ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
June 1, 2006
FLAGG CREEK WATER RECLAMATION
DISTRICT,
Complainant,
v.
VILLAGE OF HINSDALE,
METROPOLITAN WATER
RECLAMATION DISTRICT OF GREATER
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, AND DUPAGE
COUNTY,
Respondents.
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PCB 06-141
(Citizens Enforcement - Water)
ORDER OF THE BOARD (by A.S. Moore):
On March 3, 2006, Flagg Creek Water Reclamation District (FCWRD) filed a four-count
citizen’s water pollution complaint (Comp.). FCWRD named as respondents the Village of
Hinsdale (Hinsdale), the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago
(MWRDGC), the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT), and DuPage County (DuPage)
(collectively, respondents).
See
415 ILCS 5/31(d) (2004); 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204. FCWRD
operates a wastewater treatment plant. FCWRD alleges that the respondents execute their
statutory duties in a manner that contributes excess flow to FCWRD during times of rainfall.
FCWRD further alleges that these overflows prevent it from complying with various terms and
conditions to which it is subject.
The Board has not previously determined whether the complaint can proceed to hearing
in whole or in part as to any or all claims and respondents. The Board, under section 31(d) of the
Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5/31(d) (2004)), finds that the complaint is not
duplicative but is in part frivolous, as described below. The Board today grants a motion of
MWRDGC to strike and dismiss paragraphs 61 through 70 of count II of FCWRD’s complaint as
frivolous.
The Board on its own motion also strikes as frivolous the portions of complaint alleging
violations of any legal authority other than the Act and the Board’s regulations. These
authorities include the Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy issued by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and FCWRD’s ordinance.
The Board accepts the balance of the complaint for hearing as to all four respondents. In
doing so, the Board finds the balance of the complaint neither duplicative nor frivolous within
the meaning of section 31(d) of the Act.
See
415 ILCS 5/31(d) (2004).
2
To enable the parties and the Board to proceed expeditiously by using a single complaint
document, the Board directs FCWRD to file an amended complaint consistent with the terms of
this order on or before July 6, 2006, 35 days from the date of this order. MWRDGC has 60 days
from the filing of an amended complaint to file its answer. The other respondents are given
leave to file amended answers within the same 60-day period, if they choose to do so.
Below, the Board first briefly describes the procedures through which the Board
determines whether a citizen’s complaint is frivolous or duplicative. The Board next summarizes
the allegations in FCWRD’s complaint and its requested relief before turning to the arguments in
MWRDGC’s motion to strike and dismiss and in FCWRD’s response (Resp.). Finally, the
Board analyzes those arguments before determining whether any of the allegations in the
complaint are frivolous or duplicative.
DUPLICATIVE/FRIVOLOUS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES
Section 31(d) of the Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5/31(d) (2004))
allows any person to file a complaint with the Board. Section 31(d) further provides that
“[u]nless the Board determines that such complaint is duplicative or frivolous, it shall schedule a
hearing.” 415 ILCS 5/31(d)(1) (2004); 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.212(a).
A complaint is duplicative if it is “identical or substantially similar to one brought before
the Board or another forum.” 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.202. A complaint is frivolous if it requests
“relief that the Board does not have the authority to grant” or “fails to state a cause of action
upon which the Board can grant relief.”
Id.
Within 30 days after being served with a complaint, a respondent may file a motion
alleging that the complaint is duplicative or frivolous. 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.212(b). Filing
such a motion stays the 60-day period for filing an answer to the complaint.
Id
. “The stay will
begin when the motion is filed and end when the Board disposes of the motion.” 35 Ill. Adm.
Code 103.204(e).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 3, 2006, FCWRD filed its complaint. On April 5, 2006, MWRDGC filed a
motion to strike and dismiss paragraphs 61 through 70 of count II of FCWRD’s complaint or, in
the alternative, motion for leave to serve a bill of particulars (MWRDGC Mot.). On April 19,
2006, FCWRD filed its response in opposition to MWRDGC’s motion to dismiss paragraphs 61-
70 (Resp.). The Board received answers from IDOT on April 25, 2006 (IDOT Ans.), from
Hinsdale on May 5, 2006 (Hinsdale Ans.), and from DuPage on May 9,2006 (DuPage Ans.).
Respondents’ answers contained affirmative defenses raising jurisdictional issues.
See
IDOT
Ans. at 2, Hinsdale Ans. at 11, DuPage Ans. at 3.
FCWRD’S COMPLAINT
3
FCWRD System
FCWRD, formerly known as the Hinsdale Sanitary District, is a municipal government
agency organized in 1926 under the Sanitary District Act of 1917. Comp. at 1, citing 70 ILCS
2405/0.1
et seq
. (2004). FCWRD is responsible for wastewater treatment within a designated
service area of approximately 24 square miles, including all or part of the municipalities of
Hinsdale, Clarendon Hills, Oak Brook, Oak Brook Terrace, Burr Ridge, Westmont, Villa Park,
Lombard, Darien, and Willowbrook. Comp. at 1.
Generally, FCWRD argues that the four respondents’ actions cause stormwater to enter
the FCWRD system, causing or contributing to unauthorized combined sewer overflow (CSO)
events. Comp. at 3. FCWRD alleges that these CSO events do not comply with federal CSO
policy or state regulations.
Id
., citing 59 Fed.Reg. 18688, 35 Ill. Adm. Code Part 306, Subpart C.
FCWRD further alleges that, without cooperation from and corrective action by the four
respondents, FCWRD cannot comply with the terms and conditions of its National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit or with federal CSO policy. Comp. at 3, citing
59 F.R. 18688. Below, the Board separately summarizes the allegations made by FCWRD
against each of the four respondents.
Hinsdale
FCWRD alleges that Hinsdale violated sections 12(a) and 12(b) of the Act (415 ILCS
5/12(a) and 12(b) (2004)). FCWRD further alleges that Hinsdale violated 35 Ill. Adm. Code
306, Subpart C and 35 Ill. Adm. Code 307.1101. FCWRD further alleges that Hinsdale has
violated the Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy issued by the USEPA, the direction of
the Sanitary Water Board
1
in 1968 to separate Hinsdale’s sewers, and FCWRD’s ordinance and
statutory duty. Pet. at 5-6.
FCWRD further alleges that Hinsdale violated these provisions by failing to separate its
sewers, allowing substantial wet weather flows to enter FCWRD’s combined sewer system and
travel to and inundate the FCWRD system; and by failing to operate its leaf collection program
to prevent leaves and stormwater from entering the FCWRD system.
MWRGDC
FCWRD alleges that MWRDGC violated section 12(a) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/12(a)
(2004)). Pet. at 7. FCWRD further alleges that MWRDGC violated 35 Ill. Adm. Code 306,
Subpart C and 35 Ill. Adm. Code 307.1101. Pet. at 6-7. FCWRD further alleges that MWRDGC
has violated MWRDGC’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit,
the Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy issued by USEPA, and FCWRD’s ordinance
prohibiting wet weather flows, hindering FCWRD’s fulfillment of its statutory duty.
Id
..
1
The Sanitary Water Board was a predecessor agency to the Board and was abolished with the
enactment of the Act.
4
FCWRD further alleges that MWRDGC violated the Act and Board rules by diverting
flows from the area served by MWRDGC to FCWRD. FCWRD alleges that these diverted flows,
combined with wet weather flows from that area served by FCWRD, cause or contribute to
unauthorized combined sewer overflows within FCWRD’s system. FCWRD further alleges that
MWRDGC has violated its statutory duty to regulate stormwater and to maintain Flagg Creek so
that stormwater is not obstructed in it. Pet. at 6-7.
IDOT
FCWRD alleges that IDOT violated section 12(a) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/12(a) (2004)).
Pet. at 8. FCWRD further alleges that IDOT violated 35 Ill. Adm. Code Part 306, Subpart C and
35 Ill. Adm. Code 307.1101.
Id
. FCWRD further alleges that IDOT has violated FCWRD’s
ordinance prohibiting wet weather flows and has interfered with FCWRD’s statutory duty to
provide capacity for sanitary flows from residents in its service area.
Id
.
FCWRD further alleges that IDOT violated these provisions by failing to provide for wet
weather flows from 55th Street, which cause or contribute to unauthorized combined sewer
overflows within FCWRD’s system. Pet. at 8.
DuPage
FCWRD alleges that DuPage violated section 12(a) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/12(a)
(2004)). Pet. at 9. FCWRD further alleges that DuPage violated 35 Ill. Adm. Code Part 306,
Subpart C and 35 Ill. Adm. Code 307.1101.
Id
. FCWRD further alleges that DuPage violated
FCWRD’s ordinance prohibiting wet weather flows and has interfered with FCWRD’s statutory
duty to provide capacity for sanitary flows from residents in its service area.
Id
.
FCWRD further alleges that DuPage violated these provisions by failing to provide for
wet weather flows from 55th Street, which cause or contribute to unauthorized combined sewer
overflows within FCWRD’s system. Pet. at 9.
Relief Requested
In its request for relief, FCWRD seeks “an order directing Hinsdale to comply with the
direction of the Sanitary Water Board requiring Hinsdale to separate its combined sewer.” Pet.
at 9. FCWRD also seeks a Board order “directing Hinsdale to comply with FCWRD’s ordinance
prohibiting combined sewers.”
Id
. In addition, FCWRD seeks an order directing Hinsdale to
comply with the Act, Board regulations, and combined sewer overflow policy by stopping
stormwater flows and large leaf loads from entering FCWRD’s sewers.
Id
. Finally, FCWRD
asks that the Board issue an order that all four respondents address their respective wet weather
flows and stop stormwater flows from entering FCWRD’s sewers.
Id
.
MWRDGC MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISMISS
On April 5, 2006, MWRDGC filed a motion to strike and dismiss paragraphs 61 through
70 of count II of FCWRD’s complaint or, in the alternative, motion for leave to serve a bill of
5
particulars
2
(MWRDGC Mot.). MWRDGC moves that those paragraphs be dismissed as
frivolous because the Board lacks the authority to decide whether MWRDGC has committed the
violations alleged in them. MWRDGC Mot. at 5. None of the other three respondents filed a
motion under section 103.212(b). However, respondents’ answers contained affirmative
defenses raising jurisdictional issues.
See
IDOT Ans. at 2, Hinsdale Ans. at 11, DuPage Ans. at
3.
MWRDGC claims that FCWRD’s complaint alleges that MWRDGC has violated its
statutory duty to regulate stormwater in Cook County. MWRDGC Mot. at 2, citing Comp. at 7
(¶¶ 61-70). MWRDGC further claims that FCWRD has pled that this alleged failure to regulate
stormwater has interfered with FCWRD’s duty to provide capacity for sanitary flows.
MWRDGC Mot. at 2, citing Comp. at 7 (¶ 70). MWRDGC argues that FCWRD has pled that
this alleged violation of MWRDGC’s statutory duty violates the Act’s prohibition on causing or
contributing to water pollution (415 ILCS 5/12(a) (2004)) and also violates the Board’s
regulation prohibiting any person from introducing pollutants that interfere with operation of a
sewage treatment plant (35 Ill. Adm. Code 307.1101). MWRDGC Mot. at 2, citing Comp. at 7
(¶¶ 68-69).
MWRDGC argues that FCWRD has not identified “the specific Illinois statutory
provision regarding stormwater regulation that it claims was breached by the MWRD.”
MWRDGC Mot. at 2. MWRDGC notes that its statutory duties arise from its enabling statute.
Id
., citing 70 ILCS 2605/1
et seq
. (2004) (Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Act).
MWRDGC further notes that the General Assembly recently amended the Metropolitan Water
Reclamation District Act by giving MWRDGC the additional duty of managing stormwater.
MWRDGC Mot. at 2-3, citing 70 ILCS 2605/7h (2004) (Public Act 93-1049, eff. Nov. 19,
2004).
MWRDGC acknowledges that the Act gives the Board authority to adjudicate complaints
that allege violations either of the Act or Board regulations. MWRDGC Mot. at 3, citing 415
ILCS 5/5(d) and 5/30-33 (2004). MWRDGC argues, however, that “the Board’s authority is
limited to the terms of its enabling statute.” MWRDGC Mot. at 3, citing Concerned Adjoining
Owners v. PCB, 288 Ill. App. 3d 565 (5th Dist. 1997). In the Concerned Adjoining Owners case,
MWRDGC states that organizations of citizens claimed that the City of Salem did not comply
with the Illinois Municipal Code in annexing property for a landfill. MWRDGC Mot. at 3, citing
Those Opposed to Area Landfills (T.O.T.A.L.) v. City of Salem, Concerned Adjoining Owners
v. City of Salem, PCB 96-79, 96-82 (consolidated) (Mar. 7, 1996). The Board stated it “does not
have the authority to decide whether the annexation and purchase of the property by the City was
conducted according to the applicable statutes in the Illinois Municipal Code, as the Board’s
authority is limited to those matters arising under the Act.” MWRDGC Mot. at 3, citing Those
Opposed to Area Landfills (T.O.T.A.L.) v. City of Salem, Concerned Adjoining Owners v. City
of Salem, PCB 96-79, 96-82 (consolidated), slip op. at 5 (Mar. 7, 1996). MWRDGC further
notes that the appellate court affirmed the Board’s decision, stating that “[t]he Board’s authority
2
A bill of particulars is a “[f]orm or means of discovery in which the prosecution sets forth the
time, place, manner, and means of the commission of the crime as alleged in the complaint or
indictment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (6th ed. 1990)
6
is limited to the terms of its enabling statute, which does not extend to matters arising under the
Municipal Code.” MWRDGC Mot. at 3, citing Concerned Adjoining Owners and Those
Opposed to Area Landfills (T.O.T.A.L.) v. PCB,
et al
., 680 N.E.2d 810, 819 (5th Dist. 1997).
Extending this analysis to the case at hand, MWRDGC argues “it follows that the Board’s
authority does not extend to the matters arising under the MWRD’s enabling statute, assuming
that this is the basis of the ‘statutory duty’ alleged by Complainant.” MWRDGC Mot. at 3.
MWRDGC also emphasizes the case of Material Service Corp., in which the Board
dismissed a complaint as frivolous. Material Service Corp. v. J.W. Peters & Sons, Inc.
, PCB 98-
97, slip op. at 2 (Apr. 2, 1998). MWRDGC argues that the Board in that case “held that it did
not have jurisdiction to determine whether the respondent was in violation of the Act, when, in
order to do so, it first had to find violations of the Gasoline Storage Act and regulations
promulgated thereunder.” MWRDGC Mot. at 4. MWRDGC further argues that, because it did
not have jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of the Gasoline Storage Act, the Board dismissed
the complaint.
Id
. Applying the Board’s reasoning in Material Service Corp.
to this case,
MWDGC stresses that the Board also lacks “jurisdiction to determine whether MWRDGC is in
violation of the recently-enacted Stormwater Management Act.”
Id
. (referring to 70 ILCS
2605/7h (2004)). MWRDGC concludes by stating that, because paragraphs 61-70 of the
complaint appear to allege violations of the Stormwater Management Act, they should be struck
for lack of jurisdiction.
Id
.
FCWRD RESPONSE
FCWRD argues that neither the Act nor the caselaw support MWRDGC’s claim that “the
Board loses authority over matters arising under the Act in any circumstances where an alleged
violation of the Act also involves an alleged violation of another statute.” Resp. at 2. FCWRD
argues that the Act does not limit the Board’s authority by explicitly divesting it of authority “in
any case in which construing another statute is necessary to enforce the Act.”
Id
. Had the
General Assembly wished to limit the Board’s authority in that fashion, FCWRD argues that it
could have drafted the Act to read that “[t]he Board shall have authority to conduct proceedings
upon complaints charging violations of the Act, any rule or regulation adopted under the Act,
[
provided however in no event may the Board construe another statute or regulation in
connection with its deliberations regarding violations of the Act
]. Resp. at 3 (emphasis in
original). FCWRD suggests that the Board should not construe its grant of authority to contain a
limit that the General Assembly did not specifically include in the Act.
See id
.
In support of its argument, FCWRD cites to A.E. Staley Manuf. Co. v. IEPA, 290 N.E.2d
890 (4th Dist. 1972), in which the petitioner argued that the Act limited the Board’s authority to
discharges into the waters of the state and that the Board did not have authority to control
discharges into sanitary sewers which are tributary to a sanitary treatment plant. Resp. at 3,
citing Staley
, 290 N.E.2d at 893. Noting that the appellate court characterized the petitioner’s
position as “unduly restrictive,” FCWRD emphasizes that the court found a “realistic and
practical nexus” between Staley’s discharge and the waters of the state that was sufficient to give
the Board authority over Staley’s sewer. Resp. at 3, citing Staley, 290 N.E.2d at 894-95. In this
matter, FCWRD finds a nexus between MWRDGC’s alleged failure to properly manage
stormwater and the violations of the Act and Board regulations alleged in the complaint. While
7
acknowledging that the MWRDGC is delegated its authority by a separate act, FCWRD argues
that the Board’s authority to hear complaints alleging violations of the Act includes the power to
supervise MWRDGC “only to the extent reasonably required to effectuate the purposes of the
Act.” Resp. at 4.
FCWRD discounts MWRDGC’s emphasis on the Concerned Adjoining Landowners
case. FCWRD argues that the appellate court did not limit the Board’s authority to act on
complaints alleging a violation of the Act. Resp. at 4. Instead, argues FCWRD, the court merely
upheld the Board’s determination that annexation is not addressed in the Act and does not
involve causing or threatening pollution. Resp. at 4-5. In comparison, claims FCWRD, the
breach of MWRDGC’s statutory duty has allegedly caused a violation of the Act and the Board’s
regulations. Resp. at 5;
see
Comp. at 7.
FCWRD also seeks to distinguish the Materials Service Corp.
case relied upon by
MWRDGC. In the complaint in that case, argues FCWRD, “the cited section of the Act had no
application to the facts alleged in the complaint and the matter did not arise under the Act.”
Resp. at 5. In this case, however, FCWRD argues that it has alleged that MWRDGC violated the
Act and Board regulations.
Id.
Generally, FCWRD claims that the Board “is the proper venue” to hear the evidence and
issue an order addressing the violations of the Act and the Board regulations alleged in the
complaint. Resp. at 1. FCWRD states that, in order for the Board to fulfill its duties, it “must
consider and evaluate the statutory responsibility and authority of MWRDGC” to determine
whether the Act has been violated and to craft a remedy in the event that a violation is found.
Id
.
BOARD ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Complaint Not Duplicative
The Board has not identified any other cases either substantially similar or identical to
this matter pending in other forums. Additionally, MWRDGC's motion to strike does not allege
that any potentially duplicative matters are now pending. Based on the record now before the
Board, none of the allegations in the complaint are duplicative as to any respondent.
Complaint Frivolous in Part
FCWRD has alleged that MWRDGC has breached its statutory duty to maintain Flagg
Creek so that stormwater is not obstructed. Comp. at 7 (¶¶ 66-67). FCWRD has further alleged
that this breach is itself a violation of the Act and the Board’s regulations (Comp. at 7 (¶¶ 68-
69)) and an interference with FCWRD’s own statutory duties (Comp. at 7 (¶ 70)). While
FCWRD has not specifically cited the source of MWRDGC’s statutory duty (
see
Comp at 7 (¶¶
61-70)), FCWRD clearly refers to section 7h of the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District
Act. 70 ILCS 2605/7h (2004) (Stormwater management). As pled, the complaint requires the
Board to determine whether MWRDGC has violated its enabling statute in order to determine
whether MWRDGC has violated the Act and Board regulations.
8
The Board notes that its powers are limited to those vested in it by the Environmental
Protection Act.
See
Chemetco, Inc. v. PCB, 140 Ill. App. 3d 283, 286 (5th Dist. 1986); 415
ILCS 5/5 (2004). The Board’s role is analogous to a court of limited jurisdiction. The Board can
act only pursuant to the authority conferred on it by statute. Pickering v. Illinois Human Rights
Comm’n., 246 Ill. App. 3d 340, 352 (2nd Dist. 1986), citing City of Chicago v. Fair Employment
Practices Com., 65 Ill. 2d 108, 112-13 (1976). Specifically, the Act provides that “[t]he Board
shall have authority to conduct proceedings upon complaints charging violations
of this Act
,
[and] any rule or regulation adopted under this Act.” 415 ILCS 5/5(d) (2004) (emphasis added).
This limited authority is reflected in the caselaw. In Material Service Corp. v. J.W.
Peters & Sons, Inc., PCB 98-97 (Apr. 2, 1998), the Board dismissed as frivolous a complaint
alleging a violation of regulations adopted under the Gasoline Storage Act (GSA). “The Board
does not have the jurisdiction to determine” violations of regulations adopted under the GSA.
Material Service Corp. v. J.W. Peters & Sons, Inc.
, PCB 98-97, slip op. at 2 (Apr. 2, 1998),
citing 430 ILCS 15/2 (1996), 41 Ill. Adm. Code 170.670. In Concerned Adjoining Owners and
Those Opposed to Area Landfills (T.O.T.A.L.) v. PCB,
et al
., 680 N.E.2d 810 (5th Dist. 1997),
the court affirmed the Board’s conclusion that it did not have authority to determine compliance
with the Municipal Code: “[t]he Board’s authority is limited to the terms of its enabling statue.”
Id
. at 819, citing 415 ILCS 5/5 (1992). FCWRD has not persuasively distinguished its complaint
from these precedents.
FCWRD suggests that, in the absence of language explicitly forbidding the Board from
interpreting any other statute, the Act is elastic enough to allow the Board to determine whether
other statutes and regulations have been violated in connection with alleged violations of the Act.
Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument would impermissibly extend the principle of
pendent jurisdiction and all but convert the Board into a court of general jurisdiction.
Consequently, the Board finds that paragraphs 61-70 of the complaint are frivolous because they
assert claims over which the Board lacks jurisdiction and thus request relief that the Board lacks
authority to grant. The Board grants MWRDGC’s motion to strike and dismiss paragraphs 61
through 70 of FCWRD’s complaint as frivolous. Having granted that motion, the Board denies
the alternative motion for leave to serve a bill of particulars as moot.
The Board further notes that FCWRD has alleged violations of FCWRD’s ordinance
against all four respondents. The analysis and conclusion above with regard to the Board’s
authority to adjudicate violations of the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Act apply with
equal force to the Board’s authority to adjudicate violations of the FCWRD ordinance. To the
extent that it alleges a violation of that ordinance, the Board lacks jurisdiction over it. While the
Board notes that respondents have raised this issue of the Board’s jurisdiction in their answers
(
see
IDOT Ans. at 2, Hinsdale Ans. at 11, DuPage Ans. at 3), the Board on its own motion finds
that the alleged violations of FCWRD’s ordinance are frivolous because they assert claims over
which the Board lacks jurisdiction and thus request relief that the Board lacks authority to grant.
Similarly, the Board cannot directly enforce the USEPA’s combined sewer overflow
policy. To the extent that it alleges a violation of that policy, the Board lacks jurisdiction over it.
The Board on its own motion finds that the alleged violations of USEPA’s policy are frivolous
because they assert claims over which the Board lacks jurisdiction and thus request relief that the
9
Board lacks authority to grant. The Board notes, however, that it has incorporated elements of
the policy into its regulations.
See, e.g.
, 35 Ill. Adm. Code 306 Subpart C (Combined Sewers
and Treatment Plant Bypasses).
The Board accepts the balance of the complaint for hearing as to all four respondents. In
doing so, the Board finds the balance of the complaint neither duplicative nor frivolous within
the meaning of section 31(d) of the Act.
See
415 ILCS 5/31(d) (2004).
To enable the parties and the Board to proceed expeditiously by using a single complaint
document, the Board directs FCWRD to file an amended complaint consistent with the terms of
this order on or before July 6, 2006, 35 days from the date of this order. MWRDGC has 60 days
from the filing of an amended complaint to file its answer. The other respondents are given
leave to file amended answers within the same 60-day period, if they choose to do so.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Board Member N.J. Melas abstained.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, certify that the Board
adopted the above order on June 1, 2006, by a vote of 3-0.
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
