ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
September 20, 2007
GEORGE R. STRUNK,
Complainant,
v.
WILLIAMSON ENERGY LLC (POND
CREEK MINE #1),
Respondent.
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PCB 07-135
(Citizens Enforcement – Air, Noise,
Water)
ORDER OF THE BOARD (by A.S. Moore):
On June 11, 2007, George R. Strunk (Strunk) filed a citizens enforcement complaint
against Williamson Energy, LLC (Williamson Energy).
See
415 ILCS 5/31(d)(1) (2006); 35 Ill.
Adm. Code 103.204. The complaint alleges that Williamson Energy has violated Sections 8,
9(a), 9(b), 9.5(c), 12(a), 12(b), 12(c), 23, and 24 of the Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415
ILCS 5/8, 9(a), 9(b), 9.5(c), 12(a), 12(b), 12(c), 23, 24 (2006)) and also alleges a violation
relating to light in the operation of a Williamson County coal mining facility. On July 5, 2007,
Williamson Energy filed a motion to dismiss claiming that, as a result of various procedural and
substantive deficiencies, the complaint fails to comply with Board regulations. Strunk did not
respond to the motion.
For the reasons described below, the Board partially grants and partially denies
Williamson Energy’s motion to dismiss. In order to address identified deficiencies in Strunk’s
complaint, the Board also directs Strunk to file within 30 days an amended complaint complying
with appplicable requirements including those contained in the Board’s procedural rules. 35 Ill.
Adm. Code 103.204.
Below, the Board first provides the procedural history of this case, the applicable
statutory provisions, and a summary of the allegations in the complaint. The Board next
summarizes Williamson Energy’s arguments in the motion to dismiss. The Board then analyzes
those arguments before deciding Williamson Energy’s motion.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 11, 2007, Strunk filed a citizens enforcement complaint (Comp.). On July 5,
2007, Williamson Energy filed a motion to dismiss (Mot.).
In an order dated August 9, 2007, the Board directed Strunk to file either a sworn
certificate of service or other proof of service on Williamson Energy by Monday, September 10,
2007, or face dismissal of this proceeding. On August 15, 2007, Strunk filed a sworn certificate
2
of service stating that he had served Williamson Energy by personally serving a Mr. Plumley on
June 5, 2007.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Section 8 of the Act provides that
The General Assembly finds that pollution of the air of this State constitutes a
menace to public health and welfare, creates public nuisances, adds to cleaning
costs, accelerates the deterioration of materials, adversely affects agriculture,
business, industry, recreation, climate, and visibility, depresses property values,
and offends the senses.
It is the purpose of this Title to restore, maintain, and enhance the purity of the air
of this State in order to protect health, welfare, property, and the quality of life
and to assure that no air contaminants are discharged into the atmosphere without
being given the degree of treatment or control necessary to prevent pollution. 415
ILCS 5/8 (2006).
Section 9(a) of the Act provides that no person shall
[c]ause or threaten or allow the discharge or emission of any contaminant into the
environment in any State so as to cause or tend to cause air pollution in Illinois,
either alone or in combination with contaminants from other sources, or so as to
violate regulations or standards adopted by the Board under this Act. 415 ILCS
5/9(a) (2006).
Section 9(b) of the Act provides that no person shall
[c]onstruct, install, or operate any equipment, facility, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft
capable of causing or contributing to air pollution or designed to prevent air
pollution, of any type designated by Board regulations, without a permit granted
by the Agency, or in violation of any conditions imposed by such permit. 415
ILCS 5/9(b) (2006).
Section 9.5(c) of the Act provides that
[t]he Board, pursuant to Title VII, shall promulgate a list of toxic air
contaminants. The list published under this subsection shall include any air
contaminant which may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness,
or may pose a significant threat to human health or the environment. The
Agency shall propose to the Board for adoption a list which meets the
requirement of this subsection.
3
The provisions of subsection (b) of Section 27 of this Act shall not apply to
rulemakings under this subsection (c). 415 ILCS 5/9.5(c) (2006).
Section 12(a) of the Act provides that no person shall
[c]ause or threaten or allow the discharge of any contaminants into the
environment in any State so as to cause or tend to cause water pollution in Illinois,
either alone or in combination with matter from other sources, or so as to violate
regulations or standards adopted by the Pollution Control Board under this Act.
415 ILCS 5/12(a) (2006).
Section 12(b) of the Act provides that no person shall
[c]onstruct, install, or operate any equipment, facility, vessel, or aircraft capable
of causing or contributing to water pollution, or designed to prevent water
pollution, of any type designated by Board regulations, without a permit granted
by the Agency, or in violation of any conditions imposed by such permit. 415
ILCS 5/12(b) (2006).
Section 12(d) of the Act provides that no person shall “[d]eposit any contaminants upon
the land in such place and manner so as to create a water pollution hazard.” 415 ILCS 5/12(d)
(2006).
Section 23 of the Act provides that
The General Assembly finds that excessive noise endangers physical and
emotional health and well-being, interferes with legitimate business and
recreational activities, increases construction costs, depresses property values,
offends the senses, creates public nuisances, and in other respects reduces the
quality of our environment.
It is the purpose of this Title to prevent noise which creates a public nuisance.
415 ILCS 5/23 (2006).
Section 24 of the Act provides that
[n]o person shall emit beyond the boundaries of his property any noise that
unreasonably interferes with the enjoyment of life or with any lawful business or
activity, so as to violate any regulation or standard adopted by the Board under
this Act. 415 ILCS 5/24 (2006).
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Strunk first alleges that, in the course of operating a coal mine, prep plant, and shipping
facility, Williamson Energy has caused pollution in the form of “dust from coal stack & refuse
pile & haulage roads around mine site.” Comp. at 3. Second, Strunk alleges that Williamson
4
Energy has contaminated water with run-off from its coal stack and refuse.
Id
. Third, Strunk
alleges that Williamson Energy causes noise pollution in the operation of belts, transfer points,
mobile equipment, trucks, and trains.
Id
. Strunk also claims that Williamson Energy causes
light pollution by directing lights from the mine site toward his home.
Id
.
Strunk claims that the pollution he alleges began “when mine construction started and it
has gotten worse since coal production has started.” Comp. at 3. Regarding the consequences of
the alleged pollution, Strunk first claims that coal dust harms human, animal, and plant life and
also harms the finish on homes, barns, and automobiles.
Id
. Second, Strunk expresses the belief
that runoff “is causing water pollution to creeks and waterways.”
Id
. at 2. Third, Strunk
characterizes noise as “very disturbing at all times of day and night when mine is operating.”
Id
.
Strunk further states that “[t]he noise disturbs our peaceful atmosphere we once knew causing
unrest and stress on humans and wildlife.”
Id
. at 3. Fourth, Strunk claims that light is directed
toward his home nightly, “making it difficult to sleep or enjoy the night sky.”
Id
. at 2. Strunk
further claims that “[t]he lights keep me awake often and invade my privacy.”
Id
. at 3.
As relief from the violations he has alleged, Strunk states that he seeks to have the Board
“order mining operation to be stopped until all my complaints are corrected thereby giving me
back the safe environment I had before the mine started.” Comp. at 4.
WILLIAMSON ENERGY’S MOTION TO DISMISS
In its motion to dismiss, Williamson Energy argues that Strunk’s complaint is
procedurally and substantively deficient and should be dismissed in its entirety on those bases.
Mot. at 5-6. Below, the Board first summarizes each of Williamson Energy’s arguments
regarding the substance of Strunk’s complaint before addressing its arguments regarding
procedural requirements.
Substantive Requirements
Williamson Energy argues that the Board’s procedural rules provide minimum
substantive requirements that a complaint must meet. Mot. at 2. Williamson Energy further
argues that these requirements are intended to provide a respondent with information sufficient
for the preparation of a defense. Mot. at 3, citing Stanhibel v. Halat
, PCB 07-17, slip. op. at 5
(Mar. 1, 2007);
see
35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204(c)(2). Williamson Energy claims that the
complaint must refer to the legal authorities that the respondent has allegedly violated.
Id
. at 2-3,
citing 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204(c)(1). Williamson Energy further claims that the complaint
must specify “the dates, location, events, nature, extent, duration, and strength of the discharges
or emissions.”
Id
. at 3, citing 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204(c)(2). Claiming that Strunk has failed
to specify these legal and factual grounds, Williamson Energy argues that Strunk’s complaint is
“clearly deficient.” Mot. at 2-3.
Below, the Board summarizes Williamson Energy’s arguments regarding each of the
authorities and allegations cited in Strunk’s complaint.
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Section 8
Williamson Energy notes that Strunk first alleges a violation of Section 8 of the Act.
Mot. at 3;
see
415 ILCS 5/8 (2006). Williamson Energy argues that Section 8 “is merely a
‘legislative declaration’ and cannot serve as the basis of a violation.” Mot. at 3, citing Metz v.
U.S. Postal Serv.,
et al
., PCB 98-18, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 23, 1999). Williamson Energy argues
that references to Section 8 should be struck from the complaint and that “the Complaint should
be dismissed for failing to sufficiently plead a cause of action under Section 8 of the Act.” Mot.
at 3.
Section 9
Williamson Energy argues that Strunk has alleged a violation of Section 9.2(b) of the
Act. Mot. at 3;
see
415 ILCS 5/9.2(b) (2006). Noting that this section addresses emissions of
sulfur dioxide from coal-burning stationary sources, Williamson Energy argues that it “has no
application to Respondent.” Mot. at 3. Williamson Energy argues that references to Section
9.2(b) should be struck from the complaint and that “the Complaint should be dismissed for
failing to sufficiently plead a cause of action under Section 9.2(b) of the Act.”
Id
.
Section 9.5(c)
Williamson Energy argues that Strunk has alleged a violation of Section 9.5(c) of the Act.
Mot. at 3;
see
415 ILCS 5/9.5(c) (2006). Williamson Energy argues that Section 9.5(c) “is
merely a ‘legislative finding’ and cannot serve as the basis of a violation.” Mot. at 3-4, citing
Metz v. U.S. Postal Serv. and Bradley Real Estate, PCB 98-18, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 23, 1999).
Williamson Energy argues that references to Section 9.5(c) should be struck from the complaint
and that “the Complaint should be dismissed for failing to sufficiently plead a cause of action
under Section 9.5(c) of the Act.” Mot. at 4.
Section 12
Williamson Energy claims that Strunk has alleged violations of Sections 12(a), 12(b), and
12(c) of the Act, which pertain to water pollution. Mot. at 4;
see
415 ILCS 5/12(a), 12(b), and
12(c) (2006); Comp. at 2. Williamson Energy argues that, although Strunk’s allegations refer to
run off causing water pollution, the complaint does not allege any dates on which such run off
occurred, does not identify any creek or other waterway alleged to have been polluted, and does
not describe the nature or extent or consequences of any discharge. Mot. at 4;
see
Comp. at 3.
Williamson Energy argues that, because the complaint lacks this information, it fails to comply
with the Board’s procedural rules. Mot. at 4, citing 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204(c)(2).
Williamson Energy further argues that, in the absence of that information, it “has no ability to
even begin to mount a defense.” Mot. at 4. Williamson Energy claims that references to
Sections 12(a), 12(b), and 12(c) should be struck from the complaint and that “the Complaint
should be dismissed for failing to sufficiently plead a cause of action under Section 12 of the
Act.” Mot. at 4.
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Section 23
Williamson Energy notes that Strunk alleges a violation of Section 23 of the Act. Mot. at
3;
see
415 ILCS 5/23 (2006). Williamson Energy argues that Section 23 “is merely a ‘legislative
declaration’ and cannot serve as the basis of a violation.” Mot. at 4, citing Metz v. U.S. Postal
Serv. and Bradley Real Estate, PCB 98-18, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 23, 1999). Williamson Energy
argues that references to Section 23 should be struck from the complaint and that “the Complaint
should be dismissed for failing to sufficiently plead a cause of action under Section 23 of the
Act.” Mot. at 4.
Section 24
Williamson Energy claims that Strunk has alleged a violation of Section 24 of the Act,
which pertain to water pollution. Mot. at 5;
see
415 ILCS 5/24 (2006); Comp. at 2. Williamson
Energy argues that, although Strunk’s allegations refer to plant operations and mobile equipment
such as back up alarms, trucks, and trains, the complaint does not allege any dates on which
noise occurred, does not identify specific operations, and does not describe the nature or extent
or consequences of any noise emission. Mot. at 5;
see
Comp. at 3-4. Williamson Energy argues
that, because the complaint lacks this information, it fails to comply with the Board’s procedural
rules. Mot. at 5, citing 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204(c)(2). Williamson Energy further argues that,
lacking such information, it “has no ability to even begin to mount a defense.” Mot. at 5.
Williamson Energy claims that the factual allegations required by the Board’s procedural
rules are “particularly important here where many of the items apparently at the heart of
Complainant’s Complaint may be exempt from noise regulation.” Mot. at 5. Specifically,
Williamson Energy suggests that it may be able to invoke exemptions for emergency warning
devices, horns, and trains and other mobile equipment.
Id
., citing 35 Ill. Adm. Code 901.107(b)
(exceptions), 902.124 (horns and other warning devices), 902.140 (exceptions). Williamson
Energy argues that, “[e]ven if such noises were regulated, because Respondent cannot identify
with ant particularity the source of the alleged noise, it has no means of identifying additional
parties or entities that may be responsible for the noise, such as a variety of motor carriers.”
Mot. at 5. Williamson Energy argues that references to Section 24 should be struck from the
complaint and that “the Complaint should be dismissed for failing to sufficiently plead a cause of
action under Section 24 of the Act.” Mot. at 5.
Light
Williamson Energy states that “the Complainant mentions problems with ‘lights’ but fails
to identify any Section of the Act that might be violated by light emissions.” Mot. at 5.
Williamson Energy argues that references to violations related to light should be struck from the
complaint and that “the Complaint should be dismissed for failing to sufficiently plead a cause of
action.” Mot. at 5.
Procedural Requirements
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Williamson Energy argues that the Board’s procedural rules require a complainant to
include specific language either in the complaint or the accompanying notice:
Failure to file an answer to this complaint within 60 days may have severe
consequences. Failure to answer will mean that all allegations in the complaint
will be taken as admitted for purposes of this proceeding. If you have any
questions about this procedure, you should contact the hearing officer assigned to
this proceeding, the Clerk’s Office or an attorney.” Mot. at 2, citing 35 Ill. Adm.
Code 103.204(f).
Although Williamson Energy acknowledges that Strunk attached a note to his complaint, it states
that the note does not mention that the Board’s rules require an answer within 60 days. Mot. at
2, citing Mot., Exh. 1. Williamson Energy also argues that the note failed to mention that that
the respondent could file a motion to dismiss within 30 days and that the note indicated only that
a motion alleging that the complaint is frivolous or duplicative could be filed within two weeks.
Mot. at 2;
see
Mot., Exh. 1. Williamson Energy argues that “[g]iven these clear deficiencies, the
Complaint must be dismissed.” Mot. at 2, citing Stanhibel v. Halat, PCB 07-17 (Mar. 1, 2007).
BOARD ANALYSIS
Under Section 101.500(d) of the Board’s procedural rules, “[w]ithin 14 days after service
of a motion, a party may file a response to the motion. If no response is filed, the party will be
deemed to have waived objection to the granting of the motion, but the waiver of objection does
not bind the Board or the hearing officer in its disposition of the motion.” 35 Ill. Adm. Code
101.500(d). Strunk filed no response to Williamson Energy’s motion to dismiss. Because the
Board is not bound by Strunk’s failure to respond, the Board below first addresses its standard of
review before addressing the authorities and allegations in the complaint and the motion to
dismiss.
Standard of Review
Caselaw clearly establishes the Board’s standard of review. The Board takes all well-
pled allegations in the complaint as true in determining a motion to dismiss. Import Sales, Inc. v.
Continental Bearings Corp., 217 Ill. App. 3d 893, 900, 577 N.E. 2d 1205, 1210 (1st Dist. 1991)
(citations omitted); People v. Sheridan Sand & Gravel Co., PCB 06-177, slip op. at 4 (Sept. 7,
2006), People v. Pattison Associates, LLC and 5701 S. Calumet, L.L.C., PCB 05-181, slip op. at
4 (Sept. 15, 2005), People v. Stein Steel Mills Services, Inc.
, PCB 02-1, slip op. at 1 (Nov. 15,
2001), Shelton v. Crown, PCB 96-53 (May 2, 1996), Krautsack v. Patel, PCB 95-143, slip op. at
2 (June 15, 1995), Miehle v. Chicago Bridge and Iron Co.
, PCB 93-150, slip op. at 5 (Nov. 4,
1993).
“[D]ismissal of the complaint is proper only if it is clear that no set of facts could be
proven that would entitle complainant to relief.” People v. Sheridan Sand & Gravel Co.
, PCB
06-177, slip op. at 4 (Sept. 7, 2006);
see also
People v. Pattison Associates, LLC and 5701 S.
Calumet, L.L.C., PCB 05-181, slip op. at 4 (Sept. 15, 2005), People v. Stein Steel Mills Services,
Inc., PCB 02-1, slip op. at 1 (Nov. 15, 2001); Shelton v. Crown, PCB 96-53 (May 2, 1996);
8
Krautsack v. Patel, PCB 95-143, slip op. at 2 (June 15, 1995), Miehle v. Chicago Bridge and Iron
Co., PCB 93-150, slip op. at 5 (Nov. 4, 1993).
Substantive Requirements
Section 8
Section 8 of the Act states legislative findings and purposes.
See
415 ILCS 5/8 (2006);
Bogacz v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
, PCB 96-47, slip op. at 2 (Nov. 16, 1995). Section 8 does
not contain prohibitions that can be violated (Loschen v. Grist Mill Confections, Inc.
, PCB 97-
174 (June 5, 1997)), and it does not create a cause of action (Johnson v. ADM, PCB 98-31, slip
op. at 1 n.1 (Jan. 7, 1999)). Accordingly, the Board grants Williamson Energy’s motion to
dismiss with regard to any allegation of a violation of Section 8.
Section 9
Claiming that Strunk has alleged a violation of Section 9.2(b) of the Act, Williamson
Energy notes that this provision addresses emissions of sulfur dioxide from coal-burning
stationary sources. Mot. at 3;
see
415 ILCS 5/9.2(b) (2006). Having reviewed Strunk’s
handwritten complaint, the Board is convinced that Strunk alleges a violation of Sections 9(a)
and 9(b) of the Act, each of which prohibits acts pertaining to air pollution.
See
Comp. at 2;
see
also
415 ILCS 5/9(a), 9(b) (2006).
With regard to air pollution, Strunk’s complaint makes two allegations. First, when
asked to describe specifically the type and location of the alleged pollution, Strunk stated “Dust
from coal stack & refuse pile & haulage roads around mine site. Smell.” Comp. at 3. Second,
when asked to describe specifically the duration and frequency of the alleged pollution, Strunk
stated “I first noticed when mine construction started and it has gotten worse since coal
production has started. When the winds blow (slightest breeze) it carries dust from coal pile &
refuse area. Traffic in and out of mine make a lot of dust & noise.”
Id
.
After reviewing the complaint and the motion to dismiss, the Board cannot conclude that
Strunk could prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Consequently, the Board
denies Williamson Energy’s motion to dismiss with regard to any allegation of a violation of
Section 9(a) or 9(b). However, the Board finds that the complaint does not comply fully with the
Board’s procedural rules, which require that the complaint contain “[t]he dates, location, events,
nature, extent, and strength of discharges or emissions an consequences alleged to constitute
violations of the Act and regulations.” 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204(c). Accordingly, in its order
below, the Board directs Strunk to file an amended complaint.
Section 9.5(c)
Section 9.5(c) of the Act requires the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency to
propose and the Board to adopt a list of toxic air contaminants. 415 ILCS 9.5(c) (2006);
see
Toxic Air Contaminant List (35 Ill. Adm. Code 232)
, R 90-1(A) (Sept. 3, 1992) (adopting list of
263 contaminants). Section 9.5(c) does not state a prohibition of which Strunk can allege a
9
violation. Accordingly, the Board grants Williamson Energy’s motion to dismiss with regard to
any allegation of a violation of Section 9.5(c).
Section 12
Strunk alleges that Williamson Energy has violated Sections 12(a), 12(b), and 12(d) of
the Act, each of which prohibits acts pertaining to water pollution.
See
Comp. at 2;
see also
415
ILCS 5/12(a), 12(b), and 12(d) (2006). With regard to water pollution, the complaint makes two
allegations. First, when asked to describe specifically the type and location of the alleged
pollution, Strunk stated “Water contamination from run off of coal stack & refuse. Odor.”
Comp. at 3. Second, when asked to describe specifically the duration and frequency of the
alleged pollution, Strunk stated “I first noticed when mine construction started and it has gotten
worse since coal production has started. . . . I believe run off is causing water pollution to creeks
and waterways.”
Id
.
After reviewing the complaint and the motion to dismiss, the Board cannot conclude that
Strunk could prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Consequently, the Board
denies Williamson Energy’s motion to dismiss with regard to any allegation of a violation of
Sections 12(a), 12(b), and 12(d). However, the Board finds that the complaint does not comply
fully with the Board’s procedural rules, which require that the complaint contain “[t]he dates,
location, events, nature, extent, and strength of discharges or emissions an consequences alleged
to constitute violations of the Act and regulations.” 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204(c). Accordingly,
in its order below, the Board directs Strunk to file an amended complaint.
Section 23
Section 23 of the Act states legislative findings and purposes.
See
415 ILCS 5/23 (2006).
It does not provide Strunk with substantive rights.
See
Metz v. U.S. Postal Serv. and Bradley
Real Estate, PCB 98-18, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 23, 1999). “[T]here can be no violation of Section
23.” Brunson v. MCI Worldcom, Inc. and IXC Carrier, Inc., PCB 99-71, slip op. at 1 (Jan. 7,
1999). Accordingly, the Board grants Williamson Energy’s motion to dismiss with regard to any
allegation of a violation of Section 23.
Section 24
Strunk alleges that Williamson Energy has violated Section 24 of the Act, which
prohibits acts pertaining to noise under certain circumstances.
See
Comp. at 2;
see also
415
ILCS 5/24 (2006). With regard to noise pollution, the complaint makes two allegations. First,
when asked to describe specifically the type and location of the alleged pollution, Strunk stated
“noise in plant operations – belts – and transfer points – mobile equipment operations (dozer
track and back up alarms) trucks for refuse & Coal transport – train noise & odor.” Comp. at 2.
Second, when asked to describe specifically the duration and frequency of the alleged pollution,
Strunk stated “I first noticed when mine construction started and it has gotten worse since coal
production has started. . . . The noise is very disturbing at all times of day and night when mine is
operating.”
Id
.
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“The appellate court has previously stated that Section 24 is not a general statutory
prohibition.” Rulon v. Double D Gun Club, PCB 03-7, slip op. at 4 (Aug. 22, 2002), citing
Shepard v. Northbrook Sports Club and the Village of Hainesville, 272 Ill. App 3rd 764, 768,
651 N.E.2d 555, 558 (2nd Dist. 1995). Section 24 prohibits the emission of noise “
so as to
violate any regulation or standard adopted by the Board under this Act
.” Shepard, 272 Ill. App.
3rd at 768, 651 N.E.2d at 558 (emphasis in original);
see
415 ILCS 5/24 (2006). “Section 24 is
not a stand-alone provision, but a violation of certain Board noise regulations could result in a
violation of Section 24.” Rulon, PCB 03-7, slip op. at 4, citing Roti,
et al
. v. LTD Commodities,
PCB 99-19, slip op. at 2 (Nov. 5, 1998). Even if the Board finds that alleging a violation of
Section 24 alone does not state a proper cause of action, such a finding “does not preclude
complainants from filing a new complaint alleging violations of particular provisions of the
Board’s noise regulations.” Rulon, PCB 03-7, slip op. at 4 (citation omitted).
As the Board has above directed Strunk to file an amended complaint with regard to
alleged air and water violations, the Board denies Williamson Energy’s motion to dismiss the
alleged violation of Section 24. However, if an amended complaint alleges a noise violation, that
allegation must be consistent with the caselaw, including but not limited to those decisions
described above. An amended complaint alleging a noise violation must also comply with the
Board’s procedural rules, which include the requirements that the amended complaint contain
“[t]he dates, location, events, nature, extent, and strength of the discharges or emissions and
consequences alleged to constitute violations of the Act and regulations.” 35 Ill. Adm. Code
103.204 (c).
Light
Although the complaint alleges that Williamson Energy is responsible for light directed
toward his home and that this light makes it difficult to sleep, the complaint does not cite any
provision of the Act or the Board’s regulations that might be violated by these alleged light
emissions.
See
Comp. at 2. Accordingly, the Board grants Williamson Energy’s motion to
dismiss with regard to any allegation of violations relating to light.
See
Roti,
et al
. v. LTD
Commodities, PCB 99-19, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 3, 1998).
Procedural Requirements
As described above, the Board in its order below directs Strunk to file an amended
complaint complying fully with the Board’s procedural rules, including but not limited to those
listed at 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204 and those pertaining to proof of service.
CONCLUSION
The Board grants Williamson Energy’s motion to dismiss allegations relating to
violations of Sections 8, 9.5(c), and 23 of the Act (415 ILCS 5/8, 9.5(c), 23 (2006)) and
allegations relating to light. The Board denies Williamson Energy’s motion to dismiss
allegations relating to violations of Sections 9(a), 9(b), 12(a), 12(b), 12(d), and 24 of the Act.
415 ILCS 5/9(a), 9(b), 12(a), 12(b), 12(d), 24 (2006). Having found above that the complaint
does not comply fully with the Board’s procedural rules, the Board directs Strunk to file an
11
amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order. The amended complaint must be
limited to allegations relating to violations of Sections 9(a), 9(b), 12(a), 12(b), 12(d), and 24 of
the Act, and it must comply with all applicable requirements, including but not limited to those
listed at Section 103.204 of the Board’s procedural rules. 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204.
ORDER
The Board directs Strunk to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this
order. Consistent with the terms of this order deciding Williamson Energy’s motion to dismiss,
the amended complaint must be limited to allegations relating to violations of Sections 9(a), 9(b),
12(a), 12(b), 12(d), and 24 of the Act, and it must comply with all applicable requirements,
including but not limited to those listed at 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204 and those pertaining to
proof of service.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, John T. Therriault, Assistant Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, certify that
the Board adopted the above order on September 20, 2007, by a vote of 4-0.
___________________________________
John T. Therriault, Assistant Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
