1. HEARING OFFICER ORDER
      1. The Dalen Case

 
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ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
March 27, 2008
FOX MORAINE, LLC,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED CITY OF YORKVILLE, CITY
COUNCIL,
Respondent
KENDALL COUNTY,
Intervenor.
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PCB 07-146
(Pollution Control Facility
Siting Appeal)
HEARING OFFICER ORDER
On November 8, 2007, respondent United City of Yorkville (Yorkville) filed a
motion (Mot.) to compel return of a document inadvertently disclosed by respondent.
The document at issue is dated June 15, 2007 and is an invoice or “interim statement for
professional services rendered [from April 27, 2007] through May 31, 2007” (invoice)
issued to Yorkville by its attorney Wildman, Harrold, Allen, and Dixon LLP (Wildman,
Harrold). Yorkville sent the invoice to Fox Moraine, LLC, (Fox Moraine), and Fox
Moraine included it with other documents produced in response to Yorkville’s discovery
requests on October 29, 2007. Fox Moraine likewise served the Hearing Officer with its
responses to Yorkville’s discovery request, but same was not filed with the Board.
On November 27, 2007, the petitioner Fox Moraine, filed its response (Resp.) in
opposition. On December 3, 2007, Yorkville filed its reply (Rep.). For the reasons set
forth below, Yorkville’s motion is denied.
Yorkville’s Motion To Compel Return of Document
The facts underlying this motion are best related in Yorkville’s own words. In
it’s motion, Yorkville represents that:
Yorkville hired the law firm of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon to
provide legal advice regarding the proposed siting of a landfill and to
represent it if an appeal were filed. Under Yorkville’s Landfill Siting
Ordinance, Fox Moraine is required to reimburse Yorkville’s costs
associated with the landfill siting process, including attorney’s fees.
From time to time, Yorkville has sent Fox Moraine copies of invoices or
other material reflecting siting costs incurred by Yorkville. On or about

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August 15, 2007, Mr. Bart Olson, Yorkville’s Assistant City
Administrator, sent several landfill-related invoices to Mr. Don Hamman
at Fox Moraine. One of the invoices was a bill from Wildman Harrold,
dated June 15, 2007, detailing tasks undertaken on behalf of Yorkville
during Wildman’s first month of representation (the “invoice”). This is
the only Wildman Harrold invoice Yorkville has sent to Fox Moraine.
Olson had not been told to send any Wildman invoices to Fox Moraine,
nor did he appreciate the possible significance of sharing a law firm
invoice. He had no intention of waiving any privilege or protection that
may attach to the invoice. On September 21, 2007, Wildman Harrold
learned that the invoice had been included in the mailing to Mr. Hamman.
By letter dated September 28, 2007, Wildman Harrold informed Mr.
George Mueller, attorney for Fox Moraine, that the invoice had been
inadvertently sent and demanded the return and the destruction of any
copies. Mot. at 1-2(paragraph indicators in original omitted).
The facts asserted in Yorkville’s motion are attested to by the affidavit of
Bart Olsen, Yorkville’s Assistant City Administrator. Mot. Exh. A.
Citing case law, Yorkville argues that the invoice is subject to the
attorney-client privilege and because its disclosure was inadvertent and
unintentional, Yorkville did not waive the attorney-client privilege. Motion at 3.
Yorkville also argues that the invoice constitutes work- product because the
invoice reveals theories, mental impressions and litigation plans in the event of an
appeal and is therefore protected. Mot. at 4.
In conclusion, Yorkville requests the hearing officer to order the return or
destruction of all physical and electronic copies of the invoice in possession of the
petitioner and all recipients, and including:
1) Mr. Don Hamman and any other recipients at Fox Moraine;
2) Mr. George Mueller and any other recipients at his law firm;
3) Mr. Charles Helsten and any other recipients at his law firm;
4) Mr. Michael Blazer and any other recipients at his law firm;
5) Mr. Eric Weis and any other recipients at the office of the Kendall
County
State's Attorney;
6) The Hearing Officer and any other recipients at the Board;
(collectively, the "Recipients") and furthering ordering the Recipients to
retrieve the Invoice from all persons who have been provided with the
Invoice or a copy thereof, if any additional such persons exist, and for
further relief as the Hearing Officer deems just and fair. Mot. at 7.
Fox Moraine’s Response

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Fox Moraine first asserts that the Board (and presumably the hearing officer) has
no authority to order the return or the destruction of the invoice in question, having
authority only to determine whether the invoice can be included into the record. Resp.
par. 2. Next, petitioner notes that Yorkville’s Landfill Siting Ordinance requires siting
applicants to reimburse Yorkville for “certain costs and expenses including attorney fees
related to the pollution control facility application review hearing and siting process”.
Noting that Section 13(a) limits those costs, Fox Moraine argues that it is axiomatic that
Fox Moraine would be entitled to review invoices prior to payment of the same. Resp.
par. 3. Next, Fox Moraine argues that the disclosure of the invoice was neither
inadvertent nor negligent and that it was in fact intentional. Fox Moraine states the law
is well settled that persons, governmental units and corporate entities are fully
responsible for the consequences of their voluntary and intentional acts regardless of
whether they consider those consequences at the time they commit the acts. Fox Moraine
refers to the Olson affidavit as establishing that sending invoices, bills and requests for
reimbursement was apparently part of Olsen’s regular duties. Fox Moraine surmises that
Olsen performed that duty without thinking of the consequences but that his actions were
intentional. Resp. par. 4.
Distinguishing case law cited by Yorkville in its Motion, Fox Moraine argues that
Yorkville points to no portion of the invoice that reveals privileged thoughts or
communications that would be subject to the attorney-client privilege. Resp. par. 6. Fox
Moraine also argues that Yorkville’s work-product privilege claim fails as well where the
privilege claim is dependent upon the material being prepared in anticipation of
litigation. Again referring to the City’s ordinance, Fox Moraine argues that litigation
preparation is not subject to reimbursement and therefore “lends further support to the
fact that the subject invoice cannot contain references to litigation preparation.” Resp.
par. 7. Fox Moraine further argues that, if in fact the invoice concerns litigation
preparation, it would be evidence of prejudgment that would render the proceedings
fundamentally unfair. Resp. par. 7.
Finally, Fox Moraine argues that no privilege existed as there was no attorney-
client relationship between Wildman, Harrold and, Yorkville, as required before a
privilege can attach. Resp. par. 8. Fox Moraine provided the May 8, 2007, minutes from
the City Council meeting to support the position that a relationship did not exist. Resp.
Exh. A. Fox Moraine states that the minutes reflect only that attorney Michael Roth from
Wildman, Harrold, was appointed as Interim City Attorney, and not that the firm of
Wildman, Harrold was retained by Yorkville.
Yorkville’s Reply
Yorkville argues that the Olsen affidavit was not contradicted by Fox Moraine
and, that contrary to Fox Moraine’s assertions, portions of the invoice do “show the
substance of confidential attorney-client discussions and are subject to the attorney-client
privilege.” Rep. at 2.
Yorkville also argues that “Roth’s individual retention and appointment as City
Attorney does not somehow negate Yorkville’s additional retention and appointment of

 
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the firm Wildman, Harrold as counsel in the landfill matter…” Rep. at 3. Yorkville
alleges the invoice speaks for itself in demonstrating that an attorney-client relationship
was created.
Finally, Yorkville responds to Fox Moraine’s argument that the City ordinance
does not allow for anticipated litigation and therefore is not subject to the work product
privilege. Yorkville argues that the “invoice touches on the theories and mental
impressions of Yorkville’s attorneys should an appeal be filed” and “is therefore also
protected under the work-product privilege.” Rep. at 4.
DISCUSSION
To some extent, resolution of the issues presented is dependent on the time of
events, and so a recapitulation of salient events is in order. Yorkville made its decision to
deny siting approval on May 24, 2007, and Fox Moraine filed its appeal on June 27,
2007. The Wildman Harrold invoice dated June 15, 2007 covered services rendered
between April 27 and May 31, 2007. On or about August 15, 2007 Mr. Olson sent Fox
Moraine the invoice along with others from various sources as part of its collection of
siting costs from the applicant. Wildman Harrold learned of the disclosure on September
21, 2007, and made its first demands for return September 28, 2007. Fox Moraine
refused the demand by letter of October 10, 2007. On October 29, 2007, Fox Moraine
included the invoice along with other documents produced in response to Yorkville’s first
set of document requests. Wildman Harrold demanded return of the documents by e-mail
on October 30, 2007. The instant motion was filed on November 8, 2007.
The invoice at issue here was originally provided by Yorkville to Fox Moraine
outside the Board’s discovery process, in pursuit of monies due Yorkville under its
Landfill Siting Ordinance. Had this document not been included in response to discovery
requests in the Board’s action, the hearing officer would agree with Fox Moraine that the
Board has no jurisdiction to entertain the motion at all. But, as Yorkville’s motion is in
the nature of a motion for protective order as part of the Board’s discovery process, the
hearing officer reluctantly concludes that the motion is properly before him and the
Board. See, e.g. Saline County
Landfill, Inc. v. IEPA, PCB 04-117 (May 6, 2004) (ruling
on protective order concerning attorney-client privilege issues).
For the reasons expressed below, the hearing officer finds that the invoice is not
properly within the scope of either the attorney-client or work product privileges. And,
even if the privileges applied to the invoice, any such privilege would be considered
waived under Illinois case law.
The Dalen Case
An instructive case is one cited by both parties is Dalen v. Ozite Corporation, 230
Ill. App. 3d. 18, 594 N.E. 2d 1365 (2d Dist.1992). Among other things, at issue was a
four page memorandum authored by one of Ozite’s attorneys and discovered by one of
Dalen’s attorneys.

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The court’s first inquiry was whether the memorandum was covered by either the
attorney-client privilege, or by the work product privilege. The next was whether any
privilege had been waived.
The memorandum discussed certain Maryland litigation based on notes similar to
notes at issue in Dalen. In the memorandum, Oxite’s attorney outlined for his client
limitations of Ozites’s defenses and the attorney’s opinion as to the proper and likely
determination of the notes. Dalen’s attorney found the memorandum during the course
of his review of Ozite’s corporate files. After the trial court’s entry of two document
production orders, Ozite had made the files available for inspection in lieu of producing
certain documents. After Ozite refused to provide Dalen’s attorney of a copy of the
memorandum he had inspected, the trial court held that Ozite had waived any attorney
client privilege. Dalen, 594 N.E. 2d at 1367, 1369-70.
On review, the Dalen court stated that the:
Illinois and Federal courts recognize Wigmore’s definition of the attorney-client
privilege: “(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
Legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
Purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.”
Id.
, 594 N.E. 2d at 1370.
Based on this definition, the court found that the attorney-client privilege did not by its
terms apply to the memorandum.
Id.
The court did, however, find that a work product
privilege analysis was appropriate:
The work product doctrine applies to documents prepared by either client
or attorney in anticipation of litigation or trial. . .. Supreme Court Rule
201(b)(2)
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[provides that] material prepared by or for a party in
preparation for trial is not subject to discovery if it contains or discloses
“the theories, mental impressions or litigation plans of that party’s
attorney”. The memorandum was prepared by Ozite’s attorney in
anticipation of litigation, albeit different litigation
than this case, and was therefore protected by work product doctrine.
Id.
Finding that the privilege applied, the court then reviewed waiver arguments,
after finding that the case applicable to attorney-client privilege applied to work
product as well. The court noted that three general approaches had been used: a
subjective analysis, an objective analysis, and a balancing test. In the subjective
1
Section 101.616 of the Board’s procedural rules states that all discovery disputes will be
handled by the assigned hearing officer. For purposes of discovery, the Board may look
to the Code of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court Rules for guidance where the
Board’s procedural rules are silent.

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analysis, inadvertent disclosure cannot result in an intentional waiver. In the
objective analysis, any disclosure of a document to opposing counsel results in
waiver.
Id
., 594 N.E. 2d at 1371.
The court adopted and applied the balancing test consisting of five factors in
arriving at its decision that the privilege asserted had been waived. The five factors are:
(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent disclosure; (2) the time taken to
rectify the error; (3) the scope of the discovery; (4) the extent of disclosure; (5) the
overriding issue of fairness.
Id.
The court observed that Ozite had given Ozite free
access to all files, after its counsel argued that he did not have time to purge all files
before opposing counsel reviewed them. While disclosure was inadvertent, the court
found that Ozite’s conduct and that of its attorney was inconsistent with a confidentiality
claim.
Conclusions and Rationale for Ruling
After review of the case law cited by the parties in their respective briefs and a
review of the contents of the June 15, 2007 invoice, the hearing officer concludes that the
invoice does not qualify under the definitions either of the attorney-client privilege or the
work product privilege. At most, the invoice describes in general terms, that the firm
reviewed case law concerning the various issues presented in nearly every siting appeal
brought before the Board; the entries do not give research summaries or discuss
conclusions. The firm also examined the City’s Siting Ordinance, worked on evidence,
reviewed transcripts for criterion issues, and scheduled and prepared for meetings. The
invoice contains no legal advice or “theories, mental impressions, [or] litigation plans of
Yorkville’s attorneys should an appeal be filed” (Motion at 4) as required to qualify for
the protection of either of the two privileges asserted.
Additionally, absent exceptional circumstances, however, it “is well established
that information regarding a client’s fees is not protected by the attorney-client privilege
because the payment of fees is not a confidential communication between the attorney
and client.” In The Matter Of : Witnesses Before the Special March 1980 Grand Jury,
Appeal Of United States of America, 729 F. 2d 489 491 (1984),
citing
Matter of Walsh,
623 F. 2d 489, 494 (7
th
Cir.),
cert. denied
, 449 U.S. 994, 101 S. Ct. 531 (1980). Further,
ordinary work product, which is any relevant material generated in preparation for trial
which does not disclose ‘conceptual data’ is freely discoverable.” Waste Management,
Inc., v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Company, 144 Ill. 2d 178, 196, 579 N.E. 2d
322, 329-330 (1991). Work product is subject to discovery if it does not contain or
disclose the theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans of the party’s attorney.
Id
.
.
Assuming
arguendo
that either privilege applies, the hearing officer would find
that the privilege has been waived due to the disclosure of the invoice. Applying the
Dalen
balancing test here, it is unclear whether any measures were taken to segregate the
invoice from others routinely forwarded to Fox Moraine in pursuit of reimbursement of

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siting expenditures. Wildman, Harrold notified the attorney for Fox Moraine seven days
after it became aware of the disclosure, after the invoice had been in Fox Moraine’s
hands for over a month. But, Wildman, Harrold did e-mail participants in the Board
proceeding within 24 hours of Fox Moraine’s inclusion of the invoice in discovery
answers. The scope of discovery is not really relevant within the content of this case,
since the initial disclosure occurred within the context of Yorkville’s debt collection
efforts. The extent of disclosure is small, as it involves only the general task listings
described above. And finally, there do not appear to be any issues of fairness due to the
extent and content of the invoice.
For all of these reasons, Yorkville’s motion is denied in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Bradley P. Halloran
Hearing Officer
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center, Suite 11-500
100 W. Randolph Street
Chicago, Illinois 60601
312.814.8917

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
It is hereby certified that true copies of the foregoing order was mailed, first class,
on March 27, 2008 to each of the persons on the attached service list.
It is hereby certified that a true copy of the foregoing order was hand delivered to
the following on March 27, 2008:
John T. Therriault
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
100 W. Randolph St., Ste. 11-500
Chicago, Illinois 60601
Bradley P. Halloran
Hearing Officer
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph Street, Suite 11-500
Chicago, Illinois 60601
312.814.8917

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y Attorney
Road
PCB 2007-146
Derke J. Price
Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush & Krafthefer, P.C.
140 South Dearborn Street
Sixth Floor
Chicago, IL 60603
PCB 2007-14
Charles F. Helste
Hinshaw & Culbertso
100 Park Avenu
P.O. Box 138
Rockford, IL 61105-138
PCB 2007-146
Jeffery D. Jeep, Esq.
Jeep & Blazer, L.L.C.
24 Niorth Hillside Avenue
Suite A
Hillside, IL 60162
PCB 2007-14
Leo P. Dombrowsk
Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixo
225 West Wacker Driv
Suite 300
Chicago, IL 60606-122
PCB 2007-146
Anthony G. Hopp
Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon
225 West Wacker Drive
Suite 3000
Chicago, IL 60606-1229
PCB 2007-14
Thomas I. Matya
Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixo
225 West Wacker Driv
Suite 300
Chicago, IL 60606-122
PCB 2007-146
James B. Harvey
Buck, Hutchison & Ruttle
2455 Glenwood Avenue
Joliet, IL 60435
PCB 2007-14
George Muelle
Mueller Anderson, P.C
609 Etna Roa
Ottawa, IL 6135
PCB 2007-146
Ms Valierie Burd, Mayor
City of Yorkville
800 Game Farm Road
Yorkville, IL 60560
PCB 2007-14
Michael Roth, Interim Cit
City of Yorkville
800 Game Farm
Yorkville, IL 60560

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PCB 2007-146
Eric C. Weis
Kendall County State's Attorney
Kendall County Courthouse
807 John Street
Yorkville, IL 60560

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