ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    July 6, 2006
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
    Complainant,
    v.
    RON FISHER MOTORSPORTS, INC., an
    Illinois corporation d/b/a F & L Salvage,
    Respondent.
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    PCB 06-193
    (Enforcement - Land, Air)
    ORDER OF THE BOARD (by G.T. Girard):
    On June 29, 2006, the Office of the Attorney General, on her own motion and at the
    request of the People of the State of Illinois (People), filed a four-count complaint against Ron
    Fisher Motorsports, Inc. d/b/a F & L Salvage (Ron Fisher Motorsports).
    See
    415 ILCS
    5/31(c)(1) (2004); 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204. The complaint concerns Ron Fisher Motorsports’
    facility on Mitchell Lane, in Washington County. For the reasons below, the Board accepts the
    complaint for hearing.
    Under the Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5/1
    et seq
    . (2004)), the
    Attorney General and the State’s Attorneys may bring actions before the Board to enforce
    Illinois’ environmental requirements on behalf of the People.
    See
    415 ILCS 5/31 (2004); 35 Ill.
    Adm. Code 103. In this case, the People allege that Ron Fisher Motorsports violated Sections
    9(a) and (c); 21(a), (e), (f), (f)(2), and (p)(3); and 55(a) and (c) of the Environmental Protection
    Act (415 ILCS 5/9(a) and (c); 21(a), (e), (f), (f)(2), and (p)(3); and 55(a) and (c) (2004)) and 35
    Ill. Adm. Code 703.121(a), 722.111, 848.202(b). The People further allege that Ron Fisher
    Motorsports violated these provisions by (1) storing hazardous waste without a permit; (2)
    failing to make the required hazardous waste determination; (3) storing hazardous waste at a
    facility that did not fulfill applicable requirements; (4) causing or allowing the open dumping of
    waste; (5) disposing of or abandoning waste at a site that did not meet applicable requirements;
    (6) storing used or waste tires outside without cover and in a way that they accumulated water;
    (7) failing to make the required notice of tire storage activity within 30 days; (8) causing or
    allowing the open burning of waste; (9) causing the open burning of waste in a manner that
    resulted in open burning; and (10) causing, threatening, or allowing the discharge of
    contaminants into the environment so as to cause or tend to cause air pollution. The People ask
    the Board to order Ron Fisher Motorsports to cease and desist from further violation and pay a
    civil penalty of not more than the statutory maximum.
    The Board finds that the complaint meets the content requirements of the Board’s
    procedural rules and accepts the complaint for hearing.
    See
    35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204(c), (f),
    103.212(c). A respondent’s failure to file an answer to a complaint within 60 days after
    receiving the complaint may have severe consequences. Generally, if Ron Fisher Motorsports
    2
    fails within that timeframe to file an answer specifically denying, or asserting insufficient
    knowledge to form a belief of, a material allegation in the complaint, the Board will consider
    Ron Fisher Motorsports to have admitted the allegation. 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204(d).
    The Board directs the hearing officer to proceed expeditiously to hearing. Among the
    hearing officer’s responsibilities is the “duty . . . to ensure development of a clear, complete, and
    concise record for timely transmission to the Board.” 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.610. A complete
    record in an enforcement case thoroughly addresses, among other things, the appropriate remedy,
    if any, for the alleged violations, including any civil penalty.
    If a complainant proves an alleged violation, the Board considers the factors set forth in
    Sections 33(c) and 42(h) of the Act to fashion an appropriate remedy for the violation.
    See
    415
    ILCS 5/33(c), 42(h) (2004). Specifically, the Board considers the Section 33(c) factors in
    determining, first, what to order the respondent to do to correct an ongoing violation, if any, and,
    second, whether to order the respondent to pay a civil penalty. The factors provided in Section
    33(c) bear on the reasonableness of the circumstances surrounding the violation, such as the
    character and degree of any resulting interference with protecting public health, the technical
    practicability and economic reasonableness of compliance, and whether the respondent has
    subsequently eliminated the violation.
    With Public Act 93-575, effective January 1, 2004, the General Assembly changed the
    Act’s civil penalty provisions, amending Section 42(h) and adding a new subsection (i) to
    Section 42. Section 42(h)(3) now states that any economic benefit to respondent from delayed
    compliance is to be determined by the “lowest cost alternative for achieving compliance.” The
    amended Section 42(h) also requires the Board to ensure that the penalty is “at least as great as
    the economic benefits, if any, accrued by the respondent as a result of the violation, unless the
    Board finds that imposition of such penalty would result in an arbitrary of unreasonable financial
    hardship.”
    Under these amendments, the Board may also order a penalty lower than a respondent’s
    economic benefit from delayed compliance if the respondent agrees to perform a “supplemental
    environmental project” (SEP). A SEP is defined in Section 42(h)(7) as an “environmentally
    beneficial project” that a respondent “agrees to undertake in settlement of an enforcement action
    . . . but which the respondent is not otherwise legally required to perform.” SEPs are also added
    as a new Section 42(h) factor (Section 42(h)(7)), as is whether a respondent has “voluntary self-
    disclosed . . . the non-compliance to the [Illinois Environmental Protection] Agency” (Section
    42(h)(6)). A new Section 42(i) lists nine criteria for establishing voluntary self-disclosure of
    non-compliance. A respondent establishing these criteria is entitled to a “reduction in the portion
    of the penalty that is not based on the economic benefit of non-compliance.”
    Accordingly, the Board further directs the hearing officer to advise the parties that in
    summary judgment motions and responses, at hearing, and in briefs, each party should consider:
    (1) proposing a remedy for a violation, if any (including whether to impose a civil penalty), and
    supporting its position with facts and arguments that address any or all of the Section 33(c)
    factors; and (2) proposing a civil penalty, if any (including a specific total dollar amount and the
    portion of that amount attributable to the respondent’s economic benefit, if any, from delayed
    3
    compliance), and supporting its position with facts and arguments that address any or all of the
    Section 42(h) factors. The Board also directs the hearing officer to advise the parties to address
    these issues in any stipulation and proposed settlement that may be filed with the Board.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, certify that the Board
    adopted the above order on July 6, 2006, by a vote of 4-0.
    Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
    Illinois Pollution Control Board

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