ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
May 19, 2005
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Complainant,
v.
JOHN BROWN d/b/a JOHN BROWN
PAINTING,
Respondent.
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AC 04-82
(IEPA No. 270-04-AC)
(Administrative Citation)
MICHELLE RYAN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, APPEARED ON
BEHALF OF COMPLAINANT; and
JOHN BROWN APPEARED
PRO SE
.
INTERIM OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by A.S. Moore):
Today the Board finds that respondent John Brown d/b/a John Brown Painting (Brown)
violated Sections 21(p)(1) and (p)(7) of the Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS
5/21(p)(1), (p)(7) (2002)) at a site just north of Metropolis, in Massac County. Brown violated
the Act by causing or allowing the open dumping of waste resulting in litter and in the deposition
of general construction or demolition debris. The violation was alleged in an administrative
citation issued by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Agency). As described below,
Brown is therefore subject to a statutorily mandated $3,000 civil penalty, and must pay the
hearing costs of the Agency and the Board.
After finding the violations in this interim opinion and order, the Board directs the
Agency and the Clerk of the Board to provide hearing cost documentation, to which Brown may
respond. After the time periods for these hearing cost filings expire, the Board will issue a final
opinion and order assessing the civil penalty and any appropriate hearing costs.
Below, the Board first provides the legal framework for administrative citations. Next,
the Board sets forth the procedural history of this case and rules on an offer of proof made at
hearing. This is followed by the Board’s findings of fact. The Board then discusses the
Agency’s alleged violations and Brown’s claimed defenses and mitigating circumstances before
the Board renders its legal conclusions.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Under the Act (415 ILCS 5 (2002)), an administrative citation is an expedited
enforcement action brought before the Board seeking civil penalties that are fixed by statute.
2
Administrative citations may be filed only by the Agency or, if the Agency has delegated the
authority, by a unit of local government, and only for limited types of alleged violations at
sanitary landfills or unpermitted open dumps.
See
415 ILCS 5/3.305, 3.445, 21(o), (p), 31.1(c),
42(b)(4), (4-5) (2002); 35 Ill. Adm. Code 108.
The Agency or delegated local authority must serve the administrative citation on the
respondent within “60 days after the date of the observed violation.” 415 ILCS 5/31.1(b)
(2002));
see also
35 Ill. Adm. Code 108.202(b). The Agency or delegated local authority also
must file a copy of the administrative citation with the Board no later than ten days after serving
the respondent.
See
415 ILCS 5/31.1(c) (2002).
To contest the administrative citation, the respondent must file a petition with the Board
no later than 35 days after being served with the administrative citation. If the respondent fails to
do so, the Board must find that the respondent committed the violations alleged and impose the
corresponding civil penalty.
See
415 ILCS 31.1(d)(1) (2002); 35 Ill. Adm. Code 108.204(b),
108.406.
If the respondent timely contests the administrative citation, but the complainant proves
the alleged violations at hearing, the respondent will be held liable not only for the civil penalty
but also for the hearing costs of the Board and the complainant.
See
415 ILCS 5/42(b)(4-5)
(2002); 35 Ill. Adm. Code 108.500. However, if the Board finds that the respondent “has shown
that the violation resulted from uncontrollable circumstances, the Board shall adopt a final order
which makes no finding of violation and which imposes no penalty.” 415 ILCS 5/31.1(d)(2)
(2002);
see also
35 Ill. Adm. Code 108.500(b).
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Procedural History
On June 4, 2004, the Agency filed with the Board the administrative citation against
Brown. The Agency served the administrative citation on Brown on the same date. According
to the administrative citation, the Agency site inspection resulting in the citation took place on
April 7, 2004. On July 15, 2004, Brown filed with the Board a petition to contest the
administrative citation. Because the postmark date of the petition was within the 35-day appeal
period, the petition was timely filed.
1
See
35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.300(b)(2). In a July 22, 2004
order, the Board accepted the petition for hearing.
Board Hearing Officer Carol Webb held this case’s hearing on November 9, 2004, at the
Metropolis City Hall. Three witnesses testified: Agency field inspector Kent Johnson
(Johnson); Brown; and Mrs. Kim Brown (K. Brown).
2
Hearing Officer Webb found all three
witnesses credible. Tr. at 52. The Agency offered one exhibit at hearing, an open dump
1
The Board cites the administrative citation as “AC at_” and Brown’s petition as “Pet. at _.”
2
The Board cites the hearing transcript as “Tr. at _.”
3
inspection report dated April 7, 2004, which was admitted into the record.
3
Brown made an offer
of proof at hearing, which the Board discusses below. The Agency filed a brief on December 14,
2004. Brown had the opportunity but failed to file a response brief.
4
Offer of Proof
Brown moved to enter, as a hearing exhibit, eight photos allegedly showing that the site
had been cleaned up and that the site had areas of wet soil. Tr. at 13-15. The Agency objected to
entry of Brown’s photos, arguing that the photos were irrelevant to whether the alleged
violations existed at the site on April 7, 2004, the date of the Agency inspection that led to
issuance of the administrative citation. Tr. at 15. The photos were received by the hearing
officer solely as an offer of proof. Tr. at 18.
Under the Board’s procedural rules, the hearing officer may admit evidence that is
“material, relevant, and would be relied upon by prudent persons in the conduct of serious
affairs.” 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.626(a). There have been circumstances in administrative
citation actions where evidence of a respondent’s cleanup of dumped waste is relevant.
See
,
e.g.
,
IEPA v. Jack Wright, AC 89-227 (Aug. 30, 1990) (Board held administrative citation was
improperly issued where Agency site inspector had previously represented citation would not
issue if cleanup was done within a given time frame, and the waste was cleaned up within that
time frame).
To be clear, Brown does not claim, and there is no evidence in this record, that the
Agency gave Brown a time frame within which he could clean up his property to avoid an
administrative citation. Instead, Brown claims that because his cleanup was delayed due to wet
weather, he should not be held liable. Brown suggests that these weather conditions amounted to
“uncontrollable circumstances.” As noted above, where a respondent proves that the
administrative citation violation resulted from “uncontrollable circumstances,” there is no
liability.
See
415 ILCS 5/31.1(d)(2) (2002).
The Agency does not contest that a cleanup at Brown’s property was completed or that
there were wet areas on Brown’s property. Moreover, there is already testimony in the record to
this effect. Tr. at 13, 17. Therefore, whether the Board admits or excludes the photos has little
impact on the Board’s fact finding. The Agency is also correct that, generally, a subsequent
cleanup by a respondent is without legal significance in an administrative citation action for open
dumping.
See
Jack Wright, AC 89-227, slip op. at 7 (“The Act, by its terms, does not envision a
properly issued administrative citation being dismissed or mitigated because a person is
cooperative or voluntarily cleans-up the site”).
Here, however, the photos in Brown’s offer of proof do
help
to establish that the cleanup
was accomplished and that areas of the site were wet, and so are relevant to Brown’s
claim
of
“uncontrollable circumstances,” which claim is contested by the Agency. Agency Br. at 3-4.
3
The Board cites the Agency’s hearing exhibit as “Exh. 1 at _.”
4
The Board cites the Agency’s brief as “Agency Br. at _.”
4
The Board therefore accepts Brown’s offer of proof and designates the photos as Exhibit 2.
5
Whether Brown’s claim of “uncontrollable circumstances” has any legal merit will be decided
below by the Board.
FACTS
On April 7, 2004, Johnson, an Environmental Protection Specialist with the Agency,
inspected a property located at 955 Country Club Road, just north of Metrolpolis, in Massac
County. Exh. 1, Narrative at 1; Tr. at 5-6. At the time, Brown owned the site and used it as both
a residence and a headquarters for his water tower painting business called “John Brown
Painting.” Exh. 1, Narrative at 1; Tr. at 6-7, 9, 16.
The site, which lacks any waste disposal or storage permit from the Agency, is assigned
land pollution control #1270155057 by the Agency. Exh. 1, Checklist at 1, Narrative at 1-2. The
April 7, 2004 inspection was conducted as a follow-up to an October 23, 2003 Agency
inspection of the site. Exh. 1, Checklist at 1, Narrative at 1; Tr. at 9-10, 11-12.
During the April 2004 inspection, Johnson, the inspector, was accompanied by K. Brown.
Johnson observed a pile of debris and other material on the ground at the site’s north end. The
pile consisted primarily of metal and wood, which had been part of an off-site building that had
burned. Exh. 1, Narrative at 1-2, Site Sketch, Photos 001-003; Tr. at 7-8, 10.
Johnson estimated that the pile on the site was approximately 20 feet in diameter and
contained roughly 25 to 30 cubic yards of material. The pile was in largely the same condition
as it was during the Agency’s October 23, 2003 inspection of the site, though Johnson estimated
that there were approximately 30 to 40 cubic yards of material present in October 2003. Exh. 1,
Narrative at 1-2; Tr. at 12. According to Johnson, the act of loading the 30 to 40 cubic yards of
material and removing the pile from the site would take no more than “a couple weeks.” Tr. at
12.
Brown brought the debris from the burned building to his property and intended to burn
the debris. Tr. at 10. Brown testified he did not know that hauling the burned debris to his
property and dumping it was illegal.
Id
. Brown’s mother had resided at the building that burned.
Id
.
K. Brown stated during the April 2004 inspection that she would take care of the cleanup,
but that no cleanup had yet taken place because the ground had been too wet, Johnson explained.
Exh. 1, Narrative at 1-2. Brown testified that that he “had a lot of trouble with rain.” Tr. at 13.
Johnson described the site’s soil at the time of the inspection as dry, but admitted at hearing that
there were also wet areas on-site and that the access road to the pile had muddy ruts. Exh. 1,
Narrative at 1; Tr. at 10.
With the use of a tractor and a 20 yard dumpster, Brown completed removing all of the
pile from his property in October 2004. At that time, some soil on the ground in and around the
5
The Board cites Brown’s hearing exhibit as “Exh. 2 at _.”
5
cleaned-up location was wet and exhibited muddy ruts from the tractor tires. Tr. at 12-14, 17;
Exh. 2. Brown testified that he lacked the financial resources to conduct the cleanup any sooner:
“When we could afford it, we done it.” Tr. at 13.
In addition, according to K. Brown: “we don’t have the money to pay for a bunch of
fines, okay, we done the best we could. Financially, John Brown Painting no longer exists, you
know. I [mean] we’ve even had to sell our house. *** I don’t know when we can get you the
money.” Tr. at 16.
DISCUSSION
The Agency issued an administrative citation to Brown, alleging two open dumping
violations. Brown petitioned to contest the administrative citation and the Board held a hearing.
Below, the Board discusses the alleged violations and Brown’s claimed defenses and mitigating
circumstances before rendering the Board’s legal conclusion on whether Brown violated the Act.
The Board then concludes by discussing civil penalties and hearing costs.
Alleged Violations
The Agency’s administrative citation alleges that Brown violated Sections 21(p)(1) and
(p)(7) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/21(p)(1), (p)(7) (2002)). AC at 2. Sections 21(p)(1) and (p)(7) of
the Act provide in relevant part:
No person shall: In violation of subdivision (a) of this Section, cause or allow the
open dumping of any waste in a manner which results in any of the following
occurrences at the dump site:
1. litter;
* * *
7. deposition of:
i. general construction or demolition debris as defined in
Section 3.160(a)of this Act . . . . 415 ILCS 5/21(p)(1), (p)(7)
(2002).
Section 21(a) of the Act, which is referred to in Section 21(p), provides:
No person shall:
Cause or allow the open dumping of any waste. 415 ILCS 5/21(a) (2002).
The Agency bases its allegations on the April 7, 2004 site visit conducted by Agency
inspector Johnson. AC at 1-2.
6
Brown’s Claimed Defenses and Mitigating Circumstances
Brown asserts several purported defenses to the administrative citation. First, Brown
argues that his clean up of the site was delayed because of “excessive water holding on the
ground.” Pet. at 1. Brown states that he “tried numerous time to clean the debris but was unable
due to trucks getting stuck in the mud.”
Id
. In effect, Brown maintains that he is not liable
because delays in his cleanup resulted from circumstances beyond his control or “uncontrollable
circumstances.” Second, Brown testified that the cleanup was delayed because of his limited
financial resources, and that he completed the cleanup as soon as he could afford it. Tr. at 13.
Third, Brown maintains that he did not know that hauling the debris to his property and dumping
it there was illegal. Tr. at 10. Lastly, regarding the alleged violation of Section 21(p)(7) of the
Act, Brown maintains that the debris pile consisted of burned remnants from the building that
had the fire, and so does not constitute “construction” debris. Tr. at 10, 13.
Brown also alleges extenuating circumstances in an apparent attempt to mitigate civil
penalties. Specifically, Brown claims that the company “John Brown Painting” no longer exists
and that he and K. Brown, as individuals, cannot afford to pay these “very steep” fines. Pet. at 1.
The Board addresses each of Brown’s claims below in discussing the elements of a
violation of Sections 21(p)(1) and (p)(7), and the civil penalties for violating those sections.
“Open Dumping” of “Waste”
As a threshold matter, to prove a violation of Section 21(p)(1) or (p)(7), the Agency must
first prove a violation of Section 21(a) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/21(a) (2002)). Section 21(a)
provides that “[n]o person shall: Cause or allow the open dumping of any waste.” 415 ILCS
5/21(a) (2002). “Open dumping” is defined as “the consolidation of refuse from one or more
sources at a disposal site that does not fulfill the requirements of a sanitary landfill.” 415 ILCS
5/3.305 (2002). “Refuse” means “waste.” 415 ILCS 5/3.385 (2002). The Act defines “waste”
as:
[A]ny garbage, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant,
or air pollution control facility or other discarded material, including solid, liquid,
semi-solid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial,
mining and agricultural operations, and from community activities . . . . 415
ILCS 5/3.535 (2002).
The record shows that Brown brought to his property many cubic yards of miscellaneous
materials from a burned building, primarily pieces of wood and metal. Brown deposited the
materials in a pile on the ground. Some six months after the pile was first observed by the
Agency, the pile remained largely unchanged. Brown admits that he brought the materials to his
site to burn them.
The Board finds that under these circumstances, the materials were “discarded” and
therefore constitute “waste” under the Act. Further, it is undisputed that Brown’s site does not
meet the requirements for a sanitary landfill. The Board also finds that in bringing the materials
7
to his property and depositing them in a pile, Brown “open dumped” the waste.
Resulting in “Litter”
The Board finds that this open dumping of waste resulted in “litter.” The Board has
adopted the definition of “litter” provided in the Litter Control Act for purposes of Section 21 of
the Act.
See
St. Clair County v. Mund,
AC 90-64, slip op. at 4, 6 (Aug. 22, 1991). The Litter
Control Act defines “litter” as:
[A]ny discarded, used or unconsumed substance or waste [and] may include, but
is not limited to, any garbage, trash, refuse, debris, rubbish, grass clippings, or
other lawn or garden waste, newspaper, magazines, glass, metal, plastic or paper
containers . . . or anything else of any unsightly or unsanitary nature, which has
been discarded, abandoned or otherwise disposed of improperly. 415 ILCS
105/3(a) (2002).
Consistent with the discussion above, the Board finds that the pile of materials on
Brown’s property from the burned building were discarded substances, and as such fall within
the definition of “litter.”
Resulting in the Deposition of “General Construction or Demolition Debris”
Section 3.160(a) of the Act defines “general construction or demolition debris” as:
non-hazardous, uncontaminated materials resulting from the construction,
remodeling, repair, and demolition of utilities, structures, and roads, limited to
the following: bricks, concrete, and other masonry materials; soil; rock; wood,
including non-hazardous painted, treated, and coated wood and wood products;
wall coverings; plaster; drywall; plumbing fixtures; non-asbestos insulation;
roofing shingles and other roof coverings; reclaimed asphalt pavement; glass;
plastics that are not sealed in a manner that conceals waste; electrical wiring and
components containing no hazardous substances; and piping or metals incidental
to any of those materials.
General construction or demolition debris does not include uncontaminated soil
generated during construction, remodeling, repair, and demolition of utilities,
structures, and roads provided the uncontaminated soil is not commingled with
any general construction or demolition debris or other waste. 415 ILCS
5/3.160(a) (2002).
Brown argues that the pile of burned remnants from a building fire cannot be considered
“construction” debris: “There was no construction waste there. That was waste from the
building that burned. * * * [T]his was not off a construction site.” Tr. at 10, 13.
The Agency argues that the materials piled on the property by Brown meet the definition
of “general construction or demolition debris” under the Act. Agency Br. at 2. Specifically,
8
quoting from the statutory definition, the Agency states that the materials resulted from the
“demolition” of “structures,” and include “wood” and “metals.”
Id
. The Agency notes that the
Act does not define “demolition,” but the Agency quotes the definition of the word from the
American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition
(1991): “The act or process of
destroying, esp. destruction by explosives.”
Id
. at 3. The Agency argues that “demolition”
therefore requires no intent and so would include unintentionally “destroying” a building by fire.
Id
. This is especially so here, the Agency maintains, where the resulting debris needed to be
disposed.
Id
.
The Board agrees with the Agency. Brown argues only that the material is not from a
“construction” site, ignoring that the statutory term includes “demolition debris.” In this context,
there is nothing inherent in the term “demolition” that would necessarily limit its meaning to
intentional
destruction. The Board finds that the wood and metal from the burned building meets
the plain meaning of the Act’s definition of “general construction or demolition debris,” and
therefore that Brown’s open dumping of waste resulted in the deposition of such debris on his
property.
Brown’s Alleged Ignorance of the Law
Brown states he did not know that hauling the debris to his property and dumping it there
was illegal. Tr. at 10. The Agency argues that Brown’s “alleged ignorance of the law is no
defense.” Agency Br. at 3.
The Agency is correct. That Brown allegedly did not intend to violate, or did not know
he was violating, the Act is of no aid to Brown. The Illinois Supreme Court has established that
one may “cause or allow” a violation of the Act without knowledge or intent.
See
People v.
Fiorini, 143 Ill. 2d 318, 336, 574 N.E.2d 612, 621 (1991) (“knowledge or intent is not an element
to be proved for a violation of the Act. This interpretation of the Act . . . is the established rule in
Illinois.”);
see also
Freeman Coal Mining v. PCB, 21 Ill. App. 3d 157, 163, 313 N.E.2d 616, 621
(5th Dist. 1974) (the Act is
malum prohibitum
and no proof of guilty knowledge or
mens rea
is
necessary to find liability).
Brown’s Alleged “Uncontrollable Circumstances”
Brown argues that his clean up was delayed for two reasons. First, Brown claims that the
ground was too wet from rains to access the back of his property to remove the debris pile. Tr. at
10, 13, 17. Second, according to Brown, he did not have enough money to perform the work
sooner. Tr. at 13.
The Agency argues that it would have taken no more than two weeks to remove the
waste, and Brown had let it remain on-site for at least six months at the time of the April 2004
inspection. The Agency maintains that the ground was likely “dry and/or frozen during at least
some part of the period between October 2003 and April 2004.” Agency Br. at 4. The Agency
adds that Brown “did not have the waste removed until October 2004, approximately a year after
it was first observed by Illinois EPA.”
Id
. As for Brown’s purportedly limited finances, the
9
Agency states that Brown “offered no documentary evidence of his financial condition, either by
way of tax returns, bank account statements, or credit card reports to verify his claims.”
Id
.
In an administrative citation, the Board must determine whether the violation resulted
from “uncontrollable circumstances.” 415 ILCS 5/31.1(d)(2) (2002);
see also
35 Ill. Adm. Code
108.500(b). Section 31.1(d)(2) provides:
[I]f the Board finds that the person appealing the citation has shown that the
violation resulted from uncontrollable circumstances, the Board shall adopt a final
order which makes no finding of violation and which imposes no penalty. 415
ILCS 5/31.1(d)(2) (2002).
This defense is therefore available only where the
violation
resulted from uncontrollable
circumstances.
The violations alleged and found here are based on the pile of waste that (1) Brown open
dumped on his property; and (2) the Agency observed on April 7, 2004. The violations existed
when the Agency observed them on April 7, 2004. On this record, any delay in
removing
the
waste pile due to wet weather or limited finances is irrelevant to the statutory defense of
“uncontrollable circumstances.” Even if weather and finances delayed Brown’s cleanup, they
did not cause the violation of Sections 21(p)(1) and (p)(7) of the Act. The Board therefore finds
that Brown has not proven the violations resulted from uncontrollable circumstances.
Finding of Violations
Having found that Brown caused or allowed the open dumping of waste resulting in litter
and in the deposition of general construction or demolition debris, and that no uncontrollable
circumstances were established, the Board finds that Brown violated Sections 21(p)(1) and (p)(7)
of the Act.
Civil Penalty and Hearing Costs
The Agency seeks the statutory $1,500 civil penalty for each of the two alleged
violations, for a total civil penalty of $3,000. The Agency also requests that Brown pay its
hearing costs. AC at 2-3. Because Brown violated Sections 21(p)(1) and (p)(7), the Board now
addresses the issues of civil penalty and hearing costs. Both are addressed in Section 42(b)(4-5)
of the Act:
In an administrative citation action under Section 31.1 of this Act, any person
found to have violated any provision of subsection (p) of Section 21 of this Act
shall pay a civil penalty of $1,500 for each violation of each such provision, plus
any hearing costs incurred by the Board and the Agency, except that the civil
penalty amount shall be $3,000 for each violation of any provision of subsection
(p) of Section 21 that is the person’s second or subsequent adjudicated violation
of that provision. 415 ILCS 5/42(b)(4-5) (2002).
10
Brown claims the company “John Brown Painting” no longer exists and that he and K.
Brown, as individuals, cannot afford to pay the civil penalties. Pet. at 1.
When the Board finds a violation in a formal enforcement action brought under Section
31 of the Act, the Board has the discretion to impose a penalty and if the Board decides to
impose one, the Board may consider factors that mitigate the amount of penalty.
See
415 ILCS
5/31, 33(c), 42(h) (2002). The Board has no such discretion after finding a violation in an
administrative citation action. The Board must impose a civil penalty on Brown and, further, the
amount of that penalty is fixed by the Act.
There is no indication that this is a second or subsequent adjudicated violation for Brown.
Therefore, the civil penalty for Brown’s first violations of Sections 21(p)(1) and (p)(7) is
statutorily set at $1,500 for each violation, totaling $3,000.
See
415 ILCS 5/42(b)(4-5) (2002);
35 Ill. Adm. Code 108.500(b)(2). The Board will assess the $3,000 penalty in its final opinion
and order.
In addition, by unsuccessfully contesting the administrative citation at hearing, Brown
must pay the hearing costs of the Agency and the Board.
See
415 ILCS 5/42(b)(4-5) (2002); 35
Ill. Adm. Code 108.500(b)(3). However, no information on those costs is in the record. The
Agency and the Clerk of the Board are therefore each ordered to file a statement of costs,
supported by affidavit, and to serve the filing on Brown. Brown will have an opportunity to
respond to the requests for hearing costs, as provided in the order below.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that Brown violated Sections 21(p)(1) and (p)(7) of the Act by causing
or allowing the open dumping of waste resulting in litter and in the deposition of general
construction or demolition debris. Having found the violations in this administrative citation
action, Brown must pay a civil penalty of $3,000 and the hearing costs of the Agency and the
Board. As set forth in the order below, the Board directs the Agency and the Clerk of the Board
to file hearing cost documentation, to which Brown may respond. After the time periods for the
filings on hearing costs have expired, the Board will issue a final opinion and order imposing the
civil penalty on Brown and assessing against him any appropriate hearing costs.
This interim opinion constitutes the Board’s interim findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
ORDER
1. Respondent John Brown d/b/a John Brown Painting (Brown) violated Sections
21(p)(1) and (p)(7) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/21(p)(1), (p)(7) (2002)).
2. By June 8, 2005, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency must file a
statement of its hearing costs, supported by affidavit, with service on Brown. By
June 8, 2005, the Clerk of the Board must file a statement of the Board’s hearing
costs, supported by affidavit, with service on Brown.
11
3.
By June 28, 2005, Brown may file a response with the Board to the filings
required in paragraph 2 of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, certify that the Board
adopted the above interim opinion and order on May 19, 2005, by a vote of 5-0.
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
