BEFORE

THE ILLINOIS

POLLUTION

CONTROL

BOARD

PEOPLE

OF THE

STATE

OF ILLINOIS,

by

LISA MADIGAN,

Attorney

General)

of the

State of

Illinois,)

Complainant,)

V.)

)

PCB 96-98

SKOKIE

VALLEY

ASPHALT

CO., INC.,

)

(Enforcement

-

RCRA)

an Illinois

Corporation,

EDWIN

L. FREDERICK,)

JR., Individually

and

as Owner

and President

of

)

Skokie

Valley

Asphalt

Co., Inc.,

and)

RICHARD

J. FREDERICK,

Individually)

and as

Owner

and Vice

President

of Skokie)

Valley

Asphalt

Co., Inc.,)

Respondents.)

NOTICE

OF

MOTION

TO:

Mr. David

S. O'Neill,

Esq.

Ms. Carol

Webb,

Hearing

Officer

Mr.

Michael

B. Jawgiel,

Esq.

Pollution

Control

Board

5487 North

Milwaukee

Avenue

1021

North Grand

Avenue

East

Chicago,

Illinois

60630-1249

P.O.

Box 19274

Springfield,

Illinois

62794-9274

PLEASE

TAKE

NOTICE

that I have

today

filed

Complainant's

Second

Motion

for

Protective

Order

and Response

to Respondents'

Motion

to Quash

Deposition

Notices

with

the Office

of the

Clerk of the

Illinois

Pollution

Control

Board,

a true and

correct

copy of which

is

attached

hereto

and herewith

served

upon

you.

PEOPLE

OF THE

STATE

OF ILLINOIS,

by LISA

MADIGAN,

Attorney

General

of

the State

of Illinois

BY:

1AU460"

MICHAEL

C. PARTEE

Assistant

Attorney

General

Environmental

Bureau/North

188 West

Randolph,

Suite 2001

Chicago,

Illinois 60601

Tel: (312)814-2069

Fax:

(312)814-2347

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005

---

CERTIFICATE

OF SERVICE

It

is hereby

certified

that

true and

correct copies

of

the

Notice

of Motion

and

Complainant's

Second

Motion

for Protective

Order

and

Response

to Respondents'

Motion

to

Quash

Deposition

Notices,

were

sent

by First

Class

Mail,

postage

prepaid,

to

the persons

listed

on

the Notice

of Filing

on

December

28,

2005.

BY:444At%

MICHAEL

C.

PARTEE

It

is hereby

certified

that the

foregoing

were electronically

filed

with the

Clerk of

the

Board

on December

28, 2005:

Pollution

Control

Board,

Attn: Clerk

James

R. Thompson

Center

100 West

Randolph

Street,

Suite

11-500

Chicago,

Illinois 60601

BY:4

MICHAEL

4

C. PARTEE

Woya&

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005

---

BEFORE

THlE ILLINOIS

POLLUTION

CONTROL

BOARD

PEOPLE

OF THE STATE

OF ILLINOIS,)

by

LISA MAIDIGAN,

Attorney

General)

of the State

of Illinois,)

Complainant,)

V.)

)

PCB 96-98

SKOKIE VALLEY

ASPHALT

CO.,

INC.,

)

(Enforcement

-

RCRA)

an

Illinois Corporation,

EDWIN

L. FREDERICK,)

JR., Individually

and

as Owner and

President

of

)

Skokie Valley

Asphalt Co.,

Inc., and)

RICHARD

J. FREDERICK,

Individually)

and as Owner

and Vice President

of Skokie)

Valley

Asphalt

Co., Inc.,)

Respondents.)

COMPLAINANT'S

SECOND MOTION

FOR

PROTECTIVE

ORDER

AND

TO RESPONDENTS'NMOTION

TO

OUASH DEPOSITION

NOTICES

Complainant,

PEOPLE

OF THE

STATE

OF ILLINOIS

("People"),

by LISA MADIGAN,

Attorney

General

of the State of

Illinois, hereby

responds

to Respondents',

SKOKIE

VALLEY

ASPHALT

CO.,

INC., EDWIN

L. FREDERICK,

JR.,

and RICHARD

J. FREDERICK,

Motion

to Quash

Complainant's

Deposition

Notices

("Motion

to Quash").

The People

also hereby

move

for a protective

order

requiring

Respondents'

attorney(s)

to participate

in a full

and good faith

conference

with the People's

attorney

regarding

any future discovery

dispute

prior to seeking

Board intervention.

In support

of their

combined

response and

motion, the

People state

as

follows:

RELEVANT

PROCEDURAL

HISTORY

1.

On September

28,

2004, Respondents

filed

a pleading,

titled "Initial

Response to

and Motion

to Stay and/or

Extend

Time to Respond

to Complainant's

Petition for

Attorneys'

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005

---

Fees

and Costs"

("Initial

Response").

In their

Initial

Response,

Respondents

made

unsupported,

factual

allegations

regarding

their own

attorneys'

fees

and

costs, the

following

of

which are

two

examples:

"It is

hard to justify

a

claim for

attorneys'

fees

and cost

[sic]

by the

Illinois

Attorney

General's

office

that is

approximately

ten times

the a~mount

that three

Respondents

combined

paid

to defend

themselves

against

frivolous

claims"

(Initial

Response

at

11 17);

and

"It is

also hard

to justify

an

hourly

fee for

public

service

that is greater

than the

weighted-average

fee

charged

by the

Respondents'

attorney

even though

the

Respondents'

attorneys

[sic]

fees include

costs."

(Id.)

2.

On

April 25,

2005,

the People

served

Respondents

with

limited

interrogatories,

document

requests

and deposition

notices

aimed

at discovering

the factual

basis

for the

above

allegations.

3.

On

December

5, 2005,

pursuant

to

Board

Order, Respondents

provided

their

answers

and

objections

to the

People's

interrogatories

and

document

requests.

Respondents'

answers

and objections

consist

almost

entirely

of

inappropriate

objections.

4.

Therefore,

on

December

15,

2005, the

People

sent Respondents

yet

another

detailed

letter

in the spirit

of

Illinois

Supreme

Court

Rule 201

(k) to

attempt

to informally

resolve

any

potential

discovery

dispute

before

seeking

Board

intervention.

(Exhibit

A.)

5.

Respondents

have

not

yet responded

to the People's

December

15,

2005 Rule

201(k)

letter,

and it appears

that they

are unlikely

to

do so.

6.

Nevertheless,

neither

Respondents'

December

5,

2005 discovery

answers

and

objections,

nor

the People's

December

15, 2005

Rule

201(k)

letter,

address

the People's

deposition

notices.

Toward

orderly

discovery,

it was the

People's

implicit

understanding

that

depositions

would

not

occur

until written

discovery

was adequately

answered,

which

has

yet to

2

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005

---

occur

as

set forth

in the

People's

December

15, 2005

Rule

201

(k) letter.

7.

However,

on December

14, 2005,

without

any

informal

attempt

to resolve

differences,

Respondents

filed

their Motion

to

Quash.

REPONDENTS'

MOTION

TO

OUASH

SHOULD

BE DENIED

AND

ORDER

SHOULD

BE ENTERED

REOUIRING

A FULL

AND

GOOD

FAITH

ATTEMPT

TO INFORMALLY

RESOLVE

ANY FUTURE

DISCOVERY

PRIOR

TO SEEKING

BOARD

INTERVENTION

8.

The stated

basis

for

the Motion

to

Quash

is as follows:

MOTION

TO

OUASH

(6)

The Respondents

have

not

placed

their attorneys'

fees

at issue

in this

matter.

(7)

The

Respondents

have

not placed

their

expenses

at

issue

in this

matter.

(8)

The

Complainant's

deposition

of Respondents'

attorneys

will

not allow

for

the

discovery

of

information

calculated

to be admissible

at the

time

of the

hearing

on the

issue of

the reasonableness

of the

Complainant's

attorneys'

fees

and

costs.

(9)

The

Complainant's

deposition

of

Respondents'

attorneys

will

violate

the

attorney-client

privilege

between

the Respondents

and

the Respondents'

attorneys.

(I10)

Allowing

the Complainant

to

take the

deposition

of

Respondents'

attorneys

is

inconsistent

with the

Board's

Order

of April

7,

2005 which

called

for limited

discovery

on the

subject

of the

reasonableness

of

attorneys'

fees

and

costs.

Order of

April

7, 2005

at 3.

9.

Procedurally,

the Motion

to

Quash

is premature

and unwarranted.

The

Respondents

have

not

yet adequately

answered

the

People's

discovery

requests,

yet seek

to quash

deposition

notices

before

the

People

are even

afforded

the

opportunity

to review

adequate

and

complete

written

discovery

answers.

10.

Substantively,

the Motion

to Quash

is undeveloped,

conclusory,

without

any

authority,

and does

not

set forth

an adequate

basis

for the

Board

to grant

the relief

requested.

3

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005

---

11.

Paragraphs

6

and

7 of

the

Motion

to

Quash

are

flatly

contradicted

by

Respondents'

prior

allegations

in their

Initial

Response,

where

they

clearly

placed

their

attorneys'

fees

and

costs

at

issue

by going

so far

as

to reference

certain,

as yet

undisclosed,

calculated

comparisons

between

the

parties'

attorneys'

fees

and

costs.

12..

Paragraphs

8

through

10

of

the Motion

to

Quash

are

insufficient

on several

grounds

and

also

fail

to provide

a

basis

for

the relief

requested.

13.

More

specifically,

Paragraph

8 of

the

Motion

to

Quash

baldly

asserts

that

the

People's

deposition

notices

are

not

calculated

to

lead

to admissible

evidence.

No

factual

basis

is

provided

for

the

stated

objection

and

the

objection

fails

for this

reason.

Respondents

fail

to even

account

for

the reciprocal

argument

as to

why

they

should

be

allowed

to depose

the

People's

attorneys.

Further,

the

depositions

are

clearly

relevant

and Respondents

make

no relevancy

objection.

Illinois

case

law

is

legion

that

the

concept

of

relevancy

in

discovery

is broader

than

relevancy

for

admission

of

evidence

at trial.

See

Bauter

v. Reding,

68

Lll.App.3d

171,

175,

385

N.E.2d

886,

890

(III.

App.

3d

Dist.

1979)

(citing

Krupp

v.

Chicago

Transit

Auth.,

8 Ill.2d

37,

41,

32 N.E.2d

532,

535

(III.

1956)).

14.

Paragraph

9

of the

Motion

to

Quash

baldly

asserts,

without

any

factual

grounds,

that

depositions

of

Respondents'

attorneys

will

violate

the attorney-client

privilege

between

the

Respondents

and

their

attorneys.

However,

there

is no

privilege

available

as

to attorney's

fees

and

costs

when

the

very

issue

in

dispute

is

the

appropriate

amount

of

attorney's

fees

and

costs.

See,

e.g.,

LaHood

v.

Court,

236

III.App.3d

641,

649,

603

N.E.2d

11 65,

1171

(3d

Dist.

1992).

Further,

assuming

arguendo

that

such

a

privilege

existed,

Respondents

waived

it by

making

allegations

regarding

the amount

of

their

attorneysff

fees

and

costs

and

by

requesting

and

4

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005

---

obtaining the same information from the

People.

15.

Last, Paragraph

10 of the Motion to Quash incorrectly asserts that allowing the

People to take depositions of Respondents' attorneys "is inconsistent with the Board's

Order of

April 7, 2005 which called for limited discovery on the subject of the reasonableness

of

attorneys' fees and costs." Again, this is

a premature argument because Respondents have not

yet even furnished adequate answers to the People's written discovery requests. Nevertheless,

Respondents fail to explain how the People's deposition notices are inconsistent with the Board's

April 7, 2005 Order. Further, the April 7, 2005 Order was clarified by the

Board's November 17,

2005 Order, wherein the Board stated that the People will be allowed the same opportunity to

conduct discovery similar to that served by Respondents. (Board's Order

at 3 (Nov. 17, 2005).)

16.

Respondents'

Motion to Quash is frivolous and achieves nothing more than to

further delay of this proceeding and increase litigation

costs. The Motion to Quash may have

tbeen entirely avoided if Respondents' attorney(s) made a full and good faith

attempt to

informally

resolve this apparent discovery dispute prior to once again seeking Board intervention.

17.

As noted in the committee comments to Rule 201 (k), many discovery

differences

could be eliminated if the

attorneys responsible for trying the case were involved in attempts to

resolve discovery differences. "Counsel responsible for trying the trial of a case are required to

have or attempt a personal consultation

before a motion with respect to discovery is initiated."

(Committee Comments on Rule 201 (k).)

18.

A full and

good faith attempt by counsel to informally resolve discovery disputes

is a necessary

part of the discovery process.

19.

In order to avoid any further, needless Board intervention

regarding discovery

disputes, the Hearing

Officer or the Board should issue a protective order pursuant to Rule

5

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005

---

101.616(d)

of the

Board's Procedural

Rules

requiring counsel

to engage

in a full and

good faith

attempt

to informally

resolve any

future discovery

dispute prior

to seeking Board

intervention.

20.

Furthermore,

the Board

has already

held that

this is not a

one-sided proceeding.

(See

Board Order

at 3 (Nov. 17,

2005) ("To

allow the respondent

to conduct

discovery

on this

matter

and not allow

the People

the opportunity

to conduct

similar discovery

would

place the

People on unequal

footing .

.).)

Therefore,

People respectfully

request

that, if Respondents

continue to

fail to cooperate

in conducting

discovery

that they themselves

initiated,

this phase

of

the proceeding

should end

immediately

and the People's

fee petition

should be

granted.

WHEREFORE,

the

People respectfully

request

that the Board

deny Respondents'

Motion

to Quash,

that the Board

enter a protective

order

requiring counsel

to engage

in a full and good

faith attempt

to informally

resolve any

future discovery

dispute prior

to seeking

Board

intervention,

and for any

further relief

that is fair and

just under the

circumstances.

Respectfully submitted,

PEOPLE

OF THE STATE

OF ILLINOIS

by LISA

MADIGAN,

Attorney General

of

the State of Illinois

B

Y:___*

MICHAEL

C. PARTEE

Assistant

Attorney General

Environmental

Bureau/North

188 West Randolph,

Suite

2001

Chicago,

Illinois 60601

Tel: (312)814-2069

Fax: (312)814-2347

6

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005

---

EXHIBIT

AI

TO

COMPLAINANT'S

SECOND

MOTION

FOR

PROTECTIVE

ORDER

AND

RESPONSE

TO

RESPONDENTS'

MOTION

TO

QUASH

DEPOSITION

NOTICES

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005

---

OFFICE

OF

THE ArI'ORNEY

GENERAL

STATE

OF ILLINOIS

Lisa

Madigan

ArrORNEY

GENERAL

December

15,

2005

Sent

Via First

Class

Mail

and Facsimile

(773.

792.8358)

Mr. David

S.

O'Neill,

Esq.

5487

North

Milwaukee

Avenue

Chicago,

Illinois

606,30-1249

Re:

People

v.

Skokie

Valley

Asphalt

Co..

Inch.

et at,

PCB

96-98

Dear

Mr.

O'Neill:

The purpose

of this

letter is

to initiate

a

conference

in

the spirit

of Illinois

Supreme

Court

Rule

201 (k)

to informally

resolve

potential

disputes

over

Respondents'

answers

to

Complainant's

interrogatories

and

document

requests

prior

to

seeking

Board

intervention.

These

written

discovery

requests

were served

on Respondents

on

April 25,

200,

and

were answered

on

December

5, 2005.

The

following

is

a full

explanation

of our

position

on each

potential

dispute.

Please

respond

to

this letter

as requested

within

14 days

by

providing

the

requested

discovery

or

explaining

your

position

so

that

we can

make

a fully

informed

and

joint

decision

whether

it

is

absolutely

necessary

to

seek

Board

intervention

regarding

these

potential

disputes.

On

a related

note,

regarding

Respondents'

written

discovery

requests

to Complainant,

the

Board

granted

Respondents

until

December

3, 2005,

to provide

additional

responses

to Complainant's

discovery

objections.

As

of today,

I have

not

heard

from

you and

assume

that

any

potential

differences

over

Complainant's

answers

are

resolved.

Respondents'

Answers

to Complainant's

Interrogatories

Complainant

served

Respondents

with I11

interrogatories

requesting

information

regarding

Respondents'

hearing

plans

(e.g.,

the

identity

of any

witnesses

to

be called

at

hearing)

and attorneys'

fees

and costs.

The Respondents

each

elected

to

answer

the interrogatories

separately,

but their

answers

are

all the

same,

with

the exception

of Skokie

Valley

Asphalt's

("SVA")

answer

to Interrogatory

#1.

In answer

to

Interrogatory

#1,

which

requests

the

identity

of the

individual

answering

the

interrogatories,

SVA

answered

that

it "is

no longer

a

legal

entity

under the

laws

of the

State

of

Illinois"

and

"Therefore,

[it] is

incapable

of

responding

to

these

interrogatories."

However,

SVA

is one

of the

Respondents

that moved

to stay

Complainant's

fee petition

in the

first

place.

More

500

South

Second Street.

Springfield,

Illinois

62706

*(217)

782-1090

T

T1Y:

(217)

785-2771

*Fax:

(217)

782.7046

100 West

Randolph

Street,

Chicago,

Illinois

60601

*(312) 814-3000

TT11Y:

(312) 814-3374

*Fax:

(312)

814-3806

1001 East

Main, Carbondaic,

Illinois

62901 *

(618) 529-6400

*

rT:(618)

529-6403

*

Fax:

(618) 529-6416

O4~-

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005

---

Letter to David

S. O'Neill

December 15, 2005

Page 2

significantly,

SVA is also one of the Respondents that

served discovery requests on Complainant.

Rhetorically,

how can SVA oppose Complainant's

fee petition and serve discovery,

but cannot

answer discovery?

In addition, under Illinois law,

a corporation can be sued (and must have

a

registered agent for

a period of five years) even after dissolution.

Given the circumstances,

SVA's answer to Interrogatory

#1 is unacceptable. In order to

informally resolve this dispute, we

require SVA to answer Interrogatory

#1 within 14 days of this letter.

In answer to Interrogatory #2, the

Respondents listed me as a potential

witness at hearing.

I am the attorney representing

Complainant at hearing. Further, none

of my fees and costs is

included in Complainant's fee petition.

Thus, I will not be testifying at the

hearing. In order to

informally resolve this potential dispute,

please contact me within 14 days

of this letter if you

disagree.

If you disagree, we will obviously

need to seek a protective order. If we

do not hear

from you within,14 days, we will

reasonably assume that you agree

with our position.

In answer to Interrogzat

ory #3, which requests information

regarding any opinion witness

to be

called by Respondents at hearing, Respondents

identified Deborah A. Stonich,

but did not

provide

any other requested information because

she apparently has not completed

her case

assessment. However,

it is not necessary to wait for her case

assessment in order to provide

iinformnation

regarding her qualifications and previous

opinion testimony, as specifically

requested

in subparts (b) and (d) of Interrogatory

#3. In order to informally

resolve this dispute,

we require Respondents

to answer Interrogatory #3(b) and

(d) within 14 days of this letter.

In answer

to Interrog~atory #4, Respondents

provided none of the requested information.

Instead, Respondents all objected on

the same grounds and as follows:

Objection.

This interrogatory is not calculated

to be to

[sic]

admissible evidence

at

the time

of the hearing.

Furthermore, this

interrogatory asks for irrelevant

information

and violates the attorney-client privilege

between the Respondent and

the

Respondent's

attorneys. The Respondent has

not placed his attorney's fees or

its

expenses

at issue in this matter.

First,

absent some direction from the Board,

the objections based upon admissibility

and

relevance are not grounds

to withhold information (or documents

as discussed below).

Respondents' attorneys'

fees and costs were, in fact, placed

at issue through their "Initial

Response

to and Motion to Stay and/or Extend

Time to Respond to Complainant's

Petition for

Attorneys' Fees and Costs," which

contains numerous and specific

factual allegations regarding

the Respondents'

attorneys' fees and costs. (See.

e.

v.,

Initial Response at

¶f

17 ("It is hard

to

justify

a claim for attorneys' fees and cost

[sic]

by the Illinois Attorney General's office

that is

approximately

ten times the amount that three Respondents

combined paid to defend themselves

against

frivolous claims" and "It is also hard

to justify an hourly fee for public service

that is

greater than

the weighted-average fee charged by the

Respondents' attorney even though

the

Respondents'

attorneys

[sic]

fees include costs").)

In opposing Complainant's Petition

for

Attorneys'

Fees and Costs, Respondents drew

a direct comparison between the parties'

attorneys'

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005

---

Letter to David S. O'Neill

Decemnber 15, 2005

Page 3

fees and costs, yet Respondents now refuse

to disclose their own attorneys' fees and costs.

Second, regarding the attorney-client privilege asserted, our interrogatories

contain an

entire section, Section II, titled "Claims of Privilege,"

wherein we specifically requested that

Respondents identify the "statute, rule or decision

which is claimed to give rise to the privilege or

the reason

for its unavailability." Respondents did not object to this instruction or provide

us

with the legal basis for the asserted privilege. Frankly, our research indicates that

attorneys' fees

and costs are not privileged in a dispute over attorneys' fees

and costs. Furthermore, and even if

there was such a privilege, Respondents waived it by previously requesting (and obtaining) the

very same information from Complainant.

Third, the Board ruled that ". ., the People must be

allowed to conduct discover on the

reasonableness of the attorney fees and costs."' (Order at 3 (Nov. 17, 2005).) "To allow the

respondent to conduct discovery on this

matter and not allow the People the opportunity to

conduct similar discover would place the People on unequal

footing. and would not serve the

best interests of administrative justice."

For all of these reasons, in order to informally

resolve this dispute over Interrogatory #4,

we require

Respondents to provide the requested information within 14 days of this

letter.

In answer to Interrogatories #5 through # 11, Respondents again

provided none of the

requested information and repeated their previous

objection to Interrogatory #4. As with

Interrogatory #4, in order

to informally resolve this dispute, we require Respondents to provide

the requested information within 14 days of this

letter.

Responden ts' Answers to Complainant's

Document Requests

Through seven

document requests, Complainant requested documents relevant to

Respondents' attorneys' fees and costs. In answer to our document requests,

Respondents did

not produce

any documents whatsoever. Instead, the Respondents stated the following objection

to each document request:

Objection. This interrogatory

is not calculated to beadmissible evidence at the time

of the hearing. Furthermore, this interrogatory asks for irrelevant information

and

violates the attorney-client privilege between the Respondent and the Respondent's

attorneys. The

attorneys for the Respondent has not placed his or, in the case of

Skokie

Valley Asphalt Company, Inc., its attorney's fees at issue

nor has the

Respondent placed his or, in the case of Skokie

Vallky Asphalt Company, Inc., its

expenses at issue in this matter.

For

all of the same reasons that Respondents' answers

to Interrogatories #4 through #11I

are unacceptable, Respondents'

answers to all document requests are unacceptable. Again, these

reasons include that the Board has already ruled that Complainant is entitled to conduct discovery

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005

---

Letter to David

S. O'Neill

December

15, 2005

Page 4

on this

issue. Also, we

are not aware

of any legal basis

to assert a privilege

under the

circumstances,

but regardless,

Respondents

clearly waived

any privilege

by previously

requesting

(and obtaining)

the very

same information

from Complainant.

Further, pursuant

to specific

instructions in

Complainant's

discovery requests

(SeecInstruction

2 in our

Interrogatories),

Respondents

were asked

to provide a detailed

privilege log

for withheld

documents. We

did not

receive any privilege

log. Essentially,

Respondents

have refused to disclose

any. documents

and,

at the same

time, failed to

adequately assert

and define

the basis for their

refusal.

In

order to infonnally

resolve this dispute,

we require

Respondents to

produce the

requested documents

within

14 days of this

letter.

Again,

please respond

to this letter

within 14 days.

Please contact

me with any

questions

in the interim.

Michael

C. Partee

Assistant

Attorney

General

Environmental

Bureau

188 West Randolph

Street, Suite

2001

Chicago, Illinois 60601

Tel: (312)814-2069

Fax: (312)814-2347

E-Mail: mpartee~atg.state.iI.us

cc:

Carol

Webb, Hearing

Officer

(Via First

Class M~ail

Michael

B. Jawgiel, Esq.

(Via First Class

M~ail

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005

---

Canf irmat

ian Report

-

Memory Send

page

:001

Date & Time: Dec-15-05 11:14am

Line I : +3128142347

Machine ID : IAGO-ENVIRONMENTAL BUREAU

Job number

714

Date

Dec-15 11:11am

To

21917f73028358

Number of Pages

: 005

Start time.

Dec-15 11:llam

End time

Dec-15 11:14am

Pages Bent

005

S ta tus

.

OK

Job number

:714

**SEND

SUCCESSFUL**

A~tonY

oon era.

AfrrS~rE O

:>fAvid S_

-0'2JTill

PnuorqE:

773-792-2333

V--,:

773-792-BSSS

PSIOWE:312-814-2069

312-814-2347

D~rs:

flonbm

15. 2005

PACE-lS: Zc~isc~r

5

C-o%lov~N-Trs.:

Plca=,c see the following lettr

Z.

the PeopleI

'.

Skeide V.lcy

As.phlt.

et

rifl

TsA

FZ

ranmnsassI.~

n or

A flMfCfW

altEMllAflO

OPWJI

TIlls T~4MTA.

IF

VOU

AR

W

NO

x~rfnnAi

~

UDRaN.rtAI

lZ~

lturU~rno

OR

ISk14ATON

OF TIxll

fl~fvIof~f

Xs SflfCrt

RiI~l

ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, DECEMBER 28, 2005