ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    December 3, 1998
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
    Complainant,
    v.
    CRAIG LINTON, an individual, and
    RANDY ROWE, an individual,
    Respondents.
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    PCB 98-80
    (Enforcement - Land)
    ORDER OF THE BOARD (by M. McFawn):
    Before the Board is “Complainant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,” filed on
    September 29, 1998. Respondents did not respond to the motion. Because the record does not
    establish all elements of complainant’s case when viewed in the light most favorable to
    respondents, the motion for summary judgment is denied.
    This proceeding was initiated by the filing of a complaint on December 9, 1997. By
    the complaint, the State seeks reimbursement for costs incurred cleaning up an accumulation of
    used and waste tires and punitive damages, pursuant to Section 55.3 of the Environmental
    Protection Act (Act), 415 ILCS 5/55.3 (1996). The relevant subsections of Section 55.3
    provide:
    d.
    The Agency shall have authority to provide notice to the
    owner or operator, or both, of a site where used or waste
    tires are located, whenever the [Illinois Environmental
    Protection] Agency finds that the used or waste tires pose
    a threat to public health or the environment, or that the
    owner or operator, or both, is not proceeding in
    accordance with a tire removal agreement under Section
    55.4
    The notice provided by the Agency shall include the
    identified preventive or corrective action, and shall
    provide an opportunity for the owner or operator, or both,
    to perform such actions.
    e.
    In accordance with constitutional limitations, the Agency
    shall have authority to enter at all reasonable times upon
    any private or public property for the purpose of taking
    whatever preventive or corrective action is necessary and
    appropriate in accordance with the provisions of this

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    Section, including but not limited to the removal,
    processing or treatment of used or waste tires, whenever
    the Agency finds that used or waste tires pose a threat to
    public health or the environment.
    * * *
    g.
    Except as otherwise provided in this Section, the owner or
    operator of any accumulation of used or waste tires at
    which the Agency has undertaken corrective or preventive
    action under this Section shall be liable for all costs
    thereof incurred by the State of Illinois, including
    reasonable costs of collection. Any monies received by
    the Agency hereunder shall be deposited into the Used
    Tire Management Fund. The Agency may in its
    discretion store, dispose of or convey the tires that are
    removed from an area at which it has undertaken a
    corrective, preventive or consensual removal action, and
    may sell or store such tires and other items that are
    removed from the area. The net proceeds of any sale
    shall be credited against the liability incurred by the
    owner or operator for the costs of any preventive or
    corrective action.
    h.
    Any person liable to the Agency for costs incurred under
    subsection (g) of this Section may be liable to the State of
    Illinois for punitive damages in an amount at least equal
    to, and not more than 2 times, the cost incurred by the
    State if such person failed without sufficient cause to take
    preventive or corrective action pursuant to notice issued
    under subsection (d) of this Section.
    Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file,
    and affidavits disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d
    460, 483, 693 N.E.2d 358, 370 (1998). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
    Board “must consider the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits strictly against the movant and
    in favor of the opposing party.”
    Id
    . Summary judgment "is a drastic means of disposing of
    litigation," and therefore it should be granted only when the movant's right to the relief "is
    clear and free from doubt."
    Id
    ., citing Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867,
    871 (1986).
    In this case, the record includes admissions and affidavits. Admissions consist of
    responses to complainant’s first requests to admit facts (Responses), filed by each respondent
    on May 15, 1998, as well as facts admitted by operation of 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.162(c) due
    to respondents’ failure to reply to complainant’s second requests to admit facts, filed on

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    September 2, 1998. Complainant has supplied affidavits of Paul M. Purseglove, who was
    manager of the Agency’s Used Tire Unit at the time of the events alleged in the complaint, and
    Katherine Geyer, an Agency Field Inspector who inspected the site.
    To prevail on its claims, complainant must establish that the respondents were owners
    and/or operators of a site from which used or waste tires were removed. Geyer states in her
    affidavit that on May 20, 1991, respondents Craig Linton and Randy Rowe admitted that they
    owned and operated respectively a site at which used and waste tires were disposed.
    Complainant has also proffered, as Exhibit C to its motion, a quitclaim deed purportedly
    conveying a parcel of land in LaSalle County to Randall Rowe and Craig Linton as tenants in
    common. This deed is dated June 19, 1990. Neither of these documents establishes that
    Linton or Rowe owned or operated the site in March of 1996 when, according to the
    contractor’s invoice appended as Exhibit I to complainant’s motion, the tires were removed.
    Furthermore, in their Responses, both Linton and Rowe deny owning the property as joint
    tenants. While these denials are subject to multiple interpretations, for the purposes of this
    motion the Board must construe them strictly against complainant and liberally in favor of
    respondents. Purtill,
    supra
    , 489 N.E.2d at 871. Viewed in this way, the Board cannot find
    that there is no material issue as to the status of respondents as owners or operators of the site
    at the time liability would have been incurred,
    i.e.
    , in March of 1996.
    Complainant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, hereby certify that
    the above order was adopted on the 3rd day of December 1998 by a vote of 6-0.
    Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
    Illinois Pollution Control Board

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