ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE CITATION PROCESS
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
FACTS
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
AGENCY’S BRIEF
DISCUSSION

February 1, 2007

ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL

(Administrative Citation)

MICHELLE M. RYAN APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY; and

MICHAEL MORETON APPEARED

PRO SE

INTERIM OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by T.E. Johnson):

The Board today decides whether the respondent Michael Moreton (Moreton) violated

the Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (2004)), by causing or allowing

the open dumping of waste in a manner that resulted in litter and the deposition of construction

or demolition debris at the southeast corner of the intersection of Coles County roads 1380 N and

2330 E, T.13N-R.10E, Ashmore Township, Ashmore in Coles County.

For the reasons explained fully below, the Board finds that Moreton violated Section

21(p)(1) and (7) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/21(p)(1) and (7) (2004)) as alleged by the Illinois

Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) in the administrative citation. The Board assesses

the statutory civil penalty of $3,000 and finds Moreton liable for hearing costs incurred by the

Board and the Agency.

ADMINISTRATIVE CITATION PROCESS

Section 31.1 of the Act authorizes the Agency and units of local government to enforce

specified provisions of the Act through an administrative citation. 415 ILCS 5/31.1 (2004). Part

108 of the Board’s procedural rules provides the process of a citation before the Board. 35 Ill.

Adm. Code 108

et seq

. Unlike other environmental enforcement proceedings in which the Act

prescribes a maximum penalty,

see, e.g.,

415 ILCS 5/42(b)(1) (2004), the Act sets specific

penalties for administrative citations. 415 ILCS 5/42(4, 4-5) (2004). In cases such as this, the

Board has no authority to consider mitigating or aggravating factors when determining penalty

amounts.

. “[I]f the Board finds that the person appealing the [administrative] citation has

shown that the violation resulted from uncontrollable circumstances, the Board shall adopt a final

order which makes no finding of violation and which imposes no penalty.” 415 ILCS

5/31.1(d)(2) (2004).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 6, 2004, the Agency filed an administrative citation with the Board alleging

that Moreton violated the Act at the southeast corner of the intersection of Coles County roads

1380 N and 2330 E, T.13N-R.10E, Ashmore Township, Ashmore in Coles County (site).

The

citation specifically alleges that Moreton violated Section 21(p)(1) and (7) of the Act (415 ILCS

5/21(p)(3) (2004)) by causing or allowing the open dumping of waste resulting in litter and the

deposition of construction or demolition debris open burning. AC at 2.

As required, the Agency served the administrative citation on Moreton within “60 days

after the date of the observed violation.” 415 ILCS 5/31.1(b) (2004);

see also

35 Ill. Adm. Code

108.202(b). On March 31, 2004, Moreton filed a petition for review of the administrative

citation. On April 15, 2004, the Board issued an order finding the petition for review deficient

and directing Moreton to file an amended petition for review on or before May 14, 2004. On

May 11, 2004, Moreton filed an amended petition for review. On June 3, 2004, the Board issued

an order that accepted the petition for hearing.

On July 19, 2006, Board Hearing Officer Carol Webb conducted a hearing at the City

Hall Council Chambers, 208 North 19th Street in Mattoon. At the hearing, Michelle Ryan

appeared and participated on behalf of the Agency, and Michael Moreton appeared

pro se

Kenneth W. Keigley, and Agency inspector, and Moreton testified at the hearing. Hearing

Officer Webb found that credibility was not an issue in regards to either witness. Tr. at 36. The

Agency’s inspection report, including photographs of the site, was offered and accepted as an

exhibit at the hearing.

The hearing officer set a briefing schedule requiring the Agency to file its brief by

August 15, 2006; Moreton to file his brief by September 1, 2006; and the Agency to file a reply,

if any, by September 8, 2006. The Board received the transcript on July 31, 2006. Both parties

timely filed briefs in this matter. The Board has not received a reply brief.

FACTS

On January 20, 2004, Agency inspector Kenneth W. Keigley (Keigley) inspected the site

as a result of a citizen’s complaint. Tr. at 9, 26. Keigley has been a field inspector for the

Agency for 11 years. Tr. at 7. As such, he visits different sites and facilities, including open

dumps, for the purpose of determining if they are in compliance with the Illinois environmental

regulations and the Act. Tr. at 7. He has conducted between thirteen and fourteen hundred

inspections for the Agency. Tr. at 8.

Keigley holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Governors State University, a Bachelor of

Business Administration degree from Eastern Illinois University, and has completed significant

course work in environmental biology at Governors State University

. Id

. He has also completed

The Board cites the administrative citation as “AC at _.”; the hearing transcript as “Tr. at _.”;

and the hearing exhibits as “Ex. 1 at _.”

various training courses in procedures to use inspecting sites that were sponsored by the Agency.

Id.

Keigly has inspected the site three times. Tr. at 9.

Keigly took 16 photographs depicting the condition of the site that are attached to the

inspection report that was accepted into evidence. Tr. at 28. The photographs show several

different piles of used tires some of which have scraps of dimensional lumber mixed in with

them. Tr. at 11. Keigly testified that the tires were both on and off rims, and that some of the

tires had water in them in the form of ice. Tr. at 11. Keigly testified that he observed a pile of

what appeared to be gravel, concrete, small pieces of asphalt, plastic and wooden pallets, and a

pile of scraps of dimensional lumber that was weathered and overgrown by vegetation during his

inspection.

Id.

He stated that most of the piles of tires were overgrown by vegetation, and that

the southwest corner of the property held a large pile of several hundred wooden ammunition

boxes, and that there were several vehicles and older mobile homes on the site.

Id.

Specifically, Keigly identified metal, what appears to be an older kitchen stove, pieces of

plastic, and what appears to be an upholstered vehicle seat in photograph 1. Tr. at 11. He

identified dimensional lumber in photographs four, six and seven. Tr. at 12. Keigly testified that

one area of the site (pictured in photograph ten) contained two 55-gallon drums, and that there

was an area measuring approximately eight-by-four feet that was visibly contaminated with a

black oily substance. Tr. at 12. Keigly testified that the photographs accurately depict the

condition of the site on January 20, 2004. Tr. at 13.

Keigly testified that photographs 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12 depict tires being stored or

dumped on the ground. Tr. at 22-23. Keigly estimates that approximately 255 tires from

different types of vehicles were at the site on January 20, 2004. Tr. at 23. The material in

photograph 16 was identified by Moreton as concrete pit wash from a concrete mixing plant in

Mattoon. Tr. at 20.

Moreton runs a salvage business, and recycles metals. Tr. at 14. Keigly testified that the

metals in the first photograph are recyclable metals. Tr. at 15. Keigly admitted that the tires in

photographs 5, 13, and 15 are contained in a trailer, containers and a flatbed trailer respectively.

Tr. at 17.

Moreton is an auto parts recycler licensed by the Secretary of State’s office. Tr. at 28.

He has been licensed for over ten years.

. Moreton testified that this gives him the authority to

deal in automotive parts and cars any place in the state.

. Moreton has owned the site and used

it for business purposes for the last 13 years. Tr. at 22. Keigly acknowledged that Moreton is

licensed by the Secretary of State’s office, and permitted to have 10,000 automobiles on site as

part of the recycling operation, if it’s done in a timely fashion. Tr. at 20.

Moreton has recycled metals for 30 years. Tr. at 29. He ships truck trailer loads of

metals to be recycled, and recycles all types of metals, including brass, aluminum, copper, steel,

and automotive batteries

. Id

. He makes his living buying and selling.

. Moreton made a

verbal agreement to sell the ammunition boxes to Rural King in Mattoon.

. He claims that

Rural King reneged on the deal, but that the ammunition boxes are still there, and are made out

of treated wood so they do not deteriorate like a piece of two-by-four or regular lumber.

. The

ammunition boxes are for sale at one dollar apiece.

Id.

Moreton bought the site 13 years ago for his business, and has used it for business ever

since. Tr. at 30. He has never lived at the site. He acknowledged that “some of the tires got out

of hand” because he was running six trucks, two car crushers and fourteen employees which

generated significant material quickly.

. He estimated that he was shipping over 100 tons of

metal per day

. Id

Moreton had a rim crusher built to separate the rims from the tires when they were

disposed of. Tr. at 30. The rim crusher broke after 30 tires were completed.

. Moreton

refabricated the rim crusher and uses it to separate tires from wheels when recycling.

. The

tires that are removed from the rims are stored in a tarped, tailgated trailer, and removed when

the trailer gets full.

. Moreton cannot afford to ship 30 or 40 tires at a time in light of the fuel

cost.

Id.

Moreton estimates that 50 cars entering the yard per week results in 200 tires a week that

have to be dealt with. Tr. at 31. He asserts that the operation is constant and ongoing, not a

situation where he went out and bought a bunch of junked cars, took the tires off and threw them

on the ground.

Id.

Moreton asserts that he can identify people who are burning tires, and

throwing them over the hill. Tr. at 33. He states that he is no worse, and a lot better than most of

the people in his business.

Id.

In the past, Moreton would use portable crushers, and visit different salvage yards or

individuals, whenever somebody had the volume of cars to accommodate a crusher. Tr. at 33-

34. The site was used for overflow and to crush what he purchased locally.

Id.

Moreton is not a registered tire hauler. Tr. at 34. A gentleman from Madison, Indiana,

and a business associate in Garrett, Illinois, haul his tires.

Id.

Moreton asserts that as a licensed

auto parts recycler, the rims and tires are automotive parts that come off the cars and are

recyclable materials. Tr. at 34. Moreton generally sells the tire rims, but gives the tires away.

Tr. at 35. When a customer buys a rim, he gets a tire with it.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Section 3.305 of the Act defines “open dumping” as:

[T]he consolidation of refuse from one or more sources at a disposal site that does

not fulfill the requirements of a landfill. 415 ILCS 5/3.305 (2004).

Section 3.385 of the Act defines “refuse” as “waste.” 415 ILCS 5/3.385 (2004).

Section 3.535 of the Act provides that:

“Waste” means any garbage, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply

treatment plant, or air pollution control facility or other discarded material,

including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous material resulting from

industrial, commercial, mining and agricultural operations, and from community

activities, but does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or

solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows, or coal combustion

by-products as defined in Section 3.135, or industrial discharges which are point

sources subject to permits under Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act, as now or hereafter amended, or source, special nuclear, or

by-product materials as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(68 Stat. 921) or any solid or dissolved material from any facility subject to the

Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-87) or the

rules and regulations thereunder or any law or rule or regulation adopted by the

State of Illinois pursuant thereto. 415 ILCS 5/3.535 (2004).

The Litter Control Act defines “litter” as:

any discarded, used or unconsumed substance or waste. “Litter” may include, but

is not limited to, any garbage, trash, refuse, debris, rubbish, grass clippings or

other lawn or garden waste, newspaper, magazines, glass, metal, plastic or paper

containers or other packaging construction material, abandoned vehicle (as

defined in the Illinois Vehicle Code), motor vehicle parts, furniture, oil, carcass of

a dead animal, any nauseous or offensive matter of any kind, any object likely to

injure any person or create a traffic hazard, potentially infectious medical waste as

defined in Section 3.360 of the Environmental Protection Act, or anything else of

an unsightly or unsanitary nature, which has been discarded, abandoned or

otherwise disposed of improperly. 414 ILCS 105/3 (a) (2004).

The Act defines “general construction or demolition debris” as:

non-hazardous, uncontaminated materials resulting from the construction,

remodeling, repair, and demolition of utilities, structures, and roads, limited to the

following: brick, concrete, and other masonry materials; soil; rock; wood,

including non-hazardous painted, treated, and coated wood and wood products;

wall coverings; plaster; drywall; plumbing fixtures; non-asbestos insulation;

roofing shingles and other roof coverings; reclaimed asphalt pavement; glass;

plastics that are not sealed in a manner that conceals waste; electrical wiring and

components containing no hazardous substances; and piping or metals incidental

to any of those materials.

General construction or demolition debris does not include uncontaminated soil

generated during construction, remodeling, repair, and demolition of utilities,

structures, and roads provided the uncontaminated soil is not commingled with

any general construction or demolition debris or other waste. 415 ILCS

5/3.160(a) (2004).

Section 21(a) of the Act provides that no person shall “[c]ause or allow open dumping of

any waste.” 415 ILCS 5/21(a) (2004).

Section 21(p) of the Act provides that no person shall:

In violation of subdivision (a) of this Section, cause or allow the open dumping of

any waste in a manner which results in any of the following occurrences at the

general construction or demolition debris as defined in Section

3.160(a) of this Act; or

(ii)

clean construction or demolition debris as defined in Section 3.160(b) of

this Act.” 415 ILCS 5/21(p)(1), (7) (2004).

Section 31.1(d)(2) of the Act provides that:

[I]f the Board finds that the person appealing the [administrative] citation has

shown that the violation resulted from uncontrollable circumstances, the Board

shall adopt a final order which makes no finding of violation and which imposes

no penalty. 415 ILCS 5/31.1(d)(2) (2004).

Section 42(b)(4-5) of the Act provides that:

In an administrative citation under Section 31.1. of this Act, any person found to

have violated any provision of subsection (p) of Section 21 of this Act shall pay a

civil penalty of $1,500 for each violation of each such provision, plus any hearing

costs incurred by the Board and the Agency. . . . 415 ILCS 5/42(b)(4-5).

AGENCY’S BRIEF

The Agency argues it has demonstrated that Moreton caused or allowed open dumping on

the site, in that the inspection report admitted into evidence, and the testimony at hearing, show

that tires, dimensional lumber, plastic and metal pallets, wooden ammunition boxes, concrete pit

wash, a kitchen stove, an upholstered vehicle seat, plastics, metal, two drums with a black oily

discharge, and other unidentifiable items were accumulated throughout the site. Agency Br. at 1.

The identified materials, the Agency asserts, constitute discarded material within the

meaning of the term waste. Agency Br. at 1-2. The Agency argues that the wood, tires,

appliances, plastics, metal and other items constitute litter under Section 21(p)(1) of the Act, and

therefore Moreton violated that section. Agency Br. at 2. Further, the Agency contends that the

dimensional lumber visible in the piles in photographs four, six, and seven is mixed in with tires

and other debris. Agency Br. at 2. The Agency declares that Moreton stated at hearing, the

material came from a dismantled mobile home, and that a mobile home is a structure under

Section 3/160(a) and dimensional lumber qualifies as construction or demolition debris under the

Act. Agency Br. at 3.

The Agency asserts that the material in photograph 16 was identified by Moreton as

concrete pit wash from a concrete mixing plant in Mattoon, and that concrete pit wash and

dimensional lumber meet the definition of construction or demolition debris for purposes of

Section 21(p)(7) of the Act, and therefore Moreton violated that section. Agency Br. at 3.

The Agency notes that Moreton claims he is recycling the materials on site, but that

several of the photographs show items that have either not been properly recycled, or cannot be

recycled. Agency Br. at 4. In the latter category, argues the Agency, is the black oily substance

that was released into the environment, as evidenced by the visibly contaminated soils in

photograph ten; and in the former category, are the 800 treated wooden ammunition boxes,

which Moreton declined to sell to the prospective buyer when the price was insufficient.

MORETON’S BRIEF

Moreton contends that Keigly testified he had made previous trips to the site and

observed a recycling operation in progess. Moreton Br. at 1. During that visit, Moreton argues,

he observed mobile homes that he assumed were abandoned, but failed to check at the Coles

County Courthouse to see if the paper work was done to legally store the homes.

. Moreton

argues that Keigly also observed a stove and a small pile of multi-colored items, but failed to

bend over and pick one up to see whether it was plastic or metal.

Id.

Moreton asserts that Keigly observed piles of what he called construction debris, but

from a previous visit knew to be pitwash on site for a specific purpose. Moreton Br. at 1.

Moreton claims that pit wash is a byproduct of an operation that has never been previously used,

is a new material until it is used the first time, and is also recyclable.

Id.

Moreton argues that Keigly observed a mobile home in the process of being dismantled

for recycling, and that a pile of wood is a byproduct of the recycling process, as are tires from

recycling cars. Moreton Br. at 1. Moreton argues that the 255 tires estimated to be on-site

would be less than 60 recycled cars, and from the pictures, all but approximately 30 were in or

on containers.

Keigly was aware, asserts Moreton, that the two 55-gallon barrels contained hydraulic oil

from a car crusher, and that an accidental spill resulting from a repair caused the spot on the

ground. Moreton Br. at 2. Moreton argues that the spill has since been cleaned up and disposed

of properly.

. Finally, Moreton asserts, Keigly knows that a problem existed between Moreton

and a deputy sheriff who owns land adjacent to the site who is using the power of his office to

financially hurt Moreton.

Id.

Moreton argues that there are laws to protect people from such

actions, and if they don’t want him there [at the site], they should take him in front of a judge in

Coles County and not the Board.

Id.

DISCUSSION

Open Dumping of Waste

To prove a violation of Section 21(p) of the Act, the Agency must first prove that

Moreton caused or allowed the open dumping of waste.

See

415 ILCS 5/21(a), (p) (2004). As

noted, “open dumping” under the Act is defined as “the consolidation of refuse from one or more

sources at a disposal site that does not fulfill the requirements of a sanitary landfill”; “refuse” is

“waste”; and “waste” includes “any garbage . . . or other discarded material . . . .” 415 ILCS

5/3.305, 3.385, 3.535 (2004).

Moreton does not dispute that he owns the property. Further, Moreton does not deny that

the materials described in the Agency inspection report were on his property or that he arranged

to have the materials placed there; nor does Moreton argue that his operation meets the

requirements of a sanitary landfill. Moreton argues that the material on his property is not waste;

that it is all recycleable material, and a byproduct of his business that will ultimately be recycled.

In reviewing the record in this case, the Board finds that Moreton’s claims are not

dispositive of whether the material is waste or litter.

See

County of Sangamon v. Daily, AC 01-

16, 01-17 (cons.), slip op. at 10, 12-13 (Jan. 10, 2002) (despite expressed “intention to use every

single discarded item . . . numerous items were not in use, were not useable in their current

condition, and were not stored in such a way as to protect any future use”).

The photographs admitted into evidence show several different piles of used tires, some

of which have scraps of dimensional lumber mixed in with them. Exh. 1. Both the photographs

in the inspection report and testimony at hearing show that gravel, concrete, asphalt, plastic and

wooden pallets, and a pile of scraps of dimensional lumber were to be found at the site.

, Exh.

1. Much of the material is not protected from the elements and is covered with vegetation.

Photograph ten shows that two 55-gallon drums on an area measuring approximately

eight-by-four feet that was visibly contaminated with a black oily substance identified by

Moreton to be hydraulic oil from a car crusher.

On this record, the Board finds that the material on the site constitutes discarded material

within the meaning of the term waste. Additionally, Moreton consolidated these materials on the

site. Even assuming that the site contained a portion of valuable material being managed

properly for salvage or recycling, the majority of the items consolidated there and identified

during the inspection were “discarded” and thus “waste” under the Act. It is also undisputed that

Mr. Stutsman’s site does not meet the requirements for a sanitary landfill.

The Board finds that Moreton caused and allowed open dumping at the site.

Litter

The Act does not define “litter,” but the Board has applied the definition provided

in the Litter Control Act, which defines “litter” in part as “any discarded, used or

unconsumed substance or waste.” 415 ILCS 105/3(a) (2004); St. Clair County v. Louis I.

Mund, AC 90-64, slip op. at 4, 6 (Aug. 22, 1991). The definition specifically includes

refuse, debris, metal, plastic or paper containers or other packaging construction material,

abandoned vehicles, motor vehicle parts, oil, and anything else of an unsightly or

unsanitary nature, which has been discarded, abandoned or otherwise disposed of

improperly.

See

414 ILCS 105/3 (a) (2004).

The wood, tires, appliances, plastics, metal and other items found on Moreton’s site

constitute “litter” under the definition. The Board finds that materials open dumped on

Moreton’s site qualify as “litter” under the Act.

Construction or Demolition Debris

The Act’s definition of “general construction or demolition debris” includes

“uncontaminated materials resulting from the construction, remodeling, repair, and demolition of

utilities, structures, and roads . . . ” (415 ILCS 5/3.160(a) (2004)). The definition specifically

includes wood, including non-hazardous painted, treated, and coated wood and wood products;

roofing shingles and other roof coverings.

Id.

Moreton’s site contains dimensional lumber, gravel and asphalt. Again, many materials

are covered with vegetation. The Board finds that materials open dumped at Moreton’s site

qualify as “general construction or demolition debris” under the Act.

Finding of Violations

Having found that Moreton caused and allowed the open dumping of waste resulting in

litter and the deposition of general construction or demolition debris, and that none of his

purported defenses have merit; the Board finds that Moreton violated Sections 21(p)(1) and (7)

of the Act.

Civil Penalty and Hearing Costs

The Agency seeks the statutory $1,500 civil penalty per violation, for a total of $3,000, as

well as hearing costs. AC at 2. Because Moreton violated Sections 21(p)(1) and (7), the Board

now discusses the issues of civil penalty and hearing costs. Both are addressed in Section

42(b)(4-5) of the Act:

In an administrative citation action under Section 31.1 of this Act, any person

found to have violated any provision of subsection (p) of Section 21 of this Act

shall pay a civil penalty of $1,500 for each violation of each such provision, plus

any hearing costs incurred by the Board and the Agency, except that the civil

penalty amount shall be a $3,000 for each violation of any provision of subsection

(p) of Section 21 that is the person’s second or subsequent adjudicated violation

of that provision. 415 ILCS 5/42(b)(4-5) (2004).

Moreton states that he has cleaned up the spill from the two 55-gallon drums. He also

acknowledges past issues with the placement of the tires, but indicates that this also has been

remedied. When the Board finds a violation in a formal enforcement action brought under

Section 31 of the Act, the Board has the discretion to impose a penalty and if the Board decides

to impose one, the Board may consider factors that mitigate the amount of penalty.

See

415

ILCS 5/33(c), 42(h) (2004). The Board has no such discretion after finding a violation in an

administrative citation action. The Board must impose a civil penalty on Moreton.

There is no indication that this is a second or subsequent adjudicated violation for

Moreton. Therefore, the civil penalty for these first violations of Sections 21(p)(1) and (7) by

Moreton is statutorily set at $1,500 per violation, totaling $3,000, and the Board will assess the

penalty in its final opinion and order.

See

415 ILCS 5/42(b)(4-5) (2004); 35 Ill. Adm. Code

108.500(b)(2).

In addition, by unsuccessfully contesting the administrative citation at hearing Moreton

also must pay the hearing costs of the Agency and the Board.

See

415 ILCS 5/42(b)(4-5) (2004);

35 Ill. Adm. Code 108.500(b)(3). No information on those costs is in the record. The Agency

and the Clerk of the Board are therefore each ordered to file a statement of costs, supported by

affidavit, and to serve the filing on Moreton. Moreton will have an opportunity to respond to the

requests for hearing costs, as provided in the order below.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that Moreton caused and allowed the open dumping of waste resulting in

litter and the deposition of general construction or demolition debris. Having found the

violations in this administrative citation action, Moreton must pay a civil penalty of $3,000 and

the hearing costs of the Agency and the Board. As set forth in the order below, the Board directs

the Agency and the Clerk of the Board to file hearing cost documentation, to which Moreton

may respond. After the time periods for the filings on hearing costs have run, the Board will

issue a final opinion and order imposing the civil penalty on Moreton and assessing against him

any appropriate hearing costs.

This interim opinion constitutes the Board’s interim findings of fact and conclusions of

law.

ORDER

The Board finds that Michael Moreton (Moreton) violated Sections 21(p)(1) and

(7) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/21(p)(1), (7) (2004)).

The Agency and the Clerk of the Board must each file a statement of hearing

costs with the Board on or before February 22, 2007. The statements must be

supported by affidavit and served upon Moreton.

Moreton may file with the Board a response to the statements of hearing costs

required by paragraph 2 of this order. The response must be filed on or before

March 14, 2007, and must be served on the Agency. The Agency may file a reply

to the response within 14 days after being served.

IT IS SO ORDERED

I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, certify that the Board

adopted the above interim opinion and order on February 1, 2007, by a vote of 4-0.

Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk

Illinois Pollution Control Board