defendant
    WCI
    acknowledges
    that
    it
    is
    a
    “person”
    within
    the
    meaning
    of
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6903(15)
    and
    that
    WCI’s
    integrated
    steel
    plant,
    and
    all
    buildings,
    structures,
    and
    surface
    impoundments
    [*
    *23]
    located
    there,
    com
    prise
    a
    “facility”
    within
    the
    meaning
    of
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    260.10.
    WCI
    also
    concedes
    it
    did
    not
    have
    a
    permit
    for
    the
    treatment,
    storage,
    or
    disposal
    of
    hazardous
    waste.
    WCI
    disputes
    only
    that
    it
    treated,
    stored
    or
    disposed
    of
    hazardous
    waste.
    The
    Court
    now
    addresses
    the
    standards
    by
    which
    hazardous
    waste
    is
    identified.
    The
    Court
    then
    determines
    whether,
    upon
    applying
    these
    standards,
    WCI
    has
    vio
    lated
    RCRA.
    B.
    Standards
    for
    Determining
    “Hazardous
    Waste”
    1.
    Regulatory
    Classification
    and
    Corrosivity
    [HN6]
    RCRA
    controls
    the
    release
    of
    a
    “hazardous
    waste.”
    If
    a
    substance
    exhibits
    certain
    characteristics,
    industrial
    wastewaters
    are
    subject
    to
    regulation
    under
    RCRA.
    [HN7]
    UnitedStates
    v.
    Dean,
    969
    F.2d
    187,
    194
    (6th
    Cir.
    1992).
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6921
    provides
    two
    ways
    in
    which
    a
    waste
    will
    be
    considered
    “hazardous.”
    First,
    a
    wastewill
    be
    classified
    as
    “hazardous”
    where
    the
    EPA
    has
    specifi
    cally
    listed
    the
    waste
    as
    hazardous.
    Byregulation,
    the
    EPA
    has
    listed
    a
    number
    of
    wastes
    as
    hazardous.
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.31-261.33
    (1989).
    For
    example,
    spent
    pickle
    liquor,
    which
    the
    United
    States
    claims
    WCI
    dis
    charged
    into
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A,
    is
    a
    listed
    hazardous
    [**24]
    waste
    under
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.32.
    The
    EPA
    will
    also
    classify
    a
    waste
    as
    “hazardous”
    if
    it
    has
    one
    or
    more
    of
    the
    characteristics
    of
    ignitability,
    corrosivity,
    reactivity,
    or
    toxicity.
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.21-
    .24.
    Here,
    the
    United
    States
    claims
    that
    WCI
    stored
    or
    disposed
    of
    corrosive
    waste.
    [HN8]
    Corrosiveness
    is
    the
    property
    that
    enables
    a
    substance
    to
    dissolve
    material
    with
    which
    it
    comes
    in
    contact.
    Improperly
    managed
    corrosive
    wastes
    can
    pose
    a
    substantial
    present
    or
    potential
    danger
    to
    human
    health
    and
    the
    environment.
    As
    explained
    in
    further
    detail
    below,
    under
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.22
    and
    O.A.C.
    §
    3745-51-22,
    a
    waste
    is
    corrosive
    if
    it
    is
    aqueous
    and
    has
    a
    pH
    of
    2.0
    s.u.
    or
    less
    or
    greater
    than
    or
    equal
    to
    12.5
    s.u.
    Where
    a
    surface
    im
    poundment
    contains
    aqueous
    water
    with
    a
    pH
    of
    2.0
    s.u.
    or
    less,
    on
    at
    least
    one
    occasion,
    the
    water
    in
    the
    surface
    impoundment
    is
    hazardous
    waste.
    The
    United
    States
    here
    principally
    contends
    that
    substances
    in
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    are
    corrosive,
    as
    having
    had
    pH
    of
    2.0
    s.u.
    or
    less.

    Page
    11
    72
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    *;
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    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    As
    noted
    above,
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6925(a)
    prohibits
    the
    operation
    of
    any
    facility
    that
    treats,
    stores,
    or
    disposes
    of
    hazardous
    wastes,
    except
    in
    accordance
    with
    [**25]
    a
    permit.
    United
    States
    v.
    Heuer,
    4
    F.3d
    723,
    730
    (9th
    Cir.
    1993).
    Moreover,
    a
    party
    receiving
    a
    permit
    to
    store
    or
    dispose
    of
    hazardous
    waste
    must
    thereafter
    comply
    with
    the
    requirements
    of
    the
    permits.
    If
    WCI
    treated,
    stored,
    or
    disposed
    of
    waste
    at
    the
    Warren
    facility,
    it
    was
    required
    under
    RCRA
    to
    have
    a
    permit
    to
    do
    so.
    It
    is
    undisputed
    that
    WCI
    had
    no
    permit
    to
    treat,
    store,
    or
    dispose
    of
    hazardous
    waste.
    Therefore,
    if
    the
    Court
    finds
    WCI
    maintained
    hazardous
    waste
    at
    its
    Warren
    facility,
    WCI
    has
    violated
    RCRA
    and
    is
    subject
    to
    fines
    under
    RCRA.
    [*820]
    The
    parties
    offer
    differing
    views
    regarding
    how
    the
    Court
    should
    determine
    whether
    hazardous
    waste
    is
    treated,
    stored,
    or
    disposed
    of
    at
    WCI’s
    Warren
    facility.
    Defendant
    WCI
    says
    the
    evidence
    offered
    by
    the
    United
    States
    is
    insufficient
    to
    support
    a
    finding
    that
    WCI
    maintains
    hazardous
    waste
    at
    the
    facility
    because
    the
    substances
    at
    the
    site
    were
    improperly
    sampled.
    The
    United
    States
    contends
    that
    even
    if
    the
    available
    samples
    do
    not
    conform
    to
    a
    specific
    methodology
    described
    in
    RCRA’s
    regulations,
    the
    weight
    of
    evidence
    supports
    its
    contention
    that
    WCI
    treated,
    stored,
    or
    disposed
    of
    haz
    ardouswaste
    at
    the
    Warren
    [*
    *26]
    facility.
    The
    Court
    now
    examines
    whether
    RCRA’s
    regula
    tions
    require
    a
    particular
    sampling
    methodology.
    2.
    Sampling
    Methodology
    The
    United
    States
    claims
    WCI
    violated
    RCRA’s
    prohibitions
    against
    hazardous
    waste
    by
    maintaining
    “corrosive”
    waste
    at
    the
    Warren
    facility.
    The
    regulations
    currently
    define
    “corrosivity”
    in.the
    following
    way:
    [HN9]
    Sec.
    261.22
    Characteristic
    of
    corrosivity.
    (a)
    A
    solid
    waste
    exhibits
    the
    character
    istic
    of
    corrosivity
    if
    a
    representative
    sample
    of
    the
    waste
    has
    either
    of
    the
    fol
    lowing
    properties:
    (1)
    It
    is
    aqueous
    and
    has
    a
    pH
    less
    than
    or
    equal
    to
    2
    or
    greater
    than
    or
    equal
    to
    12.5,
    as
    determined
    by
    a
    pH
    meter
    us
    ing
    Method
    9040
    in
    “Test
    Methods
    for
    Evaluating
    Solid
    Waste,
    Physi
    cailChemical
    Methods,”
    EPA
    Publication
    SW-846,
    as
    incorporated
    by
    reference
    in
    Sec.
    260.11
    of
    this
    chapter.
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    26l.22(a)(l)
    (emphasis
    added).
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    asserts
    that
    WCI
    violated
    RCRA
    by
    main-
    taming
    wastewater
    with
    a
    pH
    of
    less
    than
    or
    equal
    to
    2.
    [HN1O]
    Under
    the
    regulations,
    the
    United
    States
    must
    show
    such
    violation
    via
    a
    “representative
    sample”
    of
    the
    water.
    RCRA
    regulations
    define
    “representative
    sample”
    as
    “a
    sample
    of
    a
    universe
    or
    whole
    (e.
    [**27]
    g.,
    waste
    pile,
    lagoon,
    groundwater)
    which
    can
    be
    expected
    to
    ex
    hibit
    the
    average
    properties
    of
    the
    universe
    or
    whole.”
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    260.10.
    This
    definition
    has
    remained
    unchanged
    since
    originally
    promulgated
    by
    U.S.
    EPA
    in
    1980.
    45
    Fed.
    Reg.
    33066,
    33075
    (May
    19,
    1980).
    This
    defmition
    suggests
    that
    a
    finding
    of
    a
    RCRA
    violation
    must
    depend
    upon
    reliable
    and
    accurate
    sam
    pling.
    WCI
    urges
    that
    the
    Court
    interpret
    the
    regulations
    to
    require
    a
    particular
    sampling
    method
    before
    results
    may
    be
    viewed
    as
    a
    reliable
    and
    accurate
    indication
    of
    corrosivity.
    WCI
    says
    that
    the
    sampling
    method
    used
    makes
    a
    difference
    because
    the
    Pond
    substances
    were
    heterogeneous.
    16
    Therefore,
    unless
    an
    appropriate
    sam
    pling
    method
    is
    used,
    WCI
    says
    the
    results
    will
    not
    re
    flect
    “the
    average
    properties
    of
    the
    universe
    or
    [*821]
    whole.”
    WCI
    says
    that
    the
    sampling
    presented
    here
    by
    the
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    does
    not
    meet
    the
    require
    ments
    adopted
    in
    the
    EPA’s
    own
    regulations.
    16
    In
    an
    October
    1985
    study,the
    engineering
    firm
    Duncan,
    Lagnese
    &
    Associates
    sampled
    sludge
    from
    Ponds
    5
    and
    6.
    It
    reported
    that
    the
    waste
    in
    the
    Ponds
    was
    heterogeneous,
    due
    to
    “considerable
    variation
    from
    point
    to
    point
    for
    all
    parameters
    measured.”
    Exh.
    CJ.
    Expert
    Charles
    Blumenscheim
    testified
    credibly
    on
    this
    issue:
    Q.
    Do
    you
    know
    whether
    the
    waste
    material
    in
    the
    ponds
    at
    WCI
    is
    homogeneous
    or
    heteroge
    neous?
    A.
    In
    my
    opinion
    it
    is
    not
    ho
    mogeneous
    its
    heterogeneous.
    Q.
    And
    what’s
    the
    basis
    for
    that
    opinion?
    ***
    A.
    These
    the
    water
    entering
    this
    pond
    5,
    the
    way
    the
    pond
    is
    configured,
    this
    is
    a
    classic
    exam
    ple
    of
    what
    we
    call
    plug-flow
    re
    gion.
    In
    the
    term
    of
    art.
    But
    what
    it
    means
    is
    that
    as
    the
    water
    enters
    the
    pond,
    it
    will
    move
    down
    the
    pond
    as
    a
    river
    would
    flow,
    if
    you
    can
    just
    visualize
    this
    as
    a
    river

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    (BNA)
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    30
    ELR
    20169
    and
    any
    water
    entering
    here
    will
    move
    down
    this
    pond
    in
    segments.
    There
    is
    no
    mixers
    in
    this
    to
    make
    it
    homogeneous,
    and
    as
    the
    water
    enters
    this
    pond
    and
    then
    ulti
    mately
    leaves
    the
    pond,
    enters
    the
    pipeline
    and
    enters
    this
    pond
    and
    again
    this
    water
    will
    move
    through
    this
    pond
    to
    these
    pumps
    and
    be
    pumped
    out
    and
    any
    water
    here
    again
    will
    enter
    this
    pond
    and
    be
    pumped
    to
    this
    pond
    so
    this
    is
    a
    classic
    example
    of
    a
    plug
    flow
    re
    gion.
    [**28]
    In
    contrast,
    the
    United
    States
    first
    disputes
    that
    a
    sample
    needs
    to
    reflect
    the
    average
    properties
    of
    the
    whole.
    Further,
    the
    United
    States
    argues
    that
    adop
    tion
    of
    a
    sampling
    plan,
    and
    sampling
    in
    conformity
    with
    such
    a
    plan,
    is
    not
    a
    prerequisite
    to
    showing
    a
    violation
    of
    RCRA.
    The
    United
    States
    says
    that
    the
    failure
    to
    adopt
    a
    sampling
    plan
    and
    to
    comply
    with
    that
    plan
    goes
    to
    the
    weight
    of
    the
    evidence,
    rather
    than
    its
    admissibility.
    17
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    proposed
    conclusion
    of
    law
    No.
    24b.
    Thus,
    the
    Court
    must
    first
    determine
    whether
    a
    sam
    ple
    needs
    to
    reflect
    the
    average
    properties
    of
    the
    whole.
    As
    to
    this
    issue,
    the
    United
    States’
    argument
    would
    turn
    the
    language
    of
    40
    CFR
    §
    261.22
    and
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    260.10
    on
    its
    head.
    40
    CFR
    §
    261.22
    says
    corrosivity
    is
    deter
    mined
    based
    upon
    a
    ‘representative
    sample
    of
    the
    waste.”
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    260.10
    says
    the
    sample
    must
    reflect
    “the
    average
    properties
    of
    the
    universe
    or
    whole.”
    In
    ar
    guing
    that
    this
    Court
    disregard
    the
    ponds
    as
    a
    whole,
    the
    United
    States
    pushes
    [**29]
    aside
    its
    own
    regulations.
    The
    Court
    therefore
    finds
    that
    the
    samples
    must
    be
    representative
    of
    the
    whole
    pond
    before
    a
    RCRA
    viola
    tion
    may
    be
    found.
    The
    key
    issue
    is
    what
    sampling
    method
    will
    produce
    a
    “representative
    sample”
    of
    the
    ponds
    and
    whether
    the
    methods
    used
    here
    produce
    a
    suf
    ficiently
    reliable
    picture
    of
    the
    average
    properties
    of
    the
    ponds
    as
    a
    whole.
    Defendant
    WCI
    argues
    that
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    does
    not
    give
    evidence
    of
    representative
    samples
    because
    it
    failed
    to
    use
    the
    proper
    testing
    method
    found
    in
    Test
    Methods
    for
    Evaluating
    Solid
    Waste,
    PhysicallChemical
    Methods,
    EPA
    Publication
    SW-846
    (“SW-846”).
    WCI
    says
    use
    of
    Method
    9040,
    as
    specified
    in
    the
    Second
    Edi
    tion
    of
    SW-846,
    is
    required.
    In
    contrast,
    the
    United
    States
    claims
    that
    samples
    not
    taken
    in
    conformity
    with
    Method
    9040
    can
    satisfy
    the
    requirement
    that
    samples
    exhibit
    the
    average
    properties
    of
    the
    universe
    or
    whole.
    First,
    the
    United
    States
    contests•
    the
    applicability
    of
    Method
    9040.
    The
    United
    States
    ar
    gues
    thai
    before
    1993,
    Method
    5.2,
    as
    set
    forth
    in
    the
    First
    Edition
    of
    SW-846,
    was
    the
    method
    for
    deciding
    whether
    a
    waste
    was
    corrosive.
    Method
    5.2’s
    sampling
    requirements
    are
    less
    strict
    than
    the
    requirements
    [**30]
    suggested
    by
    Defendant
    WCI.
    Method
    5.2
    does
    not
    spec
    ify
    methods
    for
    determining
    the
    number
    of
    samples
    needed
    to
    obtain
    the
    average
    properties
    of
    the
    universe
    or
    whole.
    In
    contrast,
    Method
    9040
    does.
    Alternatively,
    the
    United
    States
    says
    that
    SW-846
    intends
    only
    to
    give
    guidance,
    not
    to
    mandate
    require
    ments.
    As
    a
    guidance
    document,
    the
    United
    States
    says
    SW-846
    affords
    flexibility
    to
    use
    alternative
    test
    meth
    ods.
    To
    decide
    this
    issue,
    the
    Court
    first
    considers
    the
    general
    applicability
    of
    Method
    9040.
    During
    the
    rele
    vant
    periods,
    RCRA
    regulations
    have
    always
    referenced
    certain
    test
    methods
    that
    are
    to
    be
    use
    to
    support
    a
    find
    ing
    of
    “corrosivity,”
    and,
    by
    extension,
    the
    presence
    of
    hazardous
    waste.
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    260.11
    (citing
    test
    meth
    ods);
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.22(a)(l)
    (defining
    “corrosivity”).
    As
    the
    language
    of
    §
    260.11
    has
    altered
    Over
    the
    years,
    the
    parties
    dispute
    which
    test
    method
    applied
    during
    the
    relevant
    period.
    The
    United
    States
    argues
    that
    until
    August
    31,
    1993,
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.22(a)(1)
    required
    use
    of
    Method
    5.2,
    as
    set
    forth
    in
    the
    First
    Edition
    of
    SW-846.
    Specifically,
    until
    August
    31,
    1993,
    Section
    261.22
    provided,
    in
    perti
    nent
    part:
    (a)
    A
    solid
    waste
    exhibits
    [**3
    1]
    the
    characteristic
    of
    corrosivity
    if
    a
    represen
    tative
    [*
    822]
    sample
    of
    the
    waste
    has
    ei
    ther
    of
    the
    following
    properties:
    (1)
    It
    is
    aqueous
    and
    has
    a
    pH
    less
    than
    or
    equal
    to
    2
    or
    greater
    than
    or
    equal
    to
    12.5,
    as
    determined
    by
    a
    pH
    meter
    us
    ing
    either
    an
    EPA
    test
    method
    or
    an
    equivalent
    test
    method
    approved
    by
    the
    Administrator....
    The
    EPA
    test
    method
    for
    pH
    is
    specfied
    as
    Method
    5.2
    in
    “Test
    Methods
    for
    Evaluation
    of
    Solid
    Waste,
    Physical/Chemical
    Methods”
    (incorpo
    rated
    by
    reference,
    see
    260.11).
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    26l.22(a)(1)
    (1993
    edition)
    (emphasis
    added).
    18
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    260.11
    and
    261.22(a)(1)
    (1988-
    1993
    Editions).

    Page
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    LEXIS
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    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    The
    Second
    Edition
    of
    SW-846
    was
    formally
    adopted
    as
    part
    of
    Section
    260.11
    on
    September
    21,
    1982.
    The
    Second
    Edition
    of
    SW-846
    contains
    a
    “Con
    version
    Table’
    which
    correlates
    the
    section
    and
    method
    numbers
    used
    in
    the
    First
    Edition
    of
    SW-846
    with
    “the
    location
    of
    their
    replacements”
    in
    the
    Second
    Edition.
    SW-846
    describes
    this
    conversion
    table
    as
    giving
    “the
    replacements”
    of
    the
    methods
    [**32]
    used
    in
    the
    First
    Edition
    of
    SW-846.
    In
    this
    Table,
    Method
    5.2
    is
    ex
    pressly
    replaced
    with
    Method
    9040.
    However,
    the
    lan
    guage
    of
    the
    regulation,
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.22(a)(l),
    re
    tained
    its
    reference
    to
    Method
    5.2
    even
    as
    it
    referred
    par
    ties
    to
    SW-846.
    The
    Second
    Edition
    of
    SW-846,
    and
    the
    conversion
    table
    within
    it,
    remained
    in
    effect
    until
    Au
    gust
    31,
    1993,
    when
    the
    Third
    Edition
    of
    SW-846
    was
    adopted.
    19
    47
    Fed.
    Reg.
    41562
    (1982).
    20
    58
    Fed.
    Reg.
    46040
    (1993).
    Defendant
    WCI
    points
    out
    that
    the
    Second
    Edition
    of
    SW-846’s
    cross-index
    supports
    the
    conclusion
    that
    Method
    5.2
    was
    replaced
    by
    Method
    9040.
    Also,
    soon
    after
    the
    formal
    adoption
    of
    the
    Second
    Edition
    of
    SW-
    846,
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    issued
    a
    Technical
    Amendment
    which
    also
    noted
    the
    change
    from
    Method
    5.2
    to
    Method
    9040.
    48
    Fed.
    Reg.
    15256
    (1983).
    Further,
    WCI
    also
    points
    to
    communication
    made
    in
    1993
    by
    the
    EPA
    at
    the
    time
    it
    adopted
    the
    Third
    Edition
    of
    SW-846.
    In
    August
    1993,
    the
    Agency
    formally
    clarified
    that
    “the
    [**33]
    EPA
    method
    number
    for
    pH
    is
    incorrectly
    referenced
    in
    Sec
    tion
    261.22(a)(l)
    as
    Method
    5.2.
    Therefore,
    the
    Agency
    is
    deleting
    the
    reference
    to
    Method
    5.2
    in
    that
    section
    and
    replacing
    it
    with
    the
    correct
    reference
    to
    Method
    9040.”
    58
    Fed.
    Reg.
    46047
    (1993).
    Thus,
    the
    EPA
    changed
    the
    regulations
    to
    reflect
    what
    had
    already
    been
    indicated
    in
    SW-846
    for
    years:
    that
    Method
    9040
    replaced
    Method
    5.2
    In
    short,
    WCI
    argues
    that
    even
    though
    the
    regula
    tions
    did
    not
    specifically
    mention
    Method
    9040
    until
    1993,
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    26l.22(a)(l)
    always
    defmed
    corrosiv
    ity
    by
    reference
    to
    SW-846,
    in
    which
    Method
    9040
    re
    placed
    5.2.
    Therefore,
    WCI
    argues
    that
    Method
    9040
    applied
    from
    atleast
    1984
    to
    August
    1993.
    WCI
    makes
    a
    strong
    argument
    that
    Method
    9040
    was
    effective
    for
    the
    times
    relevant
    here.
    However,
    as
    suming
    the
    applicability
    of
    Method
    9040,
    the
    Court
    finds
    that
    strict
    adherence
    to
    Method
    9040
    is
    not
    required
    to
    show
    that
    WCI
    violated
    RCRA.
    Reliability
    and
    accuracy
    of
    samples
    may
    be
    shown
    by
    methods
    other
    than
    Method
    9040.
    Arguing
    otherwise,
    WCI
    contends
    that
    corrosivity
    can
    only
    be
    established
    if
    the
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    shows
    that
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    had
    a
    pH
    of
    2.0
    or
    less
    using
    [**34]
    a
    pH
    meter
    in
    accordance
    with
    Method
    9040.
    To
    comply
    with
    Method
    9040,
    WCI
    says
    sampling
    must
    follow
    a
    statistically-valid
    sampling
    plan
    prepared
    in
    accordance
    with
    Section
    One
    of
    SW-846.
    Method
    9040,
    §
    6.1.
    However,
    relevant
    language
    in
    SW-846
    belies
    WCI’s
    argument.
    SW-846
    provides
    that
    a
    sampling
    plan
    is
    more
    statistically
    valid
    if
    it
    provides
    for
    “some
    form
    of
    random
    sampling”
    so
    that
    ‘every
    unit
    of
    the
    population
    (e.g.
    every
    location
    in
    a
    lagoon
    used
    to
    store
    a
    solid
    waste)
    has
    a
    theoretically
    equal
    chance
    of
    being
    sampled
    and
    meas
    ured,”
    thus
    ensuring
    that
    “the
    sample
    [*823]
    is
    repre
    sentative
    of
    the
    population.”
    Section
    One,
    SW-846,
    Sec
    ond
    Edition,
    §
    1.1.2.
    “Sampling
    precision
    is
    most
    commonly
    achieved
    by
    taking
    an
    appropriate
    number
    of
    samples
    from
    the
    popu
    lation.”
    Section
    One,
    SW-846,
    Second
    Edition
    (emphasis
    added).
    SW-846
    provides
    a
    statistical
    equation
    to
    be
    used
    in
    determining
    the
    “appropriate
    number
    of
    samples.”
    21
    Compliance
    with
    the
    statistical
    calculations
    in
    SW-846
    establishes
    “a
    scientifically
    credible
    sampling
    plan”
    for
    characterizing
    waste.”
    Id.
    at
    Section
    1.
    Specifically,
    SW-
    846
    says
    that
    “solid
    wastes
    contained
    in
    a
    landfill
    or
    la
    goon
    are
    [usually]
    [**35]
    best
    sampled
    using
    the
    three-
    dimensional
    random
    sampling
    strategy.”
    Id.
    (emphasis
    added).
    21
    Table
    1,
    Equation
    8,
    in
    Section
    One
    of
    SW-
    846.
    SW-846
    also
    says
    that
    “lagooned
    waste
    that
    is
    either
    liquid
    or
    semisolid
    is
    often
    best
    sampled
    using
    the
    meth
    ods
    recommended
    for
    large
    tanks.”
    In
    describing
    the
    method
    used
    for
    sampling
    large
    tanks,
    SW-846
    says
    “a
    representative
    set
    of
    samples
    is
    best
    obtained
    using
    the
    three-dimensional
    simple
    random
    sampling
    strategy
    de
    scribed
    in
    Section
    1.4.1.”
    In
    Section
    1.4.1
    of
    SW-846,
    the
    EPA
    says:
    The
    number
    of
    samples
    required
    for
    re
    liable
    sampling
    will
    vary
    depending
    on
    the
    distribution
    of
    the
    waste
    components
    in
    the
    container.
    As
    a
    minimum
    with
    un
    known
    waste,
    a
    sufficient
    number
    and
    dis
    tribution
    of
    samples
    should
    be
    taken
    to
    address
    any
    possible
    versicle
    anomalies
    in
    the
    waste.
    SW-846
    at
    1.4.1.
    Under
    these
    provisions,
    sampling
    of
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    should
    involve
    “a
    three-dimensional
    grid
    of
    sampling
    points
    and
    then
    using
    random
    number
    tables
    or
    genera
    tors
    [**36]
    to
    select
    points
    for
    sampling.”
    Id.
    at
    1.4.4.

    Page
    14
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    As
    indicated,
    Method
    9040
    suggests
    that
    sampling
    should
    be
    done
    consistent
    with
    a
    sampling
    plan
    involving
    a
    sufficient
    number
    of
    samples.
    While
    such
    sampling
    is
    preferred,
    WCI
    does
    not
    show
    that
    the
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    cannot
    proceed
    absent
    sampling
    in
    conformity
    with
    Method
    9040.
    Other
    courts
    have
    come
    to
    similar
    conclusions.
    In
    United
    States
    v.
    Self
    2
    F.3d
    1071
    (10th
    Cir.
    1993),
    the
    defendant,
    facing
    criminal
    charges,
    argued
    that
    the
    gov
    ernment
    failed
    to
    present
    evidence
    that
    certain
    hazardous
    wastes
    were
    sampled
    in
    accord
    with
    an
    EPA-approved
    test
    method.
    Rejecting
    this
    argument,
    the
    Tenth
    Circuit
    held
    that
    [HN1
    1]
    “while
    an
    EPA-approved
    test
    of
    the
    material
    would
    have
    been
    persuasive
    evidence
    as
    to
    whether
    the
    material
    was
    hazardous
    waste,
    the
    govern
    ment
    was
    not
    required
    to
    prove
    this
    element
    through
    test
    data.”
    Id.
    at
    1086.
    To
    like
    effect,
    in
    United
    States
    v.
    Baytank,
    Inc.,
    934
    F.2d
    599
    (5th
    Cir.
    1991),
    the
    government
    brought
    a
    criminal
    claim
    under
    RCRA.
    In
    that
    case,
    the
    govern
    ment
    did
    not
    have
    sampling
    of
    the
    relevant
    drums,
    nor
    other
    sampling
    taken
    in
    conformity
    with
    EPA
    [**37]
    regulations.
    Instead,
    it
    relied
    upon
    company
    documents
    and
    testimony
    from
    persons
    in
    contact
    with
    the
    relevant
    drums.
    In
    finding
    the
    evidence
    sufficient
    to
    support
    a
    criminal
    conviction,
    the
    Fifth
    Circuit
    held:
    The
    govermnent
    admits
    no
    drum
    sam
    ples
    were
    taken,
    but
    relies
    on
    Baytank
    re
    cords,
    and
    testimony
    as
    to
    its
    practices
    at
    the
    times
    charged,
    to
    show
    that
    the
    drums
    were
    used
    to
    Store
    the
    ‘slops’
    or
    residue
    of
    hazardous
    chemicals
    that
    had
    been
    ex
    tracted
    either
    for
    sampling
    or
    line
    clean
    ing
    purposes.
    We
    agree
    that
    these
    docu
    ments,
    including
    drum
    inventories,
    a
    haz
    V
    ardous
    waste
    log,
    and
    internal
    memo
    randa,
    as
    well
    as
    the
    testimony
    at
    trial,
    all
    amply
    demonstrate
    that
    many
    of
    these
    drums
    containing
    hazardous
    wastes
    were
    stored
    for
    longer
    than
    90
    days.
    Id.
    at
    614.
    Other
    courts
    have
    held
    that
    the
    [HN12]
    failure
    to
    adhere
    to
    SW-846’s
    precise
    framework
    [*824]
    does
    not
    stop
    a
    finding
    of
    hazardous
    substances.
    See,
    e.g.,
    United
    States
    v.
    Taylor,
    802
    F.
    Supp.
    116,
    119
    (W.D.
    Mich.
    1992),
    vacated
    on
    other
    grounds,
    8
    F.3d
    1074
    (6th
    Cir.
    1993)
    (sample
    analyzed
    under
    a
    test
    method
    not
    ap
    proved
    by
    EPA
    sufficient
    to
    establish
    threat
    of
    contami
    nation
    [**38]
    under
    CERCLA).
    Further,
    failure
    to
    rig
    idly
    adhere
    to
    SW-846
    does
    not
    render
    the
    sampling
    evi
    dence
    inadmissible.
    People
    v.
    Hale,
    29
    Cal.
    App.
    4th
    730,
    734
    (1994)
    (“We
    discern
    no
    per
    se
    rule
    which
    automatically
    precludes
    the
    introduction
    of
    evidence
    of
    disposal
    of
    hazardous
    waste
    just
    because
    the
    gathering
    of
    the
    sample
    does
    not
    follow
    every
    jot
    and
    tittle
    of
    the
    EPA
    manual.”).
    Any
    deviation
    from
    the
    guidance
    goes
    to
    the
    weight
    of
    the
    evidence
    and
    not
    its
    admissibility.
    People
    v.
    Sangani,
    22
    Cal.
    App.
    4th
    1120,
    1136-1137
    (1994)
    (“Failure
    to
    follow
    precise
    regulatory
    or
    statutory
    re
    quirements
    for
    laboratory
    tests
    generally
    does
    not
    render
    the
    test
    results
    inadmissible,
    but
    instead
    goes
    to
    the
    weight
    accorded
    to
    the
    evidence.”).
    22
    22
    Courts
    show
    deference
    to
    the
    interpretation
    of
    regulation
    given
    by
    administrative
    agencies
    charged
    with
    their
    enforcement.
    United
    States
    of
    America
    v.
    Mobil
    Oil
    C’orporation,
    1997
    WL
    1048911
    (E.D.N.Y.
    1997).
    In
    Mobil
    Oil,
    the
    company
    sought
    to
    offer
    evidence
    not
    in
    confor
    mity
    with
    the
    regulations
    given
    by
    the
    U.S
    EPA.
    Rejecting
    Mobil’s
    evidence,
    the
    court
    set
    forth
    a
    standard
    of
    review
    applicable
    to
    a
    claim
    that
    the
    sampling
    methods
    utilized
    are
    invalid.
    Under
    the
    court’s
    test,
    it
    is
    not
    enough
    for
    WCI
    simply
    to
    “offer[]
    an
    alternative
    reading
    of
    the
    law.”
    Id.
    at
    *9•
    Instead,
    WCI
    must
    establish
    that
    EPA’s
    inter
    pretation
    is
    “plainly
    erroneous”
    and
    that
    WCI’s
    reading
    is
    “compelled
    by
    the
    regulation’s
    plain
    language’
    or
    the
    Administrator’s
    intent
    at
    the
    time
    the
    regulation
    was
    promulgated.”
    Id.
    (quoting
    Thomas
    Jefferson
    University
    Hospital
    v.
    Shalala,
    512
    U.S.
    504,
    512,
    129
    L.
    Ed.
    2d
    405,
    114
    S.
    Ct.
    2381
    (1994)).
    [**39]
    Consequently,
    although
    Method
    9040
    con
    trolled
    sampling
    before
    1993,
    the
    Court
    finds
    that
    strict
    adherence
    with
    Method
    9040,
    including
    grid
    sampling
    pursuantto
    a
    plan,
    is
    not
    required
    to
    show
    that
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    were
    corrosive.
    While
    sampling
    done
    in
    con
    formity
    with
    Method
    9040
    is
    preferable
    and
    more
    per
    suasive,
    evidence
    not
    conforming
    with
    the
    sampling
    pro
    visions
    of
    SW-846
    can
    support
    a
    finding
    that
    WCI
    gen
    erated
    hazardous
    substances
    subject
    to
    RCRA.
    3.
    Required
    Showing
    V
    [HN13]
    To
    show
    that
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    contained
    hazardous
    substances
    and
    were,
    as
    a
    result,
    subject
    to
    the
    cradle-to-grave
    restrictions
    of
    RCRA,
    the
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    must
    show,
    via
    representative
    samples,
    only
    that
    the
    surface
    impoundment
    contained
    aqueous
    water
    with
    a
    pH
    of
    2.0
    s.u.
    or
    less,
    on
    at
    least
    one
    occa
    sion.
    United
    States
    v.
    Conservation
    Chemical
    Co.,
    733
    F.
    Supp.
    1215,
    1224
    (N.D.
    md.
    1989)
    (finding
    that
    an
    aqueous
    solid
    waste
    exhibits
    the
    characteristic
    of
    corro
    sivity
    if
    it
    is
    properly
    tested
    and
    found
    to
    have
    a
    pH
    less
    than
    or
    equal
    to
    2
    “on
    at
    least
    one
    occasion”);
    State
    v.
    PVS
    Chemicals,
    Inc.,
    50
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    171
    (W.D.N.Y.

    Page
    15
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    *;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    1998)
    (finding
    discharges
    of
    acidic
    water
    [*
    *40]
    that
    fell
    below
    pH
    of
    2
    on
    4
    occasions
    out
    of
    51
    samples
    taken
    over
    course
    of
    6
    years
    was
    hazardous).
    [RN
    14]
    In
    order
    to
    be
    valid,
    sampling
    must
    show
    that
    it
    is
    random,
    that
    is,
    that
    ‘every
    unit
    of
    the
    popula
    tion
    (e.g.,
    every
    location
    in
    a
    lagoon
    used
    to
    store
    a
    solid
    waste)
    has
    a
    theoretically
    equal
    chance
    of
    being
    sampled
    and
    measured,”
    thus
    ensuring
    that
    “the
    sample
    is
    repre
    sentative
    of
    the
    population.”
    Section
    One,
    SW-846,
    Sec
    ond
    Edition,
    at
    1.1.2.
    With
    these
    principles
    in
    mind,
    the
    Court
    examines
    the
    samples
    presented
    by
    the
    government
    as
    evidence
    of
    RCRA
    violations.
    C.
    Assessment
    of
    Samples
    In
    claiming
    that
    Defendant
    WCI’s
    Pond
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    are
    subject
    to
    regulation
    under
    RCRA,
    the
    United
    States
    relies
    upon
    a
    limited
    number
    of
    testings
    done
    by
    U.S.
    EPA
    personnel
    and
    the
    large
    number
    of
    tests
    recorded
    by
    Defendant
    WCI’s
    personnel
    [*825]
    at
    the
    intake
    to
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant.
    WCI
    says
    the
    limited
    number
    of
    samples
    taken
    by
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    are
    insufficiently
    representative
    of
    the
    ponds
    to
    serve
    as
    proof
    of
    a
    violation.
    WCI
    also
    says
    the
    11,000
    samples
    it
    recorded
    are
    insufficiently
    representa
    tive
    of
    wastewaters
    held
    in
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    because
    the
    measuring
    probes
    were
    miscalibrated.
    [*
    *41]
    Be
    cause
    none
    of
    the
    samples
    the
    governmentrelies
    on
    were
    taken
    pursuant
    to
    Method
    9040,
    WCI
    says
    there
    is
    insuf
    ficient
    evidence,
    that
    it
    maintained
    hazardous
    waste
    at
    the
    Warren
    facility.
    As
    discussed,
    the
    Court
    fmds
    Method
    9040
    prefer
    able
    for
    showing
    a
    RCRA
    violation,
    but
    it
    is
    not
    the
    ex
    clusive
    means
    with
    which
    the
    government
    can
    support
    its
    case.
    The
    Court
    must
    now
    determine
    whether
    the
    avail
    able
    samples
    provide
    a
    reliable
    indicator
    that
    WCI
    main
    tained
    hazardous
    waste
    at
    the
    Warren
    facility.
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    shows
    sampling
    performed
    by
    WCI
    at
    the
    influent
    to
    Pond
    6.
    The
    government
    produced
    WCI’s
    internal
    “Turn
    Audit”
    forms
    reflecting
    pH
    meas
    urements
    taken
    between
    1988
    and
    1998.
    WCI
    tested
    over
    300
    samples
    a
    month
    at
    Pond
    6
    during
    these
    years.
    23
    The
    turn
    audit
    forms
    indicate
    that
    over
    11,000
    samples
    taken
    during
    these
    years
    had
    a
    pH
    of
    2.0
    or
    less.
    24
    WCI’s
    op
    erators
    made
    readings
    of
    2.0
    s.u.
    or
    less
    for
    Pond
    6
    wastewater
    entering
    the
    central
    treatment
    plant
    on
    1,361
    separate
    days,
    including
    577
    days
    during
    which
    readings
    of
    1.7
    s.u.
    were
    taken
    at
    the
    influent
    probe.
    23
    In
    July
    1990,
    WCI
    took
    240
    samples.
    In
    every
    other
    month
    during
    the
    ten-year
    period,
    WCI
    took
    more
    than
    300
    samples.
    24
    There
    were
    only
    13
    readings
    of
    2.0
    or
    less
    in
    1995
    and
    none
    in
    1996
    through
    1998.
    Therefore,
    the
    bulk
    of
    the
    low
    pH
    readings
    date
    from
    1988
    to
    1994.
    During
    several
    months,
    virtually
    all
    the
    samples
    in
    dicated
    low
    pH
    levels.
    In
    May
    1991,
    96.7%
    of
    the
    369
    samples
    taken
    that
    month
    indicated
    a
    pH
    level
    of
    2.0
    or
    below.
    In
    August
    1991,
    99.2%
    of
    the
    372
    samples
    taken
    that
    month
    registered
    at
    2.0
    or
    below,
    with
    297
    samples
    reflecting
    a
    pH
    of
    1.7
    or
    below.
    In
    May
    1993,
    90.9%
    of
    the
    372
    samples
    taken
    that
    month
    had
    a
    pH
    level
    of
    2.0
    or
    below,
    with
    268
    samples
    reading
    1.7
    or
    below.
    At
    the
    rate
    WCI
    pumps
    water
    out
    of
    the
    pond,
    there
    is
    a
    complete
    turnover
    of
    pond
    water
    every
    three
    to
    four
    days.
    Thus,
    months
    duringwhich
    low
    pH
    levels
    were
    the
    norm
    provide
    strong
    evidence
    that
    the
    samples
    were
    rep
    resentative
    of
    the
    pond
    water
    as
    a
    whole
    during
    that
    time
    and
    that
    the
    water
    contained
    hazardous
    waste.
    Though
    WCI
    levels
    valid
    criticism
    at
    the
    reliability
    of
    the
    influent
    pH
    probe,
    the
    measurements
    obtained
    from
    the
    probe
    are
    nevertheless
    probative
    of
    the
    waster-
    water’s
    hazardous
    nature.
    An
    extremely
    large
    [**43]
    number
    of
    influent
    probe
    pH
    readings
    show
    corrosivity,
    including
    many
    readings
    with
    very
    acidic
    pH
    levels.
    Even
    if
    the
    pH
    calibration
    were
    not
    precise,
    any
    error
    was
    unlikely
    to
    account
    for
    the
    extremely
    low
    pH
    read
    ings.
    This
    is
    so
    because
    pH
    is
    measured
    on
    a
    logarithmic
    scale:
    as
    pH
    measurements
    move
    down
    the
    scale,
    the
    measure
    of
    acidity
    in
    a
    substance
    increases
    exponen
    tially.
    A
    substance
    with
    a
    pH
    of
    1.8
    s.u.
    has
    twice
    the
    hydrogen
    ion
    (or
    acid)
    concentration
    of
    a
    substance
    with
    a
    pH
    of
    2.0
    s.u..
    The
    difference
    between
    the
    measure
    ment
    units
    is
    .2.
    But
    because
    of
    the
    logarithm,
    the
    .2
    dif
    ference
    between
    1.6
    and
    1.8
    represents
    a
    greater
    increase
    in
    acidity
    level
    than
    does
    the
    .2
    difference
    between
    1.8
    and
    2.0.
    Therefore,
    even
    if
    WCI’s
    probes
    were
    not
    cali
    brated
    precisely
    in
    relation
    to
    2.0,
    the
    extremely
    low
    readings
    represent
    strong
    evidence
    of
    acidity
    because
    they
    representsuch
    exponential
    change
    in
    acid
    levels.
    Indeed,
    even
    SW-846
    notes
    that
    when
    measurements
    fall
    far
    below
    the
    threshold
    allowed
    level,
    a
    method
    with
    lower
    accuracy
    and
    precision
    is
    tolerable:
    [*826]
    It
    is
    now
    apparent
    that
    a
    judgment
    must
    be
    made
    as
    to
    the
    degree
    of
    sam
    pling
    accuracy
    and
    precision
    that
    is
    re
    quired
    [**44]
    to
    reliably
    estimate
    the
    chemical
    characteristics
    of
    a
    solid
    waste
    for
    the
    purpose
    of
    comparing
    those
    char-
    [**42]

    Page
    16
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    *;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    acteristics
    to
    applicable
    regulatory
    thresh
    olds.
    Generally,
    high
    accuracy
    and
    high
    precision
    are
    required
    if
    one
    or
    more
    chemical
    contaminants
    of
    a
    solid
    waste
    is
    present
    at
    a
    concentration
    that
    is
    close
    to
    the
    applicable
    regulatory
    threshold.
    Alter
    natively,
    relatively
    low
    accuracy
    and
    low
    precision
    can
    be
    tolerated
    if
    the
    contami
    nants
    of
    concern
    occur
    at
    levels
    far
    below
    or
    far
    above
    their
    applicable
    thresholds.
    SW-826,
    §
    1.1.1,
    P
    3
    (emphasis
    added).
    Although
    high
    accuracy
    and
    precision
    is
    preferred,
    the
    reading
    of
    1.3,
    for
    example,
    reliably
    shows
    corrosivity
    even
    if
    taken
    through
    a
    less
    than
    ideal
    sampling
    method
    because
    it
    falls
    so
    far
    below
    the
    threshold
    of
    2.0.
    The
    United
    States
    does
    not
    rely
    solely
    on
    the
    meas
    urements
    from
    the
    influent
    probe.
    The
    United
    States
    gives
    evidence
    from
    a
    WCI
    consultant
    engineer
    who
    took
    grab
    sample
    pH
    measurements
    on
    October
    14
    and
    15,
    1993,
    which
    showed
    pH
    of
    2.0
    or
    lower
    at
    the
    bosh
    box
    location.
    25
    Importantly,
    one
    of
    these
    samples
    had
    the
    extremely
    low
    pH
    value
    of
    1.3
    s.u.
    while
    another
    had
    the
    extremely
    low
    value
    of
    1.7
    s.u.
    [**45]
    Also,
    a
    large
    number
    of
    grab
    bag
    samples,
    tested
    on
    bench
    pH
    meters,
    indicate
    corrosivity.
    Finally,
    although
    limited,
    U.S.
    EPA
    sampling
    shows
    corrosivity.
    25
    Consultant
    Killam
    collected
    three
    grab
    sam
    ples
    from
    the
    bosh
    box
    that
    channels
    wastewater
    to
    the
    surface
    impoundments.
    The
    three
    samples
    had
    pH
    values
    of
    1.3,
    1.7
    and
    2.0
    s.u.,
    respec
    tively.
    In
    light
    of
    the
    substantial
    evidence
    presented
    by
    the
    United
    States,
    the
    Court
    finds
    that
    during
    periods
    of
    WCI’s
    ownership,
    the
    wastewater
    treated,
    stored,
    and
    disposed
    of
    by
    WCI
    in
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    exhibited
    the
    hazardous
    waste
    characteristic
    of
    corrosivity,
    within
    the
    meaning
    of
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.22.
    Thus,
    WCI
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    were
    subject
    to
    RCRA.
    However,
    the
    Government
    fails
    to
    show
    spent
    pickle
    liquor,
    subject
    to
    RCRA,
    was
    deposited
    into
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A.
    The
    Court
    finds
    thatWCI
    always
    neutralized
    any
    spent
    pickle
    liquor
    or
    acidspillage
    with
    excess
    lime.
    [HN15]
    Lime-neutralized
    spent
    pickle
    liquor
    is
    exempt
    from
    the
    RCRA’s
    hazardous
    waste
    regulations
    under
    the
    [**46]
    iron
    and
    steel
    industry
    exemption
    in
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261
    .3(c)(2)(ii)(A).
    IV.
    Violations
    of
    RCRA
    The
    Court
    has
    determined
    that
    there
    is
    sufficient
    evidence
    that
    WCI
    treated,
    stored,
    or
    disposed
    of
    hazard-
    ous
    waste
    at
    its
    Warren
    facility.
    Maintaining
    such
    haz
    ardous
    waste
    triggers
    several
    requirements
    under
    RCRA.
    As
    detailed
    below,
    WCI’s
    failure
    to
    comply
    with
    these
    requirements
    subjects
    it
    to
    penalties
    under
    RCRA.
    A.
    First
    Claim
    for
    Relief
    [HNI6J
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    260.10
    provides,
    in
    part:
    [A]
    “Hazardous
    waste
    management
    unit”
    is
    a
    contiguous
    area
    of
    land
    on
    or
    in
    which
    hazardous
    waste
    is
    placed,
    or
    the
    largest
    area
    in
    which
    there
    is
    significant
    likelihood
    of
    mixing
    hazardous
    waste
    constituents
    in
    the
    same
    area.
    Examples
    of
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    units
    in
    clude
    a
    surface
    impoundment,
    a
    waste
    pile,
    a
    land
    treatment
    area,
    a
    landfill
    cell,
    an
    incinerator,
    a
    tank
    and
    its
    associated
    piping
    and
    underlying
    containment
    sys
    tern
    and
    a
    container
    storage
    area.
    40
    CFR
    §
    260.10.
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    at
    the
    WCI’s
    War
    ren
    facility
    are
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    units.
    As
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    units,
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    are
    subject
    to
    the
    provisions
    of
    RCP.A
    and
    analogous
    state
    law.
    [HNI7]
    Under
    [**47]
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6925(a)
    and
    (e)
    and
    Ohio
    Rev.
    Code
    §
    3734.02(F)
    and
    3734.04,
    the
    owner
    and
    operator
    of
    a
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    unit
    is
    prohibited
    from
    [*827]
    operating
    a
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    unit
    except
    in
    accordance
    with
    a
    permit
    issued
    pursuant
    to
    RCRA,
    unless
    the
    facility
    had
    interim
    status.
    The
    wastewater
    treated,
    stored,
    and
    disposed
    of
    through
    the
    impoundments
    was
    a
    “solid
    waste,”
    under
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    261.2(a)(2).
    During
    periods
    from
    1988
    to
    1993,
    the
    wastewater
    stored
    and
    disposed
    of
    by
    WCI
    in
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A,
    wasalso
    hazardous
    waste
    because
    it
    exhib
    ited
    the
    characteristic
    of
    corrosivity,
    having
    a
    pH
    of
    2
    or
    less.
    Further,
    Defendant
    WCI
    has
    neither
    a
    permit
    issued
    pursuant
    to
    the
    provisions
    of
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6925,
    nor
    does
    WCI
    have
    interim
    status.
    Defendant
    WCI’s.
    Operation
    of
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    without
    a
    permit
    and
    without
    interim
    status
    violates
    RCRA
    and
    the
    federally
    approved
    hazardous
    waste
    man
    agement
    program
    for
    the
    State
    of
    Ohio.
    Each
    day
    that
    WCI
    operated
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    without
    a
    permit
    or
    without
    interim
    status
    is
    a
    separate
    violation
    of
    RCRA.
    B.
    Second
    Claim
    for
    Relief
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    were
    hazardous
    waste
    manage
    ment
    [**48]
    units
    during
    periods
    from
    1988
    to
    1993.

    Page
    17
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    *;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    WCI
    operated
    these
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    units
    without
    including
    these
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    units
    in
    any
    RCRA
    Part
    A
    application,
    as
    required
    by
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    270.13
    and
    O.A.C.
    §
    3645-50-43,
    and
    without
    amending
    any
    RCRA
    Part
    A
    application.
    Each
    day
    that
    Defendant
    operated
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    without
    including
    these
    hazardous
    waste
    manage
    ment
    units
    in
    any
    Part
    A
    application
    and
    without
    amend
    ing
    any
    Part
    A
    application
    is
    a
    separate
    violation
    of
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6930
    and
    O.A.C.
    §
    3745-50-43.
    C.
    Third
    Claim
    for
    Relief
    WCI
    operated
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    as
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    units
    without
    including
    these
    hazard
    ous
    waste
    management
    units
    in
    any
    RCRA
    Part
    B
    appli
    cation,
    and
    without
    amending
    any
    RCRA
    Part
    B
    applica
    tion
    to
    include
    information
    pertaining
    to
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A.
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    270.14
    and
    O.A.C.
    §
    3745-50-44.
    Each
    day
    that
    WCI
    operated
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    as
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    units
    without
    including
    these
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    units
    in
    any
    RCRA
    Part
    B
    application,
    and
    without
    amending
    any
    RCRA
    Part
    B
    application
    to
    include
    information
    pertaining
    to
    Ponds
    5,
    6
    and
    6A
    is
    a
    separate
    violation.
    [*
    *49]
    D.
    FourthClaim
    for
    Relief
    [HN18]
    Under
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6928(a)
    and
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    270.1(b),
    a
    party
    also
    may
    not
    store
    hazardous
    waste
    in
    a
    surface
    impoundment
    without
    a
    permit
    or
    interim
    status.
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    are
    “surface
    impoundments”
    within
    the
    meaning
    of
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    260.10.
    [l{Nl9]
    Under
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6925(j),
    surface
    im
    poundments
    existing
    on
    November
    8,
    1984,
    were
    re
    quired
    to
    meet
    minimum
    technological
    requirements
    unless
    granted
    an
    exemption
    by
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    or
    the
    State.
    26
    WCI
    did
    not
    receive
    interim
    status.
    As
    a
    facility
    that
    did
    not
    have
    a
    permit
    and
    did
    not
    have
    interim
    status,
    WCI
    was
    required
    to
    cease
    accepting
    hazardous
    waste
    and
    commence
    closure.
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    265.1(b).
    As
    explained
    earlier,
    the
    Court
    finds
    that
    WCI
    continued
    to
    receive
    hazardous
    waste
    after
    it
    was
    not
    eligible
    to
    do
    so.
    In
    continuing
    to
    receive
    hazardous
    substances,
    WCI
    vio
    lated
    RCRA.
    26
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6924(o).
    WCI
    continued
    accepting
    hazardous
    wastes
    at
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A,
    [**50]
    even
    though
    it
    failed
    to
    meet
    the
    technological
    requirements
    of
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6924(o)(1)(A).
    WCI
    failed
    to
    close
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    as
    required
    by
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    264.228
    and.O.A.C.
    §
    3745-56-
    28.
    Each
    day
    that
    WCI
    continued
    accepting
    hazardous
    wastes
    at
    Ponds
    5,
    6
    and
    6A,
    even
    though
    it
    failed
    to
    meet
    the
    technological
    requirements
    of
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6924(o)(1)(A)
    isa
    separate
    violation.
    [*828]
    E.
    Fifth
    Claim
    for
    Relief
    [FfN2O]
    Under
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    264.112
    and
    O.A.C.
    §
    3745-55-12,
    WCI,
    as
    the
    owner
    or
    operator
    of
    a
    hazard
    ous
    waste
    management
    unit,
    was
    required
    to
    have
    a
    writ
    ten
    closure
    plan.
    The
    closure
    plan
    must
    identify
    the
    steps
    needed
    to
    perform
    a
    partial
    or
    final
    closure
    of
    the
    facility.
    Defendant
    WCI
    failed
    to
    have
    a
    written
    closure
    plan
    that
    identified
    the
    steps
    necessary
    to
    perform
    partial
    or
    final
    closure
    of
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A.
    WCI
    thus
    violated
    RCRA
    closure
    requirements
    described
    at
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    264.112
    and
    O.A.C.
    §
    3745-55-12.
    Each
    day
    that
    WCI
    failed
    to
    have
    a
    written
    closure
    plan
    that
    identified
    the
    steps
    necessary
    to
    perform
    partial
    or
    final
    closure
    of
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    is
    a
    separate
    viola
    tion.
    F.
    Sixth
    Claim
    for
    Relief
    [1{N21]
    Under
    40
    C.F.
    [**51]
    R.
    §
    264.140
    -
    264.15
    1
    and
    O.A.C.
    §
    3745-55-40
    -
    3745-55-5
    1,
    WCI,
    as
    the
    owner
    or
    operator
    of
    a
    hazardous
    waste
    manage
    ment
    facility,
    was
    required
    to
    have
    a
    detailed
    written
    estimate
    in
    current
    dollars
    of
    the
    cost
    of
    closing
    hazard
    ous
    waste
    management
    units.
    WCI
    was
    also
    required
    to
    comply
    with
    the
    financial
    assurance
    provisions
    of
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    264.143
    and
    O.A.C.
    §
    3745-55-43.
    Defendant
    WCI
    has
    failed
    to
    comply
    with
    the
    clo
    sure
    costs
    and
    financial
    assurance
    requirements
    of
    40
    C.F.R.
    Part
    264
    and
    O.A.C.
    §
    3745-55-40
    -
    3745-55-51.
    Each
    day
    that
    WCI
    failed
    to
    have
    and
    maintain
    a
    detailed
    written
    estimate,
    in
    current
    dollars,
    of
    the
    cost
    of
    closing
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    units
    to
    comply
    with
    the
    financial
    assurance
    requirements
    is
    a
    separate
    violation.
    G.
    Seventh
    Claim
    for
    Relief
    [HN22]
    The
    owner
    or
    operator
    of
    a
    surface
    im
    poundment
    is
    required
    to
    install,
    operate,
    and
    maintain
    a
    ground-water
    monitoring
    system
    which
    satisfies
    the
    cri
    teria
    contained
    at
    40
    C.F.R.
    Part
    264,
    Subpart
    F,
    and
    O.A.C.
    §
    3745-54-90
    -
    3745-54-99
    and
    3745-55-01
    -
    3745-55-02.
    During
    periods
    after
    November
    8,
    1988,
    WCI
    failed
    to
    install,
    operate,
    and
    maintain
    a
    ground
    water
    mOnitoring
    system
    that
    meets
    the
    requirements
    [*
    *52]
    of
    40
    C.F.R.
    Part
    264,
    Subpart
    F,
    and
    O.A.C.
    §
    3745-54-90
    -
    3745-55-02.
    Thefailure
    to
    operate
    such
    a
    ground-water
    monitor
    ing
    system
    violates
    RCRA
    and
    the
    federally
    approved

    Page
    18
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    *;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR.
    20169
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    program
    for
    the
    State
    of
    Ohio.
    H.
    Eighth
    Claim
    for
    Relief
    At
    times
    from
    1988
    to
    1993,
    Defendant
    WCI
    dis
    posed
    of
    corrosive
    hazardous
    waste,
    having
    a
    pH
    of
    less
    than
    or
    equal
    to
    2.0,
    from
    Ponds
    5,
    6
    or
    6A,
    which
    did
    not
    meet
    the
    treatment
    standards
    specified
    at
    O.A.C.
    §
    3745-59-40
    -
    3745-59-43,
    in
    violation
    of
    40
    C.F.R.
    §
    268.32
    and
    268.35(a)
    and
    O.A.C.
    §
    3745-59-32
    and
    3745-59-35(A).
    In
    disposing
    of
    such
    waste,
    WCI
    violated
    RCP.A
    and
    the
    federally
    approved
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    program
    for
    the
    State
    of
    Ohio.
    V.
    Penalty
    [HN23J
    Under
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6928(a)
    and
    (g),
    this
    Court
    has
    power
    to
    enjoin
    WCI
    and
    to
    impose
    civil
    pen
    alties
    for
    each
    violation
    of
    RCRA
    and
    the
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    program
    for
    the
    State
    of
    Ohio.
    This
    Court
    can
    impose
    penalties
    up
    to
    $
    25,000
    per
    day
    for
    each
    day
    of
    violation
    prior
    to
    January
    30,
    1997
    and
    $
    27,500
    for
    each
    day
    of
    violation
    thereafter.
    In
    determining
    the
    appropriate
    civil
    penalties,
    the
    Court
    considers
    the
    seriousness
    of
    [**53j
    the
    violation,
    what
    efforts
    were
    made
    to
    comply
    with
    regulations,
    the
    harm
    caused
    by
    the
    violation,
    the
    economic
    benefit
    de
    rived
    from
    noncompliance,
    the
    violator’s
    ability
    to
    pay,
    the
    government’s
    conduct,
    and
    the
    clarity
    of
    the
    obliga
    tion
    involved.
    United
    States
    v.
    Ekco
    Housewares,
    Inc.,
    62
    F.3d
    806,
    815
    (6th
    Cii.
    1995).
    In
    determining
    the
    penalty,
    this
    Court
    exercises
    its
    discretion.
    Id.
    (citing
    [*829)
    United
    States
    v.
    Midwest
    Suspension
    and
    Brake,
    49
    F.3d
    1197,
    1205
    (6th
    Cir.
    1995)).
    A.
    WCI’s
    Past
    Compliance
    and
    Seriousness
    of
    the
    Viola
    tion
    From
    the
    time
    it
    assumed
    operation
    of
    the
    Warren
    facility
    in
    1988,
    WCI
    has
    denied
    that
    it
    managed
    hazard
    ous
    wastes
    in
    Ponds
    5,
    6
    and
    6A.
    Because
    it
    denied
    its
    management
    of
    hazardous
    wastes,
    WCI
    failed
    to
    provide
    notice
    to
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    and
    the
    State
    that
    it
    managed
    haz
    ardous
    wastes
    in
    Ponds
    5,
    6
    and
    6A
    and
    failed
    to
    obtain
    any
    permit
    or
    interim
    status
    under
    RCRA
    for
    manage
    ment
    of
    the
    hazardous
    waste
    it
    maintained
    in
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A.
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6925(a)
    prohibits
    the
    treatment,
    storage
    or
    disposal
    of
    hazardous
    waste
    except
    in
    accordance
    with
    an
    authorized
    permit.
    Ekco
    Housewares,
    Inc.,
    62
    F.3d
    at
    809.
    [**54J
    The
    receipt
    of
    a
    permit,
    and
    compliance
    with
    that
    permit
    are
    at
    the
    core
    of
    the
    federal
    hazardous
    waste
    management
    system.
    United
    States
    v.
    Heuer,
    4
    F.3d
    723,
    730
    (9th
    Cir.
    1993)
    (“It
    is
    fundamental
    that
    an
    entity
    which
    performs
    a
    hazardous
    waste
    activity
    for
    which
    a
    permit
    is
    required
    under
    RCRA
    may
    not
    legally
    perform
    that
    activity
    unless
    it
    has
    a
    permit
    for
    the
    rele
    vant
    activity.”).
    WCI’s
    failure
    to
    obtain
    a
    permit
    and
    to
    comply
    with
    that
    permit
    disregards
    RCRA’s
    “cradle-to-
    grave’
    regulatory
    structure
    overseeing
    the
    safe
    treatment,
    storage
    and
    disposal
    of
    hazardous
    waste.”
    United
    Tech
    nologies
    Corp.
    v.
    EPA,
    261
    U.S.
    App.
    D.C.
    226,
    821
    F.2d
    714,
    716
    (D.C.
    Cir.1987).
    Yet,
    WCI
    has
    made
    capital
    investments
    that
    have
    improved
    environmental
    quality.
    By
    1992,
    WCI
    had
    in
    vested
    $
    135
    million
    in
    a
    continuous
    caster
    and
    ladle
    metallurgical
    facility
    that
    lowered
    costs
    and
    improved
    environmental
    performance.
    27
    In
    addition,
    WCI
    used
    a
    vigorous
    recycling
    program
    and
    eliminated
    about
    80,000
    tons
    of
    materials
    that
    formerly
    went
    to
    a
    landfill.
    In
    1996,
    the
    Ohio
    EPA
    reported
    that:
    “WCI
    has
    achieved
    an
    86
    percent
    reduction
    in
    their
    toxic
    chemical
    releases
    from
    {**55]
    1988
    to
    1994
    .
    .
    .
    1994
    was
    WCI’s
    most
    productive
    year
    in
    their
    eight-year
    history.
    The
    facility
    increased
    production
    by
    5.8
    percent
    over
    1993
    while
    reducing
    toxic
    release
    conmiission
    by
    32.9
    percent.”
    In
    March
    1999,
    the
    Environmental
    Defense
    Fund
    placed
    WCI
    in
    the
    top
    third
    of
    twenty
    integrated
    steel
    mills
    in
    the
    nation
    for
    its
    pollution
    control
    efforts.
    27
    The
    continuous
    caster
    and
    ladle
    facility
    eliminated
    approximately
    a
    hundred
    tons
    of
    air
    pollutants
    per
    year.
    In
    summary,
    while
    Defendant
    WCI
    failed
    to
    comply
    with
    RCRA
    requirements
    as
    to
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A,
    it
    otherwise
    made
    efforts
    to
    reduce
    pollution.
    B.
    Discussion
    of
    Harm
    Caused
    by
    Noncompliance
    The
    Court
    finds
    no
    credible
    evidence
    of
    harm
    caused
    by
    Defendant
    WCI’s
    RCRA
    violations.
    First,
    though
    long-term
    effects
    of
    hazardous
    wastewater
    may
    be
    re
    flected
    in
    the
    sludge
    that
    collects
    in
    the
    beneath
    the
    wastewater,
    the
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    does
    not
    allege
    that
    sludge
    in
    the
    Ponds
    ever
    had
    a
    pH
    of
    2.0
    or
    below.
    Second,
    monitoring
    wells
    placed
    downstream
    [**561
    from
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    show
    no
    impact
    on
    the
    envi
    ronment
    resulting
    from
    the
    use
    of
    these
    ponds
    as
    waste-
    water
    treatment
    units.
    Finally,
    the
    United
    States
    does
    not
    allege
    that
    the
    Ponds
    currently
    contain
    wastewater
    with
    a
    pH
    of
    2.0
    or
    below.
    [HN24]
    Where
    a
    proven
    violation
    of
    RCRA
    does
    not
    result
    in
    “the
    creation
    of
    a
    situation
    with
    the
    potential
    to
    seriously
    harm
    the
    environment,”
    civil
    penalties
    have
    been
    substantially
    reduced.
    United
    States
    v.
    Lacks
    Indus
    tries,
    Inc.,
    1990
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    7650,
    1990
    WL
    261387,
    *4
    (W.D.
    Mich.
    June
    22,
    1990).
    Thus,
    in
    deter-

    Page
    19
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    *;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    mining
    an
    appropriate
    penalty,
    this
    Court
    takes
    into
    con
    sideration
    the
    fact
    that
    WCI’s
    use
    of
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    has
    not
    resulted
    in
    any
    harm
    to
    human
    health
    or
    the
    envi
    ronment.
    [*8301
    C.
    Economic
    Benefit
    and
    Costs
    Saved
    The
    Court
    also
    considers
    the
    economic
    benefit
    de
    rived
    by
    WCI
    as
    the
    result
    of
    its
    failure
    to
    comply
    with
    RCRA.
    On
    this
    issue,
    the
    parties
    sharply
    disagree.
    The
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    says
    that
    WCI
    benefitted
    because
    it
    avoided
    expending
    monies
    to
    close
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A,
    including
    dredging,
    disposal
    of
    dredged
    materi
    als,
    and
    backfilling
    the
    ponds.
    The
    United
    States
    argues
    that
    WCI
    benefitted
    because
    it
    was
    otherwise
    required
    to
    install
    [**57]
    tanks
    to
    store
    wastewater
    with
    low
    pH;
    to
    set
    up
    a
    groundwater
    monitoring
    program;
    and
    to
    provide
    a
    closure
    and
    post
    closure
    plan
    together
    with
    necessary
    financial
    assurance.
    The
    United
    States
    says
    WCI
    delayed
    or
    avoided
    expending
    monies
    for
    these
    purposes
    and
    received
    an
    economic
    benefit.
    In
    seeking
    to
    quantify
    this
    benefit,
    the
    United
    States
    says
    the
    benefit
    should
    be
    measured
    as
    the
    current
    value
    of
    the
    capital
    cost
    of
    the
    various
    expenditures
    needed
    to
    avoid
    RCRA
    violations,
    and
    the
    annual
    operating
    costs
    that
    would
    have
    attended
    earlier
    compliance,
    all
    ex
    pressed
    in
    today’s
    dollars.
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    claims
    that
    Defendant
    WCI
    received
    a
    total
    economic
    benefit
    of
    approximately
    $
    9.1
    million.
    According
    •to
    the
    United
    States,
    the
    delayed
    capital
    expenditures
    gave
    WCI
    a
    $
    6,427,000
    benefit
    and
    the
    avoidance
    of
    operating
    and
    maintenance
    costs
    gave
    WCI
    a
    $
    2,631,000
    benefit.
    In
    reaching
    its
    position
    that
    WCI
    obtained
    economic
    benefit
    of
    $
    9.1
    million,
    the
    United
    States
    relies
    on
    sev
    eral
    core
    assumptions.
    The
    United
    States
    relies
    upon
    the
    argument
    that
    remediation
    required
    moving
    the
    majority
    of
    the
    sludges
    from
    their
    current
    locations
    and
    depositing
    them
    in
    a
    toxic
    waste
    disposal
    [**58]
    site.
    If
    the
    sludge
    did
    not
    have
    to
    be
    removed,
    WCI
    did
    not
    receive
    the
    benefit
    of
    $
    2,615,102
    for
    the
    dredging
    and
    backfilling
    of
    the
    impoundments
    and
    $
    3,696,690
    for
    its
    disposal.
    The
    Court
    finds
    credible
    WCI’s
    testimony
    that
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    are
    subject
    to
    a
    risk-
    based
    closure
    that
    gives
    consideration
    to
    human
    health
    and
    the
    environ
    ment.
    Under
    such
    a
    closure,
    the
    sludge
    would
    be
    left
    in
    place,
    it
    would
    be
    stabilized,
    and
    a
    cover
    would
    be
    placed
    upon
    it.
    Such
    a
    risk-based
    closure
    might
    involve
    moving
    the
    sludges
    from
    Ponds
    6
    and
    6A
    to
    Pond
    5,
    and
    then
    putting
    a
    cover
    on
    Pond
    5.
    A
    risk-based
    closure
    would
    be
    significantly
    less
    expensive
    than
    the
    dredging
    and
    removal
    plan
    proposed
    by
    the
    United
    States.
    Dr.
    Kenneth
    Wise
    testified
    credibly
    that
    a
    risk-based
    resulted
    in
    a
    present
    value
    economic
    benefit
    of
    $
    732,065,
    includ
    ing
    the
    cost
    of
    a
    storage
    tank.
    D.
    Present
    Value
    Determination
    As
    to
    the
    economic
    benefit
    derived
    by
    WCI
    from
    de
    layed
    compliance
    with
    RCRA,
    the
    parties
    also
    dispute
    what
    rate
    should
    be
    used
    to
    determine
    the
    present
    value
    of
    the
    benefit.
    The
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    claims
    that
    this
    Court
    should
    use
    a
    weighted
    average
    cost
    of
    capital
    rate
    of
    8.5
    percent
    for
    both
    [**59]
    past
    amounts
    benefitted
    and
    for
    future
    benefits.
    In
    contrast,
    the
    Defendant
    WCI
    suggests
    that
    the
    rate
    should
    be
    different
    for
    both
    past
    and
    future
    benefit.
    For
    past
    costs,
    WCI
    suggests
    the
    use
    of
    an
    after-tax,
    risk-free
    rate
    is
    correct.
    WCI
    argues
    that
    no
    uncertainty
    attends
    the
    amount
    and
    the
    risk-free
    return
    is
    the
    only
    economic
    benefit
    that
    a
    company
    earns
    from
    delaying
    an
    expendi
    ture.
    WCI
    argues
    that
    any
    return
    above
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    does
    not
    reflect
    delay,
    but
    instead
    reflects
    risk.
    As
    to
    future
    benefit,
    WCI
    says
    there
    is
    uncertainty.
    Future
    benefits
    are
    not
    risk
    free.
    As
    a
    result,
    WCI
    says
    a
    discount
    rate
    reflecting
    this
    risk
    should
    be
    used.
    Specifi
    cally,
    WCI
    argues
    that
    future
    benefits
    should
    be
    com
    puted
    by
    using
    an
    after-tax
    corporate
    borrowing
    rate.
    WCI
    suggests
    a
    9.6%
    rate
    should
    be
    used,
    based
    upon
    the
    current
    yield
    of
    WCI
    bonds.
    [*83
    1]
    The
    central
    issue
    is
    whether
    a
    rate
    reflecting
    risk
    should
    be
    used
    as
    to
    past
    benefits
    or
    obligations.
    Any
    return
    above
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    is
    earned
    not
    from
    delay
    but
    by
    assuming
    risk,
    and
    therefore
    is
    not
    properly
    considered
    economic
    benefit
    from
    noncompliance.
    Be
    cause
    this
    amount
    is
    known
    and
    the
    existence
    and
    sol
    vency
    of
    the
    party
    is
    also
    [**60]
    known,
    it
    is
    inappropri
    ate
    to
    increase
    the
    rate
    to
    reflect
    risk.
    As
    to
    this
    issue,
    the
    Court
    finds
    Defendant
    WCI’s
    argument
    to
    be
    more
    per
    suasive.
    After
    observing
    the
    testimony
    of
    all
    the
    experts,
    the
    Court
    finds
    WCI’s
    expert
    Kenneth
    Wise
    most
    credi
    ble.
    Indetermining
    economic
    benefit,
    the
    Court
    therefore
    finds
    an
    after-tax,
    risk-free
    rate
    is
    correct.
    B.
    Period
    for
    Determination
    of
    Economic
    Benefit.
    For
    determining
    economic
    benefit,
    the
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    says
    that
    computation
    should
    accrue
    from
    the
    initial
    dates
    of-
    noncompliance
    until
    actual
    compli
    ance
    is
    achieved.
    Thus,
    the
    United
    States
    argues
    that
    economic
    benefit
    should
    be
    calculated
    from
    November
    1988,
    the
    first
    date
    of
    noncompliance.
    [11N25]
    RCRA
    encompasses
    both
    current
    and
    con
    tinuing
    violations,
    even
    if
    the
    latter
    originated
    in
    activi
    ties
    occurring
    before
    the
    applicable
    date
    of
    the
    statute.
    State
    v.
    PVS
    Chemicals,
    Inc.,
    50
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    171,
    180

    Page
    20
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    *;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    (W.D.N.Y.
    1998).
    Thus,
    there
    is
    little
    doubt
    that
    the
    Court
    may
    consider
    WCI’s
    conduct
    prior
    to
    May
    11,
    1993,
    to
    determine
    whether
    WCI
    is
    subject
    to,
    and
    vio
    lated,
    RCRA.
    However,
    the
    assessment
    of
    a
    civil
    fine
    for
    such
    a
    violation
    is
    limited
    by
    the
    federal
    statute
    of
    [**61]
    limi
    tations
    found
    in
    [HN26]
    28
    U.S.C.
    §
    2462:
    Except
    as
    otherwise
    provided
    by
    Act
    of
    Congress,
    an
    action,
    suit
    or
    proceeding
    for
    the
    enforcement
    of
    any
    civil
    fine,
    ..
    .
    [or]
    penalty.
    ..
    shall
    not
    be
    entertained
    unless
    commenced
    within
    five
    years
    from
    the
    date
    when
    the
    claim
    first
    accrued.
    28
    U.S.C.
    §
    2462.
    Thus,
    while
    the
    economic
    benefit
    WCI
    received
    from
    violating
    RCRA
    prior
    to
    May
    11,
    1993
    may
    be
    relevant
    to
    an
    examination
    of
    the
    extent
    of
    the
    violations,
    the
    scope
    of
    injunctive
    relief,
    and
    WCI’s
    good
    faith
    in
    remedying
    known
    violations,
    it
    is
    not
    determina
    tive
    of
    this
    Court’s
    assessment
    of
    a
    fine.
    F.
    Ability
    to
    Pay
    The
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    and
    Defendant
    WCI
    dis
    pute
    WCI’s
    ability
    to
    pay
    a
    substantial
    penalty.
    The
    United
    States
    argued
    that
    WCI
    could
    and
    should
    pay
    a
    penalty
    of
    $
    34
    million.
    In
    major
    part,
    the
    United
    States
    bases
    this
    position
    upon
    certain
    high
    dividends
    that
    WCI
    paid
    its
    corporate
    owner
    in
    recent
    years.
    WCI
    challenges
    its
    ability
    to
    pay
    such
    a
    penalty
    with
    impunity.
    WCI
    says
    it
    needs
    to
    invest
    $
    40
    million
    in
    capital
    annually
    and
    this
    investment
    would
    be
    impaired
    by
    such
    a
    penalty.
    WCI
    has
    made
    [**62]
    profits
    in
    some
    recent
    years.
    However,
    it
    faces
    increased
    competition,
    especially
    dur
    ing
    business
    downturns,
    from
    numerous
    competitors.
    First,
    cheap
    Asian
    steel
    has
    flooded
    the
    U.S.
    and
    world
    markets.
    As
    a
    result,
    U.S.
    steel
    imports
    increased
    33%
    from
    1997
    to
    1998,
    despite
    the
    fact
    that
    1997
    itself
    re
    corded
    high
    imports.
    As
    a
    result
    of
    these
    imports
    and
    the
    consequent
    competition,
    prices
    will
    remain
    low,
    with
    lower
    profit
    margins.
    28
    28
    Hot
    rolled
    steel
    prices
    declined
    from
    $
    25.32
    per
    100
    pounds
    in
    1995
    to
    $
    22.46
    in
    1996,
    to
    $
    18.12
    in
    1997,
    and
    to
    about
    $
    14
    in
    1998.
    Second,
    mini-mill
    capacity
    has
    also
    increased,
    re
    sulting
    in
    lower
    prices
    and
    margins.
    This
    problem
    is
    likely
    to
    continue.
    Third,
    this
    price
    competition
    with
    resulting
    pressure
    on
    margins
    has
    occurred
    during
    a
    time
    of
    economic
    ex
    pansion.
    When
    the
    inevitable
    downturn
    occurs,
    the
    pres
    sure
    on
    produèers
    will
    increase.
    As
    an
    unaffiliated
    opera
    tion,
    WCI
    will
    likely
    face
    [*832]
    even
    greater
    pressure
    during
    the
    next
    contraction.
    Operating
    income,
    after
    taking
    [**63]
    away
    unre
    lated
    financial
    expenses,
    declined
    from
    $
    77
    million
    (S
    58
    per
    ton)
    in
    1997
    to
    $
    62
    million
    (S
    44
    per
    ton)
    in
    1998.
    For
    the
    most
    recent
    quarter,
    ending
    January
    31,
    1999,
    WCI’s
    operating
    income
    was
    a
    $
    613,000
    loss
    compared
    to
    a
    $
    14,279,000
    profit
    in
    the
    first
    quarter
    of
    the
    previous
    year.
    Capital
    expenditures
    declined
    from
    $
    39.9
    million
    in
    1997,
    to
    $
    35.4
    million
    in
    1996,
    to
    $
    15.6
    million
    in
    1998.
    Taken
    as
    a
    whole,
    the
    Court
    finds
    that
    Defendant
    WCI
    does
    not
    have
    ability
    to
    pay
    any
    significant
    penalty
    and
    remain
    extant
    in
    the
    long
    term.
    Simply
    put,
    the
    Court
    credits
    testimony
    that
    WCI
    faces
    long
    odds
    for
    survival
    in
    an
    industry
    characterized
    by
    excess
    capacity,
    unre
    strained
    dumping
    by
    foreign
    producers,
    and
    uncertain
    future
    demand
    in
    the
    next
    downturn.
    G.
    The
    Government’s
    Conduct
    In
    fashioning
    a
    penalty,
    the
    Court
    considers
    the
    gov
    ernment’s
    conduct.
    Since
    1981,
    the
    Ohio
    EPA
    has
    con
    ducted
    at
    least
    twelve
    hazardous
    waste
    compliance
    in
    spections
    of
    the
    WCI
    facility.
    After
    making
    these
    inspec
    tions,
    the
    Ohio
    EPA
    did
    not
    allege
    that
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    were
    hazardous
    waste
    units
    subject
    to
    RCRA.
    In
    1993,
    the
    Ohio
    EPA
    gave
    WCI
    a
    RCRA
    Part
    B
    permit
    for
    the
    storage
    of
    acid
    prior
    [**64]
    to
    recycling.
    The
    U.S.
    EPA
    also
    inspected
    WCI’s
    facility
    under
    the
    Clean
    Water
    Act
    and
    RCRA
    in
    1990,
    1991,
    and
    1992.
    After
    conducting
    these
    inspections,
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    inspectors
    did
    not
    allege
    that
    the
    Ponds
    were
    hazardous
    waste
    units.
    Beginning
    in
    May
    1993,
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    made
    a
    “mul
    timedia”
    inspection
    at
    WCI’s
    Warren
    facility.
    This
    mul
    timedia
    inspection
    was
    made
    under
    the
    Clean
    Water
    Act,
    the
    Clean
    Air
    Act,
    RCRA,
    and
    the
    Toxic
    Substances
    Control
    Act.
    Shortly
    after
    conducting
    this
    inspection,
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    requested
    documents
    from
    WCI.
    By
    early
    spring,
    1994,
    Defendant
    WCI
    had
    produced
    documents
    requested
    by
    the
    U.S.
    EPA.
    With
    this
    produc
    tion,
    WCI
    gave
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    the
    “Turn
    Audits”
    forms
    recording
    the
    readings
    from
    the
    pH
    meters
    located
    at
    the
    aeration
    influent
    box,
    the
    aeration
    tank,
    the
    rapid
    mix
    tank,
    and
    the
    No.
    3
    clarifier.
    This
    data
    reflected
    readings
    every
    two
    hours
    from
    September
    1,
    1988.
    The
    Turn
    Au
    dits
    also
    reflected
    the
    records
    of
    the
    grab
    sample
    pH
    measurements
    for
    Pond
    6
    influent
    wastewater.
    Despite
    having
    this
    most
    important
    evidence
    in
    early
    1994,
    the
    government
    delayed
    filing
    this
    action
    until

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    *;
    1999
    U.S.
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    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    May
    11,
    1998.
    The
    government
    delayed
    filing
    even
    though
    it
    had
    filed
    a
    Clean
    [**65]
    Water
    Act
    action
    against
    WCI
    in
    June
    1995.
    29
    The
    U.S.
    EPA
    delayed
    fil
    ing
    even
    though
    the
    EPA
    and
    WCI
    had
    reached
    a
    settle
    ment
    of
    the
    Clean
    Water
    Act
    suit
    in
    April
    1998
    and
    even
    though
    that
    settlement
    made
    provision
    for
    the
    remedia
    tion
    of
    Pond
    6
    and
    to
    fill
    in
    Pond
    6A.
    29
    United
    States
    v.
    WCI
    Steel,
    Inc.,
    Civil
    Action
    No.
    4:95CV1442
    (N.D.
    Ohio).
    As
    described
    above,
    the
    government
    delayed
    resolu
    tion
    of
    this
    dispute.
    First,
    the
    government
    delayed
    inves
    tigation
    of
    WCI’s
    wastewater
    handling
    methods
    despite
    knowledge
    that
    WCI
    used
    processes
    that
    are
    acidic.
    While
    RCRA
    requires
    self-reporting,
    the
    government’s
    inattention
    delayed
    this
    action.
    Second,
    even
    when
    it
    had
    suspicion
    and
    necessary
    information,
    the
    United
    States
    delayed
    this
    action
    more
    than
    four
    years.
    Moreover,
    it
    delayed
    this
    action
    despite
    expending
    large
    resources
    for
    discovery
    in
    the
    1995
    Clean
    Water
    Act
    case
    and
    despite
    settlement
    efforts
    in
    that
    case.
    The
    government’s
    delay
    and
    the
    government’s
    split
    ting
    of
    causes
    of
    action
    are
    taken
    into
    account
    [**66]
    in
    setting
    the
    penalty
    imposed
    upon
    WCI.
    [HN27]
    United
    States
    v.
    Bethlehem
    Steel
    Corp.,
    829
    F.
    Supp.
    1047,
    1056-58
    (N.D.
    md.
    1993).
    “Courts
    should
    respond
    to
    EPA’s
    undue
    agency
    delay
    by
    reducing
    penalties
    in
    an
    enforcement
    action
    [*833]
    in
    order
    to
    counteract
    any
    incentive
    the
    agency
    might
    have
    to
    place
    itself
    in
    a
    supe
    rior
    litigating
    position.”
    United
    States
    v.
    Marine
    Shale
    Processors,
    81
    F.3d
    1329,
    1337
    (5th
    Cu.
    1996).
    H.
    Penalty
    Finding
    The
    United
    States
    requests
    a
    per
    diem
    penalty
    for
    each
    violation.
    This
    Court
    will
    not
    do
    so
    as
    it
    is
    within
    this
    Court’s
    discretion
    to
    determine
    the
    total
    amount
    of
    penalty
    that
    WCI
    should
    pay.
    However,
    the
    Court
    con
    siders
    the
    total
    days
    of
    violation
    in
    setting
    the
    penalty.
    Bethlehem
    Steel
    Corp.,
    829
    F.
    Supp.
    at
    1056
    (citing
    United
    States
    (EPA)
    v.
    Environmental
    Waste
    Control,
    Inc.,
    710
    F.
    Supp.
    1172,
    1242
    (ND.
    md.
    1989)).
    The
    Court
    does
    not
    assume
    a
    $
    25,000
    or
    $
    27,500
    per
    day
    fine
    but
    rather
    views
    the
    evidence
    in
    total
    to
    determine
    a
    single
    penalty.
    In
    setting
    the
    penalty,
    the
    Court
    recog
    nizes
    that
    deterrence
    is
    the
    major
    purpose
    of
    a
    civil
    pen
    alty.
    Id.
    After
    considering
    Defendant
    [**67]
    WCI’s
    viola
    tions,
    the
    economic
    benefit
    it
    has
    obtained,
    the
    govern
    ment’s
    undue
    delay
    in
    bringing
    this
    action,
    the
    Court
    hereby
    assesses
    a
    civil
    penalty
    against
    WCI
    in
    the
    amount
    of
    $
    1
    million.
    I.
    Injunctive
    Relief
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6928(a)
    gives
    the
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    the
    power
    to
    file
    a
    civil
    action
    to
    obtain
    appropri
    ate
    relief.
    The
    relief
    sought
    can
    include
    a
    temporary
    or
    permanent
    injunction.
    {HN28]
    Normally,
    to
    obtain
    injunctive
    relief
    a
    party
    must
    prove
    that
    there
    is
    no
    adequate
    remedy
    at
    law,
    that
    the
    plaintiff
    may
    suffer
    an
    irreparable
    injury
    if
    an
    injunc
    tion
    is
    not
    granted
    and
    that
    the
    balance
    of
    the
    equities
    justifies
    an
    injunction.
    However,
    when
    the
    government
    brings
    the
    action
    and
    shows
    that
    an
    activity
    endangers
    public
    health,
    injunctive
    relief
    is
    proper
    without
    under
    taking
    a
    balancing
    of
    the
    equities.
    Environmental
    De
    fense
    Fund,
    Inc.
    v.
    Lamphiei,
    714
    F.2d
    331,
    337-38
    (4th
    Cir.1983);
    United
    States
    v.
    Bethlehem
    Steel
    Corp.,
    38
    F.3d
    862,
    868
    (7th
    Cir.
    1994).
    In
    cases
    of
    public
    health
    legislation,
    the
    emphasis
    shifts
    from
    consideration
    of
    irreparable
    injury
    to
    concern
    for
    the
    general
    public
    inter
    est.
    Id.
    The
    United
    [**68]
    States
    does
    not
    allege
    that
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    currently
    contain
    wastewater
    with
    a
    pH
    of
    2.0
    or
    below.
    There
    have
    been
    no
    influent
    probe
    readings
    of
    2.0
    or
    below
    after
    1995.
    The
    sludge
    lining
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    does
    not
    have
    a
    pH
    of
    2.0
    or
    lower
    and
    there
    is
    no
    evidence
    that
    it
    ever
    did
    have
    such
    a
    low
    pH.
    Conse
    quently,
    the
    United
    States’
    request
    for
    injunctive
    relief
    does
    not
    purport
    to
    correct
    ongoing
    conditions
    that
    pose
    any
    type
    of
    public
    health
    risk
    or
    risk
    to
    the
    environment.
    [1{N29]
    In
    deciding
    whether
    the
    strong
    remedy
    of
    injunctive
    relief
    should
    be
    given,
    the
    Court
    is
    most
    con
    cerned
    with
    whether
    this
    relief
    is
    necessary
    to
    stop
    the
    danger
    that
    might
    result
    from
    violations
    of
    RCRA.
    Spe
    cifically,
    is
    injunctive
    relief
    necessary
    to
    stop
    WCI
    from
    receiving,
    handling,
    or
    disposing
    of
    corrosive
    wastes
    into
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A?
    In
    circumstances
    where
    no
    evidence
    shows
    that
    corrosive
    wastes
    have
    been
    present
    in
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A
    since
    at
    least
    1995,
    the
    Court
    finds
    that
    in
    junctive
    relief
    is
    not
    necessary.
    As
    desëribed
    above,
    the
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    filed
    an
    action
    in
    June
    1995,
    alleging
    Clean
    Water
    Act
    viola
    tions
    with
    regard
    Ponds
    5,
    6,
    and
    6A.
    With
    regard
    to
    that
    action,
    the
    United
    [**69]
    States
    used
    the
    same
    basic
    evidence
    that
    it
    uses
    in
    this
    case.
    The
    United
    States
    then
    settled
    this
    Clean
    Water
    Act
    case.
    As
    part
    of
    this
    settle
    ment,
    the
    United
    States
    agreed
    to
    a
    Consent
    Decree.
    In
    that
    Consent
    Decree,
    the
    United
    States
    agreed
    that
    WCI
    should
    install
    a
    liner
    in
    Pond
    6
    and
    to
    fill
    in
    Pond
    6A.
    Given
    the
    United
    States’s
    agreement
    that
    WCI
    install
    a
    liner,
    it
    is
    inconsistent
    to
    now
    argue
    that
    Pond
    6
    must
    be
    closed
    to
    preserve
    public
    health.
    Finding
    that
    the
    Plaintiff
    United
    States
    fails
    to
    show
    any
    imminent
    threat
    to
    health
    or
    the
    environment,
    the

    Page
    22
    72
    F.
    Supp.
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    810,
    *;
    1999
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    17436,
    **;
    49
    ERC
    (BNA)
    1685;
    30
    ELR
    20169
    Court
    denies
    the
    United
    States
    request
    for
    injunctive
    re
    lief.
    [*8341
    VI.
    CONCLUSION
    For
    the
    reasons
    stated
    herein,
    the
    Court
    assesses
    a
    $
    1
    million
    fine
    against
    Defendant
    WCI.
    The
    Court
    finds
    injunctive
    relief
    inappropriate
    in
    this
    case.
    Accordingly,
    this
    action
    is
    terminated
    pursuant
    to
    Fed.
    R.
    Civ.
    P.
    58.
    IT
    IS
    SO
    ORDERED.
    Date:
    October
    22,
    1999
    Hon.
    James
    S.
    Gwin
    U.S.
    District
    Court
    ORDER
    The
    Court
    has
    entered
    its
    findings
    of
    fact
    and
    con
    clusions
    of
    law
    in
    the
    above-captioned
    case.
    For
    the
    rea
    Sons
    set
    forth
    therein,
    the
    Court
    orders
    Defendant
    WCI
    Steel,
    Inc.
    to
    pay
    a
    civil
    fine
    of
    S
    I
    million.
    Finding
    that
    WCI’s
    RCRA
    [**70]
    violations
    pose
    no
    threat
    to
    the
    public
    health,
    the
    Court
    denies
    the
    United
    States’
    request
    for
    injunctive
    relief.
    Accordingly,
    this
    action
    is
    terminated
    pursuant
    to
    Fed.
    R.
    Civ.
    P.
    58.
    IT
    IS
    SO
    ORDERED.
    Date:
    October
    22,
    1999
    Hon.
    James
    S.
    Gwin
    U.S.
    District
    Court

    Judicial
    Review
    of
    Discount
    Rates
    Used
    in
    Regulatory
    Cost-Benefit
    Analysis
    Edward
    R.
    Morrisont
    Executive
    orders,
    statutes,
    andprecedent
    increasingly
    re
    quire
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    of
    regulations.
    Presidential
    executive
    orders
    have
    long
    required
    executive
    agencies
    to
    submit
    regulatory
    impact
    analyses
    1
    to
    the
    Office
    of
    Management
    and
    Budget
    (“0MB”)
    before
    issuing
    regulations,
    2
    and
    recent
    federal
    legislation
    exhibits
    a
    trend
    toward
    mandatory
    cost-benefit
    analysis.
    For
    ex
    ample,
    the
    Toxic
    Substances
    Control
    Act,
    3
    the
    Federal
    Insecticide,
    Fungicide
    and
    Rodenticide
    Act,
    4
    and
    the
    recent
    Safe
    Drinking
    Water
    Act
    Amendments
    5
    require
    the
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency
    to
    balance
    costs
    and
    benefits
    in
    regulating
    chemicals
    and
    pesticides.
    In
    1995,
    Congress
    passed
    the
    Unfunded
    Mandates
    Act,
    requiring
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    of
    all
    significant
    federal
    regulations
    that
    require
    expenditures
    by
    state,
    local,
    or
    tribal
    governments.
    7
    Additionally,
    Congress
    has
    proposed
    several
    bills
    t
    B.S.
    1994
    University
    of
    Utah;
    AM.
    (Economics)
    1997,
    The
    Univeristy
    of
    Chicago;
    Ph.D.
    (Economics)
    Candidate
    2000,
    J.D.
    Candidate
    2000,
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago.
    A
    regulatory
    impact
    analysis
    assesses
    the
    potential
    costs
    and
    benefits
    (both
    mone
    tary
    and
    nonmonetary)
    of
    a
    rule.
    EQ
    12291,
    46
    Fed
    Reg
    13193,
    13194
    (1981).
    The
    report
    contains
    a
    “description
    of
    alternative
    approaches
    that
    could
    substantially
    achieve
    the
    same
    regulatory
    goal
    at
    lower
    cost,
    together
    with
    an
    analysis
    of
    this
    potential
    benefit
    and
    costs
    and
    a
    brief
    explanation
    of
    the
    legal
    reasons
    why
    such
    alternatives,
    if
    proposed,
    could
    not
    be
    adopted.”
    Id.
    Although
    previous
    administrations
    issued
    executive
    orders
    encouraging
    agencies
    to
    consider
    the
    economic
    impact
    of
    proposed
    regulations,
    President
    Reagan’s
    executive
    order,
    EQ
    12291,
    46
    Fed
    Reg
    13193,
    was
    the
    first
    to
    require
    cost-benefit
    analysis.
    Section
    2
    of
    EQ
    12291
    required
    agencies
    to
    ensure
    that
    the
    social
    benefits
    of
    a
    proposed
    regulation
    exceed
    its
    social
    costs.
    Id.
    In
    1993,
    President
    Clinton
    issued
    EQ
    12866,
    58
    Fed
    Reg
    51735
    (1993),
    which
    generally
    affirms
    the
    approach
    of
    the
    Reagan
    order.
    Unlike
    Reagan’s
    order,
    how
    ever,
    EQ
    12866
    §
    1(b)
    merely
    endorses
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    as
    a
    tool
    for
    evaluating
    regula
    toryoptions
    and
    does
    not
    require
    that
    benefits
    outweigh
    costs.
    58
    Fed
    Reg
    at
    51735-36.
    See
    generally
    Richard
    H.
    Pildes
    and
    Cass
    R.
    Sunstein,
    Reinventing
    the
    Regulatory
    State,
    62
    U
    Chi
    L
    Rev
    1,
    3-7
    (1995)
    (comparing
    the
    different
    approaches
    of
    the
    Reagan
    and
    Clinton
    executive
    orders);
    QMB,
    Draft
    Report
    to
    Congress
    on
    the
    Costs
    and
    Benefits
    of
    Fed
    eral
    Regulations,
    62
    Fed
    Reg
    39352,
    39355-57
    (1997)
    (describing
    the
    development
    of
    regulatory
    analyses
    in
    successive
    administrations).
    15
    USC
    §
    2605(c)(l)
    (1994).
    7
    USC
    §
    136(bb)
    (1994).
    42
    USCA
    §
    300g-l(b)(3)
    (1991
    &
    Supp
    1998).
    6
    Pub
    L
    No
    104-4,
    109
    Stat
    48
    (1995),
    codified
    at
    2
    USCA
    §
    1501
    et
    seq
    (1997).
    2
    USCA
    §
    1532(a).
    1333

    1334
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    Law
    Review
    [65:1333
    that
    would
    require
    federal
    agencies
    to
    apply
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    to
    all
    rules.
    8
    This
    trend
    raises
    important
    questions
    about
    the
    methods
    agencies
    use
    to
    conduct
    cost-benefit
    analysis.
    To
    perform
    the
    analysis,
    an
    agency
    must
    first
    quantify
    the
    stream
    of
    costs
    and
    benefits
    that
    a
    regulation
    will
    generate
    in
    current
    and
    future
    pe
    riods.
    9
    Quantification,
    however,
    is
    not
    enough.
    Because
    of
    the
    time
    value
    of
    money
    (that
    is,
    a
    dollar
    today
    can
    be
    invested
    to
    yield
    more
    than
    a
    dollar
    tomorrow),
    costs
    and
    benefits
    in
    different
    periods
    are
    different
    “goods”
    and
    are
    not
    strictly
    comparable.
    Therefore,
    the
    agency.
    must
    choose
    a
    discount
    rate
    that
    will
    con
    vert
    future
    sums
    into
    present
    values.
    It
    can
    then
    use
    these
    pres
    ent
    values
    to
    compute
    the
    net
    benefit
    (or
    “net
    present
    value”)
    of
    the
    regulation.
    Discount
    rates
    fundamentally
    influence
    judgments
    about
    the
    need
    for
    and
    the
    effectiveness
    of
    cost-benefit
    analysis.In
    1986,
    0MB
    economist
    John
    Morrall
    documented
    extreme
    variation
    in
    the
    value
    that
    regulations
    implicitly
    place
    on
    humanlife.’
    0
    On
    the
    low
    end,
    a
    National
    Highway
    Traffic
    Safety
    Administration
    (“NHTSA”)
    regulation
    cost
    $100,000
    per
    life
    saved;”
    on
    the
    high
    end,
    an
    Occupational
    Safety
    and
    Health
    Administration
    (“OSHA”)
    rule
    cost
    $72
    billion
    per
    life
    saved.’
    2
    Although
    this
    study
    has
    greatly
    influenced
    recent
    congressional
    and
    academic
    proposals
    for
    regulatory
    reform,’
    3
    emerging
    scholarship
    shows
    that
    Morrall’s
    results
    depended
    critically
    on
    the
    discount
    rate
    he
    See,
    for
    example.
    Risk
    Assessment
    and
    Cost-Benefit
    Act
    of
    1995,
    HR
    1022,
    104th
    Cong,
    1st
    Sess
    (Feb
    23,
    1995);
    Regulatory
    Improvement
    Act
    of
    1997,
    S
    981,
    105th
    Cong,
    2d
    Sess
    (June
    27.
    1997).
    See
    generally
    Cass
    R.
    Sunstein,
    Congress.
    Constitutional
    Moments,
    and
    the
    Cost-Benefit
    State,
    48
    Stan
    L
    Rev
    247,
    269-86
    (1996)
    (describing
    regulatory
    reform
    efforts
    of
    the
    104th
    Congress);
    Thomas
    0.
    McGarity,
    The
    Expanded
    Debate
    over
    the
    Future
    of
    the
    Regulatory
    State,
    63
    U
    Chi
    L
    Rev
    1463,
    1528-32
    (1996)
    (same).
    This
    Comment
    ignores
    “incommensurability”
    issues—whether
    the
    value
    of
    life
    or
    other
    nonmonetary
    benefits
    can
    be
    measured
    “along
    a
    single
    metric
    without
    doing
    violence
    to
    our
    considered
    judgments
    about
    how
    these
    goods
    are
    best
    characterized.”
    Cass
    R.
    Sun-
    stein,
    Incommensurability
    and
    Valuation
    in
    Law,
    92
    Mich
    L
    Rev
    779,
    796
    (1994)
    ‘°
    John
    F.
    Morrall
    III,
    A
    Review
    of
    the
    Record,
    Regulation
    25,
    30
    table
    4
    (Nov/Dec
    1986).
    Initial
    Federal
    Motor
    Vehicle
    Safety
    Standards,
    32
    Fed
    Reg2408.
    2414-15
    (1967).
    Occupational
    Exposure
    to
    Formaldehyde,
    50
    Fed
    Reg
    50412
    (1985).
    See,
    for
    example,
    Lisa
    Heinzerling,
    Regulatory
    Costs
    of
    Mythic
    Proportions,
    107
    Yale
    L
    J
    1981
    (1998).
    Heinzerling
    notes,
    id
    at
    1983
    n
    2,
    that
    Morrall’s
    statistics
    underlie
    Ste
    phen
    Breyer,
    Breaking
    the
    Vicious
    Circle:
    Toward
    Effective
    Risk
    Regulation
    24-27
    (Har
    vard
    1993).
    For
    other
    commentary
    relying
    on
    Morrall’s
    work,
    see
    Pildes
    and
    Sunstein,
    62
    U
    Chi
    L
    Rev
    at
    105
    &
    n
    363
    (cited
    in
    note
    2);
    John
    D.
    Graham,
    The
    Risk
    Not
    Reduced,
    3
    NYU
    Envir
    L
    J
    382,
    398
    n
    79
    (1994);
    W.
    Kip
    Viscusi,
    Equivalent
    Frames
    of
    Reference
    for
    Judging
    Risk
    Regulation
    Policies,
    3
    NYU
    Envir
    L
    J
    431,
    449-50
    n
    42
    (1994).

    19981
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1335
    chose,
    which
    differed
    markedly
    from
    the
    rates
    NHTSA
    and
    OSHA
    actually
    employed.
    14
    The
    Morall
    study
    is
    just
    one
    example
    of
    how
    small
    variations
    in
    the
    discount
    rate
    can
    have
    very
    large
    effects
    on
    the
    results
    of
    cost-benefit
    analysis.
    Consider,
    for
    example,
    a
    proposed
    regula
    tion
    that
    will
    generate
    $100
    in
    benefits
    in
    fifty
    years.
    The
    present
    value’
    5
    of
    this
    benefit
    is
    $61
    at
    a
    1
    percent
    discount
    rate,
    $14
    at
    4
    percent,
    $3
    at
    7
    percent,
    and
    less
    than
    $1
    at
    10
    percent.
    Unfortu
    nately,
    despite
    the
    importance
    of
    the
    discount
    rate
    in
    cost-benefit
    analysis,
    few
    standards
    guide
    agency
    practice.
    Although
    0MB
    has
    issued
    discount
    rate
    guidelines
    since
    1972,16
    discount
    rates
    vary
    significantly
    within
    and
    across
    agencies.
    Few
    courts
    have
    reviewed
    agency
    discount
    rates,
    in
    part
    be
    cause
    relatively
    few
    statutes
    require
    agencies
    to
    conduct
    cost-
    benefit
    analysis,
    and
    in
    part
    because
    there
    are
    no
    meaningful
    standards
    of
    review
    for
    courts
    to
    apply.
    When
    courts
    have
    ad
    dressed
    the
    issue,
    they
    have
    either
    deferred
    to
    agency
    discretion
    or
    imposed
    their
    own
    judgments
    about
    discounting.
    The
    absence
    of
    standards
    for
    discounting
    is
    particularly
    troubling
    as
    cost-
    benefit
    analysis
    has
    played
    an
    ever
    greater
    role
    in
    new
    legisla
    tion.
    Although
    several
    legal
    scholars
    have
    discussed
    this
    problem,
    none
    has
    considered
    how
    economic
    theory
    can
    assist
    courts
    in
    re
    viewing
    agency
    discount
    rates.’
    7
    This
    Comment
    develops
    a
    framework
    for
    judicial
    review
    of
    an
    agency’s
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate.
    Part
    I
    discusses
    the
    striking
    variation
    in
    the
    discount
    rates
    agencies
    use.
    Part
    II
    analyzes
    the
    economic
    theory
    of
    discounting
    and
    develops
    a
    simple
    conceptual
    framework
    for
    evaluating
    particular
    discount
    rates.
    Finally,
    Part
    III
    uses
    this
    conceptual
    framework
    to
    establish
    a
    standard
    of
    re
    See
    Heinzerling,
    107
    Yale
    L
    J
    at
    1984-85
    (cited
    in
    note
    13).
    The
    general
    formula
    for
    computing
    the
    present
    value
    (in
    discrete
    time)
    of
    asum
    X
    paid
    in
    n
    years,
    where
    the
    discount
    rate
    is
    r,
    is
    X/(l
    +
    r)°.
    Thus,
    when
    the
    discount
    rate
    is
    5
    percent,
    the
    present
    value
    of
    $100
    paid
    in
    50
    years
    is
    100/(1
    +
    .05)5°
    =
    $8.72.
    6
    See
    0MB,
    Benefit-Cost
    Analysis
    of
    Federal
    Programs;
    Guidelines
    and
    Discounts,
    57
    Fed
    Reg
    53519,
    53520
    (1992),
    replacing
    and
    rescinding
    0MB
    Circular
    No
    A-94,
    Discount
    Rate
    to
    be
    Used
    in
    Evaluating
    Time-Distributed
    Costs
    and
    Benefits
    (Mar
    27,
    1972).
    One
    article
    has
    explored
    the
    appropriate
    discount
    rate
    policy
    for
    regulatory
    agen
    cies.
    Daniel
    A.
    Farber
    and
    Paul
    A.
    Hemmersbaugh,
    The
    Shadow
    of
    the
    Future:
    Discount
    Rates,
    Later
    Generations,
    and
    the
    Environment,
    46
    Vand
    L
    Rev
    267
    (1993).
    The
    authors,
    however,
    do
    not
    address
    the
    appropriate
    standard
    ofjudicial
    review.
    Other
    commentators
    have
    discussed
    agency
    discount
    rates
    without
    reference
    to
    judicial
    review.
    See,
    for
    exam
    ple,
    Heinzerling,
    107
    Yale
    L
    J
    at
    2043-56
    (cited
    in
    note
    13);
    Bradford
    C.
    Mank,
    Protecting
    the
    Environment
    for
    Future
    Generations:
    A
    Proposal
    for
    a
    Republican
    Superagency,
    5
    NYU
    Envir
    L
    J
    444,
    460-62
    (1996).
    See
    also
    Cass
    R.
    Sunstein,
    BehavioralAnalysis
    of
    Law,
    64
    U
    Chi
    L
    Rev
    1175,
    1193-94
    (1997).

    1336
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    LawReview
    [65:1333
    view
    that
    courts
    may
    apply
    when
    reviewing
    an
    agency’s
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate.
    I.
    AGENCY
    PRACTICE:
    LARGE
    VARIATION
    WITHIN
    AND
    ACROSS
    AGENCIES
    Agencies
    exhibit
    striking
    inconsistencies
    in
    their
    use
    of
    dis
    count
    rates.
    Not
    only
    do
    different
    agencies
    use
    significantly
    dif
    ferent
    rates,
    but
    often
    a
    single
    agency
    employs
    very
    different
    rates
    for
    various
    regulations.
    Administrative
    records
    offer
    little
    explanation
    for
    this
    variation.
    In
    an
    effort
    to
    standardize
    agency
    cost-benefit
    analysis,
    0MB
    has
    issued
    discount
    rate
    guidelines
    since
    l972.’
    The
    most
    recent
    guidelines,
    published
    in
    1992,
    recommend
    a
    7
    percent
    real’
    9
    dis
    count
    rate
    for
    analysis
    of
    all
    “public
    investments
    and
    regulatory
    programs
    that
    provide
    benefits
    and
    costs
    to
    the
    general
    public.”
    20
    0MB
    asserts
    that
    this
    rate
    “approximates
    the
    marginal
    pretax
    rate
    of
    return
    on
    an
    average
    investment
    in
    the
    private
    sector
    in
    recent
    years.”
    21
    However,
    0MB.
    acknowleliges
    that
    alternative
    rates
    may
    be
    appropriate
    in
    some
    cases.
    22
    OMB’s
    guidelines
    appear
    to
    have
    had
    little
    effect
    on
    the
    dis
    count
    rates
    that
    agencies
    actually
    uáe.
    23
    This
    is
    evident
    in
    Tables
    I
    and
    2
    (following
    this
    Comment),
    which
    survey
    the
    discount
    rates
    agencies
    have
    employed
    during
    the
    past
    five
    years.
    Table
    1
    focuses
    on
    long-term
    regulations
    that
    provide
    costs
    or
    benefits
    over
    thirty
    or
    more
    years.
    Some
    agencies,
    such
    as
    the
    Department
    of
    Housing
    and
    Urban
    Development
    (“HUD”)
    and
    the
    Food
    and
    Drug
    Administration
    (“FDA”),
    have
    used
    a
    relatively
    low
    rate
    of
    3
    percent;
    others,
    such
    as
    the
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency
    (“EPA”)
    and
    the
    Bureau
    of
    Reclamation,
    have
    employed
    rates
    in
    excess
    of
    7
    percent.
    Further,
    individual
    agencies
    have
    used
    differ
    ent
    rates
    for
    different
    regulations.
    The
    EPA,
    for
    example,
    em-
    8
    See
    0MB,
    Benefit-Cost
    Analysis
    of
    Federal
    Programs,
    57
    Fed
    Reg
    at
    53520
    (cited
    in
    note
    16).
    A
    real
    discount
    rate
    (as
    opposed
    to
    a
    nominal
    rate)
    excludes
    the
    premium
    for
    ex
    pected
    inflation.
    20
    0MB,
    Benefit-Cost
    Analysis
    of
    Federal
    Programs,
    57
    Fed
    Reg
    at
    53522-23
    (cited
    in
    note
    16).
    Prior
    to
    1992,
    0MB
    recommended
    a
    10
    percent
    rate.
    0MB,
    Guidelines
    and
    Dis
    count
    Rates
    for
    Benefit-Cost
    Analysis
    of
    Federal
    Programs.
    57
    Fed
    Reg
    35613,
    35613-14
    (1992).
    2
    0MB,
    Benefit-Cost
    Analysis
    of
    Federal
    Programs,
    57
    Fed
    Reg
    at
    53523
    (cited
    in
    note
    16).
    22
    An
    agency,
    however,
    must
    gain
    0MB
    permission
    to
    use
    alternative
    discount
    rates,
    such
    as
    the
    “shadow
    price
    of
    capital,”
    instead
    of
    the
    recommended
    7
    percent
    rate.
    Id.
    0MB
    has
    acknowledged
    as
    much.
    See
    0MB,
    Draft
    Report
    to
    Congress,
    62
    Fed
    Reg
    at
    39379
    (cited
    in
    note
    2),
    where
    0MB
    notes
    that
    the
    EPA
    did
    not
    use
    the
    recommended
    dis
    count
    rate
    in
    conducting
    its
    analysis
    of
    its
    lead-based
    paint
    rule.

    19981
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1337
    ployed
    a
    3
    percent
    discount
    rate
    for
    regulations
    of
    lead-based
    paint
    but
    used
    7
    and
    10
    percent
    rates
    for
    regulations
    of
    drinking
    water
    and
    emissions
    from
    locomotives.
    This
    variation
    in
    discount
    rates
    has
    profound
    effects
    on
    the
    analysis
    of
    long-term
    regula
    tions.
    Consider
    the
    HUD
    regulation
    of
    lead-based
    paint
    24
    While
    that
    regulation
    had
    net
    benefits
    of
    $1,080.2
    million
    at
    a
    3
    percent
    discount
    rate,
    it
    had
    net
    benefits
    of
    only
    $39
    million
    at
    a
    7
    per
    cent
    rate.
    25
    Although
    HUD
    acknowledged
    this,
    it
    favored
    the
    3
    percent
    rate
    merely
    because
    the
    regulation
    affected
    future
    gen
    erations
    26
    Slightly
    less
    inconsistency
    characterizes
    agency
    analyses
    of
    short-term
    regulations
    that
    yield
    benefits
    and
    costs
    within
    the
    next
    twenty
    years.
    Table
    2
    shows
    that
    most
    agencies
    use
    discount
    rates
    between
    7
    and
    10
    percent.
    However,
    there
    is
    still
    significant
    variation:
    several
    agencies,
    such
    as
    the
    EPA
    27
    and
    the
    FDA,
    28
    have
    used
    3
    percent
    rates.
    The
    administrative
    record
    offers
    little
    explanation
    for
    the
    selection
    of
    discount
    rates.
    Many
    agencies
    employ
    discount
    rates
    without
    discussing
    the
    theoretical
    or
    political
    reasons
    for
    choos
    ing
    a
    particular
    rate.
    29
    This
    seems
    particularly
    true
    for
    the
    EPA.
    3
    °
    II.
    THE
    THEORY
    OF
    DISCOUNT
    RATES
    Scholars
    have
    long
    debated
    what
    discount
    rate
    is
    appropriate
    for
    regulations
    and
    other
    public
    projects.
    The
    debate
    has
    ethical,
    political,
    and
    economic
    dimensions.
    On
    one
    level,
    scholars
    debate
    the
    threshold
    issue
    of
    whether
    it
    is
    sound
    public
    policy
    for
    regula
    HUD,
    Requirements
    for
    Notification,
    Evaluation
    and
    Reduction
    of
    Lead-Based
    Paint
    Hazards
    in
    Federally
    Owned
    Residential
    Property
    and
    Housing
    Receiving
    Federal
    Assis
    tance,
    61
    Fed
    Reg
    29170
    (1996).
    Id
    at
    29189.
    Id.
    HUD
    noted
    that
    EPA
    also
    uses
    a
    3
    percent
    rate.
    Id.
    See
    EPA.
    Comprehensive
    Guideline
    for
    Procurement
    of
    Products
    Containing
    Recov
    ered
    Materials,
    62
    Fed
    Reg
    60962,
    60970
    (1997)
    (employing
    a
    3
    percent
    rate
    over
    a
    ten-
    year
    period).
    See
    Department
    of
    Health
    and
    Human
    Services,
    Tobacco
    Regulation
    forSubstance
    Abuse
    Prevention
    and
    Treatment
    Block
    Grants,
    61
    Fed
    Reg
    1492,
    1504,
    1506
    (1996)
    (pre
    senting
    benefit-cost
    analysis
    results
    using
    both
    3
    and
    7
    percent
    discount
    rates).
    Rare
    exceptions
    include
    the
    Department
    of
    Energy’s
    regulation
    on
    energy
    conserva
    tion
    standards
    for
    consumer
    products,
    see
    Department
    of
    Energy,
    Energy
    Conservation
    Program
    for
    Consumer
    Products,
    58
    Fed
    Reg
    47326,
    47333-35
    (1993),
    and
    the
    National
    Oceanic
    and
    Atmospheric
    Administration
    rules
    on
    natural
    resource
    damage
    assessments,
    see
    Department
    of
    Commerce,
    National
    Oceanic
    and
    Atmospheric
    Administration,
    Natu
    ral
    Resource
    Damage
    Assessments,
    61
    Fed
    Reg
    440,
    453-54
    (1996),
    where
    the
    agencies
    jus
    tify
    their
    decisions
    to
    depart
    from
    0MB
    guidelines.
    See
    discussion
    in
    Part
    111G.
    °
    See,
    for
    example,
    EPA,
    Protection
    of
    Stratospheric
    Ozone;
    Labeling,
    58
    Fed
    Reg
    8136,
    8163
    (1993)
    (offering
    alternative
    conclusions
    using
    a
    2
    percent
    and
    7
    percent
    rate
    without
    providing
    an
    explanation
    for
    using
    either
    discount
    rate).

    1338
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    LawReview
    [65:1333
    tory
    agencies
    to
    discount
    future
    benefits,
    especially
    when
    those
    benefits
    accrue
    to
    future
    generations.
    On
    another
    level,
    given
    the
    choice
    to
    discount
    future
    costs
    and
    benefits,
    the
    debate
    becomes
    more
    economic.
    Here
    scholars
    disagree
    whether
    regulatory
    agen
    cies
    should
    derive
    the
    appropriate
    discount
    rate
    from
    rates
    of
    re
    turn
    in
    financial
    markets
    or
    from
    a
    normative
    model
    of
    intergenerational
    social
    welfare.
    This
    Part
    surveys
    both
    levels
    of
    the
    debate.
    Part
    A
    addresses
    the
    ethical,
    political,
    and
    economic
    debate
    over
    the
    threshold
    de
    cision
    to
    discount
    future
    costs
    and
    benefits,
    demonstrating
    that
    sound
    public
    policy
    requires
    a
    regulatory
    agency
    to
    discount
    fu
    ture
    sums.
    Part
    B
    surveys
    the
    economic
    and
    political
    debate
    over
    the
    appropriate
    discount
    rate.
    Finally,
    Part
    C
    synthesizes
    the
    discussion
    in
    this
    Part
    and
    develops
    a
    simple
    conceptual
    frame
    work
    for
    choosing
    and
    evaluating
    discount
    rates.
    A.
    The
    Philosophical
    Approach
    to
    Discount
    Rates
    Philosophers,
    3
    legal
    scholars,
    32
    and
    several
    economists
    33
    have
    questioned
    the
    ethical
    and
    logical
    theory
    underlying
    the
    decision
    to
    discount
    future
    costs
    and
    benefits
    to
    future
    generations.
    A
    strong
    intuition
    suggests
    that
    individual
    lives
    today
    are
    no
    more
    or
    less
    valuable
    than
    lives
    in
    the
    future.
    34
    Just
    as
    a
    person’s
    life
    should
    not
    be
    treated
    as
    less
    valuable
    because
    the
    person
    lives
    one
    hundred
    miles
    away,
    so
    too
    a
    life
    should
    not
    be
    treated
    as
    less
    valuable
    because
    it
    will
    exist
    one
    hundred
    years
    in
    the
    future.
    Thus
    philosophers
    and
    some
    economists
    have
    argued
    that
    a
    zero
    discount
    rate
    should
    be
    used
    when
    evaluating
    projects
    with
    consequences
    that
    may
    benefit
    or
    harm
    future
    generations.
    35
    This
    See,
    for
    example,
    Derek
    Parfit,
    Rationality
    and
    Time,
    1983/84
    Proceedings
    of
    the
    Aristotelian
    Society
    47,
    79-81
    Derek
    Parfit,
    Energy
    Policy
    and
    the
    Further
    Future:
    The
    Social
    Discount
    Rate,
    in
    Douglas
    MacLean
    and
    Peter
    C.
    Brown,
    eds,
    Energy
    and
    the
    Fu
    ture
    31-37
    (Rowman
    and
    Littlefield
    1983):
    John
    Rawls,
    A
    Theory
    of
    Justice
    284-303
    (Belknap
    1971).
    32
    See,
    for
    example,
    Farber
    and
    Hemmersbaugh,
    46
    Vand
    L
    Rev
    at
    289-300
    (cited
    in
    note
    17);
    Mank,
    5
    NYU
    Envir
    L
    J
    at
    448-50,
    460-62
    (cited
    in
    note
    17).
    See,
    for
    example,
    R.F.
    Harrod,
    Towards
    a
    Dynamic
    Economics:
    Some
    Recent
    Devel
    opments
    of
    Economic
    Theory
    and
    their
    Application
    to
    Policy
    37-40
    (Macmillan
    1948);
    AC.
    Pigou,
    The
    Economics
    of
    Welfare
    24-26
    (Macmillan
    4th
    ed
    1932);
    F.P.
    Ramsey,
    A
    Mathe
    matical
    Theory
    of
    Saving,
    in
    J.M.
    Keynes
    and
    D.H.
    MacGregor,
    eds,
    The
    Economic
    Jour
    nal:
    The
    Journal
    of
    the
    Royal
    Economic
    Society
    543
    (Macmillan
    1928);
    Robert
    M.
    Solow,
    The
    Economics
    of
    Resources
    or
    the
    Resources
    of
    Economics,
    64
    Am
    Econ
    Rev:
    Papers
    and
    Proceedings
    1,
    7-14
    (1974).
    See
    Bruce
    A.
    Ackerman,
    Social
    Justice
    in
    the
    Liberal
    State
    203
    (Yale
    1980).
    See
    id
    at
    203;
    Harrod,
    Towards
    a
    Dynamic
    Economics
    at
    45
    (cited
    in
    note
    33);
    Parfit,
    Energy
    Policy
    at
    31,
    36-37
    (cited
    in
    note
    31);
    Ramsey,
    A
    Mathematical
    Theory
    of
    Saving
    at
    554
    (cited
    in
    note
    33);
    Solow,
    64
    Am
    Econ
    Rev:
    Papers
    and
    Proceedings
    at
    9
    (cited
    in
    note
    33).

    1998]
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1339
    approach
    recognizes
    that
    harms
    to
    future
    generations
    deserve
    no
    less
    protection
    than
    harms
    to
    the
    current
    generation.
    As
    the
    re
    nowned
    economist
    Frank
    Ramsey
    explained:
    [I]t
    is
    assumed
    that
    we
    do
    not
    discount
    later
    enjoyments
    in
    comparison
    with
    earlier
    ones,
    a
    practice
    which
    is
    ethically
    indefensible
    and
    arises
    merely
    from
    the
    weakness
    of
    the
    imagination.”
    36
    Some
    commentators
    go
    further,
    arguing
    that
    the
    “present
    generation
    has
    a
    fiduciary
    responsibility
    to
    see
    that
    future
    gen
    erations
    enjoy
    a
    parity
    of
    social
    value
    and
    opportunity.”
    37
    This
    fi
    dueiary
    duty
    implies
    that
    the
    welfare
    of
    future
    generations,
    espe
    cially
    nearer
    ones,
    should
    be
    treated
    on
    par
    with
    (that
    is
    to
    say,
    not
    discounted
    relative
    to)
    the
    welfare
    of
    the
    current
    generation.
    38
    This
    argument
    for
    zero
    discounting,
    however,
    does
    not
    deny
    the
    time
    value
    of
    money—that
    a
    dollar
    tomorrow
    is
    worth
    less
    than
    a
    dollar
    today
    (because
    a
    dollar
    can
    be
    invested
    today
    and
    yield
    more
    than
    a
    dollar
    tomorrow).
    Indeed,
    proponents
    of
    zero
    discount
    rates
    likely
    would
    agree
    that
    society
    should
    discount
    a
    monetary
    sum
    payable
    to
    future
    generations.
    Society
    can
    be
    queath
    that
    benefit
    to
    future
    generations
    simply
    by
    investing
    a
    smaller
    sum
    in
    financial
    markets
    today.
    Rather,
    proponents
    of
    zero
    discounting
    argue
    that
    regulators
    should
    not
    discount
    non-
    monetary
    benefits
    to
    future
    generations.
    Putting
    aside
    difficult
    commensurability
    problems,
    society
    cannot
    bequeath
    these
    bene
    fits
    to
    future
    generations
    merely
    by
    investing
    in
    financial
    mar
    kets.
    This
    is
    especially
    true
    for
    environmental,
    health,
    and
    other
    less
    tangible
    benefits
    that
    future
    generations
    may
    be
    unable
    to
    “buy,”
    because
    previous
    generations
    caused
    irreversible
    damage
    to
    the
    resources
    that
    provide
    these
    benefits.
    For
    example,
    if
    cur
    rent
    society
    improperly
    stores
    nuclear
    waste
    and
    leakage
    causes
    the
    death
    of
    a
    child
    in
    some
    future
    generation,
    no
    sum
    will
    enable
    the
    parent
    to
    “buy”
    back
    the
    child’s
    life.
    While
    reasonable,
    the
    ethical
    intuition
    that
    the
    state
    should
    not
    discount
    benefits
    to
    future
    generations
    suffers
    from
    two
    weaknesses.
    First,
    this
    ethical
    standard
    can
    beget
    apparently
    un
    ethical
    results.
    If
    the
    current
    generation
    is
    morally
    obligated
    to
    treat
    the
    welfare
    of
    future
    generations
    on
    par
    with
    its
    own
    wel
    fare,
    then
    logic
    dictates
    that
    the
    current
    generation
    has
    a
    duty
    to
    undertake
    almost
    any
    sacrifice,
    short
    of
    starvation,
    to
    benefit
    the
    Ramsey,
    A
    Mathematical
    Theory
    of
    Saving
    at
    261
    (cited
    in
    note
    33).
    Mank,
    5
    NYU
    Envir
    L
    J
    at
    448
    (cited
    in
    note
    17),
    referring
    to
    Ackerman,
    Social
    Jus
    tice
    at
    203
    (cited
    in
    note
    34).
    See
    also
    Rawis,
    A
    Theory
    of
    Justice
    at
    284-93
    (cited
    in
    note
    31);
    Mark
    Sagoff,
    The
    Economy
    of
    the
    Earth:
    Philosophy,
    Law
    and
    the
    Environment
    63
    (Cambridge
    1988).
    See
    Farber
    and
    Hemmersbaugh,
    46
    Vand
    L
    Rev
    at
    298-99
    (cited
    in
    note
    17).

    1340
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    LawReview
    [65:1333
    future.
    39
    By
    foregoing
    consumption
    today
    and
    investing
    in
    proj
    ects
    that
    provide
    a
    stream
    of
    benefits
    for
    future
    generations,
    the
    current
    generation
    suffers
    a
    finite
    sacrifice
    but
    generates
    an
    infi
    nite
    benefit
    (due
    to
    zero
    discounting)
    for
    the
    future.
    4
    °
    Indeed,
    the
    moral
    intuition
    of
    zero
    discounting
    implies
    that
    it
    may
    be
    optimal
    for
    the
    current
    generation
    to
    save
    two-thirds
    or
    more
    of
    its
    an
    nual
    income.
    4
    This
    is
    unacceptable,
    however,
    for
    “individuals
    are
    not
    morally
    required
    to
    subscribe
    fully
    to
    morality,
    at
    any
    cost
    to
    themselves.”
    42
    Further,
    while
    the
    argument
    against
    discounting
    seems
    compelling
    where
    future
    harms
    (such
    as
    the
    death
    of
    a
    child)
    are
    irreversible,
    this
    argument
    is
    too
    powerful.
    Most,
    if
    not
    all,
    regulations
    today
    seek
    to
    prevent
    some
    form
    of
    irreversible
    damage
    in
    the
    future,
    perhaps
    in
    future
    generations.
    Therefore,
    even
    the
    argument
    against
    discounting
    irreversible
    damage
    would
    generate
    excessive
    sacrifice
    today.
    Second,
    the
    moral
    intuition
    of
    zero
    discounting
    rests
    on
    the
    questionable
    assumption
    that
    government
    policy
    should
    be
    based
    on
    moral
    introspection
    rather
    than
    individuals’
    actual
    behavior.
    Unless
    there
    is
    evidence
    that
    the
    current
    generation
    is
    not
    suffi
    cientl.y
    altruistic
    toward
    future
    generations
    (evidence
    of
    a
    market
    failure),
    the
    observed
    behavior
    of
    individuals
    may
    be
    the
    most
    re
    liable
    indicator
    of
    the
    beliefs
    and
    values
    that
    should
    dictate
    policy
    choices
    in
    a
    democracy.
    Relative
    to
    the
    government,
    parents
    (the
    current
    generation)
    probably
    have
    superior
    information
    about
    op
    timal
    investments
    in
    the
    welfare
    of
    their
    children
    future
    genera
    tions).
    Further,
    even
    if
    surveys
    indicate
    that
    a
    majority
    of
    the
    members
    of
    the
    current
    generation
    favors
    a
    zero
    discount
    rate,
    this
    finding
    is
    not
    persuasive
    if
    individuals
    in
    society
    behave
    as
    if
    they
    discount
    the
    future.
    43
    Discounting
    may
    be
    a
    good
    description
    See
    Kenneth
    J.
    Arrow,
    Discounting,
    Morality,
    and
    Gaming
    3-8,
    working
    paper
    (Dec
    24,
    1996),
    available
    online
    at
    <http://www-econ.stanford.edulecon/wk-workp/swp970004.
    html>
    (visited
    July
    6,
    1998).
    See
    id
    at
    5.
    See
    id
    at
    6-7,
    developing
    a
    simple
    model
    ofoptimal
    investment
    and
    saving
    in
    a
    world
    that
    lasts
    forever.
    Empirical
    estimates
    of
    the
    model’s
    parameters
    suggest
    that
    the
    optimal
    savings
    rate
    is
    two-thirds
    or
    greater.
    Id
    at
    2.
    Philosophers
    and
    legal
    scholars
    reject
    this
    criticism,
    claiming
    that
    it
    con
    fuses
    intergenerational
    efficiency
    and
    intergenerational
    equity.
    See
    Tyler
    Cowen
    and
    Derek
    Parfit.
    Against
    the
    Social
    Discount
    Rate,
    in
    Peter
    Laslett
    and
    James
    S.
    Fishkin,
    eds,
    Justice
    between
    Age
    Groups
    and
    Generations
    148-49
    (Yale
    1992);
    Farber
    and
    Hem
    mersbaugh,
    46
    Vand
    L
    Rev
    at
    291-92
    (cited
    in
    note
    17).
    In
    reality,
    society
    maximizes
    two
    objectives:
    total
    welfare
    and
    intergenerational
    equity.
    See
    Cowen
    and
    Parfit,
    Against
    the
    Social
    Discount
    Rate
    at
    149
    (“[W]e
    should
    not
    simply
    aim
    for
    the
    greatest
    net
    sum
    of
    bene
    fits.
    We
    should
    have
    a
    second
    moral
    aim:
    that
    these
    benefits
    be
    fairly
    shared
    between
    dif
    ferent
    generations.”),
    citing
    Rawls,
    A
    Theory
    of
    Justice
    at
    297-98
    (cited
    in
    31).
    ‘°
    For
    a
    well-known
    statement
    of
    this
    principle
    of
    economic
    modeling,
    see
    Milton
    Friedman,
    The
    Methodology
    of
    Positive
    Economics,
    in
    Kurt
    R.
    Leube,
    ed,
    The
    Essence
    of

    19981
    Regulatory
    Disco
    unt
    Rates
    1341
    of
    individual
    behavior,
    and
    a
    good
    guide
    for
    public
    policy,
    re
    gardless
    of
    whether
    individuals
    believe
    they
    discount
    the
    future
    or
    not.
    44
    B.
    The
    Economic
    Approach
    to
    Discount
    Rates
    Economic
    theory
    offers
    two
    principal
    theories
    for
    discounting
    costs
    and
    benefits
    to
    future
    generations:
    the
    opportunity
    cost
    of
    capital
    (“0CC”)
    and
    the
    social
    rate
    of
    time
    preference
    (“SRTP”).
    Both
    theories
    provide
    strong
    political
    and
    ethical
    support
    for
    posi
    tive
    discount
    rates.
    However,
    economists
    disagree
    whether
    the
    CCC
    or
    SRTP
    should
    guide
    regulators.
    45
    Although
    the
    two
    theo
    ries
    are
    logically
    consistent,
    4
    °
    they
    generate
    very
    different
    dis
    count
    rates
    in
    practice.
    The
    SRTP
    yields
    relatively
    low
    rates,
    around
    1
    to
    3
    percent.
    47
    In
    contrast,
    the
    0CC
    generally
    produces
    rates
    in
    excess
    of
    5
    percent.
    48
    This
    Part
    introduces
    the
    two
    theo
    ries
    and
    reviews
    the
    major
    issues
    underlying
    the
    debate.
    1.
    Opportunity
    cost
    of
    capital.
    a)
    The
    economic
    theory.
    The
    cost
    of
    a
    public
    investment
    is
    not
    merely
    the
    value
    of
    the
    resources
    consumed.
    It
    also
    includes
    the
    opportunity
    cost
    of
    those
    resources.
    The
    opportunity
    cost
    re
    flects
    the
    value
    of
    the
    next
    best
    use
    of
    the
    resources,
    such
    as
    in
    vestment
    in
    the
    private
    sector.
    Consider,
    for
    example,
    a
    proposed
    regulation
    that
    costs
    $1
    million
    today
    and
    promises
    to
    reduce
    Friedman
    16
    1-66
    (Hoover
    Institution
    1987).
    Kenneth
    J.
    Arrow
    has
    demonstrated
    that
    this
    is
    actually
    the
    case
    in
    Intergenerational
    Equity
    and
    the
    Rate
    of
    Discount
    in
    Long-Term
    Social
    Investment
    19-20,
    working
    paper
    (Dec
    1995),
    available
    online
    at
    <http:Ilwww-econ.stanford.edu/econ/workp/
    swp97005.html>
    (visited
    July
    5,
    1998).
    Even
    in
    a
    world
    where
    each
    generation
    wants
    to
    treat
    all
    future
    generations
    equally,
    every
    generation
    will
    behave
    as
    if
    it
    discounts
    the
    fu
    ture.
    This
    occurs
    because,
    as
    the
    philosophical
    critique
    recognizes,
    no
    generation
    will
    make
    excessive
    sacrifices
    for
    the
    future.
    Every
    generation
    is
    slightly
    selfish.
    Consequently,
    each
    generation
    strategically
    decides
    how
    many
    resources
    to
    transfer
    to
    the
    next
    genera
    tion.
    given
    that
    the
    nextgenerations
    may
    decide
    not
    to
    transfer
    these
    resources
    to
    the
    fur
    ther
    future.
    The
    result
    of
    this
    strategic
    interaction
    is
    a
    savings
    rate
    that
    corresponds
    to
    a
    positive
    rate
    of
    discount
    on
    the
    welfare
    of
    future
    generations.
    See
    id
    at
    3-10.
    6
    See
    Robert
    C.
    Lind,
    A
    Primer
    on
    the
    Major
    Issues
    Relating
    to
    the
    Discount
    Rate
    for
    Evaluating
    National
    Energy
    Options,
    in
    Robert
    C.
    Lind,
    ed,
    Discounting
    for
    Time
    and
    Risk
    in
    Energy
    Policy
    27
    (Resources
    for
    the
    Future
    1982).
    See
    Kenneth
    J.
    Arrow,
    et
    al,
    Intertemporal
    Equity.
    Discounting
    and
    Eco.iomic
    Effi
    ciency.
    in
    James
    P.
    Bruce,
    Hoesung
    Lee,
    and
    Erik
    F.
    Haites,
    eds,
    Climate
    Change
    1995
    131-33
    (Cambridge
    1996);
    Richard
    D.
    Morgenstern,
    Conducting
    an
    Economic
    Analysis:
    Rationale.
    Issues,
    and
    Requirements,
    in
    Richard
    D.
    Morgenstern,
    ed,
    Economic
    Analyses
    at
    EPA:
    Assessing
    Regulatory
    Impact
    36
    (Resources
    for
    the
    Future
    1997).
    See
    Arrow,
    et
    al,
    Intertemporal
    Equity
    at
    132-33
    (cited
    in
    note
    47);
    Morgenstern,
    Conducting
    an
    Economic
    Analysis
    at
    36
    (cited
    in
    note
    47).

    1342
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    Law
    Review
    [65:1333
    pollutants
    that
    will
    cause
    damaging
    climate
    change
    in
    fifty
    years.
    If
    nothing
    is
    done
    to
    control
    the
    pollutants
    today,
    fifty
    years
    from
    now
    future
    society
    will
    suffer
    damage
    requiring
    $10
    million
    in
    abatement
    costs.
    At
    first
    blush,
    the
    regulation
    appears
    attractive:
    a
    $1
    million
    investment
    avoids
    a
    $10
    million
    expenditure
    in
    the
    future.
    No
    conclusion
    about
    the
    desirability
    of
    the
    regulation
    can
    be
    drawn,
    however,
    without
    considering
    the
    next
    best
    use
    of
    the
    $1
    million
    investment
    today.
    If
    the
    resources
    could
    be
    invested
    in
    an
    asset,
    such
    as
    a
    long-term
    bond
    with
    a
    5
    percent
    return,
    soci
    ety
    would
    be
    better
    served
    if
    the
    government
    avoided
    the
    regula
    tion:
    the
    bond
    would
    yield
    over
    $10
    million
    in
    fifty
    years,
    49
    leaving
    future
    generations
    with
    more
    than
    enough
    resources
    to
    combat
    the
    environmental
    damage.
    In
    other
    words,
    at
    a
    5
    percent
    dis
    count
    rate,
    the
    proposed
    regulation
    does
    not
    pass
    the
    cost-benefit
    test
    because
    it
    has
    a
    negative
    net
    present
    value.
    A
    standard
    measure
    of
    the
    opportunity
    cost
    of
    a
    public
    in
    vestment
    is
    the
    interest
    rate
    on
    assets
    with
    similar
    risk
    and
    du
    ration
    in
    private
    financial
    markets.
    Public
    investment
    generally
    displaces
    private
    investment
    because
    it
    takes
    resources
    out
    of
    the
    private
    sector,
    either
    directly
    (through
    taxes)
    or
    indirectly
    (through
    the
    private
    costs
    of
    complying
    with
    regulations)
    Pri
    vate
    assets,
    therefore,
    represent
    the
    next
    best
    investment
    oppor
    tunities
    for
    the
    resources
    used
    for
    public
    investments.
    5
    The
    fundamental
    intuition
    underlying
    the
    CCC
    approach
    is
    that
    the
    government
    should
    choose
    projects
    that
    maximize
    the
    re
    sources
    available
    to
    future
    generations,
    not
    those
    that
    maximize
    particular
    aspects
    of
    future
    welfare,
    such
    as
    environmental
    well
    being.
    Because
    the
    current
    generation
    cannot
    know
    the
    economic
    constraints
    facing
    future
    generations,
    it
    is
    better
    for
    the
    current
    generation
    to
    invest
    in
    their
    general
    well-being
    by
    choosing
    the
    projects
    with
    the
    highest
    rates
    of
    return.
    As
    proponents
    of
    this
    approach
    argue:
    Insofar
    as
    we
    today
    should
    consider
    the
    welfare
    of
    future
    generations,
    our
    duty
    lies
    not
    in
    leaving
    them
    exactly
    the
    so
    cial
    and
    environmental
    life
    we
    think
    they
    ought
    to
    have,
    but
    rather
    in
    making
    it
    possible
    for
    them
    to
    inherit
    a
    climate
    of
    open
    choices—that
    is,
    in
    leaving
    behind
    a
    larger
    level
    of
    gen
    eral
    fluid
    resources
    to
    be
    redirected
    as
    they,
    not
    we,
    see
    fit.
    52
    The
    actual
    payoff
    of
    the
    bond
    would
    be
    ($l,000000)x(1.05)5°=$
    11,467,340.
    See,
    for
    example,
    Arrow,
    Intergenerational
    Equity
    at
    7
    (cited
    in
    note
    44);
    William
    J.
    Baumol,
    On
    the
    Social
    Rate
    of
    Discount,
    58
    Am
    Econ
    Rev
    788,
    789-93
    (1968).
    See
    generally
    Discounting
    an
    Uncertain
    Future,
    FEEM
    Newsletter
    24
    (Dec
    1997).
    52
    Arrow,
    et
    al,
    Intertemporal
    Equityat
    133
    (cited
    in
    note
    47),
    quoting
    Aaron
    Wildav

    1998]
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1343
    b)
    Applying
    the
    economic
    theory.
    The
    0CC
    is
    a
    descriptive
    approach
    to
    the
    choice
    of
    a
    social
    discount
    rate.
    53
    The
    approach
    assurns
    that
    the
    price
    system—in
    particular,
    the
    rate
    of
    return
    available
    in
    financial
    markets—accurately
    reflects
    the
    scarcity
    of
    resources,
    expectations
    about
    the
    future,
    and
    societal
    preferences
    regarding
    future
    consumption
    vis-à-vis
    current
    consumption.
    The
    0CC
    approach
    makes
    no
    assumptionabout
    what
    the
    social
    dis
    count
    rate
    should
    be.
    The
    0CC
    approach,
    however,
    is
    complicated
    and
    may
    not
    be
    appropriate
    for
    evaluating
    all
    public
    projects.
    Critics
    have
    identi
    fied
    several
    limitations
    to
    the
    0CC
    approach.
    To
    begin,
    the
    CCC
    is
    not
    directly
    observable.
    Rates
    of
    return
    in
    financial
    markets
    in
    clude
    premia
    for
    risk,
    54
    the
    expected
    rate
    of
    inflation,
    and
    taxes
    that
    should
    not
    affect
    the
    social
    discount
    rate.
    Scholars
    have
    shown
    that
    once
    these
    factors
    are
    subtracted,
    the
    discount
    rate
    (in
    real
    terms)
    will
    generally
    exceed
    5
    percent,
    but
    it
    may
    be
    as
    low
    as
    1
    percent.
    55
    The
    particular
    rate
    will
    vary
    over
    time
    and
    will
    change
    with
    expectations
    regarding
    the
    welfare
    of
    future
    genera
    tions.
    Critics,
    however,
    note
    that
    it
    is
    very
    difficult
    to
    adjust
    ob
    served
    rates
    of
    return
    for
    taxation,
    risk,
    and
    other
    factors.
    56
    sky,
    Searching
    for
    Safety
    216
    (Transaction
    Books
    1988).
    See
    Arrow,
    et
    al,
    Intertemporal
    Equity
    at
    132-33
    (cited
    in
    note
    47).
    Although
    risk-averse
    investors
    demand
    a
    premium
    to
    compensate
    for
    the
    risk
    of
    an
    asset,
    most
    scholars
    agree
    that
    no
    such
    premium
    is
    necessary
    for
    government
    investments
    because
    (1)
    the
    government’s
    investment
    portfolio
    (its
    collection
    of
    regulations
    and
    in
    vestments)
    is
    sufficiently
    broad
    to
    eliminate
    most
    diversifiable
    risk,
    see
    Baumol,
    58
    Am
    Econ
    Rev
    at
    794
    (cited
    in
    note
    50),
    and
    (2)
    even
    if
    a
    government
    investment
    is
    risky,
    the
    cost
    of
    risk-bearing
    is
    trivial
    when
    it
    is
    spread
    among
    taxpayers,
    see
    Kenneth
    J.
    Arrow
    and
    Robert
    C.
    Lind,
    Uncertainty
    and
    the
    Evaluation
    of
    Public
    In
    vestment
    Decisions,
    60
    Am
    Econ
    Rev
    364,
    3
    70-74
    (1970).
    See
    Arrow,
    et
    al,
    Intertemporal
    Equity
    at
    133
    (cited
    in
    note
    47);
    Raymond
    J.
    Kopp
    and
    Paul
    R.
    Portney,
    Mock
    Referenda
    for
    Intergenerational
    Decisionmaking,
    5
    Discussion
    Paper
    97-48
    (Resources
    for
    the
    Future
    1997),
    available
    online
    at
    <http://www.rff.org?
    disc_papersfPDF_
    files/9748.pdf>
    (visited
    July
    5,
    1998).
    See
    Richard
    H.
    Thaler
    and
    George
    Loewenstein,
    Intertemporal
    Choice,
    in
    Richard
    H.
    Thaler,
    ed,
    The
    Winner’s
    Curse:
    Paradoxes
    and
    Anomalies
    of
    Economic
    Life
    105-06
    (Princeton
    1996).
    Additionally,
    some
    scholars
    object
    to
    the
    use
    of
    the
    0CC
    when
    an
    agency
    evaluates
    benefits
    to
    future
    generations
    because
    financial
    markets
    generally
    do
    not
    offer
    assets
    that
    pay
    Out
    in
    future
    generations.
    See
    Farber
    and
    Hemmersbaugh,
    46
    Vand
    L
    Rev
    at
    296-97
    (cited
    in
    note
    17);
    FEEM
    Newsletter,
    Discounting
    at
    24-25
    (cited
    in
    note
    51).
    The
    0CC
    makes
    most
    sense
    where
    financial
    markets
    offer
    assets
    with
    term
    structures
    that
    are
    similar
    to
    regulations
    that
    agencies
    are
    considering.
    In
    such
    situations,
    the
    agency
    can
    di
    rectly
    compare
    the
    payoff
    of
    the
    regulation
    to
    the
    payoff
    of
    the
    asset.
    Where
    the
    regulation
    involves
    intergenerational
    welfare,
    financial
    markets
    are
    unhelpful
    and
    therefore
    the
    0CC
    approach
    is
    inappropriate.
    This
    objection,
    however,
    merely
    points
    out
    a
    complication
    of
    the
    0CC;
    it
    does
    not
    undermine
    the
    approach.
    Financial
    markets
    will
    exist
    in
    future
    genera
    tions,
    so
    there
    are
    trading
    strategies
    whereby
    individuals
    could
    invest
    sequentially
    in
    pri
    vate
    assets
    that
    collectively
    have
    a
    duration
    comparable
    to
    the
    long-term
    public
    project.
    The
    expected
    rate
    of
    return
    on
    this
    strategy
    would
    be
    one
    logical
    discount
    rate
    for
    the
    public
    investment.

    1344
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    Law
    Review
    [65:1333
    Additionally,
    critics
    note
    that
    the
    0CC
    approach
    assumes
    that
    public
    projects
    and
    regulations
    divert
    resources
    (via
    taxa
    tion)
    from
    capital
    markets.
    To
    the
    contrary,
    evidence
    suggests
    that,
    in
    the
    absence
    of
    taxation,
    members
    of
    society
    would
    invest
    only
    a
    fraction
    of
    their
    resources
    in
    credit
    markets
    57
    and
    would
    consume
    the
    rest.
    Therefore,
    to
    the
    extent
    that
    regulations
    are
    fi
    nanced
    by
    resources
    that
    would
    otherwise
    be
    consumed,
    the
    0CC
    may
    overstate
    the
    appropriate
    rate
    of
    discount.
    Instead,
    the
    SRTP,
    which
    measures
    the
    rate
    at
    which
    society
    is
    willing
    to
    trade
    current
    and
    future
    consumption,
    may
    be
    closer
    to
    the
    rele
    vant
    rate.
    58
    These
    considerations
    have
    led
    some
    economists
    to
    conclude
    that
    the
    appropriate
    discount
    rate
    may
    vary
    with
    the
    type
    of
    regulation
    or
    public
    project
    and
    how
    it
    is
    financed.
    When
    the
    gov
    ernment
    relies
    on
    debt
    to
    finance
    the
    regulation,
    the
    0CC
    pro
    vides
    more
    accurate
    results.
    59
    When
    government
    relies
    on
    taxes,
    however,
    a
    combination
    of
    the
    0CC
    approach
    and
    the
    SRTP
    ap
    proach
    may
    be
    more
    appropriate.
    60
    At
    least
    one
    economist,
    how
    ever,
    has
    questioned
    this
    notion
    that
    the
    discount
    rate
    should
    vary
    with
    the
    government’s
    source
    of
    funds.
    61
    Whether
    the
    state
    uses
    debt
    or
    taxes
    to
    finance
    regulations,
    it
    is
    essentially
    impos
    ing
    a
    tax
    on
    production
    by
    diverting
    inputs
    from
    productive
    proc
    esses
    (firms).
    Therefore,
    the
    appropriate
    discount
    rate
    will
    always
    be
    the
    0CC.
    2.
    Social
    rate
    of
    time
    preference.
    a)
    The
    economic
    theory.
    While
    the
    0CC
    relies
    on
    observable
    behavior
    to
    derive
    the
    social
    discount
    rate,
    the
    SRTP
    relies
    on
    theory
    to
    derive
    that
    rate.
    Standard
    economic
    theory
    hypothe
    sizes,
    62
    and
    empirical
    evidence
    confirms,
    63
    that
    individuals
    value
    See
    Arrow,
    Intergenerational
    Equity
    at
    9
    (cited
    in
    note
    44).
    See
    id;
    see
    also
    Lind,
    A
    Primer
    on
    the
    Major
    Issues
    at
    29-32
    (cited
    in
    note
    46);
    Joel
    D.
    Scheraga,
    Perspectives
    on
    Goverhnient
    Discounting
    Policies,
    18
    J
    Envir
    Econ
    &
    Mgmt
    S
    65,
    S-67
    (1990).
    The
    SRTP
    is
    discussed
    in
    the
    following
    Part.
    See,
    for
    example.
    Scheraga,
    18
    J
    Envir
    Econ
    &
    Mgmt
    at
    S-65
    (cited
    in
    note
    58).
    The
    appropriate
    discount
    rate
    would
    be
    a
    weighted
    average
    of
    the
    rates
    derived
    from
    the
    0CC
    and
    SRTP
    approaches,
    where
    the
    weights
    are
    approximately
    equal
    to
    the
    propor
    tion
    of
    funds
    that
    displaces
    Tnvestment
    (for
    the
    0CC-based
    rate)
    and
    the
    proportion
    that
    displaces
    consumption
    (for
    the
    SRTP-based
    rate).
    See
    Larry
    A.
    Sjaastad
    and
    Daniel
    L.
    Wisecarver,
    The
    Social
    Cost
    of
    Public
    Finance,
    85
    J
    Pol
    Econ
    513,
    514-16
    (1977).
    See
    Baumol,
    58
    Am
    Econ
    Rev
    at
    79
    1-92
    (cited
    in
    note
    50).
    See
    generally
    Maureen
    L.
    Cropper
    and
    Frances
    G.
    Sussman,
    Valuing
    Future
    Risks
    to
    Life,
    19
    J
    Envir
    Econ
    &
    Mgmt
    160,
    173-74
    (1990)
    (applying
    standard
    theory
    to
    the
    problem
    of
    valuing
    future
    risks
    to
    life);
    Andreu
    Mas-Colell,
    Michael
    D.
    Whinston,
    and
    Jerry
    R.
    Green,
    Microeconomic
    Theory
    732-36
    (Oxford
    1995)
    (describing
    standard
    theory
    of
    intertemporal
    choice
    and
    the
    theory
    underlying
    discounting).

    1998]
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1345
    current
    consumption
    more
    than
    future
    consumption.
    The
    rate
    at
    which
    a
    person
    will
    trade
    (via
    a
    hypothetical
    asset)
    current
    for
    fu
    ture
    consumption
    is
    known
    as
    the
    individual
    rate
    of
    time
    prefer
    ence.
    Analogously,
    the
    social
    rate
    of
    time
    preference
    represents
    the
    rate
    at
    which
    members
    of
    society,
    on
    average,
    are
    willing
    to
    trade
    current
    benefits
    for
    future
    benefits.
    The
    appropriate
    meas
    ure
    of
    the
    SRTP,
    however,
    depends
    on
    the
    government’s
    theory
    of
    intergenerational
    welfare:
    different
    models
    of
    welfare
    imply
    dif
    ferent
    measures
    of
    the
    SRTP.
    Most
    welfare
    models,
    in
    which
    the
    current
    government
    chooses
    projects
    to
    maximize
    the
    joint
    welfare
    of
    all
    generations,
    show
    that
    the
    SRTP
    can
    be
    written
    as
    the
    sum
    of
    two
    compo
    nents:
    pure
    time
    preference
    and
    the
    growth
    rate
    of
    per
    capita
    in
    come.
    64
    Pure
    time
    preference
    is
    a
    measure
    of
    preferences,
    reflect
    ing
    each
    generation’s
    desire
    (or
    impatience)
    to
    receive
    benefits
    sooner
    rather
    than
    later.
    65
    The
    more
    impatient
    the
    present
    gen
    eration,
    the
    higher
    the
    discount
    rate
    on
    benefits
    to
    future
    genera
    tions.
    The
    growth
    rate
    of
    per
    capita
    income
    is
    a
    measure
    of
    scar
    city,
    reflecting
    the
    relative
    incomes
    of
    different
    generations.
    66
    The
    higher
    the
    income
    of
    future
    generations
    relative
    to
    the
    current
    generation
    (that
    is,
    the
    higher
    the
    growth
    rate
    of
    per
    capita
    in
    come),
    the
    higher
    the
    discount
    on
    benefits
    to
    future
    generations.
    The
    pure
    time
    preference
    component
    is
    controversial
    because
    it
    might
    reflect
    myopia,
    a
    special
    affinity
    for
    nearer
    generations,
    or
    some
    other
    defect
    in
    “our
    telescopic
    faculty”
    that
    should
    not
    guide
    government
    decisions
    about
    intergenerational
    welfare.
    67
    This
    criticism
    is
    valid
    insofar
    as
    the
    observed
    “myopia”
    of
    the
    cur
    rent
    generation
    imposes
    some
    negative
    externality
    on
    future
    gen
    See,
    for
    example,
    Michael
    J.
    Moore
    and
    W.
    Kip
    Viscusi,
    Discounting
    Environmental
    Health
    Risks:
    New
    Evideiice
    and
    Policy
    Implications,
    18
    J
    Envir
    Econ
    &
    Mgmt
    S-51,
    S-61
    (1990)
    (providing
    evidence
    that
    workers
    discount
    future
    job-related
    health
    and
    safety
    haz
    ards
    at
    a
    2
    percent
    rate);
    Thaler
    and
    Loewenstein,
    Intertemporal
    Choice
    at
    92
    (cited
    in
    note
    56)
    (discussing
    evidence
    that
    discount
    rates
    vary
    with
    age,
    irrespective
    of
    whether
    the
    future
    outcome
    is
    a
    gain
    or
    loss,
    or
    whether
    the
    size
    of
    the
    gain
    or
    loss
    is
    large
    or
    small).
    See
    Arrow,
    et
    al,
    Intertemporal
    Equity
    at
    134-35
    (cited
    in
    note
    47).
    There
    the
    authors
    illustrate
    a
    popular
    welfare
    model:
    a
    continuous-time
    welfare
    function,
    where
    the
    welfare
    of
    each
    generation
    is
    additively
    separable.
    In
    this
    model,
    the
    optimality
    conditions
    for
    public
    investment
    yield
    the
    expression:
    +pg=SRTP.
    Here,
    tX
    is
    a
    measure
    of
    pure
    time
    preference
    (impatience”),
    g
    is
    the
    growth
    rate
    of
    per
    capita
    income,
    and
    p
    is
    a
    scale
    factor
    equal
    to
    the
    elasticity
    of
    marginal
    utility
    with
    respect
    to
    consumption
    (for
    simplicity,
    this
    scale
    factor
    can
    be
    treated
    as
    constant
    and
    ignored).
    While
    A
    is
    constant
    over
    time,
    pg
    will
    vary
    with
    per
    capita
    income.
    The
    higher
    the
    rate
    of
    income
    growth,
    g,
    thehigher
    is
    the
    so
    cial
    rate
    of
    discount
    r.
    See
    id
    at
    131,
    136.
    See
    id.
    6
    Pigou,
    The
    Economics
    of
    Welfare
    at
    25
    (cited
    in
    note
    33).

    1346
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    LawReview
    [65:1333
    erations,
    who
    would
    pay
    the
    current
    generation
    to
    be
    less
    myopic
    if
    such
    payments
    were
    possible.
    Thus,
    the
    government
    should
    override
    societal
    preferences
    in
    favor
    of
    intergenerational
    wel
    fare.
    68
    However,
    given
    that
    individuals
    are
    altruistic
    toward
    fu
    ture
    generations
    (for
    example,
    children
    and
    grandchildren),
    it
    is
    unclear
    when
    the
    preferences
    of
    the
    current
    generation
    will
    exert
    a
    negative
    externality
    on
    future
    generations.
    69
    In
    contrast,
    the
    SRTP’s
    dependence
    on
    economic
    growth
    has
    strong
    economic
    and
    ethical
    justifications.
    If
    future
    generations
    will
    be
    better
    off
    than
    the
    current
    generation,
    optimal
    resource
    allocation
    suggests
    that
    the
    current
    generation
    should
    favor
    pub
    lic
    investments
    with
    immediate
    payoffs
    over
    those
    that
    benefit
    fu
    ture
    generations.
    7
    °
    Similarly,
    the
    ethical
    notion
    that
    one
    genera
    tion
    should
    not
    sacrifice
    excessively
    for
    another
    implies
    that
    regulatory
    agencies
    should
    discount
    benefits
    to
    future
    genera
    tions—who
    will
    be
    better
    off
    than
    current
    citizens
    anyway—when
    evaluating
    potential
    projects.
    7
    b)
    Applying
    the
    economic
    theory.
    The
    SRTP
    is
    a
    prescriptive
    approach
    to
    the
    social
    discount
    rate.
    It
    assumes
    that
    society
    should
    maximize
    an
    arbitrarily
    chosen
    intergenerational
    welfare
    function,
    72
    and
    then
    derives
    the
    social
    discount
    rate
    from
    the
    op
    timality
    conditions
    of
    that
    function.
    This
    approach,
    however,
    raises
    at
    least
    three
    controversial
    ethical,
    political,
    and
    economic
    issues.
    First,
    while
    the
    CCC
    approach
    relies
    on
    observable
    economic
    behavior,
    the
    SRTP
    rejects
    such
    evidence
    in
    favor
    of
    normative
    models
    of
    intergenerational
    welfare.
    Thus
    the
    SRTP
    implicitly
    assumes
    a
    market
    failure:
    financial
    markets
    provide
    a
    poor
    indi
    cator
    of
    society’s
    willingness
    to
    invest
    in
    particular
    projects
    (such
    as
    climate
    control)
    that
    benefit
    future
    generations.
    73
    The
    source
    of
    this
    market
    failure
    is
    unclear.
    The
    failure
    may
    result
    from
    infor
    mation
    problems,
    such
    as
    the
    current
    generation’s
    inability
    to
    as-
    Many
    economists
    do
    not
    believe
    that
    myopic
    societal
    preferences
    justify
    government
    intervention.
    See,
    for
    example,
    Kopp
    and
    Portney,
    Mock
    Referenda
    at
    5
    (cited
    in
    note
    55).
    See
    also
    Arrow,
    et
    al,
    Interteinporal
    Equity
    at
    136
    (cited
    in
    note
    47),
    where
    the
    authors
    note
    that
    a
    nonzero
    pure
    rate
    of
    time
    preference
    may
    be
    defensible
    because
    “as
    a
    matter
    of
    description,
    the
    current
    generation
    gives
    less
    value
    to
    consumption
    of
    future
    generations.’
    69
    Once
    we
    account
    for
    altruism,
    the
    societal
    discount
    rate
    will
    be
    a
    function
    of
    the
    rate
    of
    intergenerational
    altruism.
    See
    Gary
    S.
    Becker,
    A
    Treatise
    on
    the
    Family
    162-69
    (Har
    vard
    Enlarged
    ed
    1991).
    See
    Arrow,
    eta!,
    Intertemporal
    Equity
    at
    131,
    136-37
    (cited
    in
    note
    47).
    See
    id
    at
    136.
    12
    See,
    for
    example,
    the
    welfare
    function
    discussed
    in
    note
    64.
    ‘°
    See
    Sjaastad
    and
    Wisecarver,
    85
    J
    Pol
    Econ
    at
    5
    15-16
    (cited
    in
    note
    60).

    19981
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1347
    sess
    the
    costs
    to
    future
    generations
    (for
    example,
    pollution
    miti
    gation,
    medical
    costs,
    and
    risks
    of
    mortality)
    if
    a
    particular
    regu
    lation
    is
    not
    imposed.
    74
    Alternatively,
    the
    market
    failure
    may
    re
    flect
    myopia:
    members
    of
    the
    current
    generation
    may
    not
    care
    sufficiently
    about
    (or
    maynot
    be
    sufficiently
    altruistic
    toward)
    fu
    ture
    generations,
    who
    would
    be
    willing
    to
    pay
    members
    of
    the
    current
    generation
    to
    invest
    in
    particular
    projects.
    75
    In
    either
    case,
    however,
    the
    government
    likely
    cannot
    test
    whether
    the
    market
    failure
    is
    sufficiently
    serious
    to
    warrant
    the
    normative
    approach
    of
    the
    SRTP,
    which
    effectively
    overrides
    observed
    socie
    tal
    preferences
    in
    favor
    of
    a
    particular
    welfare
    model.
    Second,
    even
    assuming
    market
    failures
    warrant
    the
    SRTP
    approach,
    it
    is
    unclear
    whether
    an
    agency
    can
    identify
    an
    appro
    priate
    intergenerational
    welfare
    function
    and
    whether
    that
    func
    tion
    will
    generate
    discount
    rates
    that
    yield
    better
    outcomes
    than
    rates
    derived
    by
    the
    0CC
    approach.
    7
    °
    Critics
    claim
    that
    even
    the
    most
    simple
    (and
    popular)
    welfare
    functions
    yield
    unreasonable
    discount
    rates
    that
    are
    “glaringly
    inconsistent”
    with
    the
    observed
    behavior
    of
    governments.
    77
    Further,
    if
    the
    SRTP
    yields
    a
    social
    discount
    rate
    that
    differs
    from
    the
    rate
    based
    on
    the
    0CC—
    thereby
    forcing
    society
    to
    invest
    at
    a
    rate
    that
    differs
    from
    market
    rates—government
    regulation
    may
    not
    have
    its
    intended
    effect
    on
    future
    generations.
    Society
    today
    can
    only
    control
    the
    welfare
    of
    the
    immediately
    succeeding
    generation.
    78
    If
    government
    today
    at
    tempts
    to
    influence
    further
    generations
    by
    investing
    in
    irreversi
    ble
    projects
    (such
    as
    climate
    control
    technology),
    intermediate
    generations
    will
    merely
    reduce
    their
    investments
    in
    the
    future
    if
    they
    believe
    that
    the
    original
    investment
    was
    excessive.
    Such
    a
    reduction
    in
    investments
    is
    particularly
    likely
    to
    occur
    if
    techno
    logical
    changes
    have
    made
    the
    original
    investments
    worthless.
    79
    See,
    for
    example,
    Amartya
    K.
    Sen,
    Approaches
    to
    the
    Choice
    of
    Discount
    Rates
    for
    Social
    Benefit-Cost
    Analysis,
    in
    Lind,
    ed,
    Discounting
    for
    Time
    and
    Risk
    at
    349-50
    (cited
    in
    note
    46).
    Id
    at
    349.
    See
    Arrow,
    et
    al.
    Intertemporal
    Equity
    at
    131-33
    (cited
    in
    note
    47).
    Id
    at
    132.
    The
    authors
    further
    note
    that
    a
    “discount
    rate
    of
    2%
    implies
    far
    more
    in
    vestment
    than
    actually
    occurs
    in
    any
    country
    now,
    and
    thus
    would
    require
    a
    big
    jump
    in
    savings
    rates
    to
    finance.”
    Id
    at
    133.
    See
    Richard
    A.
    Epstein,
    Justice
    Across
    the
    Generations,
    67
    Tex
    L
    Rev
    1465,
    1482
    (1989)
    Arrow,
    Discounting,
    Morality,
    and
    Gaming
    at
    12
    (cited
    in
    note
    39).
    This
    is
    a
    variant
    of
    the
    theory
    of
    Ricardian
    Equivalence,
    which
    states
    that
    govern
    ment
    generally
    cannot
    force
    one
    generation
    to
    save
    for
    the
    next
    by
    imposing
    a
    tax
    or
    in
    vesting
    in
    long-term
    assets.
    This
    forced
    saving
    will
    be
    “undone”
    as
    members
    of
    the
    first
    generation
    reduce
    their
    private
    bequests
    to
    future
    generations.
    For
    the
    basic
    theory
    of
    RI
    cardian
    Equivalence,
    see
    Robert
    J.
    Barro,
    Are
    Government
    Bonds
    Net
    Wealth?,
    82
    J
    Pol
    Econ
    1095
    (1974).

    1348
    The
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    of
    Chicago
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    Review
    [65:1333
    Contrary
    to
    the
    beliefs
    of
    some
    commentators,
    8
    °
    economic
    theory
    provides
    strong
    support
    for
    the
    principle
    that
    current
    society
    best
    serves
    future
    generations
    by
    choosing
    investments
    that
    maximize
    general
    welfare
    in
    the
    future,
    not
    by
    choosing
    investments
    that
    protect
    future
    societies
    against
    particular
    problems.
    81
    Finally,
    even
    if
    a
    regulator
    can
    identify
    a
    proper
    intergenerational
    welfare
    function,
    the
    regulator
    faces
    complex
    methodological
    problems.
    Consider
    the
    simple
    welfare
    function
    that
    describes
    the
    SRTP
    as
    a
    function
    of
    pure
    time
    preference
    and
    the
    growth
    rate
    of
    per
    capita
    income.
    Scholars
    debate
    how
    to
    measure
    these
    components
    of
    the
    SRTP.
    Although
    the
    typical
    ap
    proach
    is
    to
    derive
    the
    components
    from
    studies
    of
    individual
    be
    havior,
    studies
    in
    behavioral
    economics
    show
    that
    individual
    time
    preference
    may
    vary
    with
    age,
    income,
    the
    type
    of
    future
    payoff
    (that
    is
    to
    say,
    whether
    the
    payoff
    is
    a
    gain
    or
    loss,
    or
    whether
    it
    involves
    risk
    to
    future
    lives),
    and
    the
    amount
    of
    time
    until
    the
    payoff.
    82
    Indeed,
    some
    studies
    indicate
    that
    the
    SRTP
    may
    be
    much
    higher
    than
    scholars
    have
    generally
    believed
    and
    may
    even
    exceed
    the
    0CC.
    83
    The
    SRTP
    theory
    offers
    no
    guidance
    here.
    Additionally,
    once
    an
    agency
    computes
    the
    SRTP,
    it
    faces
    significant
    difficulties
    in
    applying
    the
    rate.
    84
    Unlike
    the
    0CC,
    the
    SRTP
    is
    an
    appropriate
    discount
    rate
    for
    future
    consumption.
    Thus,
    an
    administrative
    agency
    must
    convert
    all
    costs
    and
    bene
    fits
    of
    a
    proposed
    regulation
    into
    consumption
    equivalents;
    as
    in
    the
    0CC
    approach,
    the
    costs
    of
    a
    proposed
    regulation
    include
    the
    private
    investment
    that
    it
    displaces.
    85
    3.
    A
    conceptual
    framework.
    As
    a
    threshold
    matter,
    it
    seems
    unreasonable
    for
    agencies
    not
    to
    discount
    benefits
    to
    future
    generations
    in
    their
    cost-benefit
    analyses
    of
    proposed
    rules.
    To
    begin,
    without
    a
    discount
    rate,
    the
    analysis
    fails
    to
    account
    for
    the
    opportunity
    cost
    of
    resources
    that
    are
    diverted
    from
    private
    investment
    toward
    investment
    in
    the
    ‘°
    See
    Farber
    and
    Hemmersbaugh,
    46
    Vand
    L
    Rev
    at
    298-99
    (cited
    in
    note
    17).
    See
    Arrow,
    Discounting.
    Morality,
    and
    Gaming
    at
    12
    (cited
    in
    note
    39).
    See
    generally
    Thaler
    and
    Loewenstein,
    Intertemporal
    Choice
    at
    92-106
    (cited
    in
    note
    56).
    See
    id.
    See
    also
    Robert
    C.
    Lind,
    Reassessing
    the
    Government’s
    Discount
    Rate
    Policy
    in
    Light
    of
    New
    Theory
    and
    Data
    in
    a
    World
    Economy
    with
    a
    High
    Degree
    of
    Capital
    Mo
    bility,
    18
    J
    Envir
    Econ
    &
    Mgmt
    S-8,
    S-19
    (1990),
    in
    which
    the
    author
    points
    to
    evidence
    that
    credit
    card
    debtors
    pay
    interest
    rates
    in
    excess
    of
    16
    percent.
    See
    Morgenstem,
    Conducting
    an
    Economic
    Analysis
    at
    36
    (cited
    in
    note
    47);
    Scher
    aga,
    18
    J
    Envir
    Econ
    &
    Mgmt
    at
    S-66
    (cited
    in
    note
    58).
    See
    Lind,
    A
    Primer
    on
    the
    Major
    Issues
    at
    39-55
    (cited
    in
    note
    46);
    Lind,
    18
    3
    Envir
    Econ
    &
    Mgmt
    at
    S-li
    (cited
    in
    note
    83).

    1998]
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1349
    proposed
    rule.
    Having
    no
    discount
    rate
    may
    lead
    the
    agency
    to
    adopt
    rules
    that
    reduce
    the
    welfare
    of
    future
    generations,
    because
    the
    resources
    could
    have
    been
    invested
    in
    assets
    with
    higher
    rates
    of
    return.
    Additionally,
    a
    zero
    discount
    rate
    biases
    cost-
    benefit
    analysis
    in
    favor
    of
    rules
    that
    impose
    excessive
    sacrifices
    on
    the
    current
    generation.
    Finally,
    a
    zero
    discount
    rate
    is
    incon
    sistent
    with
    the
    observable
    behavior
    of
    individuals,
    which
    is
    ar
    guably
    the
    best
    guide
    for
    policy
    in
    a
    democratic
    state.
    The
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate
    is
    primarily
    a
    matter
    of
    policy
    and
    secondarily
    a
    matter
    of
    methodology.
    86
    Policy
    judgments
    largely
    dictatethe
    choice
    between
    the
    two
    competing
    approaches
    to
    dis
    counting.
    The
    CCC
    approach
    assumes
    that
    succeeding
    genera
    tions
    will
    be
    in
    the
    best
    position—because
    of
    superior
    informa
    tion—to
    deal
    with
    environmental,
    health,
    or
    other
    problems.
    Therefore,
    the
    optimal
    regulatory
    policy
    is
    to
    maximize
    the
    wealth
    of
    succeeding
    generations.
    In
    contrast,
    the
    SRTP
    approach
    assumes
    that
    current
    society
    may
    be
    in
    a
    better
    position
    to
    deal
    with
    particular
    problems,
    such
    as
    global
    warming
    and
    nuclear
    waste
    storage.
    Thus,
    the
    SRTP
    overrides
    market
    prices
    and
    chooses
    seemingly
    suboptimal
    investments
    (relative
    to
    prevailing
    market
    rates
    of
    return)
    to
    ensure
    that
    future
    generations
    do
    not
    suffer
    these
    risks.
    Thus,
    agency
    choice
    between
    the
    0CC
    and
    SRTP
    approaches
    should
    be
    based,
    in
    part,
    on
    a
    determination
    whether
    current
    society
    is
    in
    a
    better
    position
    to
    deal
    with
    long-
    term
    problems.
    Methodological
    issues
    determine
    the
    relative
    costs
    of
    apply
    ing
    the
    0CC
    or
    SRTP
    approaches.
    While
    the
    0CC
    approach
    re
    quires
    detailed
    information
    about
    alternative
    financial
    assets
    and
    adjustments
    for
    taxes,
    risk,
    and
    inflationary
    expectations,
    the
    SRTP
    requires
    complex
    estimates
    of
    parameters
    such
    as
    the
    pure
    rate
    of
    time
    preference
    and
    the
    growth
    rate
    of
    per
    capita
    income.
    87
    Additionally,
    the
    SRTP
    approach
    requires
    an
    agency
    to
    determine
    the
    precise
    effects
    of
    the
    regulation
    on
    future
    consumption.
    Al
    though
    the
    regulation
    may
    raise
    future
    consumption
    by
    improv
    ing
    air
    quality
    or
    other
    public
    goods,
    the
    project
    may
    also
    lower
    future
    consumption
    by
    diverting
    funds
    from
    private
    investment.
    The
    agency
    must
    subtract
    this
    “opportunity
    cost”
    of
    the
    regula
    tion,
    which
    raises
    precisely
    the
    same
    issues
    as
    in
    the
    0CC
    ap
    proach
    (specifically,
    the
    agency
    must
    adjust
    market
    rates
    of
    re
    turn
    for
    risk,
    taxes,
    inflation,
    and
    other
    distortions).
    This
    is
    also
    described
    in
    Arrow,
    et
    al,
    Intertemporal
    Equity
    at
    134
    (cited
    in
    note
    47).
    M
    Additionally,
    as
    shown
    in
    note
    64.
    the
    SRTP
    also
    requires
    an
    estimate
    of
    a
    scale
    fac
    tor
    representing
    the
    elasticity
    of
    marginal
    utility
    with
    respect
    to
    per
    capita
    income.

    1350
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    LawReview
    [65:1333
    On
    balance,
    policy
    and
    methodology
    issues
    favor
    the
    0CC
    over
    the
    SRTP.
    Because
    the
    current
    generation
    cannot
    know
    the
    resource
    constraints
    or
    preferences
    of
    future
    generations,
    regula
    tors
    take
    large
    gambles
    with
    scarce
    resources
    when
    they
    follow
    the
    SRTP
    approach
    and
    invest
    in
    particular
    environmental,
    en
    ergy,
    or
    other
    projects
    that
    have
    lower
    returns
    than
    assets
    in
    fi
    nancial
    markets.
    Like
    the
    Maithusian
    predictions
    of
    over
    population,
    88
    these
    gambles
    may
    prove
    mistaken
    because
    they
    are
    based
    on
    incomplete
    information
    about
    market
    failures
    in
    finan
    cial
    markets
    and
    the
    capabilities
    of
    future
    generations
    to
    contend
    with
    environmental
    and
    other
    harms.
    Future
    generations
    would
    be
    better
    served
    (and
    better
    able
    to
    contend
    with
    future
    harms)
    if
    the
    government
    invests
    in
    rules
    that
    maximize
    their
    general
    wel
    fare
    and
    enable
    them
    to
    make
    their
    own
    choices
    regarding
    the
    environment,
    energy,
    and
    other
    public
    goods.
    Additionally,
    methodological
    issues
    favor
    the
    0CC
    approach
    because
    it
    is
    much
    simpler
    to
    calculate.
    and
    apply.
    89
    While
    the
    0CC
    relies
    on
    observable
    financial
    market
    data,
    the
    SRTP
    re
    quires
    that
    the
    regulator
    select
    a
    particular
    welfare
    function,
    de
    rive
    an
    expression
    for
    the
    social
    discount
    rate,
    and
    identify
    em
    pirical
    analogues
    for
    the
    parameters
    of
    the
    discount
    rate.
    Addi
    tionally,
    the
    regulator
    must
    convert
    all
    benefits
    and
    costs
    (in
    cluding
    opportunity
    costs)
    into
    consumption
    equivalents.
    III.
    JUDICIAL
    REVIEW
    OF
    AGENCY
    DISCOUNT
    RATES
    Very
    few
    courts
    have
    reviewed
    agency
    discount
    rates.
    When
    courts
    have
    reached
    the
    issue,
    they
    have
    either
    deferred
    to
    agency
    discretion
    9
    °
    or
    imposed
    their
    own
    judgment
    about
    dis
    counting.
    9
    No
    court
    has
    developed
    a
    meaningful
    standard
    of
    re
    view
    for
    agency
    choice
    of
    discount
    rates.
    This
    is
    troubling
    because
    legislation
    increasingly
    requires
    cost-benefit
    analysis.
    As
    such
    legislation
    is
    enacted,
    courts
    will
    encounter
    challenges
    to
    the
    methods—including
    discount
    rates—agencies
    use
    to
    conduct
    the
    See
    generally
    Gary
    S.
    Becker,
    Human
    Capital:
    A
    Theoretical
    a,d
    Empirical
    Analy
    sis
    with
    Special
    Reference
    to
    Education
    3
    23-25
    (Chicago
    3d
    ed
    1993).
    See
    Raymond
    J.
    Kopp,
    Alan
    J.
    Krupnick,
    and
    Michael
    Toman,
    Cost-Benefit
    Analysis
    and
    Regulatory.
    Reform:
    An
    Assessment
    of
    the
    Science
    and
    the
    Art
    41,
    available
    online
    at
    <http://www.rff.orgldisc_papers/PDF_files/97
    19.pdf>
    (visited
    July
    5,
    1998);
    Morgenstern,
    Conducting
    an
    Economic
    Analysis
    at
    36-37
    (cited
    in
    note
    47).
    °
    See,
    for
    example,
    Ohio
    vDepartment
    of
    Interior,
    880
    F2d
    432,
    465
    (DC
    CIr
    1989)
    (de
    ferring
    to
    Department’s
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate,
    which
    is
    “first
    and
    foremost
    a
    policy
    choice”).
    91
    See,
    for
    example,
    Corrosion
    Proof
    Fittings
    v
    EPA,
    947
    F2d
    1201,
    1218
    (5th
    Cir
    1991),
    citing
    popular
    press—
    What
    Price
    Posterity?,
    The
    Economist
    73
    (Mar
    23,
    1991)—for
    the
    principle
    that
    if
    EPA
    discounts
    future
    costs,
    it
    must
    also
    discount
    future
    benefits.

    19981
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1351
    analysis.
    Judicial
    review
    will
    prevent
    arbitrary
    agency
    decisions
    and
    ensure
    that
    statutory
    cost-benefit
    requirements
    have
    force.
    Without
    standards
    to
    cabin
    agency
    discretion,
    cost-benefit
    analy
    sis
    may
    become
    mere
    window
    dressing,
    providing
    a
    veneer
    of
    sci
    entific
    backing
    for
    agencies’
    arbitrary
    choices.
    92
    This
    Part
    proposes
    a
    standard
    for
    judicial
    review.
    First,
    Part
    A
    briefly
    indicates
    when
    a
    court
    should
    review
    agency
    discount
    rates.
    Part
    B
    then
    shows
    that
    significant
    uncertainty
    surrounds
    the
    standard
    of
    review
    that
    courts
    should
    apply
    to
    discount
    rates.
    In
    an
    effort
    to
    resolve
    the
    uncertainty,
    this
    Part
    proposes
    a
    stan
    dard
    of
    review
    based
    on
    the
    conceptual
    framework
    developed
    in
    Part
    II.
    Finally,
    Part
    C
    illustrates
    the
    proposed
    standard
    of
    re
    view
    by
    applying
    it
    to
    discount
    rates
    that
    agencies
    have
    employed
    in
    recent
    cost-benefit
    analyses.
    A.
    When
    Judicial
    Review
    Is
    Appropriate
    A
    court
    will
    review
    agency
    discount
    rates
    when
    either
    the
    underlying
    statute
    requires
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    or
    the
    agency
    relies
    on
    such
    analysis
    to
    justify
    a
    rule,
    adjudication,
    or
    exercise
    of
    discretion.
    Statutes
    increasingly
    contain
    direct
    or
    indirect
    requirements
    for
    traditional
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    or
    a
    less
    rigorous
    comparison
    of
    the
    costs
    and
    benefits
    of
    a
    regulation.
    Direct
    requirements
    ap
    pear
    in
    such
    statutes
    as
    the
    Toxic
    Substances
    Control
    Act
    (“TSCA”),
    which
    requires
    the
    agency
    to
    consider
    “reasonably
    as
    certainable
    economic
    consequences
    of
    the
    rule,”
    93
    and
    the
    Federal
    Insecticide,
    Fungicide
    and
    Rodenticide
    Act
    (“FIFRA”),
    which
    re
    quires
    the
    agency
    to
    promulgate
    regulations
    of
    toxins
    after
    con
    sidering
    the
    environmental,
    economic,
    and
    social
    impact
    of
    the
    regulations.
    94
    Similarly,
    the
    Energy
    Policy
    and
    Conservation
    Act
    (“EPCA”)
    requires
    the
    Department
    of
    Energy
    to
    assess
    whether
    an
    energy
    conservation
    regulation
    is
    economically
    justified,
    95
    and
    See,
    for
    example.
    Scheraga,
    18
    J
    Envir
    Econ
    &
    Mgmt
    at
    S-66
    (cited
    in
    note
    58)
    (The
    author,
    an
    EPA
    official,
    noted
    that
    “many
    discounting
    procedures
    are
    subject
    to
    manipula
    tion.
    .
    .
    This
    can
    lead
    to
    manipulation
    of
    the
    outcomes
    by
    some
    clever
    (Or
    perhaps
    igno
    rant)
    analyst.”).
    15
    usc
    §
    2605(c)(l)
    (“In
    promulgating
    any
    rule
    under
    ..
    .
    this
    section
    with
    respect
    to
    a
    chemical
    substance
    or
    mixture,
    the
    Administrator
    shall
    consider
    and
    publish
    a
    state
    ment
    with
    respect
    to
    .
    .
    .
    the
    reasonably
    ascertainable
    economic
    consequences
    of
    the
    rule,
    after
    consideration
    of
    the
    effect
    on
    the
    national
    economy,
    small
    business,
    technological
    in
    novation,
    the
    environment,
    and
    public
    health.”).
    7
    USC
    §
    136(bb)
    defines
    an
    “unreasonable
    adverse
    effect
    on
    the
    environment”
    as
    “any
    unreasonable
    risk
    to
    man
    or
    the
    environment,
    taking
    into
    account
    the
    economic,
    so
    cial.
    and
    environmental
    costs
    and
    benefits
    of
    the
    use
    of
    any
    pesticide.”
    42
    usc
    §
    6295(o)(2)(B)(i)(I)
    (1994)
    (providing
    that
    the
    Department
    of
    Energy
    must

    1352
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    LawReview
    [65:1333
    the
    1996
    Amendments
    to
    the
    Safe
    Drinking
    Water
    Act
    (“SDWA”)
    explicitly
    require
    cost-benefit
    96
    and
    risk-risk
    97
    analysis
    of
    all
    ma
    jor
    drinking
    water
    regulations.
    Additionally,
    under
    the
    Un
    funded
    Mandates
    Act,
    98
    all
    federal
    agencies
    must
    conduct
    cost-
    benefit
    analysis
    of
    any
    rule
    requiring
    significant
    (over
    $100
    mil
    lion)
    expenditures
    by
    state,
    local,
    or
    tribal
    governments.
    99
    Indirect
    requirements
    for
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    appear
    in
    statutes
    mandating
    reasonable
    regulations,
    such
    as
    regulations
    that
    are
    “reasonably
    necessary”
    or
    that
    reduce
    an
    “unreasonable
    risk.”
    InAmerican
    Textile
    Manufacturers’
    Institute,
    Inc
    v
    Dono
    van(the
    Cotton
    Dust
    ,‘°°
    the
    Supreme
    Court
    noted
    that
    Con
    gress
    likely
    intends
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    where
    a
    statute
    uses
    the
    phrase
    “unreasonable
    risk.”
    91
    Similarly,
    many
    lower
    courts
    have
    found
    requireffients
    for
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    in
    statutory
    lan
    guage
    calling
    for
    “reasonably
    necessary”
    regulations.’°
    2
    Where
    statutes
    contain
    such
    direct
    or
    indirect
    language
    re
    quiring
    cost-benefit
    analysis,
    courts
    can
    and
    should
    review
    the
    methods
    that
    agencies
    use,
    especially
    their
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate.
    In
    Corrosion
    Proof
    Fittings
    v
    EPA,’°
    3
    the
    Fifth
    Circuit
    re
    viewed
    the
    EPA’s
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate
    under
    the
    TSCA,’°
    4
    and
    in
    Natural
    Resources
    Defense
    Council,
    Inc
    v
    Herrington,’°
    5
    the
    D.C.
    Circuit
    reviewed
    the
    agency’s
    discount
    rate
    in
    a
    rulemaking
    consider,
    among
    other
    things,
    “the
    economic
    impact
    of
    the
    standard
    on
    manufacturers
    and
    on
    the
    consumers
    of
    products
    subject
    to
    such
    standard”).
    42
    USCA
    §300g-l
    (b)(3)
    (C)(i)
    provides
    that
    ‘[wihen
    roposing
    any
    national
    primary
    drinking
    water
    regulation
    that
    includes
    a
    maximum
    contaminant
    level,
    the
    Administrator
    shall”
    analyze
    the
    costs
    of
    complying
    with
    the
    regulation
    and
    “[t]he
    incremental
    costs
    and
    benefits
    associated
    with
    each
    alternative
    maximum
    contaminant
    level
    considered.”
    Id
    §
    300g-l
    (b)
    (3)
    (C)
    (i)
    (VI)
    (requiring
    the
    Administrator
    to
    consider
    [amy
    increased
    health
    risk
    that
    may
    occur
    as
    the
    result
    of
    compliance,
    including
    risks
    associated
    with
    co
    occurring
    contaminants”).
    2
    USCA
    §
    1501
    et
    seq.
    2
    USCA
    §
    1532(a).
    ‘°°452
    US
    490
    (1981).
    ‘Id
    at
    510
    n
    30.
    However,
    in
    the
    same
    decision,
    theCourt
    noted
    that
    statutory
    lan
    guagecalling
    for
    regulation
    “to
    the
    extent
    feasible”
    creates
    no
    obligation
    to
    conduct
    such
    analysis.
    Id
    at
    509.
    For
    further
    discussion
    of
    statutory
    language
    that
    may
    or
    may
    not
    re
    quire
    cost-benefit
    analysis,
    see
    Cass
    R.
    Sunstein.
    Interpreting
    Statutes
    in
    the
    Regulatory
    State,
    103
    Harv
    L
    Rev
    405,
    419,435
    (1989).
    ‘°‘See,
    for
    example,
    National
    Grain
    and
    Feed
    Association
    v
    OSHA,
    866
    F2d
    717,
    728
    (5th
    Cir
    1988);
    United
    Automobile
    Workers
    v
    OSHA,
    938
    F2d
    1310,
    1319
    (DC
    Cir
    1991)
    (“Cost-benefit
    analysis
    is
    certainly
    consistent
    with
    the
    language”
    of
    the
    statute,);
    Alabama
    Power
    Co
    v
    OSHA,
    89
    F2d
    740,
    746
    (11th
    Cir
    1996)
    (“Although
    the
    agency
    does
    not
    have
    to
    conduct
    an
    elaborate
    cost-benefit
    analysis,
    it
    does
    have
    to
    determine
    whether
    the
    benefits
    expected
    from
    the
    standard
    bear
    a
    reasonable
    relationship
    to
    the
    costs
    imposed
    by
    the
    standard,”),
    citing
    American
    Petroleum
    Institute
    v
    OSHA,
    581
    F2d
    493,
    503
    (5th
    Cir
    1978).
    103947
    F2d
    1201
    (5th
    Cir
    1991).
    ‘°
    4
    Id
    at
    1218.
    ‘°768
    FZd
    1355
    (DC
    Cir
    1985).

    1998]
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1353
    pursuant
    to
    the
    EPCA.’°
    6
    Similarly,
    in
    Ohio
    vDepartment
    of
    Inte
    rior,
    107
    the
    D.C.
    Circuit
    reviewed
    the
    agency’s
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate
    in
    a
    rulemaking
    pursuant
    to
    the
    Superfund
    Act
    (“CER
    CLA”)
    ,108
    These
    cases—as
    well
    as
    the
    Administrative
    Procedure
    Act
    (“APA”)
    ‘°
    9
    —make
    clear
    that
    it
    is
    appropriate
    for
    a
    court
    to
    re
    view
    the
    reasonableness
    of
    agency
    cost-benefit
    analysis.
    Similarly,
    judicial
    review
    is
    appropriate
    when
    an
    agency
    re
    lies
    on
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    in
    a
    rulemaking,
    adjudication,
    or
    ex
    ercise
    of
    discretion,
    even
    when
    the
    underlying
    statute
    does
    not
    require
    such
    analysis.
    Case
    law”°
    and
    the
    APA”
    require
    the
    court
    to
    review
    such
    agency
    action
    for
    reasonableness
    under
    the
    “arbitrary
    and
    capricious”
    test.
    This
    implies
    that
    the
    court
    can
    and
    should
    review
    the
    methods—especially
    the
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate—that
    the
    agency
    used
    to
    perform
    the
    cost-benefit
    analysis.”
    2
    This
    Comment,
    however,
    focuses
    on
    cases
    where
    the
    underlying
    statute
    contains
    a
    requirement
    for
    cost-benefit
    analysis.
    B.
    The
    Standard
    of
    Review
    Judicial
    review
    of
    discount
    rates
    involves
    two
    levels
    of
    analy
    sis.
    First,
    a
    court
    will
    consider
    whether
    the
    agency
    action—the
    091d
    at
    14
    12-14.
    ‘°880
    F2d
    432
    (DC
    Cir
    1989).
    ‘°
    8
    1d
    at
    465.
    5
    Usc
    §
    706(2)
    (A)
    (1994)
    (specifying
    the
    arbitrary
    and
    capricious
    test
    forjudicial
    re
    view
    ofagency
    actions).
    ‘°See,
    for
    example,
    Motor
    Vehicle
    Manufacturers
    Association
    v
    State
    Farm
    Mutual
    Automobile
    Insurance
    Co,
    463
    US
    29,
    33-34
    (1983)
    (finding
    that
    NHTSA
    abused
    its
    discre
    tion
    to
    issue
    motor
    vehicle
    safety
    standards
    that
    “shall
    be
    practicable,
    shall
    meet
    the
    need
    for
    motor
    vehicle
    safety,
    and
    shall
    be
    stated
    in
    objective
    terms”);
    Citizens
    to
    Preserve
    Over-
    ton
    Park,
    Inc
    v
    Volpe,
    401
    US
    402,
    416
    (1971)
    (applying
    arbitrary
    and
    capricious
    test
    to
    agency
    discretion
    where
    the
    statute
    required
    the
    agency
    to
    consider
    “feasible
    and
    prudent”
    alternatives);
    National
    Coalition
    Against
    Misuse
    of
    Pesticides
    v
    Thomas,
    809
    F2d
    875,
    882-
    83
    (DC
    Cir
    1987)
    (finding
    that
    EPA
    abused
    its
    discretion
    to
    promulgate
    pesticide
    tolerance
    levels
    “to
    the
    extent
    necessary”).
    5
    USC
    §
    706(2)
    (A).
    2
    Arguably
    the
    APA
    implies
    that
    the
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate
    is
    insulated
    from
    judicial
    review
    because
    it
    is
    “committed
    to
    agency
    discretion
    by
    law.”
    5
    USC
    §
    701
    (a)(2)
    (1994).
    In
    this
    case
    there
    is
    “no
    law
    to
    apply,”
    Overton
    Park,
    401
    US
    at
    410
    (citation
    omitted);
    that
    is,
    there
    is
    no
    statutory
    standard
    against
    which
    a
    court
    may
    judge
    the
    agency’s
    use
    of
    its
    dis
    cretion.
    See
    generally,
    Richard
    J.
    Pierce,
    Jr.,
    Sidney
    A.
    Shapiro,
    and
    Paul
    R.
    Verkuil,
    Ad
    ministrative
    Law
    and
    Process
    §
    5.3
    at
    12429
    (Foundation
    2d
    ed
    1992).
    However,
    this
    ap
    proach
    is
    controversial
    among
    scholars.
    Compare
    Raoul
    Berger,
    Administrative
    Arbitrari
    ness
    and
    Judicial
    Review,
    65
    Colum
    L
    Rev
    55,
    77-83
    (1965)
    (arguing
    that
    the
    “no
    law
    to
    apply”
    rationale
    does
    not
    preclude
    judicial
    review
    for
    abuse
    of
    discretion),
    with
    Kenneth
    C.
    Davis,
    4
    Administrative
    Law
    Treatise
    §
    28.16
    at
    80-81
    (West
    1958)
    (arguing
    that
    where
    there
    is
    “no
    law
    to
    apply,”
    even
    abuse
    of
    discretion
    is
    not
    reviewable).
    Additionally,
    courts
    regularly
    review
    the
    reasonableness
    of
    agency
    discretion
    under
    the
    “arbitrary
    and
    capri
    cious”
    test
    even
    when
    the
    underlying
    statute
    conveys
    broad
    discretionary
    power.
    See,
    for
    example,
    State
    Farm,
    463
    US
    at
    42-43,
    51-57;
    Overton
    Park,
    401
    US
    at
    411-4
    13,
    417.

    1354
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    Law
    Review
    [65:1333
    decision
    to
    discount
    and
    the
    choice
    of
    a
    particular
    discount
    rate—
    represents
    an
    interpretation
    of
    the
    underlying
    statute
    that
    the
    agency
    administers.”
    3
    This
    raises
    a
    question
    of
    law,
    subject
    to
    the
    two-step
    standard
    of
    review
    in
    Chevron
    USA,
    Inc
    v
    Natural
    Re
    sources
    Defense
    Council,
    Inc.’
    ‘‘
    If
    the
    agency
    action
    raises
    no
    question
    of
    law,
    the
    court
    will
    review
    the
    agency
    decision
    for
    abuse
    of
    discretion
    under
    the
    arbitrary
    and
    capricious
    test.”
    5
    As
    this
    Part
    demonstrates,
    the
    threshold
    decision
    to
    discount
    argua
    bly
    isa
    question
    of
    law.
    In
    contrast,
    the
    choice
    of
    a
    particular
    dis
    count
    rate
    is
    largely
    a
    matter
    of
    agency
    discretion.
    This
    Part
    first
    considers
    the
    question
    of
    law
    and
    argues
    that
    courts
    generally
    have
    reached
    the
    right
    conclusion
    when
    they
    have
    found
    that
    an
    agency
    acts
    unreasonably
    if
    it
    fails
    to
    discount
    future
    costs
    and
    benefits.
    Next,
    the
    Part
    considers
    the
    question
    of
    agency
    discretion,
    showing
    that
    courts
    have
    been
    unable
    to
    ar
    ticulate
    a
    meaningful
    test
    to
    determine
    whether
    the
    agency’s
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate
    is
    arbitrary
    and
    capricious.
    The
    Part
    con
    cludes,
    therefore,
    by
    offering
    a
    meaningful
    test
    and
    demonstrat
    ing
    how
    a
    court
    would
    employ
    the
    framework
    in
    Part
    II
    to
    take
    a
    “hard
    look”
    at
    an
    agency’s
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate.
    1.
    Review
    of
    agency
    statutory
    interpretation:
    The
    decision
    to
    discount
    future
    costs
    and
    benefits.
    Chevron
    established
    the
    well-known
    standard
    of
    review
    for
    questions
    of
    law.”
    6
    A
    court
    will
    defer
    to
    an
    agency’s
    interpretation
    of
    a
    statute
    if
    the
    interpretation
    is
    not
    contrary
    to
    the
    intent
    of
    the
    statute
    (Chevron
    Step
    One)
    and
    if
    it
    is
    reasonable
    (Chevron
    Step
    Two).”
    7
    The
    court
    will
    apply
    “traditional
    tools
    of
    statutory
    construction”
    to
    infer
    Congress’s
    intent.”
    8
    It
    will
    test
    the
    reason
    ableness
    of
    the
    agency
    interpretation
    by
    determining
    whether
    the
    agency
    considered
    all
    statutorily
    relevant
    factors
    and
    ignored
    statutorily
    irrelevant
    factors.”
    9
    This
    test
    of
    reasonableness,
    how
    3
    A
    statutory
    interpretation
    (a
    question
    of
    law)
    is
    reviewable
    under
    5
    USC
    §
    706(2)
    (C).
    467
    US
    837,
    842-45
    (1984).
    IS
    Courts
    may
    review
    agency
    discretion
    under
    5
    usc
    §
    706(2)
    (A),
    (D).
    116467
    US
    at
    837.
    “Id
    at
    842-45.
    See
    also
    Ohio,
    880
    F2d
    at
    464
    (‘As
    petitioners
    point
    to
    no
    CERCLA
    provision
    addressing
    the
    precise
    question
    in
    issue
    (the
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate),
    their
    bur
    den
    is
    to
    show
    that
    the
    imposition
    of
    the
    discount
    rate
    was
    unreasonable
    or
    contrary
    to
    the
    statutory,
    purpose.”).
    ‘“Chevron,
    467
    US
    at
    843
    n
    9.
    See
    also
    INS
    v
    Cardozo
    Fonseca,
    480
    US421,
    446-50
    (1987)
    (employing
    tools
    of
    statutory
    construction);
    Babbitt
    v
    Sweet
    Hone
    Chapter
    of
    Com
    munitiesfora
    Great
    Oregon,
    515
    US
    687,
    703-05
    (1995)
    (same).
    9
    See
    Chevron,
    467
    US
    at
    845;
    State
    Farm,
    463
    US
    at
    42-44.

    1998]
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1355
    ever,
    tends
    to
    be
    quite
    similar
    to
    the
    arbitrary
    and
    capricious
    standard
    of
    review
    that
    courts
    apply
    to
    agency
    discretion.’
    2
    °
    Thus,
    when
    courts
    encounter
    challenges
    to
    agency
    discount
    rates,
    Chevron
    Step
    One
    implies
    that
    they
    must
    first
    interpret
    the
    statute
    in
    question
    to
    determine
    Congress’s
    intent.
    However,
    most
    statutes—such
    as
    TSCA
    and
    FIFRA—offer
    no
    particular
    standards
    for
    conducting
    cost-benefit
    analysis,
    evidencing
    no
    con
    gressional
    intent
    as
    to
    the
    appropriate
    methods
    for
    choosing
    a
    discount
    rate.
    This
    forces
    courts
    to
    proceed
    to
    the
    next
    level
    of
    analysis—
    Chevron
    Step
    Two—and
    examine
    the
    reasonableness,
    of
    the
    agency,
    decision.
    Thus,
    in
    the
    few
    cases
    where
    courts
    have
    reviewed
    an
    agency’s
    decision
    to
    discount
    future
    costs
    and
    benefits,
    they
    have
    focused
    on
    the
    reasonableness
    of
    the
    decision,
    not
    on
    whether
    the
    decision
    is
    consistent
    with
    the
    purpose
    of
    the
    statute.
    In
    Corro
    sion
    Proof
    Fittings,
    for
    example,
    the
    court
    found
    that
    the
    EPA
    would
    act
    unreasonably
    if
    it
    failed
    to
    discount
    future
    benefits:
    “Because
    the
    EPA
    must
    discount
    costs
    to
    perform
    its
    evaluations
    properly,
    the
    EPA
    also
    should
    discount
    benefits
    to
    preserve
    an
    apples-to-apples
    comparison,
    even
    if
    this
    entails
    discounting
    benefits
    of
    a
    non-monetary
    ‘‘
    Similarly,
    in
    Ohio,
    the
    court
    found
    that
    the
    Department
    of
    the
    Interior
    did
    not
    act
    un
    reasonably
    when
    it
    followed
    0MB
    guidance
    and
    discounted
    future
    benefits.’
    22
    In
    neither
    case,
    however,
    did
    the
    court
    articulate
    a
    standard
    of
    reasonableness.
    In
    Corrosion
    Proof
    Fittings,
    the
    court
    held
    simply
    that
    an
    agency
    cannot
    discount
    costs
    without
    dis
    counting
    benefits;’
    23
    in
    Ohio,
    the
    court
    deferred
    to
    the
    agency’s
    decision
    because
    it
    was
    “first
    and
    foremost
    a
    policy
    choice.”
    24
    Although
    they
    lack
    coherent
    explanations,
    Corrosion
    Proof
    Fittings
    and
    Ohio
    reach
    the
    correct
    conclusion:
    discounting
    is
    reasonable;
    not
    discounting
    is
    arbitrary.’
    25
    However,
    the
    courts
    in
    these
    cases
    could
    have
    reached
    the
    same
    conclusion
    more
    simply
    by
    relying
    on
    the
    language
    of
    the
    underlying
    statutes
    (Chevron
    Step
    One).
    A
    plain
    reading
    of
    statutory
    language
    requiring
    an
    ‘agency
    to
    consider
    “the
    reasonably
    ascertainable
    economic
    conse
    quences
    of
    the
    rule,
    after
    consideration
    for
    the
    effect
    on
    the
    na
    ‘°See
    Ronald
    M.
    Levin
    The
    Anatomy
    of
    Chevron:
    Step
    Two
    Reconsidered,
    72
    chi-Kent
    L
    Rev
    1253,
    1266-77
    (1997)
    (demonstrating
    that
    analysis
    of
    a
    question
    of
    law
    under
    Chev
    ron
    Step
    Two
    is
    very
    similar
    to—indeed,
    may
    be
    identical
    to—arbitrary
    and
    capricious
    re
    view).
    947
    F2d
    at
    1218.
    122880
    F2d
    at
    465.
    ‘947
    F2d
    at
    1218.
    880
    F2d
    at
    465.
    2
    See
    the
    discussion
    in
    Part
    II.

    1356
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    LawReview
    [65:1333
    tional
    economy”
    26
    suggests
    that
    the
    agency
    should
    use
    reasonable
    methods
    for
    evaluating
    the
    costs
    and
    benefits
    of
    a
    regulation.
    This
    is
    precisely
    the
    conclusion
    in
    Gas
    Appliance
    Manufacturers
    Association,
    Inc
    v
    Department
    of
    Energy,’
    27
    where
    the
    D.C.
    Circuit
    considered
    a
    statute
    requiring
    that
    regulations
    be
    “adequately
    analyzed
    in
    terms
    of
    .
    .
    .
    economic
    cost
    and
    benefit,
    and
    impact
    upon
    affected
    groups.”
    28
    The
    court
    found
    that
    this
    language
    re
    quired
    the
    agency
    to
    use
    reasonable
    methods
    in
    its
    cost-benefit
    analysis.’
    29
    As
    demonstrated
    in
    Part
    II,
    reasonable
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    includes
    positive
    discount
    rates
    for
    future
    costs
    and
    benefits.
    2.
    Review
    of
    agency
    discretion:
    The
    choice
    of
    a
    particular
    discount
    rate.
    Most
    courts
    treat
    the
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate
    as
    a
    matter
    of
    agency
    discretion.’
    3
    °
    Unless
    the
    underlying
    statute
    calls
    for
    strin
    gent
    review,’
    3
    courts
    will
    apply
    the
    APA’s
    “arbitrary
    and
    capri
    cious”
    standard
    of
    review
    to
    the
    agency’s
    choice.’
    32
    The
    Supreme
    Court
    has
    interpreted
    this
    standard
    as
    requiring
    that
    courts
    take
    a
    “hard
    look”
    at
    the
    agency’s
    decision,
    inquiring
    whether
    the
    agency
    provided
    a
    detailed
    explanation,
    investigated
    reasonable
    alternatives,
    and
    considered
    statutorily
    relevant
    factors
    and
    ig
    nored
    statutorily
    irrelevant
    factors.’
    33
    Although
    th
    standard
    of
    review
    calls
    for
    a
    “hard
    look,”
    most
    courts
    have
    taken
    a
    “soft
    look”
    34
    at
    agency
    discount
    rates.
    In
    Cor
    20
    TSCA,
    15
    Usc
    §
    2605(c)
    (1)
    (D).
    127998
    F2d
    1041
    (DC
    cir
    1993).
    Id
    at
    1044,
    quoting
    the
    Energy
    Conservation
    Standards
    for
    New
    Buildings
    Act
    of
    1976,
    42
    USC
    §
    6839
    (1988),
    repealed
    by
    the
    Energy
    Policy
    Act
    of
    1992,
    Pub
    L
    No
    102-486,
    Title
    I
    §
    101(a)(2),
    106
    Stat
    2776,
    2783.
    29998
    F2d
    at
    1045-46.
    ‘°See,
    for
    example,
    Corrosion
    Proof
    Fittings,
    947
    F2d
    at
    1218
    n
    19
    (concluding
    that
    the
    EPA’s
    choice
    of
    a
    3
    percent
    real
    discount
    rate
    was
    not
    unreasonable);
    Ohio,
    880
    F2d
    at
    465
    n
    46
    (deferring
    to
    agency
    choice
    of
    10
    percent
    rate);
    Northern
    California
    Power
    v
    FERC,
    37
    F3d
    1517,
    1522-23
    (DC
    Cir
    1994)
    (“It
    was
    .
    .
    .
    entirely
    proper
    for
    the
    Commis
    sion
    to
    calculate
    the
    present
    value
    .
    .
    .
    using
    a
    discount
    rate
    that
    focused
    on
    the
    consum
    ers’
    value
    of
    money.”).
    31
    TSCA,
    for
    example,
    provides
    for
    substantial
    evidence
    review,
    15
    USC
    §
    2618(c)(1)(B)(i).
    2
    See
    5
    USC
    §
    706(Z)(A);
    Overton
    Park,
    401
    US
    at
    4
    13-16.
    33
    See,
    for
    example,
    State
    Farm,
    463
    US
    at
    43-44:
    Vermont
    Yankee
    Nuclear
    Power
    Corp
    vNatural
    Resources
    Defense
    Council,
    mc,
    435
    US
    519,
    549-55
    (1978);
    Overton
    Park,
    401
    US
    at
    415-17.
    See
    also
    Scenic
    Hudson
    Preservation
    Conference
    v
    FPC,
    354
    F2d
    608,
    617-
    18,
    620-22
    (2d
    Cir
    1965).
    “‘The
    term
    “soft
    look”
    is
    borrowed
    from
    Richard
    J.
    Pierce,
    Judicial
    Review
    of
    Agency
    Actions
    in
    a
    Period
    of
    Diminishing
    Agency
    Resources,
    49
    Admin
    L
    Rev
    61,
    90
    (1997)
    (char
    acterizing
    Judge
    Easterbrook’s
    dissent
    in
    Salameda
    v
    INS,
    70
    F3d
    447
    (7th
    Cir
    1995),
    as
    the
    ‘soft
    look”
    position).

    19981
    Regulatory
    Disco
    unt
    Rates
    1357
    rosion
    Proof
    Fittings,
    for
    example,
    the
    Fifth
    Circuit
    deferred
    to
    the
    EPA’s
    choice
    of
    a
    3
    percent
    discount
    rate
    because
    “historically
    the
    real
    rate
    of
    interest
    has
    tended
    to
    vary
    between
    2%
    and
    “1:35
    The
    court
    did
    not
    consider
    alternative
    measures
    of
    the
    dis
    count
    rate,
    nor
    did
    it
    inquire
    whether
    the
    EPA
    applied
    this
    rate
    appropriately.
    Similarly,
    in
    Ohio,
    the
    D.C..
    Circuit
    deferred
    to
    the
    Department
    of
    Interior’s
    choice
    of
    a
    10
    percent
    discount
    rate
    be
    cause
    the
    choice
    was
    “first
    and
    foremost
    a
    policy
    choice.”
    36
    De
    spite
    this
    conclusion,
    the
    court
    noted
    that
    the
    agency
    would
    need
    to
    provide
    a
    “reasonable
    justification”
    if
    it
    revised
    its
    discount
    rate
    in
    the
    future,although
    it
    gave
    no
    indication
    what
    such
    ajus
    tification
    would
    be)
    7
    The
    D.C.
    Circuit
    has
    attempted
    to
    harden
    the
    prevailing
    “soft
    look”
    by
    inquiring
    into
    the
    theory
    underlying.
    agency
    discount
    rates.
    In
    Northern
    California
    Power
    Agency
    vFERC,’
    8
    the
    parties
    disputed
    whether
    the
    appropriate
    discount
    rate
    should
    reflect
    the
    average
    discount
    rate
    of
    members
    of
    society
    (which
    FERC
    advo
    cated)
    or
    the
    cost
    of
    borrowing
    for
    city
    governments
    (which
    the
    plaintiff
    municipalities
    advocated).’
    39
    After
    reviewing
    the
    basic
    theory
    of
    discounting
    and
    citing
    a
    popular
    textbook,’
    4
    °
    the
    court
    concluded
    that
    the
    appropriate
    rate
    should
    reflect
    the
    discount
    rate
    of
    members
    of
    society.’
    4
    The
    court,
    however,
    did
    not
    inquire
    whether
    FERC’s
    particular
    rate
    (15
    percent)
    was
    a
    good
    measure
    of
    the
    appropriate
    social
    discount
    rate.
    Similarly,
    in
    Herrington,
    the
    D.C.
    Circuit
    invalidated
    the
    dis
    count
    rate
    that
    the
    Department
    of
    Energy
    (“DOE”)
    had
    used
    in
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    of
    energy
    efficiency
    standards.’
    42
    Applying
    hard
    look
    review,
    the
    court
    found
    that
    the
    DOE
    failed
    to
    explain
    how
    it
    derived
    this
    rate.
    In
    stark
    contrast
    to
    its
    approach
    in
    Ohio,
    the
    D.C.
    Circuit
    held
    that
    the
    agency
    could
    not
    rely
    on
    0MB
    guidelines
    to
    justify
    its
    choice:
    “The
    disputed
    0MB
    circular
    is
    es
    sentially
    a
    general
    instruction
    to
    government
    agencies
    and
    does
    not
    explain
    the
    reasoning
    behind
    the
    discount
    rate
    it
    recom
    “947
    F2d
    at
    1218
    n
    19.
    ‘88O
    F2d
    at
    465.
    311d
    at
    465
    n
    46.
    ‘37
    F3d
    1517
    (DC
    Cir
    1994).
    391d
    at
    1522-23.
    401d
    at
    1523,
    citing
    E.J.
    Mishan,
    Cost
    BenefitAnalysis
    176
    (Praeger
    1976).
    “‘Id
    (“Additionally,
    when
    determining
    the
    net
    present
    benefit
    of
    a
    project,
    a
    discount
    rate
    that
    reflects
    society’s,
    as
    opposed
    to
    an
    individual’s,
    preferences
    is
    commonly
    used.
    It
    was
    therefore
    entirely
    proper
    for
    the
    Commission
    to
    calculate
    the
    present
    value
    of
    the
    net
    benefits
    of
    the
    projects
    using
    a
    discount
    rate
    that
    focused
    on
    the
    consumers’
    value
    of
    money.”)
    (citations
    omitted).
    2768
    F2d
    at
    1410-14.

    1358
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    Law
    Review
    [65:1333
    mends.”
    43
    The
    court
    stressed
    that
    the
    “major
    consequences
    of
    the
    discount
    rate
    made
    it
    particularly
    important
    that
    DOE
    fix
    the
    rate
    carefully
    and
    explain
    its
    decision
    intelligibly.”
    44
    Although
    Herrington
    critically
    examined
    the
    DOE’s
    decision,
    the
    case
    is
    similar
    to
    other
    “soft
    look”
    cases
    because
    the
    court
    offers
    no
    stan
    dard
    of
    review
    for
    agency
    discount
    rates.
    These
    casesshow
    that,
    even
    where
    courts
    attempt
    to
    take
    a
    hard
    look
    at
    agency
    discount
    rates,
    their
    inquiry
    generally
    ends
    after
    testing
    whether
    the
    agency
    has
    provided
    at
    least
    a
    “tolera
    bly
    terse”
    45
    explanation
    for
    its
    choice.
    Courts
    do
    not
    address
    the
    other,
    “harder”
    elements
    of
    this
    review:
    whether
    the
    agency
    ad
    dressed
    reasonable
    alternatives
    and
    whether
    it
    considered
    statu
    torily
    relevant
    factors
    and
    ignored
    statutorily
    irrelevant
    factors.
    Courts’
    “soft
    look”
    review
    of
    discount
    rates
    seems
    perverse
    when
    they
    will
    apply
    a
    strict
    hard
    look
    review
    to
    other
    elements
    of
    agency
    cost-benefit
    analysis.’
    46
    The
    problem
    appears
    to
    be
    that
    courts
    lacka
    coherent
    framework
    for
    reviewing
    the
    agency
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate.
    In
    evaluating
    the
    choice
    of
    a
    discount
    rate,
    courts
    should
    un
    dertake
    a
    three-step
    analysis.
    First,
    as
    Herrington
    requires,
    a
    court
    must
    find
    at
    least
    a
    “tolerably
    terse”
    explanation
    of
    the
    agency’s
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate.
    Second,
    the
    court
    should
    inquire
    whether
    the
    agency
    considered
    reasonable
    alternatives.
    As
    ex
    plained
    in
    Part
    II,
    the
    choice
    between
    the
    0CC
    and
    the
    SRTP
    ap
    proaches
    is
    primarily
    a
    matter
    of
    policy
    and
    secondarily
    a
    matter
    of
    methodology.’
    47
    The
    court
    should
    find
    that
    an
    agency
    abused
    its
    discretion
    if
    it
    failed
    to
    acknowledge
    these
    alternative
    approaches
    and
    explain
    why,
    in
    its
    view,
    policy
    and
    methodology
    favor
    one
    approach
    over
    another.
    Requiring
    such
    an
    explanation
    ensures
    not
    only
    that
    the
    agency’s
    decision
    has
    a
    rational
    basis,
    but
    that
    the
    agency
    recognizes
    and
    responds
    to
    the
    social
    (and
    administra
    tive)
    costs
    and
    benefits
    of
    a
    particular
    approach.’
    48
    3
    1d
    at
    1413.
    “Id
    at
    1414.
    “Id
    at
    1413,
    quoting
    Greater
    Boston
    Television
    Corp
    vFCC,
    444
    F2d
    841,
    852
    (DC
    Cir
    1970).
    “See,
    for
    example,
    Competitive
    Enterprise
    Institute
    v
    NHTSA,
    956
    F2d
    321,
    323-27
    (DC
    Cir
    1992),
    where
    the
    Court
    found
    that
    NHTSA
    acted
    arbitrarily
    by
    not
    considering
    the
    risk-risk
    tradeoffs
    of
    new
    fuel
    economy
    standards.
    For
    analysis
    of
    this
    case,
    see
    Cass
    R.
    Sunstein,
    Health-Health
    Tradeoffs,
    63
    U
    Chi
    L
    Rev
    1533,
    1565-67
    (1996).
    “See
    note
    86
    and
    accompanying
    text.
    “This
    is
    precisely
    the
    goal
    of
    hard
    look
    review,
    as
    explained
    by
    the
    Supreme
    Court
    in
    State
    Farm,
    where
    the
    Court
    stated
    that
    “the
    agency
    must
    examine
    the
    relevant
    data
    and
    articulate
    a
    satisfactory
    explanation
    for
    its
    action
    including
    a
    ‘rational
    connection
    between
    the
    facts
    found
    and
    the
    choices
    made.’
    .
    .
    In
    reviewing
    that
    explanation,
    we
    must
    ‘con
    sider
    whether
    the
    decision
    was
    based
    on
    a
    consideration
    of
    relevant
    factors
    and
    whether

    1998]
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1359
    Finally,
    given
    the
    agency’s
    choice
    between
    the
    0CC
    and
    SRTP,
    courts
    should
    examine
    whether
    the
    agency
    properly
    ap
    plied
    the
    chosen
    method.
    The
    0CC
    and
    SRTP
    involve
    very
    differ
    ent
    methodologies.
    If
    an
    agency
    applies
    the
    0CC,
    it
    must
    consider
    whether
    the
    financial
    markets
    offer
    assets
    or
    trading
    strategies
    with
    term
    structures
    similar
    to
    the
    proposed
    regulation.
    Addi
    tionally,
    the
    agency
    must
    adjust
    the
    market
    rates
    of
    return
    for
    taxes,
    risk,
    inflation,
    and
    distortions
    due
    to
    credit
    constraints.
    Finally,
    the
    agency
    should
    consider
    whether
    the
    regulation
    di
    verts
    resources
    from
    investment
    or
    consumption.
    In
    contrast,
    if
    an
    agency
    applies
    the
    SRTP,
    a
    court
    should
    ask
    whether
    the
    agency
    converted
    the
    future
    benefits
    of
    the
    regulation
    into
    con
    sumption
    equivalents.
    Additionally,
    the
    agency
    should
    reduce
    fu
    ture
    benefits
    to
    account
    for
    the
    fact
    that
    the
    regulation
    may
    di
    vert
    resources
    from
    private
    investment
    and
    thereby
    lower
    future
    consumption.
    149
    Hard
    look
    review
    of
    agency
    discount
    rates
    would
    not
    take
    the
    choice
    of
    a
    discount
    rate
    out
    of
    the
    hands
    of
    administrative
    agen
    cies,
    which
    possess
    greater
    competence
    than
    courts
    in
    this
    area.
    Nor
    would
    hard
    look
    review
    tax
    judicial
    resources
    or
    require
    judges
    to
    develop
    special
    expertise.
    Rather,
    hard
    look
    review
    of
    agency
    choice
    of
    discount
    rates
    asks
    a
    series
    of
    simple
    questions
    that
    courts
    generally
    ask
    when
    reviewing
    agency
    discretion:
    Is
    there
    a
    record?’
    5
    °
    Did
    the
    agency
    explain
    its
    choice
    between
    the
    relevant
    alternatives,
    the
    SRTP
    and
    0CC?’
    5
    Did
    the
    agency
    con
    sider
    the
    relevant
    factors
    in
    applying
    either
    method?
    152
    Admittedly,
    hard
    look
    review
    of
    agency
    discount
    rates
    will
    raise
    both
    the
    cost
    of
    judicial
    review
    and
    the
    cost
    of
    conducting
    cost-benefit
    analysis.
    However,
    the
    costs
    of
    judicial
    review
    will
    there
    has
    been
    a
    clear
    error
    ofjudgment.”
    463
    US
    at
    43
    (citationsomitted).
    5
    Hard
    look
    review
    should
    be
    particularly
    strict
    when
    an
    agency
    applies
    the
    SRTP.
    This
    method
    raises
    more
    difficult
    policy
    issues
    and
    Creates
    more
    complex
    methodological
    problems
    than
    the
    0CC.
    Most
    academic
    studies
    indicate
    that
    agencies
    have
    very
    little
    ex
    perience
    applying
    this
    method.
    See
    Kopp,
    Krupnick,
    and
    Toman,
    Cost-Benefit
    Analysis
    and
    Regulatory
    Reform
    at
    41
    (cited
    in
    note
    89).
    ‘°See,
    for
    example,
    State
    Farm,
    463
    US
    at
    43
    (‘We
    will
    ...
    uphold
    a
    decision
    of
    less
    than
    ideal
    clarity
    if
    the
    agency’s
    path
    may
    reasonably
    be
    discerned.”)
    (citations
    omitted);
    SEC
    v
    Chenery,
    318
    US
    80,
    94
    (1943)
    (“[T]he
    orderly
    functioning
    of
    the
    process
    of
    review
    requires
    that
    the
    grounds
    upon
    which
    the
    administrative
    agency
    acted
    be
    clearly
    disclosed
    and
    adequately
    sustained.”).
    See,
    for
    example,
    State
    Farm,
    463
    US
    at
    43
    (“Normally,
    an
    [agency
    decision]
    would
    be
    arbitrary
    and
    capricious
    if
    the
    agency
    .
    .
    .
    entirely
    failed
    to
    consider
    an
    important
    as
    pect
    of
    the
    problem.”);
    Scenic
    Hudson,
    354
    F2d
    at
    624-25
    (“The
    record
    as
    it
    comes
    to
    us
    fails
    markedly
    to
    make
    out
    a
    case
    for
    the
    [agency
    decision]
    on,
    among
    other
    matters,
    costs,
    public
    convenience
    and
    necessity,
    and
    absence
    of
    reasonable
    alternatives.”).
    52
    See,
    for
    example,
    Overton
    Park,
    401
    US
    at
    416
    (“[T]he
    court
    must
    consider
    whether
    the
    [agency]
    decision
    was
    based
    on
    a
    consideration
    of
    the
    relevant
    factors,”).

    1360
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    Law
    Review
    [65:1333
    rise
    only
    because
    courts
    to
    date
    have
    not
    given
    serious
    considera
    tion
    to
    agency
    discount
    rates.
    This
    increased
    cost
    is
    not
    problem
    atic,
    because
    both
    the
    APA’
    53
    and
    case
    law’
    54
    require
    the
    level
    of
    serious
    consideration
    implied
    by
    hard
    look
    review.
    Additionally,
    although
    hard
    idok
    review
    will
    impose
    costs
    on
    agencies
    by
    requiring
    them
    to
    prepare
    detailed
    explanations
    of
    their
    discount
    rate
    choices,
    these
    added
    costs
    are
    outweighed
    by
    the
    benefits
    to
    society
    from
    more
    careful,
    reasoned
    consideration
    of
    the
    methods
    used
    in
    cost-benefit
    analysis.
    A
    primary
    goal
    of
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    is
    to
    help
    agencies
    identify
    the
    advantages
    and
    disadvantages
    of
    various
    regulatory
    strategies
    and
    thereby
    allocate
    their
    scarce
    budgetary
    resources
    toward
    regulations
    that
    best
    promote
    social
    welfare.’
    55
    By
    rationalizing
    and
    disciplining
    agency
    decision
    making,
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    promotes
    the
    regulatory
    efficiency
    as
    well
    as
    the
    political
    accountability
    of
    agencies.’
    56
    Yet,
    when
    agencies
    lack
    meaningful
    standards
    for
    conducting
    the
    analysis,
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    is
    subject
    to
    ma
    nipulation,
    may
    be
    ridden
    with
    error,
    and
    has
    the
    appearance
    of
    mere
    window
    dressing.
    157
    Hard
    look
    review,
    therefore,
    strength
    ens
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    by
    giving
    agencies
    strong
    incentives
    to
    develop
    consistent
    and
    theoretically
    sound
    methods
    of
    analysis.
    C.
    Applying
    the
    Standard
    of
    Review
    to
    Agency
    Discount
    Rates
    Hard
    look
    review
    would
    significantly
    alter
    the
    way
    agencies
    select
    discount
    rates.
    As
    this
    Part
    illustrates,
    many
    recent
    dis
    count
    rate
    choices
    by
    agencies
    would
    not
    survive
    judicial
    review
    under
    this
    standard.
    Perhaps
    the
    most
    interesting
    application
    of
    hard
    look
    review
    would
    involve
    OMB’s
    guidelines
    for
    discount
    rates.
    Applying
    this
    standard,
    a
    court
    would
    find
    that
    an
    agency
    cannot
    rely
    on
    0MB
    guidelines
    to
    justify
    its
    choice
    of
    discount
    rate.
    Although
    0MB
    adopts
    the
    0CC
    approach
    and
    provides
    an
    adequate
    explanation
    for
    this
    choice,
    thereby
    surviving
    the
    first
    two
    levels
    of
    analysis
    under
    hard
    look
    review,
    0MB
    fails
    the
    third
    level
    of
    analysis,
    be-
    5
    Usc
    §
    7.06(2)
    (A)
    (requiring
    courts
    to
    set
    aside
    agency
    action
    that
    is
    arbitrary,
    Ca
    pricious,
    an
    abuse
    of
    discretion,
    or
    otherwise
    not
    in
    accordance
    with
    the
    law’).
    See
    text
    accompanying
    notes
    138-44.
    “For
    analysis
    of
    the
    pathologies
    of
    administrative
    decisionmking
    in
    the
    absence
    of
    effective
    cost-benefit
    analysis,
    see
    Breyer,
    Breaking
    the
    Vicious
    Circle
    at
    10-29
    (cited
    in
    note
    13)
    and
    Cass
    R.
    Sunstein,
    Free
    Markets
    and
    Social
    Justice
    289-94
    (Oxford
    1997).
    See
    also
    Thomas
    0.
    McGarity
    and
    Sidney
    A.
    Shapiro.
    OSHA
    ‘s
    Critics
    and
    Regulatory
    Reform,
    31
    Wake
    Forest
    L
    Rev
    587,
    622-32
    (1996)
    (discussing
    the
    costs
    and
    benefits
    of
    cost-benefit
    analysis).
    See
    Sunstein,
    48
    Stan
    L
    Rev
    at
    252-53
    (cited
    in
    note
    8).
    See,
    for
    example,
    Scherega,
    18
    J
    Envir
    Econ
    &
    Mgmt
    at
    S-66
    (cited
    in
    note
    58).

    1998]
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1361
    cause
    it
    does
    not
    sufficiently
    explain
    its
    application
    of
    the
    0CC
    approach.
    In
    particular,
    0MB
    advocates
    a
    7
    percent
    discount
    rate,
    unadjusted
    for
    taxes
    or
    risk.’
    58
    Likewise,
    EPA
    discount
    rates
    generally
    would
    not
    survive
    hard
    look
    review.
    The
    agency
    chooses
    radically
    different
    discount
    rates
    for
    different
    regulations,
    generally
    providing
    no
    explanation
    for
    this
    variation.’
    59
    Indeed,
    EPA
    practice
    appears
    arbitrary
    be
    cause
    it
    often
    chooses
    relatively
    high
    discount
    rates
    (between
    7
    and
    10
    percent)
    for
    regulations
    imposing
    future
    costs’
    6
    °
    and
    low
    rates
    (around
    3
    percent)
    for
    regulations
    creating
    future
    bene
    fits.
    16
    Because
    the
    agency
    offers
    no
    coherent
    explanation
    for
    these
    choices,
    its
    discount
    rates
    would
    fail
    the
    second
    level
    of
    analysis
    under
    hard
    look
    review.
    In
    contrast,
    a
    recent
    DOE
    regulation
    likely
    would
    survive
    hard
    look
    review.
    The
    agency
    provided
    detailed
    justification
    of
    its
    discount
    rate
    in
    a
    rule
    setting
    energy
    conservation
    standards
    for
    certain
    major
    household
    appliances.’
    62
    After
    reviewing
    the
    theo
    retical
    and
    practical
    aspects
    of
    both
    the
    SRTP
    and
    the
    CCC,
    the
    Department
    tentatively
    advocated
    the
    0CC
    approach,
    noting
    that
    “consideration
    must
    be
    given
    to
    the
    opportunity
    costs
    of
    devoting
    more
    economic
    resources
    to
    the
    production
    and
    purchase
    of
    more
    energy-efficient
    appliances
    and
    fewer
    national
    resources
    to
    other
    alternative
    types
    of
    investment.”
    63
    Not
    all
    agency
    choices
    are
    as
    simple
    to
    evaluate
    under
    hard
    look
    review.
    A
    harder
    case
    appears
    in
    a
    recent
    regulation
    by
    the
    National
    Oceanic
    and
    Atmospheric
    Administration
    (“NOAA”),
    where
    the
    agency
    established
    standards
    for
    valuing
    damages
    to
    natural
    resources
    and
    the
    costs
    of
    mitigating
    those
    damages.’
    64
    There
    NOAA
    considered
    both
    the
    SRTP
    and
    0CC,
    explaining
    the
    See
    notes
    18-20
    and
    accompanying
    text.
    EPA
    generally
    offered
    no
    explanations
    for
    the
    regulations
    in
    Tables
    1
    and
    2.
    Consider,
    for
    example,
    EPA,
    Protection
    of
    Stratospheric
    Ozone,
    58
    Fed
    Reg
    at
    8163
    (cited
    in
    note
    30).
    °See,
    for
    example,
    EPA,
    Control
    of
    Air
    Pollution
    from
    New
    Motor
    Vehicles
    and
    New
    Motor
    Vehicle
    Engines:
    Voluntary
    Standards
    for
    Light-Duty
    Vehicles,
    62
    Fed
    Reg
    31192,
    31215
    (1997)
    (applying
    a
    10
    percent
    discount
    rate
    to
    pollution
    credits
    that
    the
    agency
    will
    give
    to
    manufacturers
    of
    automobiles):
    EPA,
    Amended
    Proposed
    Test
    Rule
    for
    Hazardous
    Air
    Pollutants,
    62
    Fed
    Reg
    67466,
    67477
    (1997)
    (using
    a
    7
    percent
    discount
    rate
    to
    annu
    alize
    initial
    regulatory
    costs).
    6
    See,
    for
    example.
    EPA,
    LEAD;
    Requirements
    for
    Lead-Based
    Paint
    Activities
    in
    Tar
    get
    Housing
    and
    Child-Occupied
    Facilities,
    61
    Fed
    Reg
    45778,
    45808
    (1996)
    (using
    a
    3
    per
    cent
    discount
    rate
    for
    core”
    analysis
    of
    future
    benefits).
    DOE,
    Energy
    Conservation
    Program,
    58
    Fed
    Reg
    at
    47333-35
    (cited
    in
    note
    29).
    at
    47335.
    ‘Department
    of
    Commerce,
    NOAA,
    Natural
    Resource
    Damage
    Assessments,
    61
    Fed
    Reg
    at
    450-57
    (cited
    in
    note
    29).

    1362
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    Law
    Review
    [65:1333
    theory
    and
    methodological
    issues
    underlying
    each
    alternative.’
    65
    The
    agency
    ultimately
    advocated
    a
    3
    percent
    discount
    rate
    for
    valuing
    damages
    to
    natural
    resources
    because
    the
    rate
    is
    reason
    ablein
    light
    of
    existing
    estimates
    of
    the
    SRTP,
    the
    rate
    is
    close
    to
    the
    real
    after-tax
    rate
    of
    return
    on
    riskiess
    Treasury
    bills,
    and
    a
    relatively
    low
    discount
    rate
    may
    be
    appropriate
    for
    goods
    (natural
    resources)
    that
    are
    not
    traded
    in
    a
    market.’
    66
    Unfortunately,
    however,
    NOAA
    also
    concluded—without
    a
    coherent
    explana
    tion—that
    different
    discount
    rates
    should
    apply
    to
    the
    benefits
    (the
    value
    of
    damages
    to
    natural
    resources)
    and
    costs
    (mitigation
    of
    damages)
    of
    restoring
    natural
    resources.
    While
    the
    agency
    ad
    vocated
    the
    SRTP
    for
    benefits,’
    67
    it
    supported
    the
    relatively
    high
    0CC
    rate
    for
    costs.’
    68
    This
    illogical
    decision
    should
    fail
    hard
    look
    review.
    CONCLUSION
    The
    discount
    rate
    is
    a
    critical
    element
    of
    cost-benefit
    analy
    sis.
    The
    value
    of
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    in
    improving
    regulatory
    de
    cisions
    depends,
    in
    large
    part,
    on
    the
    reasonableness
    of
    the
    dis
    count
    rate.
    Small
    variations
    in
    the
    discount
    rate
    can
    significantly
    bias
    the
    analysis.
    Despite
    the
    importance
    of
    the
    discount
    rate,
    courts
    have
    failed
    to
    develop
    a
    standard
    of
    review
    for
    agency
    dis
    count
    rate
    choices.
    This
    is
    particularly
    troubling
    in
    light
    of
    evi
    dence
    that
    agency
    practice
    exhibits
    wide-ranging,
    and
    generally
    unexplained,
    variation
    in
    discount
    rates.
    Not
    only
    do
    different
    agencies
    employ
    different
    rates,
    butthe
    same
    agency
    will
    some
    times
    apply
    different
    rates
    to
    different
    regulations
    without
    ex
    planation.
    This
    Comment
    seeks
    to
    strengthen
    cost-benefit
    analysis
    by
    providing
    a
    framework
    for
    judicial
    review
    of
    agency
    discount
    rates.
    As
    a
    threshold
    matter,
    courts
    should
    find,
    as
    a
    matter
    of
    law,
    that
    an
    agency
    acts
    unreasonably
    if
    it
    fails
    to
    discount
    future
    costs
    and
    benefits,
    even
    if
    they
    accrue
    to
    future
    generations.
    Ad
    ditionally,
    courts
    should
    take
    a
    “hard
    look”
    at
    agency
    discount
    rates
    and
    ask
    three
    basic
    questions:
    Is
    there
    a
    record
    for
    the
    agency’s
    choice?
    Did
    the
    agency
    explain
    its
    choice
    between
    the
    al
    ternative
    approaches
    to
    discounting,
    the
    SRTP
    and
    0CC?
    Did
    the
    agency
    consider
    the
    relevant
    factors
    in
    applying
    the
    chosen
    method?
    While
    these
    questions
    are
    standard
    fare
    in
    hard
    look
    re
    5
    Id
    at
    453-54.
    9d.
    ‘°‘Id
    at
    454.
    9d
    at
    456.

    1998]
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1363
    view,
    they
    would
    represent
    a
    significant
    advance
    in
    judicial
    re
    view
    of
    discount
    rates.
    More
    importantly,
    hard
    look
    review
    would
    provide
    strong
    incentives
    for
    agencies
    to
    adopt
    morally
    and
    eco
    nomically
    sensible
    discount
    rates.

    1364
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    LawReview
    [65:1333

    1998]
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1365

    1366
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    Law
    Review
    [65:1333

    1998]
    Regulatory
    Disco
    unt
    Rates
    1367

    1368
    The
    University
    of
    Chicago
    LawReview
    [65:1333

    1998]
    Regulatory
    Discount
    Rates
    1369

    O.\Wth,k\L,w
    NOTES
    THE
    USE
    OF
    THE
    DISCOUNT
    RATE
    IN
    EPA
    ENFORCEMENT
    ACTIONS
    The
    U.S.
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency
    (“EPA”)
    is
    responsi
    ble
    for
    protecting
    the
    public
    health
    and
    environment.
    Beginning
    in
    the
    late
    1960s
    and
    early
    1970s,
    Congress
    delegated
    this
    responsibility
    and
    authority
    to
    the
    EPA
    through
    several
    environmental
    protection
    statutes.
    Under
    these
    statutes,
    the
    EPA
    promulgates
    and
    enforces
    a
    number
    of
    regulations
    designed
    to
    reduce
    emissions
    of
    pollutants
    in
    order
    to
    protect
    public
    health
    and
    the
    environment
    including,
    air,
    wa
    ter
    and
    land.’
    As
    a
    result,
    a
    national
    system
    of
    environmental
    regula
    tions
    has
    replaced
    nuisance
    suits
    and
    the
    common
    law
    as
    the
    primary
    means
    of
    ensuring
    environmental
    quality.
    2
    According
    to
    those
    who
    support
    the
    development
    of
    a
    national
    regulatory
    system
    for
    environmental
    protection,
    common
    law
    liability
    and
    nuisance
    litigation
    are
    incapable
    of
    controlling
    pollution
    in
    a
    complex
    modern
    industrial
    society.
    On
    the
    other
    hand,
    there
    are
    indi
    viduals
    who
    advocate
    a
    decentralization
    of
    environmental
    manage
    ment
    and
    policy,
    if
    not
    a
    complete
    return
    to
    nuisance
    litigation,
    be
    cause
    they
    believe
    the
    current
    national
    system
    fails
    to
    achieve
    envi
    ronmental
    prGtection
    in
    an
    efficient,
    cost-effective
    manner.
    3
    Notwith
    standing
    this
    important
    debate,
    this
    Note
    presumes
    that
    the
    national
    See
    Federal
    Water
    Pollution
    Control
    Act
    (“CWA”)
    of
    1972,
    33
    U.S.C.
    §
    125
    1-1387
    (1994);
    Resource
    Conservation
    and
    Recovery
    Act
    (“RCRA”)
    of
    1976,
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6901-
    6992k
    (1994);
    Clean
    Air
    Act
    (“CAA”)
    of
    1970,
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    7401-7671
    q
    (1994).
    2
    See
    STEPHEN
    G.
    BRaYER
    ET
    AL.,
    ADMINISTRATIVE
    LAW
    AND
    REGULATORY
    POLICY
    351(4th
    ed.
    1999)
    (asserting
    that
    a
    dramatic
    trend
    beginning
    in
    the
    I
    960s
    was
    the
    development
    of
    several
    national
    environmental
    protection
    statutes).
    See
    also
    JESSE
    DUKEMINIER
    &
    JAMES
    E.
    KRIER,
    PROPERTY
    776-77
    (4th
    ed.
    1998)
    (describing
    the
    dominant
    role
    of
    the
    federal
    govern
    ment
    in
    environmental
    regulation
    since
    1970);
    Allison
    Rittenhouse
    Hayward,
    Common
    Law
    Remedies
    and
    the
    UST
    Regulations,
    21
    B.C.
    ENVTL.
    AFF.
    L.
    REv.
    619,
    630
    (1994)
    (explaining
    that
    with
    the
    enactment
    of
    statutes
    such
    as
    the
    CAA,
    the
    CWA,
    and
    RCRA,
    pollution
    became
    regulated
    by
    comprehensive
    federal
    laws
    and
    regulations).
    Perhaps
    no
    case
    has
    been
    cited
    more
    than
    Booinr
    v.
    Atlantic
    Cement
    Co.,
    257
    N.E.2d
    870
    (N.Y.
    1970),
    for
    the
    proposition
    that
    common
    law
    nuisance
    actions
    can
    be
    used
    to
    effi
    ciently
    address
    environmental
    pollution
    problems.
    In
    Boomer,
    the
    court
    awarded
    permanent
    damages,
    instead
    of
    an
    injunction,
    to
    plaintiffs
    in
    a
    private
    nuisance
    suit
    after
    balancing
    the
    harm
    to
    theplaintiffs’
    property
    against
    thebeneficial
    effects
    of
    the
    defendants’
    cement
    plant.
    Id.
    1009

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    [Vol.
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    regulatory
    system
    will
    not
    be
    phased
    out
    or
    discontinued.
    However,
    many
    firms
    delay
    or
    do
    not
    comply
    with
    EPA
    regulations.
    Through
    out
    the
    remainder
    of
    this
    Note,
    the
    terms
    “delayed
    compliance”
    and
    “noncompliance”
    are
    used
    interchangeably.
    The
    environmental
    protection
    statutes
    grant
    the
    EPA
    the
    authority
    to
    seek
    civil
    penalties
    for
    delayed
    or
    noncompliance.
    A
    critical
    com
    ponent
    of
    civil
    penalties
    is
    the
    economic
    benefits
    of
    delayed
    compli
    ance.
    4
    Often
    there
    is
    a
    significant
    time
    lag
    between
    the
    occurrence
    of
    a
    violation
    and
    enforcement
    followed
    by
    a
    penalty
    payment.
    During
    this
    interval
    a
    firm
    may
    use
    the
    avoided
    costs
    of
    noncompliance
    to
    ward
    its
    next
    best
    alternative
    investment(s).
    A
    discount
    rate
    is
    used
    to
    estimate
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    as
    of
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    The
    EPA
    advocates
    using
    the
    weighted
    average
    cost
    of
    capital
    (“WACC”)
    based
    on
    the
    principle
    that
    the
    economic
    benefits
    of
    de
    layed
    compliance
    include
    potential
    risk-related
    profits
    from
    alterna
    tive
    investment(s).
    Risk-related
    profits
    are
    potential
    profits
    that
    com
    pensate
    a
    firm
    for
    risk
    associated
    with
    its
    alternative
    investment.
    Pre
    viously,
    most
    courts
    accepted
    the
    EPA
    position.
    5
    However,
    in
    a
    re
    centcase,
    United
    States
    v.
    WCI
    Steel,
    Inc.,
    6
    the
    U.S.
    District
    Court
    for
    the
    Northern
    District
    of
    Ohio
    accepted
    the
    alternative
    argument
    that
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    was
    the
    appropriate
    discount
    rate.
    7
    Use
    of
    the
    risk-
    free
    rate
    does
    not
    capture
    potential
    risk-related
    profits.
    8
    The
    resolution
    to
    this
    potentially
    emerging
    split
    among
    the
    courts
    is
    important
    for
    several
    reasons.
    First,
    the
    two
    discount
    rates
    result
    in
    substantially
    different
    estimates
    of
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    See
    CWA,
    33
    U.S.C.
    §
    1319(d);
    RCRA,
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    6928(a)(3);
    CAA,
    42
    U.S.C.
    §
    74
    l
    3
    (eXI).
    See
    United
    States
    v.
    Smithfield
    Foods,
    Inc.,
    972
    F.
    Supp.
    338,
    349
    (ED.
    Va:
    1997),
    aff’d,
    191
    F.3d
    516,
    531
    (4th
    Cit.1999),
    cert.
    denied,
    531
    U.S.
    813
    (2000)
    (affirming
    the
    district
    court’s
    use
    of
    the
    WACC
    to
    estimate
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefit
    from
    avoiding
    the
    cost
    of
    compliance).
    See
    also
    United
    States
    v.
    Roll
    Coater,
    Inc.,
    [19911
    21
    Envtl.
    L.
    Rep.
    (Envtl.
    L.
    Inst.)
    21,073,
    21,075
    (S.D.
    md.
    1991)
    (finding
    use
    of
    WACC
    discount
    factor
    more
    appropriate
    than
    alternative
    methods).
    6
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810
    (ND.
    Ohio
    1999).
    Id.
    at
    830-3
    1
    (holding
    that
    the
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    rather
    than
    the
    WACC
    is
    the
    cor
    rect
    rate
    to
    use
    in
    estimating
    the
    present
    value
    of
    the
    economic
    benefits
    of
    noncompliance
    and
    that
    any
    profits
    earned
    in
    excess
    of
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    are
    earned
    not
    from
    noncompliance,
    but
    by
    assuming
    risk).
    Whether
    the
    WACC
    or
    risk-free
    rate
    is
    used,
    adjustments
    for
    related
    tax
    effects
    must
    be
    made.
    See
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency,
    Calculation
    of
    the
    Economic
    Benefit
    of
    Noncom
    pliance
    in
    EPA’s
    Civil
    Penalty
    Enforcement
    Cases,
    64
    Fed.
    Reg.
    32,948,
    32,950
    (proposed
    June
    18,
    1999)
    (explaining
    that
    EPA
    accounts
    for
    tax
    effects
    by
    using
    after-tax
    cash
    flows
    to
    estimate
    economic
    benefits
    of
    delayed
    compliance);
    Kenneth
    T.
    Wise
    et
    al.,
    EPA
    ‘s
    New
    BEN
    Model:
    A
    Change
    for
    the
    Better?,
    1993
    Toxics
    L.
    REP.
    1125,
    1127
    (explaining
    that
    the
    after-tax
    risk-free
    rate
    is
    used
    in
    actual
    calculations
    to
    account
    for
    interest
    earned
    on
    avoided
    costs
    that
    were
    tax
    able).

    \Lw
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    20021
    THE
    DISCOUNTK4TE
    IN
    EPA
    ENFORCEMENTACTIONS
    1011
    benefits
    of
    noncompliance.
    If
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    is
    employed,
    the
    esti
    mate
    can
    be
    lower
    by
    an
    order
    of
    magnitude,
    which
    may,
    as
    a
    result,
    encourage
    forum
    shopping
    in
    order
    to
    ensure
    that
    a
    “friendly”
    court
    hears
    the
    case.
    9
    Second,
    the
    same
    group
    of
    expert
    economists
    has
    appeared
    before
    different
    courts
    in
    support
    of
    these
    two
    approaches,
    resulting
    in
    divergent
    judicial
    determinations
    as
    to
    which
    rate
    is
    ap
    propriate.
    Third,
    the
    literature
    in
    support
    of
    both
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    and
    the
    WACC
    as
    applied
    to
    environmental
    regulatory
    noncompliance
    tends
    to
    be
    dominated
    by
    those
    who
    are
    either
    interested
    parties
    or
    expert
    witnesses
    in
    litigation.
    Finally,
    unlike
    previous
    assessments,
    this
    Note
    investigates
    which
    discount
    rate
    is
    correct
    in
    light
    of
    the
    legal
    doctrine
    of
    temporary
    takings
    and
    the
    underlying
    structure
    and
    purpose
    of
    damages
    in
    tort
    actions.
    Interestingly,
    this
    emerging
    split
    appears
    to
    be
    part
    of
    a
    larger
    debate
    among
    the
    courts
    about
    the
    ap
    propriate
    rate
    for
    pre-judgment
    interest
    to
    be
    applied
    to
    damage
    awards.
    10
    The
    remaining
    sections
    of
    this
    Note
    are
    as
    follows:
    Part
    I
    ex
    plains
    the
    important
    role
    of
    civil
    penalties
    and
    the
    discount
    rate
    in
    enforcing
    environmental
    regulations,
    given
    the
    purpose
    of
    imposing
    regulations;
    Part
    II
    explains
    the
    general
    role
    of
    the
    discount
    rate
    in
    estimating
    present
    value;
    Part
    III
    outlines
    the
    mechanics
    of
    estimating
    present
    value
    using
    the
    WACC
    and
    risk-free
    rate;
    Part
    IV
    shows
    that
    economic
    and
    financial
    theory
    support
    using
    the
    risk-free
    discount
    rate;
    Part
    V
    demonstrates
    that
    temporary
    takings
    and
    tort
    law
    are
    con
    gruent
    with
    economic
    and
    financial
    theory
    supporting
    the
    risk-free
    discount
    rate;
    and
    Part
    VI
    recommends
    an
    approach
    for
    the
    appropri
    ate
    accounting
    of
    economic
    benefits
    and
    potential
    risk-related
    profits
    from
    noncompliance
    in
    the
    context
    of
    civil
    penalties.
    I.
    CIVIL
    PENALTIES,
    REGULATION,
    AND
    THE
    EcoNoMic
    BENEFIT
    OF
    DELAYED
    OR
    NONCOMPLIANCE
    The
    critical
    question
    this
    Note
    addresses
    is
    which
    discount
    rate,
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    or
    the
    WACC,
    should
    be
    used
    to
    determine
    the
    pre
    sent
    value
    of
    ex
    post
    economic
    benefits,
    or
    those
    benefits
    a
    firm
    en
    joys
    from
    the
    time
    of
    delayed
    or
    noncompliance
    through
    the
    penalty
    Of
    course
    jurisdictional
    requirements
    may
    restrict
    a
    firm’s
    ability
    to
    forum
    shop.
    ‘°
    Compare
    Blanton
    v.
    Anzalone,
    760
    F.2d
    989,
    992-93
    (9th
    Cir.
    1985)
    (holding
    that
    the
    interest
    rate
    on
    52-week
    U.S.
    Treasury
    Bills
    to
    be
    applied
    to
    post-judgment
    interest
    civil
    money
    judgments
    in
    federal
    courts,
    as
    required
    under
    28
    U.S.C.
    §
    1961,
    should
    also
    be
    applied
    to
    pre
    judgment
    interest
    in
    an
    ERISA
    suit
    unless
    the
    trial
    court
    finds
    that
    a
    different
    rate
    is
    appropri
    ate),
    with
    Smith
    v.
    Am.
    Int’l
    Life
    Assurance
    Co.,
    50
    F.3d
    956,
    958
    (11th
    Cir.
    1995)
    (holding
    that
    because
    the
    language
    of
    28
    U.S.C.
    §
    1961
    only
    addresses
    post-judgment
    interest,
    determina
    tion
    of
    the
    pre-judgment
    interest
    rate
    in
    an
    ERISA
    suit
    is
    left
    to
    the
    discretion
    of
    the
    district
    court
    subject
    only
    to
    a
    review
    for
    abuse
    of
    discretion).

    D:\Wbie\Lw
    1012
    CASE
    WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW
    [Vol.
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    payment
    date.
    For
    the
    reasons
    developed
    throughout
    this
    Note,
    the
    conclusion
    is
    that
    the
    appropriate
    discount
    rate
    to
    use
    is
    the
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    (or
    a
    firm’s
    cost
    of
    debt
    if
    it
    faced
    more
    than
    a
    mere
    probability
    of
    bankruptcy
    during
    the
    period
    of
    noncompliance).
    The
    risk-free
    rate
    separates
    economic
    benefits
    due
    to
    the
    illicit
    act
    of
    vio
    lating
    a
    regulation
    from
    potential
    risk-related
    returns.
    Noncompliance
    with
    EPA
    regulations
    defeats
    the
    very
    purpose
    of
    the
    regulation,
    which
    is
    the
    protection
    of
    human
    health
    and
    the
    envi
    ronment.
    Society
    is
    therefore
    unable
    to
    capture
    the
    increase
    in
    social
    well-being.
    It
    is
    then
    necessary
    to
    ensure
    compliance
    through
    the
    im
    position
    of
    civil
    penalties.
    Penalizing
    firms
    through
    the
    imposition
    of
    a
    civil
    penalty
    that
    includes
    economic
    benefits
    of
    delayed
    compliance
    deters
    the
    target
    firm
    (i.e.,
    specific
    deterrence)
    and
    other
    firms
    (i.e.,
    general
    deterrence)
    from
    similar
    violations
    in
    the
    future.
    11
    In
    order
    to
    understand
    the
    important
    role
    that
    civil
    penalties
    play
    in
    environmental
    protection,
    a
    brief
    explanation
    for
    imposing
    regula
    tions
    is
    needed.
    Regulations
    are
    imposed
    to
    correct
    for
    market
    fail
    ures
    such
    as
    negative
    externalities.’
    2
    In
    the
    context
    of
    pollution,
    nega
    tive
    externalities
    exist
    as
    firms
    fail
    to
    internalize
    the
    external
    cost
    of
    pollution
    as
    a
    result
    of
    their
    production
    process.
    Consequently,
    the
    quantity
    of
    goods
    and
    services
    consumed
    exceeds
    the
    optimal
    level.
    The
    optimal
    level
    is
    where
    the
    marginal
    social
    benefits
    equal
    mar
    ginal
    social
    costs.
    This
    is
    displayed
    in
    Figure
    1.
    Q’
    represents
    the
    socially
    optimal
    level
    of
    output
    of
    good
    or
    service
    Q
    when
    a
    firm
    in
    ternalizes
    all
    costs
    of
    production,
    including
    pollution
    damages
    im
    posed
    on
    others.
    The
    associated
    market
    price
    is
    P’’.
    Qo
    represents
    output
    when
    a
    firm
    fails
    to
    internalize
    the
    external
    cost.
    The
    associ
    ated
    market
    price
    is
    Po.
    The
    distance
    between
    points
    B
    and
    C
    repre
    sents
    the
    marginal
    externality
    cost.
    The
    failure
    to
    internalize
    the
    cost
    of
    pollution
    is
    shown
    in
    Figure
    1.
    D
    is
    the
    marginal
    willingness
    to
    pay,
    which
    represents
    the
    value
    of
    Q
    to
    consumers.
    MCp,
    the
    marginal
    private
    cost,
    which
    is
    less
    than
    MCs,
    the
    marginal
    social
    cost,
    characterizes
    the
    firm’s
    cost
    of
    produc
    1
    See
    United
    States
    v.
    Smithfield
    Foods,
    Inc.,
    191
    F.3d
    516,
    529
    (4th
    Cir.
    1999),
    cert.
    denied,
    531
    US.
    813
    (2000)
    (stating
    that
    the
    economic
    benefit
    component
    of
    a
    civil
    penalty
    is
    to
    prevent
    violators
    from
    obtaining
    a
    competitive
    advantage
    through
    noncompliance);
    United
    States
    v.
    Bethlehem
    Steel
    Corp.,
    829
    F.
    Supp.
    1047,
    1057
    (ND.
    md.
    1993)
    (discussing
    in
    the
    context
    of
    a
    RCRA
    violation
    “that
    the
    major
    purpose
    of
    a
    civil
    penalty
    is
    deterrence”).
    2
    See
    TOM
    TIETENBERO,
    ENVIRONMENTAL
    AND
    NATURAL
    RESOURCE
    ECONOMICS
    53-54
    (3d
    ed.
    1992)
    (describing
    the
    problem
    of
    externalities
    as
    causing
    a
    market
    failure
    because
    prices
    do
    not
    adjust
    to
    account
    for
    pollution).
    See
    also
    SCOTT
    J.
    CALLAN
    &
    JANET
    M.
    THOMAS,
    ENVI
    RONMENTAL
    ECONOMICS
    AND
    MANAGEMENT:
    THEORY,
    POLICY,
    AND
    APPLICATIONS
    81-84
    (1996)
    (defining
    a
    negative
    externality
    as
    a
    spillover
    effect
    from
    either
    production
    or
    consump
    tion
    that
    extends
    outside
    the
    market
    and
    affects
    third
    parties
    who
    are
    neither
    the
    consumer
    nor
    the
    producer).

    fl:\Wth,k\Lw
    doc
    2002]
    THE
    DISCOUNTRATE
    IN
    EPA
    ENFORCEMENTACTIONS
    1013
    tion.
    The
    marginalsocial
    cost
    of
    production
    represents
    the
    cost
    of
    producing
    goods
    and
    services
    after
    a
    firm
    internalizes
    the
    cost
    of
    pol
    lution.
    13
    In
    Figure
    1,
    the
    area
    ABCE
    represents
    the
    benefits
    of
    im
    proved
    public
    health
    and
    environmental
    quality
    as
    a
    result
    of
    a
    firm
    internalizing
    the
    cost
    of
    pollution.
    The
    EPA
    promulgates
    and
    enforces
    environmental
    protection
    regulations
    in
    order
    to
    force
    firms
    to
    internalize
    pollution
    costs.’
    4
    The
    cost
    of
    production
    changes
    from
    MCp
    to
    MCs.
    Triangle
    ACE
    is
    lost
    profits
    as
    the
    quantity
    of
    Q
    produced
    and
    sold
    falls
    from
    Qo
    to
    Q*
    due
    to
    this
    increase
    in
    cost.
    The
    difference
    between
    these
    two
    areas,
    triangle
    ABC,
    is
    the
    net
    gain
    in
    social
    well-being.
    Figure
    1
    Social
    Cost
    of
    Pollution
    $/unit
    .
    MCs
    MCp
    B
    P*
    Po
    .
    .
    C
    Q*
    Qo
    Q
    See
    TIETENBERG,
    supra
    note
    12,
    at
    52
    (defining
    MCp
    as
    the
    cost
    of
    production
    ex
    cludng
    the
    cost
    of
    pollution
    and
    MCs
    as
    the
    social
    cost
    of
    production
    that
    includes
    the
    cost
    of
    pollution).
    See
    RH.
    Coase,
    The
    Problem
    of
    Social
    Cost,
    3
    J.L.
    &
    Ec0N.
    1
    (1960)
    (arguing
    that
    in
    the
    absence
    of
    transaction
    costs,
    polluters
    and
    non-polluters
    will
    internalize
    the
    cost
    associated
    with
    negative
    externalities
    through
    bargaining
    and
    negotiation
    rather
    than
    government
    interven
    tion).
    However,
    due
    to
    the
    large
    number
    of
    affected
    parties,
    the
    Coase
    Theorem’s
    assumption
    of
    zero-transactions
    costs
    does
    not
    hold
    true
    for
    most,
    if
    not
    all,
    environmental
    issues
    EPA
    regu
    lates.
    See
    ROBERT
    C.
    ELLICKSON,
    ORDER
    WITHOUT
    LAW:
    How
    NEIGHBORS
    SETTLE
    DISPUTES
    280
    (1991)
    (describing
    Coase’s
    assumption
    of
    zero
    transactions
    costs
    as
    unrealistic).
    Relatedly,
    the
    Coase
    Theorem
    does
    not
    address
    another
    situation
    where
    environmental
    regulation
    is
    re
    quired,
    where
    there
    are
    potential
    “free-riders”
    who
    may
    seek
    the
    benefits
    of
    pollution
    reductions
    without
    incurring
    any
    of
    the
    associated
    transactions
    costs.

    D:\Wb,i\L
    1014
    CASE
    WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW
    [Vol.
    52:1009
    II.
    ECONOMIC
    BENEFIT
    OF
    DELAYED
    OR
    NONCOMPLIANCE
    AND
    THE
    ROLE
    OF
    THE
    DISCOUNT
    RATE
    For
    simplicity,
    assume
    here
    and
    throughout
    the
    rest.
    of
    this
    Note
    that
    the
    economic
    benefits
    of
    delayed
    or
    noncompliance
    are
    ex
    post
    relative
    to
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.’
    5
    A
    firm
    derives
    economic
    bene
    fits
    from
    noncompliance
    with
    environmental
    regulations
    by
    avoiding
    the
    commitment
    6f
    financial
    resources
    for
    pollution
    control.
    Eco
    nomic
    benefits
    are
    derived
    from
    two
    sources:
    (1)
    avoided
    capital
    in
    vestments
    required
    for
    the
    purchase
    and
    installation
    of
    pollution
    con
    trol
    equipment
    (e.g.,
    scrubbers
    to
    remove
    sulfur
    emissions
    from
    fossil
    fuel
    combustion),
    and
    (2)
    avoided
    operation
    and
    maintenance
    ex
    penses
    as
    a
    result
    of
    the
    initial
    choice
    not
    to
    install
    pollution
    control
    equipment.
    A
    firm
    may
    apply
    these
    funds
    toward
    other
    investments
    until
    a
    civil
    penalty
    is
    paid
    and
    compliance
    is
    required.
    The
    role
    of
    the
    discount
    rate
    is
    to
    determine
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    from
    noncompliance
    because
    there
    is
    a
    lag
    be
    tween
    a
    violation,
    enforcement,
    and
    payment
    of
    a
    penalty.
    The
    pre
    sent
    value
    is
    estimated
    by
    applying
    the
    compounded
    discount
    rate
    to
    the
    avoided
    cost
    from
    the
    initial
    date
    of
    delayed
    compliance
    through
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    A
    court
    may
    choose
    the
    WACC
    or
    the
    risk-free
    discount
    rate.
    With
    the
    decision
    in
    United
    States
    v.
    WCI
    Steel,
    Inc.,
    courts
    have
    taken
    divergent
    positions
    on
    which
    rate
    is
    cor
    rect.’
    6
    III.
    ESTIMATING
    PRESENT
    VALUE
    OF
    ECONOMIC
    BENEFIT:
    RJSK
    FREE
    RATE
    VS.
    WACC
    The
    mechanics
    of
    estimating
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    using
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    and
    applying
    its
    retrospective
    ex
    post
    analysis
    are:
    °
    In
    reality,
    we
    may
    have
    to
    account
    for
    economic
    benefits
    that
    would
    be
    expected
    to
    accrue
    ex
    ante,
    or
    after
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    For
    these
    benefits
    those
    who
    advocate
    use
    of
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    for
    ex
    post
    benefits
    relative
    to
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date
    agree
    with
    the
    EPA
    that
    the
    WACC
    should
    be
    used
    to
    discount
    ex
    ante
    benefits
    relative
    to
    the
    penalty
    payment
    to
    their
    present
    value
    as
    of
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    See
    Stewart
    C.
    Myers
    et
    al.,
    The
    BEN
    Model
    and
    the
    Calculation
    of
    Economic
    BenefitS
    (Mar.
    1997)
    (prepared
    for
    the
    BEN
    Coalition
    and
    the
    Synthetic
    Organic
    Chemical
    Manufacturers
    Association)
    (explaining
    that
    ex
    post
    analyses
    may
    have
    to
    account
    for
    future
    cash
    flows
    whose
    value
    is
    not
    known
    with
    certainty,
    such
    as
    the
    cost
    of
    equipment
    replacement
    based
    on
    necessary
    replacement
    cycles)-(on
    file
    with
    author).
    6
    In
    rare
    instances,
    courts
    have
    applied
    discount
    rates
    solely
    based
    on
    the
    cost
    of
    equity
    capital.
    See
    Atlantic
    States
    Legal
    Found.
    Inc.
    v.
    Universal
    Tool
    &
    Stamping
    Co.,
    786
    F.
    Supp.
    743,
    751
    (N.D
    md.
    1992).
    However,
    this
    Note
    does
    not
    consider
    this
    discount
    rate,
    as
    even
    the
    EPA
    believes
    it
    should
    not
    be
    used
    to
    determine
    the
    present
    value
    of
    the
    economic
    benefits
    of
    delayed
    compliance
    in
    enforcement
    cases.
    See
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency,
    Calculation
    of
    the
    Economic
    Benefit
    of
    Noncompliance
    in
    EPA’s
    Civil
    Penalty
    Enforcement
    Cases,
    64
    Fed.
    Reg.
    32,948,
    32,959
    (proposed
    June
    18,
    1999).

    D\Wthi\L
    2002]
    THE
    DISCOUNT
    RATE
    IN
    EPA
    ENFORCEMENTACTIONS
    1015
    ppd
    PVPCE
    1
    i=i
    Cj,ontime
    (l+k)
    [1]
    Equation
    I,
    where
    PVPCE
    1
    is
    the
    present
    value
    of
    pollution
    con
    trol
    expenditures,
    represents
    the
    present
    value
    of
    pollution
    control
    expenditures
    for
    on
    time
    compliance
    with
    an
    EPA
    regulation
    as
    of
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date
    (“ppd”).
    time
    is
    the
    cost
    of
    compliance
    that
    would
    have
    been
    incurred
    for
    each
    period
    i.
    Additionally,
    k
    is
    the
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    and
    is
    used
    to
    determine
    the
    present
    value
    of
    Ci,on
    time
    as
    of
    ppd.
    ppd
    PVPCE
    2
    =
    j=i
    Cj,ieiay’
    (l+k)
    [2]
    Equation
    2
    represents
    the
    present
    value
    of
    pollution
    control
    ex
    penditures
    in
    the
    case
    of
    delayed
    or
    noncompliance
    after
    the
    EPA
    has
    required
    a
    firm
    to
    comply,
    also
    as
    of
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    C
    3
    delay
    is
    the
    cost
    of
    compliance
    incurred
    in
    each
    period
    from
    j
    through
    the
    date
    on
    which
    the
    penalty
    is
    paid.
    k
    is
    the
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    and
    is
    used
    to
    determine
    the
    present
    value
    of
    Cj
    delay
    as
    of
    ppd.
    The
    pre
    sent
    value
    of
    the
    economic
    benefit
    is
    then
    calculated
    by
    subtracting
    the
    value
    of
    equation
    2
    from
    equation
    1.
    The
    mechanics
    the
    EPA
    employs
    to
    estimate
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    using
    the
    WACC
    and
    applying
    its
    prospective
    ex
    ante
    analysis
    to
    ex
    post
    benefits
    through
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date
    are:
    ppd
    PVPCE
    3
    =
    Ci,ontime/(l+k)’
    [31
    Equation
    3
    represents
    the
    present
    value
    of
    pollution
    control
    ex
    penditures
    for
    on
    time
    compliance
    with
    an
    EPA
    regulation
    as
    of
    the
    original
    noncompliance
    date.
    Similar
    to
    the
    risk-free
    analysis,
    C
    0
    time
    is
    the
    cost
    of
    compliancethat
    would
    have
    been
    incurred
    for
    each
    pe
    riod
    i
    through
    ppd.
    However,
    the
    discount
    rate,
    k,
    which
    is
    used
    to
    determine
    the
    present
    value
    of
    time
    as
    of
    the
    original
    noncom
    pliance
    date
    is
    the
    WACC
    rather
    than
    the
    risk-free
    rate.
    ppd
    PVPCE
    4
    =
    t
    Cj,delay/(1
    [4]

    Riw\oI52_n4\PodoIky.doc
    1016
    CASE
    WESTERNRESERVE
    LAWRE
    VIEW
    [Vol.
    52:1009
    Equation
    4
    represents
    the
    present
    value
    of
    pollution
    control
    ex
    penditures
    in
    the
    case
    of
    delayed
    or
    noncompliance
    after
    the
    EPA
    has
    compelled
    a
    firm
    to
    comply,
    also
    as
    of
    the
    original
    noncompliance
    date.
    Cj,delay
    is
    the
    cost
    of
    compliance
    that
    is
    incurred
    for
    each
    period
    and
    s
    is
    the
    number
    of
    periods
    from
    the
    initial
    date
    of
    noncompliance
    until
    compliance
    begins.
    After
    subtracting
    the
    value
    of
    equation
    4
    from
    equation
    3,
    the
    last
    step
    in
    the
    EPA’s
    analysis
    is
    to
    apply
    the
    WACC
    and
    bring
    this
    value
    forward
    to
    determine
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economics
    benefit
    as
    of
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    The
    choice
    of
    analytical
    framework
    and
    thus
    k
    is
    critical,
    given
    the
    power
    of
    compounding,
    because
    a
    small
    change
    in
    the
    magnitude
    of
    k
    can
    result
    in
    a
    significant
    difference
    in
    the
    estimate
    of
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    from
    delayed
    compliance.
    TheWACC
    is
    significantly
    higher
    than
    the
    risk-free
    rate.
    A
    court’s
    decision
    to
    use
    the
    WACC
    or
    risk-free
    rate
    results
    in
    estimates
    of
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    that
    are
    orders
    of
    magnitude
    apart.
    17
    However,
    this
    choice
    must
    be
    based
    not
    on
    whether
    one
    favors
    higher
    or
    lower
    esti
    mates,
    but
    on
    economic,
    financial,
    andlegal
    theory,
    and
    how
    such
    theory
    comports
    with
    the
    purpose
    of
    deterrence
    underlying
    the
    impo
    sition
    of
    civil
    penalties.
    A
    review
    of
    relevant
    decisions
    shows
    that
    except
    for
    thç
    court
    in
    WCI
    Steel,
    courts
    provide
    no
    explanations
    based
    on
    economic
    or
    financial
    theory
    regarding
    their
    choice
    of
    dis
    count
    rate.
    18
    IV.
    EcoNoMIc
    AND
    FINANCIAL
    THEORY
    JUSTIFIES
    THE
    RISK-FREE
    DISCOUNT
    RATE
    Having
    described
    the
    options
    for
    estimating
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    of
    noncompliance,
    it
    is
    now
    necessary
    to
    assess
    which
    choice
    is
    correct
    based
    on
    economic
    and
    financial
    theory.
    The
    WACC
    is
    a
    firm’s
    weighted
    average
    cost
    of
    capital.
    Typically,
    a
    firm’s
    cost
    of
    capital
    is
    divided
    into
    the
    cost
    of
    debt
    (e.g.,
    interest
    on
    corporate
    bonds)
    and
    the
    cost
    of
    equity
    (i.e.,
    rate
    of
    return
    on
    firm’s
    See
    United
    States
    v.
    WCI
    Steel,
    Inc.,
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    830-31
    (ND.
    Ohio
    1999)
    (showing
    that
    controlling
    for
    the
    type
    of
    remediation
    required
    for
    RCRA
    sludge
    management
    violations,
    the
    estimated
    present
    value
    of
    the
    economic
    benefit
    using
    the
    WACC
    was
    $2.8
    mil
    lion,
    while
    the
    estimate
    was
    only
    $732,000
    using
    the
    risk-free
    rate).
    See
    also
    Robert
    H.
    Furh
    man,
    A
    Discussion
    of
    Technical
    Problems
    with
    EPA
    ‘S
    BEN
    Model,
    I
    ENVTL.
    LAW.
    561,
    576-79
    (1995)
    (outlining
    several
    articles
    that
    assert
    that
    the
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    is
    correct
    and
    using
    a
    hypothetical
    example
    demonstrating
    that
    the
    WACC
    results
    in
    an
    estimated
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    of
    noncompliance
    of
    approximately
    $1.1
    million,
    while
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    results
    in
    an
    estimate
    of
    $485,000).
    18
    See
    United
    States
    v.
    Smithfield
    Foods,
    tnc.,
    972
    F.
    Supp.
    338,
    349
    nIl
    (E.D.
    Va.
    1997),
    off
    d
    191
    F.3d
    516
    (4th
    Cir.
    1999),
    cert.
    denied,
    531
    U.S.
    813
    (2000)
    (stating
    that
    the
    court
    was
    simply
    more
    persuaded
    by
    the
    testimony
    of
    the
    economic
    expert
    supporting
    use
    of
    the
    WACC).

    D\Wth’\L
    20021
    THE
    DISCOUNTRATE
    IN
    EPA
    ENFORCEMENTACTIONS
    1017
    stock)
    based
    upon
    a
    firm’s
    capital
    structure.
    The
    cost
    of
    capital
    repre
    sents
    the
    cost
    of
    financing
    pollution
    control
    equipment
    purchases
    to
    comply
    with
    environmental
    protection
    regulations
    or
    the
    opportunity
    cost
    of
    foregone
    investments
    because
    of
    such
    purchases.’
    9
    A
    rational
    profit-maximizing
    company
    might
    choose
    not
    to
    comply
    with
    a
    regu
    lation
    if
    it
    could
    earn
    a
    rate
    of
    return
    equal
    to
    the
    WACC,
    especially
    because
    pollution
    control
    equipment
    yields
    no
    actual
    monetary
    in
    come
    to
    a
    firm.
    2
    °
    Consequently,
    proponents
    of
    the
    WACC
    assert
    that
    only
    by
    usingthis
    discount
    rate
    can
    all
    earnings
    be
    disgorged
    and
    the
    violator
    made
    indifferent
    when
    deciding
    between
    compliance
    and
    noncompliance.
    2
    The
    WACC
    includes
    a
    risk
    premium
    that
    captures
    and
    compen
    sates
    those
    who
    provide
    capital
    resources
    to
    a
    firm.
    22
    The
    EPA
    rec
    ognizes
    the
    presence
    of
    a
    risk
    premium
    in
    a
    firm’s
    cost
    of
    capital
    in
    the
    EPA’s
    own
    internal
    guidance
    documents.
    23
    The
    risk
    is
    due
    to
    the
    uncertainty
    of
    future
    cash
    flows
    or
    profits
    that
    an
    investment
    may
    generate.
    The
    economic
    benefits
    of
    noncompliance
    are
    estimated
    from
    the
    perspective
    of
    a
    firm
    making
    the
    initial
    decision
    not
    to
    com
    ply
    and
    use
    the
    avoided
    costs
    for
    an
    alternative
    investment
    expected
    to
    earn
    a
    rate
    of
    return
    at
    least
    as
    large
    as
    the
    WACC.
    However,
    if
    the
    amount
    of
    cash
    flow
    is
    known,
    there
    is
    no
    risk
    and
    thus
    no
    need
    to
    include
    a
    risk
    premium
    in
    the
    discount
    rate.
    In
    fact,
    this
    is
    the
    very
    point
    of
    those
    who
    support
    using
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    because,
    by
    definition,
    enforcement
    actions
    are
    taken
    after
    the
    avoided
    costs
    of
    delayedcompliance
    are
    known.
    The
    EPA
    implicitly
    9
    See
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency,
    Calculation
    of
    the
    Economic
    Benefit
    of
    Non
    compliance
    in
    EPA’s
    Civil
    Penalty
    Enforcement
    Cases,
    64
    Fed.
    Reg.
    at
    32,958.
    20
    Id.
    at32,949.
    21
    Id.
    at
    32,963-64
    (explaining
    that
    capturing
    all
    of
    the
    economic
    benefits
    and
    retuming
    the
    violator
    to
    the
    financial
    position
    prior
    to
    noncompliance
    requires
    accounting
    for
    the
    rate
    of
    retum
    a
    company
    earns
    on
    the
    alternative
    investments
    made
    in
    lieu
    of
    purchasing
    and
    maintain
    ing
    pollution
    control
    equipment).
    22
    See
    Myers
    et
    al.,
    supra
    note
    15,
    at
    9
    (describing
    the
    cost
    of
    capital
    as
    reflecting
    the
    risk
    and
    uncertainty
    of
    future
    cash
    flows
    of
    an
    investment).
    See
    also
    WALTER
    NICHOLSON,
    MICRO-
    ECONOMIC
    THEORY:
    BASIC
    PRINCIPLES
    ANO
    EXTENSIONS
    250
    (5th
    ed.
    1992)
    (explaining
    that
    the
    variance
    in
    potential
    outcomes
    for
    an
    activity
    proxies
    the
    economic
    concept
    of
    risk);
    Wise
    et
    al.,
    supra
    note
    8,
    at
    1127
    (explaining
    that
    the
    cost
    of
    capital
    incorporates
    the
    risk
    of
    an
    invest
    ment);
    Kenneth
    T.
    Wise
    et
    al.,
    EPA
    ‘s
    “BEN”
    Model:
    Challenging
    Excessive
    Penalty
    Calcula
    tions,
    1992
    TOXICS
    L.
    REP.
    1492,
    1495
    n.
    14
    (discussing
    that
    the
    WACC
    is
    a
    risk-adjusted
    dis
    count
    rate
    in
    order
    to
    account
    for
    uncertainty
    in
    the
    amount
    of
    future
    cash
    flows).
    As
    applied
    to
    the
    firm
    in
    the
    case
    of
    delayed
    compliance,
    the
    activity
    of
    investing
    avoided
    costs
    has
    more
    than
    one
    potential
    outcome.
    The
    outcome
    may
    yield
    a
    high
    rate
    of
    return,
    providing
    the
    firm
    with
    a
    significant
    payoff.
    On
    the
    other
    hand,
    the
    investment
    may
    fail,
    leaving
    the
    firm
    with
    a
    loss.
    The
    risk
    premium
    in
    the
    WACC
    is
    the
    compensation
    the
    firm,
    and
    thus
    its
    investors,
    receive
    for
    the
    willingness
    to
    take
    the
    risk.
    29
    See
    U.S.
    EPA,
    GUIDELINES
    FOR
    PPEPARING
    ECONOMIC
    ANALYSES
    ch.
    9
    (2000)
    (cx
    plaining
    that
    analyses
    of
    the
    economic
    impact
    of
    future
    regulatory
    compliance
    costs
    on
    firms
    must
    use
    the
    firms’
    private
    costs
    of
    capital
    that
    reflect
    risk).

    D\Wb,,\Lw
    1018
    CASE
    WESTERNRESERVELAWREVJEW
    [Vol.
    52:1009
    acknowledges
    the
    accuracy
    of
    this
    statement.
    24
    Consequently,
    there
    is
    no
    uncertainty
    in
    the
    amount
    of
    avoided
    costs,
    and
    to
    compound
    for
    ward
    using
    the
    WACC
    wouldeffectively
    compensate
    the
    EPA
    for
    risk
    when
    no
    such
    risk
    exists.
    25
    The
    economic
    benefits
    of
    noncompli
    ance
    are
    estimated
    from
    an
    ex
    post
    perspective
    based
    on
    a
    firm’s
    ac
    tual
    avoided
    costs.
    The
    use
    of
    the
    WACC
    to
    estimate
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    would
    compensate
    the
    government
    for
    risk
    that
    it
    did
    not
    bear.
    26
    The
    financial
    theory
    of
    applying
    the
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    to
    noncompliance
    finds
    its
    roots
    in
    the
    literature
    on
    tort
    law
    advocating
    use
    of
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    to
    estimate
    the
    present
    value
    of
    damages
    for
    wrongs
    committed
    in
    the
    past.
    27
    Like
    an
    award
    for
    past
    damages
    in
    tort,
    the
    avoided
    cost
    has
    occurred
    in
    the
    past
    and
    is
    thus
    known
    and
    certain.
    The
    amount
    of
    the
    avoided
    cost
    need
    only
    be
    compounded
    by
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    up
    to
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date
    to
    account
    for
    the
    pure
    time
    value
    of
    money.
    The
    risk-free
    rate
    paradigm
    does
    not
    deny
    that
    a
    firm
    might
    earn
    risk-related
    profits,
    or
    what
    some
    might
    refer
    to
    as
    profits
    from
    arbitrage.
    However,
    it
    distinguishes
    such
    profits
    from
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    of
    noncompliance.
    24
    See
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency,
    Calculation
    of
    the
    Economic
    Benefit
    of
    Non
    compliance
    in
    EPA’s
    Civil
    Penalty
    Enforcement
    Cases,
    64
    Fed.
    Reg.
    at
    32,958
    (showing
    that
    the
    amount
    of
    the
    estithated
    financial
    gain
    from
    initial
    delay
    is
    the
    same,
    and
    is
    known
    and
    certain
    under
    either
    approach).
    25
    See
    Myers
    Ct
    al.,
    supra
    note
    15,
    at
    10
    (“Assume
    the
    benefits
    of
    delayed
    compliance
    have
    been
    identified.
    These
    benefits
    are
    now
    fixed
    past
    cash
    flows—there
    is
    no
    risk
    in
    hind
    sight.
    The
    only
    remaining
    step
    is
    to
    bring
    those
    cash
    flows
    to
    the
    present.
    .
    .
    .
    [T]he
    risk-free
    rate
    should
    be
    used.
    Using
    any
    higher
    rate
    would
    compensate
    the
    government
    for
    risks
    it
    has
    not
    incurred.”).
    See
    also
    Wise
    et
    al.,
    supra
    note
    8,
    at
    1127
    (explaining
    that
    the
    amount
    of
    past
    cash
    flows
    are
    known
    and
    thus
    risk-free,
    requiring
    the
    use
    of
    a
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    to
    deter
    mine
    present
    value);
    Wise
    et
    al.,
    supra
    note
    22,
    at
    1495
    n.14
    (asserting
    that
    there
    is
    no
    uncer
    tainty
    associated
    with
    past
    cash
    flows,
    and
    thus
    a
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    must
    be
    used
    to
    estimate
    the
    present
    value).
    26
    See
    United
    States
    v.
    WCI
    Steel,
    Inc.,
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d.
    810,
    831
    (ND.
    Ohio
    1999)
    (“The
    central
    issue
    is
    whether
    a
    rate
    reflecting
    risk
    should
    be
    used
    as
    to
    past
    benefits
    or
    obligations.
    Any
    return
    above
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    is
    earned
    not
    from
    delay
    but
    by
    assuming
    risk,
    and
    therefore
    is
    not
    properly
    considered
    economic
    benefit
    from
    noncompliance.
    Because
    this
    amount
    is
    known
    and
    the
    existence
    and
    solvency
    of
    the
    party
    is
    also
    known,
    itis
    inappropriate
    to
    increase
    the
    rate
    to
    reflect
    risk.”).
    See
    also
    Myers
    et
    al.,
    supra
    note
    15,
    at
    10
    (explaining
    that
    a
    company
    could
    place
    funds
    that
    would
    otherwise
    be
    used
    for
    environmental
    regulatoiycompliance
    in
    a
    risky
    investment,
    but
    that
    any
    return
    over
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    is
    compensation
    for
    bearing
    the
    risk,
    not
    a
    benefit
    from
    noncompliance).
    27
    See
    R.F.
    Lanzillotti
    &
    AK.
    Esquibel,
    Measuring
    Damages
    in
    Commercial
    Litigation,
    5
    J.
    ACCOUNTING,
    AUDITING
    &
    FINANCE
    125,
    134
    (1990)
    (“In
    the
    case
    of
    past
    lost
    profits
    since
    the
    materialized
    cash
    flows
    are
    certain,
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    should
    be
    used
    to
    bring
    the
    past
    lost
    profits
    to
    present
    value.”).
    See
    also
    Franklin
    M.
    Fisher
    &
    R.
    Craig
    Romaine,
    Janis
    Joplin
    ‘s
    Yearbook
    and
    the
    Theory
    of
    Damages,
    5
    J.
    ACCOUNTING,
    AUDITING
    &
    FmiA.NCE
    145,
    153-56
    (1990)
    (arguing
    that
    making
    a
    plaintiff
    whole
    for
    a
    lost
    profit
    or
    destroy6d
    asset,
    where
    compen
    sation
    is
    paid
    at
    a
    future
    point,
    requires
    a
    damage
    award
    equal
    to
    the
    value
    of
    the
    lost
    profit
    or
    destroyed
    asset
    as
    of
    the
    time
    of
    injury
    compounded
    forward
    to
    the
    award
    payment
    date
    using
    a
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    to
    account
    only
    for
    the
    time
    value
    of
    money).

    0
    \Wb\Lw
    20021
    THE
    DISCOUNTRATE
    IN
    EPA
    ENFORCEMENT
    ACTIONS
    1019
    Indeed,
    the
    EPA’s
    advocacy
    of
    the
    WACC
    disregards
    the
    essen
    tial
    point
    of
    the
    retrospective
    ex
    post
    view.
    The
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    is
    correct
    because
    of
    certainty
    in
    the
    amount
    of
    the
    avoided
    costs.
    Judge
    Posner’s
    decision
    in
    Douglass
    v.
    Hustler
    Magazine,
    Inc.
    28
    ad
    dressed
    an
    economic
    expert’s
    estimate
    of
    the
    present
    value
    of
    the
    plaintiff’s
    lost
    future
    earnings
    due
    to
    invasion
    of
    her
    privacy
    as
    a
    re
    suit
    of
    an
    illegal
    publication
    of
    photos
    of
    her
    in
    Hustler
    Magazine.
    Regarding
    this
    estimate,
    Posner
    wrote:
    One
    [problem)
    is
    that
    in
    discounting
    to
    present
    value
    the
    economist
    failed
    to
    correct
    for
    the
    extreme
    riskiness
    of
    the
    earnings
    stream
    for
    which
    he
    was
    trying
    to
    find
    a
    present
    value.
    An
    award
    of
    damages
    is
    a
    sum
    certain.
    If
    it
    is
    in
    tended
    to
    replace
    a
    stream
    of
    earnings
    that
    is
    highly
    uncer
    tain—surely
    an
    understatement
    in
    discussing
    [future]
    earn
    ings
    in
    the
    field
    of
    entertainment—then
    risk
    aversion
    should
    be
    taken
    into
    account
    in
    computing
    the
    discount
    (interest)
    rate.
    The
    riskless
    rate
    .
    .
    .
    would
    be
    the
    proper
    rate
    if
    the
    earnings
    stream
    that
    the
    damages
    award
    was
    intended
    to
    re
    place
    was
    one
    that
    would
    have
    been
    obtained
    with
    certainty.
    29
    Unlike
    the
    plaintiff’s
    future
    earnings
    in
    Douglass,
    the
    economic
    benefit
    of
    delayed
    compliance
    is
    known
    and
    certain.
    Clearly,
    the
    risk-
    free
    rate
    should
    be
    used
    to
    estimate
    its
    present
    value.
    Any
    return
    over
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    is
    compensation
    for
    bearing
    risk,
    not
    an
    economic
    benefit
    of
    noncompliance.
    In
    addition,
    consider
    the
    position
    of
    a
    firm
    that
    has
    decided
    not
    to
    comply
    with
    an
    environmental
    regulation.
    Other
    than
    putting
    avoided
    costs
    under
    the
    mattress,
    the
    only
    way
    for
    a
    firm
    to
    ensure
    that
    the
    funds
    derived
    from
    delayed
    compliance
    will
    be
    available
    to
    pay
    the
    civil
    penalty
    is
    to
    place
    them
    in
    a
    risk-free
    investment
    such
    as
    a
    treas
    ury
    bond.
    3
    °
    If
    a
    firm
    places
    the
    funds
    in
    a
    risk-bearing
    investment,
    any
    return
    over
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    is
    the
    reward
    for
    willingness
    to
    ac
    cept
    the
    risk.
    If
    the
    risky
    venture
    fails
    and
    all
    of
    the
    funds
    are
    lost,
    the
    EPA
    will
    not
    waive
    the
    company’s
    compliance
    requirement,
    and
    will
    likely
    impose
    some
    form
    of
    fine
    anyway.
    In
    short,
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    is
    appropriate
    since
    the
    EPA
    bears
    no
    risk
    from
    delayed
    compliance.
    A
    related
    criticism
    of
    employing
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    is
    that
    it
    may
    result
    in
    a
    negative
    estimate
    of
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    ‘°
    769
    F.2d
    1128
    (7th
    Cir.
    1985).
    Id.
    at
    1143
    (citation
    omitted).
    °
    See
    Myers
    et
    al.,
    supra
    note
    15,
    at
    10
    (“[F]rom
    the
    vidlator’s
    point
    of
    view:
    what
    can
    the
    violator
    do
    with
    the
    money
    during
    the
    period
    of
    noncompliance
    without
    taking
    on
    the
    risk
    of
    losing
    all
    or
    a
    portion
    of
    it?
    The
    only
    answer
    is
    to
    invest
    in
    a
    risk
    free
    security.”).

    Dr\Wb,j\L3w
    Rev
    w\volS2
    number4\Fodolky.dee
    1020
    CASE
    WESTERN
    RESER
    yE
    LA
    WRE
    VIEW
    [Vol.
    52:1009
    from
    delayed
    compliance.
    The
    EPA
    provides
    an
    example
    in
    which
    the
    use
    of
    the
    WACC
    results
    in
    a
    positive
    economic
    benefit,
    whereas
    the
    use
    of
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    results
    in
    a
    negative
    estimate
    of
    economic
    benefits.
    3
    An
    unstated
    assumption
    is
    that
    a
    firm
    must
    obtain
    positive
    benefits
    from
    delayed
    or
    noncompliance.
    However,
    there
    is
    no
    ra
    tionale
    in
    economic
    or
    financial
    theory
    to
    substantiate
    this
    assump
    tion.
    There
    is
    no
    reason
    that
    delaying
    expenditures
    must
    result
    in
    a
    positive
    financial
    gain.
    A
    priori,
    given
    the
    number
    of
    financial
    variables
    that
    can
    affect
    expenditures,
    including
    potential
    changes
    in
    their
    value
    over
    time,
    the
    difference
    between
    on
    time
    and
    delayed
    expenditures
    for
    pollution
    control
    is
    intuitively
    indeterminate.
    For
    example,
    consider
    the
    choice
    as
    to
    when
    to
    purchase
    a
    home.
    One
    might
    choose
    to
    purchase
    a
    home
    today
    at
    current
    prices
    and
    interest
    rates,
    or
    delay
    the
    purchase
    hoping
    that
    interest
    rates
    or
    purchase
    prices,
    or
    both,
    will
    decrease.
    Unfortunately,
    it
    is
    possible
    that
    a
    “negative”
    benefit
    may
    result,
    as
    only
    one
    or
    perhaps
    neither
    factor
    will
    decrease
    or
    even
    possibly
    in
    crease.
    When
    the
    present
    value
    of
    the
    two
    total
    purchase
    costs
    is
    compared,
    there
    may
    be
    a
    negative
    benefit.
    Consider
    the
    position
    of
    those
    who
    did
    not
    purchase
    a
    home
    in
    the
    early
    1990s,
    prior
    to
    the
    substantial
    increase
    in
    housing
    prices
    that
    occurred
    in
    the
    late
    1990s.
    Instinctively,
    under
    such
    a
    scenario,
    even
    after
    accounting
    for
    possi
    ble
    tax
    benefits
    of
    owning
    a
    home,
    it
    would
    not
    be
    shocking
    that
    a
    buyer
    might
    experience
    a
    negative
    financial
    gain
    due
    to
    his
    delayed
    purchase.Thus,
    it
    should
    not
    be
    surprising
    that
    a
    firm
    might
    experi
    ence
    a
    similar
    “negative”
    benefit
    from
    delaying
    expenditures
    on
    pol
    lution
    control
    equipment.
    Notwithstanding
    the
    conceptual
    power
    of
    using
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    for
    ex
    post
    benefits,
    one
    critical
    assumption
    underlies
    the
    use
    of
    this
    discount
    rate.
    This
    assumption
    is
    that
    a
    firm
    does
    not
    face
    any
    risk
    of
    bankruptcy.
    32
    As
    discussed
    below,
    if
    a
    firm
    has
    faced
    more
    than
    a
    negligible
    risk
    of
    bankruptcy
    during
    the
    period
    of
    delayed
    compli
    ance,
    use
    of
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    would
    be
    inappropriate.
    A
    firm
    3
    s
    cost
    of
    debt,
    or
    the
    interest
    rate
    charged
    for
    borrowing
    funds
    from
    a
    bank
    or
    through
    a
    bond
    issue,
    becomes
    the
    appropriate
    discount
    rate.
    33
    The
    avoided
    costs
    due
    to
    delay
    are
    fixed
    and
    known
    and
    thus
    equivalent
    to
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency,
    Calculation
    of
    the
    Economic
    Benefit
    of
    Noncompli
    ance
    in
    EPA’s
    Civil
    Penalty
    Enforcement
    Cases,
    64
    Fed.
    Reg.
    32,948,
    32,959
    (proposed
    June
    18,
    1999):
    32
    See
    Myers
    et
    al.,
    supra
    note
    15,
    at
    10.
    D
    See
    GABRIEL
    HAWAWINI
    &
    CLAUDE
    VIALLET,
    FINANCE
    FOR
    ExEcuTives:
    MANAGING
    VALUE
    FOR
    CREATION
    303-04
    (1999)
    (defining
    the
    cost
    of
    debt
    as
    either
    the
    interest
    rate
    a
    bank
    charges
    a
    firm
    in
    exchange
    for
    a
    loan
    or
    the
    market
    yield
    to
    maturity
    for
    bonds
    the
    firm
    has
    issued).

    D\Wh,i,\L
    Reiw\voI52nu4\odol,ky.do
    2002]
    THE
    DISCOUNT
    RATE
    IN
    EPA
    ENFORCEMENTACTIONS
    1021
    a
    debt
    obligation.
    The
    only
    uncertainty
    is
    the
    risk
    of
    default,
    which
    banks
    and
    bondholders
    include
    in
    either
    the
    interest
    charged
    or
    re
    quired
    yield.
    Synonymous
    with
    a
    typical
    borrower
    and
    a
    bank,
    a
    firm
    is
    in
    effect
    the
    borrower
    and
    the
    government
    is
    the
    lender.
    34
    More
    over,
    due
    to
    the
    tax
    deductibility
    of
    interest
    payments,
    firms
    tend
    to
    prefer
    debt
    financing
    to
    equity
    financing
    through
    the
    sale
    of
    stock.
    35
    If
    a
    firm
    has
    multiple
    debt
    obligations,
    a
    weighted
    average
    of
    the
    in
    terest
    rates
    or
    yield
    to
    maturities
    should
    be
    used
    to
    determine
    a
    firm’s
    average
    cost
    of
    debt.
    There
    is
    no
    clear
    line
    that
    dictates
    when
    courts
    or
    the
    EPA
    should
    employ
    the
    cost
    of
    debt
    as
    compared
    to
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    to
    determine
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits.
    There
    is
    some
    probability
    greater
    than
    zero
    that
    any
    firm,
    even
    the
    most
    financially
    secure,
    may
    have
    faced
    bankruptcy
    during
    the
    period
    of
    noncompliance.
    How
    ever,
    it
    is
    inequitable
    to
    assert
    that
    the
    cost
    of
    debt,
    instead
    of
    the
    risk-
    free
    rate,
    should
    be
    used
    in
    all
    cases.
    Courts
    must
    make
    this
    determi
    nation
    on
    a
    case-by-case
    basis
    using
    all
    of
    the
    relevant
    evidence
    pre
    sented.
    Such
    evidence
    may
    include
    information
    concerning
    a
    firm’s
    liquidity,
    36
    the
    market
    yield
    of
    a
    firm’s
    bonds,
    37
    and
    the
    yield
    spread
    between
    the
    market
    yield
    of
    a
    firm’s
    bonds
    over
    a
    government
    bond
    with
    the
    same
    maturity.
    38
    Courts
    may
    also
    consider
    the
    overall
    eco
    nomic
    state
    of
    the
    industry
    to
    which
    a
    firm
    belongs.
    The
    expost
    ret
    rospective
    analysis
    remains
    the
    same,
    regardless
    of
    whether
    the
    risk-
    free
    rate
    or
    cost
    of
    debt
    is
    used.
    This
    Note
    will
    presume
    that
    a
    court
    should
    apply
    the
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    unless
    there
    is
    more
    than
    a
    negligible
    probability
    of
    a
    firm
    having
    faced
    bankruptcy
    during
    the
    period
    of
    noncompliance.
    39
    See
    Myers
    et
    aL,
    supra
    note
    15,
    at
    10.
    If
    the
    firm
    has
    multiple
    debt
    obligations,
    includ
    ing
    either
    bank
    loans
    and/ormultiple
    bond,
    issues,
    a
    weighted
    average
    of
    the
    interest
    rates
    or
    yield
    to
    maturities
    should
    be
    used
    to
    determine
    the
    firm’s
    average
    cost
    of
    debt.
    See
    HAWAWINI
    &
    VIALLET,
    supra
    note
    33,
    at
    372.
    See
    Ed.
    at
    67
    (describing
    a
    firm’s
    liquidity
    as
    its
    ability
    to
    meet
    its
    “recurrent
    cash
    obli
    gations
    towards
    various
    creditors”
    and
    noting
    that
    a
    firm
    that
    is
    illiquid
    is
    technically
    bankrupt).
    See
    Ed.
    at
    281
    (explaining
    that
    the
    market
    yield
    is
    a
    measure
    of
    a
    firm’s
    credit
    risk
    and
    is
    used
    by
    bond
    rating
    agencies
    such
    as
    Standard
    &
    Poor’s
    or
    Moody’s
    to
    rate
    a
    firm’s
    overall
    credit
    risk).
    See
    id.
    at
    282
    (discussing
    that
    large
    or
    growing
    yield
    spreads
    indicate
    that
    the
    firm
    is
    a
    credit
    risk).
    J.
    Huston
    McCulloch,
    an
    economist
    at
    Ohio
    State
    University,
    and
    Menahem
    Spiegel,
    an
    economist
    at
    Rutgers
    University,agreed
    that
    either
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    or
    cost
    of
    debt
    was
    the
    appropriate
    discount
    rate
    to
    use
    to
    determine
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    of
    delayed
    or
    noncompliance
    prior
    to
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    However,
    in
    their
    opinion,
    the
    cost
    of
    debt
    should
    be
    used
    unless
    a
    firm
    had
    escrowed
    the
    initial
    avoided
    costs
    in
    a
    secureinvestment
    in
    a
    risk-free
    treasury
    such
    as
    U.S.
    government
    T-Bills,
    because
    all
    firms
    have
    some
    probability
    of
    entering
    bankruptcy.

    1022
    CASE
    WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW
    [Vol.
    52:1009
    V.
    LEGAL
    FRAMEWORKS
    JUSTIFYING
    THE
    RISK-FREE
    RATE
    OVER
    THE
    WACC
    This
    section
    demonstrates
    that
    twolegal
    frameworks,
    temporary
    takings
    and
    tort
    jurisprudence,
    are
    congruent
    with
    the
    economic
    and
    financialtheory
    for
    using
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    to
    estimate
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    in
    enforcement
    cases.
    A.
    Delayed
    Compliance
    Is
    Synonymous
    with
    a
    Temporary
    Taking
    Temporary
    regulatory
    takings
    occur
    when
    a
    government
    regula
    tion
    has
    temporarily
    denied
    the
    owner
    of
    an
    interest
    the
    ability
    to
    make
    use
    of
    that
    interest.
    Analogously,
    when
    a
    firm
    delays
    comply
    ing
    with
    an
    environmental
    regulation,
    it
    temporarily
    “takes”
    the
    pub
    lic
    interest
    in
    a
    safe
    and
    clean
    environment,
    an
    interest
    described
    in
    Part
    II,
    until
    appropriate
    enforcement
    actions
    are
    taken.
    Significantly,
    temporary
    takings
    litigation
    demonstrates
    that
    for
    a
    temporary
    inva
    sion
    of
    another’s
    interest,
    damages
    are
    awarded
    for
    actual
    damages
    incurred
    and
    not
    those
    that
    are
    uncertain
    or
    based
    on
    speculation.
    Moreover,
    just
    as
    the
    government’s
    liability
    is
    limited
    to
    actual
    dam
    ages,
    a
    firm’s
    liability
    for
    economic
    benefits
    measured
    from
    the
    non
    compliance
    date
    through
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date
    should
    be
    limited
    to
    actual
    economic
    benefits.
    The
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    is
    consistent
    with
    this
    approach,
    while
    the
    WACC
    is
    not.
    In
    First
    English
    Evangelical
    Church
    v.
    County
    of
    Los
    Angeles,
    4
    °
    the
    Supreme
    Court
    recognized
    the
    existence
    of
    compensable
    tempo
    rary
    regulatory
    takings
    and
    defined
    takings
    as
    temporary
    because
    the
    regulation
    is
    eventually
    “invalidated
    by
    the
    courts.”
    41
    Typically,
    the
    situation
    is
    the
    government’s
    denial
    of
    potential
    future
    development
    to
    a
    landowner.
    4
    Though
    the
    SupremeCourt
    in
    First
    English
    Evan
    gelical
    Church
    held
    that
    landowners
    must
    be
    compensated,
    it
    did
    not
    prescribe
    a
    fixed
    method
    of
    estimating
    compensation.
    43
    Subsequently,
    courts
    have
    ruled
    that
    those
    subject
    to
    temporary
    takings
    are
    entitled
    to
    actual
    damages
    only.
    In
    Corrigan
    v.
    City
    of
    Scottsdale,
    44
    while
    addressing
    the
    damages
    to
    which
    the
    plaintiff
    property
    owner
    was
    entitled
    due
    to
    an
    invalid
    zoning
    ordinance,
    the
    40
    482
    U.S.
    304
    (1987).
    See
    id.at3lO.
    42
    See
    J.
    Margaret
    Tretbar,
    Calculating
    Compensation
    for
    Temporary
    Regulatory
    Takings,
    42
    U.
    KAN.
    L.
    REv
    201,
    207
    (1993)
    (“[Tjhe
    effect
    of
    an
    ultimately
    invalid
    regulation
    prohibit
    ing
    development
    of
    property
    held
    for
    future
    use
    is
    often
    simply
    a
    delay
    in
    development
    or
    an
    impairment
    of
    the
    landowner’s
    ability
    to
    plan
    for
    future
    development.”).
    See
    First
    English
    Evangelical
    Church,
    482
    U.S.
    at
    321-22
    (remanding
    the
    case
    for
    further
    consideration
    without
    defining
    how
    to
    estimate
    the
    amount
    of
    compensation
    to
    which
    the
    landowner
    was
    entitled).
    720
    P.2d
    513
    (Ariz.
    1986).

    D’.Web,a\L
    Rviw\I52n,b,r44doI,kydo
    2002]
    THE
    DISCOUNTRATE
    IN
    EPA
    ENFORCEMENT
    ACTIONS
    1023
    court
    emphasized
    that
    the
    plaintiff
    was
    entitled
    only
    to
    provable
    ac
    tual
    damages.
    45
    Similarly,
    in
    both
    Yuba
    Natural
    Resources,
    Inc.
    v.
    United
    States
    46
    and
    Poirier
    v.
    Grand
    Blanc
    Townshi,
    47
    the
    courts
    denied
    lost
    profits
    as
    part
    of
    the
    plaintiffs
    damage
    award
    because
    such
    profits
    were
    speculative.
    48
    In
    Yuba
    and
    Poirier,
    the
    courts
    stated
    that
    the
    compensation
    the
    plaintiff
    was
    entitled
    to
    for
    actual
    damages
    was
    best
    measured
    by
    the
    fair
    value
    of
    what
    was
    taken,
    which
    did
    not
    include
    lost
    profits.
    49
    Like
    the
    government
    regulations
    in
    Corrigan,
    Yuba,
    and
    Poirier,
    firms
    that
    delay
    compliance
    with
    EPA
    regulations
    and
    pollute
    the
    en
    vironment
    temporarily
    “take”
    the
    public
    interest
    in
    environmental
    quality.
    This
    “taking”
    occurs
    until
    the
    EPA
    takes
    enforcement
    actions
    to
    force
    compliance.
    As
    the
    plaintiffs
    in
    the
    temporary
    takings
    cases
    are
    entitled
    to
    damages
    from
    the
    government,
    the
    EPA
    is
    entitled
    to
    economic
    benefits
    of
    noncompliance.
    However,
    just
    as
    the
    plaintiffs
    in
    the
    temporary
    takings
    cases
    are
    entitled
    only
    to
    actual
    damages
    and
    were
    foreclosed
    from
    receiving
    compensation
    for
    speculative
    profits,
    the
    EPA
    should
    be
    entitled
    only
    tO
    actual
    economic
    benefits,
    which
    is
    consistent
    with
    the
    language
    and
    intent
    of
    the
    environmental
    protec
    tion
    statues.
    5
    °
    Applying
    the
    concepts
    of
    actual
    economic
    benefits
    re
    quires
    the
    use
    of
    the
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    to
    estimate
    the
    present
    value
    of
    avoided
    costs
    from
    delayed
    compliance
    whose
    value
    is
    known
    and
    certain
    [Tjhe
    language
    in
    environmental
    statutes
    and
    court
    opinions
    indicates
    an
    intent
    to
    remove
    the
    actual
    economic
    benefit
    as
    sociated
    with
    noncompliance.
    The
    approach
    most
    consistent
    with
    the
    statutes
    and
    opinions
    would
    take
    advantage
    of
    all
    available
    information
    to
    determine
    the
    actual
    economic
    bene
    fit,
    not
    the
    expected
    economic
    benefit
    at
    the
    noncompliance
    date.
    The
    calculations
    would
    use
    actual
    data
    from
    the
    past
    (cx
    post)
    and
    expected
    data
    from
    the
    future
    (cx
    ante)
    to
    value
    the
    on-time
    and
    delay
    cases
    as
    of
    the
    present.
    51
    Based
    on
    the
    economic
    and
    financial
    theory
    described
    in
    Part
    IV,
    the
    analysis
    in
    the
    quotation
    requires
    that
    the
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    be
    applied
    to
    the
    known
    and
    certain
    ex
    post
    avoided
    costs
    to
    estimate
    the
    L
    Id.
    at
    519
    (stating
    that
    such
    actual
    damages
    must
    be
    provable
    to
    a
    reasonable
    certainty).
    46
    904
    F.2d
    1577
    (Fed.
    Cir.
    1990).
    481
    N.W.2d
    762
    (Mich.
    Ct.
    App.
    1992).
    See
    Yuba,
    904
    F.2d
    at
    1581-82;
    Foirier,
    481
    N.W.2d
    at
    766.
    See
    Yuba,
    904
    F.2d
    at
    1581-82;
    Poirier,
    481
    N.W.2d
    at766.
    But
    see
    Wheeler
    v.
    City
    of
    Pleasant
    Grove,
    833
    F.2d
    267,
    270-71
    (11th
    Cir.
    1987)
    (holding
    that
    plaintiffs
    in
    temporary
    takings
    cases
    are
    entitled
    to
    a
    market
    rate
    of
    retum
    or
    foregone
    expected
    profits).
    See
    Myers
    etal.,
    supra
    note
    15,
    at7.
    Id.at7.

    D;\Wb,ie\L
    ReASol52_numbr4\PodoIky.do
    1024
    CASE
    WESTERNRESERVELAWREVJEW
    [Vol.
    52:1009
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    of
    delayed
    compliance
    through
    the
    penalty
    payment.
    In
    so
    doing,
    the
    EPA
    is
    proscribed
    from
    collecting
    speculative
    economic
    benefits
    that
    may
    have
    never
    materialized.
    Though
    not
    a
    temporary
    takings
    case,
    Independent
    Bulk
    Trans
    port,
    Inc.
    v.
    Vessel
    MORANIA
    ABA
    CO
    52
    demonstrates
    why
    the
    risk-
    free
    discount
    rate
    is
    appropriate
    for
    estimating
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    in
    EPA
    enforcement
    cases.
    In
    Independent
    Bulk,
    prior
    to
    obtaining
    an
    award
    for
    damages,
    the
    plaintiff
    was
    required
    to
    expend
    funds
    to
    repair
    his
    ship,
    which
    the
    defendant’s
    ship
    had
    dam
    aged
    in
    a
    collision.
    3
    The
    plaintiff
    had
    requested
    prejudgment
    interest
    equal
    to
    its
    cost
    of
    borrowing
    funds.
    54
    In
    response,
    the
    court
    stated:
    Plaintiff’s
    position
    that
    prejudgment
    interest
    should
    be
    de
    termined
    through
    proof
    of
    what
    the
    particular
    plaintiff
    actu
    ally
    paid
    to
    borrow
    money
    during
    the
    relevant
    period
    is
    in
    error.
    Consideration
    of
    the
    precise
    credit
    circumstances
    of
    the
    victim
    would
    inject
    a
    needless
    variable
    into
    these
    cases.
    Plaintiff
    is
    entitled
    to
    the
    income
    which
    the
    monetary
    dam
    ages
    would
    have
    earned,
    and
    that
    should
    be
    measured
    by
    in
    terest
    or
    short-term,
    risk-free
    obligations
    .
    Clearly,
    the
    Independent
    Bulk
    court
    established
    that
    plaintiffs
    are
    entitled
    to
    be
    compensated
    for
    the
    cost
    of
    money
    based
    on
    risk-free
    investments
    for
    known
    ex
    post
    damages.
    The
    EPA’s
    position
    that
    the
    present
    value
    of
    ex
    post
    economic
    benefits
    should
    be
    calculated
    using
    the
    WACC
    is
    inconsistent
    with
    the
    court’s
    position.
    B.
    Similar
    Goal
    and
    Comparable
    Structure
    of
    Civil
    Penalties
    and
    Damage
    Awards
    in
    Tort
    Cases
    The
    minimum
    goal
    of
    EPA
    enforcement
    actions,
    in
    order
    to
    deter
    future
    regulatory
    violations,
    is
    to
    make
    a
    firm
    completely
    indifferent
    toward
    compliance
    and
    noncompliance.
    However,
    this
    does
    not
    jus
    tify
    the
    artificial
    estimation
    of
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    using
    the
    WACC.
    In
    torts,
    punitive
    damages
    are
    designed
    to
    ensure
    that
    defendants
    are
    not
    better
    off
    after
    the
    legal
    process
    has
    con
    cluded.
    56
    As
    discussed
    below,
    the
    assessment
    of..an
    appropriate
    “pu
    52
    676
    F.2d
    23
    (2d
    Cir.
    1982).
    Id.
    at
    24-25.
    Id.
    at27.
    Id.
    See
    also
    W.
    Pac.
    Fisheries,
    Inc.
    v.
    Cent
    Nat’l
    Ins.
    Group
    of
    Omaha,
    730
    F.2d
    1280,
    1288-89
    (9th
    Cir,
    1982)
    (approving
    of
    the
    rationale
    in
    Independent
    Bulk
    while
    deciding
    an
    analogous
    case,
    which
    according
    to
    the
    court
    had
    been
    captured
    in
    application
    of
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    for
    post
    judgment
    interest
    under
    28
    U.S.C
    §
    1961
    and
    thus
    such
    rate
    was
    also
    appropriately
    applied
    as
    prejudgment
    interest
    unless
    substantial
    evidence
    required
    use
    of
    a
    different
    rate).
    See
    David
    D.
    Haddock
    et
    al.,
    An
    Ordinary
    Economic
    Rationale
    for
    Extraordinary
    Legal
    Sanctions,
    78
    CAL.
    L.
    Rev.
    1,
    27
    (1990)(asserting
    that
    the
    amount
    of
    punitive
    damages
    depends

    O\Wth,\Lw
    Rw\voI52nmbr4\Po&kky.doc
    20021
    THE
    DISCOUNTRATE
    IN
    EPA
    ENFORCEMENTACTIONS
    1025
    nitive”
    component
    of
    civil
    penalties
    is
    the
    correct
    approach
    from
    a
    legal
    as
    well
    as
    an
    economic
    and
    financial
    perspective.
    In
    tort
    cases,
    compensatory
    damages
    are
    directed
    at
    deterrence.
    57
    This
    is
    the
    prevailing
    view
    among
    the
    courts.
    58
    Further,
    the
    purpose
    of
    punitive
    damages
    is
    punishment
    and
    deterrence.
    59
    In
    Kalavity
    v.
    United
    States,
    6
    °
    the
    court
    stated:
    “Damages
    are
    ‘punitive’
    when
    awarded
    separately
    for
    the
    sole
    purpose
    of
    punishing
    a
    tortfeasor
    who
    inflicted
    injuries
    ‘maliciously
    or
    wantonly,
    and
    with
    circumstances
    of
    contumely
    and
    indignity.”
    6
    Further,
    the
    court
    in
    0
    ‘Gilvie
    v.
    Inter
    national
    Flaytex,
    Inc.
    62
    explained
    that
    punitive
    damages
    are
    imposed
    for
    willful
    or
    wanton
    conduct
    in
    order
    to
    restrain
    and
    deter
    others
    from
    similar
    actions.
    63
    Thus,
    it
    is
    inaccurate
    for
    the
    EPA
    to
    assert
    that
    on
    the
    particular
    circumstances
    of
    a
    case
    with
    respect
    to
    the
    defendant,
    not
    the
    plaintiff).
    See
    also
    Robert
    D.
    Cooter,
    Economic
    Analysis
    of
    Punitive
    Damages,
    56
    S.
    CAL.
    L
    Ray.
    79,
    89-90
    (1982)
    (explaining
    that
    punitive
    damages
    are
    justified
    by
    the
    need
    to
    deter
    and
    punishthose
    who
    intentionally
    commit
    egregious
    harms);
    Jason
    Johnston,
    Punitive
    Liability:
    A
    New
    Paradigm
    of
    Efficiency
    in
    Tort
    Law,
    87
    COLUM.
    L.
    REv.
    1385,
    1388-89
    (1987)
    (arguing
    that
    courts
    have
    a
    propensity
    to
    underestimate
    damages
    and
    that
    properly-set
    punitive
    damages
    can
    overcome
    these
    errors
    and
    provide
    defendants
    with
    appropriate
    incentives
    and
    help
    achieve
    optimal
    levels
    of
    deterrence).
    See
    Kalavity
    v.
    United
    States,
    584F,2d
    809,
    811(6th
    Cir.
    1978)
    (explaining
    that
    ordi
    nary
    tort
    damages
    serve
    both
    a
    compensatory
    and
    deterrent
    function).
    See
    MARSHALL
    S.
    SHAPO,
    BASIC
    PRINCIPLES
    OF
    TORT
    LAW
    342-43
    (1999)
    (explaining
    that
    the
    prevailing
    view
    among
    courts
    is
    that
    the
    purpose
    of
    compensatory
    damages
    is
    both
    to
    compensate
    the
    plaintiff
    and
    deter
    the
    defendant).
    The
    minority
    view
    is
    that
    the
    purpose
    of
    compensatory
    damages
    is
    to
    compensate
    victims
    and
    that
    punishment
    and
    deterrence
    emanate
    solely
    from
    punitive
    damages.
    See
    Vanskike
    v.
    ACF
    Indus.,
    Inc.,
    665
    F.2d
    188
    (8th
    Cir.
    1981)
    (asserting
    that
    there
    is
    a
    distinction
    between
    compensatory
    and
    punitive
    damages,
    and
    that
    if
    punishment
    and
    deterrence
    are
    to
    be
    achieved
    it
    must
    be
    done
    through
    a
    separate
    award
    of
    puni
    tive
    damages).
    See
    Pac.
    Mut.
    Life
    Ins.
    Co.
    v.
    Haslip,
    499
    U.S.
    1,
    21(1991)
    (describing
    the
    purpose
    of
    punitive
    damages
    as
    deterrence);
    O’Gilvie
    v.
    Int’l
    Playtex,
    Inc.,
    821
    F.2d
    1438,
    1446(10th
    Cir.
    1987)
    (same);
    Kalavity
    v.
    United
    States,
    584
    F.2d
    809,
    811(6th
    Cir.
    1978)
    (describing
    the
    sin
    gular
    purpose
    of
    punitive
    damages
    is
    punishment
    and
    deterrence);
    In
    re
    Exxon
    Valdez,
    No.
    A89-0095-CV,
    1995
    U.S.
    Dist.
    LEXIS
    12952,
    at
    *3
    (D.
    Alaska
    Jan.
    27,
    1995)
    (explaining
    that
    punitive
    damages
    are
    to
    deter
    conduct);
    Green
    Oil
    Co.
    v.
    Hornsby,
    539
    So.2d
    218,
    222
    (Ala.
    1989)
    (holding
    that
    the
    purpose
    of
    punitive
    damages
    is
    not
    compensate
    but
    to
    deter
    behavior);
    Wangen
    v.
    Ford
    Motor
    Co.,
    294
    N.W.2d
    437,
    450
    (Wis.
    1980)
    (same).
    See
    also
    SHAPO,
    supra
    note
    58,
    at
    3
    58-59
    (describing
    the
    role
    of
    punitive
    damages
    as
    serving
    to
    punish
    the
    defendant
    and
    provide
    specific
    and
    general
    deterrence
    that
    have
    a
    “heightened
    behavior
    controlling
    ef
    fect”).
    69
    584
    F.2d
    809
    (6th
    Cir,
    1978).
    63
    Id.
    at
    811
    n.1
    (citing
    Milwaukee
    R.R.
    v.
    Arms,
    91
    U.S.
    489,
    493
    (1875)).
    See
    also
    Roginsky
    v.
    Richardson-Merrel,
    Inc.,
    378
    F.2d
    832,
    842-43
    (2d
    Cir.
    1967)
    (describing
    the
    con
    duct
    that
    New
    York
    courts
    have
    found
    to
    support
    punitive
    damages
    as
    wanton,
    malicious,
    or
    gross
    and
    outrageous);
    Leichtamer
    v.
    Am.
    Motors
    Corp.,
    424
    N.E.2d
    568,
    580
    (Ohio
    1981)
    (asserting
    that
    in
    Ohio
    punitive
    damages
    may
    be
    awarded
    for
    actual
    malice
    or
    malice
    that
    may
    be
    inferred
    from
    intentional,
    reckless,
    willful,
    or
    gross
    conduct).
    62
    821
    F.2d
    1438
    (10th
    Cir.
    1987).
    63
    Id.
    at
    1446.

    DAWb,\Lw
    Rw\vol52_nombr4\PodoTky.do
    1026
    CASE
    WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW
    [Vol.
    52:1009
    the
    only
    “appropriate”
    focus
    in
    a
    tort
    action
    is
    compensating
    the
    vic
    64
    tim.
    Importantly,
    the
    Supreme
    Court
    has
    recognized
    the
    significant
    de
    terrent
    effect
    of
    civil
    penalties
    on
    noncompliance.
    In
    Friends
    of
    the
    Earth,
    Inc.
    v.
    Laidlaw
    Environmental
    Services,
    65
    the
    Court
    explained
    that
    the
    purpose
    of
    a
    civil
    penalty
    for
    violation
    of
    the
    Clean
    Water
    Act
    is
    deterrence.
    66
    Deterrence
    provides
    incentives
    not
    only
    for
    current
    violators
    to
    come
    into
    compliance,
    but
    also
    for
    the
    current
    violator
    and
    others
    to
    avoid
    future
    violations.
    67
    Given
    that
    courts
    apply
    these
    factors
    for
    violations
    of
    many
    of
    the
    environmental
    protection
    stat
    utes,
    it
    is
    clear
    that
    a
    purpose
    of
    civil
    penalties
    is
    deterrence.
    Civil
    penalties
    have
    two
    components:
    economic
    benefits
    of
    de
    layed
    compliance
    and
    a
    dollar
    penalty
    to
    account
    for
    the
    severity
    of
    the
    violation,
    including
    the
    violator’s
    willfulness
    in
    delaying
    or
    not
    complying
    with
    a
    regulation.
    68
    According
    to
    the
    EPA,
    the
    economic
    benefit
    portion
    of
    a
    civil
    penalty
    constitutes
    “a
    critically
    important
    element
    of
    deterrence.”
    69
    The
    additional
    dollar
    penalty
    is
    imposed
    over
    and
    above
    economic
    benefits
    in
    EPA
    enforcement
    actions
    to
    ac
    count
    for
    the
    severity
    of
    the
    violation
    and
    deter
    future
    violations.
    70
    While
    using
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    may
    leave
    the
    violating
    firm
    with
    some
    net
    gain
    due
    to
    potential
    risk-related
    profits,
    such
    profits
    are
    derived
    from
    accepting
    risk
    and
    should
    not
    be
    included
    in
    the
    estimate
    of
    pre
    sent
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits.
    The
    fact
    that
    a
    violating
    firm
    may
    derive
    some
    financial
    gain
    after
    accounting
    for
    the
    economic
    benefits
    64
    See
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency,
    Calculation
    of
    the
    Economic
    Benefit
    of
    Non
    compliance
    in
    EPA’s
    Civil
    Penalty
    Enforcement
    Cases,
    64
    Fed.
    Reg.
    32,948,
    32,958
    (proposed
    June
    18,
    1999).
    65
    528U.S.
    167(2000).
    Id.
    at706.
    Id.
    at
    707.
    Though
    beyond
    the
    scope
    of
    this
    Note,
    another
    potential
    explanation
    for
    imposing
    civil
    penalties
    is
    retribution.
    See
    id.
    at
    706.
    See
    ENVIRONMENTAL
    PROTECTION
    AGENCY,
    PUB.
    No.
    300-F-00-002,
    LEVELING
    THE
    PLAYiNG
    FIELD
    1
    (2000),
    available
    at
    http://www.epa.gov/oecalore/med/.
    See
    also
    Hayward,
    supra
    note
    2,
    at
    648-49
    (explaining
    that
    the
    EPA
    seeks
    civil
    penalties
    to
    deter
    polluters
    from
    violating
    regulations
    and
    resolves
    environmental
    problems
    by
    removing
    the
    economic
    benefit
    as
    well
    as
    imposing
    further
    penalties
    over
    and
    above
    the
    economic
    benefit).
    69
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency,
    Calculation
    of
    the
    Economic
    Benefit
    of
    Noncompli
    ance
    in
    EPA’s
    Civil
    Penalty
    Enforcement
    Cases,
    64
    Fed.
    Reg
    at
    32,958.
    See
    also
    EPA,
    LEVEL
    ING
    THE
    PLAYING
    FIELD,
    supra
    note
    68,
    at
    3
    (asserting
    that
    federal
    courts
    have
    almost
    unani
    mously
    recognized
    the
    importance
    of
    economic
    benefit
    in
    setting
    civil
    penalties
    that
    will
    deter
    firms
    from
    violating
    environmental
    protection
    regulations
    in
    the
    future).
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency,
    Calculation
    of
    the
    Economic
    Benefit
    of
    Noncompli
    ance
    in
    EPA’s
    Civil
    Penalty
    Enforcement
    Cases,
    64
    Fed.
    Reg.
    at
    32,958
    n.2l.
    See
    also
    EPA,
    LEVELING
    THE
    PLAYING
    FIELD,
    supra
    note
    68,
    at
    3
    (explaining
    that
    federal
    courts
    impose
    a
    punitive
    component
    of
    civil
    penalties
    over
    and
    above
    economic
    benefits
    to
    achieve
    the
    goal
    of
    deterrence).

    D\Wb\L
    Riw\voI52_numbr4\PodoI,ky.do
    2002]
    THE
    DISCOUNTRATE
    IN
    EPA
    ENFORC’EMENTACTIONS
    1027
    is
    analogous
    to
    the
    remedial
    outcome
    associated
    with
    compensatory
    damages
    as
    applied
    to
    the
    environment.
    7
    More
    important,
    the
    dollar
    penalty
    plays
    a
    directly
    analogous
    role
    to
    punitive
    damages
    in
    traditional
    tort
    cases,
    which
    are
    used
    to
    make
    the
    defendant
    indifferent
    toward
    committing
    or
    not
    committing
    an
    illicit
    act.
    In
    United
    States
    V.
    Municipal
    Authority
    of
    Union
    Town
    ship,
    72
    the
    court
    held
    that
    the
    goal
    of
    a
    civil
    penalty
    is
    to
    deter
    viola
    tors
    through
    the
    imposition
    of
    an
    economic
    benefit
    component
    and
    punitive
    component
    designed
    to
    account
    for
    the
    willfulness
    or
    mali
    ciousness
    of
    the
    violator’s
    activities.
    7
    The
    court’s
    language
    in
    Union
    Township
    is
    directly
    comparable
    to
    language
    used
    to
    describe
    the
    un
    derlying
    rationale
    for
    punitive
    damages
    in
    tort
    cases.
    Further,
    the
    factors
    courts
    and
    the
    EPA
    use
    to
    assess
    the
    amount
    of
    the
    “gravity,”
    a
    dollar
    penalty
    portion
    of
    the
    civil
    penalty
    are
    analogous
    to
    those
    that
    courts
    employ
    in
    determining
    the
    reasonability
    of
    the
    level
    of
    punitive
    damages.
    Specifically,
    the
    factors
    are:
    (I)
    seriousness
    of
    violations;
    (2)
    the
    economic
    benefit
    from
    the
    violation;
    (3)
    any
    history
    of
    violations;
    (4)
    good
    faith
    efforts
    to
    comply
    with
    the
    applicable
    requirements;
    (5)
    the
    economic
    impact
    of
    the
    penalty
    on
    the
    violator;
    and
    (6)
    such
    other
    matters
    as
    justice
    may
    require.
    74
    Factor
    (2)
    accounts
    for
    the
    economic
    benefit
    portion
    of
    the
    civil
    penalty,
    while
    factors
    (1),
    (3),
    and
    (4)
    represent
    the
    gravity
    factors.
    Factor
    (5)
    assesses
    the
    ability
    of
    violators
    to
    pay
    a
    penalty
    that
    may
    be
    imposed.
    The
    EPA’s
    internal
    policies
    for
    establishing
    the
    level
    of
    See
    Haddock
    Ct
    al.,
    supra
    note
    56,
    at
    17-18
    (explaining
    that
    in
    thin
    markets
    such
    as
    environmental
    quality,
    where
    transactions
    do
    not
    occur
    on
    a
    Continuous
    basis
    through
    a
    regular
    market,
    the
    awarding
    of
    compensatory
    damages
    leaves
    a
    defendant
    with
    a
    net
    gain).
    72
    929
    F.
    Supp.
    800
    (MD.
    Pa.
    1996),
    afJ’d,
    150
    F.3d
    259
    (3d
    Cir.
    1998),
    ‘u
    Id.
    at803-05.
    See
    also
    UnitedStates
    v.
    Bethlehem
    Steel
    Corp.,
    829
    F.
    Supp.
    1047,
    1057
    (N.D.
    md.
    1993)
    (explaining
    that
    the
    “major
    purpose
    of
    a
    civil
    penalty
    [under
    RCRA]
    is
    deterrence”).
    N
    See
    CWA,
    33
    U.S.C.
    §
    309(d)
    (1994).
    See
    also
    United
    States
    v.
    WCI
    Steel,
    Inc.,
    72
    F.
    Supp.
    2d
    810,
    828
    (ND.
    Ohio
    1999)
    (showing
    that
    the
    factors
    to
    be
    considered
    underCWA
    are
    the
    same
    under
    RCR.A).

    D:\Wb,L
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    1028
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    WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW
    [Vol.
    52:1009
    civil
    penalties
    are
    consistent
    with
    those
    the
    courts
    follow.
    75
    For
    ex
    ample,
    the
    factors
    the
    EPA
    considers
    in
    determining
    the
    amount
    of
    civil
    penalties
    to
    pursue
    under
    section
    311
    (b)(3)
    of
    the
    Clean
    Water
    Act
    are:
    (1)
    the
    nature,
    extent,
    and
    degree
    of
    success
    of
    any
    efforts
    of
    the
    violator
    to
    minimize
    or
    mitigate
    the
    effects
    of
    the
    discharge;
    (2)
    any
    history
    of
    prior
    violations;
    (3)
    any
    other
    penalty
    for
    the
    same
    incident;
    (4)
    any
    other
    matters
    as
    justice
    may
    require;
    (5)
    the
    economic
    impact
    of
    the
    penalty
    on
    the
    violator;
    (6)
    the
    seriousness
    of
    the
    violation
    or
    violations;
    (7)
    the
    degree
    of
    culpability
    involved;
    (8)
    the
    economic
    benefit
    to
    the
    violator,
    if
    any,
    resulting
    from
    the
    violation.
    76
    EPA
    guidance
    documents
    contain
    a
    disclaimer
    that
    they
    are
    for
    internal
    purposes
    only
    and
    thus
    do
    not
    create
    enforceable
    rights
    by
    parties
    in
    litigation
    with
    the
    EPA.
    77
    Nevertheless,
    courts
    may
    con
    sider
    them
    in
    determining
    the
    final
    penalty
    amount.
    78
    This
    is
    conss
    tent
    with
    the
    doctrine
    that
    the
    final
    amount
    of
    a
    civil
    penalty
    is
    subject
    The
    EPA’s
    generic
    civil
    penalty
    policy
    for
    determining
    the
    amount
    of
    a
    penalty
    the
    agency
    intends
    to
    seek
    essentially
    parallels
    the
    factors
    that
    courts
    consider.
    See
    EPA,
    LEVELING
    THE
    PLAYING
    FIELD,
    supra
    note
    68,
    at
    1
    (describing
    recovery
    of
    the
    economic
    benefit,
    plus
    a
    gravity
    penalty,
    as
    the
    foundation
    of
    EPA
    civil
    penalty
    policy).
    76
    See
    ENVIRONMENTAL
    PROTECTION
    AGENCY,
    CIVIL
    PENALTY
    POLICY
    FOR
    SECTION
    31
    l(b)(3)
    AND
    SECTION
    31
    1(j)
    OF
    THE
    CLEAN
    WATER
    ACT
    (1998)
    (providing
    an
    example,
    pur
    suant
    to
    §
    31
    l(b)(8)
    of
    the
    Clean
    Water
    Act,
    as
    amended
    by
    33
    U.S.C.
    §
    l321(b)(8)),
    at
    http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/water/3llpen.html
    (last
    visited
    Mar.
    30,
    2002).
    See
    Bamett
    M.
    Lawrence,
    EPA
    ‘s
    Civil
    Penalty
    Policies:
    Making
    the
    Penalty
    Fit
    the
    Violation,
    22
    ENVTL.
    L.
    Rap.
    10,529,
    10,531
    (1992)
    (discussing
    that
    the
    EPA’s
    intemal
    guid
    ance
    documents
    cannot
    be
    cited
    to
    create
    rights
    in
    legal
    actions
    involving
    the
    EPA
    and
    may
    be
    changed
    at
    any
    time
    without
    public
    notice).
    78
    See
    Friends
    of
    the
    Earth,
    Inc.
    v.
    Laidlaw
    Envtl.
    Serv.,
    Inc.,
    956
    F,
    Supp.
    588,
    610-11
    (D.S.C.
    1997)
    (taking
    into
    account
    the
    defendant’s
    own
    legal
    costs,
    along
    with
    the
    plaintiff’s
    legal
    costs
    that
    the
    defendant
    is
    responsible
    for,
    in
    setting
    the
    ultimate
    penalty
    to
    be
    paid).

    D:\W,b,i\Lw
    2002]
    THE
    DISCOUNT
    RA
    TE
    IN
    EPA
    ENFORCEMENT
    ACTIONS
    1029
    to
    the
    discretion
    of
    trial
    courts.
    79
    Further,
    plaintiffs
    in
    citizens’
    suits
    may
    use
    EPA
    guidelines
    to
    decide
    upon
    a
    negotiated
    penalty
    with
    a
    firm
    that
    has
    violated
    environmental
    quality
    statutes
    and
    EPA
    regula
    tions.
    8
    °
    In
    PacJIc
    Mutual
    Life
    Insurance
    Co.
    v.
    Haslip,
    8
    the
    Supreme
    Court
    held
    that
    a
    set
    of
    factors
    established
    by
    the
    Alabama
    Supreme
    Court
    (the
    Hammond
    factors)
    provides
    a
    sufficient
    and
    meaningful
    review
    of
    the
    reasonability
    of
    punitive
    damage
    awards.
    82
    These
    fac
    tors
    are:
    (I)
    whether
    there
    is
    a
    reasonable
    relationship
    between
    the
    puni
    tive
    damages
    award
    and
    the
    harm
    likely
    to
    result
    from
    the
    defendant’s
    conduct
    as
    well
    as
    the
    harm
    that
    actually
    occurred;
    (2)
    the
    degree
    of
    reprehensibility
    of
    the
    defendant’s
    conduct,
    the
    duration
    of
    that
    conduct,
    the
    defendant’s
    awareness,
    any
    concealment,
    and
    the
    existence
    and
    frequency
    of
    similar
    past
    conduct;
    (3)
    the
    profitability
    to
    the
    defendant
    of
    the
    wrongful
    conduct
    and
    the
    desirability
    of
    removing
    that
    profit
    and
    of
    having
    the
    defendant
    also
    sustain
    a
    loss;
    (4)
    the
    “financial
    position”
    of
    the
    defendant;
    (5)
    all
    the
    costs
    of
    litigation;
    (6)
    the
    imposition
    of
    criminal
    sanctions
    on
    the
    defendant
    for
    its
    conduct,
    these
    to
    be
    taken
    in
    mitigation;
    and
    (7)
    the
    existence
    of
    other
    civil
    awards
    against
    the
    defendant
    for
    the
    same
    conduct,
    these
    to
    be
    taken
    in
    mitigation.
    83
    See
    Tull
    v.
    United
    States
    481
    U.S.
    412,
    426-27
    (1987)
    (holding
    that
    the
    setting
    of
    final
    civil
    penalty
    amounts
    under
    CWA
    is
    left
    to
    the
    discretiod
    of
    trial
    judges).
    See
    also
    United
    States
    v.
    Smithfield
    Foods,
    Inc.,
    191
    F.3d
    516,
    529
    (4th
    Cir.
    1999)
    (asserting
    that
    the
    trial
    court’s
    valuation
    of
    the
    civil
    penalty
    is
    reviewed
    only
    for
    abuse
    of
    discretion);
    United
    States
    v.
    Bethlehem
    Steel
    Corp.,
    829
    F.
    Supp.
    1047,
    1055
    (ND.
    md.
    1993)
    (explaining
    that
    assessment
    of
    the
    amount
    of
    a
    civil
    penalty
    is
    determined
    based
    on
    the
    court’s
    “informed”
    discretion).
    °
    See
    Lawrence,
    supra
    note
    77,
    at
    10,531.
    499
    U.S.
    1(1991).
    Id.
    at
    21-22.
    Id.
    at2l.

    D:\Wbe\L
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    \vv
    5rnrnbvr4\PodoI,ky.dvv
    1030
    CASE
    WESTERN
    RESERVE
    LAWRE
    VIEW
    [Vol.
    52:1009
    The
    Hammond
    factors
    are
    analogous
    to
    guidance
    that
    other
    courts
    have
    offered
    in
    assessing
    the
    reasonability
    of
    the
    level
    of
    punitive
    damages.
    In
    0
    ‘Gilvie
    v.
    International
    Playtex.,
    Inc.,
    84
    the
    court
    stated
    that
    under
    Kansas
    law:
    In
    assessing
    punitive
    damages
    the
    nature,
    extent,
    and
    enor
    mity
    of
    the
    wrong,
    the
    intent
    of
    the
    party
    committing
    it,
    and
    all
    circumstances
    attending
    the
    transaction
    involved
    should
    be
    considered.
    Any
    mitigating
    circumstances
    which
    may
    bear
    upon
    any
    of
    the
    above
    factors
    may
    be
    considered
    to
    re
    duce
    such
    damages.
    In
    fixing
    an
    award
    of
    punitive
    damages
    a
    jury
    may
    consider
    the
    amount
    of
    actual
    damages
    recovered,
    defendant’s
    financial
    condition
    and
    the
    probable
    litigation
    expenses.
    85
    Although
    there
    are
    some
    differences,
    the
    factors
    set
    forth
    in
    the
    civil
    penalty
    sections
    of
    the
    environmental
    protection
    statutes
    and
    internal
    EPA
    guidance
    documents
    demonstrate
    a
    remarkable
    similar
    ity.
    Clearly,
    the
    purpose
    and
    method
    for
    assessing
    damage
    awards
    in
    tort
    law
    and
    civil
    penalties
    in
    enforcement
    cases,
    especially
    the
    puni
    tive
    component,
    are
    very
    much
    the
    same.
    Thus,
    if
    the
    EPA
    believes
    that
    a
    civil
    penalty
    should
    include
    a
    finn’s
    potential
    risk-related
    prof
    its,
    the
    agency
    should
    present
    the
    requisite
    proof
    and
    seek
    the
    imposi
    tion
    of
    an
    appropriate
    dollar
    penalty.
    VI.
    INCORPORATING
    ECONOMIC
    BENEFITS
    AND
    POTENTIAL
    RISK-
    RELATED
    OR
    SECOND
    ORDER
    PROFITS
    INTO
    CIVIL
    PENALTIES
    DUE
    TO
    DELAYED
    OR
    NONCOMPLIANCE
    WITH
    ENVIRONMENTAL
    REGULATIONS
    Both
    the
    courts
    and
    the
    EPA
    should
    universally
    adopt
    use
    of
    the
    risk-free
    rate,
    a
    new
    approach
    to
    incorporating
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefit
    and
    second
    order
    returns
    from
    noncompliance
    with
    environmental
    regulations.
    Both
    financial
    and
    legal
    theory
    demon
    strate
    that
    the
    present
    value
    of
    economic
    benefits
    from
    the
    noncom
    pliance
    date
    through
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date
    should,
    as
    the
    court
    in
    UnitedStates
    v.
    WCI
    Steel
    ruled,
    be
    calculated
    using
    the
    risk-free
    in
    terest
    rate
    from
    the
    initial
    date
    of
    noncompliance
    through
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    821
    F.2d
    1438
    (10th
    Cir.
    1987).
    85
    Id.
    at
    1446-47
    (citations
    omitted).
    See
    also
    Wangen
    v.
    Ford
    Motor
    Co.,
    294
    N.W.2d
    437,
    461
    (Wis.
    1980)
    (explaining
    that
    either
    a
    trial
    or
    appellate
    court
    has
    the
    power
    to
    reduce
    punitive
    damages
    to
    a
    fair
    and
    reasonable
    amount,
    and
    that
    a
    plaintiff
    whose
    award
    of
    punitive
    damage
    is
    reduced
    may
    accept
    the
    lower
    amount
    or
    a
    new
    trial).

    D\W,b,\L
    2002]
    THE
    DISCOUNTRATE
    IN
    EPA
    ENFORCEMENTACTJONS
    1031
    Nevertheless,
    health
    and
    environmental
    quality
    policy
    concerns
    suggest
    that
    courts
    and
    the
    EPA
    may
    consider
    a
    firm’s
    potential
    risk-
    related
    profits
    in
    setting
    the
    level
    of
    the
    gravity
    component
    of
    a
    civil
    penalty.
    Indeed,
    some
    reasonable
    amount
    of
    punitive
    or
    gravity
    pen
    altymay
    need
    to
    be
    added
    to
    the
    economic
    benefits
    of
    delayed
    or
    noncompliance
    in
    order
    to
    attain
    the
    appropriate
    level
    of
    deterrence.
    86
    The
    courts
    can
    consider
    potential
    risk-related
    profits
    through
    the
    “such
    other
    matters
    as
    justice
    may
    require”
    factor
    contained
    in
    envi
    ronmental
    statutes.
    The
    EPA
    may
    adopt
    such
    a
    feature
    by
    amending
    its
    current
    civil
    penalty
    guidelines.
    However,
    this
    recommended
    approach
    would
    require
    both
    the
    courtsand
    the
    EPA
    to
    justify
    the
    inclusion
    of
    potential
    risk-related
    profits
    as
    part
    of
    a
    civil
    penalty
    on
    a
    case-by-case
    basis.
    This
    recom
    mendation
    is
    consistent
    with
    the
    underlying
    premise
    of
    Judge
    Pos
    ner’s
    opinion
    in
    assessing
    the
    plaintiff’s
    claim
    for
    punitive
    damages
    in
    Douglass:
    “The
    plaintiff
    should
    be
    required
    to
    establish,
    at
    least
    within
    rough
    limits,
    the
    profits
    attributable
    to
    [the
    defendant’s]
    viola
    tion
    of
    her
    rights.”
    87
    CoNcLusIoN
    This
    Note
    has
    examined
    whether
    the
    risk-free
    discount
    rate
    or
    the
    WACC
    should
    be
    used
    to
    estimate
    the
    present
    value
    of
    the
    economic
    benefits
    of
    noncompliance
    with
    environmental
    regulations
    that
    are
    ex
    post
    relative
    to
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    Financial
    and
    economic
    theory,
    along
    with
    the
    legal
    jurisprudence
    in
    temporary
    takings
    and
    the
    structure
    and
    purpose
    of
    civil
    penalties,
    dictates
    thern
    use
    of
    the
    risk-free
    rate.
    Use
    of
    the
    risk-free
    rate
    separates
    economic
    benefits
    due
    to
    the
    illicit
    act
    of
    violating
    a
    regulation
    from
    the
    ability
    to
    invest
    wisely.
    As
    part
    of
    a
    civil
    penalty,
    a
    court
    and
    the
    EPA
    may
    find
    that
    deterrence
    requires
    penalizing
    firms
    beyond
    the
    present
    value
    of
    eco
    nomic
    benefits,
    through
    the
    imposition
    of
    a
    punitive
    component
    in
    cluding
    potential
    profits
    earned
    from
    bearing
    the
    risk
    of
    alternative
    investments
    rather
    than
    complying
    with
    environmental
    regulations.
    Thus,
    it
    is
    recommended
    that
    the
    courts
    consider
    the
    need
    to
    include
    See
    Lynn
    M.
    Dodge,
    Economic
    Benefit
    in
    Environmental
    Civil
    Penalties:
    Is
    BEN
    too
    Gentle?,
    77
    U.
    DET.
    MERCY
    L.
    REv.
    543,
    552-54
    (2000)
    (arguing
    that
    civil
    penalties
    should
    include
    wrongful
    profits
    earned
    as
    a
    result
    of
    noncompliance
    with
    environmental
    regulations).
    87
    Douglass
    v.
    Hustler
    Magazine,
    Inc.,
    769
    F.2d
    1128,
    1145(7th
    Cir.
    1985).
    See
    also
    Dan
    C.
    Dobbs,
    Deterrence-Measured
    Remedies,
    40
    ALA.
    L.
    REv.
    831,
    866
    n.9l
    (1989)
    (“But
    while
    extracompensatory
    liability
    might
    be
    triggered
    on
    the
    basis
    of
    such
    a
    common
    sense
    estimate
    [that
    misconduct
    is
    profitablej,
    the
    measure
    of
    that
    liability
    is
    another
    matter
    and
    requires
    proof.”).

    1032
    CASE
    WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW
    [Vol.
    52:1009
    potential
    risk-related
    profits
    through
    the
    “such
    other
    matters
    as
    justice
    may
    require”
    factor.
    MICHAEL
    J.
    PODOLSKYt
    I
    would
    very
    much
    like
    to
    thank
    Professor
    Jonathan
    L.
    Entin,
    Professor
    Marc
    R.
    Poirier,
    and
    Professor
    Menahem
    Spiegel
    for
    their
    suggestions
    and
    comments.
    All
    remaining
    errors
    are
    the
    responsibility
    of
    the
    author.

    BEN
    USER’S
    MANUAL
    Multimedia
    Enforcement
    Division
    (2248-A)
    Office
    of
    Regulatory
    Enforcement
    Office
    of
    Enforcement
    and
    Compliance
    Assurance
    United
    States
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency
    401
    M
    Street,
    SW
    Washington,
    D.C.
    20460
    September
    1999
    THIS
    MANUAL
    IS
    RELEASABLE
    IN
    ITS
    ENTIRETY

    ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
    This
    document
    was
    prepared
    under
    the
    technical
    direction
    of
    Mr.
    Jonathan
    Libber,
    BEN/ABEL
    Coordinator,
    Office
    of
    Enforcement,
    U.S.
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency
    (EPA).
    Technical
    assistance
    was
    provided
    under
    contract
    to
    EPA
    by
    Industrial
    Economics,
    Incorporated
    (JEc)
    of
    Cambridge,
    Massachusetts.
    MAILING
    LIST
    ADDITION
    If
    you
    would
    like
    to
    receive
    updated
    materials,
    and
    you
    work
    for
    a
    federal,
    state
    or
    local
    government
    environmental
    agency,
    please
    e-mail
    your
    name,
    government
    mailing
    address,
    and
    government
    phone
    number
    to
    benabel@indecon.com.
    If
    you
    have
    any
    questions
    about
    updates,
    contact
    the
    EPA
    enforcement
    economics
    toll-free
    helpline
    at
    888-ECON-SPT
    (326-6778).
    If
    you
    are
    a
    member
    of
    the
    public
    and
    would
    like
    to
    obtain
    these
    materials,
    download
    them
    from
    the
    U.S.
    EPA’s
    web
    site
    at
    http://es.epa.gov/oeca.
    (This
    address
    may
    have
    changed
    by
    the
    time
    you
    read
    this
    manual.
    To
    obtain
    the
    current
    address,
    you
    can
    call
    the
    helpline
    at
    888-ECON-SPT.)
    September
    1999

    TABLE
    OF
    CONTENTS
    INTRODUCTION
    .
    Chapter
    1
    A.
    Overview
    1-1
    B.
    Context
    and
    Theory
    of
    Economic
    Benefit
    1-2
    C.
    Summary
    of
    BEN
    Methodology
    1-2
    D.
    How
    to
    Use
    this
    Manual
    1-3
    USING
    THE
    COMPUTER
    PROGRAM
    Chapter
    2
    A.
    Structure
    of
    the
    Computer
    Program
    2-1
    B.
    Installing
    BEN
    2-2
    C.
    Data
    Entry
    2-5
    D.
    Calculating
    and
    Printing
    Results
    2-6
    E.
    Exiting
    and
    Saving
    2-7
    DATA
    REQUIREMENTS
    Chapter
    3
    A.
    Case
    Screen
    3-2
    1.
    Case
    Name,
    Office/Agency,
    Analyst
    Name
    3-2
    a.
    Case
    Name
    3-3
    b.
    Office/Agency
    3-3
    c.
    Analyst
    Name
    3-3
    2.
    Entity
    Type,
    State,
    Customized
    Taxes
    3-3
    a.
    Entity
    Type
    3-3
    b.
    State
    3-4
    c.
    Customized
    Tax
    Rate
    3-4
    3.
    Competitive
    Advantage
    3-5
    4.
    Penalty
    Payment
    Date
    3-7
    5.
    Creating/Adding,
    Copying
    and
    Removing
    Runs
    3-7
    B.
    Run
    Input
    Screen
    3-8
    1.
    Compliance
    Cost
    Components
    3-9
    a.
    Capital
    Investment
    3-9
    b.
    One-Time
    Nondepreciable
    Expenditure
    3-10
    c.
    Annually
    Recurring
    Costs
    3-11
    2.
    Cost
    Estimate
    Dates
    3-1
    1
    3.
    Noncompliance
    and
    Compliance
    Dates
    3-12
    •C.
    Options
    3-13
    1.
    Discount/Compound
    Rate
    3-14
    2.
    Inflation
    Indices
    and
    Projected
    Inflation
    Rate
    3-15
    3.
    Capital
    Investment
    Replacement
    Cycles
    and
    Useful
    Life
    3-17
    4.
    Avoided
    vs.
    Delayed
    3-18
    5.
    Tax
    Deductibility
    of
    One-Time,
    Nondepreciable
    Expenditure
    3-18
    D.
    SpecificCost
    Estimates
    3-18
    1.
    Separate
    Cost
    Estimates
    for
    Noncompliance
    and
    Compliance
    Dates
    .
    3-21
    2.
    Inflation
    Data
    More
    Appropriate
    thanBEN’s
    3-23
    September
    1999

    TABLE
    OF
    CONTENTS
    (continued)
    ISSUES
    THAT
    ARISE
    WITH
    BEN
    Chapter
    4
    A.
    Common
    Violator
    Arguments
    4-1
    B.
    Characterizing
    Compliance
    Scenarios
    4-3
    DETAILED
    CALCULATIONS
    Appendix
    A
    A.
    Theory
    and
    Overview
    A-i
    B.
    Calculations
    and
    Spreadsheet
    A-2
    1.
    Inputs
    and
    Variables
    A-3
    2.
    Discount/Compound
    Rate
    Calculation
    A—5
    3.
    Specific
    Cost
    Estimates
    A-7
    4.
    Capital
    and
    One-Time
    Costs
    A-7
    5.
    Avoided
    Annually
    Recurring
    Costs
    A-i
    i
    6.
    Economic
    Benefit
    Results
    A-i
    i
    September
    1999

    INTRODUCTION
    CHAPTER
    1
    A.
    OVERVIEW
    The
    U.S.
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency
    developed
    the
    BEN
    computer
    model
    to
    calculate
    the
    economic
    benefit
    a
    violator
    derives
    from
    delaying
    and/or
    avoiding
    compliance
    with
    environmental
    statutes.
    EPA
    uses
    the
    model
    to
    assist
    its
    staff
    in
    developing
    settlement
    penalty
    figures.
    BEN
    can
    also
    develop
    testimony
    for
    trial
    or
    hearings,
    but
    an
    expert
    is
    necessary
    to
    explain
    its
    methodology
    and
    calculations.
    While
    the
    primary
    purpose
    of
    the
    BEN
    model
    is
    to
    calculate
    the
    economic
    benefit
    of
    noncompliance,
    the
    model
    can
    also
    calculate
    the
    after-tax
    net
    present
    value
    of
    supplemental
    environmental
    projects
    (SEP
    s)
    that
    involve
    early
    compliance.’
    For
    all
    other
    SEP’s.
    you
    should
    use
    the
    PROJECT
    model.
    Calculating
    economic
    benefitusing
    the
    BEN
    model
    is
    generally
    the
    first
    step
    in
    developing
    a
    civil
    penalty
    figure
    under
    EPA’s
    February
    16,
    1984,
    generic
    penalty
    policy.
    This
    two
    part
    document
    was
    codified
    in
    the
    General
    Enforcement
    Policy
    Compendium
    as
    P.T.
    1-1
    and
    P.T.
    1-2.
    Related
    medium-specific
    policies
    have
    been
    developed
    since
    then
    to
    implement
    the
    1984
    policy.
    The
    BEN
    model
    assists
    in
    fulfilling
    one
    of
    the
    main
    goals
    of
    the
    generic
    policy.
    That
    goal
    is
    that
    civil
    penaltiesshould
    at
    least
    recover
    the
    economic
    benefit
    from
    noncompliance
    to
    ensure
    that
    members
    of
    the
    regulated
    community
    have
    a
    strong
    economic
    incentive
    to
    comply
    with
    environmental
    laws
    on
    time.
    You
    can
    use
    BEN
    in
    all
    cases
    to
    measure
    benefit
    from
    delayed
    and/or
    avoided
    compliance,
    except
    for
    Clean
    Air
    Act
    Section
    120
    actions,
    which
    require
    the
    application
    of
    a
    Section
    120
    specific
    computer
    model.
    As
    a
    form
    of
    SEP,
    a
    defendant
    may
    offer
    to
    comply
    with
    an
    environmental
    regulation
    significantly
    earlier
    than
    is
    required.
    Such
    a
    SEPhas
    associated
    with
    it
    an
    after-tax
    net
    present
    value
    that
    is
    the
    maximum
    amount
    by
    which
    you
    can
    reduce
    the
    proposed
    civil
    penalty.
    For
    the
    “compliance
    date”
    in
    the
    BEN
    model,
    enter
    the
    date
    when
    the
    regulation
    requires
    compliance
    of
    the
    defendant
    (i.e.,
    the
    date
    by
    which
    you
    would
    normally
    expect
    the
    defendant
    to
    achieve
    compliance).
    For
    BEN’s
    “noncompliance
    date,”
    enter
    the
    datethat
    the
    defendant
    is
    proposing
    for
    its
    early
    compliance
    (i.e.,
    a
    date
    earlier
    than
    the
    compliance
    date
    you
    previously
    entered).
    Enter
    all
    other
    inputs
    normally.
    BEN’s
    “economic
    benefit”
    result
    is
    the
    maximum
    amount
    by
    which
    you
    should
    mitigate
    the
    proposed
    civil
    penalty.
    1-1
    September
    1999

    BEN
    is
    easy
    to
    use,
    and
    designed
    for
    people
    with
    no
    background
    in
    economics
    or
    financial
    analysis.
    Because
    the
    program
    contains
    standard
    values
    for
    many
    of
    the
    variables
    needed
    to
    calculate
    economic
    benefit,
    BEN
    requires
    only
    a
    small
    number
    of
    user
    inputs.
    BEN
    also
    allows
    the
    user
    to
    modify
    all
    of
    its
    standard
    values.
    Data
    requirements,
    standard
    values
    and
    modifications
    are
    described
    in
    detail
    in
    Chapter
    3.
    B.
    CONTEXT
    AND
    THEORY
    OF
    ECONOMIC
    BENEFIT
    Compliance
    with
    environmental
    regulations
    usually
    requires
    a
    commitment
    of
    financial
    resources;
    both
    initially
    (in
    the
    form
    of
    a
    capital
    investment
    orone-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditure)
    and
    over
    time
    (in
    the
    form
    of
    annually
    recurring
    costs).
    These
    expenditures
    might
    result
    in
    better
    protection
    of
    public
    health
    or
    environmental
    quality,
    but
    are
    unlikely
    to
    yield
    any
    direct
    financial
    return.
    Economic
    benefit
    represents
    the
    financial
    gains
    that
    a
    violator
    accrues
    by
    delaying
    and/or
    avoiding
    such
    pollution
    control
    expenditures.
    Funds
    not
    spent
    on
    environmental
    compliance
    are
    available
    for
    other
    profit-making
    activities
    or,
    alternatively,
    a
    defendant
    avoids
    thecosts
    associated
    with
    obtaining
    additional
    funds
    for
    environmental
    compliance.
    (This
    concept
    is
    known
    in
    economics
    as
    opportunity
    cost.)
    Economic
    benefit
    calculates
    the
    amount
    by
    which
    a
    defendant
    is
    financially
    better
    off
    from
    not
    having
    complied
    with
    environmental
    requirements
    in
    a
    timely
    manner.
    Economic
    benefit
    is
    “no
    fault”
    in
    nature.
    A
    defendant
    need
    not
    have
    deliberately
    chosen
    to
    delay
    compliance
    (for
    financial
    or
    any
    other
    reasons),
    or
    in
    facteven
    have
    been
    aware
    of
    its
    noncompliance,
    for
    it
    to
    have
    accrued
    the
    economic
    benefit
    of
    noncompliance.
    The
    appropriate
    economic
    benefit
    calculation
    should
    represent
    the
    amount
    of
    money
    that
    would
    make
    the
    violator
    indifferent
    between
    compliance
    and
    noncompliance.
    If
    the
    enforcement
    agency
    fails
    to
    recover
    thiFough
    a
    civil
    penalty
    at
    least
    this
    economic
    benefit,
    then
    the
    violator
    will
    retain
    a
    gain.
    Because
    of
    the
    precedent
    of
    this
    retained
    gain,
    other
    regulated
    companies
    may
    see
    an
    economic
    advantage
    in
    similar
    noncompliance,
    and
    the
    penalty
    will
    fail
    to
    deter
    potential
    violators.
    Economic
    benefit
    does
    not
    represent
    compensation
    to
    the
    enforcement
    agency
    as
    in
    a
    typical
    “damages”
    calculation
    for
    a
    tort
    case,
    but
    instead
    is
    the
    minimum
    amount
    by
    which
    the
    violator
    must
    be
    penalized
    so
    as
    to
    return
    it
    to
    the
    position
    it
    would
    have
    been
    in
    had
    it
    complied
    on
    time.
    C.
    SUMMARY
    OF
    BEN
    METHODOLOGY
    BEN
    calculates
    the
    economic
    benefits
    gained
    from
    delaying
    and
    avoiding
    required
    environmental
    expenditures.
    Such
    expenditures
    can
    include:
    (1)
    Capital
    investments
    (e.g.,
    pollution
    control
    equipment),
    (2)
    One-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditures
    (e.g.,
    setting
    up
    a
    reporting
    system,
    or
    acquiring
    land),
    (3)
    Annually
    recurring
    costs
    (e.g.,
    operating
    and
    maintenance
    costs).
    Each
    of
    these
    expenditures
    canbe
    either
    delayed
    or
    avoided.
    BEN’s
    baseline
    assumption
    is
    that
    capital
    investments
    and
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditures
    are
    merely
    delayed
    over
    the
    period
    of
    1-2
    September
    1999

    noncompliance,
    whereas
    annual
    costs
    are
    avoided
    entirely
    over
    this
    period.
    BEN
    does
    allow
    you,
    however,
    to
    analyze
    any
    combination
    of
    delayed
    and
    avoided
    expenditures.
    The
    economic
    benefit
    calculation
    must
    incorporate
    the
    economic
    concept
    of
    the
    “time
    value
    of
    money.”
    Stated
    simply,
    a
    dollar
    today
    is
    worth
    more
    than
    a
    dollar
    tomorrow,
    because
    you
    can
    invest
    today’s,
    dollar
    to
    start
    earning
    a
    return
    immediately.
    Thus,
    the
    further
    in
    the
    future
    the
    dollar
    is,
    the
    less
    it
    is
    worth
    in
    “present-value”
    terms.
    Similarly,
    the
    greater
    the
    time
    value
    of
    money
    (i.e.,
    the
    greater
    the
    “discount”
    or
    “compound”
    rate
    used
    to
    derive
    the
    present
    value),
    the
    lower
    the
    present
    value
    of
    future
    costs.
    To
    calculate
    a
    violator’s
    economic
    benefit,
    BEN
    uses
    standard
    financial
    cash
    flow
    and
    net
    present
    value
    analysis
    techniques,
    based
    on
    modern
    and
    generally
    accepted
    financial
    principles.
    First,
    BEN
    calculates
    the
    costs
    of
    complying
    on-time
    and
    of
    complying
    late,
    adjusted
    for
    inflation
    and
    tax
    deductibility.
    To
    compare
    the
    on-time
    and
    delayed
    compliance
    costs
    in
    a
    common
    measure,
    BEN
    calculates
    the
    present
    value
    of
    both
    streams
    of
    costs,
    or
    “cash
    flows,”
    as
    of
    the
    date
    of
    initial
    noncompliance.
    BEN
    derives
    these
    values
    by
    discounting
    the
    annual
    cash
    flows
    at
    an
    average
    of
    the
    cost
    of
    capital
    throughout
    this
    time
    period.
    BEN
    can
    then
    subtract
    the
    delayed-case
    present
    value
    from
    the
    on-time-case
    present
    value
    to
    detennine
    the
    initial
    economic
    benefit
    as
    of
    the
    noncompliance
    date.
    Finally,
    BEN
    compounds
    this
    initial
    economic
    benefit
    forward
    to
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date
    at
    the
    same
    cost
    of
    capital
    to
    determine
    the
    final
    economic
    benefit
    of
    noncompliance.
    A
    violator
    may
    gain
    illegal
    competitive
    advantages
    in
    addition
    to
    the
    usual
    benefits
    of
    noncompliance.
    These
    may
    be
    substantial
    benefits,
    but
    they
    are
    beyond
    the
    capability
    of
    BEN
    or
    any
    computer
    program
    to
    assess.
    Instead
    BEN
    asks
    you
    a
    series
    of
    questions
    about
    possible
    illegal
    competitive
    advantages
    so
    that
    you
    may
    identif’
    cases
    where
    they
    are
    relevant.
    EPA
    is
    in
    the
    process
    of
    developing
    guidance
    protocols
    for
    such
    situations.
    You
    can
    obtain
    a
    copy
    of
    these
    protocols
    from
    EPA’s
    enforcement
    economics
    toll-free
    helpline
    at
    888-ECON-SPT.
    Meanwhile,
    if
    illegal
    competitive
    advantage
    is
    an
    issue
    you
    should
    consult
    an
    expert
    or
    the
    helpline.
    B.
    HOW
    TO
    USE
    THIS
    MANUAL
    This
    manual
    provides
    instructions
    for
    accessing,
    operating
    and
    interpreting
    results
    from
    the
    BEN
    program.
    It
    also
    takes
    you
    step
    by
    step
    through
    a
    BEN
    case.
    Chapter
    2
    outlines
    the
    procedures
    for
    installing
    and
    managing
    the
    model.
    Chapter
    3
    describes
    BEN’s
    data
    requirements,
    default
    values
    and
    opportunities
    for
    customization.
    Chapter
    4
    addresses
    common
    issues
    that
    arise
    when
    using
    BEN.
    Appendix
    A
    contains
    a
    detailed
    discussion
    of
    the
    economic
    rationale
    and
    computational
    methods
    used
    in
    BEN.
    You
    do
    not
    have
    to
    be
    familiar
    with
    Appendix
    A
    to
    use
    BEN
    or
    this
    manual.
    1-3
    September
    1999

    All
    of
    the
    information
    from
    this
    manual
    except
    Appendix
    A
    is
    available
    through
    BEN’s
    on
    line
    help
    system.
    The
    help
    system
    is
    context
    sensitive
    and
    may
    be
    accessed
    at
    anytime
    during
    the
    program
    by
    pressing
    Fl.
    It
    may
    also
    be
    accessed
    using
    the
    Help
    pull-down
    menu
    on
    the
    main
    screen.
    If
    you
    are
    a
    government
    employee
    (of
    any
    federal,
    state
    or
    local
    agency)
    and
    need
    further
    assistance
    in
    operating
    the
    program
    or
    understanding
    the
    results,
    please
    contact
    the
    EPA
    enforcement
    economics
    toll-free
    helpline
    at
    888-ECON-SPT
    (326-6778)
    or
    benabel@indecon.com.
    If
    you
    need
    legal
    or
    policy
    guidance,
    please
    contact
    Jonathan
    Libber,
    the
    BEN/ABEL
    coordinator
    at
    202-5
    64-
    6
    102,
    or
    e-mail
    him
    at
    libber.jonathanepamail.epa.gov.
    1-4
    September
    1999

    USING
    THE
    COMPUTER
    PROGRAM
    CHAPTER
    2
    BEN
    is
    an
    interactive
    computer
    program
    that
    runs
    in
    the
    WindowsTM
    operating
    enviromTlent.
    You
    can
    obtain
    a
    copy
    of
    BEN
    from
    EPA’s
    web
    site
    (http:/Ies.epa.gov/oeca).
    2
    If
    you
    lack
    internet
    access
    and
    are
    a
    government
    employee
    (federal,
    state,
    or
    local),
    you
    can
    contact
    EPA’s
    enforcement
    economics
    toll-free
    helpline
    (8
    88-ECON-SPT,
    or
    888-326-6778).
    Chapter
    2
    contains
    five
    sections
    describing
    procedures
    for
    using
    BEN.
    Section
    A
    describes
    the
    structure
    of
    the
    computer
    program.
    Section
    B
    explains
    the
    procedures
    for
    installing
    the
    program
    on
    your
    computer.
    Section
    C
    provides
    data
    format
    requirements
    and
    additional
    helpful
    hints
    for
    entering
    data
    at
    your
    computer,
    as
    well
    an
    overview
    of
    error
    messages.
    Section
    D
    tells
    you
    how
    to
    calculate
    and
    print
    results.
    Section
    B
    explains
    how
    to
    exit
    the
    program
    and
    save
    files.
    For
    an
    in-
    depth
    description
    of
    each
    variable
    and
    recommended
    sources
    of
    information,
    see
    Chapter
    3.
    A.
    STRUCTURE
    OF
    THE
    COMPUTER
    PROGRAM
    BEN
    consists
    of
    five
    different
    screens:
    mainlcase
    screen,
    run
    screen,
    options
    screen,
    specific
    cost
    estimates
    screen,
    and
    results
    screen.
    In
    general,
    you
    start
    with
    the
    case
    screen,
    enter
    data
    on
    separate
    screens,
    return
    to
    the
    case
    screen,
    then
    view
    (and
    print)
    your
    output
    on
    the
    results
    screen.
    BEN
    operates
    like
    any
    standard
    WindowsTM
    application.
    Use
    the
    mouse
    or
    the
    Tab
    and
    Return
    keys
    to
    move
    between
    cells
    and
    within
    a
    screen.
    Hold
    down
    the
    Shift
    key
    while
    pressing
    Tab
    to
    return
    to
    previous
    entries.
    When
    you
    first
    open
    BEN
    the
    case
    screen
    appears.
    BEN
    starts
    up
    with
    a
    blank
    case
    screen.
    You
    can
    obtain
    a
    new
    screen
    at
    any
    time
    by
    selecting
    “New”
    from
    the
    File
    menu,
    or
    using
    the
    Ctrl+N
    shortcut.
    To
    toggle
    between
    cases,
    select
    the
    appropriate
    file
    name
    under
    the
    “Window”
    menu.
    2
    This
    address
    may
    have
    changed
    by
    the
    time
    you
    read
    this
    manual.
    To
    obtain
    the
    current
    address,
    you
    can
    call
    the
    helpline
    at
    888-ECONSPT.
    2-1
    September
    1999

    The
    first
    inputs
    on
    the
    case
    screen
    are
    case
    name,
    analyst
    name
    and
    office/agency.
    These
    values
    are
    for
    reference
    only
    and
    do
    not
    affect
    the
    results.
    Then
    BEN
    asks
    for
    the
    violator’s
    tax
    status
    and
    state.
    With
    this
    information
    BEN
    references
    an
    internal
    database
    and
    automatically
    calculates
    the
    relevant
    marginal
    tax
    rates.
    Here
    you
    have
    the
    opportunity
    to
    modify
    taxes
    by
    pressing
    the
    [Customize
    Taxes]
    button.
    Under
    taxes
    is
    the
    [Competitive
    Advantage]
    button.
    Pressing
    this
    button
    presents
    you
    with
    questions
    to
    alert
    you
    to
    the
    presence
    of
    illegal
    competitive
    advantage.
    At
    the
    bottom
    of
    the
    screen,
    BEN
    requires
    you
    to
    enter
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    The
    right
    side
    of
    the
    case
    screen
    is
    for
    run
    management.
    Here
    you
    can
    create
    a
    new
    run,
    enter
    or
    edit
    run
    data,
    copy
    a
    run,
    remove
    a
    run,
    and
    calculate
    a
    run.
    Youcan
    create
    multiple
    runs
    for
    each
    case.
    The
    run
    screen
    is
    where
    you
    enter
    the
    costs
    of
    compliance.
    You,
    must
    enter
    all
    the
    cost
    data
    and
    cost
    estimate
    dates
    for
    a
    run
    before
    you
    can
    calculate
    economic
    benefit.
    From
    the
    run
    screen
    you
    may
    go
    to
    the
    options
    screen.
    The
    option
    screen
    allows
    you
    to
    change
    BEN’s
    standard
    values
    for
    the
    discountlcompound
    rate
    and
    inflation.
    Here
    you
    can
    also
    alter
    the
    number
    of
    replacement
    cycles,
    useful
    life
    for
    capital
    equipment,
    whether
    a
    cost
    is
    delayed
    or
    avoided,
    and
    tax
    deductibility
    of
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditures.
    This
    screen
    contains
    BEN’s
    default
    settings,
    so
    you
    will
    never
    need
    to
    use
    it
    unless
    you
    customize
    the
    standard
    values.
    From
    the
    options
    screen
    you
    may
    go
    to
    the
    specific
    cost
    estimates
    screen.
    This
    screen
    is
    needed
    only
    under
    certainrare
    circumstances.
    Here
    you
    can
    adjust
    BEN’s
    assessment
    of
    on-time
    and
    delay
    compliance
    costs.
    The
    result
    screen
    is
    reached
    from
    the
    main
    screen,
    and
    displays
    the
    results
    of
    BEN’s
    calculation.
    Here
    you
    have
    three
    options:
    you
    can
    print
    out
    a
    summary
    of
    the
    BEN
    calculation,
    you
    can
    print
    out
    a
    detailed
    version
    of
    the
    calculation,
    andlor
    you
    can
    return
    to
    the
    run
    screen.
    Once
    you
    are
    finished
    with
    a
    calculation,
    you
    can
    create,
    edit
    or
    calculate
    other
    runs.
    You
    can
    even
    create
    other
    case
    files,
    and
    toggle
    between
    them.
    Before
    you
    exit
    BEN
    it
    gives
    you
    the
    option
    of
    saving
    the
    current
    case,
    plus
    you
    can
    save
    your
    case
    file
    at
    anytime
    during
    your
    session.
    The
    case
    is
    saved
    with
    a
    “.ben”
    extension
    in
    the
    folder
    you
    specify,
    and
    all
    runs
    are
    automatically
    saved
    with
    the
    case.
    At
    any
    time
    during
    your
    use
    of
    the
    model
    you
    can
    access
    the
    context-sensitive
    help
    system
    by
    pressing
    the
    Fl
    key,
    just
    as
    in
    any
    Windows
    application.
    B.
    INSTALLING
    BEN
    BEN
    requires
    a
    personal
    computer
    running
    the
    Windows
    operating
    system
    (version
    3.1
    or
    higher).
    In
    addition,
    for
    optimal
    formatting
    of
    various
    data
    entry
    screens,
    set
    your
    display
    in
    the
    2-2
    September
    1999

    control
    panel
    to
    “small
    fonts”
    option.
    (“Small
    fonts”
    is
    the
    Windows
    default,
    so
    unless
    your
    display
    settings
    have
    been
    altered,
    your
    computer
    should
    be
    set
    appropriately.)
    The
    remainder
    of
    this
    section
    describes
    how
    to
    install
    BEN
    from
    EPA’s
    website
    or
    from
    floppy
    disks
    onto
    a
    local
    network
    or
    stand-alone
    PC.
    Installing
    BEN
    will
    automatically
    install
    the
    PROJECT
    model,
    since
    the
    models
    share
    some
    installation
    files.
    If
    you
    have
    trouble
    downloading
    or
    installing
    the
    model,
    consult
    your
    local
    computer
    technician.
    BEN
    is
    located
    on
    the
    EPA
    website
    at
    http://es.epa.gov/oeca.
    3
    To
    install
    BEN,
    first
    download
    the
    installation
    file
    to
    your
    computer
    or
    network,
    then
    run
    the
    file
    and
    follow
    the
    steps
    listed
    below
    for
    installing
    it
    from
    a
    set
    of
    disks.
    The
    installation
    screens
    will
    appear
    as
    they
    do
    for
    installation
    from
    a
    disk,
    although
    you
    will
    not
    be
    prompted
    for
    a
    second
    disk.
    If
    you
    have
    access
    to
    the
    installation
    disks,
    insert
    Disk
    1
    and
    run
    “a:\setup.exe”
    (or
    “b:\setup.exe”
    if
    the
    floppy
    is
    in
    the
    b:\
    drive).
    Then
    click
    [OK].
    If
    you
    receive
    a
    warning
    message
    that
    you
    caimot
    copy
    a
    file
    because
    it
    is
    in
    use,
    simply
    click
    [OK].
    It
    is
    merely
    notifying
    you
    that
    the
    file
    the
    installation
    system
    is
    trying
    to
    copy
    already
    exists
    on
    your
    computer
    and
    is
    currently
    open.
    You
    should
    close
    all
    other
    programs
    before
    installing
    the
    model.
    To
    do
    so,
    click
    on
    [Cancel],
    close
    the
    programs
    and
    repeat
    the
    appropriate
    steps
    above.
    Otherwise
    click
    [Next]
    and
    proceed
    to
    the
    second
    screen
    as
    shown
    below:
    This
    address
    may
    have
    changed
    by
    the
    time
    you
    read
    this
    manual.
    To
    obtain
    the
    current
    address,
    you
    can
    call
    the
    helpline
    at
    888-ECON-SPT.
    The
    first
    BEN
    setup
    screen
    will
    appear:
    2-3
    September
    1999

    Setup
    will
    rnstall
    BEN
    .
    PRDJECT
    in
    the
    foflowiri
    dIrectory
    T
    install
    to
    this
    dkectoy
    click
    Next.
    A
    10
    install
    toe
    dittererit
    directory
    click
    Browse
    andselect
    another
    directoty
    tq0
    riot
    to
    install
    BEN.ffiOIECT
    bydic
    iniancel
    to
    eiiIt
    Setup.
    4:
    1
    Destmnation.Directory
    —..
    JC:\BNPRJ
    .
    :
    Cancel
    The
    second
    screen
    offers
    you
    the
    opportunity
    to
    designate
    a
    directory
    in
    which
    to
    store
    the
    model.
    The
    default
    directory
    is
    “c:\BENPRJ”
    (assuming
    that
    your
    local
    hard
    drive
    is
    c:\).
    If
    you
    wish
    to
    save
    the
    model
    to
    a
    different
    directory,
    press
    [Browse]
    and
    choose
    yourdesired
    directory.
    To
    proceed
    with
    the
    BEN/PROJECT
    installation,
    press
    (Next].
    The
    next
    setup
    screen
    allows
    you
    to
    choose
    a
    program
    folder
    name
    as
    shown
    below:
    September1999
    .1
    type
    a
    flew
    folder
    name.
    or
    selectonIrom
    the
    ssdtin
    Folders
    list>
    Click,
    Nerdto
    continue
    f
    I
    I
    I
    rograrn
    Folders
    EingFoIdet
    Accessories
    uroupwise
    D
    lEc
    Documents
    lEc
    Utilities
    :
    LiveNote
    Novell
    .
    StartUp
    :-:
    (e
    j
    Next>
    Cal
    2-4

    The
    default
    folder
    name
    is
    EPA
    Models,
    which
    you
    may
    alter.
    To
    continue
    installation
    press
    INexti.
    BEN/PROJECT
    will
    partially
    install
    and
    then
    prompt
    you
    for
    Disk
    2,
    as
    shown
    below:
    Setup
    Needs
    The
    Next
    Disk
    r
    Please
    insert
    the
    next
    disk.
    Disk
    2.
    lIthe
    fes
    on
    this
    disk
    can
    be
    found
    7-f
    in
    another
    location,
    for
    example.
    in
    another
    drive,
    enter
    its
    full
    path
    or
    click
    the
    Browse
    button
    to
    select
    its
    path.
    Path:
    -
    Browse...
    OK
    cancel
    If
    the
    files
    are
    not
    on
    Disk
    2
    you
    may
    type
    their
    location
    or
    use
    browse
    to
    find
    them.
    Press
    [OKj
    when
    the
    path
    is
    correct.
    If
    the
    program
    is
    on
    two
    disks,
    simply
    insert
    Disk
    2
    and
    press
    [01(1.
    The
    setup
    program
    will
    create
    icons
    for
    BEN
    and
    PROJECT
    and
    finish
    installing
    them.
    When
    you
    have
    completed
    the
    installation
    process,
    you
    should
    reboot.your
    computer
    prior
    to
    using
    the
    BEN
    model
    or
    any
    other
    software
    package.
    Once
    BEN
    has
    been
    loaded
    onto
    your
    hard
    drive,
    simply
    double-click
    the
    model
    iconto
    start
    the
    program.
    If
    you
    are
    running
    WifldowsTM
    95
    or
    higher,
    and
    did
    not
    change
    the
    default
    directory
    and
    folder,
    BEN
    and
    PROJECT
    will
    automatically
    be
    listed
    on
    the
    start
    menu
    under
    programs
    in
    the
    “EPA
    Models”
    folder.
    After
    installing
    the
    model,
    you
    may
    wish
    to
    create
    a
    subdirectory
    for
    storage
    of
    all
    your
    case
    files.
    Alternatively,
    you
    may
    also
    choose
    to
    save
    your
    case
    files
    in
    any
    pre-existing
    directories
    corresponding
    to
    different
    cases
    or
    projects
    C.
    DATA
    ENTRY
    BEN
    is
    a
    WindowsTMbased
    computer
    program.
    Like
    other
    WindowsTMbased
    programs
    it
    uses
    the
    mouse
    or
    the
    Enter
    and
    Tab
    keys
    to
    move
    from
    entry
    to
    entry
    or
    from
    screen
    to
    screen.
    Hold
    down
    the
    Shift
    key
    while
    pressing
    Tab
    to
    return
    to
    previous
    entries.
    Each
    screen
    has
    several
    options
    and
    spaces
    for
    input.
    BEN
    will
    accept
    several
    entry
    formats.
    Numerical
    values
    can
    include
    but
    do
    not
    require
    commas.
    Monetary
    values
    may
    include
    decimals
    but
    will
    be
    rounded
    to
    the
    nearest
    dollar.
    They
    may
    be
    entered
    with
    or
    without
    dollar
    signs.
    Rates
    or
    percentages
    should
    be
    entered
    as
    a
    decimal
    number
    without
    a
    percent
    symbol
    (e.g.,
    enter
    0.20
    to
    represent
    20
    percent).
    If
    you
    type
    2.5
    for
    an
    inflation
    rate,
    BEN
    will
    read
    it
    as
    an
    inflation
    rate
    of
    250
    percent.
    2-5
    September
    1999

    BEN
    converts
    all
    dates
    to
    a
    “l-Jan-1998”
    format,
    but
    can
    understand
    almost
    any
    sensible
    format.
    If
    you
    enter
    an
    atypical
    date
    format,
    besure
    to
    check
    that
    BEN
    has
    interpreted
    it
    as
    you
    intended.
    If
    you
    do
    not
    enter
    a
    day,
    BEN
    will
    assume
    the
    first
    day
    of
    the
    month.
    Be
    careful
    to
    use
    only
    number
    keys
    to
    enter
    numerical
    values.
    A
    frequent
    mistake
    is
    typing
    the
    lowercase
    letter
    L
    instead
    of
    a
    number
    1.
    Another
    error
    occurs
    when
    the
    capital
    letter
    0
    is
    typed
    instead
    of
    the
    number
    0
    (zero).
    BEN
    will
    tell
    you
    if
    the
    format
    for
    the
    entry
    is
    incorrect.
    If
    this
    happens,
    correct
    the
    number
    and
    enter
    it
    again.
    Some
    inputs
    are
    limited
    to
    a
    range
    of
    values.
    If
    an
    entered
    value
    falls
    out
    of
    this
    range,
    BEN
    will
    display
    an
    error
    message
    with
    the
    allowable
    range
    of
    values.
    Other
    error
    messages
    will
    appear
    if
    you
    did
    not
    enter
    data
    in
    a
    required
    field.
    You
    may
    enter
    variables
    on
    thesame
    screen
    in
    any
    order.
    The
    only
    exception
    to
    this
    is
    that
    you
    must
    have
    entered
    all
    of
    the
    inputs
    for
    a
    case
    before
    you
    create
    a
    run.
    Therefore
    you
    will
    receive
    non-entry
    error
    messages
    only
    when
    moving
    from
    screen
    to
    screen
    or
    creating
    a
    run.
    After
    typing
    your
    entry
    you
    might
    discover
    that
    you
    have
    typed
    an
    incorrect
    letter
    or
    number.
    Typing
    errors
    are
    easy
    to
    correct:
    simply
    return
    to
    the
    relevant
    value
    and
    type
    over
    the
    mistake.
    Like
    all
    computer
    programs,
    BEN
    follows
    the
    GIGO
    protocol:
    “Garbage
    In,
    Garbage
    Out.”
    Verifying
    your
    data
    inputs
    is
    thereforeextremely
    important.
    D.
    CALCULATING
    AND
    PRINTING
    RESULTS
    To
    perform
    an
    economic
    benefit
    calculation,
    select
    the
    desired
    run
    title
    from
    thelist
    on
    the
    main
    screen
    and
    press
    [Calculate].
    You
    may
    calculate
    multiple
    runs
    and
    display
    the
    results
    simultaneously
    by
    selecting
    multiple
    run
    titles
    (i.e.,
    select
    a
    run
    and
    then
    click
    on
    subsequent
    desired
    runs,
    while
    simultaneously
    holding
    down
    the
    Control
    key).
    Anew
    screen
    will
    display
    a
    summary
    of
    the
    results.
    You
    can
    may
    print
    either
    a
    summary
    of
    the
    results
    or
    detailed
    background
    spreadsheet
    pages.
    The
    “Summary”
    option
    will
    print
    only
    the
    information
    contained
    in
    the
    summary
    results
    screen.
    The
    “Detail”
    option
    will
    print,
    separately
    for
    each
    run,
    a
    summary
    page
    and
    spreadsheet
    pages
    that
    include:
    (1)
    Illegal
    Competitive
    Advantage,
    which
    lists
    possible
    sources
    of
    additional
    economic
    benefit
    (omitted
    if
    the
    user
    does
    not
    check
    off
    any
    such
    conditions
    for
    the
    case
    inputs);
    (2)
    Discount/Compound
    Rate
    Calculation,
    which
    provides
    the
    details
    for
    the
    cost
    of
    capital
    calculation
    (omitted
    if
    the
    user
    overrides
    BEN’s
    calculations
    on
    the
    Options
    screen);
    (3)
    Calculations
    for
    Specific
    Cost
    Estimates,
    which
    essentially
    prints
    the
    similarly
    named
    screen
    (omitted
    if
    the
    user
    overrides
    BEN’s
    calculations
    on
    the
    Options
    screen);
    and
    (4)
    Cash
    Flow
    (maximum
    of
    four
    pages),
    which
    show
    the
    annual
    cash
    flow
    and
    net
    present
    value
    calculations.
    2-6
    September
    1999

    For
    more
    information
    on
    interpreting
    these
    pages,
    consult
    Appendix
    A
    of
    the
    BEN
    User’s
    Manual,
    or
    call
    EPA’s
    toll-free
    enforcement
    economics
    support
    helpline
    at
    888-ECON-SPT
    (326-6778).
    Although
    printing
    is
    done
    from
    the
    output
    screen,
    the
    printer
    setup
    is
    controlled
    by
    the
    pull-
    down
    menu
    on
    the
    main
    screen.
    The
    printer
    setup
    allows
    you
    to
    shift
    between
    landscape
    and
    portrait
    printing,
    as
    well
    as
    choose
    more
    advanced
    options.
    E.
    EXITING
    AND
    SAVING
    You
    exit
    BEN
    just
    like
    any
    other
    standard
    Windows
    application.
    From
    the
    main
    screen,
    select
    Exit
    under
    the
    File
    pull-down
    menu
    at
    the
    top
    left
    corner
    of
    your
    screen,
    or
    click
    on
    the
    [x]
    button
    at
    the
    top
    right
    corner
    of
    your
    screen.
    You
    can
    also
    double-click
    on
    the
    BEN
    icon
    at
    the
    top
    left
    corner
    of
    your
    screen.
    BEN
    will
    ask
    you
    if
    you
    want
    to
    save
    your
    work
    before
    you
    exit.
    Be
    sure
    to
    save
    your
    case(s)
    before
    you
    exit.
    You
    save
    a
    case
    by
    selecting
    “Save”
    under
    the
    File
    menu
    (or
    give
    the
    case
    a
    new
    name
    by
    selecting
    “Save
    As...”),
    or
    the
    Ctrl+S
    shortcut.
    BEN
    cases
    are
    automatically
    saved
    with
    the
    extension
    “.ben”and
    can
    be
    accessed
    using
    the
    “Open”
    command
    under
    the
    File
    menu
    or
    the
    Ctrl+O
    shortcut.
    You
    can
    save
    cases
    in
    any
    folder,
    and
    switch
    between
    different
    folders
    at
    any
    time.
    Runs
    are
    automatically
    saved
    as
    part
    of
    a
    case.
    2-7
    September
    1999

    DATA
    REQUIREMENTS
    CHAPTER
    3
    To
    run
    BEN,
    you
    enter
    certain
    data,
    including
    the
    entity’s
    tax
    status
    and
    state;
    the
    dates
    for
    penalty
    payment,
    noncompliance,
    and
    compliance;
    and
    the
    compliance
    cost
    estimates
    and
    estimate
    dates.
    BEN
    provides
    standard
    values
    which
    you
    can
    modify
    for
    tax,
    inflation,
    and
    discount
    rates,
    as
    well
    as
    the
    capital
    equipment’s
    number
    of
    replacement
    cycles
    and
    useful
    life,
    and
    the
    one
    time
    nondepreciable
    expenditure’s
    tax
    deductibility.
    This
    chapter
    explains
    these
    variables
    (in
    the
    order
    in
    which
    you
    enter
    them
    in
    BEN),
    covering
    the
    criteria
    for
    developing
    input
    values
    and
    the
    basis
    for
    the
    standard
    values.
    Each
    explanation
    also
    states
    how
    a
    change
    in
    each
    variable’s
    value
    will
    affect
    the
    economic
    benefit
    result,
    as
    summarized
    below
    (holding
    all
    other
    variables
    constant).
    Direction
    Impact
    on
    Input
    Item
    of
    Change
    Economic
    Benefit
    Marginal
    Tax
    Rate
    increase
    decrease
    Penalty
    Payment
    Date
    later
    increase
    Cost
    Estimates
    increase
    increase
    Noncompliance
    Date
    later
    decrease
    Compliance
    Date
    later
    increase
    Discount/Compound
    Rate
    increase
    increase
    Number
    of
    Replacement
    Cycles
    increase
    increase
    Useful
    Life
    of
    Capital
    Equipment
    increase
    decrease
    Projected
    Rate
    for
    Future
    Inflation
    increase
    varies
    Cost
    Index
    for
    Inflation
    PCI
    to
    other
    index
    varies
    Tax-Deductibility
    of
    One-Time,
    tax
    deductible
    to
    increase
    Nondepreciable
    Expenditure
    not
    tax
    deductible
    -
    3-1
    September
    1999

    A.
    CASE
    SCREEN
    The
    case
    screen
    shown
    below
    is
    what
    you
    see
    when
    you
    first
    open
    BEN.
    This
    is
    where
    you
    enter
    the
    following
    variables:
    case
    name,
    office/agency,
    analyst
    name,
    entity
    tax
    status,
    state,
    marginal
    tax
    rate,
    penalty
    payment
    date,
    and
    run
    name.
    It
    is
    also
    where
    you
    consider
    questions
    of
    competitive
    advantage.
    The
    right
    side
    of
    the
    case
    screen
    is
    where
    you
    create,
    edit,
    calculate
    and
    remove
    mns.
    r
    Case
    .
    -
    Runs
    Case
    Name:
    New
    Run:
    jExample
    Case
    I
    -
    -
    -
    Region.-
    .
    .
    -
    jReciionl
    Analyst:
    .
    Existing
    Runs:
    .
    j.
    Analyst
    -
    -
    -
    .
    Test
    Run
    2--CD
    1/1/98
    Taxes
    Erity
    -
    .
    -
    .
    .
    .
    --
    (.
    Not-Fot-Profit
    .
    .
    .
    Enter/Edit
    iCCorporation
    .
    .•
    .
    I
    r
    For-Profit
    0
    ther
    than
    C-Corporation
    .
    .
    .
    -
    I.
    Copy
    -
    .
    State:
    .
    •-
    .
    .
    .
    -
    .-..
    -
    jMA
    Customize
    Taxesi
    -
    .
    .
    .:Renove
    r
    axes
    Have
    een
    customize
    .
    .
    .
    .
    .--
    ompetitie
    Advantage
    .
    .
    .
    :
    Penalty
    Payment
    Date:
    I
    01
    1998
    I
    .
    .
    -
    1.
    Case
    Name,
    Office/Agency,
    Analyst
    Name
    Case
    name,
    office/agency
    (formerly
    EPA
    Region),
    and
    analyst
    name
    are
    the
    first
    three
    inputs
    in
    BEN.
    They
    are
    for
    reference
    purposes
    only
    and
    do
    not
    affect
    the
    calculation.
    Each
    of
    them
    will
    appear
    along
    with
    the
    current
    date
    on
    the
    bottom
    of
    every
    page
    of
    the
    results.
    3-2
    September
    1999

    a.
    Case
    Name
    Case
    name
    is
    the
    first
    input
    in
    BEN.
    This
    name
    can
    be
    any
    length
    and
    can
    contain
    letters,
    spaces,
    punctuation
    and
    numbers
    (although
    you
    may
    not
    leave
    it
    blank).
    It
    will
    appear
    along
    with
    the
    current
    date,
    analyst
    name,
    and
    EPA
    region
    on
    each
    page
    of
    the
    results.
    Since
    its
    sole
    purpose
    is
    documentation,
    this
    label
    can
    contain
    anything
    you
    choose.
    It
    can
    reflect
    the
    violator’.s
    name
    or
    a
    characteristic
    of
    the
    specific
    case
    (e.g.,
    “Payment
    on
    July
    15,
    1999”).
    Each
    case
    can
    contain
    several
    runs,
    so
    you
    will
    not
    need
    to
    alter
    the
    case
    name
    to
    save
    individual
    calculations.
    b.
    Office/Agency
    Like
    case
    name,
    office/agency
    is
    for
    reference
    purposes
    only
    (although
    you
    may
    not
    leave
    it
    blank).
    It
    will
    appear
    along
    with
    the
    current
    date,
    case
    name,
    and
    analyst
    name
    on
    each
    page
    of
    the
    results.
    A
    pull
    down
    menu
    to
    the
    right
    of
    the
    cell
    lists
    all
    ten
    EPA
    regions,
    EPA
    headquarters,
    and
    the
    option
    of
    “other.”
    You
    may
    also
    type
    in
    a
    different
    entry.
    c.
    Analyst
    Name
    Like
    case
    name
    and
    office/agency,
    analyst
    name
    is
    for
    reference
    purposes
    only
    (although
    you
    may
    not
    leave
    it
    blank).
    This
    name
    can
    be
    of
    any
    length
    and
    can
    contain
    letters,
    spaces,
    punctuation
    and
    numbers.
    It
    will
    appear
    along
    with
    the
    current
    date,
    case
    name,
    and
    EPA
    region
    on
    each
    page
    of
    the
    results.
    ‘It
    can
    be
    anything
    you
    choose,
    but
    it
    is
    most
    appropriate
    simply
    to
    enter
    your
    own
    name.
    2.
    Entity
    Type,
    State,
    Customized
    Tax
    Rate
    BEN
    needs
    to
    know
    the
    violator’s
    tax
    rate
    to
    calculate
    economic
    benefits,
    as
    compliance
    costs
    are
    usually
    tax-deductible.
    Because
    tax-deductible
    expenses
    and
    depreciation
    associated
    with
    capital
    investments
    reduce
    taxable
    income
    they
    result
    in
    tax
    savings.
    The
    higher
    the
    tax
    rate,
    the
    higher
    the
    tax
    savings,
    and
    therefore
    the
    lower
    the
    economic
    benefit
    of
    noncompliance.
    BEN
    uses
    the
    marginal
    tax
    rate
    to
    account
    for
    the
    tax
    effects
    of
    compliance
    costs.
    Changing
    the
    violator’s
    state
    or
    tax
    status
    changes
    the
    violator’s
    marginal
    tax
    rate
    and
    thus
    alters
    economic
    benefit.
    a.
    Entity
    Type
    BEN
    asks
    you
    to
    designate
    the
    tax
    filing
    status
    of
    the
    entity.
    The
    three
    options
    are:
    Not-For
    Profit,
    C-Corporation,
    or
    For-Profit
    Other
    than
    C-Corporation.
    Choosing
    the
    correct
    tax
    status
    is
    critical,
    because
    it
    determines
    BEN’s
    application
    of
    the
    tax
    rate
    and
    the
    discount/compound
    rate.
    BEN
    will
    default
    to
    C-Corporation
    status.
    3-3
    September
    1999

    A
    C-Corporation
    files
    a
    federal
    tax
    Form
    1120
    or
    Form
    1120-A.
    These
    companies
    are
    taxed
    at
    corporate
    income
    tax
    rates.
    Virtually
    all
    publicly
    traded
    companies
    are
    C-Corporations,
    but
    small
    privately
    held
    firms
    can
    also
    be
    C-Corporations.
    For-profit
    entities
    other
    than
    C-corporations
    may
    be
    S-corporations,
    partnerships,
    or
    sole
    proprietorships
    (e.g.,
    a
    corner
    grocery
    store).
    These
    entities
    file
    federal
    tax
    returns
    other
    than
    1120
    or
    1120-A
    (e.g.,
    an
    S-
    corporation
    files
    a
    Form
    1120-S
    and
    a
    ScheduleK
    for
    each
    shareholder).
    The
    income
    and
    expenses
    of
    these
    organizations
    are
    divided
    among
    the
    shareholders
    and
    reported
    on
    their
    individual
    income
    tax
    returns.
    Income
    is
    therefore
    taxed
    at
    the
    individual
    income
    tax
    rate.
    Not-for-profit
    entities,
    such
    as
    municipalities,
    public
    authorities,
    and
    charitable
    organizations,
    generally
    have
    a
    tax-exempt
    status.
    When
    you
    indicate
    that
    the
    violator
    is
    a
    not-for-profit
    entity,
    BEN
    sets
    the
    marginal
    income
    tax
    rate
    to
    zero.
    (Although
    rare,
    certain
    not-for-profit
    companies
    are
    subject
    to
    taxation.
    You
    should
    verify
    the
    status
    of
    the
    not-for-profit
    in
    question
    and
    adjust
    the
    tax
    rates
    accordingly.)
    b.
    State
    This
    is
    the
    state
    in
    which
    the
    entity
    conducts
    the
    majority
    of
    its
    business,
    which
    is
    not
    necessarily
    the
    state
    in
    which
    it
    is
    incorporated.
    Selecting
    the
    correct
    state
    is
    important
    because
    BEN
    uses
    state-specific
    tax
    rates
    in
    its
    calculations.
    The
    pull-down
    menu
    lists
    all
    fifty
    states
    plus
    “AVG”
    and
    “BEN.”
    “AVG”
    is
    an
    average
    of
    all
    state
    tax
    rates
    (appropriate
    if
    the
    nonoompliant
    facilities
    span
    several
    states).
    “BEN”
    is
    similar
    to
    “AVG”,
    but
    instead
    of
    adjusting
    the
    state
    average
    each
    year,
    it
    uses
    one
    state
    average
    for
    the
    period
    1987-1992
    and
    another
    for
    1993
    and
    beyond.
    This
    option
    is
    appropriate
    only
    for
    replicating
    prior
    calculations
    from
    the
    DOS
    version
    of
    BEN,
    which
    used
    these
    rates
    as
    its
    standard
    value.
    c.
    Customized
    Tax
    Rate
    After
    you
    have
    entered
    the
    tax
    status
    and
    state
    of
    the
    violator,
    BEN
    will
    automatically
    calculate
    the
    combined
    marginal
    income
    tax
    rate.
    The
    marginal
    tax
    rate
    is
    the
    fraction
    of
    the
    last
    dollar
    of
    taxable
    income
    that
    a
    defendant
    would
    pay
    to
    federal
    and
    state
    governments.
    BEN
    uses
    the
    marginal
    tax
    rate,
    not
    the
    average
    tax
    rate
    (i.e.,
    total
    tax
    divided
    by
    total
    taxable
    income),
    because
    the
    marginal
    tax
    rate
    is
    the
    rate
    that
    applies
    to
    incremental
    changes
    in
    the
    violator’s
    tax-deductible
    expenses.
    State
    tax
    rates
    must
    be
    adjusted
    to
    reflect
    the
    fact
    that
    you
    can
    deduct
    state
    taxes
    from
    federal
    taxable
    income.
    The
    adjustment
    is
    made
    by
    multiplying
    the
    marginal
    state
    tax
    rate
    by
    a
    factor
    equal
    to
    one
    minus
    the
    marginal
    federal
    tax
    rate,
    as
    shown
    in
    the
    following
    formula:
    Combined
    tax
    rate
    =
    Federal
    rate
    +
    [State
    rate
    x
    (.1
    -
    Federal
    rate)]
    3-4
    September
    1999

    State
    income
    taxes
    do
    not
    include
    sales
    tax,
    inventory
    tax,
    charter
    tax,
    or
    taxes
    on
    property.
    One-time
    tax
    payments,
    such
    as
    taxes
    on
    the
    purchase
    of
    equipment,
    should
    be
    included
    in
    the
    capital
    investment
    or
    in
    the
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditure.
    If
    the
    tax
    recurs
    regularly,
    then
    it
    should
    be
    included
    in
    the
    annually
    recurring
    cost.
    For
    example,
    sales
    tax
    would
    be
    included
    in
    the
    capital
    cost
    while
    property
    tax
    would
    be
    included
    in
    the
    annual
    cost.
    You
    may
    have
    information
    that
    supports
    the
    use
    of
    tax
    rates
    other
    than
    those
    supplied
    by
    the
    BEN
    model
    (e.g.,
    the
    entity
    was
    not
    subject
    to
    the
    highest
    marginal
    rate).
    In
    these
    situations
    you
    can
    modify
    the
    annual
    rates
    individually
    by
    pressing
    [Customize
    Taxes].
    The
    tax
    customization
    window
    shown
    below
    will
    appear
    and
    you
    can
    simply
    type
    in
    your
    customized
    values.
    t
    Combined
    =
    Federal
    +
    EState
    1
    -
    Federal))
    Federal
    M
    Combined
    1387
    4.0%
    3.5
    40.30%
    1988
    34.0%
    35%
    40.30%
    1383
    34.0%
    S.5
    40.30%
    1990
    34.0%
    9.5%
    4030%
    1931
    4.0%
    35%
    40.30%
    1932
    4.0%
    9.5
    40.30%
    1833
    35.0%ø
    9.5%
    41.20%
    1934
    5.0
    9.5%
    41.20%
    1935
    5.0%
    3.5.
    41.20%.
    1936
    .OY
    3.5%
    41.20%
    ote:
    Changing
    entity
    or
    state
    on
    the
    previous
    screen
    will
    result
    inloss
    of
    tax
    customization.
    ancel
    The
    “Taxes
    Have
    Been
    Customized”
    box
    on
    the
    case
    screen
    will
    be
    checked
    when
    modifications
    have
    been
    made
    to
    the
    tax
    rates.
    Similarly,
    this
    information
    will
    appear
    in
    the
    BEN
    run
    results
    and
    print-out.
    Note
    that
    once
    tax
    rates
    are
    modified,
    re-designation
    of
    the
    state
    or
    entity
    tax
    status
    will
    result
    in
    a
    loss
    of
    the
    customized
    information.
    3.
    Competitive
    Advantage
    BEN
    or
    any
    computer
    model
    is
    incapable
    of
    calculating
    economic
    benefit
    from
    illegal
    competitive
    advantage,
    leading
    to
    a
    possible
    underestimate
    of
    economic
    benefit
    in
    certain
    cases.
    Therefore
    BEN
    provides
    a
    [Competitive
    Advantage]
    button
    and
    asks
    questions
    for
    case
    attributes
    indicative
    of
    illegal
    competitive
    advantage,
    providing
    suggestions
    for
    furtherresearch
    and
    analysis.
    3-5
    September
    1999

    Youmust
    read
    the
    competitive
    advantage
    screen
    and
    press
    [OK]
    before
    BEN
    will
    allow
    you
    to
    create
    a
    run.
    J
    I-
    I
    rD
    I-
    ....
    r
    Ha
    via
    ator
    developed
    or
    old
    new
    products
    or
    eivice
    hIIe
    in
    noncompance
    7
    r
    CouLd
    vioLator
    have
    complied
    cost-effectively
    by
    reducing
    outpuk/Lhoughput?
    0K____l
    CnceI
    Below
    are
    the
    responses
    that
    appear
    in
    BEN’s
    results
    ifyou
    check
    a
    question
    box.
    1
    .
    Did
    violator
    ‘s
    noncompliance
    allow
    it
    to
    begin
    production
    or
    sales
    sooner
    than
    it
    should?
    Violator
    may
    have
    received
    “early-mover
    advantage”
    by
    beginning
    production
    or
    sales
    sooner
    than
    it
    should.
    2.
    Did
    violator
    sellprohibitedproducts?
    Violator’s
    net
    profits
    from
    illegally
    sold
    products
    may
    constitute
    economic
    benefit,
    and
    if
    the
    violator
    continues
    to
    sell
    similar
    now-legal
    products
    in
    same
    market,
    then
    lasting
    market
    share
    effect
    may
    constitute
    an
    additional
    benefit.
    3.
    Are
    compliance
    costs
    a
    signfIcantpercentage
    oftotaiproduction
    costs?
    Violator
    may
    have
    benefitted
    from
    market
    share
    gains
    by
    undercutting
    its
    competitors
    through
    price
    advantages
    from
    noncompliance.
    .
    4.
    Does
    violator
    seliproducts
    that
    can
    develop
    “brand
    loyalty
    or
    high
    switching
    costs?
    Violator
    may
    have
    benefitted
    from
    market
    share
    gains
    because
    it
    sells
    products
    that
    can
    develop
    “brand
    loyalty”
    or
    high
    switching
    costs.
    5
    .
    Has
    violator
    developed
    or
    sold
    new
    products
    or
    services
    while
    in
    noncompliance?
    Violator
    may
    have
    gained
    “early
    mover”
    market
    share
    and
    been
    able
    to
    discourage
    competitors
    by
    keeping
    prices
    low,
    since
    it
    developed
    or
    sold
    new
    products/services
    while
    in
    noncompliance.
    3-6
    .
    September
    [999

    6.
    Could
    violator
    have
    complied
    cost-effectively
    by
    reducing
    output/throughput?
    Incremental
    net
    profit
    from
    higher
    output/throughput
    could
    constitute
    economic
    benefit,
    since
    violator
    could
    have
    complied
    cost-effectively
    by
    output/throughput
    reduction.
    If
    you
    answer
    affirmatively
    to
    any
    of
    these
    questions,
    further
    research
    and
    analysis
    is
    necessary
    to
    determine
    the
    full
    extent
    of
    the
    violator’s
    economic
    benefit.
    Youmight
    wish
    to
    consult
    U.S.
    EPA’s
    guidance
    on
    illegal
    competitive
    advantage,
    or
    contact
    EPA’s
    enforcement
    economics
    support
    helpline,
    at
    888-ECONSPT
    (326-6778).
    4.
    Penalty
    Payment
    Date
    The
    penalty
    payment
    date
    is
    the
    date
    you
    expect
    the
    violator
    to
    .pay
    the
    civil
    penalty.
    Dates
    may
    be
    entered
    as
    month/day/year
    (i.e.,
    7/31/98)
    or
    written
    out
    (i.e.,
    July31,
    1998).
    BEN
    will
    accept
    two-digit
    years,
    but
    four-digit
    years
    are
    preferable.
    You
    must
    enter
    dates
    to
    the
    day.
    BEN
    automatically
    calculates
    the
    final
    economic
    benefit
    as
    of
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date
    and
    assumes
    that
    the
    violator
    earns
    a
    return
    on
    the
    benefit
    until
    that
    date.
    Therefore,
    the
    benefit
    figure
    increases
    for
    later
    penalty
    payment
    dates,
    holding
    all
    other
    variables
    constant.
    A
    considerable
    time
    lag
    oflen
    occurs
    between
    when
    the
    violator
    signs
    the
    consent
    decree
    and
    when
    it
    actually
    pays
    the
    penalty.
    If
    the
    violator
    is
    willing
    to
    transfer
    the
    entire
    penalty
    figure
    to
    an
    interest-bearing
    escrow
    account
    on
    a
    date
    before
    entry
    of
    the
    consent
    decree,
    this
    escrow
    date
    may
    be
    used
    as
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    Upon
    entry
    of
    the
    consent
    decree,
    the
    escrowed
    penalty
    plus
    any
    interest
    should
    accrue
    to
    the
    enforcement
    agency.
    You
    should
    be
    certain
    that
    the
    violator
    knows:
    (1)
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date
    used
    in
    your
    economic
    benefit
    calculation;
    and,
    (2)
    that
    if
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date
    is
    actually
    later
    than
    you
    have
    assumed,
    the
    economic
    benefit
    will
    be
    higher.
    On
    the
    other
    hand,
    if
    the
    violator
    settles
    the
    case
    and
    pays
    its
    penalty
    prior
    to
    the
    date
    you
    used
    in
    your
    calculation,
    or
    if
    it
    agrees
    to
    escrow
    the
    economic
    benefit
    amount,
    the
    benefit
    component
    of
    the
    penalty
    will
    be
    lower.
    By
    conveying
    this
    information
    early
    in
    a
    negotiation
    with
    a
    violator,
    you
    will
    give
    the
    violator
    added
    incentive
    to
    settle
    promptly.
    In
    addition,
    this
    approach
    will
    allow
    you
    to
    avoid
    giving
    the
    violator
    any
    “unpleasant
    surprises”
    should
    you
    need
    to
    increase
    the
    benefit
    component
    as
    a
    result
    of
    a
    delay
    in
    the
    settlement.
    5.
    Creating/Adding,
    Copying,
    and
    Removing
    Runs
    You
    must
    create
    a
    run
    before
    you
    can
    enter
    compliance
    cost
    information.
    To
    add
    a
    new
    run,
    enter
    the
    run
    name
    under
    “New
    Run:”
    and
    press
    [AddJ.
    BEN
    will
    save
    the
    new
    run
    and
    list
    it
    under
    “Existing
    Runs.”
    Run
    names
    can
    be
    any
    length
    and
    include
    any
    letter,
    punctuation
    or
    number.
    Each
    case
    may
    contain
    multiple
    runs.
    3-7
    September
    1999

    To
    copy
    an
    existing
    run
    select
    the
    run
    you
    wish
    to
    copy
    from
    the
    list
    of
    existing
    runs
    and
    press
    [Copyl.
    A
    window
    will
    appear
    asking
    you
    to
    enter
    a
    name
    for
    the
    new
    run.
    No
    two
    runs
    can
    have
    the
    same
    name.
    Enter
    the
    new
    name
    and
    press
    [OK]
    to
    save
    the
    new
    run
    or
    [Cancel]
    to
    delete
    it.
    The
    copy
    will
    contain
    all
    of
    the
    information
    from
    the
    original.
    Copies
    are
    particularly
    useful
    when
    making
    only
    minor
    changes
    in
    cost
    information
    from
    run
    to
    run,
    because
    they
    can
    carry
    over
    consistent
    data.
    To
    remove
    a
    run
    select
    it
    from
    the
    existing
    run
    window
    and
    press
    [Remove].
    A
    window
    will
    appear
    asking
    you
    if
    you
    are
    sure.
    Press
    [Yes]
    and
    the
    run
    is
    deleted.
    Remember
    that
    BEN
    does
    not
    have
    a
    “trash
    bin”
    to
    hold
    deleted
    runs,
    so
    you
    will
    have
    no
    way
    to
    retrieve
    a
    run
    once
    you
    have
    removed
    it.
    B.
    RUN
    INPUT
    SCREEN
    To
    access
    the
    run
    input
    screen,
    select
    a
    run
    and
    press
    [Enter/Edit],
    or
    simply
    double
    click
    on
    the
    run
    name.
    Here
    you
    enter
    cost
    estimates
    for
    three
    possible
    compliance
    components:
    capital
    investments,
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditures
    and
    annually
    recurring
    costs.
    Each
    cost
    component
    requires
    a
    cost
    estimate
    and
    an
    estimate
    date.
    At
    the
    bottom
    of
    the
    run
    screen
    you
    must
    enter
    the
    noncompliance
    and
    compliance
    dates.
    -
    x
    CompIince
    Components
    -.
    Cost
    Etimat
    Esti
    ate
    Dat
    Capital
    Investment:
    $1,000.000
    1101
    -Jan-i
    932
    One-Time,
    Nondepeciable
    penditure:
    jsi
    00.000
    I
    [ni
    S32J
    uaHy
    Re
    ring
    Jsi
    0.000
    1101
    ian-1
    392
    Dates
    [Noncomplianc
    :
    I011932
    I
    Compliance
    I011397
    OK
    Options
    Cancel
    j
    3-8
    September
    1999

    1.
    Compliance
    Cost
    Components
    This
    is
    where
    you
    enter
    the
    costs
    of
    the
    equipment/labor/activities
    necessary
    to
    achieve
    compliance.
    Engineers
    and
    technical
    staff
    in
    your
    enforcement
    program
    are
    usually
    aware
    of
    what
    reasonable
    costs
    might
    be
    for
    pollution
    control
    technologies
    and
    remedial
    activities,
    and
    might
    also
    know
    of
    standard
    cost
    information
    that
    exists
    in
    publications.
    Another
    potential
    source
    of
    information
    is
    the
    violator,
    who
    might
    willingly
    giveyou
    the
    required
    data.
    Otherwise,
    you
    can
    take
    a
    number
    of
    legal
    approaches
    to
    obtain
    the
    data
    from
    the
    violator.
    The
    EPA
    usually
    has
    authority
    to
    request
    the
    necessary
    information.
    With
    a
    legal
    issue
    like
    this
    one,
    the
    appropriate
    attorney(s)
    should
    also
    be
    consulted.
    In
    cases
    wherecost
    data
    is
    available,
    but
    the
    required
    compliance
    measures
    are
    still
    unclear,
    two
    general
    guidelines
    will
    assist
    you:
    (1)
    The
    best
    evidence
    of
    what
    the
    violator
    shouldhave
    done
    to
    prevent
    the
    violations
    is
    what
    it
    eventually
    did
    (or
    will
    do)
    to
    achieve
    compliance.
    This
    rule
    is
    instructive
    in
    those
    cases
    where
    the
    violator
    may
    appear
    to
    be
    installing
    a
    more
    expensive
    pollution
    control
    system
    than
    EPA
    staff
    believe
    is
    necessary
    to
    achieve
    compliance.
    In
    such
    situations,
    the
    proper
    cost
    inputs
    in
    the
    BEN
    model
    are
    usually
    still
    based
    on
    the
    actual
    (more
    expensive)
    system
    being
    installed.
    This
    is
    because
    the
    EPA
    should
    not
    second
    guess
    the
    business
    decisions
    of
    a
    violator.
    A
    violator
    often
    will
    have
    sound
    business
    reasons
    to
    install
    a
    more
    expensive
    compliance
    system
    (e.g.,
    it
    may
    be
    more
    reliable,
    easier
    to
    maintain,
    or
    have
    a
    longer
    useful
    life).
    (2)
    Costs
    not
    truly
    associated
    with
    pollution
    control
    efforts
    to
    remedy
    the
    violations
    alleged
    in
    the
    complaint
    should
    be
    excluded
    from
    BEN
    inputs,
    but
    the
    violator
    must
    present
    convincing
    evidence
    that
    the
    costs
    were
    not
    associated
    with
    the
    operation
    of
    the
    pollution
    control
    system.
    For
    example,
    if
    the
    violator
    is
    addingadditional
    capacity
    to
    handlç
    a
    waste
    stream
    from
    a
    new
    production
    line,
    the
    incremental
    costs
    associated
    with
    treating
    the
    new
    waste
    stream
    should
    not
    be
    included
    in
    the
    BEN
    run
    (based
    on
    the
    assumption
    that
    the
    additional
    capacity
    for
    treatment
    of
    wastesfrom
    new
    production
    was
    not
    needed
    to
    achieve
    compliance
    under
    previous
    levels
    of
    production).
    Similarly,
    if
    the
    violator
    is
    addingcapacity
    to
    accommodate
    normal
    anticipated
    business
    growth,
    and
    on-time
    compliance
    would
    not
    have
    entailed
    such
    additional
    capacity,
    then
    you
    should
    exclude
    the
    incremental
    costs
    of
    the
    additional
    capacity.
    Youmay
    enter
    compliance
    costs
    with
    or
    without
    commas
    or
    dollar
    signs.
    BEN
    will
    accept
    decimals
    but
    will
    round
    the
    amount
    to
    the
    nearest
    whole
    dollar.
    Enter
    a
    zero
    for
    any
    component
    category
    where
    expenses
    would
    not
    be
    incuned.
    All
    else
    being
    equal,
    larger
    compliance
    costs
    will
    result
    in
    a
    higher
    economic
    benefit
    of
    noncompliance.
    a.
    Capital
    Investment
    The
    capital
    investment
    cost
    estimate
    should
    include
    all
    depreciable
    investment
    outlays
    necessary
    to
    achieve
    compliance.
    Generally
    these
    are
    expenditures
    the
    violator
    delayed
    making
    (although
    they
    could
    sometimes
    be
    avoided
    altogether).
    Enter
    a
    zero
    if
    no
    capital
    investment
    was
    3-9
    September
    1999

    required
    for
    compliance.
    Holding
    all
    other
    inputs
    constant,
    the
    economic
    benefit
    from
    delay
    will
    be
    greater
    for
    larger
    capital
    investment
    outlays.
    Depreciable
    capital
    investments
    are
    made
    for
    things
    thatwear
    out
    such
    as
    buildings,
    equipment
    or
    other
    long-lived
    assets.
    Note
    that
    land
    is
    not
    a
    depreciable
    capital
    investment;
    land
    costs
    should
    instead
    be
    input
    as
    a
    one-time
    non-depreciable
    expenditure.
    Typical
    environmental
    capital
    investments
    include
    groundwater
    monitoring
    wells,
    stack
    scrubbers,
    and
    wastewater
    treatment
    systems.
    In
    estimating
    capital
    cost,
    keep
    in
    mind
    this
    includes
    all
    costs
    associated
    with
    designing,
    installing,
    shipping,
    and
    purchasing
    the
    necessary
    equipment
    (including
    sales
    tax)
    and
    associated
    facilities.
    If
    the
    capital
    investment
    is
    avoided
    (i.e.,
    the
    violator
    is
    not
    just
    delaying
    making
    the
    investment,
    but
    will
    never
    make
    the
    investment),
    after
    entering
    all
    the
    required
    information
    on
    the
    run
    inputs
    screen,
    on
    the
    options
    screen
    uncheck
    the
    “Delayed,
    Not
    Avoided”
    box
    and
    set
    the
    replacement
    cycles
    to
    0.
    (If
    a
    replacement
    cycle
    has
    also
    been
    avoided,
    then
    retain
    the
    default
    cycle
    of
    1.)
    If
    you
    have
    capital
    investment
    costs
    with
    significantly
    different
    cost
    estimate
    dates,
    you
    should
    perform
    separate
    runs
    for
    each,
    which
    you
    can
    add
    together
    to
    produce
    a
    total
    economic
    benefit
    result.
    b.
    One-Time,
    Nondepreciable
    Expenditure
    This
    category
    includes
    compliance
    expenditures
    that
    need
    to
    be
    made
    only
    once
    and
    are
    non-
    depreciable
    (i.e.,
    do
    not
    wear
    out).
    Enter
    a
    zero
    if
    no
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditure
    was
    required
    for
    compliance.
    Holding
    all
    other
    inputs
    constant,
    the
    economic
    benefit
    from
    delay
    will
    be
    greater
    for
    larger
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditures.
    Such
    an
    expenditurecould
    be
    purchasing
    land,
    setting
    up
    a
    record-keeping
    system,
    removing
    illegal
    discharges
    of
    dredged
    and
    fill
    material,
    disposing
    of
    soil
    from
    a
    hazardous-waste
    site,
    or
    initial
    training
    of
    employees.
    However,
    if
    training
    or
    record
    keeping
    must
    occur
    over
    time
    and
    regularly,
    these
    costs
    should
    be
    entered
    as
    annually
    recurring
    costs.
    If
    the
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditure
    involved
    is
    avoided
    (i.e.,
    the
    violator
    is
    not
    just
    delaying
    making
    the
    expenditure,
    but
    will
    never
    make
    the
    expenditure),
    on
    the
    options
    screen
    uncheck
    the
    “Delayed,
    Not
    Avoided”
    box.
    Most
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditures
    are
    tax-deductible;
    with
    the
    primary
    exception
    being
    purchases
    of
    land.
    Land
    is
    an
    asset
    and,
    therefore,
    cannot
    be
    deducted
    as
    an
    expense
    from
    taxable
    income.
    BEN
    assumes
    that
    the
    expenditure
    is
    tax-deductible
    unless
    otherwise
    specified.
    To
    change
    this
    assumption
    uncheck
    the
    “Tax
    Deductible”
    box
    on
    the
    options
    screen.
    3-10
    September
    1999

    c.
    Annually
    Recurring
    Costs
    Annually
    recurring
    costs
    are
    costs
    associated
    with
    operating
    and
    maintaining
    pollution
    control
    equipment.
    Enter
    a
    zero
    if
    no
    (additional)
    annual
    costs
    were
    required
    to
    operate
    the
    necessary
    pollution
    control
    equipment.
    Holding
    all
    other
    inputs
    constant,
    the
    economic
    benefit
    from
    delay
    will
    be
    greater
    for
    larger
    annually
    recurring
    costs.
    This
    cost
    estimate
    should
    reflect
    the
    average
    annual
    incremental
    cost
    of
    operating
    and/or
    maintaining
    the
    required
    environmental
    control
    measures.
    These
    expenditures
    should
    include
    any
    changes
    in
    the
    cost
    of
    labor,
    power,
    water,raw
    materials
    and
    supplies,
    recurring
    training
    of
    employees,
    and
    any
    change
    in
    annual
    property
    taxes
    associated
    with
    operating
    the
    new
    or
    improved
    pollution
    control
    equipment.
    Note
    that
    annually
    recurring
    costs
    may
    be
    negative
    if
    compliance
    increases
    efficiency.
    Include
    any
    lease
    payments
    for
    equipment,
    but
    not
    expenses
    such
    as
    annualized
    capital
    recovery,
    interest
    payments,
    or
    depreciation.
    Any
    operating
    and
    maintenance
    (O&M)
    offsetting
    credits
    should
    also
    be
    considered
    in
    determining
    the
    incremental
    annual
    costs.
    Suèh
    credits
    might
    represent
    actual
    O&M
    cost
    savings:
    heat
    recovery,
    product
    or
    byproduct
    recovery,
    and
    so
    forth.
    To
    be
    included,
    such
    savings
    must
    be
    proven
    by
    the
    violator,
    not
    just
    asserted.
    For
    example,
    the
    installation
    of
    new
    pollution
    control
    equipment
    may
    reduce
    certain
    costs
    (such
    as
    sludge
    disposal)
    associated
    with
    operations
    during
    the
    noncompliance
    period.
    If
    the
    resulting
    incremental
    O&M
    cost
    is
    negative,
    the
    net
    cost
    savings
    may
    be
    used
    in
    determining
    annual
    costs.
    Credit
    is
    given
    only
    for
    annually
    recurring
    cost
    savings
    that
    are
    both
    documented
    and
    directly
    related
    to
    compliance.
    Annual
    costs
    must
    be
    equal
    for
    each
    year
    of
    the
    violation,
    differing
    only
    by
    inflation,
    to
    enter
    them
    into
    BEN.
    If
    they
    vary
    only
    slightly,
    you
    can
    enter
    an
    average
    estimate
    of
    the
    different
    yearly
    figures.
    If
    theyvary
    significantly,
    then
    you
    can
    create
    separate
    runs
    corresponding
    to
    the
    different
    years
    of
    the
    violation.
    Each
    run’s
    noncompliance
    and
    compliance
    dates
    should
    reflect
    the
    beginning
    and
    ending
    dates
    for
    the
    year
    of
    the
    specific
    annual
    cost.
    If
    the
    annual
    costs
    are
    delayed,
    and
    not
    avoided,
    then
    enter
    them
    as
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditures.
    You
    can
    either
    enter
    the
    entire
    sum
    of
    the
    annual
    costs
    that
    have
    been
    delayed
    over
    the
    entire
    noncompliance
    period,
    or
    you
    can
    create
    a
    separate
    run
    for
    each
    year
    of
    delayed
    costs.
    Either
    way,
    the
    noncompliance
    date
    should
    be
    the
    midpoint
    of
    when
    the
    annual
    costs
    should
    have
    been
    incurred
    (i.e.,
    the
    midpoint
    of
    the
    entire
    noncompliance
    period,
    or
    the
    middle
    of
    the
    year),
    and
    the
    compliance
    date
    should
    be
    the
    midpoint
    of
    when
    the
    costs
    were
    or
    will
    be
    incurred.
    2.
    Cost
    Estimate
    Dates
    Each
    cost
    estimate
    needs
    a
    date,
    reflecting
    the
    date
    on
    which
    the
    estimate
    is
    premised.
    Dates
    may
    be
    entered
    as
    month/day/year
    (i.e.,
    7/31/98)
    or
    written
    out
    (i.e.,
    July31,
    1998).
    BEN
    will
    accept
    two-digit
    years,
    but
    four-digit
    years
    are
    preferable.
    You
    must
    enter
    dates
    to
    the
    day.
    If
    you
    do
    not
    3-11
    September1999

    have
    date
    information
    to
    the
    day,
    use
    the
    day
    that
    falls
    in
    the
    middle
    of
    the
    time
    frame
    you
    have.
    For
    example,
    if
    all
    you
    know
    is
    that
    the
    estimate
    was
    made
    in
    May
    of
    1998,
    use
    May
    15,
    1998
    as
    the
    estimate
    date.
    If
    all
    you
    know
    is
    that
    the
    estimate
    was
    made
    in
    1998,
    use
    July
    1,
    1998
    as
    the.estimate
    date.
    If
    you
    have
    multiple
    costs
    for
    the
    same
    component
    with
    different
    dollar-years,
    enter
    them
    as
    separate
    runs,
    and
    sum
    the
    results.
    3.
    Noncompliance
    and
    Compliance
    Dates
    For
    all
    dates
    you
    can
    use
    any
    format,
    but
    be
    sure
    to
    enter
    the
    year,
    month,
    and
    day.
    (If
    you
    do
    not
    enter
    a
    day,
    BEN
    will
    assume
    the
    first
    day
    of
    the
    month.)
    Also,
    BEN
    will
    not
    accept
    any
    dates
    before
    July
    1,
    1987.
    The
    noncompliance
    date
    is
    generally
    when
    the
    first
    violation
    of
    the
    environmental
    requirement
    occurred.
    BEN
    uses
    this
    as
    the
    proxy
    for
    when
    the
    violator
    should
    have
    actually
    incurred
    the
    expenditures
    necessary
    for
    compliance.
    Since
    compliance
    expenditures
    must
    often
    occur
    far
    in
    advance
    of
    actual
    legal
    compliance,
    it
    is
    highly
    conservative
    to
    use
    the
    date
    by
    when
    the
    violator
    should
    have
    completed
    installation
    of
    the
    necessary
    pollution
    control
    equipment
    and
    had
    such
    equipment
    fully
    operational.
    The
    benefit
    from
    delayed
    and/or
    avoided
    expenditures
    generally
    increases
    with
    the
    length
    of
    the
    delay
    period.
    An
    earlier
    noncompliance
    date
    (holding
    the
    compliance
    date
    constant)
    will,
    in
    virtually
    all
    cases;
    increase
    the
    benefit
    figure.
    Hence,
    if
    you
    were
    to
    use
    the
    actual
    date
    when
    the
    compliance
    expenditures
    would
    have
    been
    incurred
    if
    this
    information
    were
    available
    the
    economic
    benefit
    would
    be
    substantially
    higher
    than
    how
    EPA
    typically
    calculates
    it.
    The
    compliance
    date
    is
    when
    the
    violator
    came
    into
    compliance
    with
    environmental
    requirements
    or
    the
    date
    when
    you
    expect
    the
    violator
    to
    achieve
    compliance.
    BEN
    once
    again
    uses
    this
    as
    the
    proxy
    for
    when
    the
    violator
    actually
    did
    or
    will—
    incur
    the
    expenditures
    necessary
    for
    compliance.
    The
    date
    when
    the
    equipment
    was
    initially
    installed
    is
    not
    necessarily
    sufficient:
    the
    violator
    needs
    to
    be
    in
    compliance
    (for
    consistency
    with
    the
    noncompliance
    date),
    and
    have
    already
    incurred
    all
    of
    the
    capital
    and
    one-time
    costs
    and
    started
    to
    incur
    the
    annual
    costs.
    (Often
    a
    significant
    amount
    of
    time
    is
    required
    to
    “break-in”
    the
    equipment
    and
    adjust
    it;
    thus
    the
    compliance
    date
    is
    when
    compliance
    is
    actually
    achieved.)
    Remember
    though
    that
    BEN
    is
    ultimately
    concerned
    with
    financial
    not
    legal
    dates:
    your
    object
    should
    be
    to
    “follow
    the
    money.”
    (In
    an
    extreme
    example,
    if
    a
    violator
    were
    to
    install
    the
    required
    capital
    equipment
    yet
    for
    some
    reason
    not
    operate
    it
    then
    for
    the
    purposes
    of
    BEN’s
    calculations
    of
    the
    capital
    investment
    economic
    benefit
    the
    violator
    is
    in
    compliance.)
    Using
    the
    legal
    dates
    of
    noncompliance
    and
    compliance
    can
    be
    a
    useful
    proxy,
    and
    will
    keep
    the
    noncompliance
    time
    period
    the
    correct
    length,
    but
    it
    will
    generally
    underestimate
    the
    true
    economic
    benefit
    (since
    the
    noncompliance
    period
    is
    being
    artificially
    shifted
    closer
    to
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date).
    3-12
    September
    1999

    Note
    that
    in
    economic
    benefit
    analyses,
    the
    compliance
    date
    must
    occur
    after
    the
    noncompliance
    date.
    A
    later
    compliance
    date
    (holding
    the
    noncompliance
    date
    constant)
    will,
    in
    virtually
    all
    cases,
    increase
    the
    economic
    benefit
    figure.
    If
    you
    are
    running
    BEN
    to
    calculate
    the
    after-tax
    net
    present
    value
    of
    an
    “early
    compliance”
    supplemental
    environmental
    project,
    then
    enter
    the
    date
    when
    the
    violator
    will
    comply
    early
    as
    the
    noncompliance
    date,
    and
    the
    date
    when
    the
    violator
    is
    required
    to
    comply
    as
    the
    compliance
    date.
    The
    dates
    are
    a
    major
    consideration
    in
    the
    BEN
    analysis.
    As
    the
    interval
    of
    non-compliance
    increases,
    the
    economic
    benefit
    generally
    increases.
    For
    each
    month
    that
    the
    violator
    delays
    compliance,
    it
    delays
    capital
    and
    one-time
    costs
    and
    avoids
    operation
    and
    maintenance
    expenses.
    In
    practice,
    the
    period
    of
    violation
    is
    sometimes
    not
    clear.
    Proving
    the
    entire
    period
    of
    violation
    might
    encounter
    evidentiary
    problems.
    It
    might
    be
    helpful
    to
    perform
    several
    different
    BEN
    runs
    to
    show
    the
    impact
    of
    different
    violation
    periods
    on
    economic
    benefit.
    Although
    a
    statute
    of
    limitations
    may
    apply
    in
    your
    case,
    it
    shouldgenerally
    affect
    only
    the
    maximum
    penalty
    you
    can
    assess
    (i.e.,
    the
    statutory
    cap).
    Since
    you
    are
    only
    trying
    to
    calculate
    the
    amount
    the
    violator
    gained
    by
    violating
    the
    law,
    you
    may
    go
    beyond
    any
    statute
    of
    limitations,
    as
    long
    as
    you
    do
    not
    exceed
    the
    statutory
    cap.
    Should
    your
    case
    go
    to
    trial
    or
    hearing,
    you
    should
    consult
    your
    legal
    staff
    before
    going
    forward
    with
    a
    benefit
    amount
    based
    on
    the
    earlier
    violations.
    Another
    point
    to
    keep
    in
    mind
    is
    that
    as
    of
    the
    datethe
    BEN
    analysis
    is
    performed,
    the
    violator
    might
    not
    yet
    be
    in
    compliance.
    Therefore,
    you
    must
    make
    an
    assumption
    regarding
    the
    date
    of
    eventual
    compliance.
    In
    discussions
    with
    the
    violator
    about
    the
    BEN
    calculation,
    you
    should
    be
    explicit
    about
    your
    compliance
    date
    assumption.
    Youshouldthen
    make
    clear
    to
    the
    violator
    that
    further
    delays
    in
    compliance
    will
    yield
    a
    higher
    economic
    benefit,
    and
    thus
    a
    higher
    penalty.
    Conversely,
    earlier
    compliance
    will
    yield
    a
    lower
    penalty.
    By
    conveying
    this
    information
    up
    front,
    you
    will
    give
    the
    violator
    added
    incentive
    to
    comply
    early,
    and
    will
    also
    avoid
    having
    to
    give
    the
    violator
    any
    “unpleasant
    surprises”
    should
    you
    have
    to
    increase
    the
    benefitcomponent
    of
    the
    penalty.
    C.
    OPTIONS
    The
    standard
    values
    in
    BEN
    are
    updated
    annually
    to
    reflect
    changes
    in
    interest
    rates,
    tax
    law,
    and
    so
    forth.
    Although
    these
    values
    are
    updated,
    the
    assumptions
    upon
    which
    they
    are
    based
    remain
    the
    same.
    If
    the
    case
    you
    are
    analyzing
    is
    significantly
    different
    from
    that
    represented
    by
    the
    standard
    values,
    you
    may
    wish
    to
    customize
    some
    of
    the
    optional
    inputs.
    In
    particularly
    complicated
    cases,
    you
    might
    also
    want
    to
    consult
    the
    EPA
    helpline
    (888-ECON-SPT).
    The
    options
    screen
    allows
    you
    tO
    modify
    the
    discount/compound
    rate,
    cost
    indices
    for
    inflation,
    number
    of
    replacement
    cycles,
    whether
    a
    cost
    is
    delayed
    or
    avoided,
    the
    useful
    life
    of
    capital
    equipment,
    future
    inflation
    rate,
    and
    the
    tax
    deductibility
    of
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditures.
    You
    should
    customize
    these
    variables
    only
    if
    you
    have
    reliable
    information
    to
    substantiate
    the
    change.
    3-13
    September1999

    Oicount/Coppound
    Rate
    110
    3%
    Capital
    1nvetment,
    Cost
    lnder
    for
    Inflation
    5
    {PC1
    j
    r
    Number
    offReplacmentCycles
    11
    {Jseful
    Life
    of
    aalEquipmnL
    115
    1
    Projeoted
    Rte
    for
    Future
    1
    IelayedNotAvotded
    —•
    -One
    Time
    Nondeprec,abtEtpendture
    P1iaDeductibfe
    f.
    ‘•
    Jlielaed
    NotAided
    12’
    t•
    r
    I
    .
    ,Costndex
    f&
    lnflatr.
    1.
    Discount
    I
    Compound
    Rate
    To
    compare
    the
    on-time
    and
    delayed
    compliance
    costs
    from
    different
    dates
    in
    a
    common
    measure,
    BEN
    adjusts
    both
    streams
    of
    costs
    (i.e.,
    “cash
    flows”)
    for
    inflation
    as
    of
    the
    date
    of
    initial
    noncompliance.
    After
    determining
    the
    initial
    economic
    benefit
    as
    of
    the
    noncompliance
    date
    (i.e.,
    the,
    difference
    between
    the
    on-time-case
    present
    value
    and
    the
    delay-case
    present
    value),
    BEN
    compounds
    this
    amount
    forward
    to
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    To
    perform
    these
    present
    value
    calculations,
    BEN
    must
    employ
    a
    discount/compound
    rate
    that
    reflects
    the
    violator’s
    “time
    value
    of
    money.”
    For
    a
    for-profit
    entity’s
    discount/compound
    rate,
    BEN
    uses
    the
    weighted-average
    cost
    of
    capital
    (WACC)
    for
    a
    typical
    company,
    reflecting
    the
    cost
    of
    debt
    and
    equity
    capital
    weighted
    by
    the
    value
    of
    each
    fmancing
    source.
    A
    company
    must
    on
    average
    earn
    a
    rate
    of
    return
    necessary
    to
    repay
    its
    debt
    holders
    (e.g.,
    banks,
    bondholders)
    and
    satisfy
    its
    equity
    owners
    (e.g.,
    partners,
    stock
    holders).
    While
    companies
    often
    earn
    rates
    in
    excess
    of
    their
    WACC,
    companies
    that
    do
    not
    on
    average
    earn
    at
    least
    their
    WACC
    will
    not
    survive
    (i.e.,
    their
    lenders
    will
    not
    receive
    their
    principal
    and/or
    interest
    payments,
    and
    their
    owners
    will
    be
    dissatisfied
    with
    their
    returns).
    The
    WACC
    represents
    the
    return
    3-14
    September
    1999

    a
    company
    can
    earn
    on
    monies
    not
    invested
    in
    pollution
    control,
    or,
    viewed
    alternatively,
    represents
    the
    avoided
    costs
    of
    financing
    pollution
    control
    investments.
    Thus,
    a
    company
    should
    make
    its
    business
    decisions
    by
    discounting
    cash
    flows
    at
    its
    WACC,
    and
    BEN
    follows
    the
    internal
    analysis
    a
    company
    will
    normally
    perform.
    For
    a
    not-for-profit
    discount/compound
    rate,
    BEN
    uses
    a
    typical
    municipality’s
    cost
    of
    debt,
    based
    on
    interest
    rates
    for
    general
    obligation
    bonds.
    You
    can
    view
    BEN’s
    discount/compound
    rate
    calculation
    by
    selecting
    the
    detail
    printouts
    after
    you
    calculate
    a
    run.
    BEN
    calculates
    the
    rate
    in
    each
    year,
    then
    uses
    the
    average
    of
    the
    annual
    rate
    over
    the
    period
    from
    the
    year
    of
    initial
    noncompliance
    through
    the
    year
    of
    penalty
    payment.
    Each
    yearEPA
    appends
    the
    BEN
    model
    so
    that
    it
    contains
    another
    year
    of
    data
    for
    the
    annual
    rates.
    Some
    violators
    will
    argue
    for
    rates
    tailored
    to
    their
    industry,
    company,
    or
    specific
    division,
    or,
    for
    a
    not-for-profit
    entity,
    actual
    bond
    issues
    or
    debt
    ratings.
    In
    general,
    you
    should
    involve
    a
    financial
    analyst
    or
    contact
    the
    U.S.
    EPA
    enforcement
    economics
    toll-free,
    helpline
    at
    888-
    ECONSPT
    (326-6778)
    if
    the
    violator
    raises
    an
    issue
    about
    the
    cost
    of
    capital.
    Also,
    you
    should
    inform
    the
    violator
    that
    a
    case-specific
    cost
    of
    capital
    could
    result
    in
    a
    higher
    discount/compound
    rate,
    which
    will
    increase
    the
    economic
    benefit
    result.
    If
    you
    customize
    the
    discount
    rate,
    be
    sure
    to
    enter
    it
    as
    a
    decimal.
    BEN
    will
    automatically
    convert
    it
    to
    a
    percentage.
    2.
    Inflation
    Indices
    and
    Projected
    Inflation
    Rate
    For
    actual
    historical
    inflation,
    BEN
    adjusts
    each
    cash
    flow
    from
    the
    date
    of
    the
    cost
    estimate
    by
    referencing
    a
    look-up
    table
    of
    cost
    index
    values.
    4
    The
    default
    cost
    index
    is
    the
    Plant
    Cost
    Index,
    from
    the
    magazine
    Chemical
    Engineering.
    This
    particular
    index
    may
    not
    be
    appropriate
    for
    every
    case.
    Thus
    BEN
    offers
    a
    pull-down
    menu
    for
    each
    compliance
    component
    listing
    other
    available
    cost
    indices.
    The
    inflation
    rate
    for
    each
    compliance
    cost
    category
    may
    be
    modified
    individually
    because
    the
    different
    cost
    categories
    may
    be
    affected
    by
    different
    inflationary
    trends.
    The
    table
    on
    the
    next
    page
    summarizes
    the
    optional
    indices.
    (EPA
    modifies
    the
    BEN
    model
    each
    year
    to
    include
    Unlike
    the
    earlier
    DOS
    version,
    BEN
    no
    longer
    applies
    an
    explicit
    inflation
    rate,
    although
    an
    annualized
    rate
    could
    be
    imputed
    from
    the
    model’s
    data.
    For
    example,
    suppose
    a
    $200
    cost
    estimate
    from
    1991
    must
    be
    adjusted
    for
    inflation
    to
    the
    same
    day
    in
    1992.
    The
    1991
    cost
    index
    value
    is
    100,
    whereas
    the
    1992
    index
    value
    is
    103.
    The
    calculation
    the
    model
    performs
    is
    $200
    *
    103
    /
    100
    $206
    (i.e.,
    multiplying
    the
    original
    cost
    estimate
    by
    the
    ratio
    of
    the
    cost
    index
    values
    from
    the
    date
    on
    which
    the
    cost
    is
    actually
    incuned,
    and
    the
    date
    on
    which
    the
    estimate’
    is
    made).
    The
    index
    change
    from
    1991
    to
    1992
    does
    represent
    an
    annual
    inflation
    rate
    of
    three
    percent
    (i.e.,
    103
    /
    100
    =
    1.03
    -
    1
    0.03),
    but
    the
    model
    does
    not
    directly
    apply
    this
    rate.
    A
    calculation
    that
    uses
    the
    ratio
    of
    the
    index
    values
    is
    both
    more
    precise
    and
    more
    simple
    than
    one
    that
    calculates
    multiple
    annual
    inflation
    rates
    over
    different
    periods
    for
    historical
    costs.
    3-15
    September
    1999

    new
    data
    from
    each
    index.)
    For
    projected
    future
    inflation,
    BEN
    extrapolates
    each
    cost
    index
    forward
    in
    time
    at
    a
    separate
    forecasted
    rate.
    5
    INFLATION
    INDICES
    Abbreviation
    and
    Full
    Name
    Description
    Typical
    Applications
    BCI
    Building
    Cost
    Index
    building
    costs;
    based
    on
    1.128
    tons
    general
    construction
    costs,
    Portland
    cement,
    1,088
    bd.
    ft.
    2x4
    especially
    structures
    lumber,
    68.38
    hrs.
    skilled
    labor
    BEN
    current
    BEN
    model’s
    average
    of
    PCI’s
    last
    10
    years;
    i.e.,
    replication
    of
    results
    from
    constant
    inflation
    rate
    a
    constant
    1.8%
    increase
    each
    year
    current
    BEN
    model
    version
    CCI
    Construction
    Cost
    construction
    costs;
    same
    as
    BCI,
    general
    construction
    projects,
    Index
    except
    200
    hrs.
    common
    labor
    especially
    where
    labor
    costs
    are
    a
    high
    proportion
    of
    total•
    costs
    CPI
    Consumer
    Price
    Index
    representative
    consumer
    goods
    compliance
    somehow
    involves
    consumer
    goods
    ECIM
    Employment
    Cost
    employment
    costs
    for
    the
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    Index:
    Manufacturing
    manufacturing
    industry
    expenditures
    or
    annual
    costs
    that
    comprise
    mainly
    labor
    ECTW
    Employment
    Cost
    employment
    costs
    for
    white
    collar
    same
    as
    ECIM,
    except
    Index:
    White
    Collar
    labor
    professional
    labor
    (e.g.,
    .
    permits)
    PCI
    Plant
    Cost
    Index
    plant
    equipment
    costs
    standard
    value
    In
    addition
    to
    the
    option
    of
    selecting
    an
    alternative
    to
    the
    PCI,
    BEN
    offers
    two
    other
    ways
    to
    modif,’
    its
    inflation
    adjustments.
    First,
    BEN
    uses
    a
    separate
    projected
    future
    inflation
    rate
    for
    any
    additional
    recurring
    capital
    replacement
    cycles
    after
    the
    first
    one.
    You
    can
    override
    the
    standard
    value,
    which
    is
    based
    on
    the
    PCI
    projected
    rate
    for
    future
    inflation.
    i
    you
    modify
    the
    inflation
    rate,
    be
    sure
    to
    enter
    it
    as
    a
    decimal.
    BEN
    will
    automatically
    convert
    it
    to
    a
    percentage.
    This
    is
    based
    upon
    a
    consensus
    forecast
    for
    the
    Consumer
    Price
    Index
    (CPI)
    and
    each
    individual
    index’s
    historical
    relationship
    to
    the
    CPI.
    The
    rationale
    for
    the
    calibration
    of
    the
    other
    indices
    to
    the
    CPI
    is
    that
    the
    CPI
    has
    widely
    available
    forecasts
    for
    projected
    inflation,
    but
    the
    others
    do
    not.
    3-16
    September
    1999

    Second,
    on
    the
    “Specific
    Cost
    Estimates”
    screen,
    you
    can
    override
    BEN’s
    inflation
    adjustments
    for
    the
    capital
    investment
    and
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditure,
    and
    instead
    enter
    separate
    estimates
    for
    these
    compliance
    costs
    as
    of
    the
    noncompliance
    date,
    compliance
    date,
    and
    the
    initial
    recurring
    cycle
    start
    dates.
    This
    customized
    data
    entry
    can
    represent
    another
    alternative
    cost
    index,
    case-specific
    inflation
    assumptions,
    or
    entirely
    different
    actions
    for
    on-time
    and
    delayed
    compliance.
    3.
    Capital
    Investment
    Replacement
    Cycles
    and
    Usefnl
    Life
    You
    can
    specify
    the
    number
    of
    replacement
    cycles
    for
    the
    capital
    equipment,
    and
    the
    useful
    life
    of
    the
    equipment
    (i.e.,
    the
    years
    between
    replacement
    cycles).
    A
    violator
    who
    delays
    installing
    pollution
    control
    equipment
    for,
    say,
    five
    years,
    benefits
    not
    only
    by
    delaying
    the
    initial
    expenditure
    five
    years,
    but
    also
    by
    postponing
    the
    second
    and
    potentially
    subsequent
    replacement
    cycles
    by
    the
    same
    five
    years.
    The
    BEN
    model
    defaults
    to
    one
    replacement
    cycle,
    although
    you
    can
    specify
    as
    many
    as
    five.
    Because
    the
    present
    value
    of
    future
    costs
    decreases
    rapidly
    the
    further
    they
    occur
    from
    the
    present,
    additional
    replacement
    cycles
    after
    the
    first
    cycle
    typically
    have
    almost
    no
    significant
    impact
    upon
    the
    economic
    benefit
    result.
    Not
    all
    capital
    investments
    need
    to
    be
    replaced
    at
    the
    end
    of
    their
    useful
    lives.
    For
    example,
    groundwater
    monitoring
    wells
    or
    other
    equipment
    used
    to
    close
    a
    RCRA
    site
    may
    not
    need
    to
    be
    replaced.
    By
    contrast,
    water
    and
    air
    pollution
    control
    equipment
    are
    typically
    replaced
    since
    this
    equipment
    is
    generally
    needed
    to
    support
    compliance
    for
    the
    foreseeable
    future.
    Most
    capital
    investments
    will
    be
    replaced.
    In
    identifying
    equipment
    as
    a
    one-time
    purchase,
    you
    should
    be
    convinced
    that
    the
    equipment
    will
    not
    require
    future
    replacement.
    If
    this
    is
    indeed
    the
    case,
    set
    the
    number
    of
    replacement
    cycles
    to
    zero.
    The
    useful
    life
    determines
    the
    number
    of
    years
    between
    replacement
    cyc1es
    Equipment
    with
    a
    long
    useful
    life
    is
    replaced
    less
    frequently
    thanequipment
    with
    a
    short
    useful
    life.
    Assuming
    the
    same
    investment
    cost
    per
    replacement
    cycle,
    the
    total
    present
    value
    of
    the
    costs
    of
    replacement
    for
    the
    longer-lived
    equipment
    would
    be
    lower
    (since
    each
    subsequent
    investment
    occurs
    later).
    Therefore,
    a
    longer
    useful
    life
    reduces
    the
    benefit
    of
    delaying
    compliance
    holding
    all
    other
    inputs
    constant
    although
    this
    impact
    might
    be
    offset
    somewhat
    if
    the
    shorter
    useful
    life
    triggers
    a
    more
    rapid
    depreciation
    schedule.
    If
    your
    capital
    investment
    reflects
    different
    pieces
    of
    equipment
    with
    significantly
    different
    replacement
    cycles
    and/or
    useful
    lives,
    you
    need
    to
    create
    separate
    BEN
    runs
    for
    the
    differing
    equipment.
    You
    can
    add
    together
    the
    results
    from
    the
    two
    calculations
    to
    determine
    the
    total
    economic
    benefit.
    3-17
    September
    1999

    4.
    Avoided
    vs.
    Delayed
    BEN’s
    default
    assumption
    is
    that
    both
    the
    capital
    investment
    and
    the
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditure
    are
    delayed,
    not
    avoided.
    If
    the
    violator
    will
    instead
    never
    incur
    such
    compliance
    costs,
    then
    uncheck
    the
    “Avoided,
    Not
    Delayed”
    delayed
    boxes.
    Also,
    for
    an
    avoided
    capital
    investment,
    you
    should
    change
    the
    replacement
    cycles
    to
    0,
    unless
    the
    violator
    has
    avoided
    not
    only
    the
    initial
    installation
    but
    also
    its
    replacement.
    5.
    Tax
    Deductibility
    of
    One-Time
    Nondepreciable
    Expenditure
    Most
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditures
    are
    tax-deductible;
    with
    the-primary
    exception
    being
    purchases
    Of
    land.
    Landis
    an
    asset
    and,
    therefore,
    cannot
    be
    deducted
    as
    an
    expense
    from
    taxable
    income.
    BEN
    assumes
    that
    the
    expenditure
    is
    tax-deductible
    unless
    you
    uncheck
    the
    box.
    D.
    SPECIFIC
    COST
    ESTIMATES
    The
    specific
    cost
    estimate
    screen
    allowsyou
    to
    view
    BEN’s
    inflation
    adjustments,
    which
    calculate
    specific
    cost
    estimates
    for
    certain
    dates,
    extrapolating
    from
    the
    original
    single
    cost
    estimate
    (whichyou
    enter
    on
    the
    earlier
    screen
    for
    compliance
    components
    data).
    This
    screen
    also
    allows
    you
    to
    override
    BEN’s
    calculations
    for
    the
    specific
    cost
    estimates.
    You
    reach
    the
    specific
    cost
    estimates
    screen
    by
    pressing
    [Specific
    Cost
    Estimates]
    at
    the
    bottom
    of
    the
    options
    screen.
    All
    data
    except
    for
    the
    specific
    cost
    estimates
    are
    “grayed
    out”,
    since
    BEN
    allows
    to
    you
    override
    only
    the
    final
    estimates,
    not
    the
    intermediate
    calculations.
    Changing
    your
    inputs
    on
    prior
    screens,
    however,
    will
    have
    an
    impact
    on
    the
    “grayed-out”
    data,
    unless
    you
    click
    [OK]
    on
    this
    screen,
    which
    will
    lock
    in
    your
    inputs
    on
    prior
    screens.
    (BEN
    takes
    this
    action
    because
    otherwise
    it
    would
    not
    know
    whether
    you
    intended
    subsequent
    changes
    to
    prior
    screens
    to
    affect
    the
    customized
    data
    you
    have
    entered
    on
    this
    screen.)
    Clicking
    [OK]
    on
    this
    screen
    will
    also
    visually
    erase
    all
    of
    the
    other
    data
    when
    you
    return
    to
    this
    screen
    in
    the
    future.
    (BEN
    takes
    this
    action
    because
    it
    does
    not
    know
    howmuch
    of
    the
    other
    data
    you
    incorporated
    into
    your
    customized
    specific
    cost
    estimates.)
    BEN
    displays
    four
    separate
    columns
    of
    data,
    corresponding
    to
    the
    start
    dates
    of
    the
    on-time
    compliance
    scenario
    (i.e.,
    the
    noncompliance
    date),
    the
    delay
    compliance
    scenario
    (i.e.,
    the
    compliance
    date),
    the
    on-time
    replacement
    cycle
    (i.e.,
    the
    noncompliance
    date
    plus
    the
    useful
    life
    of
    capital
    equipment),
    and
    the
    delay
    replacement
    cycle
    (i.e.,
    the
    compliance
    date
    plus
    the
    useful
    life).
    The
    first
    row
    simply
    provides
    the
    date
    for
    each
    scenario,
    as
    calculated
    above.
    The
    next
    rows
    are
    divided
    into
    two
    groupings:
    the
    first
    for
    capital
    investments,
    and
    the
    second
    for
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditures.
    3-18
    September
    1999

    Each
    grouping
    starts
    with
    a
    row
    for
    the
    single
    cost
    estimate
    you
    originally
    entered
    on
    the
    basic
    rim
    input
    screen.
    The
    second
    row
    then
    displays
    the
    value
    of
    the
    selected
    cost
    index
    (the
    Plant
    Cost
    Index
    is
    the
    default)
    as
    of
    the
    cost
    estimate
    date,
    and
    the
    third
    row
    displays
    the
    value
    for
    the
    same
    cost
    index
    as
    the
    specific
    cost
    estimate
    date.
    The
    final
    row
    (as
    the
    operator
    signs
    between
    the
    rows
    indicate)
    is
    equal
    to
    the
    first
    row
    divided
    by
    the
    second
    row,
    multiplied
    by
    the
    third
    row.
    x
    -
    Compliance
    Start
    Replacement
    Cycle
    S1rt
    On-Time
    Oely
    On-Time
    Oel
    -
    Jn-1S92
    I
    I01007
    ]
    Ifh-2012
    I
    Dapital
    Investment
    -
    -
    Origwal
    cost
    Ethmate,
    .l1
    P000
    000
    I
    )s
    ooo.
    000
    I
    jsi
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    OOcL000
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    Index
    Value
    as
    oF
    IA);
    j359500
    -
    353.500
    J5oo
    500
    Cost
    Index
    Valueasof
    18);
    }5500
    I
    j383.300
    -
    J442.833
    Jt776
    -
    SeciFicCos
    Estimate:
    j$t000.000
    1
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    -
    i$L23L803
    $1.340i27
    I
    One
    Time.
    Iondeprecia
    Ic
    Expenditure
    *
    (J-
    Original
    Cost
    Esimate-Date
    Original
    ot
    Esti
    ate
    )$1
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    I
    I
    00000
    -
    Specific
    Cost
    Estima
    e
    Date
    ostlndexValueasoI
    A
    1359500
    359.500
    I
    -
    -—
    Cost
    Index
    Value
    as
    oFfBJ.
    35
    500
    -
    j383.
    300
    SpecifiDost
    Estimat
    j$1
    00M00
    I
    Isi
    06620
    -
    -
    -
    -
    -‘
    0K
    I0i1
    3-19
    September
    1999

    If
    you
    click
    [OKI
    on
    the
    specific
    cost
    estimate
    screen,
    exit
    it
    and
    then
    later
    return,
    all
    of
    the
    intermediate
    calculations
    will
    be
    blank,
    and
    only
    the
    final
    specific
    cost
    estimates
    will
    appear:
    Reasons
    for
    modifying
    BEN’s
    calculations
    can
    include
    the
    following,
    but
    be
    prepared
    to
    -
    document
    your
    actions
    and
    rationale.
    3-20
    September
    1999

    1.
    Separate
    Cost
    Estimates
    for
    Noncompliance
    and
    Compliance
    Dates
    This
    could
    reflect
    several
    scenarios:
    the
    violator
    obtained
    a
    cost
    estimate
    at
    the
    noncompliance
    date,
    even
    though
    it
    did
    not
    comply
    until
    later;
    technological
    change
    between
    the
    noncompliance
    and
    compliance
    dates
    implies
    that
    different
    compliance
    measures
    were
    available
    at
    the
    two
    dates;
    or,
    regulatory
    change
    over
    time
    mandated
    different
    compliance
    measures
    at
    the
    noncompliance
    vs.
    compliance
    dates.
    Under
    such
    scenarios,
    use
    the
    most
    recent
    data
    for
    the
    original
    capital
    cost
    estimate
    so
    that
    it
    reflects
    the
    delay
    compliance
    scenario
    (ensuring
    that
    any
    future
    capital
    equipment
    replacement
    cycles
    are
    calculated
    correctly).
    Then,
    override
    the
    specific
    cost
    estimate
    in
    the
    first
    column
    (i.e.,
    on-time
    scenario
    compliance
    start)
    with
    the
    correct
    estimate.
    In
    the
    example
    below,
    the
    violator
    obtained
    a
    cost
    estimate
    for
    required
    capital
    investments
    of
    $100,000
    at
    the
    date
    of
    noncompliance
    (January
    1,
    1992),
    but
    because
    of
    technological
    change
    it
    only
    had
    to
    spend
    $80,000
    when
    it
    came
    into
    compliance
    on
    January
    1,
    1997.
    The
    user
    entered
    the
    $80,000
    estimate
    (with
    an
    estimate
    date
    of
    January
    1,
    1997)
    as
    the
    capital
    investment
    cost
    on
    the
    initial
    input
    screen.
    The
    specific
    cost
    estimate
    screen
    then
    appears
    as:
    SPC2:
    Specific
    Cost
    Estimates
    3-21
    September
    1999

    However,
    had
    the
    violator
    actually
    complied
    on
    time
    it
    would
    have
    faced
    a
    capital
    investment
    of
    $100,000
    (the
    estimate
    it
    received
    in
    1992),
    not
    $75,033
    (the
    specific
    cost
    estimate
    as
    calculated
    from
    the
    1997
    estimate).
    To
    reflect
    this,
    the
    user
    changed
    the
    on-time
    compliance
    specific
    cost
    estimate
    to
    $100,000.
    SPC
    2:
    Specific
    Cost
    Estimates
    3-22
    September
    1999

    2.
    Inflation
    Data
    More
    Appropriate
    than
    BEN’s
    Although
    BEN
    offers
    many
    other
    alternative
    cost
    indices
    in
    addition
    to
    its
    defaultPlant
    Cost
    Index,
    occasionally
    some
    other
    inflation
    adjustment
    may
    be
    necessary.
    If
    so,
    override
    whichever
    specific
    cost
    estimates
    you
    believe
    are
    inaccurate.
    (If
    you
    are
    using
    some
    other
    index,
    you
    might
    want
    to
    create
    a
    spreadsheet
    that
    mimics
    the
    BEN
    screen,
    substituting
    your
    index’s
    values
    for
    the
    ones
    on
    the
    screen)
    In
    the
    following
    example,
    the
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditure
    consists
    mostly
    of
    chemicals.
    A
    subset
    of
    the
    Producer
    Price
    Index
    for
    chemicals
    will
    give
    a
    more
    precise
    inflation
    adjustment
    than
    the
    various
    indices
    BEN
    offers.
    You
    can
    use
    this
    chemicalindex
    to
    adjust
    the
    original
    cost
    estimate
    for
    inflation
    as
    shown
    in
    the
    table
    below:
    Specific
    Cost
    Estimate
    Transportation
    Equipment
    Index
    On-Time
    Delay
    (1/1/1992)
    (1/1/1997)
    Original
    Cost
    Estimate
    100,000
    100,000
    Costlndex
    Value
    111.0
    111.0
    as
    of
    original
    estimate
    date
    x
    x
    Costlndex
    Value
    111.0
    116.9
    as
    of
    specific
    cost
    estimate
    date
    =
    =
    Specific
    Cost
    Estimate
    1,000,000
    105,315
    Once
    you
    have
    calculated
    the
    appropriate
    specific
    cost
    estimates,
    you
    can
    incorporate
    them
    into
    the
    BEN
    calculation
    by
    overriding
    the
    values
    on
    the
    specific
    cost
    estimate
    screen,
    as
    shown
    on
    the
    next
    page.
    3-23
    September
    1999

    ISSUES
    THAT
    ARISE
    WITH
    BEN
    CHAPTER
    4
    Section
    A
    of
    this
    chapter
    provides
    guidance
    for
    addressing
    common
    arguments
    made
    by
    violators.
    Section
    B
    discusses
    how
    to
    characterize
    more
    complicated
    compliance
    scenarios.
    A.
    COMMON
    VIOLATOR
    ARGUMENTS
    1.
    Cost
    of
    roof
    on
    new
    treatment
    building
    should
    be
    excluded
    since
    roof
    is
    not
    needed
    to
    operate
    treatment
    system.
    In
    virtually
    all
    cases
    BEN
    should
    include
    the
    cost
    of
    the
    roof
    unless
    the
    violator
    can
    conclusively
    prove
    that
    the
    treatment
    system
    would
    operate
    just
    as
    effectively
    and
    efficiently
    without
    the
    roof
    (all
    else
    being
    equal)
    and
    that
    the
    roof
    is
    not
    a
    customary
    part
    of
    such
    treatment
    systems.
    A
    violator
    can
    almost
    never
    support
    this
    claim,
    since
    it
    must
    essentially
    argue
    that
    installing
    a
    roof
    was
    a
    waste
    of
    money
    (serving
    no
    sensible
    business
    purpose).
    2.
    Cost
    ofpainting
    walls
    and
    landscaping
    treatment
    building
    should
    be
    excluded
    since
    they
    are
    unnecessary
    for
    compliance.
    While
    such
    items
    may
    not
    be
    directly
    necessary
    to
    achieve
    compliance,
    if
    these
    items
    are
    normally
    part
    of
    such
    projects,
    then
    BEN
    should
    include
    their
    costs.
    Such
    expenditures
    often
    provide
    intangible
    and
    tangible
    benefits,
    such
    as
    improving
    the
    appearance
    of
    the
    facility,
    reducing
    erosion
    and
    dust,
    preserving
    the
    building,
    and
    creating
    a
    more
    attractive
    environment
    for
    employees,
    visitors,
    and
    customers.
    Presumably
    these
    expenditures
    would
    have
    been
    necessary
    for
    on-time
    compliance,
    and
    hence
    the
    violator
    benefitted
    by
    delaying
    them.
    4-1
    September
    1999

    3.
    Cost
    of
    an
    extra
    (backup)
    pump
    should
    be
    excluded,
    since
    it
    is
    unlikely
    ever
    to
    be
    used.
    While
    the
    pump
    may
    never
    be
    used,
    if
    reasonable
    engineering
    practice
    would
    include
    an
    extra
    pump
    (or
    any
    other
    backup
    systems),
    then
    BEN
    should
    include
    its
    cost.
    Given
    that
    the
    violator
    did
    (or
    will)
    purchase
    the
    extra
    pump,
    the
    burden
    is
    on
    the
    violator
    to
    show
    that
    it
    is
    unnecessary
    to
    achieve
    and
    consistently
    maintain
    compliance.
    Further,
    even
    if
    the
    cost
    of
    the
    extra
    pump
    were
    subtracted
    from
    the
    capital
    investment,
    annual
    operation
    and
    maintenance
    costs
    might
    need
    to
    be
    increased
    to
    reflect
    the
    greater
    importance
    of
    maintaining
    the
    existing
    pumps.
    4
    Cost
    of
    building
    second
    floor
    above
    treatment
    plant
    should
    be
    excluded
    since
    it
    is
    used
    exclusively
    for
    purposes
    unrelated
    to
    compliance.
    If
    the
    second
    floor
    does
    not
    support
    the
    pollution
    control
    system,
    then
    the
    incremental
    cost
    of
    building
    the
    second
    floor
    may
    be
    subtracted
    from
    the
    capital
    investment.
    5.
    Cost
    of
    building
    tertiary
    treatment
    system
    should
    be
    excluded
    since
    only
    primary
    and
    secondary
    treatment
    systems
    were
    necessary
    to
    remedy
    violations.
    If
    the
    tertiary
    treatment
    system
    really
    was
    unnecessary
    to
    prevent
    the
    violations
    alleged
    in
    the
    complaint,
    but
    rather
    is
    necessary
    for
    achieving
    compliance
    with
    future
    standards,
    then
    subtract
    its
    cost
    from
    the
    capital
    investment.
    Recall
    that
    the
    capital
    investment
    should
    reflect
    the
    pollution
    control
    system
    that
    was
    necessary
    to
    remedy
    the
    violations
    at
    the
    time
    and
    under
    the
    conditions
    alleged
    in
    the
    complaint.
    The
    violator,
    however,
    must
    convince
    EPA
    that
    the
    additional
    cost
    is
    truly
    unrelated
    to
    remedying
    the
    violations
    alleged
    in
    the
    complaint.
    6.
    No
    additional
    labor
    is
    necessary
    to
    operate
    new
    pollution
    control
    system,
    since
    existing
    employees
    operating
    old
    system
    will
    operate
    it.
    If
    the
    existing
    employees
    were
    operating
    an
    old
    pollution
    control
    system
    replaced
    by
    the
    new
    system,
    then
    this
    claim
    may
    be
    correct.
    Presumably
    the
    total
    labor
    costs
    associated
    with
    the
    old
    pollution
    control
    system
    (replaced
    by
    the
    new
    system)
    areless
    than
    or
    equal
    to
    the
    labor
    costs
    for
    the
    new
    system.
    If
    the
    new
    system
    is
    more
    efficient
    to
    operate,
    even
    less
    labor
    may
    be
    required.
    Your
    entry
    for
    annually
    recurring
    costs
    should
    reflect
    this
    and
    can
    even
    be
    negative.
    7.
    Labor
    costs
    for
    new
    system
    are
    really
    zero
    because
    we
    are
    reassigning
    workers
    from
    another
    part
    ofplant;
    thus,
    since
    we
    are
    not
    hiring
    additional
    workers
    to
    run
    system,
    we
    have
    no
    incremental
    labor
    costs.
    This
    claim
    is
    not
    correct
    since
    the
    employees
    who
    will
    operate
    the
    new
    system
    are
    not
    coming
    from
    the
    old
    pollution
    control
    system
    that
    is
    being
    replaced.
    Rather,
    they
    are
    coming
    from
    4-2
    September
    1999

    another
    part
    of
    the
    facility
    and
    the
    facility
    will
    be
    deprived
    of
    the
    productive
    work
    these
    employees
    were
    doing.
    If
    the
    violator
    had
    complied
    on-time,
    it
    would
    have
    had
    to
    shift
    these
    employees
    to
    pollution
    control
    and
    given
    up
    the
    work
    these
    employees
    otherwise
    would
    have
    done
    somewhere
    else
    (e.g.,
    the
    production
    line)
    during
    the
    period
    of
    noncompliance.
    This
    is
    the
    concept
    of
    opportunity
    cost:
    the
    cost
    of
    resources
    for
    a
    particular
    use
    is
    measured
    by
    the
    benefit
    lost
    in
    forfeiting
    their
    most
    profitable
    alternative
    use.
    •B.
    CHARACTERIZING
    COMPLIANCE
    SCENARIOS
    1.
    Violator
    Spends
    $100,000
    on
    System
    that
    Does
    Not
    Work.
    The
    violator
    should
    have
    spent
    $1,000,000
    to
    install
    a
    satisfactory
    system,
    but
    instead
    spent
    $100,000
    on-time
    for
    a
    system
    that
    did
    not
    work.
    If
    the
    system
    did
    not
    result
    in
    compliance,
    it
    is
    questionable
    that
    the
    system’s
    expenditures
    were
    in
    fact
    intended
    for
    compliance.
    Unless
    some
    other
    factor
    is
    present,
    the
    conect
    entry
    for
    the
    capital
    cost
    should
    be
    $1,000,000.
    The
    enforcement
    team
    might
    find
    that
    the
    violator
    had
    some
    reasonable
    basis
    or
    justification
    for
    selecting
    the
    inexpensive
    technology.
    If
    the
    violator
    went
    to
    a
    reputable
    firm,
    the
    firm
    recommended
    the
    system
    that
    failed,
    and
    the
    violator’s
    reliance
    on
    the
    recommendation
    was
    reasonable,
    then
    you
    should
    offset
    the
    economic
    benefit
    by
    the
    after-tax
    present
    value
    of
    the
    unsuccessful
    expenditure.
    You
    could
    use
    BEN
    to
    calculate
    this
    offset,
    although
    remember
    that
    this
    is
    a
    case-specific
    judgement
    for
    the
    litigation
    team.
    2.
    System
    “Works,
    “But
    Is
    Too
    Small.
    The
    violator
    spent
    $100,000
    on-time
    for
    a
    system
    that
    was
    too
    small
    to
    solve
    the
    pollution
    problem,
    but
    the
    existing
    system
    can
    be
    incorporated
    into
    the
    fmal,
    fully
    sized
    system.
    The
    Agency
    should
    subtract
    from
    the
    total
    required
    investment
    the
    $100,000
    already
    spent;
    the
    BEN
    capital
    investment
    input
    would
    be
    $900,000.
    The
    reason
    for
    this
    treatment
    is
    that
    the
    violator
    gained
    a
    benefit
    on
    only
    the
    $900,000
    that
    it
    did
    not
    spend,
    not
    the
    $100,000
    it
    did
    spend.
    3.
    Same
    as
    Scenario
    2,
    But
    Violator
    Has
    Letter
    from
    Government
    OfficiaiApp
    roving
    System.
    While
    the
    violator
    has
    a
    reason
    for
    being
    out
    of
    compliance,
    it
    still
    had
    the
    benefit
    of
    using
    the
    $900,000
    for
    other
    purposes
    while
    it
    was
    in
    violation.
    Thus,
    BEN’s
    capital
    investment
    is
    still
    $900,000.
    BEN
    is
    “no-fault”
    in
    nature.
    Regardless
    of
    how
    good
    the
    violator’s
    excuse
    is,
    it
    still
    had
    the
    use
    of
    the
    $900,000
    over
    the
    period
    of
    the
    violation.
    The
    only
    difference
    between
    this
    and
    scenario
    2
    is
    the
    existence
    of
    an
    arguable
    approval
    by
    the
    regulatory
    agency,
    but
    this
    is
    a
    legal
    distinction,
    not
    an
    economic
    one,
    possibly
    affecting
    the
    gravity
    component
    of
    the
    penalty,
    but
    not
    the
    economic
    benefit
    component.
    4-3
    September
    1999

    4.
    Violator
    Complies
    in
    Stages.
    The
    violator
    put
    part
    of
    the
    pollution
    system
    into
    operation
    (with
    actual
    pollution
    reduction)
    one
    year
    after
    the
    noncompliance
    date
    at
    a
    cost
    of
    $200,000.
    One
    year
    later
    (and
    two
    years
    after
    the
    noncompliance
    date),
    the
    violator
    put
    a
    second
    piece
    of
    the
    system
    costing
    $300,000
    into
    operation
    (which
    resulted
    in
    additional
    pollution
    reduction).
    Three
    years
    later
    the
    entire
    system
    was
    in
    operation,
    and
    the
    final
    piece
    cost
    $500,000.
    If
    on-time
    compliance
    could
    have
    been
    achieved
    in
    one
    stage
    instead
    of
    three
    (see
    timeline
    below),
    create
    three
    separate
    BEN
    runs,
    each
    with
    the
    same
    noncompliance
    date:
    $200,000
    capital
    investment,and
    a
    one-year
    period
    of
    noncompliance;
    $300,000
    capital
    investment,
    and
    a
    two-year
    period
    of
    noncompliance;
    $500,000
    capital
    investment,
    and
    a
    three-year
    period
    of
    noncompliance.
    As
    the
    violator
    paid
    for
    each
    component,
    it
    was
    no
    longer
    delaying
    the
    purchase
    of
    that
    equipment.
    Add
    the
    results
    from
    the
    three
    runs
    to
    determine
    the
    total
    economic
    benefit.
    HYPOTHETICAL
    COMPLYING
    FIRM’S
    TIMELINE
    (not
    adjusted
    for
    inflation)
    BEN’s
    noncompliance
    date:
    7/119Z
    7/1193
    711794
    7/1/95
    I
    I
    Decision
    Expenditures
    to
    comply
    for
    $1,000,000
    on-time
    NONCOMPLYING
    FIRM’S
    ACTUAL
    TIMEUINE
    BEN’s
    compliance
    dates
    for.
    Run
    2:
    7/1/92
    7/1/93
    7/1/94
    7/1/95
    7/1196
    7/1/97
    7/1/98
    Decision
    Expenditures
    Expenditures
    Expenditures
    to
    comply
    for
    Part
    A
    for
    Part
    B
    for
    Part
    C
    in
    delayed
    $200,000
    $300,000
    $500,000
    fashion
    4-4
    September
    1999

    5.
    System
    is
    Operational
    at
    Conclusion
    of
    Series
    of
    Expenditures.
    This
    is
    similar
    to
    scenario
    4
    (where
    the
    violator
    purchased
    and
    installed
    the
    various
    system
    components
    over
    three
    years),
    except
    that
    here
    the
    system
    is
    put
    into
    operation
    only
    after
    all
    of
    its
    components
    are
    installed,
    instead
    of
    sequentially.
    You
    should
    create
    one
    BEN
    run
    with
    a
    capital
    investment
    of
    $1,000,000
    and
    a
    three-year
    noncompliance
    period.
    This
    assumes
    that
    on-time
    compliance
    would
    have
    been
    accomplished
    the
    same
    way
    as
    delayed
    compliance,
    in
    three
    separate
    stages.
    For
    both
    on-time
    and
    delayed
    compliance,
    three
    years
    are
    necessary
    to
    comply,
    and
    therefore
    if
    the
    violator
    had
    complied
    on
    time
    it
    would
    have
    needed
    to
    start
    three
    years
    before
    the
    compliance
    date.
    Note
    that
    BEN’s
    calculation
    here
    is
    based
    upon
    the
    simplifying
    assumption
    that
    all
    the
    money
    was
    spent
    on
    a
    single
    date,
    i.e.,
    the
    day
    compliance
    was
    achieved.
    Instead
    of
    this
    simplifying
    assumption,
    you
    could
    instead
    create
    three
    separate
    BEN
    runs,
    with
    different
    noncompliance
    and
    compliance
    dates
    (yet
    hence
    the
    same-length
    noncompliance
    period).
    This
    will
    yield
    a
    slightly
    higher
    BEN
    result,
    although
    the
    additional
    complexity
    may.
    not
    be
    worth
    the
    additional
    accuracy
    (especially
    if
    the
    noncompliance
    period
    is
    long
    relative
    to
    the
    period
    over
    which
    the
    actual
    expenditures
    are
    spread
    out).
    September
    1999
    HYPOTHETICAL
    COMPLYING
    FIRM’S
    TU’4ELINE
    (not
    adjusted
    for
    inflation)
    BEN’s
    noncompliance
    date:
    7/1/92
    7/1/93
    7/1/94
    7/1/95
    Decision
    Expenditures
    Expenditures
    Expenditures
    to
    comply
    for
    Part
    A
    for
    Part
    B
    for
    Part
    C
    on-time
    $200,000
    $300,000
    $500,000
    System
    on-line
    NONCOMPLVIt’G
    FIRM’S
    ACTUAL
    TIMELINE
    BEN’s
    cp1iancedat
    711192
    7/1/93
    7/1/94
    7/1/95
    7/1/96
    7/1/97
    711/98
    I
    I
    I
    Decision
    Expenditures
    Expenditures
    Expenditures
    to
    comply
    for
    Part
    A
    for
    Part
    B
    for
    Part
    C
    -
    in
    delayed
    $200,000
    $300,000
    $500,000
    fashion
    System
    on-line
    4-5

    6.
    Pollution
    Control
    Equipment
    Will
    Be
    Leased,
    Not
    Purchased.
    The
    violator
    is
    actually
    leasing
    the
    equipment
    it
    needs
    to
    comply
    for
    $125,000
    per
    year.
    Ratherthan
    entering
    the
    $1,000,000
    as
    a
    capital
    cost,
    you
    should
    enter
    a
    zero
    for
    capital
    investment
    and
    $125,000
    as
    an
    annually
    recurring
    cost.
    7.
    Compliance
    is
    “Cheaper”
    than
    Noncompliance.
    The
    violator
    comes
    into
    compliance
    late
    and
    finds
    that
    it
    has
    been
    saving
    money
    since
    it
    installed
    the
    new
    technology.
    This
    may
    occur
    because
    the
    compliant
    technology
    allows
    the
    violator
    to
    recover
    materials
    and/or
    reduce
    operation
    and
    maintenance
    costs.
    BEN
    produces
    a
    negative
    result,
    seemingly
    confirming
    that
    the
    violator
    would
    have
    been
    better
    off
    had
    it
    complied
    on-time.
    Other
    factors
    may
    have
    caused
    the
    violator
    to
    delay
    compliance,
    or
    perhaps
    the
    violator
    was
    unaware
    not
    only
    of
    the
    potential
    cost
    savings
    from
    compliance
    but
    also
    the
    status
    of
    its
    noncompliance.
    Be
    wary
    of
    such
    negative
    economic
    benefit
    results!
    For
    example,
    the
    violator
    might
    have
    felt
    that
    the
    new
    processes
    and
    technology
    needed
    to
    comply
    would
    have
    adversely
    affected
    its
    product
    quality.
    In
    that
    case,
    the
    violator
    probably
    realized
    an
    economic
    benefit
    from
    not
    having
    its
    product
    quality
    adversely
    affected
    by
    the
    compliant
    technology.
    This
    constitutes
    illegal
    competitive
    advantage,
    and
    typically
    requires
    additional
    research
    into
    the
    alternative
    compliance
    scenarios
    and
    their
    financial
    impacts.
    Even
    if
    the
    economic
    benefit
    really
    is
    negative,
    the
    enforcement
    team
    should
    carefully
    consider
    the
    appropriate
    gravity
    component
    of
    the
    penalty,
    since
    the
    violations
    might
    still
    be
    serious,
    despite
    the
    lack
    of
    economic
    gain
    to
    the
    violator.
    4-6
    September
    1999

    DETAILED
    CALCULATIONS
    APPENDIX
    A
    This
    technical
    appendix
    explains
    in
    detail
    how
    the
    BEN
    computer
    program
    calculates
    the
    economic
    benefit
    a
    violator
    gains
    from
    delaying
    or
    avoiding
    compliance
    with
    environmental
    regulations.
    The
    first
    section
    is
    an
    introduction
    to
    the
    theory
    and
    underlying
    assumptions
    of
    BEN.
    The
    second
    section
    is
    a
    step-by-step
    explanation
    of
    a
    sample
    economic
    benefit
    calculation.
    A.
    THEORY
    AND
    OVERVIEW
    Economic
    benefit
    represents
    the
    financial
    gains
    that
    a
    violator
    accrues
    by
    delaying
    and/or
    avoiding
    pollution
    control
    expenditures.
    Funds
    not
    spent
    on
    environmental
    compliance
    are
    available
    for
    other
    profit-making
    activities
    or,
    alternatively,
    a
    defendant
    avoids
    the
    costs
    associated
    with
    obtaining
    additional
    funds
    for
    environmental
    compliance.
    (This
    concept
    is
    known
    in
    economics
    as
    opportunity
    cost.)
    Economic
    benefit
    is
    “no
    fault”
    in
    nature:
    a
    defendant
    need
    not
    have
    deliberately
    chosen
    to
    delay
    compliance
    (for
    financial
    or
    any
    other
    reasons),
    or
    in
    fact
    even
    have
    been
    aware
    of
    its
    noncompliance,
    for
    it
    to
    have
    accrued
    the
    economic
    benefit
    of
    noncompliance.
    The
    appropriate
    economic
    benefit
    calculation
    should
    represent
    the
    amount
    of
    money
    that
    would
    make
    the
    violator
    indifferent
    between
    compliance
    and
    noncompliance.
    (BEN
    implicitly
    assumes
    a
    100-percent
    probability
    of
    the
    violator
    payingthat
    sum
    of
    money
    in
    the
    form
    of
    a
    civil
    penalty,
    but
    as
    that
    probability
    declines,
    the
    amount
    of
    money
    increases
    that
    would
    make
    the
    violator
    indifferent
    between
    compliance
    and
    noncompliance.)
    If
    the
    enforcement
    agency
    fails
    to
    recover
    through
    a
    civil
    penalty
    at
    least
    this
    economic
    benefit,
    then
    the
    violator
    will
    retain
    a
    gain.
    Because
    of
    the
    precedent
    of
    this
    retained
    gain,
    other
    regulated
    companies
    may
    see
    an
    economic
    advantage
    in
    similar
    noncompliance,
    and
    the
    penalty
    will
    fail
    to
    deter
    potential
    violators.
    Economic
    benefit
    does
    not
    represent
    compensation
    to
    the
    enforcement
    agency
    as
    in
    a
    typical
    “damages”
    calculation
    for
    a
    tort
    case,
    but
    instead
    is
    the
    minimum
    amount
    by
    which
    the
    violator
    must
    be
    penalized
    so
    as
    to
    return
    it
    to
    the
    position
    it
    would
    have
    been
    in
    had
    it
    complied
    on
    time.
    The
    economic
    benefit
    calculation
    must
    incorporate
    the
    concept
    of
    the
    “time
    value
    of
    money.”
    In
    simple
    terms,
    a
    dollar
    yesterday
    is
    worth
    more
    than
    a
    dollar
    today
    since
    yesterday’s
    dollar
    had
    A-l
    September
    1999

    investment
    opportunities.
    Thus,the
    further
    in
    the
    past
    the
    dollar
    is,
    the
    more
    it
    is
    worth
    in
    “present
    value”
    terms.
    The
    greater
    the
    timevalue
    of
    money
    (i.e.,
    the
    greater
    the
    “discount”
    or“compound”
    rate),
    the
    more
    valuepast
    costs
    have
    in
    present
    value
    terms.
    Pollution
    control
    expenditures
    can
    include:
    (1)
    Capital
    investments
    (e.g.,
    pollution
    control
    equipment),
    (2)
    One-time
    nondepreciableexpenditures
    (e.g.,
    setting
    up
    a
    reporting
    system,
    or
    acquiring
    land),
    (3)
    Annually
    recurring
    costs
    (e.g.,
    operating
    and
    maintenance
    costs,
    or
    off-site
    disposal
    of
    fluids
    from
    injection
    wells).
    Each
    of
    these
    expenditures
    can
    be
    either
    delayedor
    avoided.
    s
    baseline
    assumption
    is
    thatcapital
    investments
    and
    one-time
    nondepreciable
    expenditures
    are
    merely
    delayed
    over
    the
    period
    of
    noncompliance,
    whereas
    annual
    costs
    are
    avoided
    entirely
    over
    this
    period.
    BEN
    does
    allow
    you,
    however,
    to
    analyze
    any
    combination
    of
    delayed
    and
    avoided
    expenditures.
    BEN
    derives
    a
    violator’s
    economic
    benefit
    in
    several
    steps.
    First
    BEN
    adjusts
    compliance
    costs
    fromthe
    cost
    estimate
    dateto
    the
    date
    when
    they
    wouldhave
    been
    expended
    had
    the
    violator
    complied
    on
    time(on-time
    scenario)
    and
    to
    the
    date
    when
    they
    will
    be
    expended
    as
    the
    violator
    comes
    into
    compliance
    (delayscenario).
    Next
    BEN
    uses
    these
    costs
    to
    compute
    the
    total
    cost
    of
    complying
    on-timeand
    of
    complying
    late,
    adjusted
    for
    inflation,
    depreciation
    and
    taxes.
    BEN
    also
    calculates
    the
    present
    value
    of
    both
    scenarios
    as
    of
    the
    date
    of
    initial
    noncompliance,
    so
    thatthey
    can
    be
    compared
    in
    a
    common
    metric.
    Then
    BEN
    subtractsthedelayed
    scenario
    present
    value
    from
    the
    on-time
    scenario
    present
    value
    to
    determine
    the
    initial
    economic
    benefit
    as
    of
    the
    noncompliance
    date.
    Finally,
    BEN
    compounds
    this
    initial
    economic
    benefit
    forward
    to
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    A
    violator
    may
    gain
    illegal
    competitive
    advantages
    in
    addition
    to
    the
    usual
    benefits
    of
    noncompliance.
    These
    may
    be
    substantial
    benefits,
    but
    they
    are
    beyond
    the
    capability
    of
    BEN
    or
    any
    computer
    program
    to
    assess.
    Instead
    BEN
    asks
    you
    a
    series
    of
    questionsabout
    possible
    illegal
    competitive
    advantages
    so
    that
    you
    may
    identify
    cases
    where
    they
    are
    relevant.
    If
    illegal
    competitive
    advantage
    is
    an
    issue
    you
    should
    consult
    the
    EPAenforcement
    economics
    toll-freehelpline
    at
    888-
    ECON-SPT
    (326-6778)
    or
    benabel@indecon.com.
    If
    you
    need
    legal
    or
    policy
    guidance,
    please
    contactJonathan
    Libber,
    the
    BEN/ABEL
    coordinator
    at
    202-564-6102,
    or
    e-mail
    him
    at
    libber.jonathan@epamail.epa.gov.
    B.
    CALCULATIONS
    AND
    SPREADSHEET
    BEN
    references
    a
    Microsoft
    ExcelTM
    spreadsheet
    to
    perform
    all
    of
    its
    economic
    benefit
    calculations,
    although
    you
    do
    not
    need
    Excel
    to
    run
    BEN.
    Thedata
    you
    enter
    into
    the
    program
    is
    automatically
    transfened
    to
    the
    spreadsheet.
    The
    spreadsheet
    calculates
    economic
    benefit
    and
    returns
    the
    result
    to
    the
    program
    for
    output.
    This
    section
    illustrates
    a
    BENcalculation
    bytaking
    you
    step-by-step
    throughrelevant
    portions
    of
    the
    underlying
    spreadsheet.
    Italicized
    commentswithin
    brackets
    are
    added
    to
    explain
    the
    calculations,
    and
    are
    not
    part
    of
    the
    spreadsheet
    itself.
    A-2
    September
    1999

    The
    spreadsheet
    is
    in
    your
    BEN
    folder
    (on
    your
    C
    drive
    or
    wherever
    else
    you
    installed
    BEN),
    filename
    “ben****.xls”.
    (The
    asterisks
    represent
    the
    most
    recent
    year
    for
    which
    EPA
    has
    performed
    updates
    for
    the
    spreadsheet.)
    You
    may
    open
    the
    file,
    but
    it
    has
    beenwrite-protected
    to
    preserve
    the
    integrity
    of
    the
    calculations.
    This
    spreadsheet
    contains
    necess.ary
    formulas
    and
    background
    information
    like
    tax
    rates,
    discount
    rates,
    and
    inflation
    indices.
    The
    background
    information
    will
    be
    updated
    once
    a
    year,
    but
    the
    calculations
    themselves
    will
    remain
    the
    same.
    1.
    Inputs
    and
    Variables
    The
    first
    section
    of
    the
    spreadsheet
    contains
    the
    variables
    entered
    by
    the
    user.
    These
    are
    a
    prerequisite
    for
    the
    calculations.
    The
    following
    page
    lists
    BEN’s
    basic
    inputs,
    along
    with
    inputs
    from
    an
    example
    case.
    Tax
    rates
    are
    contained
    in
    the
    spreadsheet
    as
    tables
    that
    contain
    corporate
    and
    individual
    tax
    rates
    and
    state
    tax
    rates
    from
    1987to
    2010,(with
    rates
    for
    future
    years
    assumed
    to
    remain
    the
    same).
    Annual
    updateswill
    keep
    taxrates
    current
    andadd
    future
    years.
    When
    you
    designate
    a
    state
    and
    tax
    status
    for
    the
    violator,
    BEN
    findsthe
    appropriate
    federal
    and
    state
    tax
    rates
    and
    calculates
    a
    combined
    tax
    rate.
    State
    taxes
    are
    deductible
    from
    federal
    taxable
    income,
    so
    the
    combined
    tax
    rate
    calculation
    is:
    Combined
    =
    Federal
    +
    (State
    *
    (1
    -
    Federal)).
    The
    spreadsheet
    also
    contains
    a
    table
    for
    the
    BCI,
    BEN,
    CCI,CPI,
    ECIM,
    ECIW
    and
    PCI
    inflation
    indices.
    (See
    Chapter
    3
    for
    a
    complete
    explanation
    of
    these
    difference
    indices.)
    Inflation
    indices
    are
    more
    precise
    than
    an
    annual
    inflation
    rate,
    but
    they
    require
    an
    index
    value
    for
    every
    relevant
    month.
    Therefore,
    BEN
    contains
    a
    database
    of
    monthly
    index
    values
    for
    every
    index
    from
    1987
    to
    2029.
    Annual
    updates
    will
    keep
    indices
    current
    andadd
    future
    values.
    For
    projected
    future
    inflation,
    BEN
    extrapolates
    eachcost
    index
    forward
    in
    time
    at
    a
    separate
    forecasted
    rate,
    which
    is
    based
    upon
    a
    consensus
    forecast
    for
    the
    Consumer
    Price
    Index
    (CPI)
    and
    each
    individual
    index’s
    historical
    relationship
    to
    the
    CPI.
    (The
    rationale
    for
    the
    calibration
    of
    the
    other
    indices
    to
    the
    CPI
    is
    that
    the
    CPI
    yet
    not
    the
    more
    specialized
    indices
    has
    widely
    available
    forecasts
    for
    projected
    inflation.)
    A-3
    September
    1999

    Inputs
    Example
    Comments
    Case
    Name
    Example
    Case
    Analyst
    Name
    Jon
    Analyst
    EPA
    Region
    .
    EPA
    Region
    I
    Tax
    Status
    C-Corp
    [Also
    known
    as
    “Entity
    Type
    ‘7
    State
    MA
    Customized
    Tax
    Rates?
    n
    [You
    may
    customize
    tax
    rates,
    in
    which
    case
    BEN
    will
    use
    the
    Penalty
    Payment
    Date
    (PPD)
    01-Jan-1999
    customized
    rates
    instead
    of
    its
    internaltable]
    Run
    Name
    Test
    Run
    DiscountlCompound
    Rate
    10.0%
    [BEN
    calculates
    this
    from
    tax
    status,
    state,
    &
    relevant
    dates]
    Customized
    DiscountlCompound
    Rate?
    n
    [You
    may
    customize
    the
    discount
    rate]
    Customized
    Specific
    Cost
    Estimates?
    n
    [You
    may
    customize
    the
    spec/Ic
    cost
    estimate
    screen]
    Capital
    Investment:
    Cost
    Estimate
    $1,000,000
    Cost
    Estimate
    Date
    01-Jan-1992
    Cost
    Index
    for
    Inflation
    PCI
    [You
    may
    choose
    from
    several
    indices]
    Cost
    Index
    Value
    359.500
    [This
    is
    the
    index
    value
    as
    of
    the
    cost
    estimate
    date]
    Number
    of
    Replacement
    Cycles
    1
    [This
    is
    the
    default
    value]
    Useful
    Life
    of
    Capital
    Equipment
    15
    [This
    is
    the
    default
    value]
    Projected
    Rate
    for
    Future
    Inflation
    2.2%
    [This
    is
    the
    default
    value]
    One-Time,
    Nondepreciable
    Expenditure:
    Cost
    Estimate
    $100,000
    Cost
    Estimate
    Date
    01-Jan-I
    992
    Cost
    Index
    for
    Inflation
    PCI
    [You
    may
    choose
    from
    several
    indices]
    Cost
    Index
    Value
    359.500
    [This
    is
    the
    index
    value
    as
    of
    the
    cost
    estimate
    date]
    Tax
    Deductible?
    Y
    [This
    is
    the
    default
    setting]
    Annually
    Recurring
    Costs:
    Cost
    Estimate
    $10,000
    Cost
    Estimate
    Date
    01-Jan-1992
    Cost
    Index
    for
    Inflation
    PCI
    [You
    may
    choose
    from
    several
    indices]
    Cost
    Index
    Value
    359.500
    [This
    is
    the
    index
    value
    as
    of
    the
    cost
    estimate
    date]
    Noncompliance
    Date
    (NCD)
    01-Jan-1992
    Compliance
    Date
    (CD)
    01-Jan-1997
    Question
    I
    n
    [These
    are
    the
    competitive
    advantage
    questions.
    Ifyou
    Question
    2
    n
    answer
    yes
    to
    any
    of
    them
    a
    warning
    that
    possible
    illegal
    Question
    3
    .
    n
    competitive
    advantage
    exists
    appears
    in
    the
    results.]
    Question
    4
    n
    Question
    5
    n
    Question
    6
    n
    A-4
    September
    1999

    2.
    Discount/Compound
    Rate
    Calculation
    Once
    the
    entity
    type
    and
    relevant
    dates
    have
    been
    entered,
    BEN
    can
    then
    calculate
    the
    violator’s
    discountlcompound
    rate.
    This
    is
    based
    on
    entity
    type
    and
    financialinformation
    from
    the
    date
    of
    noncompliance
    to
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date.
    (An
    industry-
    or
    company-specific
    discountrate
    can
    be
    calculated
    by
    experts,
    butcannot
    be
    calculated
    by
    BEN.)
    The
    discount/compound
    rate
    quantifies
    thetime
    value
    of
    money.
    BEN
    discounts
    and
    compounds
    all
    cash
    flows
    at
    the
    cost
    of
    capital,
    averaged
    over
    the
    time
    period
    from
    the
    noncompliance
    date
    to
    the
    compliance
    or
    penalty
    payment
    date,
    whichever
    is
    later.
    For
    a
    for-profit
    entity’s
    discount/compound
    rate,
    BEN
    uses
    the
    weighted-average
    cost
    of
    capital
    (WACC)
    for
    a
    typical
    company,
    reflecting
    the
    cost
    of
    debt
    and
    equity
    capital
    weighted
    by
    the
    value
    of
    each
    financing
    source.
    A
    company
    must
    on
    average
    earn
    a
    rate
    of
    return
    necessary
    to
    repay
    its
    debt
    holders
    (e.g.,
    banks,
    bondholders)
    and
    satisfy
    its
    equity
    owners
    (e.g.,
    partners,
    stock
    holders).
    While
    companies
    often
    earn
    rates
    in
    excess
    of
    their
    WACC,
    companies
    that
    do
    not
    on
    average
    earn
    at
    least
    their
    WACC
    will
    not
    survive
    (i.e.,
    their
    lenders
    will
    not
    receive
    their
    principal
    andlor
    interest
    payments,
    and
    their
    owners
    will
    bedissatisfied
    with
    their
    returns).
    The
    WACC
    represents
    the
    return
    a
    company
    can
    earn
    on
    monies
    not
    invested
    in
    pollution
    control,
    or,
    viewed
    alternatively,
    represents
    the
    avoided
    costs
    of
    financing
    pollution
    control
    investments.
    Thus,
    a
    company
    should
    make
    its
    business
    decisions
    by
    discounting
    cash
    flows
    at
    its
    WACC,
    and
    BEN
    follows
    the
    internal
    analysis
    a
    company
    will
    normally
    perform.
    For
    a
    not-for-profit
    discount/compound
    rate,
    BEN
    uses
    a
    typical
    municipality’s
    cost
    of
    debt,
    based
    on
    interest
    rates
    for
    general
    obligation
    bonds.
    A-5
    September
    1999

    DiscountlCompounci
    Rate
    Calculation
    Notes:
    (1)
    Corporate
    Bonds:
    All
    Industries;
    Federal
    Reserve
    Bulletin,
    Table
    1.35.
    [Average
    industiy
    cost
    of
    debt]
    (2)
    Combined
    state/federal
    marginal
    tax
    rates:
    federal+(state*(1
    -federal));
    Federation
    of
    Tax
    Administrators.
    (3)
    Calculated
    as:
    (1)
    *
    (100%-(2)).
    (4)
    Standard
    &
    Poor’s
    Analyst’s
    Handbook,
    S&P
    Industrials
    Sample
    Balance
    Sheet,
    Liabilities
    section.
    [Average
    Industiy
    debt
    weight]
    (5)
    Federal
    Reserve
    Bulletin
    Table
    1.35.
    [Used
    as
    a
    risk-free
    rate,
    Capital
    Asset
    Pricing
    Model
    (CAPM)]
    (6)
    Beta
    is
    a
    measure
    of
    risk
    relative
    to
    the
    overall
    market.
    [A
    value
    of
    1.00
    assumes
    risk
    is
    same
    as
    overall
    market]
    (7)
    Differences
    of
    historical
    arithmetic
    mean
    returns
    from
    1926
    to
    prior
    year;
    Ibbotson
    Associates
    Handbook,
    [Representing
    expected
    return
    on
    an
    average
    risk
    investment]
    (8)
    Calculated
    as
    (6)
    *
    (7).
    /This
    equals
    (7)for
    average
    risk,
    because
    average
    risk
    has
    abeta
    of]]
    (9)
    Calculated
    as
    (5)
    +
    (8).
    [Risk-free
    rate
    of
    return
    plus
    the
    risk
    premium]
    (10)
    Calculated
    as
    100%
    -
    (4).
    [Totalfinancing
    -
    debt
    =
    equity
    financing]
    (11)
    Calculated
    as
    (3)
    *
    (4)
    +
    (9)
    *
    (10).
    [(Debt
    cost
    x
    debt
    weight)
    +
    (equity
    cost
    x
    equity
    rate)]
    average
    1992
    to:
    1998
    10.0%
    from:
    [Final
    result]
    (1)
    (2)
    (3)
    (4)
    (5)
    (6)
    (7)
    (8)
    (9)
    (10)
    (11)
    5-Year
    Intermed.
    Company
    Cost
    of
    After-Tax
    Debt
    Treasury
    Horizon
    Risk
    Equity
    Equity
    YEAR
    Debt
    Tax
    Rate
    Debt
    Cost
    Weight
    Notes
    Beta
    Risk
    Prem
    Premium
    Cost
    Weight
    Rate
    1987
    9.9%
    40.3%
    5.9%
    43.0%
    7.94%
    1.00
    7.7%
    7.7%
    15.6%
    57.0%
    1988
    10.2%
    40.3%
    6.1%
    52.0%
    8.47%
    1.00
    7.3%
    7.3%
    15.8%
    48.0%
    1989
    9.7%
    40.3%
    5.8%
    49.0%
    8.50%
    1.00
    7.4%
    7.4%
    15.9%
    51.0%
    1990
    9.8%
    40.3%
    5.9%
    50.0%
    8.37%
    1.00
    7.8%
    7.8%
    16.2%
    50.0%
    1991
    9.2%
    40.3%
    5.5%
    49.0%
    7.37%
    1.00
    7.5%
    7.5%
    14.9%
    51.0%
    1992
    8.6%
    40.3%
    5.1%
    47.0%
    6.19%
    1.00
    7.7%
    7.7%
    13.9%
    53.0%
    9.8%
    1993
    7.5%
    41.2%
    4.4%
    47.0%
    5.14%
    1.00
    7.6%
    7.6%
    12.7%
    53.0%
    8.8%
    1994
    8.3%
    41.2%
    4.9%
    44.0%
    6.69%
    1.00
    7.6%
    7.6%
    14.3%
    56.0%
    10.2%
    1995
    7.8%
    41.2%
    4.6%
    42.0%
    6.38%
    1.00
    7.4%
    7.4%
    13.8%
    58.0%
    9.9%
    1996
    7.7%
    41.2%
    4.5%
    37.0%
    6.18%
    1.00
    7.8%
    7.8%
    14.0%
    63.0%
    10.5%
    1997
    7.5%
    41.2%
    4.4%
    37.0%
    6.22%
    1.00
    7.9%
    7.9%
    14.1%
    63.0%
    10.5%
    1998
    7.0%
    41.2%
    4.1%
    37.0%
    5.50%
    1.00
    8.2%
    8.2%
    13.7%
    63.0%
    10.2%
    A-6
    September
    1999

    3.
    Specific
    Cost
    Estimates
    After
    the
    compoundldiscount
    rate,
    BEN
    calculates
    specific
    cost
    estimates.
    This
    calculation
    adjusts
    costs
    from
    the
    cost
    estimate
    date
    to
    the
    date
    on
    which
    they
    should
    have
    been
    spent(on-time
    compliance
    scenario)
    and
    thedate
    on
    which
    they
    will
    be
    spent
    (delay
    compliance
    scenario).
    These
    calculations
    are
    visible
    and
    may
    be
    altered
    on
    the
    specific
    cost
    estimates
    screen.
    (If
    the
    violatorwill
    avoid
    compliance
    completely,
    rather
    than
    simply
    delay
    it,
    you
    must
    modify
    this
    screen
    by
    changing
    the
    delay
    cost
    of
    compliance
    to
    zero.)
    The
    specific
    cost
    estimate
    calculations
    are
    shown
    below.
    Calculations
    for
    Specific
    CostEstimates
    Compliance
    Start:
    Replacement
    Cycle
    Start:
    On-Time
    On-Time
    Date:
    01-Jan-I
    992
    01-Jan-I
    997
    01
    -Jan-2007
    01
    -Jan-201
    2
    Capital
    Investment:
    Original
    Cost
    Estimate
    $1,000,000
    $1,000,000
    $1,000,000
    $1,000,000
    PCI
    Value
    as
    of
    CostEstimate
    Date,
    359.500
    359.500
    359.500
    359.500
    O1-Jan-1992
    x
    x
    x
    x
    PCI
    Value
    as
    of
    Specific
    Estimate
    Date
    359.500
    383.300
    471
    .943
    526.192
    Specific
    Cost
    Estimate,
    $1,000,000
    $1,066,203
    $1,312,777
    $1,463,677
    reflecting
    implicit
    annualized
    inflation
    rate
    of:
    N/A
    1.3%
    1.8%
    1.9%
    One-Time,
    Nondepreciable
    Expenditure:
    Original
    Cost
    Estimate
    $100,000
    $100,000
    PCI
    Value
    as
    of
    Cost
    Estimate
    Date,
    359.500
    359.500
    O1-Jan-1992
    x
    x
    PCI
    Value
    as
    of
    Specific
    Estimate
    Date
    359.500
    383.300
    Specific
    Cost
    Estimate,
    $100,000
    $106,620
    reflecting
    implicit
    annualized
    inflation
    rate
    of:
    N/A
    1.3%
    Note
    that
    the
    specific
    cost
    estimate
    and
    the
    original
    cost
    estimate
    arethe
    samehere
    for
    the
    “Compliance
    Start:
    On-Time”
    scenario.
    This
    is
    because
    the
    cost
    estimate
    was
    made
    on
    the
    on-time
    date,
    so
    no
    inflation
    adjustment
    was
    needed.
    4.
    Capital
    and
    One-Time
    Costs
    Now
    BENcan
    calculate
    the
    total
    costs
    of
    compliance
    for
    both
    scenarios.
    First
    it
    calculates
    the
    costs
    of
    compliance
    as
    of
    the
    on-time
    and
    delay
    scenarios.
    Then
    BEN
    adjusts
    both
    sets
    of
    costs
    to
    the
    noncompliance
    date
    so
    that
    they
    canbe
    compared
    to
    each
    other.
    Each
    scenario
    is
    divided
    into
    an
    initial
    cycle
    and
    a
    replacement
    cycle.
    The
    initial
    cycle
    covers
    the
    cost
    of
    installing
    equipment,
    while
    the
    replacement
    cycle
    covers
    the
    cost
    of
    replacing
    that
    A-7
    September
    1999

    equipment
    when
    its
    useful
    life
    is
    over.
    The
    number
    of
    replacement
    cycles
    defaults
    to
    one,
    and
    the
    useful
    life
    of
    equipment
    defaults
    to
    fifteen
    years.
    Because
    of
    the
    time
    value
    of
    money,
    the
    farther
    in
    the
    future
    costs
    are,
    the
    less
    value
    they
    have
    in
    present
    terms.
    Therefore,
    replacement
    cycles
    after
    the
    first
    one
    have
    almost
    no
    impact
    on
    economic
    benefit.
    They
    are
    cumulatively
    calculated
    from
    the
    value
    of
    the
    first
    replacement
    cycle.
    The
    present
    value
    (as
    of
    the
    noncompliance
    date)
    of
    each
    date’s
    cash
    flow
    is
    equal
    to
    the
    cash
    flow
    multiplied
    by
    that
    date’s
    present
    value
    factor.
    The
    PV
    factor
    uses
    the
    discountJcompound
    rate
    to
    determine
    a
    dollar’s
    equivalent
    value
    in
    noncompliance
    date
    dollars.
    Therefore,
    the
    PV
    factor
    for
    any
    date
    is
    equal
    to
    the
    sum
    of
    one
    plus
    the
    discount/compound
    rate,
    raised
    to
    the
    difference
    in
    the
    number
    of
    years
    (including
    any
    fractions)
    between
    that
    date
    and
    the
    noncompliance
    date.
    A-8
    September
    1999

    A)
    On-Time
    Capital
    &
    One-Time
    Costs:
    Initial
    Cycle
    01-Jan-1992
    01-Jul-i
    992
    01-Jul-i
    993
    0i-Jul-i994
    01-Jul-1995
    01-Jul-i
    996
    01-Jul-i
    997
    01-Jul-i
    998
    01-Jul-i
    999
    One-Time,
    Nondepreciable
    Expenditure
    (100000)
    [From
    spec(flc
    cost
    estimates]
    Capital
    Investment
    (1000,000)
    [From
    spec(f
    Ic
    cost
    estimates]
    Depreciation
    0
    (142,860)
    (244,897)
    (174,935)
    (124,953)
    (89,243)
    (89,243)
    (89,243)
    (44,626)
    MarginalTaxRate
    40.3%
    40.3%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    Net
    After-Tax
    Cash
    Flow
    (1,059,700)
    57,573
    100,898
    72,073
    51,481
    36,768
    36,768
    36,768
    18,386
    PV
    Factor:
    Adjusts
    Cash
    Flow
    to
    NOD
    1.0000
    0.9536
    0.8669
    0.7881
    0.7164
    0.6511
    0.5919
    0.5381
    0.4892
    PV
    Cash
    Flow
    as
    of
    NOD
    (1.059,700)
    54,900
    87,468
    56,800
    36,883
    23,941
    21,765
    19,786
    8,995
    Net
    Present
    Value
    (NPV
    as
    of
    NClTh
    Initial
    Cycle
    Subsequent
    Replacement
    Cycles
    Total
    All
    Cycles
    ($749,162)
    ($216,058)
    ($965,220)
    [C’oinpanies
    may
    deduct
    the
    depreciation
    of
    capital
    equipment
    from
    their
    taxable
    income.
    Be/ow
    is
    the
    standard
    7-year
    depreciation
    schedule,
    using
    the
    half-year
    convention.]
    Depreciation
    14.2860%
    24.4897%
    17.4935%
    12.4953%
    8.9243%
    8.9243%
    8.9243%
    4.4626%
    (MACRS):
    B)
    Delay
    Capital
    &
    One-Time
    Costs:
    Initial
    Cycle
    01-Jan-1997
    01-Jul-i997
    01-Jul-i998
    Oi-JuI-1999
    01-JuI-2000
    Oi-Jul-2001
    0i-JuI-2002
    01-JuI-2003
    01-JuI-2004
    One-Time,
    Nondepreciable
    Expenditure
    (106620)
    [From
    spec(fic
    costestimates]
    Capital
    Investment
    (1,066,203)
    [From
    specJIc
    cost
    estimates]
    Depreciation
    0
    (152,318)
    (261,110)
    (186,516)
    (133,225)
    (95,151)
    (95,151)
    (95,151)
    (47,580)
    MarginalTaxRate
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    Net
    After-Tax
    Cash
    Flow
    (1,128,896)
    62,755
    107,577
    76,845
    54,889
    39,202
    39,202
    39,202
    19,603
    PV
    Factor:
    Adjusts
    Cash
    Flow
    to
    NCD
    0.6206
    0.5919
    0.5381
    0.4892
    0.4446
    0.4042
    0.3675
    0.3341
    0.3036
    PV
    Cash
    Flow
    as
    of
    NCD
    (700,589)
    37,148
    57,891
    37,593
    24,405
    15,846
    14,405
    13,096
    5,952
    Net
    Present
    Value
    (NPV)
    as
    of
    NCD:
    Initial
    Cycle
    ($494,254)
    Subsequent
    Replacement
    Cycles
    ($149,541)
    Total
    --
    All
    Cycles
    ($643,796)
    A-9
    September
    1999

    A)
    On-Time
    Capital
    &
    One-Time
    Costs:
    First
    Replacement
    Cycle
    One-Time,
    Nondepreciable
    Expenditure
    Capital
    Investment
    Depreciation
    Marginal
    Tax
    Rate
    Net
    After-Tax
    Cash
    Flow
    PV
    Factor:
    Adjusts
    Cash
    Flowto
    NCD
    PV
    Cash
    Flow
    as
    of
    NCD
    Total
    NPV
    of
    First
    Replacement
    Cycle
    as
    ofNCD
    i”,
    where
    i
    =
    (1+futureinflation)l(1+discountrate)
    “U”,
    where
    u
    =
    useful
    life
    of
    capital
    equipment
    n”,
    where
    n
    =
    number
    of
    replacement
    cycles
    “f’,wheref=sum[from
    i
    =1
    tol
    njof:
    rA(u
    “(i-i))
    Total
    NPV
    of
    All
    Replacement
    Cycles
    as
    of
    NCD
    ($216,058)
    0.929
    1
    B)
    Delay
    Capital
    &
    One-Time
    Costs:
    First
    Replacement
    Cycle
    15
    O1-Jan-2012
    O1-Jul-2012
    01-Jul-2013
    01-Jul-2014
    01
    -Jul-201
    5
    01-Jul-2016
    01
    -Jul-2017
    01-Jul-201
    8
    01-Jul-201
    9
    One-Time,
    Nondepreciable
    Expenditure
    0
    Capital
    Investment
    (1463,677)
    Depreciation
    0
    (209,101)
    (358,450)
    (256,048)
    (182,891)
    (130,623)
    (130,623)
    (130,623)
    (65,318)
    MarginalTaxRate
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    Net
    After-Tax
    Cash
    Flow
    (1,463,677)
    86,150
    147,681
    105,492
    75,351
    53,817
    53,817
    53,817
    26,911
    PV
    Factor:
    Adjusts
    Cash
    Flow
    to
    NCD
    0.1484
    0.1416
    0.1287
    0.1170
    0.1064
    0.0967
    0.0879
    0.0799
    0.0726
    PV
    Cash
    Flow
    as
    of
    NCD
    (217,282)
    12,195
    19,005
    12,342
    8,014
    5,202
    4,729
    4,299
    1,954
    Net
    Present
    Value
    (NPV)
    as
    of
    NCD:
    Total
    NPV
    of
    First
    Replacement
    Cycle
    as
    of
    NCD
    ($149,541)
    Total
    NPV
    of
    All
    Replacement
    Cycles
    as
    of
    NCD
    ($149,541)
    [Calculated
    using
    the
    same
    formula
    as
    on-time
    all
    replacement
    cycles
    above]
    01-Jan-2007
    01-Jul-2007
    01-Jul-2008
    01-Jul-2009
    01
    -Jul-201
    0
    01-.JuI-201
    1
    01
    -Jul-2012
    01-Jul-201
    3
    01-Jul-2014
    0
    [Zerobecause
    this
    is
    the
    replacement
    cycle,
    and
    one-time
    costs
    do
    not
    occur
    again
    by
    definition]
    (1,312,777)
    [From
    spec(fic
    cost
    estimates]
    0
    (187,543)
    (321,495)
    (229,651)
    (164,035)
    (117,156)
    (117,156)
    (117,156)
    (58,584)
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    41.2%
    (1,312,777)
    77,268
    132,456
    94,616
    67,583
    48,268
    48,268
    48,268
    24,137
    0.2391
    0.2281
    0.2073
    0.1885
    0.1713
    0.1558
    0.1416
    0.1287
    0.1170
    (313,940)
    17,625
    27,460
    17,832
    11,579
    7,518
    6,833
    6,212
    2,824
    1
    .0000
    [This
    is
    where
    the
    value
    offuture
    replacement
    cycles
    is
    calculated]
    ($216,058)
    =
    f
    *
    First
    Replacement
    Cycle
    Depreciation
    14.2860%
    24.4897%
    (MACRS):
    17.4935%
    12.4953%
    8.9243%
    8.9243%
    8.9243%
    4.4626%
    A-1O
    September
    1999

    5.
    Avoided
    Annually
    Recurring
    Costs
    Annual
    costs
    are
    avoided,
    not
    merely
    delayed.
    Therefore
    BEN
    does
    not
    need
    to
    calculate
    and
    compare
    two
    different
    scenarios
    for
    annual
    costs.
    Instead,
    it
    computes
    the
    costs
    avoided
    each
    year,
    then
    adjusts
    those
    costs
    to
    the
    noncompliance
    date.
    Finally
    it
    adds
    the
    present
    values
    of
    the
    costs
    avoided
    each
    year
    to
    compute
    the
    total
    net
    present
    value
    of
    avoided
    costs.
    C)
    Avoided
    Annually
    Recurring
    Costs
    PCI
    value
    as
    of
    cost
    est
    imate
    date—
    359.500
    PCI
    mid-point
    value:
    356.100
    359.400
    368.000
    381.900
    381.800
    Period
    of
    Avoided
    Annual
    Costs;
    From:
    01-Jan-1992
    0i-Jan-i993
    0i-Jan-1994
    Oi-Jan-1995
    01-Jan-1996
    To:
    31
    -Dec-i
    992
    31
    -Dec-i
    993
    31
    -Dec-i
    994
    31
    -Dec-i
    995
    31
    -Dec-i
    996
    Annual
    Costs
    Avoided
    (9,933)
    (9,997)
    (10,236)
    (10,623)
    (10,649)
    Marginal
    Tax
    Rate
    40.3%
    41.2%
    4i.2%
    4i.2%
    4i.2%
    Net
    After-Tax
    Cash
    Flow
    (5,930)
    (5,878)
    (6,019)
    (6,246)
    (6,262)
    PV
    Factor:
    Adjusts
    Cash
    Flow
    to
    NCD
    0.9535
    0.8667
    0.7879
    0.7163
    0.65ii
    PV
    Cash
    Flow
    as
    of
    NCD
    (5,654)
    (5,095)
    (4,742)
    (4,474)
    (4077)
    NPV
    of
    Avoided
    Annual
    Costs
    as
    of
    NCD
    ($24,042)
    Note
    that
    BEN
    determines
    the
    cost
    index
    value
    for
    the
    midpoint
    of
    the
    period
    in
    question
    to
    account
    for
    inflation.
    BEN
    also
    adjusts
    the
    annual
    cost
    for
    any
    partial
    years.
    6.
    Economic
    Benefit
    Results
    Now
    that
    BEN
    has
    computed
    the
    present
    values
    (PVs)
    of
    complying
    on-time
    and
    complying
    delayed,
    it
    compares
    the
    two.
    Economic
    benefit
    is
    the
    PV
    of
    complying
    on-time,
    minus
    the
    PV
    of
    complying
    delayed,
    plus
    the
    PV
    of
    the
    avoided
    annually
    recurring
    costs.
    The
    initial
    economic
    benefit
    is
    calculated
    as
    of
    the
    noncompliance
    date,
    and
    then
    brought
    forward
    to
    the
    penalty
    payment
    date
    at
    the
    discount/compound
    rate.
    The
    initial
    economic
    benefit
    is
    multiplied
    by
    the
    sum
    of
    one
    plus
    the
    discount/compound
    rate,
    raised
    to
    the
    difference
    in
    the
    number
    of
    years
    (including
    any
    fractions)
    between
    the
    noncompliance
    and
    penalty
    payment
    dates.
    Run
    Name
    =
    Test
    Run
    Present
    Values
    as
    of
    Noncompliance
    Date,
    Oi-Jan-i992
    A)
    On-Time
    Capital
    &
    One-Time
    Costs
    $965,220
    [Sum
    from
    on-time
    scenario
    calculations]
    B)
    Delay
    Capital
    &
    One-Time
    Costs
    $643,796
    [Sum
    from
    delay
    scenario
    calculations]
    C)
    Avoided
    Annually
    Recurring
    Costs
    $24,042
    [Sum
    from
    avoided
    annually
    recurring
    cost
    calculation]
    D)
    Initial
    Economic
    Benefit
    (A-B+C)
    $345,466
    [Economic
    benefit
    as
    of
    the
    date
    of
    noncompliance]
    E)
    Final’
    Econ.
    Ben.
    at
    Penalty
    Payment
    Date,
    O1-Jan-1999
    $673,567
    [Final
    result,
    economic
    benefit
    as
    of
    the
    venaltv
    oavment
    date!
    A-il
    September
    1999

    ExpertReport
    February
    3,2009
    Flexographic
    Presses
    VOM
    Emissions
    Packaging
    Personified,
    Inc.
    Prepared
    by:
    Richard
    Trzupek
    Principle
    Consultant
    Mostardi
    Platt
    Environmental
    1520
    Kensington
    Road,
    Suite
    204
    Oak
    Brook,
    Illinois
    60523
    Mostardi
    Platt
    Jj
    e€
    ,
    Prepared
    for:
    ATTACHMENT
    B
    Drinker
    Biddle
    &
    Reath
    LLP
    191
    North
    Wacker
    Drive,
    Suite
    3700
    Chicago,
    IL
    60606-1698
    MPH
    Project
    Number:
    M06
    1706
    Page
    1
    of8

    Expert
    Report
    Flexographic
    Presses
    VOM
    Emissions
    1.
    Introduction
    MPE
    was
    retained
    to
    evaluate
    compliance
    options
    related
    to
    VOM
    control
    from
    flexographic
    presses
    operated
    by
    Packaging
    Personified,
    Inc.
    (“PPI”)
    at
    the
    company’s
    Carol
    Stream,
    Illinois
    plant.
    The
    author’s
    qualifications
    for
    performing
    this
    type
    of
    review
    and
    evaluation
    are
    described
    inthe
    cuniculum
    vitae
    attached
    to
    this
    report.
    My
    hourly
    billing
    rate
    for
    this
    project
    is
    $158
    per
    hour.
    2.
    Issue
    History
    and
    Details
    PPI
    manufactures
    polyethylene
    packaging
    used
    in
    a
    variety
    of
    industries,
    such
    as
    the
    consumer
    products,
    food
    and
    medical
    industries.
    PPI
    produces
    polyethylene
    film
    on
    site.
    Flexographic
    printing
    presses
    are
    used
    to
    print
    images
    and
    text
    on
    some
    of
    this
    film,
    according
    to
    customer
    specifications.
    Most
    of
    the
    film
    is
    thenconverted
    to
    plastic
    bags
    which
    are
    shipped
    in
    bulk
    to
    PPI’s
    customers.
    The
    flexographic
    printing
    presses
    which
    are
    or
    have
    been
    in
    use
    at
    the
    facility
    are
    described
    as
    follows:
    Press
    #1
    This
    press
    was
    installed
    in
    1992.
    It
    is
    used
    to
    print
    on
    film,
    using
    low-VOM
    water-based
    inks.
    Its
    emissions
    are
    not
    controlled
    by
    an
    add-on
    control
    device.
    o
    Press
    #2
    This
    press
    was
    installed
    in
    1992.
    It
    is
    used
    to
    print
    on
    film,
    using
    low-VOM
    water-based
    inks.
    Its
    emissions
    are
    not
    controlled
    by
    an
    add-on
    control
    device.
    o
    Press
    #4
    This
    press
    was
    installed
    in
    1992.
    It
    was
    used
    to
    print
    on
    film,
    using
    VOM-based
    inks.
    Its
    emissions
    were
    not
    controlled
    by
    an
    add-on
    control
    device.
    It
    was
    decommissioned
    in
    December
    2002
    and
    moved
    to
    PPI’s
    Sparta,
    Michigan
    plant
    in
    December
    2004.
    Press
    #5
    -
    This
    press
    was
    installed
    in
    1995.
    It
    is
    used
    to
    print
    on
    film,
    using
    VOM-based
    inks.
    Its
    emissions
    formerly
    were
    controlled
    by
    a
    recirculating
    drying
    oven
    which
    destroyed
    VOM
    released
    in
    the
    drying
    process.
    A
    Permanent
    Total
    Enclosure
    was
    installed
    in
    November
    2006
    to
    control
    Page
    2
    of
    8

    fugitive
    emissions
    from
    this
    press.
    A
    Regenitive
    Thermal
    Oxidizer
    (RTO)
    was
    installed
    in
    December
    2006
    to
    provide
    additional
    control
    of
    VOM
    emissions.
    Press
    #6
    This
    press
    was
    installed
    in
    December
    2006.
    It
    is
    used
    to
    print
    on
    film,
    using
    VOM-based
    inks.
    A
    Permanent
    Total
    Enclosure
    was
    installed
    in
    December
    2006
    to
    control
    fugitive
    emissions
    from
    this
    press.
    A
    Regenerative
    Thermal
    Oxidizer
    (RTO)
    was
    installed
    in
    December
    2006
    to
    provide
    control
    of
    VOM
    emissions.
    Much
    of
    the
    film
    produced
    by
    PPI
    is
    “high-slip”
    film
    that
    contains
    a
    significant
    amount
    of
    waxon
    the
    surface
    of
    the
    film.
    “High
    slip”
    is
    an
    important
    consideration
    for
    many
    customers,
    in
    order
    to
    ensure
    that
    their
    packaged
    products
    move
    freely
    from
    each
    other
    when
    stored
    or
    on
    display.
    I
    was
    retained
    by
    PPI
    to
    evaluate
    the
    compliance
    status
    of
    the
    facility,
    shortly
    after
    an
    inspection
    by
    Illinois
    EPA
    revealed
    that
    emissions
    units
    at
    the
    facility
    (Presses
    #1,
    #2,
    #4
    and
    #5)
    were
    not
    pennitted
    under
    Illinois
    EPA’s
    permit
    program.
    I
    personally
    inspected
    all
    of
    the
    presses,
    reviewed
    PPI
    production
    records,
    observed
    the
    production
    process,
    interviewed
    PPI
    employees
    and
    reviewed
    Material
    Safety
    Data
    Sheets,
    as
    a
    part
    of
    this
    project.
    I
    concluded
    that
    Presses
    #1
    and
    #2
    were
    in
    compliance
    with
    the
    control
    requirements
    of
    35
    IAC
    218.401
    (see
    Section
    3,
    below)
    by
    virtue
    of
    using
    water-based
    inks
    that
    contained
    no
    more
    than
    25%
    of
    the
    VOM
    by
    volume
    of
    the
    volatile
    content
    of•
    the
    ink.
    I
    furtherconcluded
    that
    Press
    #4
    was
    not
    in
    compliance
    with
    the
    control
    requirements
    of
    35
    IAC
    Section
    218.401.
    With
    regard
    to
    Press
    #5,
    PPI
    indicated
    that
    the
    press
    was
    designed
    with
    a
    recirculating
    drying
    oven
    that
    destroyed
    Volatile
    Organic
    Material
    (VOM)
    released
    from
    the
    solvent-
    based
    inks
    used
    on
    the
    press.
    In
    order
    to
    determine
    whether
    or
    not
    the
    oven
    destroyed
    90%
    or
    more
    of
    the
    VOM
    emitted
    before
    control,
    as
    required
    by
    35
    IAC
    Section
    218.401(c),
    I
    designed
    andmanaged
    an
    emissions
    test
    program
    to
    measure
    the
    VOM
    destruction
    efficiency
    of
    the
    oven.
    This
    test
    was
    conducted
    following
    USEPA
    Methods
    1,
    2,
    3
    and
    25A
    (40
    CFR,
    Part
    60,
    Appendix
    A).
    Gas
    flow
    and
    VOM
    concentrations
    were
    measured
    at
    the
    inlet
    and
    outlet
    of
    the
    drying
    oven
    while
    Press
    #5
    was
    operating.
    VOM
    mass
    emission
    rates
    at
    the
    inlet
    and
    outlet
    of
    the
    oven
    were
    then
    calculated,
    based
    on
    these
    measurements.
    The
    test
    program
    revealed
    that
    VOM
    destruction
    within
    the
    dryingoven
    exceeded
    99%.
    I
    did
    not
    directly
    measure
    the
    VOM
    capture
    efficiency
    of
    Press
    #5
    as
    part
    of
    this
    test
    program.
    Measurement
    of
    VOM
    capture
    efficiencies
    is
    a
    time
    consuming
    and
    expensive
    process,
    and
    neither
    PPI
    nor
    I
    felt
    that
    the
    investment
    in
    time
    and
    the
    cost
    were
    justified
    at
    that
    time,
    since
    our
    efforts
    were
    directed
    toward
    making
    a
    reasonable
    determination
    of
    compliance
    status
    and
    bringing
    the
    facility
    into
    compliance
    as
    quickly
    as
    possible.
    In
    order
    to
    meet
    the
    overall
    control
    efficiency
    of
    60%
    applicable
    to
    Press
    #5
    (35
    IAC
    Section
    218.401(c)),
    given
    a
    destruction
    efficiency
    in
    excess
    of
    99%,
    the
    VOM
    capture
    efficiency
    of
    Press
    #5
    would
    have
    to
    exceed
    60%.
    ,Page3of8

    Based
    onmy
    inspection
    of
    Press
    #5,
    its
    design
    and
    my
    professional
    experience
    conducting
    capture
    efficiency
    tests
    on
    similar
    flexographic
    printers,
    it
    was
    my
    professional
    opinion
    that
    the
    capture
    efficiency
    of
    Press
    #5
    exceeded
    60%.
    It
    is,
    in
    my
    professional
    opinion,
    extremely
    unlikely
    that
    the
    capture
    efficiency
    of
    Press
    #5
    would
    not
    meet
    this
    benchmark.
    Press
    #5
    is
    a
    central
    impression
    (CI)
    flexographic
    press,
    equipped
    with
    localized
    pick-up
    hoods
    ateach
    printing
    station,
    doctor
    blades
    to
    minimize
    ink
    usage,
    covered
    ink
    pans
    and
    a
    drying
    oven
    operating
    at
    negative
    pressure.
    These
    design
    features
    are
    consistent
    with
    best
    management
    practices
    used
    in
    the
    flexographic
    printing
    industry
    and
    would
    enable
    the
    Press
    #5
    to
    achieve
    high
    capture
    efficiencies.
    Based
    on
    the
    emissions
    test
    that
    I
    conducted
    and
    my
    evaluation
    of
    the
    VOM
    capture
    system,
    it
    was
    and
    is
    my
    professional
    opinion
    that
    Press
    #5
    met
    the
    control
    requirements
    of
    35
    IAC
    Section
    218.401(c).
    3.
    Regulatory
    Background
    The
    flexographic
    printing
    presses
    at
    PPI
    are
    subject
    to
    Flexographic
    Printing
    rules
    found
    at
    35
    IAC
    Section
    218.401
    through
    35
    IAC
    Section
    218.404.
    These
    rules
    provide
    three
    options
    to
    comply
    with
    emissions
    limitations:
    Use
    of
    compliant
    inks
    that
    contain
    no
    more
    than
    40%
    VOM
    by
    volume,
    not
    including
    water
    or
    exempt
    compounds,
    or
    that
    contain
    no
    more
    than
    25%
    of
    VOM
    by
    volume
    of
    the
    volatile
    content
    of
    the
    ink
    (35
    IAC
    Section
    218.401(a)),
    or
    Daily
    weighted
    averaging
    across
    multiple
    printing
    lines
    to
    demonstrate
    compliance
    with
    the
    above
    VOM
    content
    limitations
    (35
    IAC
    Section
    218.410(b)),
    or
    Use
    of
    a
    control
    device
    that
    that
    reduces
    the
    mass
    emission
    rate
    of
    captured
    VOM
    emissions
    by
    at
    least
    90%
    and
    use
    of
    a
    capture
    and
    control
    system
    that
    reduces
    overall
    VOM
    emissions
    by
    at
    least
    60%
    (35
    IAC
    Section
    218.401(c)).
    In
    addition
    to
    the
    above
    compliance
    options,
    the
    Illinois
    Environmental
    Protection
    Act
    (the
    Act)
    provides
    for
    a
    mechanism
    for
    a
    source
    to
    seek
    relief
    from
    regulatory
    requirements
    by
    seeking
    an
    Adjusted
    Standard.
    The
    Illinois
    EPA
    and
    Illinois
    Pollution
    Control
    Board
    (IPCB)
    are
    required
    to
    consider
    a
    number
    of
    factors
    when
    considering
    a
    petition
    for
    an
    Adjusted
    Standard
    (415
    ILCS
    5/28.1
    and
    35
    IAC
    Section
    104.400).
    These
    factors
    include,
    but
    are
    not
    limited
    to:
    Evaluating
    the
    cost
    of
    control,
    in
    dollars
    per
    ton
    of
    pollutant
    controlled,
    on
    an
    annual
    basis.
    If
    the
    cost
    of
    control
    exceeds
    generally-accepted
    guidelines
    for
    Reasonable
    Available
    Control
    Technology
    (RACT),
    Illinois
    EPA
    and
    the
    IPCB
    will
    generally
    consider
    an
    Adjusted
    Standard
    petition
    more
    favorably.
    Page
    4
    of
    8

    Determining
    the
    technical
    feasibility
    of
    compliance
    options.
    If
    the
    compliance
    options
    listed
    in
    the
    regulation(s)
    in
    question
    are
    not
    technically
    feasible,
    Illinois
    EPA
    and
    the
    IPCB
    will
    generally
    consider
    an
    Adjusted
    Standard
    petition
    more
    favorably.
    Considering
    the
    environmental
    effect
    of
    granting
    an
    Adjusted
    Standard.
    If
    it
    can
    be
    shown
    that
    no
    significant
    environmental
    harm
    will
    be
    caused
    by
    granting
    an
    Adjusted
    Standard,
    Illinois
    EPA
    and
    the
    IPCB
    will
    generally
    consider
    an
    Adjusted
    Standard
    petition
    more
    favorably.
    4.
    Compliance
    History
    Upon
    discovering
    non-compliance
    with
    35
    IAC
    Section
    218.401
    in
    2002,
    PPI
    examined
    the
    compliance
    options
    available
    to
    the
    company.
    The
    evaluation
    revealed
    the
    following:
    Required
    permit
    applications,
    records
    and
    reports
    had
    not
    been
    filed
    with
    the
    Illinois
    EPA.
    I
    was
    authorized
    to
    rectify
    these
    oversights
    by
    PPI.
    Specifically
    I
    prepared
    and,
    where
    appropriate,
    submitted
    to
    the
    Illinois
    EPA
    documents
    which
    include,
    but
    are
    not
    limited
    to,
    the
    following:
    a.
    A
    construction
    permit
    application
    for
    the
    facility.
    b.
    An
    operating
    (CAAPP)
    permit
    application
    for
    the
    facility.
    c.
    Retroactive
    Annual
    Emissions
    Reports.
    d.
    Retroactive
    Seasonal
    Emissions
    Reports.
    e.
    A
    recordkeeping
    system
    in
    accordance
    with
    35
    IAC
    Section
    401
    through
    35
    IAC
    Section
    404.
    I
    have
    been
    working
    with
    PPI
    since
    2002
    to
    ensure
    that
    they
    are
    in
    compliance
    with
    applicable
    rules,
    periodically
    reviewing
    the
    company’s
    records
    and
    filing
    required
    reports
    with
    Illinois
    EPA.
    Presses
    #1
    and
    #2
    were
    and
    had
    been
    in
    compliance
    with
    control
    requirements
    by
    virtue
    of
    using
    inks
    that
    met
    the
    VOM
    content
    limitations
    set
    forth
    at
    35
    IAC
    Section
    218.401(b).
    These
    presses
    process
    low-slip
    or
    no-slip
    film,
    therefore
    water-based
    inks
    could
    be
    and
    were
    used
    for
    printing.
    Press
    #5
    was
    and
    had
    been
    in
    compliance
    by
    virtue
    of
    a
    recirculating
    oven
    that
    destroyed
    at
    least
    90%
    of
    captured
    VOM
    and
    that
    provided
    overall
    VOM
    control
    of
    atleast
    60%,
    thus
    meeting
    the
    requirements
    of
    35
    IAC
    Section
    2
    18.401(c).
    Page
    5
    of
    8

    Press
    #4
    was
    not
    in
    compliance
    with
    35
    IAC
    Section
    218.401.
    The
    options
    available
    to
    control
    this
    press
    were:
    a.
    Pursuit
    of
    relief
    through
    an
    Adjusted
    Standard:
    Illinois
    EPA
    indicated
    that
    it
    would
    not
    support
    PPI
    if
    the
    company
    pursued
    an
    Adjusted
    Standard.
    It
    should
    be
    noted
    that
    PPI’s
    processes
    and
    products
    are
    substantially
    the
    same
    as
    three
    other
    flexographic
    printers
    who
    make
    packaging
    products
    from
    polyethylene
    film:
    Formel
    Industries,
    Inc.,
    Bema,
    Inc.
    and
    Vonco
    Products,
    Inc.
    These
    companies
    were
    granted
    an
    Adjusted
    Standard
    in
    January
    2001.
    I
    served
    as
    lead
    consultant
    for
    the
    three
    companies
    listed
    above
    during
    the
    Adjusted
    Standard
    process.
    It
    is
    my
    professional
    opinion
    that,
    had
    PPI
    been
    aware
    of
    the
    Flexographic
    Printing.rules,
    and
    had
    PPI
    joined
    the
    group
    of
    flexographic
    printers
    referenced
    above,
    PPI
    would
    also
    have
    been
    granted
    relief
    in
    the
    form
    of
    an
    Adjusted
    Standard.
    The
    overall
    cost
    to
    the
    group
    of
    three
    flexographic
    printers
    who
    were
    granted
    the
    Adjusted
    Standard
    was
    approximately
    $90,000,
    split
    roughly
    evenly
    between
    attorney
    fees
    and
    consultant
    costs.
    Each
    company’s
    share,
    therefore
    came
    to
    $30,000.
    Had
    Illinois
    EPA
    supported
    PPI’s
    request
    to
    receive
    an
    Adjusted
    Standard,
    it
    is
    my
    professional
    opinion
    that
    $30,000
    represents
    the
    maximum
    that
    PPI
    would
    have
    had
    to
    pay
    its
    consulting/legal
    team.
    The
    reasons
    for
    this
    are
    twofold:
    1)
    much
    of
    the
    language
    needed
    for
    the
    petition
    to
    be
    filed
    would
    have
    already
    been
    developed
    from
    the
    previous
    filing
    and
    was
    publicly
    available;
    and
    2)
    although
    some
    site-specific
    information
    would
    have
    had
    to
    be
    developed
    for
    PPI,
    much
    of
    that
    information
    would
    have
    been
    developed
    in
    order
    to
    submit
    a
    permit
    application,
    and
    any
    increased
    costs
    in
    this
    regard
    would
    not
    be
    enough
    to
    offset
    the
    cost-reduction
    referenced.
    b.
    Move
    Press
    #4
    to
    PPI’s
    Sparta,
    Michigan
    plant.
    The
    cost
    of
    moving
    the
    press
    was
    determined
    to
    be
    approximately
    $15,000.
    c.
    Purchase
    of
    an
    add-on
    control
    system
    (35
    IAC
    Section
    218.40
    1(c)):
    This
    option
    was
    technically
    feasible.
    Control
    of
    Press
    #4
    would
    have
    required
    purchase
    of
    a
    thermal
    oxidizer
    of
    approximately
    5,000
    scfm
    capacity.
    A
    used
    thermal
    oxidizer
    of
    this
    size
    was
    found
    and
    it
    was
    determined
    that
    the
    installed
    cost
    for
    this
    oxidizer
    would
    have
    been
    approximately
    $75,000.
    d.
    Use
    of
    water-based
    inks
    (35
    IAC
    Section
    218.401(a)):
    This
    option
    was
    not
    technically
    feasible,
    because
    Press
    #4
    was
    used
    to
    print
    high-slip
    film
    and
    water-based
    inks
    do
    not
    adhere
    to
    high-slip
    film.
    e.
    Cross-line
    averaging
    (35
    IAC
    Section
    218.40
    1(b)):
    This
    option
    was
    not
    technically
    feasible,
    because
    a
    large
    percentage
    of
    PPI’s
    customer
    base
    Page
    6
    of
    8

    require
    high-slip
    film,
    which
    in
    turn
    requires
    solvent-based
    inks.
    PPI
    did
    not
    and
    does
    not
    have
    enough
    business
    for
    low-slip
    or
    no-slip
    film
    to
    utilize
    enough
    water-based
    inks
    such
    that
    cross-line
    averaging
    would
    be
    a
    possible
    compliance
    solution.
    PPI
    chose
    option
    (b),
    moving
    Press
    #4
    to
    the
    Sparta,
    Michigan
    plant
    in
    December
    2004
    and
    it
    began
    operation
    there
    in
    February
    2005.
    Subsequently,
    in
    2006,
    it
    was
    decided
    to
    purchase
    a
    new,
    high-speed
    flexographic
    press
    to
    be
    installed
    at
    the
    Carol
    Stream,
    Illinois
    facility.
    This
    was
    designated
    Press
    #6.
    This
    decision
    was
    made,
    in
    part,
    to
    ensure
    the
    continuing
    viability
    of
    the
    Carol
    Stream,
    Illinois
    plant.
    As
    a
    part
    of
    this
    project,
    PPI
    added
    a
    thermal
    oxidizer
    to
    control
    Press
    #6
    and
    reconfigured
    Press
    #5
    to
    vent
    to
    the
    thermal
    oxidizer.
    Press
    #5
    was
    vented
    to
    the
    thermal
    oxidizer
    in
    order
    to
    eliminate
    the
    need
    for
    oven
    recirculation,
    which
    improved
    press
    performance
    and
    allowed
    for
    higher
    printing
    speeds
    with
    a
    wider
    variety
    of
    inks.
    The
    project
    also
    increased
    the
    overall
    VOM
    emissions
    reduction
    efficiency
    associated
    with
    Press
    #5,
    from
    the
    estimated
    60%
    before
    installation
    of
    the
    thermal
    oxidizer
    and
    PTE
    to
    approximately
    99%
    afterward.
    This
    increase
    in
    overall
    control
    was
    necessary
    so
    that
    the
    project
    would
    not
    constitute
    a
    major
    modification
    and
    trigger
    NonAttainment
    New
    Source
    Review.
    The
    thermal
    oxidizer
    was
    rated
    at
    15,000
    scfm,
    large
    enough
    to
    accommodate
    a
    third
    press,
    should
    future
    expansion
    occur.
    Finally,
    PPI
    also
    decided
    to
    construct
    a
    Permanent
    Total
    Enclosure
    (PTE)
    to
    capture
    100%
    of
    VOM
    emissions
    from
    Presses
    #5
    and
    #6.
    Although
    a
    PTE
    is
    not
    required
    under
    applicable
    rules,
    PPI
    voluntarily
    took
    this
    action
    so
    as
    to
    ensure
    continuous
    compliance
    and
    to
    further
    reduce
    VOM
    emissions
    from
    the
    facility.
    PPI
    applied
    for
    a
    construction
    permit
    in
    2006
    with
    the
    Illinois
    EPA.
    This
    application
    requested
    permission
    to
    install
    Press
    #6,
    to
    install
    the
    thermal
    oxidizer,
    to
    construct
    the
    PTE
    and
    to
    redirect
    the
    VOM
    emissions
    captured
    from
    Press
    #5
    to
    the
    thermal
    oxidizer.
    Illinois
    granted
    this
    construction
    permit,
    date
    October
    10,
    2006
    (Application
    No.:
    06020062).
    This
    permit
    limited
    VOM
    emissions
    to
    the
    following:
    Presses
    #1
    and
    #2:
    2.00
    tons/year
    Presses
    #5
    and
    #6:
    18.00
    tons/year
    Clean
    up
    solvents
    and
    other
    materials:
    4.90
    tons/year
    Total
    VOM
    emissions,
    for
    the
    facility
    as
    a
    whole,
    were
    thus
    limited
    to
    24.90
    tons
    per
    year.
    Following
    installation
    of
    the
    thermal
    oxidizer
    and
    construction
    of
    the
    PTE,
    an
    emissions
    test
    was
    conducted
    by
    ART
    Environmental
    of
    Wauconda,
    Illinois.
    This
    test
    was
    conducted
    in
    accordance
    with
    construction
    permit
    conditions.
    A
    test
    protocol
    was
    submitted
    to
    and
    accepted
    by
    Illinois
    EPA,
    and
    Illinois
    EPA
    was
    invited
    to
    witness
    the
    test
    program.
    The
    test
    program
    demonstrated
    that
    the
    thermal
    oxidizer
    was
    destroying
    over
    90%
    of
    captured
    VOM,
    that
    the
    enclosure
    constructed
    around
    Presses
    #5
    and
    #6
    met
    the
    criteria
    for
    a
    PTE
    Page
    7
    of
    8

    as
    described
    in
    40
    CFR
    Part
    51,
    Appendix
    M,
    and
    that
    the
    overall
    control
    efficiency
    of
    the
    system
    exceeded
    60%.
    Based
    on
    the
    date
    of
    installation
    for
    Presses
    #1,
    #2,
    #4
    and
    #5,
    and
    the
    actual
    VOM
    emission
    rates
    calculated
    based
    on
    historical
    material
    use
    rates,
    it
    was
    determined
    that
    PPI
    had
    never
    triggered
    Non-Attaimnent
    New
    Source
    Review
    (NANSR)
    and
    Illinois
    EPA
    verbally
    agreed
    with
    this
    determination.’
    The
    construction
    permit
    issued
    in
    2006
    resulted
    in
    facility-wide
    VOM
    emissions
    that
    were
    less
    than
    previous
    emitted
    and
    that
    were
    below
    the
    Major
    Source
    Threshold
    applicable
    to
    sources
    in
    the
    Chicagoland
    Ozone
    Non-
    Attainment
    Area.
    Accordingly,
    NANSR
    was
    not
    triggered
    by
    this
    project
    either.
    -
    As
    part
    of
    the
    construction
    permit
    application
    filed
    in
    2006,
    PPI
    also
    asked
    Illinois
    EPA
    to
    grant
    the
    facility
    a
    Federally
    Enforceable
    State
    Operating
    Permit
    (FESOP).
    Illinois
    EPA
    has
    not
    yet
    granted
    PPI
    a
    FESOP,
    nor
    has
    Illinois
    EPA
    requested
    additional
    information
    in
    regard
    to
    this
    application,
    nor
    has
    Illinois
    EPA
    responded
    to
    requests
    to
    issue
    the
    FESOP.
    The
    above
    report
    represents
    my
    professional
    opinion,
    based
    on
    the
    facts
    known
    to
    me,
    my
    training
    and
    my
    experience.
    Diglaty
    signed
    by
    Rich
    Trzupek
    R
    Ich
    =
    Mostardi
    Platt
    Environmental
    f
    Reason:
    I
    am
    the
    author
    ot
    this
    T
    r-.
    “k
    I
    L_J
    ...
    Date:
    2009.02.03
    16:55:41
    -0600
    fJ.
    Richard
    Trzupek,
    Principle
    Consultant
    Mostardi
    Platt
    Environmental
    Date
    ‘After
    submission
    of
    PPI’s
    emissions
    history
    to
    Illinois
    EPA,
    several
    meetings
    and
    teleconferences
    were
    held
    with
    Illinois
    EPA
    in
    an
    effort
    to
    reach
    a
    Compliance
    Commitment
    Agreement
    (CCA).
    During
    at
    least
    one
    of
    these
    discussions,
    representatives
    of
    the
    Illinois
    EPA
    verbally
    indicated
    that
    PPI
    was
    not
    then,
    and
    never
    would
    have
    been,
    subject
    to
    NANSR.
    Page
    8
    of
    8

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