PROPOSED NEW CAIR

S02, CAIR NOx

ANNUAL TRADING PROGRAMS,

)

R06-26

35

1LL.ADM.CODE 225,

(Rulemaking -Air)

CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM LARGE

)

COMBUSTION SOURCES,

NOTICE OF FILING

Dorothy Gunn, Clerk

Illinois Pollution Control Board

James

R. Thompson Center

Suite 11-500

100 West Randolph

Chicago, Illinois 60601

Persons included on the

ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that we have today filed with the Office of the Clerk of the

Pollution Control Board a

MOTION TO DISMISS

on behalf of Dynegy Midwest Generation,

Inc., Midwest Generation, LLC, and Southern Illinois Power Cooperative, copies of which are

herewith served upon you.

Dated: November 30,2006

Sheldon A.

Zabel

Kathleen C. Bassi

Stephen J. Bonebrake

SCHIFF

HARDIN,

LLP

6600 Sears Tower

233 South Wacker Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60606

3 12-258-5500

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

PROPOSED NEW CAIR

S02, CAIR NOx

ANNUAL TRADING PROGRAMS,

R06-26

35

1LL.ADM.CODE 225,

)

(Rulemaking

-

Air)

CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM LARGE

)

COMBUSTION SOURCES,

1

MOTION TO DISMISS

Participants, DYNEGY MIDWEST GENERATION, INC., MIDWEST GENERATION,

LLC, and SOUTHERN ILLINOIS POWER COOPERATIVE (collectively "Petitioners"), by

and through their attorneys, SCHIFF

HARDIN LLP, and pursuant to 35 Ill. Adm. Code

5

101.506, for the reasons set forth below, move the Board to dismiss the Illinois Environmental

Protection Agency's ("Agency") proposed new

Subparts C, D, and E of Part 225, to the Board's

air pollution regulations (35

I11.Adm.Code Part 225, Subparts C, D, and E).

RELEVANT FACTS

On May 30,2006, the Agency submitted to the Board a rulemaking proposal pursuant to

Sections 27 and 28 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (the "Act") (415 ILCS 5/27 and

28 (2004)) that proposes to add new

Subparts C, D, and E to Part 225. The proposed rule applies

to any fossil fuel-fired electric generating unit

("EGU") with a nameplate capacity greater than

25 megawatts

("MW") that sells electricity. As explained in the Agency's Statement of Reasons,

the Agency proposes the adoption of the Clean Air Interstate Rule ("CAIR) trading program for

sulfur dioxide

(902") in Subpart C. The Agency's proposals for nitrogen oxides ("NOx") in

Subparts D and E would provide for participation in the federal annual and seasonal NOx trading

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

programs, respectively, and would comply with the annual and seasonal NOx caps established by

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("USEPA") in the CAIR.

In addition to satisfying Illinois' obligations under the CAIR, the Agency asserts that its

proposal is intended to address, in part, its obligation to meet the Clean Air Act

("CAP)

requirements for the control of fine particulate matter (PM2.5) and ozone in the Chicago and

Metro

East/St. Louis nonattainment areas.

On June 15,2006, the Board accepted the proposal for hearing, finding that it generally

satisfies the content requirements of the Act and the Board's procedural rules for rulemaking

proposals.

Board Order,

June 15,2006. However, because the Board lacks statutory authority

to promulgate the proposed rules in Part 225,

Subparts C, D, and E, Petitioners move the Board

to dismiss the Agency's new Part 225 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 35

Ill. Adm.

Code

§

101.506.

I.

Standard for

Motions to Dismiss

Section 101.506 of the Board's procedural rules provides that parties may file "motions

to strike, dismiss or challenge the sufficiency of any pleading within 30 days after service of the

challenged document." 35

111.Adm.Code

8

101.506. When ruling on a Motion to Dismiss, the

Board applies "the same principles applied to Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 2-615 and 2-619

motions to strike or dismiss."

County of DuPage

v.

Waste Mgrnt. of Illinois,

AC No. 94-92, at 2

(Dec. 1, 1994). All well-pled facts must be taken as true, and all inferences drawn from them

must be drawn in favor of the non-movant.

People

v.

Pattison Ass 'n, LLC,

PCB 05-1 81, at 4

(Sept. 15,2005). However, if it appears that no set of facts could be proven under the pleadings

that would entitle a complainant to relief, the complaint should be dismissed.

Pattison,

at 4.

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

11.

Petitioners' Motion to Dismiss Is Timely.

Generally, motions to strike, dismiss, or challenge the sufficiency of any pleading filed

with the Board must be filed within 30 days after service of the challenged document. 35

Ill.

Adm. Code

§

101.506. However, in

Brazas

v.

Village of Hampshire,

the Board affirmed that "a

challenge to jurisdiction can be made any time prior to a final decision on the merits." PCB

06-

131, at 3;

see also

E&E

Truck Line, Inc.

v.

Dep't ofEmployment Sec.,

634 N.E.2d 1191, 1194

(111.App.Ct. 1994);

Camp

v.

Chicago Transit Auth.,

403 N.E.2d 704,706 (I11.App.Ct. 1980)

(holding that the question of whether a court has jurisdiction is always open). Thus, the

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is timely.

111.

The Board Lacks Jurisdiction to Promulgate the Proposed Trading Rules.

The Board lacks statutory authority to adopt the NOx trading rules proposed in Subparts

D and E, which invalidate the Agency's proposed new Subparts D and E in Part 225. Section 10

of the Act states:

The Board, pursuant to procedures prescribed in Title VII of this

Act, may adopt regulations to promote the purposes of this Title.

Without limiting the generality of this authority, such regulations

may among other things prescribe:

(a)

Ambient air quality standards specifying the

maximum permissible short-term and long-term concentrations of

various contaminants in the atmosphere;

@)

Emissions standards specifying the maximum

amounts or concentrations of various contaminants that may be

discharged into the atmosphere.

. . .

415 ILCS 5/10. Thus, Section 10 authorizes the Board to adopt regulations that promote the

purposes of the Act, including air quality standards and emissions standards.

Aside from this general rulemaking authority, however, Section 9.8 of the Act

specifically delineates a trading system for volatile organic compounds, and Section 9.9 of the

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

Act specifically delineates aNOx trading system. 415 ILCS 519.8 and 9.9. Particularly, Section

9.9 mandates that

"[tlhe Agency shall propose and the Board shall adopt regulations to

implement an interstate

NOx trading program (hereinafter referred to as the "NOx Trading

Program")

as provided for in 40 CFR Part 96, including incorporation by reference of

appropriate provisions of 40 CFR Part 96."

The general grant of authority conveyed by Section 10 must be construed in light of the

specific grants of authority in Sections 9.8 and 9.9. If the general grant of authority in Section

10

conveyed authority to promulgate trading regulations, there would have been no need to enact

Sections 9.8 and 9.9, which authorized VOC and

NOx trading programs, respectively. In other

words, if Section 10 conveyed the authority to promulgate trading program regulations,

enactment of Sections 9.8 and 9.9 would have been a meaningless, superfluous grant of

authority.

Under Illinois law, however, an agency must apply a statute so that no part is rendered

superfluous.

Dzj?ore

v.

Retirement Board ofPolicemen's Annuity

&

BeneJit Fund,

729 N.E.2d

878,881 (111.App.Ct. 2000). For this reason, the Board cannot construe the air quality and

emissions standards provisions of Section 10 to authorize emissions trading programs. Trading

programs in Illinois are specifically authorized by the General Assembly when the General

Assembly has determined that such authorization is appropriate, such as in Sections 9.8 and 9.9.

There has been no such specific grant of statutory authority with respect to the Agency's

proposed

NOx trading programs. If Section 10 authorizes trading programs, Sections 9.8 and 9.9

would be superfluous. If the Board has statutory authority to adopt the Agency's proposed

NOx

trading programs, that authority arises only under Section 9.9, which specifically provides for a

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

NOx trading program. The proposed NOx trading programs, however, are inconsistent with and

are not authorized by Section

9.9.

Section 9.9 mandates that the Agency make certain provisions as part of the NOxTrading

Program. One of these provisions includes an allowance set aside for new units that is no greater

than

5%. Moreover, Section 9.9 also allows the Agency to make certain provisions if it so

chooses as part of the

NOx Trading Program. However, Section 9.9 does not include an

allowance set-aside for any purpose other than for new units in any of its mandates or grants of

authority to the Agency. If the General Assembly intended there to be allowance set-asides for

the purposes proposed in the Clean Air Set-Aside ("CASA") provisions of the proposed rule as

part of the

NOx Trading Program, it would have included them as part of either the mandates or

discretionary grants of authority under Section

9.9. However, it chose not to do so. As a result,

the Board lacks statutory authority, and thus jurisdiction, to promulgate the proposed

NOx

trading programs under Section 9.

The proposed NOx trading programs are further inconsistent with, and thus are not

authorized by, Section

9.9 because it requires the inclusion of non-EGUS' in the seasonal NOx

trading program. The Agency has specifically excluded non-EGUs from this proposal and has

indicated that it has no intention of proposing to include them in a

NOx trading program in a

future rulemaking.

Further, Section

9.9 of the Act specifically addresses ozone attainment and maintenance.

Because ozone attainment and maintenance are only a seasonal requirement, the trading program

authorized by Section

9.9 can be only a seasonal program. Proposed Subpart D, the proposed

'

Those industrial boilers greater than 250 mmBtu and generators greater than 25 MW

that do not produce electricity for sale.

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

annual NOx trading program, exceeds the scope of Section 9.9. Therefore, Section 9.9 cannot

provide authority for the Agency's proposed annual

NOx trading program as proposed in

Subpart

D.

In the alternative, because Section 9.9 specifically refers to the NOx SIP Call and does

not recognize the CAIR, the Board does not have the authority to adopt any

NOx trading rule

that is different from that specified in Section

9.9.

Nor has the General Assembly authorized the Board to adopt the proposed SO2 trading

program. As discussed above, Sections

9.8 and 9.9 provide only for trading programs for VOC

and

NOx, respectively. There is no section in the Act that specifically provides for an SO2

trading program. For the same reasons that the Board does not have jurisdiction to adopt the

proposed

NOx trading programs,

i.e.,

the lack of authority in the Act, the Board does not have

jurisdiction to consider and adopt the proposed

SO2 trading program, even though Illinois

sources are subject to and participate in a national

SO2 trading program authorized by Title IV of

the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

$5

7651-76510 ("the Acid Rain Program"), and the proposed

program builds

from the Acid Rain Program as required by USEPA. The Acid Rain Program is

administered directly by

USEPA with no state involvement or authorization required other than

to include Acid Rain permits in Clean Air Act Program (CAAPP) permits pursuant to Section

39.5 of the Act. However, the federal CAIR requirement to comply with a different cap on

SO2

emissions, which proposed Subpart C would accomplish, is based upon Section 110 of the Clean

Air Act,

42 U.S.C.

$

7410, and is a different program that requires the addition of substantive

trading regulations by the states. For Illinois to comply with this requirement through

Board-

adopted Subpart C regulations, the General Assembly must have granted the Board the authority

to adopt such a program. The General Assembly has not provided that authority to the Board.

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

For the foregoing reasons, the Board does not have the statutory authority to adopt

new

Subparts C, D, and E of Part 225.

IV.

Proposed Part

the Act.

Under Illinois law, an administrative agency such as the Board is a "creature of statute"

and, therefore, has only the authority given to it by the Act.

Brazas v. Village of Hampshire,

PCB 06-131, at 3 (May 4,2006) (citing

Granite City Div. ofNat'I Steel Co. v. PCB,

613 N.E.2d

719,729 (1993)). The Board thus must act within the bounds of authority granted to it by the

Act. To the extent an agency, including the Board, acts outside its statutory authority, it acts

without jurisdiction, and its actions are invalid.

Bus.

&

Prof1 People for Pub. Interest v. Illinois

Commerce Comm

h,

555 N.E.2d 693,716 (Ill. 1989).

The Act does not allow the Board to promulgate Subpart C of the Agency's proposed

Part 225. Subpart C purports to regulate

SO2 emissions from EGUs throughout the state,

including the three metropolitan areas of Chicago, Peoria, and

Metro-EastJSt. Louis, for reasons

other than attainment of the national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") for

SOz.

Statement of Reasons, p. 18. This directly conflicts with the Board's statutory authority unde~

section 10(B) of the Act. Section 10(B) states:

The Board shall adopt sulfur dioxide regulations and emission

standards for existing fuel combustion stationary emission

sources located in all areas of the State of Illinois, except in

Chicago, St. Louis (Illinois) and Peoria major metropolitan areas,

in accordance with the following requirements:

(1) Such regulations shall not be more restrictive than

necessary to attain and maintain the "Primary National Ambient

Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Dioxide" and within a

reasonable time attain and maintain the "Secondary National

Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Dioxide."

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

41 5 ILCS 5/10(B) (emphasis added). Thus, under Section 10(B), the Board must not adopt

emission standards for existing

EGUs outside the Chicago, St. Louis, and Peoria metropolitan

areas that are more restrictive than necessary to attain and maintain the

SO2 NAAQS. However,

this is exactly what Subpart C proposes. There are no

SO2 nonattainment areas in Illinois.

Therefore, no additional

SO2 regulation is "necessary to attain and maintain" the SO2 NAAQS.

Consequently, under Section

10(B), the Board lacks statutory authority to adopt Subpart C of the

Agency's proposal to amend Part 225 and any proposed rule that contains such regulations.

Despite the statutory restrictions on the Board's authority in Section

10(B), the Agency,

in its Statement of Reasons, asserts statutory interpretations that are not only unpersuasive but

also contradict Illinois law. The Agency attempts to argue through a convoluted interpretation of

Section

10(B) that because the second purpose of Section 10(B), adoption of NAAQS for SO2

within the three metropolitan areas, has been met, the only remaining function of Section lO(B)

is to provide guidance about the adoption of SO2-related regulations by the Board. Statement of

Reasons, p. 21. Based on this interpretation, the Agency then asserts that a "newer statutory

provision has superseded Section

10(B) as to that limited purpose, and therefore all remaining

purpose and effect of Section

10(B) has essentially ended." Statement of Reasons, p. 21. That

newer statutory provision, Section 9.10, directs the Agency to "issue to the House and Senate

Committees on Environment and Energy findings that address the potential need for the control

or reduction of emissions from fossil fuel fired electric generating plants." 415 ILCS

5/9.10(b).

According to the Agency, this means that the statutory limitations in Section 10(B) are no longer

effective even though they remain in the Act.

However, the language of Section 9.10 does not displace the restriction on the Board's

jurisdiction to adopt regulations requiring reductions in

SO2 emissions outside the three major

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

metropolitan areas beyond the levels necessary for attainment of the SO2 NAAQS. The

Agency's contorted interpretation directly contradicts long-standing principles of Illinois law.

Under Illinois law, in construing a statute, the most fundamental rule is to give effect to the

legislature's intent, and the best evidence of that intent is the statutory language.

US.

Bank Nat'l

Assoc.

v.

Clark,

837 N.E.2d 74,82 (Ill. 2005). Moreover, statutory language must be given its

plain and ordinary meaning.

Clark,

at 82. As a result, courts must not construe a statute by

altering its language in a way that constitutes a change in the plain meaning of the words actually

adopted by the legislature.

Clark,

at 82.

Applying these fundamental principles of statutory construction to Section

10(B), its

plain and ordinary meaning clearly prohibits the Board from regulating

SO2 emissions beyond

that required for attainment of the

SO2 NAAQS. Even if there was any ambiguity in this

statutory prohibition, and there is not, Section 9.10 cannot be construed to provide authority that

was precluded under Section

10(B). Section 9.10 merely requires the Agency to issue a report

that addresses such things as reduction of

SO2 emissions. The General Assembly could then act

upon the report's findings. Such action could potentially have included, if requested by the

Agency and determined to be necessary, repeal of Section

10(B) and a grant of authority to the

Board to adopt additional

SO2 regulations. However, as discussed further below, the General

Assembly has not repealed Section

10(B) and has not granted such authority following

submission of the Agency's report. Indeed, a bill that would have repealed Section

lO(B),

Senate Bill 2721 ("S.B. 2721") was proposed but never enacted. Nothing in the statutory

language of Section 9.10 suggests that the Board may regulate

SO2 emissions in contradiction of

If the Agency found that further regulation of

SO2 was an appropriate outcome of its

investigation, the Agency could have and should have included a recommendation to amend

Section

10(B) in its report to the General Assembly pursuant to the statutory direction in Section

9.10.

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

Section 10(B). As a result, the Agency's interpretation of these two statutes violates their plain

and ordinary meaning.

Other principles of statutory interpretation also preclude the Agency's tortuous

interpretation of Sections

10(B) and 9.10. Under Illinois law, it is presumed that the legislature

will not enact a law which completely contradicts a prior statute without an express repeal of it.

See Clark,

837 N.E.2d at 80; In

re Marriage oflasky,

678 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (111. 1997). Thus,

repeal by implication is generally disfavored, and the Supreme Court will presume new

legislation was intended to be consistent with existing law.

Clark,

837 N.E.2d at 80;

Lasky,

678

N.E.2d at 1037. In fact, when there is an alleged conflict between two legislative enactments,

the court has a duty to construe those statutes in a manner that avoids an inconsistency and gives

effect to both enactments, where such a construction is reasonably possible.

Spina

v.

Toyota

Motor Credit Corp.,

703 N.E.2d 484,492 (111.App.Ct. 1998);

see also Clark,

837 N.E.2d at 80.

Nevertheless, repeal by implication is exactly what the Agency asks the Board to find in order to

support promulgating Subpart C. Indeed, the Board is effectively asked to repeal Section

10(B)

when the General Assembly itself has chosen not to do so even following the Agency's report

under Section 9.10.

On January 20,2006, Senator James

F. Claybome, Jr. proposed S.B. 2721 to repeal

Section

10(B) of the Act. S.B. 2721,94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2006). After a First

Reading, the Senate referred S.B. 2721 to its Rules Committee. On February 8,2006, the Senate

Rules Committee assigned this bill to the Senate Environment and Energy Committee.

However, the Senate Environment and Energy Committee postponed S.B. 2721 on February 15,

2006, and subsequently re-referred the bill to the Senate Rules Committee on February 17,2006.

Since that time, the Senate has taken no further action toward passing this bill.

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

The Legislature passed Section 10(B) over twenty years ago. It has had ample time to

explicitly repeal or otherwise amend this section if it so desired, including through S.B. 2721.

However, it has not done so, and the Agency should not ask the Board to find, through the

Agency's contorted interpretation, that the General Assembly has repealed Section

10(B) by

implication through its adoption of Section 9.10.

Further, even if the two statutes may be construed to be in conflict, as apparently urged

by the Agency, the Board has a duty to construe them in a manner that avoids inconsistency and

gives effect to both enactments. The Agency's interpretation gives no effect to Section

10(B).

However, the Board can readily give effect to the plain and ordinary language of both statutes by

the following natural and consistent interpretation: (1) Section

10(B) prohibits the Board from

regulating

SO2 emissions in excess of attainment, and (2) Section 9.10 required the Agency to

file a report to the legislature. Neither part of this interpretation includes authorization of

regulation of

SO2 outside the three major metropolitan areas more than is necessary to attain the

SO2 NAAQS.

For all of these reasons, the Agency's labyrinthine interpretation of Sections

10(B) and

9.10 in its Statement of Reasons defies all principles of statutory construction under Illinois law.

Accordingly, the Agency's interpretation does not establish that the Board has subject matter

jurisdiction to adopt

SO2 regulations, proposed Subpart C, or to adopt any rule that regulates SO2

outside the three major metropolitan areas beyond the level necessary to attain or maintain the

SO2 NAAQS.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Board lacks the requisite statutory authority to promulgate

proposed

Subparts C, D, and E of Part 225 and must dismiss the Agency's proposal.

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, Petitioners request that the Board grant

its Motion to Dismiss and dismiss the Agency's proposal to add new

Subparts C, D, and E to

Part 225.

Respectfully submitted,

DYNEGY MIDWEST GENERATION,

INC.,

MIDWEST GENERATION, LLC, and

SOUTHERN ILLINOIS POWER COOPERATIVE

by:

Dated: November 30,2006

Sheldon

A. Zabel

Kathleen C. Bassi

Stephen

J. Bonebrake

SCHIFF

HARDIN, LLP

6600 Sears Tower

233 South Wacker Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60606

312-258-5500

Fax: 312-258-5600

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, certify that on this 30" day of November, 2006, I have served

electronically the attached

MOTION TO DISMISS

on behalf of Dynegy Midwest Generation;

Inc., Midwest Generation, LLC, and Southern Illinois Power Cooperative,, upon the following

persons:

Dorothy

Gunn, Clerk

Illinois Pollution Control Board

James R. Thompson Center

Suite 11-500

100 West Randolph

Chicago, Illinois 60601

and electronically and

by first-class mail with postage thereon fully prepaid and affixed to the

persons listed on the

ATTACHED SERVICE LIST.

Sheldon A. Zabel

Kathleen C. Bassi

Stephen

J. Bonebrake

SCHIFF

HARDIN, LLP

6600 Sears Tower

233 South Wacker Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60606

3 12-258-5500

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

SERVICE LIST

(RO6-26)

John Knittle

Hearing Office

Illinois Pollution Control Board

James R. Thompson Center

100 W. Randolph

Suite

1 1-500

Chicago, Illinois 60601

knittlei@,ipcb.state.il.us

Matthew J. Dunn, Division Chief

Office of the Illinois Attorney General

Environmental Bureau

188 West Randolph, 20" Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60601

mdunn@atg.state.il.us

David Rieser

James T. Harrington

Jeremy R. Hojnicki

McGuireWoods LLP

77 West Wacker, Suite 4100

Chicago, Illinois 60601

drieser@,mcguirewoods.com

j harrin~on@,mc~irewoods.com

jhoinicki@,mc~uirewoods.com

Katherine D. Hodge

N. LaDonna Driver

HODGE DWYER ZEMAN

3150 Roland Avenue, P.O. Box 5776

Springfield, Illinois 62705-5776

Faith

E. Bugel

Environmental Law and Policy Center

35 East Wacker Drive, Suite 1300

Chicago, Illinois 60601

fbugel@elpc.org

Rachel Doctors, Assistant Counsel

John J. Kim, Managing Attorney

Air Regulatory Unit

Division of Legal Counsel

Illinois Environmental Protection Agency

1021 North Grand Avenue, East

P.O. Box 19276

Springfield, Illinois 62794-9276

rachel.doctors@,ilIinois.gov

john.i.kim@,illinois.gov

Virginia Yang, Deputy Legal Counsel

Illinois Department of

Natural Resources

One Natural Resources Way

Springfield, Illinois 62701-1271

virginia.vang@,illinois.nov

-

William A. Murray

City of Springfield, Office of Public Utilities

800 East Monroe,

4" Floor, Municipal

Building

Springfield, Illinois 62757-0001

bmurray@,cwlp.com

I

I

S. David Farris

Manager, Environmental, Health and Safety

City Water Light

&

Power

201 East Lake Shore Drive

Springfield, Illinois 62757

dfarris@,cwlp.com

Keith I. Harley

Chicago Legal Clinic, Inc.

205 West Monroe Street, 4" Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60606

kharley@kentlaw.edu

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

---

SERVICE LIST

(RO6-26)

Sasha M. Reyes

Steven J. Murawski

Baker

&

McKenzie

One Prudential Plaza, Suite 3500

130 East Randolph Drive

Chicago, IL 60601

sasha.m.reyes@,bakemet.com

steven.i .murawski@bakernet.com

-

Daniel D. McDevitt

General Counsel

MIDWEST GENERATION, LLC

440 South

LaSalle Street, Suite 3500

Chicago, Illinois 60605

dmcdevitt@mw~en.com

Bruce Nilles

Sierra Club

122 West Washington Avenue, Suite 830

Madison, Wisconsin 53703

bmce.nilles@sierraclub.org

James H. Russell

Winston

&

Strawn LLP

35 W. Wacker Drive,

4oth Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60601

jrussell@,winston.com

Bill S. Forcade

Katherine M.

Rahill

JENNER

&

BLOCK LLP

One IBM Plaza

Chicago, Illinois 6061 1

bforcade@ienner.com

krahill@,ienner.com

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, NOVEMBER 30, 2006