RECE~VED
CLERK’S OFFICE
DEC 012004
STATE OF ILLJNOIS
Pollution Control Board
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF ILLINOIS
Lisa Madigan
ATTORNEY GENERAL
November 30, 2004
The Honorable Dorothy Gunn
Illinois Pollution Control Board
State of Illinois Center
100 West Randolph
Chicago, Illinois 60601
Re:
People v. The Highlands, LLC., et al.
PCB No. 00-104.
Dear Clerk Gunn:
Enclosed for filing please find the original and ten copies of a NOTICE OF FILING and
COMPLAINANT’S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT MURPHY FARMS, INC.’S MOTION TO
DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT in regard to the above-captioned matter. Please file
the original and return a file-stamped copy of the document to our office in the enclosed self-
addressed, stamped envelope.
Thank you for your cooperation and consideration.
Very truly yours,
~
~yp~_~
“i~neE. McBride
Environmental Bureau
500 South Second Street
Springfield, Illinois 62706
(217) 782-9031
JEM/pp
Enclosures
500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706
•
(217) 782-1090
•
TTY: (217) 785-2771
•
Fax: (217) 782-7046
100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601
•
(312) 814-3000
•
TTY: (312) 814-3374
•
Fax: (312) 814-3806
1001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901
•
(618) 529-6400
•
TTY: (618) 529-6403
•
Fax: (618) 529-6416
RE CE ~
V
E~
CLERK’S OFFICE
BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
DEC 012004
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
)
)
STATE
OF ILLINOIS
Complainant,
)
Pollution Control Board
v.
)
PCB NO. 00-1 04
)
(Enforcement)
THE HIGHLANDS, LLC, an Illinois limited
)
liability corporation, MURPHY FARMS, INC.,
)
(a division of MURPHY-BROWN, LLC, a
)
North Carolina limited liability corporation,
)
and SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC., a Virginia
)
corporation)
)
-
Respondents.
)
NOTICE OF FILING
To:
Mr. Jeffery W. Tock
Mr. Charles M. Gering, Esq.
Harrington, Tock & Royse
McDermott, Will & Emery
201 W. Springfield Ave., Ste. 601
227 West Monroe Street
P.O. Box 1550
Chicago, IL 60606-5096
Champaign, IL 61824-1550
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on this date I mailed for filing with the Clerk of the Pollution
Control Board of the State of Illinois, Complainant’s Response to Respondent Murphy Farms, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, a copy of which is attached hereto and herewith
served upon you.
Respectfully submitted,
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
LISA MADIGAN
Attorney General of the
State of Illinois
MATTHEW J. DUNN, Chief
Environmental Enforcement/Asbestos
Litigation Division
• BY:
~~_—~
/~fANEMcBRIDE
Assistant Attorney General
Environmental Bureau
500 South Second Street
Springfield, Illinois 62706
217/782-9031
Dated: November 30, 2004
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I did on November 30, 2004, send by First Class Mail, with postage
thereon fully prepaid, by depositing in a United States Post Office Box a true and correct copy
of the following instruments entitled NOTICE OF FILING and COMPLAINANT’S RESPONSE
TO RESPONDENT MURPHY FARMS, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT
To:
Mr. Jeffrey W. Tock
Mr. Charles M. Gering, Esq.
Harrington, Tock & Royse
McDermott, Will & Emery
201 W. Springfield Avenue, Ste. 601
227 West Monroe Street
P.O. Box 1550
Chicago, IL 60606-5096
Champaign, IL 61824-1 550
and the original and ten copies by First Class Mail with postage thereon fully prepaid of the
same foregoing instrument(s):
To:
Dorothy Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
State of Illinois Center
Suite 11-500
100 West Randolph
Chicago, Illinois 60601
A copy was also sent by First Class Mail with postage thereon fully prepaid
To:
Mr. Brad Halloran, Hearing Officer
Illinois Pollutio,n Control Board
State of Illinois Center, Ste. 11-500
100 West RandoJph
Chicago, IL 60601
,,,~eE. McBride
Assistant Attorney General
This filing is submitted on recycled paper.
•
RECE~VE1D
BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
CLERK’S OFFICE
•
0EC012004
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
•
))
Pollution
STATE OF
Control
ILLINOIS
Board
Complainant,
)
v.
)
PCB No. 00-104
•
)
(Enforcement)
THE HIGHLANDS, LLC, an Illinois limited
)
liability corporation, and MURPHY
)
FARMS, INC., (a division of MURPHY-
)
BROWN, LLC, a North Carolina limited
)
liability corporation, and SMITHFIELD
)
FOODS, INC., a Virginia corporation).
)
•)
Respondents.
)
COMPLAINANT’S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT MURPHY FARMS, INC.’S
MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
NOW COMES,
Complainant, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
ex rel
Lisa
Madigan, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, and responds as follows to Respondent
Murphy Farms, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint:
I.
INTRODUCTION
• In response to Respondent Murphy Farms Inc.’s motion to dismiss, asserted based
upon its contention, described as affirmative matter, that Respondent Murphy Farms Inc.
(“Respondent Murphy”, “Respondent”, “Murphy Farms, Inc.”, “Murphy Farms” or “Murphy”)
does not own the subject facility and does not control the subject facility, Complainant responds
as follows (1) Respondent Murphy has sufficient ownership and control of the facilrty and
operation to meet the premise set forth in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency,
72 Ill.App.3d 217 (2d Dist. 1979), 390 N.E.2d 620; (2) that, as the 3rd District
• held in the case of
People v. McFalls,
313 llI.App.3d 223 (3rd Dist. 2000), 728 N.E.2d 1152,
ownership and control of the site is not the sole controlling factor in a determination of the
liability of the person who has caused pollution; (3) Respondent’s reliance upon nuisanöe
standards is misplaced in that the Illinois Pollution Control Board (the “Board”) is not authorized
by the legislature to determine and proceed against common law nuisances, and violations of
the Act alleged in the complaint are not defined in terms of nuisance; and (4) Respondent’s
reliance upon the case of
Village of Goodfield v. Jamison,
188 IIl.App.3d 851 (4th Dist. 1989),
544 N.E.2d 1229, regarding decisions concerning the concentration of large numbers of
livestock, falls short in light of the recent decision of
Nickels v. Burnett,
343 III.App.3d 654, 798
N.E.2d 817..
II.
RESPONSE TO FACTUAL ASSERTIONS PRESENTED AS “BACKGROUND” IN
RESPONDENT’S MEMORANDUM
As stated in Respondent’s motion, Respondents The Highlands. LLC and Murphy
Farms, Inc. operated the subject sow facility pursuant to an agreement. A true and correct
copy of said agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 attached to the Affidavit of Jane
McBride.
Given the terms and conditions of its agreement with Respondent The Highlands, LLC
(“Respondent The Highlands”, “The Highlands, LLC” or “The Highlands”), the only swine that
could be maintained at The Highlands facility were swine owned by Respondent Murphy.
Respondent Murphy is identified as “Owner” pursuant to the conditions and terms of the
agreement, and Respondent The Highlands is identified as “Producer”. Pursuant to Item 18 on
page 3 of the agreement, under the section entitled “Producer Hereby Agrees”, The Highlands
agreed not to own or have possession of, either as agent, producer or otherwise, any swine not
owned by Respondent Murphy Farms. Item 14 of the “Producer Hereby Agrees” section of the
agreement states: “To house the breeding stock delivered by Owner only for the purposes of
producing weaned pigs for Owner and to own no swine.” Respondent Murphy, and exclusively
2
Respondent Murphy, owned every hog on the site. Therefore, under this agreement, without
Murphy’s hogs, there is no swine facility because there are no hogs.
Under the agreement, pursuant to item 3 under the “Owner Hereby Agrees” section,
appearing on page 3 of the agreement, Respondent Murphy had sole ownership and control of
all supplies and feed that went in and on the hogs. Also, it had sole control of the management
of all procedures for the care and productivity of the hogs, and reserved the right to change the
management of these procedures from time to time (Item 2 under the “Owner Hereby Agrees”
section, page 1 of the agreement). Item 15 of the “Producer Hereby Agrees” section of the
agreement, states (page 3 of the agreement): “To take measures deemed necessary by Owner
to provide for the herd.” There is no definition of the term “measures” contained in the exhibit.
It is apparent from the face of the document that this provision is purposefully broad and vague,
with the intent of allowing Respondent Murphy to dictate any action it deems necessary for the
care and production of its swine.
As is obvious from this agreement, Respondent Murphy owned all of the hogs
maintained at The Highlands facility, and dictated all management procedures for the care and
productivity of the breeding herd and all swine maintained at the facility.
Further evidence of the agreement between Respondent The Highlands and
Respondent Murphy is found in Exhibit 4 attached to the Affidavit of Eric Ackerman, which is a
true and correct copy of a description of The Highlands operation generated by The Highlands,
LLC provided to the Illinois EPA. A description of the contractual arrangement between Murphy
Family Farms and The Highlands is included on the fourth page of the exhibit. It is stated that
Murphy Farms, Inc. provides the following: Feed, Breeding Stock, Training of Employees,
Transportation of Pigs, Medication & Veterinary service and anything that goes in or on the
animal, i.e. syringe, needles, marking sticks, etc.
In further support of this aspect of control exerted by Respondent Murphy in the
3
operation of the subject hog facility, attached as Exhibits 2 and 3 to the Affidavit of Jane
McBride, are, as Exhibit 2, a memorandum from Doug Lenhart describing the terms and
conditions of The Highlands’ employee Don Bybee’s training at the Murphy Missouri facility.
Despite Respondent Murphy’s claim that The Highlands’ employees were not its employees, it
is apparent from the content of Exhibit 2 that Mr. Bybee was to complete a Murphy of Missouri
Application for Employment and would be receiving housing and a salary pursuant to Mr.
Lenhart’s instruction. Exhibit 3 is a Murphy Family Farms document listing training
competencies of The Highlands’ employees.
It is obvious that Respondent Murphy exerted control of The Highlands’ operation by
requiring that The Highlands’ employees be trained at Murphy facilities by Murphy personnel
regarding Murphy management procedures.
In its memorandum in support of its motion, on page 2 of the memorandum,
Respondent states that no Murphy personnel were employed at The Highlands’ farm. It states
that The Highlands employed management personnel and workers to operate the farm, and
The Highlands’ management determined how the farm would be operated. Yet it is all too clear
from the agreement between Respondents The Highlands and Murphy that Murphy had very
significant managerial control of the operation, and, even though the employees may have been
paid by The Highlands, they were trained by Murphy in Murphy’s management procedures.
Respondent’s statement on page 2 of its memorandum in support of its motion, that The
Highlands had “unfettered control of the operation of the farm,” is a disturbing characterization.
By the terms and conditions of its agreement with The Highlands, it is obvious that this
characterization is blatantly untrue, It is noteworthy that Respondent Murphy did not include a
copy of the agreement as an exhibit to Mr. Lenhart’s affidavit.
It is also apparent from the agreement that Respondent Murphy was heavily involved in
the financial management of The Highlands facility. In Exhibit 1, attached to and attested to in
4
the affidavit of Jane McBride, is a Contract Addendum to the agreement between The
Highlands and Murphy Family Farms.
Item 1 of the Addendum states: “The parties herein agree that all terms and conditions
under this addendum shall be effective May 1, 2001. All adjustments to the existing contract
dated December 6, 1996 are subject to Highlands’ agreement to the items listed under
paragraph no. 4, which shall be mandatory criteria for continuance of the contract addendum.”
Paragraph No. 4 states: “Highlands agrees to comply with the following criteria in
consideration of an increase in production payment. The criteria is (sic) as follows:”
Paragraphs “a” through “j” of Item 4 set forth financial information The Highlands was to submit
to Murphy Farms,, as well as transactions that were not to proceed without approval of
Respondent Murphy Farms, such as all transactions executed between The Highlands and
Baird Seed Farm (paragraph “e”) and Baird Family Members (paragraph “f”). Exhibit 4 attached
to the Affidavit of Jane McBride is the Illinois Secretary of State’s registration of The Highlands,
LLC. It shows that the make-up of this limited liability corporation exclusively consists of Baird
family members.
Paragraph “g” states: All monthly repair and maintenance expenditures that exceed
budgeted amount by $1,000 or more will require written explanation and cost justification to be
included in the distribution of monthly financial statements to MFI (Murphy Farms, Inc.) and
FCS (Farm Credit Services).
In its memorandum, Respondent Murphy represents that Respondent The Highlands
determined where the farm would be sited and the inference is that Respondent Murphy had no
control or participation in the siting of the facility. Complainant contends that Respondent
Murphy did participate in the siting of the facility and exercised a very active role in the
determination of the siting of the subject sow facility. As evidence of its participation,
Complainant offers Exhibit I attached to the affidavit of Eric Ackerman, which is a
5
memorandum of a phone conversation with Doug Lenhart regarding the siting and
establishment of a sow operation in the Illinois EPA’s Peoria Region, dated July 5, 1996. In that
phone conversation, Mr. Lenhart indicated that he himself would be moving to Illinois to become
Director of Illinois Operations with Murphy Farms. Mr. Ackerman documents that Mr. Lenhart
indicated “they” intended to construct a 3,600 sow operation in western Peoria County. Mr.
Lenhart informed Mr. Ackerman of the particulars regarding the location and design of the
facility, and how it would be operated. Mr. Lenhart was calling to discuss the requirements of
the Illinois Pollution Control Board’s Subtitle E: Agriculture Related Pollution Regulations. In
that conversation, he advised Mr. Ackerman that Mr. Lenhart, personally, had previously
contacted IDOA (Illinois Department of Agriculture) regarding the requirements of that
department, which were, as stated in Mr. Ackerman’s affidavit, the siting requirements the
Illinois Department of Agriculture administered under the Livestock Management Facilities Act.
Mr. Lenhart himself, as the Director of Illinois Operations for Murphy Farms, was ascertaining
the siting requirements for this 3,600 sow operation and was also contacting the Illinois EPA
about the Subtitle E requirements.
Exhibit 2 attached to the affidavit of Eric Ackerman is another phone memorandum, this
one hand written. It is dated October 3, 1996. It documents a phone conversation with Doug
Lenhart, in which Mr. Lenhart is inquiring as to whether any other state regulatory personnel
should be brought out to the site. It clearly says that he, Doug Lenhart, was seeking regulatory
agency input on site selection for the sow operation. Exhibit 3, attached to the Affidavit of Eric
Ackerman, clearly states that Mr. Lenhart represented that Respondent Murphy operates hog
production facilities in Illinois and conducts programs at these facilities that address
environmental controls. This would lead agency personnel to believe Respondent Murphy does
have control of operations at its facilities to the extent that programs it conducts impact local
environmental concerns at these facilities. As attested to in Mr. Ackerman’s affidavit, all of the
6
hog production facilities in which Respondent Murphy was involved in Illinois at the time were
contract operations. Thus, based on Mr. Lenhart’s letter, it could be garnered that Respondent
Murphy considered itself to have operational control at its contract facilities and so represented
itself in this letter to regulatory personnel.
Exhibit 4 attached to the affidavit of Bruce Yurdin, attested to as a true and accurate
copy of an email written by Dan Heacock and received by Mr. Yurdin, documents a
conversation in which Doug Lenhart, identifying himself as a representative of Murphy Farms,
called regarding “a potential” Murphy Family Farm operation in Peoria County south of
Elmwood.
If Mr. Lenhart truly had nothing to do with the siting of the sow production facility
established as The Highlands facility, why was he calling state agencies, asking for their input
in siting the facility and ascertaining the requirements of pertinent regulations? If he had no
authority, no control, no influence, no participation in the determination of the siting of the
facility, why would he be calling state agencies, extending invitations to view the site, requesting
input and asking the questions documented in these exhibits? Were the state agencies to rely
on his representations then, and provide him with the information he was seeking, cooperate
with his requests at that time, in full acknowledgment of his representation that he had the
authority of Murphy Farms, Inc. to be making these calls seeking assistance with the siting of
the sow production facility, and yet now, in the case of an enforcement action, be told, under
oath, that Mr. Lenhart had no authority to make these calls and make such representations to
state regulatory personnel?
As is obvious from the terms and conditions of the agreement, the whole reason that the
waste was at this facility, in the volume that existed at the facility, was due to the presence of
Respondent Murphy’s hogs and all the inputs Respondent Murphy delivered for the care of the
animals. The facility was operated pursuant to management procedures dictated by
7
Respondent Murphy and executed by personnel trained by Murphy personnel, at Murphy
facilities in Murphy management procedures. Respondent Murphy had the ability, under the
provisions of the agreement to require any measure be undertaken at the facility “deemed
necessary” by Respondent Murphy “to provide for the herd.” It is clear from the exhibits, that
Respondent Murphy intended to establish a 3,600 sow facility in the Peoria area in Illinois. See
Exhibit 4 attached to the affidavit of Bruce Yurdin, a July 8, 1996 email from Dan Heacock
documenting a conversation with Doug Lenhart, and Exhibit I attached to the affidavit of Eric
Ackerman, ~ July 5, 1996 phone conversation record documented by Eric Ackerman,
documenting Murphy’s intention to construct a 3,600 sow operation. Respondent Murphy
intended to establish a 3,600 sow facility, it was Respondent Murphy’s target operating
capacity, which thus would result in the generation of waste in the volume that exists at The
Highlands facility.
Respondent Murphy had sole ownership and control of every interest that resulted in the
production of waste at this facility. It controlled, solely, the source of the waste. In that it had
supplied all the feed and inputs for the hogs, and had sole control of the management of all
procedures for the care and productivity of the hogs, and reserved the right to change the
management of these procedures from time to time (Item 2, page 1 of the agreement), it had
sole ownership and control of the rate of production of the waste and the content of the waste.
If anything, such as, but not limited to, any aspect of the structure of the waste
management system, fumes from the waste management system, or the ventilation system,
were to impact the productivity of Respondent’s Murphy’s swine at The Highlands facility, it is
very clear from the agreement that Murphy would have sufficient ownership and control of the
operation to dictate a change in the operation for the benefit of the hogs.
To paint a picture as to how this might impact facts relevant to the Count I of the second
amended complaint, it is obvious that Respondent Murphy ultimately had the final say as to the
8
rate of ventilation in the facility, to ensure a healthful environment for its hogs. On any given
day, due to weather conditions, due to power failures, or any variety and combination of
conditions arising in the interior of the hog confinement structures, Respondent Murphy could
certainly dictate the rate of ventilation in the buildings should the well-being of the hogs become
threatened in the buildings due to a build-up of unhealthful conditions, or should physical
failures require compensatory adjustments to other portions of the operation. Respondent
Murphy’s control and ownership of the hogs, as well as its provision of and control over all feed
and inputs or the hogs, as well as its ability to control all measures deemed necessary for the
well-being of the herd, certainly gives Respondent Murphy control over the original rate of
ventilation necessary to accommodate the inputs and procedures involved in the operation at
the facility, as well as a change in the ventilation, which in turn certainly dictates the rate and
composition of air emissions from the facility.
With regard to Count II of the second amended complaint, a count alleging water
pollution due to the over application of waste, it is obvious from the terms of the agreement, that
as long as Respondent Murphy maintained hogs at the facility, it owned and controlled the
source of the waste and all of the components of the waste at the facility. Respondent Murphy
owned and controlled every aspect of the source of the waste. Under the agreement, the very
fact that this facility was a hog farm during the term of the agreement, is due to the components
of the operation that Respondent Murphy owned and controlled.
Complainant also contends and believes that Respondent Murphy had a significant role
in the selection of the BION waste management system for The Highlands facility. Complainant
intends to pursue this theory further, in discovery. The basis of this contention includes
information gathered in 1997 and 1998, documented in Exhibits 1, 2 and Group Exhibit 3
attached to the affidavit of Bruce Yurdin, wherein it is stated that information gathered to date
indicated a strong relationship between BION Environmental Technologies, Inc. and Murphy
9
Family Farms and significant involvement on the part of Doug Lenhart with BION personnel with
regard to the BION system installed at The Highlands facility. It is Complainant’s contention
that Respondent Murphy is responsible for the introduction of Doug Baird and The Highlands
LLC to BION Technologies, and that Respondent Murphy had a significant role in the
installation and operation of the BION system at The Highlands facility.
Given Respondent Murphy’s level of participation in the selection and establishment of
the BION system, there remains a question to be developed in discovery as to its participation
in later modifications of the facility’s waste management system. Given Respondent Murphy’s
interest in all hogs at the facility, and its capability, pursuant to its agreement with The
Highlands, to control all management and procedures relative to the well being and productivity
of the hogs, and the productivity and profitableness of the operation, it is a reasonable question,
for development in discovery for the purpose of presentation of evidence at hearing, to inquire
as to the extent of Respondent Murphy’s involvement in modifications to The Highlands waste
management system during the duration and term of its agreement with The Highlands.
Respondent Murphy claims in its memorandum that to the extent that The Highlands’
waste management program involved land application of waste, Highlands controlled the land
application process, and Murphy was not involved in any way with land application of waste
materials from The Highlands’ farm.
It is clear from the affidavits and exhibits attached thereto, that Respondent Murphy was
most likely involved in the selection of the waste management system utilized at the facility, and
certainly was involved with the establishment of that system at the facility. Thus, Respondent
Murphy not only owned and controlled the source of the waste, but also participated in the
control of how its waste was to be handled at The Highlands facility. Land application is a part
and parcel of the waste handling system utilized at The Highlands. Respondent Murphy owned
the source of the waste, it shared in the control of the planning, siting, design and
10
establishment of the facility, including the waste management system, and it retained control of
all hogs maintained and delivered to the facility, including the number of hogs and composition
of the herd during the term of its contract with the Highlands that resulted in the volume and
composition of waste that was generated and handled at the site. Given the terms and
conditions of its agreement with The Highlands, the facility would not be a swine production
facility and the waste would not be at the site but for Respondent Murphy’s participation in this
sow operation. Respondent Murphy, and exclusively Respondent Murphy, owned every hog on
the site.
-
In its memorandum, at the bottom of page 2, Respondent Murphy states that Highlands
controlled all aspects of the operation of its farm, and Murphy had no ability to cause Highlands
to make, or to refrain from making, any particular decision with respect to any issue concerning
Highlands’ farm. Complainant quotes this representation only to highlight the absurdity of the
statement when held up against the actual terms and conditions of the agreement between The
Highlands and Respondent Murphy.
In its memorandum, also on page 2, Respondent Murphy makes the statement that The
Highlands determined whether it would follow Murphy’s recommendations. Respondent goes
on to represent that The Highlands sometimes did deviate from Murphy’s recommendations.
First, the very fact that Respondent Murphy made recommendations, and took note
when The Highlands did not follow its recommendation, indicates that Respondent Murphy had
the right and ability to make recommendations, as is clear from the agreement now that the
agreement is available for consideration in this proceeding, and that, pursuant to the provisions
of the agreement, The Highlands was to follow these recommendations.
Further, it is clear from the terms and conditions of Respondent Murphy’s agreement
with The Highlands, that Respondent Murphy had control of management procedures
concerning the care of the hogs, and pursuant to Item 15 of the “Producer Hereby Agrees”
11
section of the agreement, Respondent Highlands agreed “To take measures deemed
necessary by Owner to provide for the herd.” It is very apparent from the agreement, that, if
Respondent Murphy so chose, it could claim a breach of contract at any time The Highlands
deviated from Murphy’s management procedures for the care and productivity of the breeding
herd or measures deemed necessary by Respondent Murphy to provide for the herd, and
Respondent Murphy could choose to enforce the contract or end the contract, thereby exerting
significant control over the operation of the Highland sow production facility. In fact, as
indicated inits memorandum, Respondent Murphy did ultimately terminate its contract with The
Highlands.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL
Generally, section 2-619 affords a “means of obtaining . . . a summary disposition of
issues of law or of easily proved issues of fact, with a reservation of jury trial as to disputed
questions of fact.”
Kedzie and 103” Currency Exchange, Inc., v Hodge,
156 III.2d 112, 115
(1993), 619 .E.2d 732 citing Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 110, par 2-619, Historical & Practice Notes, at 662
(Smith-Hurd 1 ~83);see
Barber-Colman Co. v. A & K Midwest Insulation Co.
(1992), 236
lIl.App.3d 1065, 1071, 603 N.E.2d 1215.) Subsection (a)(9). . . permits dismissal where “the
claim asserted . . . is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating
the claim.”
Kedzie,
156 Ill.2d at 115, citing Ill.Rev. State.I989, ch. 110, par 2-6I9(a)(9).
The phrase “affirmative matter” encompasses any defense other than a negation of the
essential allegations of the plaintiff’s cause of action.
Kedzie,
156 lII.2d at 115 (See 4 R.
Michael, Illinois Practice § 41.7 (1989).) For that reason, it is recognized that a section 2-
61 9(a)(9) motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action much in
the same way that a section 2-615 motion to dismiss admits a complaint’s well-pleaded facts.
12
Kedzie,
156 llI.2d ati 15, citing
Barber-Colman,
236 lll.App.3d at 1073, 603 N.E.2d 1215.
The term “affirmative matter” as used in section 2-619(a)(9) has been defined as a type
of defense that either negates an alleged cause of action completely or refutes crucial
conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact unsupported by allegations of specific fact
contained in or inferred from the complaint.
Consumer Electric Company, v. Cobelcomex, Inc.,
149 lll.App.3d 699, 703 (1st Dist. 1986), 501 N.E.2d 156, citing
Ralston v. Casanov,
129
llI.App.3d 1050 (1984), 473 N.E.2d 444. By contrast, where the affirmative matter is merely
evidence upon which defendant expects to contest an ultimate fact stated in the complaint,
section 2-619(a)(9) should not be used.
Consumer Electric Company, v. Cobelcomex, Inc.,
149
IIl.App.3d 699, 703 (1st Dist. 1986), 501 N.E.2d 156, citing
Connelly v. Estate of Dooley,
96
lII.App.3d 1077 (1981), 422 N.E.2d 143.
If the “affirmative matter” asserted is not apparent on the face of the complaint, the
motion must be supported by affidavit.
Kedzie,
156 lll.2d at 116, citing lII.Rev.Stat 1989, ch
110, par 2-619(a); see also 4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice § 41.7 (1989) (observing that
“materials of the same nature as are used to support motions for summary judgment” may
serve as support for the motion). By presenting adequate affidavits supporting the asserted
defense (see 134 Ill.2d R. 191), the defendant satisfied the initial burden of going forward on
the motion. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff.
Kedzie,
156 lll.2d at 116.
The plaintiff must establish that the defense is unfounded or requires the resOlution of
an essential element of material fact before it is proven. The plaintiff may do so by “affidavit or
other proof.”
Kedzie,
156 lII.2d at 116, citing llI.Rev.Stat 1989, ch 110, par 2-619(c).) A counter
affidavit is necessary, however, to refute evidentiary facts properly asserted by affidavit
supporting the motion else the facts are deemed admitted.
Kedzie,
156 llI.2d at 116.
Although similar to a summary judgment motion, a section 2-619 motion differs in that
the court may, in its discretion, decide questions of fact “upon the hearing of the motion.”
13
Consumer Electric Company, v. Cobelcomex, Inc.,
149 lll.App.3d 699, 703 (1st Dist. 1986), 501
N.E.2d 156, citing
North Park Bus Service, Inc. v. Pastor,
39 Ill.App.3d 406 (1976), 349 N.E.2d
664; lll.Rev.Stat 1985, ch 110, par 2-619(c). However, in deciding the merits of the motion, a
trial court cannot determine disputed factual issues solely upon affidavits and counter-affidavits.
If the affidavits presented disputed facts, the parties must be afforded the opportunity to have
an evidentiary hearing.
Consumer Electric Company, v. Cobelcomex, Inc.,
149 lll.App.3d 699,
703-704 (1st Dist. 1986), 501 N.E.2d. 156, citing
Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. LaSalle
National Bank,
132 III.App.3d 485 (1984), 477 N.E.2d 1249;
Dickman v. Country Mutual
Insurance Co.,
120 Ill.App.3d 470 (1983), 458 N.E.2d 199.
If it cannot be determined with reasonable certainty that the alleged defense exists, the
motion should not be allowed.
Consumer Electric Company, v. Cobelcomex, Inc.,
149
Ill.App.3d 699, 703 (1st Dist. 1986), 501 N.E.2d 156, citing
Dangeles v. Marcus,
57 IIl.App.3d
662 (1978), 373 N.E.2d 645;
Loughman Cabinet Co. v. C. Iber & Sons, Inc.,
46 lll.App.3d 873
(1977), 361 N.E.2d 379;
House of Realty, Inc. v. Ziff,
9 Ill.App.3d 419 (1973), 292 N.E.2d 71.
IV.
CASE LAW REGARDING EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL OF THE
PREMISES OR CONTROL OVER THE SOURCE OF POLLUTION TO BE A
SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR A FINDING OF LIABILITY UNDER THE ACT.
In the case of
Perkinson v. the Illinois Pollution Control Board,
187 lll.App.3d 689, 693,
(3rd
Dist. 1989), 543 N.E.2d 901, the court reviewed case law pertinent to the concepts as
ownership and control with regard to liability under the Act:
Two cases involving railroad tank cars are cited by Perkinson in support of his
contention that he neither caused nor allowed the swine waste discharge here.
In
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
72
Ill.App.3d 217 (2d Dist. 1979), 390 N.E.2d 620, a tank of anhydrous
ammonia owned by Phillips was under the sole control of the transporting
railroad when it was punctured in a derailment and released poisonous gas into
14
the air. Since there was no evidence showing that Phillips, the alleged polluter,
had the capability of controlling the pollution or was even in control of the
premises where the pollution occurred, the appellate court affirmed a finding the
Phillips did not cause or allow the pollution.
The second tank car case is
Union Petroleum Corp. v. United States
(Ct.Cl.1981), 651 F.2d 734, where the valves on two cars were opened by
vandals during a labor strike. The cars were at a loading rack at Union’s
terminal in Massachusetts, and the spilled oil eventually reached Chelsea Creek.
As soon as the oil spill was discovered, Union took appropriate measure to
contain the spill and to clean up the oil. The litigation arose when Union sought
to recover the cost of clean up from the United States government. The Court
of Claims noted that, under the federal statute, a claimant cannot recover where
a vandal or third party caused the spillage if the claimant does not prove that
reasonable actions were taken to prevent or forestall such intervention by a third
party. The trial judge ruled in favor of Union, concluding that the discharge was
caused by unknown vandals in spite of the company’s reasonable precautions
against vandalism, and Court of Claims affirmed. Union had fenced in the most
accessible part of its terminal, had installed 1000-watt mercury streetlights in the
vicinity of the tank cars, and had employed additional security guards to patrol
the area during the strike. There was also persuasive evidence that Union had
adequate oil containment facilities and took reasonable care to prevent the spill.
***
Many cases have held that the owner’s lack of knowledge of the discharge is no
defense under the Environmental Protection Act. The leading case is
Meadowlark Farms v. Illinois Pollution Control Board,
17 Ill.App.3d 851
(5th
Dist.
1974), 308 N.E.2d 829, where water pollution was caused by seepage through
mine refuse piles. The PCB found that Meadowlark Farms owned the surface
rights of the property and thus owned the source of the pollution and had the
capability of controlling the pollutional discharge. The reviewing court affirmed
and stated’:
“Petitioner’s so-called lack of knowledge that the discharge existed
provides no defense. The Environmental Protection Act is
malum
prohibitum,
no proof of guilty knowledge or
mens rea
is necessary to a
finding of guilt.” 17 lll.App.3d at 861, 308 N.E.2d at 837.
A similar holding is found in
Freeman Coal Mining Corp. v. Illinois Pollution
Control Board,
21 lll.App.3d 157
(5th
Dist. 1974), 313 N.E.2d 616, another case
where water pollution occurred when rainwater seeped through a mine refuse
pile. Again, the court ruled that the fact that pollution came from the seepage off
the owner’s land was sufficient proof that the owner allowed the discharge within
the meaning of the statute. It was no defense that the discharges were
accidental and not intentional or that they were the result of an “Act of God”
(rain) beyond its control. The court relied in part upon a case from another
jurisdiction which held that the legislature had imposed a duty to take all prudent
measures to prevent pollution.
15
In
Hindman v. Environmental Protection Agency,
42 lIl.App.3d 766 (5th Dist.
1976), 356 N.E.2d 669, the operator of a Iandfilll site was held accountable for a
fire that was not started by either the operator or his employees. The court relied
upon the Meadowlark Farms case and upon
Bath, Inc. v. Pollution Control
Board,
10 III.App.3d (4th Dist. 1973), 294 N.E.2d 778, and ruled that a violation is
not predicated upon proof of guilty knowledge or intentional harm. In the Bath
case, the owner of a landfill was held to be responsible for underground burning
even though the cause was unknown and not the result of the owner’s
affirmative act.
The case before us is controlled by the long line of precedent in Illinois which
holds that the owner of the source of the pollution causes or allows the pollution
within the meaning of the statute and is responsible for that pollution unless the
facts establish the owner either lacked the capability to control the source, as in
-
Phillips Petroleum
or had undertaken extensive precautions to prevent vandalism
or other intervening causes, as in
Union Petroleum.
Here Perkinson plainly had
control of the lagoons and the land where the pollutional discharge occurred.
The PCB concluded that he is liable for the pollution that had its source on his
land and in a waste facility under his control. Under well-established Illinois law,
that is sufficient to support a finding of a violation of the Environmental Protection
Act.
Complainant attaches hereto as Exhibit A, a copy of the United States District Court,
Western District of Kentucky, opinion and order regarding issues raised in motions for summary
judgment in the case of
Sierra Club, Inc. v. Tyson Foods.
2003 WL 22595989, 299 F. Supp.2d
693. The decision included a ruling that found Tyson Chicken to be a “person in charge” under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) and
an “operator” under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”)
with respect to two facilities Tyson claimed to be independent contractors. The analysis and
findings are found on page 718 through 721 of the decision. Tyson Chicken’s contract and
relationship with its growers is not identical to the working arrangement and agreement
between Respondent Murphy and The Highlands. However, there are some similarities in the
analysis the court undergoes in making its ruling and, to the extent the court’s analysis in
Sierra
Club v. Tyson
is relevant to questions currently before the Board in the instant matter,
Complainant incorporates said analysis herein by reference.
16
V.
PEOPLE EX REL. RYAN V. MCFALLS
In the case of
People ex rel Ryan v. McFalls,
313 Ill.App.3d 223 (3~Dist. 2000), 728
N.E.2d 1152, the court held that an off-site generator of waste to be a person who may cause
open dumping within the plain meaning of Section 21(a) and 21(p)(l) of the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act (the “Act”). 415 ILCS 5/21(a), (p)(1). The court provided the
following analysis as the basis of its reasoning.
The Act does not define “cause.” In the absence of a statutory definition,
“cause” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See
Moran
Transportation Corp. v. Stroger,
303 lll.App.3d 459, 708 N.E.2d 508 (1999). The
verb “cause” ordinarily means “to serve as cause or occasion of or to bring into
existence . . . .“ (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 356 (1993)).
The Act contains a broad definition of “person.” The definition contains no
qualifying language limiting its scope to entities having an ownership interest in,
or control over, a disposal site. Moreover, neither ownership, nor control, of an
allegedly illegal disposal site is necessary to effect the consolidation of refuse
there. Therefore, an off-site generator, as a “person,” may “cause” “open
dumping” within the plain meaning of subsections 21(a) and 21 (p)(1).
Accordingly, we hold that off-site generators fall within the class of persons who
may violate these subsections.
***
Finally, we do not agree that a long line of precedent limits the scope of the
subsections at issue to parties having an ownership interest in, or exercising
control over, the allegedly illegal disposal site. Rather than establishing
ownership or control of the premises as a necessary condition to liability under
the Act, the cases cited by appellees merely hold that ownership or control of the
premises or control over the source of pollution is a sufficient condition where an
owner or operator is alleged to have passively permitted pollution to enter the
environment. See
Perkinson v. Pollution Control Board,
187 III..App.3d 689, 546
N.E.2d 901 (1989);
Phillips Petroleum Co.
V.
Pollution Control Board,
72
lll.App.3d 217, 390 N.E.2d 620 (1979);
Freeman Coal Mm. Corp. v. Pollution
Control Board,
21 lll.App.3d 157, 313 N.E.2d 616 (1974);
Meadowlark Farms,
Inc.
17 IIl.App.3d 851, 308 N.E.2d 829. Therefore, we must reject the argument
that these cases control the disposition of the case at bar.
17
VI.
RESPONDENT MURPHY’S APPLICATION OF NUISANCE PRINCIPLES TO AN
ALLEGATION OF SECTION 9(A) IS IMPROPER, IN LIGHT OF THE COURTS
HOLDINGS THAT THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD IS NOT
AUTHORIZED BY THE LEGISLATURE TO DETERMINE AND PROCEED AGAINST
COMMON LAW NUISANCE, AND THAT THE BOARD IS TO APPLY STATUTORY
CRITERIA IN ITS ANALYSIS OF A SECTION 9(A) ALLEGATION.
In its
memorandum, Respondent Murphy asserts that a common law nuisance claim is
analogous to the State’s claim under Section 9(a) of the Act, and goes on to apply nuisance
principles to the allegations of the complaint. Respondent Murphy’s attempt to apply nuisance
principles to an allegation of Section 9(a) is improper and incorrect.
The standards to be utilized in a Section 9(a) analysis were plainly set forth in the cases
of
City of Monmouth v. Pollution Control Board,
57 lll.2d 482 (1974), 313 N.E.2d 1,
Incinerator,
Inc. v. Pollution Control Board,
59 Ill.2d 290 (1974), 319 N.E.2d 794; and
Mystik Tape v.
Pollution Control Board,
60 lll.2d 330 (1975), 328 N.E.2d 5, wherein the Illinois Supreme Court
held that section 9(a), when read in conjunction with section 3(b), 3(d) and 33(c),contained
sufficient standards for determining what constitutes air pollution, that is, the unreasonable
interference with the enjoyment of life or property. These standards were further defined in
terms of the statutory criteria within the Act, specifically for causes brought before the Pollution
Control Board, in the case of
Wells Manufacturing Company v. Pollution Control Board,
73 Ill.2d
226 (1978), 383 N.E.2d 148.
The courts have held that the Illinois Pollution Control Board is not authorized by the
legislature to determine and proceed against common law nuisance. Rather, it must proceed
strictly within the authority defined by the Act.
Incinerator, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board,
59
Ill.2d 290, 299 (1974), 319 N.E.2d 794, 799;
W.F. Hall Printing Company v. Environmental
Protection Agency,
16 lll.App.3d 864, 869 (4th Dist. 1973), citing
Mystik Tape v. Illinois Pollution
Control Board
16 llI.App.3d 778 (4th Dist. 1973), 306 N.E.2d 574,
aff’d in part and rev’d in part
on other grounds,
60 lIl.2d 330; 328~N.E.2d.
18
Therefore, Respondent’s argument contained in the second paragraph of page 6 of its
memorandum, in which it encourages the Board to rely on nuisance standards in its analysis of
a claim of a Section 9(a) violation, and its contention in the first full paragraph of page 8 that
Respondent Murphy’s conduct must be the focus of the Board’s analysis, is terribly flawed and
outright incorrect.
VII.
IN THE RECENT DECISION OF
NICKELS V. BURNETT,
BASED ON A SUFFICIENT
SHOWING OF THE POTENTIAL HARMS AND SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY THAT
THE HARMS WOULD OCCUR, THE COURT UPHELD THE GRANTING OF
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF THAT PROHIBITED THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION
OF A FACILITY HOUSING A LARGE NUMBER OF HOGS.
Despite the fact that Respondent’s reliance on nuisance standards is completely
misplaced, Complainant cannot allow to go unchallenged Respondent’s argument that it is “well
settled” that the mere introduction of livestock into an area — even large numbers of animals —
without more, does not establish the requisite conduct to support a nuisance claim.
In the instant matter, Complainant has pled and alleged all facts necessary to meet
pleading standards. Respondent Murphy’s motion is not based in a Section 2-615 claim, but
rather Respondent’s motion is a Section 2-619(a)(9) claim. Complainant has pled a sufficient
factual basis for its allegation of unreasonable interference consistent with applicable statutory
criteria, and, particularly, Complainant has alleged facts relevant to actual unreasonable
interference experienced by neighbors of the subject facility. As such, Complainant’s assertion
of a concentration of a large number of hogs at the subject operation — an operation for which it
is requisite that there be a concentration of over 3,000 sows — is one allegation among many
specific factual allegations iii support of its claim of unreasonable interference. As stated
above, a section 2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
cause of action much in the same way that a section 2-615 motion to dismiss admits a
19
complaint’s well-pleaded facts.
Kedzie,
156 lIl.2d at 115, citing
Barber-Colman,
236 IIl.App.3d at
1073, 603 N.E.2d 1215.
In the recent decision of
Nickels v. Burnett,
343 Ill.App.3d 654, 798 N.E.2d 817, the
court upheld a grant of injunctive relief prohibiting the construction and operation of a facility
that housed a large number of hogs.
Nickels
was an action in which plaintiffs claimed
prospective nuisance, and based on the record of the case, the court upheld the trial court’s
decision to grant a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from constructing a hog
confinement facility. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision, and
that injunctive relief was available in the matter to redress substantially certain prospective
harm. Relying on the case of
Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc.,
86 Il’I.2d 1, 25 (1981), 426
N.E.2d 824, the court stated that it is well settled that a plaintiff may seek to enjoin an activity
that may lead to substantial future harm. In
Nickels,
the court found that the plaintiffs had
presented extensive evidence of the potential harms to their health and to the values of their
lands should the hog facility begin to operate. Further, the court found the evidence submitted
by the plaintiffs to indicate that the harms described were substantially certain to occur should
the hog facility begin operations in its present proposed location. Therefore, with a sufficient
showing of the potential harms and substantial certainty that the harms would occur should
large numbers of hogs be moved into the proposed facility, the court upheld the lower court’s
finding of a prospective private and public nuisance and upheld the injunctive relief granted by
the lower court.
VIII.
ARGUMENT
As set forth above, section 2-619 affords a “means of obtaining . . . a summary
disposition of issues of law or of easily proved issues of fact, with a reservation of jury trial as to
20
disputed questions of fact.”
Kedzie,
156 lll.2d at 115. The term “affirmative matter” as used in
section 2-61 9(a)(9) has been defined as a type of defense that either negates an alleged cause
of action completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact
unsupported by allegations of specific fact contained in or inferred from the complaint.
Consumer Electric,
149 lII.App.3d at 703. The plaintiff must establish that the defense is
unfounded or requires the resolution of an essential element of material fact before it is proven.
Kedzie,
156 lll.2d at 116. If it cannot be determined with reasonable certainty that the alleged
defense exists, the motion should not be allowed.
Consumer Electric,,
149 lll.App.3d at 703.
The terms and conditions of Respondent Murphy’s and Respondent Highland’s,
operating agreement certainly afforded Respondent Murphy, as the owner of the source of
pollution, that being the hogs themselves and the hogs and all’ inputs into the hogs as the
source of the waste at the facility, sufficient ownership and control to meet the standards for a
finding of liability under the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, as defined in the cases of
People v. A.J. Davinroy Contractors,
249 III. App.3d 788, 793 (Sth Dist. 1993), 618 N.E.2d 1282
Perkinson v. Pollution Control Board,
187 lll..App.3d 689, 546 N.E.2d 901 (1989);
Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Pollution Control Board,
72 lll.App.3d 217, 390 N.E.2d 620 (1979);
Freeman
Coal Mm. Corp. v. Pollution Control Board,
21 lIl.App.3d 157, 313 N.E.2d 616 (1974);
Meadowlark Farms, Inc.
17 llI.App.3d 851, 308 N.E.2d 829.
In the case of
People ex rel Ryan v. McFalls,
313 Ill.App.3d 223 (3m’ Dist. 2000), 728
N.E.2d 1152, the court found that the Illinois Environmental Protection Act does not define
“cause.” In the absence of a statutory definition, “cause” should be given its plain and ordinary
meaning. The verb “cause” ordinarily means “to serve as cause or occasion of or to bring into
existence. . . .“ (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 356 (1993)). Further, the Act
contains a broad definition of “person.” The definition contains no qualifying language limiting
its scope to entities having an ownership interest in, or control over, a disposal site. Moreover,
21
neither ownership, nor control, of an allegedly illegal disposal site is necessary to affect the
consolidation of refuse there. Not unlike the off-site generator that was’the subject of
McFaII,
a “person” that “caused” “open dumping” within the plain meaning of subsections 21(a) and
21 (p)(1), Respondent Murphy has served as cause or occasion to bring into existence the
source of pollution that existed at The Highlands facility, and thus, consistent with the holding in
McFall,
has liability under Section 9(a) of the Act, as a person who, as alleged in the second
amended complaint, caused, threatened or allowed the discharge or emission of a contaminant
so as to cause or tend to cause air pollution, and who failed to practice adequate odor control
methods and technology at The Highlands livestock management facility and livestock waste-
management facility so as not to cause air pollution.
With regard to Count II of the complaint, in that Respondent Murphy owns and controls
the source of the pollution, that being the hogs and all elements of the generation of the waste,
Respondent Murphy, under its agreement with The Highlands and in its actual participation in
The Highlands facility operations, had sufficient ownership and control in the facility to meet the
standards for a finding of liability under the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, as defined in
the case law set forth above, including the
McFall
case. Respondent Murphy’s participation in
the planning, siting and design of the facility, a facility Respondent Murphy established with a
requisite of over 3,000 sows, and which included the selection and establishment of the BION
system, as well as any other system that might have later been installed at the facility, definitely
qualifies as an allegation of specific facts that support Complainant’s contention that
Respondent Murphy is liable for the water pollution allegations contained in Count II of the
second amended complaint.
As set forth in paragraph 22 of Count II of the second amended complaint, Respondents
Highlands and Murphy were land applying waste from the facility via a traveling gun irrigation
unit on June 18, 2002. On that date, Respondent Murphy had as much, if not more, of an
22
interest in land applying the facility’s waste as part and parcel of the waste management system
at lhe facility, as was the interest of The Highlands. For the production of swine at the facility,
swine that it exclusively owned, Respondent Murphy had to move the waste out from under its
hogs, into waste management structures and ultimately dispose of it upon the land in order to
properly provide for its hogs and properly conduct a swine production operation and facility.
Pursuant to Illinois law, Respondent Murphy, who owned and controlled the very source of the
pollution, is liable for its compliance with the Illinois Environment Protection Act and regulations
promulgated thereunder in the operation of this swine production facility.
With regard to Respondent Murphy’s reliance on nuisance principles in its
memorandum, it is obvious from the recitation of applicable case law that the analysis of an
allegation of a Section 9(a) violation, in a case brought before the Board, and also in circuit
court for that matter, is to be based upon statutory criteria. The case law sets forth, in detail,
the considerations that are to be included in a proper analysis. Further support for
Complainant’s contention that the law is not nearly as favorable to Respondent Murphy’s
position as Respondent Murphy would like the Board to believe, is found in Respondent’s
misplaced reliance on the case of
Village of Goodfield v. Jamison,
188 lll.App.3d 851 (4th Dist.
1989), 544 N.E.2d 1229. It is obvious from the holding in
Nickels,
343 lll.App.3d at 663, that
plaintiffs in this state have presented sufficient showings of potential harm and substantial
certainty that the harms would occur should a large number of hogs be established in a given
location, to uphold the grant of injunctive relief prohibiting construction and operation of facilities
housing large numbers of hogs.
Respondent Murphy had sufficient ownership and control in The Highlands facility, and
sufficient participation in the operation, siting, design, and establishment of both the facility and
the waste management system to qualify as a person who caused or allowed both air pollution
and water pollution under the statutory criteria applicable to the allegations contained in Count I
23
and II of the Act. In light of the affidavits and accompanying exhibits, attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference, Respondent Murphy’s assertion of affirmative matter
completely fails. If,
arguendo,
Complainant’s response is found short of bringing to light the
complete failure of Respondent Murphy’s assertion, the affidavits presented with this response
and attached exhibits certainly establish that, without completion of discovery and an
evidentiary hearing, it cannot be determined with reasonable certainty that the alleged defense
exists.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing grounds and for the foregoing reasons, Complainant
respectfully requests that the Board deny Respondent Murphy Farms, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss.
Respectfully submitted,
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
ex reL LISA MAD IGAN, Attorney General
of the State of Illinois
MATTHEW J. DUNN, Chief
Environmental Enforcement Division
BY:
/~ JANE E.MCBRIDE
Assistant Attorney General
500 South Second Street
Springfield, Illinois 62706
(217) 782-9031
24
STATE OF ILLINOIS
)
SS
COUNTYOFSANGAMON )
AFFIDAVIT
I, JANE E. MCBRIDE, after being duly sworn and upon oath, state as follows:
1.
I am the assistant attorney general assigned to the matter of
People v. The
Highlands, LLC and Murphy Farms, Inc.,
PCB No. 00-104. I have been lead counsel
representing the Complainant in this matter since the case was originally filed with the Illinois,
Pollution Control Board.
2.
Included in the materials contained within the Office of the Attorney General’s
case file on this matter is a copy of the Weaned Pig Production Agreement dated December 6,
1996, signed by an executive vice president for Murphy Farms, Inc, and James R. Baird. This
agreement includes a contract weaned pig payment schedule, attached to the agreement as
Exhibit A. The agreement includes a contract addendum, signed by the same representative of
Murphy Farms, Inc. and Douglas Baird for the Highlands, LLC, in April 2001. These
documents were included in a response to a request for production, produced by the Thielen
Law Offices, representing The Highlands, LLC in the matter of
Roy Kell and Diane Kell, v. The
Highlands LLC and Murphy Family Farms, Inc.,
Knox County Circuit Court Case No. 99-L-62.
The agreement, payment schedule and contract addendum are attached to this affidavit as
Exhibit 1.
3.
Included in the production from the Thielen Law Offices representing The
Highlands, LLC in the matter of
Roy Kell and Diane Kell, v. The Highlands LLC and Murphy
Family Farms, Inc.,
Knox County Circuit Court Case No. 99-L-62, was a copy of a
memorandum from Doug Lenhart, dated January 12, 1998, regarding the training of Highlands’
employee Don Bybee, and attached hereto as Exhibit 2, and a copy Murphy Family Farms
employment training record, attached hereto as Exhibit 3, that reports the results of The
Highlands’ employees competency tests. These two documents present evidence of the
employee training agreement and arrangements between The Highlands and Murphy Farms,
Inc., pursuant to their operating agreement.
4.
The Attorney General’s case file in this matter includes The Highlands articles of
organization as a limited liability company, filed on December 4, 1996, a copy of a document
filed with the Illinois Secretary of State to return The Highlands LLC to good standing in 1997,
and copies of The Highlands LLC annual reports field in November 1997 and October 1998.
These reports indicate the members of The Highlands LLC to be James R. Baird, Patricia A.
Baird and Douglas B. Baird. The documents were obtained from the Illinois Secretary of States
office upon request of the Illinois Attorney General’s Office. The facsimile cover letter
transmitting the documents from the Illinois Secretary of State’s office to the Attorney General’s
office is included with the exhibit. The return cover transmission sheet is superimposed on the
cover sheet utilized for the Attorney General’s Office’s original request for the documents. The
documents are attached hereto as Exhibit 4.
5.
Under the penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are
true and correct, except as to matters stated to be on information and belief and as to such
matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily believes the same to be true.
Further affiant sayeth not.
~
/~JANE E. MCBRIDE
Subscrib~iand swornAo before me
this, ~
day of
,/JL~i
Q~n4I/,
2004.
NO~’1AF~YPUBLIC
OFFICIAL SEAL
2
PEGGY J. POITEVINT
NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF ILLINOIS
MY CCMMISS~ONEXPIRES 4’l6-2006
MURPHY
FAMILY FARMS.
n
P.O.
BOX
759
ROSE HILL, NORTH CAROLNA 28458
WEANED PIG PRODUCTION AGREEMENT
THIS AG~EME~Tmade this
___________
day of___________
1996,
between M~hy
Farms, Inc. Andlor Quarter M Farms, Inc. Doing business in Illinois as Murphy Family Farms,
North Carolina Corporations with their principal place of business in Rose Hill, North Carolina
(hereinafter- called Owner) and
\4~n\o~~
LLC~.
,
whose address is
I~’t2.2- ‘~(v~o~
~
t~ ~
‘
,
of
E\bo~
Township,
Kv~pK1
CL.
County, State
of
“I!—.
(hereinafter called Producer) whose farm
shall be known as
________________________________________“.
Each’ party to this contract is an
independent contractor and neither party has any responsibility’or liability for any of the debts or
obligations ofthe other party. Neither shall either party be liable to the other for failure to act in any
waydue to any unforseen circumstances beyond their control.
IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual benefits to evolve from Producer breeding, farrowing, and
producing weaned pigs for Owner in facilities owned by Producer and from breeding stock owned
and provided by Owner, the parties hereby agree to the following:
OWNER HEREBY AGREES:
1.
To deliver to Producer’s premises a total breeding herd of ~—“~U~
gifts and
the necessary boars for that size herd. The quality, time of delivei~~dnumber of
animals of each delivery shall be the discretion of Owner which agrees to strive to
deliver said stock for maximum utilization ofProducer’s facilities.
2.
To provide management procedures for the care and productivity of the Breeding
Herd which may change from time to time.
Exhibit 1
Eff 1/1/96
1
3.
To provide all fe~d,medications and veterinary service deemed necessary at the
discretion ofOwner.
4.
To provide from information furnished by Producer all records regarding herd
productivity considered to be necessary by Owner.
5.
To deliver and pick up all necessary Breeding Stock at Producer’s premises and to
haul all pigs to and from farm.
6.
To pay producer in accordance with payment schedule attached marked “Exhibit A.”
-
‘
PRODUCER HEREBY AGREES:
1.
To provide facilities, housing and equipment as specified by Owner, and
bear all
costs ofproducing weaned pigs except those covered by Owner described in item 3
under “OWNER HEREBY AGREES”.
2.
To. receive the breeding herd and thereafter, provide the proper husbandry for
maximum productivity by following the management’s procedures specified by
Owner.
3.
To provide an all weather road from the public road to the premises suitable or the
delivery and/or pick up of feed and breeding stbck. If Owner incurs any wrecker
bills due to poor road conditions, then to reimburse Owner for wrecker cost.
4.
To deliver acceptable commercial weaned pigs to off-site nurseries as scheduled by
Owner.
5.
To select qua:lity weaned pigs from those sows designated for replacement gilt
production and place those pigs into the on-site nursery as scheduled by the Owner.
These pigs will be raised to provide replacement gilts forthe breeding herd.
6.
To properly maintain the premises, including grass and weed mowing, adequate rat
and fly control measures and provide security to facility such as to exclude access by
outside animals, birds and unauthorized humans.
.7.
To ‘follow the weaned pig production program furnished by Owner.
8.
To provide Owner with information deemed necessary by Owner for maintenance of
proper records.
9.
To permit any authorized representative of Owner to enter the premises to inspect
the animals and facilities at any time.
Eff 1/1/96’
2
10.
To recognize the security interest of any secured creditor in the feed, medication,
breeding stock and its offspring as superior to and having priority over any rights
which Producer may have therein: furthermore, Producer agrees to permit any
secured creditors of Owner to have access to the premises and facilities at all
reasonable times for the purpose of exercising any right, including the rights of
inspection and possession; with respect to the secured creditors security interest.
11.
To account for all death losses daily, submit a weekly mortality report to the
OWner’s accounting office in a timely manner and dispose of all dead animals
according to ILLINOIS state regulations.
12.
To dispose ofall animal waste according to federal, state and county regulations.
13.
To hold Owner harmless from any damages, loss or expense, including attorney fees
-
and court costs, resulting from the negligent, unlawful or willful acts oromissions of
Producer, Producer’s employees, representatives or invitees or from Producer’s
failure to perform any obligation imposed upon Producer by law’ or by the
provisions of this Agreement, with respect to the maintenance and operation of the
facilities used for the production of weaned pigs for Owner.
14.
To use the breeding stock delivered by Owner only for the purposes of producing
weanedpigs for Owner and to own no swine.
15.
To take measures deemed necessary by Owner to provide for the herd.
16.
To allow Owner to withhold from proceeds und~rthis contract any amounts due to
Owner by Producer for the purchase of materials and supplies from Owner or for
advances to Producer or to others for the benefit ofProducer by Owner.
17.
For the purpose of this agreement, a weaned pig shall be defined as a pig of
sufficient age and size, as determined by owner, to survive in a nursery.
18.
To not own or have possession of, either as agent, producer or otherwise, ~anyswine
not owned by Owner. Producer shall not permit any swine not owned and
designated for the swine facilities herein contracted for, to come within 500 feet of
the swine facilities, unless permitted in writing by Owner. It is specifically
understood and agreed that under no circumstances shall the requirement for written
approval be waived.
)
EU 1/1/96
THiS AGREEMENT shall continue in force for a period of
~
years from this date
Hove.v~t6e.r
C)
I
,
1997. At the conclusion of this term, this agreement will
automatically renew on an annual basis. Should either party wish to terminate the agreement,
written notice will be required within 90 days ofthe expiration date ofthis agreement. In the event
that Producer fails to provide necessary facilities, husbandry or security ofthe animals as set out in
the management programs by Owner, Owner reserves the right, without notice to remove Owner’s
property from Producers premises.
MURPHY FARMS, INC
-
Titie:
~
J~c~
/;
_____
SSNorFrN~3~/-r~3
r9~.v
Telephone:c.~~-
~—
~
H: USE
T~’CON A~CON T1.RGE\1LLWP~DOC
Eff 1/1J~9~6.
Witne
.7
7
4
I’
I
EXHIBIT “A”
CONTRACT WEANED PIG PAYMENT SCHEDULE
Murphy Family Farms will pay Producer for the pigs produced and delivered by Producer to
Murphy as follows:
Pigs accepted by Murphy and moved to a nursery from Producer’s farrowing building will be
paid
~per pig moved. It is the intent of Murphy and the understanding of the Producer
that pigs should weigh an average of 10 pounds. If Producer ships pigs weighing less than 8
pounds on an ir4dividual basis, then payment on those individual pigs are subject to a discount
of
er pig at Murphy’s discretion. Injured, ruptured or non viable pigs are subject to
ayment. The net payment will be paid within 10 days of pig movement. Murphy’s
decision on discounted pigs is final.
Pigs accepted by Murphy and moved from Producer’s Unit will also earn a
iner pig
reserve to be paid to Producer for essential repairs and maintenance on his Unit which are
approved in advance by Murphy Farms, Inc. service representative.
A production incentive bonus will also be paid to Producer for production above ~pigs
per
sow per year. This bonus will be paid within 30 days after the end of each of Murphy2s fiscal
quarters based upon pigs produced during that quarter. However, the bonus will not be paid
until after the first quarter in which Producer was farrowing pigs in the first week of the
quarter. Pigs produced during a quarter will be calculated by taking pigs shipped during the
quarter, adding the end of quarter on farm pig inventory and subtracting the beginning of
quarter on farm pig inventory. Pigs discounted for light weight will, not be considered in
calculating the pigs produced during the quarter. The average of weekly sow inventories for
the quarter will be used in computing production level.
The production bonus per pig roduced will be calculated by dividing the annualized
pigs/sow/year for thea~~rterby
id subtracting
_____
However, the maximum bonus per
pig cannot exceed
,~
per pig.
Example:
“s/soy “““~irdivided by~=
bonus per pig produced
This bonus will be paid for all eligible pigs produced during the quarter.
Before the Producer will have produced pigs for a full quarter, he probably will have farrowed
pigs during the preceding quarter. At the time that the Producer is paid his first quarterly
production bonus, he will also be paid a bonus at the same rate per pig for all pigs produced
before the first full production quarter.
Murphy Family Farms will pay_Producer for fmished gilts produced in the on-site nursery and
finishing facilities at the rate of
______
for each gilt placed back into the breeding herd or moved
from the Producer’s Unit. This gilt production fee is in addition to the pig payments described
above and will be paid within 10 days ofthe gilt movement.
Eff L/1../96
Highlands Sow Farm
Contract Addendum
1. The parties herein agree that all terms and conditions under this addendum shall be effective
May 1, 2001. All adjustments to the existing contract dated December 6, 1996 are subject to
Highlands agreement to the items listed under paragraph no. 4 which shall be mandatory
criteria for continuance ofthe contract addendum.
I
a. Failure to carry out the items listed will constitute a voiding of the new contract
payment and an inimediate return to the previous payment structure. Such violation
ofthe criteria shall constitute a default under the contract addendum.
b. Notice of default may be given by written notice by United States Mail or facsimile.
Highlands shall have seven (7) days in which to cure such notice of default.,
c. It is agreed by all the parties herein that this agreement shall remain confidential in all
respects. All information exchanged will remain confidential and will not be
disclosed to any person or entity without the expressed written consent of the
respective parties.
2. In response to cost of production unique to Illinois an adjustment for the remainder of the
production contract will be made to the base payment in the amount of
per pig.
3. Recognizing that these costs have been incurred since the beginning of production, a payment
equal to
____
per pig for all wean pigs shipped from the Highlands up to the date of
implementing the new payment program will be made.
a. The back payment will first ofall retire all money due to Murphy Farms
and the remainder will be distributed directly to the Highlands.
4. Highlands agrees to comply with the following criteria in consideration of an increase in
production payment. The criteria is as follows:
a. Highlands will prepare an Annual Operating Budget. The Budget will be reviewed by
Murphy Farms, Inc. (MFI) and by Farm Credit Services (FCS) in its final copy before
November 30th of each year. This review is for Highlands business purposes and benefit.
It is understood and agreed that MFI and FCS review of the annual operating budget is
for evaluation purposes and not for the purpose of giving advice or direction of the
management ofHighlands operations.
b. Highland shall provide monthly financial statements distributed to MFI and FCS by the
2~Friday after month end. Statements will include:
1. Comparative balance sheet
2. Budget to actual income statement with a narrative explanation of
significant variances
3. Cash flow statement
4. An aged AlP listing by vendor
S. Pay report by employee
6. Listing ofall transactions between Highlands and Baird Seed Farm (‘BSF)
7. Listing ofall transactions between Highlands and any Baird Family Member
c. Highland shall retain a professional accounting service who will be used! to record all
frnancial transactions and produce timely and accurate Financial Statements.
d. Highland agrees to provide a copy ofthe annual Highlands tax return and distribute to MFI
and FCS no later than April 15 ofeach year.
e. Highland agrees to provide a schedule of the terms of all planned transactions between
Highlands and BSF. No additional transactions will be executed without prior consent
from MFI and FCS.
f. Highland agrees to provide a schedule of the terms of all planned transactions between
Highlands and any Baird Family Member. No additional transactions will be executed
without prior consent from MFI and FCS.
g. All monthly repair and maintenance expenditures that exceed budgeted amount by $1,000
or more will require written explanation and cost justification to be included in the
distribution ofmonthly financial statements to MN and FCS.
h. Capital expenditures or leases (operating or financing) which exceed $1,000 will require
written explanation and cost justification to be included in the distribution of monthly,
financial statements to MIFI and FCS.
i. Quarterly meetings to review Highlands financial statements will be conducted no later
than the end ofthe month following the calendar quarter close. Attending will be Mr. &
Mrs. Doug Baird, Mr. & Mrs. Jim Baird, Doug Lenhart, Mike Sherman and Cecil Ccx.
j. Legal and professional fees will be segmented on the income statement between legal,
accounting and secretarial costs. Copies of all professional service invoices will be
forwarded to MN and FCS monthly.
~
High1añ~LLC
-
~p~_3~
o -~
MuFpl’iy Fa~sIr~c.
/
//
Date
Date.
/
/
MEMORANDUM
DATE:
January 12, 1998
TO:
Darra, Kay, Stacy, Dee
FROM:
Doug Lenhart
RE:
Highlands Employee getting Farrowing Training
Don Bybee of the Highlands Sow Farm would like to go to Missouri for farrowing
training. He is available to begin at the earliest convenience for the Missouri
Operations. He will be able to stay in Missouri until April 1, 1998.
I would like for him to be set up the same as we did with others as far as providing
housing and a salary of $18,000. We have some Murphy of Missouri Applications for
Employment in our office. I will have Don fill one out and forward it to Dee as soon as
possible.
If anything else needs to be done by us, please contact Jackie.
r
ExhIbit 2
.
L
.1
M 00029
MURPHY
FA)A~LYFARMS
g
Farm Name:
Tota’ Number
Total Nunber
Total Number
Tota1 Ntimber
of
B,Ab4~
of ~*dI~
of
Farro*in~
of Farrowing
Emptoyw
Compe~es
Co*pete~des
Competencies
Compet.nc*s
!M!fl!
____
CrlIf
lid
-
Tra~d
C~t1If~ed
_______
________
________
• _______
________
~
~
1~(1~A
~
T~~Y~nStv~
~
_________
________
1J~
(jbtiis
_________
________
-
r
-
~
~thic~r’
____________
____________
~ P
____________
.&~\1~A)
~d~cJ(-
___________
~
__________
___________
—c~)~ç~-~
~-b~
-
Y2-9
__________
_________
__________
~Wrn tQ
Jnnif~r Ke11~
by
~:OOPM
on Thursday1 February
5.
M~ 13 ‘99 a8:2e~M
F~m
,IaouarY
l9~
_______
Ge~r~
H~~yw1
_____________________________________________
Sa~re~ay
~f
S~a:e
Ceparrniarit ~f
Eu~ines~Ser/ices
______________________
Uri,ited
Uability
Ccm~any
Oivision
Roam~S7,Hcwfelt ~uiJdirig
____________________________
Sprkig1Ie~d,IL 627E6
~aymel1~ muSf
~ari1a~e~y Cartifled
Iieck.
ca~hiet~cned~.l!IIrc~
a~torney’.i
~~!laok.iHittCi3C.~.ASthe~c
~r
money
;rder,
payable to
‘Secrenary ef SIa~a.~
—
1.
Limited
LJabiflty Company Name:
The Highlands, ~
(T71e LL.C
name mi.ie~
occi~inIrte wc~a
(lmzffie ia
ility
company
~r L.L.C.
and ~a~ino(
~iitàn
tt~e~ernisa
ra~iori,Carp.,
~nccrpora~ed.
Inc., If~.,
ac..
I~mi~~d
p ner~t~tp.
or LP.)
2.
Transacting
business
under sri assumed name
~ Yes
~
No.
I? YES.
a Farm LLC’
~.2O
i~required ~ 13e cenipteted and attacited ~e~ta~O
3.
The address, including county~of its principal place of business. (Post office box alone and do are
unacceptable.) .1122 !rtox Eiqhway 18, Williamsfield
LI~x Coux1t~L),
Zilinois
4.
Federal
Employer Identification Number (F.E.1.N.):
~ft~E:ywT:
~bt~i~d
~ —‘~/~_.7P~~
The Articles of
Organization
are
effective en:
(Check
one)
a)
~L the filing date, or b)
another date later than but riot
more
than ~Odays subsequent
•
to the filing date:_~
•
(month. day. year)
6.
The
registered
agent’s
name and registered
office
address
is:
Registered agent:
Pegistered Office:
_____________________________________________________________________
(P.O. Box alone and
ole
are unacceptable)
7.
Purpose or pur~csesfor which the LLC is organized: Include the business code ~(Form 1065)
•
(U
not ~uEt~cI9i1t~
0
C~’~~rthi~
~Cint,~
on~
or
more
~
~f
e,i~sI~a.)
The producti,on and marketing of 1ivestocl~ and agricultural
commodities and the transactieri of any or all
lawful
businesses
for which limited liability companies
r~taybe
organized under
the
Limited Liability Company Act.
Cc~’O~
•~
~)-~O
8.
The
lafes
date the
company
is to dissolve
12—01—2016
-
or
upon the
occurrence
of events of dissolution state
mcrt~t.uy,year)
in Section 35—1(3) of the Act.
~
ether
events of dissolution enumerated on an attachment.
-~c---.~
/
11l111O~S
Limited Liability Company Act
Th~e.7:~p2~eby
~ct!t~r).
~t
5ta&~
• Artfctes
ci
Organization
•
j L
ED
~C
.
04 ~96
4~ :jj~tjg~~a~.
C-IiORGE
H. R~AN
SECR.ETARX OF
~ilino
~ee
uoc.
rr~rir~l7~wi-ai’,rirn!I~
•
/
Must~ay~wr1tten
‘
Thia apace far uaa by
cre~r~~f~
Qate
/)..
- O 4’ - /~
~
As~gned~ie
5
~cpro’ed~~“
PAID
John
J.
Hatte~y
Nai,i~
-
t6~Jq
Jnf,’~aJ
L.a~t
name
•
~
Suite 402, ~i.ll Arcade
•,
NwTtber
—
Sfreee
Sw/a ~
Galesburg
61401
~flo~
2Z~7C4c~e
Exhibit 4
MA~
13 ‘99 ~8~.29AM
P.3
10,
a) Management is vested,
in
whale or fri part, in managers
0 Yes
List
tfleir
names and ~usfr7e.~saddresses
b) Management
is retained, in
whole or in
part, by
the members
List
meir u’~mesand ado’res~s
James
R. Baird
2218 Knox Road lOON
Yates City, IL 61572
Douglas
B. Baird
1124 Knox Highway 5.8
Williamsfield,
IL
(Nama ~/
~2Cc’~cl~#an
or
othef
~
$icngw,~
(Name
if
a corpora
don
or
amer en~iy)
3Jgt~ira
~
(/I~rne1/
~cC,~rjraacr,Oro~,a/
enn~)’)
•
~
—
EYes
ONo
Patricia
A. Baird
2218 Kr~ox Road lOON
Yates City, IL 61572
(Signatures
must
be fri irtk on art
onginal document.
Carbon copy, photocopy or ruCber stamp signatures may only be used
on contormad copies)
LL.C-4
LLC-5..5
9.
Other
provisions
fcr the regulation ot
The
internal affairs
of
the LL.C per Section 5-~(a) (8) included as at~chmertt
Yes
~Nc
65.489
11,
Name(s) & Addrass(e~)al
Organizer(s)
The undersigned
atfimis~
under penalties of
pefuzy,
having a
thorfty
to
sign
hereto,
that
this art~c1esof organization
is
to the
best
of
my knowledge arid belief, true, correct and complete.
Dated
December
3
—
-
96
Sigriat~~reand Name
1.
“4~
/
5Jgriaa~re
J1’ohn
~.
Hattery, Orgaii~.zer
(P/p1p~ntran8~,d~e)
Business Address
2.
3.
Suite 402, Hill Arcade
Niunter
Ga1esbu~g
Sft~et
,
—
Illinois
~‘1~~~wi
.
•
•
61401
-
Sure
~P
CO~9
2.
3.
S(re~r
C/~q7~w,i
$~te
•
-
~pC~dG
NtJm~f
sttg.Jt
clwrow,,
S~a
-
ZpCOda
1. Limited Liability Company niame:
The ~igh1ands~ L. L
~
2. File number assigned
by the Secretary of State:
00093521
3. Federal Employer Identification Number (F.E.l.N.):
4,
The registered agents name arid registered office address is:
Registered agent:
John
~egisteredOffice:
(P.O.
Box alone and
do
are
unacceptable),
__________________________________________________________________________
5. The penalties appl?cable to
where appropr~ale)
a)
S
- Failure to file the annual report and
pay the requisite fee prior to the
first
day af the anniversary
manth.
b)
S
_______
Failure to appoint andma:ritain a registered agent ri lllin~isas required.
C)
$
•
~aiIure
to report
the iedenal
employer
i~anth’icationnumber within 90 days of
the
initial filThg.
Total penalty amount (a through C) is $ -
6.
The
undersigned aflirrns, under penalties ~f perjury, having authority to sign heretc, that this penalty form
is
to the best
of my i~nowIedgeand belief, true, correct and complete.
Dated
-
April
/..?
- 19 97
~
-
B.
•
~aird,
(Typa
or
prrni
Me~ber/Mana~
Name arid Title)
NAY
13 ‘99 ~8:29AM
p0rrnLLC”50a15
January
19~4
G~ar9eH.
Ryan
Secretary of State
Department of Business Services
Limited
Liability
Company
Division
Room
3S7,
Hcwlatt Suiidlrig
Springfield, IL 62756
•
Illinois
Limited Liab~1ityCompany Act
PEN~LTY
- RETURN
TO GOOD STANOING
Submit in Duplicate
MuSt
~etypewntten
Payment must’ be made by
cert(ffeo’
che~k,cashier~s
check, Ill/n0/saftomey’s
check.
Illinois
C.P,A.’s check or money
order,
payable to ‘Secreea,y of State.
P.4
Thie
~~4CG
~
uee
~y
Secretary
~i
Slato
~‘~‘—
.It’
,~c~
~
APR 22 1997
Limited Lieb~lityCo~
Div.
Thiz
space foruga by Sec’ernry of
SIaia
Date
Assigned File ~
Filing Fee
•
$
Approved;
36—4127830
J.
Eattery
Fr~tName
• Middle Initial
Arcade
•
Last Name
Suite 402,
Hill
•
Ni~rnbar
Slreat
5uit~~
Galesburg
61401
Knox
C~ry
--
ZIP
Code
County
return
the
limtted lability company to good standing are as follows: (Check arid complete
(It
a~plicant
is a
company ør
ocrier
eriflty.
state name of
corTParly
aria ndlcata wlieltier it is
a
member
or manager
of die LLC.)
MAY 13 ‘99 O8:3~AM
P.5
L.LC.FileNumber: 00093521
Filing Deadline is ~riortot:
1
2/0 1 /
1 997
This r~p~rtmust
be RECEIVED in
the
office of
the Sacre~
of
State
prior to
the
anniversary
dateto avoid tale tilingperialtiea
eventual
administrative disscluUon at lie
orgeIli2atiOrt.
Fomi
LLC501 (D)
• j~riueryigg~
George H.
Ryan
Secretary of State — State of
llllno4~
~onIeeticLimited UabIIlty
Company
Annua’ Repert
Filing
Pee $300
Must be typewritten
1. LimIted Liability Company name: Registered
Agent,
Registered Office,
City, IL., ZIP
Code
THE HIGHLANDS,
L.L..C.
JOHN
J
HATTER~
HILL
ARCADE STE 402
GALES9URS XL,
611,01—0000
2. CHANCES ONLY:
REGISTERED AGENT
REGISTERED OFFICE
CITY, IL., ZIP CODE, COUNT?
3. Federal Enip(oyer Identification Number:
_____
36—4127830
4. Address of the office at which the records
required
by
SectIon
1.40 are to be kept
is:
r
1122
Knox Highway 18
Number
Street
Suite
Wil1iams~ie1d,
IL
61489
Knox
•
City, State
ZIP
coce
County
5.
Names and addresses of the managers or,
it
none, the members:
Maine
Nwnber & Street
City, Stalt
ZIP COO
Soled
~,t,
James
R. Baird
0j~
Patricia A.
Baird
,...i
Dcu~1asB. Baird
2218
Knox
Road lOON
Williamsfield,
IL 61489
2218 Knox Road lOON
1124 Knox Highway 18
Williamsfield,
IL 61489
Williamsfield, IL 61489
6. The undersigned
affirms,
under penalties of
perjury having authority to
sign thereto,
that this annual report is to the
best of
my knowledge and
belief,
true, correct and
complete.
Payment may be
made by business firm
check payable to Secretary of State. (It
check
is returned for arty reason this filing
will be nullified)
Return tot
Department of BusLnes~
SeMces
Limited
Liability
Company
Division
Roam 359,
HOWIOtt
building
Sprmgfl&d, IL 62756
lit
~p~licantl~a ~oi7,penyor
other enifly, state name 01 ~i11OW1Y
a14
indi~ieeI’ett~erFin a mambo,
or
rnenager ot iite u.C.)
Dated
-~
~
3/
,
19
~4L~
~7~1a,~i
-~
/
‘
(Signetuf~~~
~
/ James
R.
Baird, Member
/
Type
or
pnnt
NSm,
and life)
fl
L
.It~si~
MBR
MBR
LLC~~
MAY
13 ‘99 ~8:31AM
P.5
George
H.
Ryan
Secretary
of State
—
State
of
flulnols
Dume~tlcUmited Liability Company
Artnu&
Report
SEE 8~LOW
Submit Jn
Di~pticztte
Must be
typewritten
1. Limited Liability
Company name:
Reglster~d
Agent,
Registered Office, CIty, IL.,
ZIP
Code
LT~
THE 1~IGHL,ANDS, L.L.~.
JOHN J HATTEP..Y
HILL. ~CADZ STE 402
GALES8URG IL, 61401—0000
2. CHANGES
ONLY:
REGtSTERED AQENT
REGISTERED OFFICE
CITY,
IL., ZIP CODE,
COUNTY
3. Federal Employer ldentlficatiort Number:
4,
Address of the off e at which the records required by Section 1-40 are to be kept is;
36—4127830
FILING FEE
HAS LLC ELECTED TO ~E
GOVERNED 8? 1997
AMENDATORY ACT
FILING
flU
44
FILI1’~G F~E $3~U
PAE~
~CT~g1~g8
Hi
1122
Kt~ox~ighway 18
•
• NUITth~I’
Street
SuitS
Williamefiald, IL
61489
•
•
~floX
C~ly,
Slate
ZIPCCOe
Cou’,ty
5.
Names
and addresses
of the managers or,
i~
none, the members:
7~ijr~e
Mumfar & Str~at
City. Stnla
ZIP COO
SaiOCi
~,1OP1MS~
~‘JatnesR, Baird
2218 Knox Road IOO~
Williamsfield, IL
6L~89
MBR
-
PatrIcia
A.
Baird
2218
Knox Road 1OO~
•
Wililaisfield, IL 61489
MBR
-
~..
~ Dcu~1asB. BaIrd
1124 Knoi
Highway 18
Wi11ia~sfi~1d,IL
51489
MBR
6.. The undersigned affirms, under penalties of perjury, having authority to sign thereto, that this annual report is to the best of
my knowledge
and belief, true,
correct and complete.
Payment may be
made by business fIrm
check payable
to Secretary of State. (If
check is
returned forany reason this filing
will be nullified)
Return to:
Department
of
8usiriess Services
Limited
Liability
Company Division
Room 359, 1-lawleft Building
Sprin~fleld,
1L.
62756
Dated
~
—~c&
,
19
______
17
“~
~~eir~
• James R.
Baird, Member
—
(Type or Orint Name and 1~o)
(ifao~tJcanta
a ~mpeny
or o~df
eutaty, eu. iwne
0? ~II~Pau1y
and indicate wt,ether it a a n,e~n~eror menogeu’ of s~oLLC.I
L.L.C.FileNumber: 00093521
—
Fllirtg Deadline Is! orto:.JA! 01 / 1998
(~iiisreport must b~RECEIVED in
the
offIce of the Secretary I
of
Slate priorto the
anniversary
date tO
avoie
late
fling penalties
I
~~venttrni
administratIve dlsaeiUtisn
of
its organization.
~_j
Form
LLC5O~i(D)
Jartuaryl9M
tJ.C~22
~y- ~
GEM~AL
•
~AX~0,
•
217 ~247740
~HONE:
217/782-9031
~oice)
~
217/5244740 (Fax
#)
•
217/782-1
91
(Fax #)
TotaL aumber
p
s, instud~ngcover s
SUBJE
MS:
__
•
___IfaUpage~~
•ThistUOrney-privilege~and/or
conL~eiitia1in!or~naUonis
intend only for
the
use
of
the
entity
to which ft
is
addr~ed.It
you
ha,e
received th~s
error, please notify
the
gcnd~ret~fletelephone
flUfnber
ebo~e.~ edvosed that the
retention
J~
‘eJ~v ~ ~ 4~~,A7Ieeur*e~
~
i~
s~t*tty
praitiOL~o’.
500
ScUth
Sca’ond
S1t~C4
SpI4n~a14,IUIZIO.S
62’706 (217)
ias~ioco•
~
(5~1)
~
•
~AX~ çc~n1ae-.~7o4e
‘I~A
~Me~
~
Street, c~g~ago,
flhinais 60601 (~
15) 5~4.3OOO
•
‘rDD: (3 t2) 814.3374
•
FAXn (~Z) Sld.3506 ~
Qmc~
o~~
STATE OF
ILLINOIS
GjE
.1P6 1999
Jim
Ryan
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET
TO~
$1P~4~
~
~
c ~
1~AX#:
DATE:
~3~O
-
S
~
.
•.~
FROM:
..-Qfflce
of the Attorney General
Ezivironme~ta1
~h~L
B’~reau
L~~?
SOC
South
Secoi~d
StreeL
Springfield,
IllinoIs
62706
rrJ)
No_
Hard
cop~i
A
aa aoofl as possible.
STATE OF ILLINOIS
)
SS
COUNTY
OF
PEORIA
)
AFFIDAVIT
I, ERIC 0.
ACKERMAN,
after
being
duly sworn
and
upon
oath,
state as follows:
1.
I have firsthand knowledge of the matters stated herein, and could and would
testify competently thereto if called as a witness.
2.
I am employed by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (“Illinois EPA”) as
a field inspector and environmental protection engineer, stationed at the Peoria Regional Office
of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. I have been employed with the Illinois EPA in
this capacity for over twenty years. I am assigned to the Illinois EPA’s agriculture pollution
program and concentrate the vast majority of my time inspecting and evaluating agricultural
facilities.
3.
I am one of the inspectors that has been assigned to and involved in site
investigations and inspections pertinent to allegations of air and water pollution violations at The
Highlands facility, which is the facility that is the subject of the case of
People v. The Highlands,
LLC and Murphy Farms, Inc.,
PCB No.
00-104.
4.
As the environmental protection engineer assigned to the Illinois EPA’s
agriculture program, I am a custodian of the Illinois EPA’s field office file regarding
documentation accumulated pertinent to and regarding The Highlands facility. This file is kept
in the ordinary course of business and it contains copies of all inspection reports generated
regarding the facility, as well as copies of all other documentation of correspondence,
communications, conversations and information generated and obtained by the office regarding
the subject facility.
S
5.
I have received communications and correspondence about Murphy Farms, Inc.
interest and efforts to establish a sow facility in Illinois, since 1996. In 1996, I received
communication from Doug Lenhart, representing himself as Murphy Farm, Inc.’s designated
agent for Illinois, regarding the siting and establishment of asow facility in the vicinity of Peoria,
in an area contained within the Illinois EPA’s Peoria Region.
6.
To my knowledge and belief, based on communications I received from Doug
Lenhart, concerned citizens and David lnskeep, Murphy Farms, Inc., prior to establishing a
relationship and contract with Doug Baird, entered into discussions with David lnskeep to locate
a 3,600 head sow facility at or near the then proposed location of what later became Inwood
Dairy near Elmwood, Illinois. At a point in time, it became apparent that Murphy Farms, Inc.
was no longer considering contracting with David Inskeep, but in factwas working with Doug
Baird in the establishment of a sow facility approximately three miles south of Williamsfield in
Knox County that later did in fact become established as an operating sow facility known as
The Highlands. It is this facility, the facility approximately three miles south of Williamsfield, that
is the subject of the case of
People v. The Highlands, LLC and Murphy Farms, Inc.,
PCB No.
00-104.
7.
Attached to this affidavit, are exhibits that are true and correct copies of
documents contained in the Peoria Regional Office’s file for The Highlands facility.
8.
Exhibit 1, is a true and correct copy of a telephone conversation record that I
wrote regarding a phone conversation I had with Doug Lenhart on July 5, 1996, at 10:15 a.m.
regardingMurphy Farms, Inc.’s intent to establish a 3,600
sow operation in
the vicinity of
Peoria. The purpose of Mr. Lenhart’s call was to discuss the requirements of the Subtitle E,
Agriculture Pollution Related Regulations. In the course ofthe conversation, Mr. Lenhart
indicated he personally had talked to the Illinois Department of Agriculture regarding the
requirements of that department, which included siting requirements pursuant to the Illinois
Livestock Management Facilities Act.
9.
Exhibit 2, is a true and correct copy of a document retained in the Illinois EPA’s
field office’s file on The Highlands facility. It is a handwritten record of a phone conversation
with Doug Lenhart. In that conversation, Mr. Lenhart requested Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency input regarding site selection for The Highlands facility.
10.
Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of a letter sent to A.G. Taylor of the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency by Doug Lenhart, Illinois Development Manager for Murphy
Family Farms. This document is contained within the Illinois EPA Peoria Region field office’s
files, and is kept in this file pursuant to customary business practices in which the office
accumulates copies all documentation relevant to a facility in
its
field file. In this letter, Mr.
Lenhart states that Murphy Family Farms operates pork production facilities in several
Midwestern states, including Illinois. The letter is an invitation to an environmental summit in
which information is to be provided regarding Murphy Family Farms programs utilized at its
operations for environmental protection. Upon information and belief, Murphy Family Farms’
only involvement in hog production in Illinois has been with contract operations. That is, one
entity owned the property and Murphy Farms, Inc. or Murphy Family Farms, which to my
knowledge is essentially the same entity, owned the hogs. Thus, Mr. Lenhart’s representation
in this letter would be with regard to contract operations.
S
11.
Exhibit 4, is a true and correct copy of a document provided by Doug Baird to me
and other employees of the Illinois EPA outlining the design and construction of The Highlands
facility and also outlining the contractual responsibility of The Highlands and Murphy Farms in
the operation of The Highlands facility.
12.
Based on information and belief, Murphy Farms, Inc. participated in the selection
and establishment of waste management systems at The Highlands. Murphy Farms, Inc.
facilitated Doug Baird’s introduction to and exploration of the use of the BION system, and
Doug Lenhart and other Murphy Farms, Inc. personnel were involved in the discussions
pertinent to the establishment and operation of the BION system at the Highlands facility.
Further, upon information and belief, Murphy Farms, Inc. personnel have been involved in the
analysis and design of modifications made to the waste management system at The Highlands
since BION Technologies ended its contract at The Highlands.
13.
Under the penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are
true and correct, except as to matters stated to be on information and belief and as to such
matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily believes the same to be true.
Further affiant sayeth not.
S
S
~
~
ERIC 0. ACKERMAN
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this &
r
day of / ~
,
2004.
NOTARYPUBLIC’
S
OFFICE SEAL
S
JANETTE K. GODIN
NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF ILLINOIS
MY COMM’.~”~
~FS
07-25-2006
STATE OF ILLINOIS
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
DIVISION OF WATER ~LLtTTION CONTROL
PEORIA REGIO~L OFFICE
PEORIA
COUNTY
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION RECORD
RE:
Mur~hv Farms
-
Sow Operation
CONVERSATION WITH: Doug Lenhart (417)667-3397
-(
)
ICalled Party
(X) Party Called Me
DATE:
July 5, 1996
TIME: 10:15 ~.M.
Doug Lenhart contacted the Peoria office to discuss the
Subtitle E requirements. Mr. Lenhart is with Murphy Farms in
Nevada, MO. He will be moving to Illinois to become Director of
Illinois Operations with Murphy Farms.. They intend to construct
a 3,600 sow operation in western Peoria County.. The facility is
locally owned, but under
contractS?~
supplies all pigs,
feed,
medication, etc. The facility proposes to utilize an anaerobic
lagoon with center pivot irrigation unit. The facility
will
£arrow daily with pigs taken off site at 17 days of age. Four
separate off-site nurseries are proposed to take the pigs from 10
lbs. to 45 lbs. These nurseries
will
be within a 30-mile radius
of the site and probably in Knox County. EDS Engineering will be
on site in mid-July. Earthwork to begin in mid-August and first
sows on
site approximately January
1.,
1997. I advised
Mr. Lenhart of the need for a stor~ater construction permit if
greater than 5 acres were disturbed. We also discussed NPDES
requirements and proper lagoon construction.
Mr. Lenhart advised that he had
previously contacted IDOA
regarding the requirements of that department.
~
Signed
a~~)
EOA/lb
S
cc:-DWPC/FOS & RU
______
-Bruce Yurdin/Dan Heacock
-A.G. Taylor
Exhibit 1
~ttN
rLu~J-i
Ff~X
NO
3096935467
mm
Pre
-
~
~
-
/
~2Si~i’~
I
T
i~~
~.k
~
~ —
S
5—.
Thur.tPhv ~
~
S
.
S
./
55~
S
S
I-
—~
—
~
--~
~,
~e
~
~
~/ ~~
0
~4~/
t~C~
S
-i
.
~
/.
7.
—
Z7~ ?‘~
~e/e~,’~y~
/
-~
S
~
~
.7
/Z’~ o~/~ M
,~ ~
S
—
S
~
~
i~d~
.
//
.
.
S
-S—~~
~
~
~J~
*;~
~
~/~i&
~
~c/
~.
~
~
.
O76~OO2
.~
.~S~::::
Exhibit 2
03
V—UV--~i~
ij’~)f~ltDi4
Senterr,b~r
4. 1.997
,.rr
NiA
~1_
~_rC.r~..d
NV
~U~O~ii~4O(
ALA
4.~
MURPHY
F~A
MI ~ Y
F A P
Dear Represen~ve:
AG. Taylor
Lllii,.ois
Exivironmen~lProtection Azency
Fax:
217-7~S-1~lZ
You and thj~e~exub~a o(your agency are invited
to an ~Evfratlment2l
Sn~it”
s
onscired by Murphy Family
Farms. The p~po~eof the meethg is to
shae
information about the p~gramswe use to protect ourccunn~y’s
naturat resources. Murphy Family
F~xm~
operates pork production facilities itt se’/eral
Midwesr~
states,
~inhl~i3~
S
The meeting will be held on Tuesday, Septetnber
16,
at the Crowne
Plaza
in Spt~igfield,XL. We hope you can
join
thts prestigimxs v~aup
The En~’iroutnenra1Stnr~itwes draigned to infárm you about how pro-active Uvestoek proth era and specifically
Murphy Family Farms go to greatlengths to operate r~p~sib1y.Our
rent pragrem5 which are h~pisce
throii~houtthe company and our a -goIng research t~reduce odor. use manure as ferti1~-,and m~iegesc,il
m±ieruswill be covered by featured avea.kees.
The speakers for the mecth~gare technically oriented prof~siona!s,not public rektiorxs pitch men. A rouniltable
discussion is also part of the meeting because
we
value the opportunity to l~nmore about the isroes eottcerning
the people of flflnoi~.
Since lunch will be provided, we will be calling to cnn~rxxiyour a~endanca.If you have any qu tiotte or re~vire
additional information egarding the Envhumneatal Sunaniit, plesse feel free
to
contact rxme
ax
309.344-49~O.
W~
hope you can join us ou September 16 for an interesting and infortuativo scasioxi..
Sincere lv,
tD~ Lerth~
Illinois Development Manager
Murphy Family Farms
Enclosin~e:
256
South
Sonag~taha
I~ad,
Galesburg, IX.., 61401, (309) 344-4W70,
FAX (309) 344.-4973
r u~
1:37
Exhibit 3
NOV—05—99 FRI 12:37
IEP~PORII~
F~XNO. 3096935467
P. 02
THE HIGHLANDS LLC
3600 SOW FARM
OWNED AND OPERATED BY
DOUGLAS B.
AND
JAMES
R BAIRD
CONTP~ACTEDWITH
MURPHY FAMILY FARMS
LAGOON
ca~
~?
~I
~
~11
~
One time
capacity
Specifications
Sows Gestation
Saws not bred
Boars
Saws
Lactating
Replacement
nursery
Replacement finisher
Total
Animal
Units
2900 head
300 bead
20 head
450 h~d
300
head
S00
head
1810
head
I-..
1
~~S:~:.SSS-.
:SSJ
~
1
LAGOON
c~j~
+1
Exhibit 4
NOV—05-99 FRI 12:38
IEP~?EORJ8
F~XNO.
3096935467
P.03
S
Building
Specifications
Gestation
78
X
578
feet
Breeding
76X341.
feet
Farrowing
61 X
597
feet
(8 rooms
-
72 crates each)
Nursery
26 X 66
feet
S
Finisher
53 X
171
feet
S
Office and
Shower room
40 X 40
feet
Garage
12 X
40
feet
These buildings are wood framed, metal
covered
with tunnel ventilation
and curtain
sides.
Labor Force
Annual projected payroll
5380,000
15 Employee Positions:
Sow Farm Manager
Trainer
Breeding Supervisor
Fan-owing
Supervisor
2 Assistant Supervisors
9
Laborers
Entry
level position starts
at
56.50
per hour.
Employee Benefit Programs
Health Insurance
Life
Insurance
Paid
Vacation
7 paid Holidays /
Funeral leave
Profit Share Plan
401K plan
NOV-05-99 FRI l~2:38
F~XNO. 3096935467
Manure
~2.nagement
Buildiiig pits;
1
a
in. deep Pull plug system
Maximum e~1uentlevel 10
inches
Total gallons ofeffluent produced ~er year
Two Stage Lagoon
2,506,775
gal
Capacity
Primary (Cell No. 1)291 X 431 feet 2,9 ac. --11,107,276 gal
(Anaerobic biological breakdown)
Secondary (Cell No. 2) 396 X 396
feet
3.6
ac.
- -
13,613,974 gal
(Water
used
for pit recharge and
Irrigation)
Lagoofl cells are lined
with one
foot.
packed clay liner to
95
compaction, top of berm
covered with
synthetic liner.
S
Illinois law required
core borc
sample 50 feet below the
bottom
of lagoon revealed
solid clay
soil, no
aquifer material and seasonal water table one foot below the bottom oflagoon.
TOP
or 8SPJ.1 EL
=
308.3
FLOOR
EL ~
95.5
#‘
~
EL.
=
105.8
Nutrient Application
Total nutrients produced by
this unit would be just ovr
9,000,000
gallons: Planned low pressure
centerpivot
irrigation with drop
nozzles for large droplet size
-
220
acres needed
to comply with
Livestock Mananement Facilities
Act.
As
new
methods
are developed and
cost effective they
will
be introduced.
I’
IEP~ PE0RIi~
P. 04
CELL
,-~-
~
CORE TRENCH~
NOTE: CLAY LINER & CLAY CORE TRENCH
COMPACICO TO 95
STANOARD PROCTOR
DENS1T~
One acre inch of
water equals
27,500 gal., 220 acres X 1 inch
=
9,1~5,0O0gallons
NOV—05—99
FRI 12:39
JEPA PEORIA
FAX NO. 3096935467
P05
Annual Consumption
S
Water
-
-2
wells
687
-
690 ~et deep
Total usage of
25.000
gal / day
Kilowatt
hot.ffs
electricity
80,000!month
S
960,000
kwiilyear
Propane
gas
42,600 gal
Emergency power
supply
175 kw genset
Corn
144,431 bu.
S
Soybean meal
756 tons
=
37,778 bu.
Real..estate
Taxes
S
Cdunty
S
$ 1,980.00
Coimty Pension
5
418.00
Elba
$
3,696.00
Elba
Township
Pension5
$
110.00
UnIt
School
Dlst
210
$
12,584.00
Unit2IO
Pension
$
528.00
Jr. College Dist
518
.$
1,320.00
Williamsfield Fire
Dept.
$
748.00
MTA
5
154.00
Williamsfield Public
Library
$
374.00
Total
$21,912.00
NOV—08-99 MON 08:41
TEPA PEORIA
FAX NO.
3096935467
P02
The Highlands
is
a contract Sow Farm owned
by Jim
and Doug Baird
contacting with Murphy Family Farms.
The
Highlands will artificially
breed sows using fresh semen brought in daily. Boars will be used for
checking heat. The Highlands will farrow 170 sows per week with the
baby pig being
weaned
at 17 to 21 days weighing approximately 10#. The
baby pigs are then sent to
other
locations in the state of
fflinois to be raised
to
market
weight.
The
cone-actual arrangement between Murphy Family Fains and The
Highlands can
be briefly
described as the following.
S
Jim and Doug Baird
Provides
Land & Buildings
E~ployees
S
Employee Benefits
Responsible
for Manure
Management
Option
to
contract
corn
Non Pig Consumables,
ie. peas, paper, soap, etc.
S
Dead
Animal Disposal
Dead animals and afterbirth will be stored hi a refrigerated’frailer
-
Located
at Baird Seed
Farm,
picked up
regularly
by
National By-Products.
Murphy Family
Farms
Provides
Feed
Breeding Stock
Training
of
~mp1oyees
Transportation
ofPigs
Medication & Veterinary service
Anything that
goes in
or on the
snimal,
le. Syringe,
needles, Marking
sticks,
etc.
The Highlands
manure management plan meets or exceeds
the
flhinois
S
Livestock
Management
Facilities Act. The
Highlands wifl be applying
manure nu~entsat rates
not to
exceed
plant
utilization.
NOV—08-99 NON 08:42
IEPA PEORIA
FAX
NO. 3096935467
P. 03
The
Highlands
A
partial listing of annual nor~pig consumables
Shampoo
Liquid shower soap
Hand cl~aner(orange)
Ear plugs
Spray deodorant
tinderwear:
mens briefs
mens boxers
women’s brie±~
women’s sport
bras
T
-
shIrts
Coveralls
Socks
Bandanas
Sweet shirts
Boots
Boot insoles
Bleach
Laundry soap
Latex gloves
Dish soap
46
bottles
9gal
9gal
541
pairs
47
cans
38
17
4
4
54
60
lOOpaiis
20
14
40
40
.22
gal
1,000 pounds
1,900
pairs
7
bottles
Toilet
paper
Band-aid
Push Brooms
Clothes
pins
Heat lamps
S
Incandescent
60 wt.
Legal pads
S
Mernobooks3X5
Assorted ink pens
Pencils
Paper clips
-
large
-small
Computer paper
Particle mask
Coffee filters
Coffee
Electrical tape
Duct tape
OB lube
Paint
sticks
5lOrolls
2 cases
7
1,235
300 bulbs
122 bulbs
69
37
258
50
450
2 boxes
2 boxes
250
350
30 pounds
85
rolls
7 rolls
95
gal
I ,132
STATE
OF ILLINOIS
)
SS
COUNTY OF SANGAMON
)
AFFIDAVIT
I, BRUCE YURDIN, after being duly sworn and upon oath, state as follows:
1.
I have firsthand knowledge of the matters stated herein, and could and would
testify competently thereto if called as a witness.
2.
I am employed by
the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (“Illinois EPA”) as
the manager of the Watershed Management Section. In this position, I have managerial
responsibilities for the administration of the National Pollution Elimination Discharge System
(“NPDES”) program as it applies to agricultural facilities.
3.
In this capacity, I am at times requested to assist
with
questions pertinent to
watershed pollutional issues. I also receive and respond to inquiries from the regulated
community regarding the NPDES permit program
as.
it pertains to agriculture facilities.
4.
Exhibit
1,
attached to this affidavit, is a true
and correct copy of an email
I wrote in
which
I documented a question that arose in
the course of the Illinois
EPA’s discussions and
communications with Doug
Lenhart of Murphy
Family Farms regarding the waste management
system to be utilized at The Highlands sow facility.
ASS IS
obvious from the subject line of the
email that is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 the sow facility that is the topic of discussion is the
Baird facility, which is also known as The Highlands and is the subject of the case of
People v.
The Highlands, LLC and Murphy Farms, Inc.,
PCB No. 00-104.
5.
Exhibit 2, attached to this affidavit, is a true and correct copy of an email I wrote in
which I documented questions and issues that arose in the course of the Illinois EPA’s
discussions and communications with Doug Lenhart of Murphy Family Farms regarding the
S
waste management system in use at The Highlands sow facility. It documents information
S
1
provided by Doug regarding his interactions with BION personnel regarding the system in place
at The Highlands and information he wished to communicate to me regarding modifications
made and issues that had arose relative to the BION system at The Highlands
facility.
6.
Group Exhibit 3 is a letter I sent to select state agriculture and environmental
agencies seeking information pertinent to BION Technologies, Inc. waste management systems.
The exact nature of the request is set out on the second page of my letter of June 25, 1998.
Also, as set forth in the letter on the second page, upon information and belief, all of the BION
systems involved in my inquiry, that were either under construction or in place and operating at
the time, were installed at facilities affiliated
with Murphy Family Farms. It was my understanding
at the time, in part based on this inquiry, that the BION systems in use across the continental
United States were commonly implemented for and at facilities affiliated with or owned by
Murphy FamiIy~Farms.
S
S
7.
Exhibit 4, attached to this affidavit, is a true and correct copy of an e-mail I
received in my capacity as unit supervisor, written by Dan Heacock, an Illinois EPA engineer that
I supervise within my unit. In the e-mail, Dan Heacock documented a conversation he had with
Doug Lenhart of Murphy Family Farms in July of 1996, in which Mr. Lenhart was seeking
information on stormwater permit requirements. In the course of the conversation, as
documented in the email, Mr. Lenhart indicated Murphy Family Farms was calling regarding a
S
potential swIne operation to be located in Peoria County and he indicated the typical Murphy
Family Farm operation to be a 3600-sow operation.
8.
Under the penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true
and correct, except as to matters stated to be on information and belief and as to such matters
the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily believes the same to be true.
2
Further affiant sayeth not.
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this~~~~’day of
~1~P2
~
2004.
~
NOTARY PUBLIC
~
:~
OFFICIAL SEAL
8
CYNTHIA L. WOLFE
8
NOTARY
pusuc,
STATE OF IWNOIS
:~
MY COMMISSION
~
EXPIRES 3-20-2007
:~
BRUCE YURDIN
3
NOV-29-2004
NON 12:41 PN ENVIRONIIENTAL
FAX
NO. 2175247740
P, 02/17
S
__
~Mox
~
From:
Bruce
Yurdin
To:
AG and FOS Ag
Engineers, Rich i~arrington
S
DatQ:
12/11/97 12:2~pm
subject:
Baird Farm Ready
t~Sprout Pigs -For~arded
AG-
S
r
don’t get the impression that this is
the same waste system ~en±iart ta.lked
to us about
several weeks ago. I don’t reme~iberanything
at
that time about
an aeration
system--solids
separation and a
covered lagoon,
but not aeration.
Did I miss something?
bjy
S
C~/’,y.
-/-1
—
EXHIBIT 1
NOV-29-2004 NON
12:42
PN
ENVIRONNENTAL
FAX NO. 2175247740
P.
03/17
From:
Bruce Yurdin
S
~
S
~
To:
AG Taylor, Eric Ackerman
~/2s/sa
1:55cm
Subject:
~
I spoke to Doug this morning.
He is having trouble getting IDOA’s attention
so a firm date has not been set on the meeting in Henry County.
(In case I
failed to
mention
this yesterday, Eric, the public
meeting was to be in
Atkinson, tentatively.)
Due to ccn~ljcts and the holiday, Doug is leaning
toward the week of
7/13.
He will advise later.
S
S
Doug went on
to
discuss conversations he had yesterday with BIOL’T.
He says he
told them that there is a real
prob.lem at the Highlands and it has to be
fixed.
According- to Doug, Duane Stutzman of BIO~ countered, that:
1. BION is disappointed that the owner
has moved so slowly on in9talling- the
baffle and the last aerator, both in the 3rd cell.
2. EION seems to put high priority in the value of the cuality of the
recycled/flush water that is pum~ed into the pits from
the 3rd cell. Their
statement, through Doug, was that this high 02-low solids water has alot to do
with the operations in cell
#1. BIObT believes this cell is
now overloaded,
apparently due to the poor performance of the
3rd cell
(this is an issue--the
overloadidg of
cel l~1-
-
that
AG and I brought up when we talked to Doug cm
BION will
be at the Highlands on ~/27 and Doug invited us to attend.
1
declined.
Doug also suggested that he may arrange for BION, probably Steve
Pagano--the
BION rep. assigned to this project, to come in for
a meeting with
us
in Spfld.
S
One
Last item: Doug is concerned about
how FOS-Peoria will
react. I
attempted to explain that FOS is in
a
tight spot, they receive the ccmtlaints,
donc have many options, etc, etc. He seems to view FOS as more reactive,
maybe more eager to press an issue (my words, not his)
.
Be advised.
One more last item: The letter to the states asking about
BION goes out
today, pretty much
as
you saw it. I’m thinking that
a separate letter to BIONS
may be useful, however
Doug
said yesterday that he would ask
BION for mere
details en performance criteria.
I may wait until we get to meet with BION,
if that happens (Doug said Spfld, but a meeting at the SitC may be
better--I’ll
ad.vise
you both when that gets
set up)
.
S
bj y
CC:
Dan Heacock, Tim Kiuge
~
—
c:
~
~
~
—
~
EXHIBIT 2
NOV—29—2004 MON 12:42 PM ENVIRONNENTAL
FAX
NO.
2175247740
P. 04/17
June25,
1998
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
2021
North Grand
Avenue East.
P.O.
Box 19276,
Springfield.
Illinois 62794-9276
Mnr~A. Cads, Director
Mr. Robert Schoenecke
Oldahoima Department of Agriculture
2800
North
Lincoln Boulevard
Oklahoma
City, OK 73105
Mr.
Dennis Ramsey
North
Carolina Department of Water Quality
P.O. Box 29535
Raleigh. NC 27626-0535
Mr. Ubbo Agena
Iowa Department of Natural Resources
Nonpoinc Source Pollution
Water Quality Section
Wallace State Office Building
900 East Grand
Des Moines, IA 50319
Mr. David Hoim
Colorado Department of Health
arid Environment
Water Quality Control Division
WGCD-DO-32
4300 Cherry Creek Drive South
Denver, CO 80222
S
S
S
Gentlemen:
Mr. Donald Carison
Kansas Department of Health and Environment
Building 283
Topeka, KS 66620
Mr. Randy
Cla.rkson
S
Missouri Department of Natural Resources
P.O. Box 176
Jefferson City, MO 65102
Mr.
Kiran Bhayani
Utah Division
of Water Quality
P.O. Box 144870
S
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Mr. N. 0. Kaul
S
New
York Department
of Environmental Conservation
Division of Water
50 Wolf Road
S
Albany, NY 12233
The Illinois EPA is currently reviewing the operations of a new swine farm in
the
north~centralpart of this state. This
facility is now operating at 3650 sows, farrow to wean (approximately 14 days old). The owner of the swine operation
plans to expand this facility to approximately 7300 sows. Our interest in this facility in particular is in regard to the
generation of odors. The livestock waste at this facility is treated under a system designed by BION Environmental
Thcbnologies. Inc. (BION).
Ba.sed on information tiled by BION with the Securities and Exchange Commission in their May 1998 quarterly report,
BION cites several examples where their designs are
now under consideration or are
in use. These locationslt’acilities
are:
I.
Mulupie in.staUations
at Circle Four Farm, Phase II. Milford, Utah. for riot less than 10.000 sows,
32.000
nursery
pigs and 40,000 finishing hogs.
2. Three (3) installations in
Kansas tone in Lane
County and two in Hodgeman County), each for not less than 11.000
sews,
JSS:
~
S
‘~55.Sa
~
,.u~
GROUP EXHIBIT 3
NOV—29—2004
MON
12:43
PI’l ENVIRONMENTAL
FAX
NO.
2175247740 .
P. 05/17
3. One (1) installation in Barton County, Missouri for not less
than
75,000 sows.
4. Two to four (2-4) installations in the area of Laverne, Oklahoma for not less than 40,000 finishing hogs.
5. One (1) installation at the Squire sow farm in Bladen County,
North
Carolina for not less than 3600 sows. A
separate demonstration unit is also cited, although the location and size
are
not specified,
6. One (I’) demonsri~adoninstallation in Iowa fOr not less than 3300 finishing hogs.
All of the above
are
facilities affiliated with Murnhy Family Farms. In addition the SEC report also cites an
aereement with Bowman Family farms of Wray,Colorado for 36 treatment units in two unspecified states, arid a unit
near Hermitage, New
York (believed
to be a dairy facility).
S
We are interested in obtaining any information submitted to your office by BION or the
facility
owners/operators
regarding
the basis of design for the facilities in your state. In addition
to
the BION
plans and specifications for the
facilities, please also provide information on the stams or existence of state odor control standards, guidelines or
monitoring to which these systems must adhere, and the existence at’
compliance or enforcement actions taken by your
state
against
these facilities for problems associated with the livestock waste treatment system desigri or odor
generation problems.
Than.k
you for yo~ircooperation.
We
understand that in certain instances the information we have requested may be
desi~iacedas proprietary or confidential by BION. If this is the case, please advise as to how the information may
be obtained in accordance with your rules for this type of proterted data, If you are interested in our compiled
findings, please advise. I can he reached
at
the above phone number, address or by Email ac epal
l77~epa.stace.il.us.
Sincerely,
~~~J(Yurdin
M~anager,Watershed Unit
Permit Section
Di~4sionafWater Pollution Control
cc: EPA, DWPC. FO.S, Peoria
P. 06/17
NOV-29-2004 MON 12:43
PM ENVIRONMENTAL
FAX NO.
2175247740
DEPARTMENT OF E~IRO~1ENTALQUALITY
DtVTSION OF WATER
QUALITY
Michael 0.
L~avitz
C~v~i’nor
Dianne P~.
t4itheii. Ph.D.
£x~.zt8j\..,C)ir~ctor
Don
A. ç~tler.
P.E.
2~3North
1460 West
P.O.
Box
1441370
Salt Lake City. (kah ~4I 1 4.48’70
(501)
535-6
146
(SOt) 535.6016 Fa~
(501)
536-44)4
T.D.D.
ww.dcq.~Lite.ut.u~
Web
July22,
1998
Mr.
Bruce J
Yurdin
Illinois Division of Water PoUution Control
P.O. Box 19276
Springfield,
IL 62794-9276
Dear Mr. Yurdin:
SUBJ’E CT;
BION Technologies Inc.
JUL 2 7
‘1998
ILLINOIS EN
VIRONMENT~~~
pROTECTION
AGENCY
BOw/WPC/~MlTSECTION
BION Technologies Inc. currently has a single system proposed for permitting in
Utah
for a complex
known as Circle Four Farms. It is to
serve
40,000 finishing hogs. ‘It consists of the
usual reactors
associated with BION systems. The general design basis for BION
systems is
confidential.
However,
BION’s
generalcriteria can obtained from thern’under certain conditions.
Neither the proposed permit nor this statecurrently have standards for odorcontrolor the monitoring
ofsuch. An enforcement action was taken against the farm unrelated to BION systems. The most
common problem
occurring at these
farms is accidental disconnection of the wastewater conveyance
piping.
This usually occurs due
to the impact of vehicles with cleanout structures which are
connected to pipelines.
S
If you have any further questions, please contact Mz~.David Rupp of our office.
esign Evaluation Section
DAR:dr
Sincerely,
‘iayani, ~.E., D.E.E., ivlanager
F.’~Ior~o.1&c.NILLnqu~’y
FILE;Ajiu~l
~
Mn~j.~
NOV-29-2004 MON 12:44 PM ENVIRONMENTAL
FAX
NO.
2175247740
P. 07/17
Roy Rorner, Governor
S
STAT.E
‘‘. ‘~ ,
OF
“..‘
~OL~T~ADO
Patti Shwayckr, E*ecucive Director
S
Dedicated
to
pro
cacting
a,id improving the health and environmenc
ot’the
people of Colorado
.
.:
4300
Cherry Creek Dr.
S.
Laboratory
and Radiation Ser4ce~Division
‘~
Denvcr, Colorado 8024~.1
5630
SlOG Lowry
Blvd.
Phone (303) 6~2-20O0
Denver CO SO220.~928
,
- .
..
5
5
Located in Glendatc, Colorado
(303) 692.3090
..—--
S
S , ‘
•~,
~
Deparunent
ht~//cdph~wco
~a
- Q
4/
—
.
~1
~ of~ibhc~~th
July
13, 1998
.
S
Mr. Bruce J. Yurdin
.
Manager, Watershed Unit
Permit Section
Division of Water Pollution Control
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
-
1021 North Grand Avenue East
S
P.O. Box 19276
5
Springfield, Illinois 62794—9276
5
Re: col~rado’s Experience with BION Environmental Technologies,
Inc.
Dear Mr. lurdin:
In reply to your request for information
on Colorado’s experience
with BION
designs,
we have not received a submittal from BIO~’T as
of this time. Your reference to the Bowman Family Farms proposal
is still a proposal.
We have only been provided limited
information on the BION process much like your SEC information.
However based on the limited information available, our
impression of the process is that it is temperature dependent and
as such it would be subject
to reduced efficiency during cold,.
periods~
currently Colorado has no odor control standards for agricultural
facilities because state law specifically exempts these
facilities. However, there is art initiative underway to create
such standards for corporate hog farm facilities. This
initiative’s focus for odors is anaerobic treatment processes and
the need to capture and treat off gases.
should you have any further questions of our program, please
contact me at (303) 692—3561. Also, I would be interested in the
outcome of your BION inquiry.
Sincerely,
Derald Lang, P.E.
P. 08/17
NOV—29—2004 MON 12:44 PM ENVIRONMENTAL
FAX
NO. 2176247740
NOV—29—2004 MON 12:45 PM ENVIRONMENTAL
FAX NO. 2175247740
P. 09/17
ILLINOISENVIRONMENTAL PRoTEcTIoN AGENCY
1021
North
Crnnd Aveiiue East. P.O. Box
19276,
5prin~rfieli1.illinois
62794-926
iry
A. Cad~,Director
S
RECEIVE
JUL01 19S8
June25,
1998
Mr.
Robert Schoenecke
Oklahoma
Department
of Agriculture
2800 North Lincoln Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73105
Mr. Dennis Ramsey
North Carolina Department of Water Quality
P.O. Box 29535
Raleigh, NC 27626-0535
Mr. TJ’bbo Agena
Iowa Department of
Natural
Resources
Nonpoint Source Pollution
Water Quality Section
Wallace State Office Building
900 East Grand
Des
Moines,
IA 50319
Mr. David Hoim
5
Colorado
Department of Health and
Environment
Water Quality Control Division
WGCD-DO-B2
4300 Cherry
Creek
Drive South
Denver, CO 80222
Gentlemen:
WQOD~D1reCtOrSOff.
Mr. Donald Carison
Kansas Department of Health and Environment
Building
283
Topeka, KS 66620
Mr. P.andy Clarkson
Missouri Department of Natural Resources
P.O. Box 176
Jefferson City, MO 65102
Mr. Kiran Bhayani
titali. Division of Water Quality
P.O. Box
144870.
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Mr. N..G. (aW
New York Depa.rrmeru of Environmental Conservation
Division of Water
5 5
50 Wolf Road
Albany, NY 12233
The Illinois EPA is currently reviewing the operations of a new swine farm in the north-central part of this state. This
facility is now operating at 3650 sows. farrow to wean (approximately 14 days old). The owner of the swine operation
pLans to expand this facility to approximately 7300 saws. Our interest in this facility in particular is in regard to the
generation of odors. The livestock waste at this facility is treated under a system designed by BION Environmental
Technologies, Inc. (BION).
Based on information filed by BION with the Securities and Exchange Corrtrnission in their May 1998 quarterly report,
BION cites several examples where
their
designs are now under consideration or are in use. These locations/facilities
are:
1. Multiple installations at Circle Four Farm, Phase II, Milford, titah, for not less than 10.000 sows, 32,000 nursery
pigs and 40,000 finishing hogs.
2. Three (3) installations in Kansas (one in Lane County and two in Hodgeman County), each for not less than 11,000
L
sows.
NOV-29-2004 MON 12:45 PM ENVIRONMENTAL
FAX NO. 2175247740
P. 10/17
3. One (1). installation in Barton County, Missouri for not less than 75,000 saws,
4. Two to four (2-4) installations in the area of Laverne, Oklahoma for not less than 40,000 finishing hogs.
5. One (1) installation at the Squire sow farm in Bladen County, North Carolina for not less than 3600 sows. A
separate demonstration unit is
also cited, although
the
location
and size are not specified.
6. One (1) demonstration installation in Iowa for not less than 3300 finishing hogs.
All of the above are facilities affiliated with Murphy Family Farms. In addition the SEC report also cites an
agreement with Bowman Family farms of Wray, Colorado for 36 treatment units
itt
two unspecified states, and a unit
near Hermitage, New York (believed to be a dairy facility).
We are interested lit obtaining any information submitted to your office by BION or the facility ownersloperatcrs
regarding the basis of design
for the facilities
in your state. In additiod to the BION plans and specifications for the
facilities, please also provide information on the
status
or existence of state odor control standards, guidelines
or
monitoring to which
these systems must
adhere, and the existence of compliance or enforcementactions taken by your
state against these facilities for problems associated
with the livestock
waste treatment system design
or odor
generation problems.
Thank you for your cooperation. We understand that in certain instances the information we have requested may be
desi~’iatedas proprietary or confidential by BJON. If this is the case, please advise as to how the information may
be obtained in accordance with your rules for this type of protected data. If you arc
interested in our compiled
findings, please advise. I caiI
be
reached at the above phone number, address or
by
Email at epall77@epa.state.il.us.
Sincerely,
~din
a.nager, Watershed Unit
Permit Section
Division of Water Pollution Control
cc: IEPA, DWPC, FOS, Peoria
NOV—29—2004 MON 12:46 PM ENVIRONMENTAL
FAX NO. 2175247740
P. 11/17
rA~c~
O~.~f!S~oURr’
Mel C:cn~,~n,(~vern.)r
.
.~c~ph~n~I. ~‘.I.~h(~od,Dir:oer
D~EP~TMENTOF NATURAL RESOURCES
__________
‘5,
~
S
_______
____________
• ~
S
DIVISION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
4
S./4~”•SS.S~
~S1
.
I
-.,_L~
‘~‘~
...Z•
P0 Box 176 JcEet~onCity MO 65102 Ol’G
S
JUL29i3S8
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
July 24, 1998
PROTECTION
AGENCY
B0W/WPC/PEI~M1TSECTION
Bruce J.Yurdm
Manager, Watershed Unit.
Division of Water Pollution Corurol
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
1021 North Grand Avenue
East
P.O. Box 19276
5
Sprin~eld,LL
62794-9276
-
RE: Inquiry about Murphy Farms
Use of BION
Technology
S
Dear Mr. Yurdin:
S
Please find enclosed
information that was submitted
to
Missouri Deparmienr
of
Natural Resources, Water
Pollution Control
Program
by BION. Our interpretation of the data is that
the system is basically a surface
aerated lagoon
using Aeradon Indusnies aerator (page enclosed).
We
have
not seen a
formal
application for the
system. The Murphy Famis have several permitting
issues
that must be resolved before approval of arty treatment system.
S
The state of Missouri does
not
currently have odor regulations.
There
is a workgroup that has been formed
to
investigate agriculture odor regulations.
You may contact
the A.ir Pollution Conrrol Program at (573)
751-4817 for
additional information on odor issues.
You
may contact me at (573) 751-6568 if
you
have additional
questions.
Sincerely,
WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL
PRO
GRAM
Troy Chockley, P.E.
Agricultural Unit Chief
TC:lsm
Enclosures
NQV—2~-2OO4
NON 12:46 PN ENV1RONflENT~L
FAX NO, 2175247740
P. 12/17
BION
TECHNOLOGIES
INC.
TYPICAL BION NMSTM
SYSTEM
PREPARED BY:
BION TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
•619-.C SOUTH
THIRD STREET
SMITHFIELD, NC
27577
(919) 934-3066
NUV-29—2004 NON 12:47
P~
ENVIRONHENTAL
FAX ~
~
J75247740
P.5 13/17
S
COMPANY BACKGROUND
S
Bioti
Technologies, Inc.,
is
acornpany uniquely
qualified
tO
deal
profit bt~iiththe growing
public concern
and awareness
of ow-
environment.
This concern has become a
major cost factor
of
business in
the 1990’s due to intense regulatory pressure on the business community to adopt
more efficient
pollution control
sys~erits.
While
conventional solutions are expensive
and
frequently ineffective, Bions patented and proprietary systems solve a b~oadrange of
disposal
S
problems
efficiently
and
at greatly
reduced costs. In marty
cases, they also improve
the
profitability
of
the
user.
Bion systems rely
on natura.l, biological
processes and do
not
require
the expensive structures of alternative waste treatment technologies.
They also
create
self-
contained natural habitats
and
significantly reduce odor.
Bion
has offices in North Carolina,
Colorado, New York and Florida. Bion Technologies,
Inc. represents a unique
opportunity
as a company committed to providing ecological benefits
to its clients
and
long-term economic returns to
its
shareholders.
,
B1ON NMS
SYSTEM
The Elan NMS~syst~mis a patented
process developed by Bion
Technologies, Inc. CBion)
that treats
both
the solid and liquid fraction of the
manure wastestrearn through a
complex series
of natural microbial processes. The system
typically consists of
Solids Ecoreactors.
Bioreactors,
Temporary
Water Storage Areas
and Polishing Ecoreactors.
The
Solids Ecoreactors are
designed to capture
and dewater waste
solids whIch the.n undergo a biological conversion into
an organic soil-Like material.
The
Bioreactors are designed to be high intensity microbial action
zones that contain aerobic, anaerobic,
and facult,acive bacterial populations. They are designed
to biologically assimilate nutrients as well as reduce Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD)
suspended solids
arid odor.
Water
Storage
Areas are
designed to
meet all local regulatory
requirements and to provide final treatment prior to application onto a. new or established
spray-field
crop. The Polishing Ecoreactor
is a
wetland type
component of
the
system designed
to further remove nutrient by mean.~of a vegetative-microbial complex, capable of producing
final water quality that is suitable for reuse on the farm. The end-product water from the
system
can be treated to any desired standard level.
Solids are periodically harvested from the Solids Ecoreactor, processed, and subsequently
removed from the fat-rn site. The processed material, BionSoilTM, will be sold by Bion as a
commercial product. Utilization studies conducted on processed
BionSoil
have indicated great
potential as a plant growth
media
or soil amendment product, as well as other potential uses
which are currently being investigated.
BioriSoil has a ready market in home gardens.
landscaping. potting soils, organic farms, soil remediation, golf courses, nurseries, sod farms,
groves, field crops, and many other applications. Biori is committed to successfully marketing
BionScil as a renewable resource for the horticulture and agriculture industries.
NOV—29—2004 NON 12:47 PN ENVIRONNENT~L
FAX NO. 2175247740
P. 14/
TYPICAL HOG SOW, NURSERY, OR FINISHING BION SYSTEM
Bian has developed a Bion Nutrient
Management System~application specifically designed
for typical hog sow, nursery, andlor finishing farm facilities. A typical Bion waste
management
process flow diagram is
presented in
Figure HE-i. The process
flow
diagram illustrates
the
prirnazy features associated with
the
Elan
treatment system and
its potential coordination with
a
typical
existing
waste management system. The Bion NMS treatment
system is
designed
to
funtion with minimal operational
and maintenance
involvement of farm personnel. Where
ever
possible, the waste stream flows through the process
by
gravity. The entire system
is located
as close to the hog
houses
as possible to facilitate efficient waste collection and treatment, and
S
is
designed
to contain wastewater as well as divert clean stormwater from entering the system.
The treatment
process
begins when the
hog
house wastes are
flushed
to an initial bioreactor
(Bioreactor #1). Bioreactor #1 is an aerated earthen basin, which may be lined
with
a
geomembrane synthetic liner, if required. The initial bioreactor has a short retention period and
is designed to stimulate mIcrobial growth. The microbes, in
Bioreactor
#1, begin
to
quickly
assimilate
the1
nuitrients available from
the waste products. The
microbes
will utilize low
molecular weight compounds first. The low molecular weight compounds are typically the
unfavorable odor causing compounds often associated with hog farming. The effluent from
Bioreactor #1 gravity flows or is pumped into one of two Solids Ecoreactor cells.
The Solids Ecoreactor is comprised of two deep earthen cells, each of which has been sized
to contain waste manure generated from the hogs for a period of four to twelve months.
The
cells operate in
parallel
such that as one cell
is
filling the other filled cell is left to cure and dry
prior to harvesting. The Solids Ecoreactor cells are designed to capture and dewater waste
solids. The nutrients in
the waste
solids
undergo
a biological conversion utilizing the natural
microorganisms which are stimulated in
Bioreactor #1.
The resulting solids are
organic material
which can be used as a plant growth media or soil conditioner.
As with the bioreactors, the Solids Ecoreactorcells may be synthetically lined, if necessary.
L
The SoLids Ecoreactor is sloped to a flow control sump at the effluent end of the cell. The flow
control sump at the outlet of the cell is designed to maintain a
flow
of water over flow control
boards while retaining
the solids
in the Ecoreactor. Flow control boards are
periodically added
until the Solids Ecoreactor
is filled to.
its maximum
capacity.
The solids are harvested front
one of
the Solids Ecoreactor cells at least once every four to
twelve months. eased on previous operating experience, Bion estimates approximately
0.75
cubic
yard
per one finishing hog house occupancy
space,
per year. The solids may be pumped
from
the Solids
Ecoreactor and processed, to be subsequently transported off the facility. The
solids may also be utilized on the
farm,
depending on the specific requirements of each
individual
client.
The effluent from the Solids Ecoreactor
cell gravity flows or is pumped into a second stage
bioreactor (Bioreactor #2). Bioreactor ~2 is also
an aerated earthen basin and
may also
be
NUV—~9—2004NON 12:48
Pfl
ENVIRONIjENTAL
FAX NO 2
175247740
P. 15/17
synthetically
lined,
ifnecessa.ry.
The second stage bioreactor has been
designed to further the
treatment process by stimulating
additional microbial growth. Bioreactor #2 has a
longer
retention period than Bioreactor #1
and, as such allows the microbes
to
further assimilate the
nutrients in the waste stream. Water in
Bioreactor
#2
is
recycled back to the hog
houses
for
flushing
or
recharging
the subslat pit. Depending upon
required
agronomic land application
rates,
excess water from Bioreactor #2
can be further treated in a third stage bioreactor
(Bioreactor #3) or
can be directed to a final
Water Storage
Area.
S
Bioreactor #3 is an aerated earthen basin
and
may also be synthetically lined if
necessary.
The bioreactor
further treats
the
waste stream through a long retention period and ectensive
additional microbial
nutrient utilization. Excess water from Bioreactor
#3 gravity flows or is
pumped
to a
final
Water Storage Area
which is used
to
provide an
adequate temporary storage
volume and
polish the
waste stream prior to final irrigation on the sprayfields.
If minimizing fresh
water
usage andior minimizing
sprayfield irrigation is desirable, Bion
will design a Polishing Ecoreactor to complete the treatment process. The Polishing Ecoreactor
is a constructed wetland type of treatment component, which is extremely effective for the low
nutrient containing water typically
created in a Bion. NMS. The Polishing Ecoreactor is a
flooded,
vegetated area in which nutrients will
be removed from the waste
stream by means
of
a vegetative—~tiicrobialcomplex. The
Polishing
Ecoreactot consists of a series of cells
separated
by
small internal berms
with flow control structures to regniate water levels. A
portion of the
Polishing Ecoreactor may be
used to produce nutrient rich plants andlor organic soil. The
Polishing Ecoreactor has the appe.arance
of a
native wetland, which provides
wetland habitat for
wildlife,
and in general, presents an attractive environmental image.
S
Bion Technologies, Inc.
~
N~lJ.l~ic~luRo.d5~Li~
&
(mb~iOUY
flu..... ~
~
I..., ..aI
-
FLog
F’arut
l.~uJIflL~ui
Solids E
acitU l)usig~
TypicaL BiutSoil
NMS~M
System
P)uce,ss
Fluw
Diagr~ini
Date:
)Jl)i97
~rjJ~,ID: C:/I1IONS
V~(l
IL—
l.D.SF
I
I
---
-
i------
uHF
NQV-29-2004 NON 12:49 P11 ENVIRONNE~fl’AL
FAX NO. 2175247740
P. 17/17
aeration industries, inc.
I-Iaze1t~neGates
•
Chaska, Minnesota 553 iS
1—800—328—8287
(612) 448—6789
A1RE-02 AERATOR
OPERATI ON,
TROUBLESHOOTING
AND
INSTALLATION
MANUAL
2,3~.5&
7.5HP
AIRE-02
•1 ~
~
::~
EXHIBIT 4
——
NOV—29—2004
NON
1203PM ENVIROUMEftFAL
FAX t~O 21752477~
P 02/02
•
From:
Dan Heacock
-
S
-
-
.
-
To
EPAI177, A~t’~olE~O~O1~
REGDO1 PEOPoL EPA1
Date:
7/8/96 12:14cm
-
.
-S
.
-.
--
-
-,
-‘S
-,
.
Subject:
Murphy Family Farms
-
~‘eor:a Co.
-.
-
.
i -received a cal. from Doug Lenhar: of ~urphy Family Farms re~garding a
-
-
-.
S
potential swine contract operation
in
eoria Co. south of Elmwood. Doug
Lenhart. indicated the following: The ty~ical
Mu~phy Family farm operation
consists cf a 3600 Sow operation and/c: a seperate nursery operation with
buildings each housing 2300 pigs from
L7 days old to 40
lbs. each. The pigs.
are to be shipped cut of state after they reach ~0 lbs. They ~iill be applying
for a stormwater
~PDES
permit for the scw operation which will disturb
S
approximately 10
acres.
The facil~cy (b~ildings~ lagoons,
etc.) will be o~ed.
by an individual operator, who raises Murchys
hogs.
Doug Len.harz indicated
chat he could ~end in an application.
for
the
1~vestockN?DES
termic, although
he stated the facility would
be designed with a
1~lagoonhI and laud application
without a discharge to
waters
of
the
state.
I stated
chat,
if he sent plans and
an application for our review, and the review confirmed the “no discharge
plan
for the facility the Agency would :rcbably issue a no permit ~e~Lired
-
letter.
Mr. Lenhart had previously discussed with Eric ~ckerr~’an
the
~ropoaed
facility. Mr. Lenharc will be calling r.e to provide the
name
and
address of
-the operator to send
the. scarmwater aç~iicationsto.
-
DLH
Page 2 of26
w~•,*
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL
22595989
(W.D.Ky.),
58
ERC 1076
(Cite
as: 299
F.Supp.2d
693,
2003 WL 22595989
(W.D.Ky.))
Page 1
C
United States District Court,
W.D.
Kentucky,
Owensboro Division.
SIERRA CLUB, iNC., Mary B.
Edwards,
Norma
Caine, and
Leesa Webster, Plaintiffs,
v.
TYSON FOODS, iNC., Tyson Children
Partnership, Adams
Chicken Farms,
Stirman
Adams, Buchanan Livestock, Buchanan Farms,’ and
Roland Buchanan, Defendants.
-
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:O2CV-73-M.
Nov. 7,
2003.
Background:
Owners of
land located near chicken
production
farms,
together with environmental
group,
brought action against
farm owners
-
and
operators, alleging failure to report releases of
ammonia from chicken droppings in violation of the
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA) and the
Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know Act
(EPCRA).
Cross-motions for summary
judgment were filed.
Holdings: The
District Court, McKinley,
J., held
that:
-
(1) owners and environmental group had standing
to
bring action;
(2)
farms were not exempt from reporting
requirements of CERCLA and EPCRA;
(3) the whole farm site, rather than each poultry
house, was a “facility”;
(4) under CERCLA, wholly owned subsidiary of
food production company was a “person in charge”
of
two chicken production facilities under contract
with growers; and
(5)
partnership that leased chicken production
facility to chicken production farm was not “person
in qharge.”
Motions granted in part and denied in part.
-
West Headnotes
1
Federal Civil Procedure ?~103.2
170Akl03.2
Most Cited Cases
Standing is a core component of the case or
controversy requirement of Article
III
of the United
States Constitution.
U.S.C.A. Const.
Art. 3, § 2, cl.
2 Federal Civil Procedure ?~103.2
l7OAkl 03.2
Most Cited Cases
The standing doctrine under Article III
of the
United
States Constitution is designed to confme
the courts to adjudicating actual cases and
controversies
by ensuring
that
the plaintiff has
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy
as to warrant his invocation of federal
court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the
court’s remedial powers on his behalf.
U.S.C.A.
Const.
Art. 3, § 2, cI. 1.
3 Federal Civil Procedure ?103.2
l70Ak103.2 Most Cited Cases
The injury in fact test to establish standing
under
Article III of the United States’ Constitution requires
more than an injury to a
cognizable interest;
jt
requires that the party seeking review
be himself
among the injured. U.S.C.A. Const.
Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1
4
Associations
?~‘20(1)
4lk20(l) Most Cited Cases
- An organization has standing under Article III of
the United States Constitution to
bring
suit
on
behalf of its members when: (1) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right;
(2) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane
to
the organization’s purpose; and
(3) neither the- claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
5 Federal Civil Procedure ?~‘103.2
l70Akl03.2 Most Cited Cases
The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the
burden of establishing that it has standing to pursue
the action. U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 3,
§ 2, cl. 1.
6 Environmental Law ?‘656
l49Ek656 Most Cited Cases
Allegations by owners of land located near chicken
production farms that
ammonia emitted
by chicken
Copr. ©
2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
Exhibit A
.5
http://print.westlaw. comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
299 F.Supp.2d 693
‘ -
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.),
58
ERC 1076
(Cite
as: 299
F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 3 of26
Page 2
droppings
curtailed
their activities and forced them
to cancel outdoor events, and that failure of farm
operators to report ammonia releases denied them
access to critical information and
impaired
ability of
government
agencies to respond to releases, were
sufficient to state injury in fact, as required to
establish standing to sue farm operators under the
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the
Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know Act
(EPCRA).
U.S.C.A.
Const.
Art. 3, § 2,
cl. 1; Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act
of
1980,
§ 101, 42
U.S.C.A.
§
9601; Emergency Planning and
Community
Right-To-Know Act of 1986,
§ 301, 42
U.S.C.A. §
11001.
7
Federal Civil Procedure ?Z~103.2
l70Akl03.2 Most Cited Cases
Injury required by Article III may exist solely by
virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion
of which creates
standing.
U.S.C.A. Const.
Art. 3, §
2, cl. 1.
8 Environmen~a1Law?~656
149Ek65’6 Most Cited Cases
Owners of land located near chicken production
farms, alleging that farm operators failed to report-
dangerous levels of ammonia emitted from chicken
droppings, did not, in order to establish standing to
sue operators under the Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation
and
Liability
Act (CERCLA) and the Emergency
Planning
and Community Right to Know Act
(EPCRA),
have to prove that
a
reportable
quantity
of ammonia to trigger the
reporting requirements
was
released; owners presented evidence
that
-
poultry
houses emitted ammonia and that studies
existed estimating amount of
ammonia
a poultry
house emits over a specific -time
-
period.
-
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
§ 101, 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601; Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986,
§ 301, 42
U.S.C.A. § 11001.
9
Environmental Law ?~656
l49Ek656 Most Cited Cases
Alleged failure by
operators of chicken production
farms to give notice of ammonia released from
chicken droppings caused alleged injury to nearby
landowners,
as
required for landowners to establish
standing under Article III of the United States
Constitution
to sue operators
under Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Emergency
Planning and Community
Right to Know Act
(EPCRA); absent notice of releases, government
agencies could, not mitigate them
and
protect
landowners from potential exposure. U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 3,
§ 2, cl. 1; Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act,
of
1980, § 101, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601;
Emergency
Planning
and
Community
Right-To-Know Act of 1986, § 301, 42
U.S.C.A. §
11001.
10 Federal Civil Procedure ?~103.3
l7OAkl 03.3
Most Cited Cases
The redressability requirement for establishing
- standing under Article III
of the United States
Constitution ensures that a plaintiff personally
would benefit in a tangible way from the court’s
intervention.
U.S.C.A. Const.
Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
11 Injunction ?~‘114(2)
2l2k1 14(2) Most Cited Cases
A plaintiff seeking injunctive
relief- demonstrates
redressability, as required to establish standing
under Article III of the United States Constitution,
by alleging a continuing violation or the imminence
of a future violation of the statute at issue.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cI. 1.
12 Environmental Law ?~‘656
l49Ek656 Most Cited Cases
A decision favorable to owners of land near
chicken, production farm that emitted ammonia from
chicken droppings, in their action seeking injunctive
relief against farm operators under Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability - Act (CERCLA) and the Emergency
-
-
Planning and
Community Right to Know Act
(EPCRA), would, jedress owner’s injuries, as
required to establish standing; favorable decision
would require farm operators to provide notice that
a specific episodic release of ammonia had occurred
or that specific continuous releases would occur in
the
future,
allowing
landowners
to
take
precautionary steps to protect themselves from
releases and allowing governmental agencies to
respond. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of.1980, § 101, 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601; Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986, § 301, 42
U.S.C.A. § 11001.
13 Environmental Law ?~415
l49Ek4l5 Most Cited Cases
Copr.
© 2004 West. No Claim to
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 4 of26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
131
Environmental Law ?‘441
149Ek441 Most Cited Cases
Chicken production farms which released ammonia
from chicken droppings were not exempt from
reporting
requirements
of
Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) and Emergency Planning
and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA),
despite fact that there was no generally accepted
methodology or model for estimating the amount of
ammonia chicken production facilities emit.
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
§ 101, 42
U.S.C.A.
§
9601; Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986,
§ 301, 42
U.S.C.A.
§
11001.
-
141
Environmental Law ?460
149Ek460 Most Cited Cases
-
Fact that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
had not enforced reporting requirements of
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) or
Emergency Plai~ining and
Community Right to -
Know Act (EPCRA) against animal production
facilities did not prohibit citizen enforcement suit
against chicken production farm operators for
violation of such requirements. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980,
§
101, 42 U.S.C.A.
§
9601;
Emergency
Planning
and
Community
Right-To-Know Act of 1986,
§
301, 42 U.S.C.A.
§
11001.
15 Environmental Law ?~‘415
l49Ek4l5 Most Cited Cases
151
Environmental Law ?~441
l49Ek441 Most Cited Cases
Fact that government had knowledge of ammonia
emissions from
chicken production farm did not
automatically exempt farm operators from reporting
requirements under Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) and Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA); notice of
specific releases was required. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980,
§
103(a), 42 U.S.C.A.
§
9603(a); Emergency Planning and ‘Community
Right-To-Know Act of 1986,
§ 304(3)(a), 42
U.S.C.A.
§ 11004(3)(a).
161
Environmental Law ?~415
l49Ek4l5 Most Cited Cases
16 Environmental Law ?‘441
149Ek44l Most Cited Cases
Actual or constructive knowledge of a release of a
reportable quantity of a hazardous substance, rather
than mere knowledge that some release occurred,
creates a duty to report under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) and Emergency Planning
and
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA).
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
§
103(a),
42 U.S.C.A.
§
9603(a); Emergency Planning and
Community
Right-To-Know Act of 1986,
§
301, 42
U.S.C.A.
§
11001.
17 Environmental Law ?~415
149Ek415 Most Cited Cases
171 Environmental
Law ?‘441
149Ek44l Most Cited Cases
Where chicken production farms which released
ammonia
from
chicken droppings consisted of
several poultry houses on a contiguous site, the
whole farm site, rather than each poultry house, was
the regulated “facility” for
purposes
of reporting
requirements under Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) and Emergency Planning and
Community Right
to
-
Know
Act (EPCRA); all
poultry houses at a site were operated together for a
singular
purpose. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
§
101(9),’ 42 U.S.C.A. §
9601(9); Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of
1986,
§
301,42 U.S.C.A.
§ 11001.
18 Environmental Law ?~415
l49Ek4l5 Most Cited Cases
18 Environmental Law ?~441
l49Ek441 Most Cited Cases
-
-
In instances where a hazardous substance or
contamination is
confined to an individual building
or structure, the “facility,” for purposes of reporting
requirements under Comprehensive Environmental
Response,
Compensation
and
Liability
Act
(CERCLA) and Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA), is
properly limited to this unit; however, when
-
multiple sources of hazardous substances are
grouped together, the “facility” encompasses the
entire area
and extends
to the bounds of the
contamination.
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
Page 3
http://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataidB005
580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite
as: 299
F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page
5
of26
Page 4
§
101, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9601; Emergency Planning
and Community Right-To-Know
Act of 1986, §
301, 42 U.S.C.A.
§
11001.
19 Environmental Law ?~415
149Ek4l5 Most Cited Cases
191 Environmental Law ?~441
149Ek44l Most Cited Cases
Release
of ammonia from chicken production
farms was not a continuous release subject to
reduced
reporting
requirements
under
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and
exempt from
Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know Act (EPCRA) requirements; person
in charge of farm operations had not notified any
agency of any releases, or established that releases
were continuous rather than episodic.
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980, § 103, 42
U.S.C.A.
§
9603;, 40 C.F.R.
§
302.8(e); Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of
1986,
§
301,42 T.~r.S.C.A.
§
11001.
20 Environmental Law ?‘415
149Ek4l5 Most Cited Cases
Chicken production farms which released ammonia
from chicken droppings were not exempt from
reporting requirements of Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Kiiow Act (EPCRA) as
“routine agricultural operations”; exemption applied
only to substances stored or used by the agricultural
user, and alleged reporting violation was based on
venting of gaseous ammonia into the atmosphere,
not storage of chicken manure or application of
chicken manure to farm fields. Emergency
Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act of
1986,
§
311, 42U.S.C.A.
§ 11021.
-
21 Environmental Law ?~415
149Ek4l5 Most Cited Cases
21 Environmental Law ?~441
l49Ek44l Most Cited Cases
Chicken production farms
which released ammonia
-from chicken droppings were not exempt from
reporting requirements of Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) and Emergency Planning
and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) as the
normal application of fertilizer; challenged release’
was venting
of gaseous ammonia into the
atmosphere from the chicken houses, not from
storage of chicken manure or the application of
chicken manure to farm fields. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980,
§
101, 42 U.S.C.A.
§
9601;
Emergency Planning and Community
Right-To-Know Act of 1986,
§ 301, 42~U.S.C.A.§
11001.
22 Environmental
Law ?~441
149Ek44l Most Cited Cases
The
owner or operator of a facility is not always a
“person in charge” for purposes of reporting
requirements under Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA); proper inquiry is whether
owner/operator occupies positions of responsibility
and power, and whether they are
in a position to
make timely discovery of a release, direct the
activities that result in the pollution, and have the
capacity to prevent and abate the environmental
damage.
Comprehensive- Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
§ 103, 42
U.S.C.A.
§
9603.
23 Environmental
Law ?~441
l49Ek44l Most Cited Cases
Wholly owned subsidiary of food production
company was a “person in charge” of a
chicken
production facility which released ammonia from
chicken droppings, for purposes of reporting
requirements under Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA),
where subsidiary
leased facility,
subsidiary
employees
performed
all
duties
necessary to raise chickens
there, and subsidiary
clearly occupied a position of responsibility and
power and was
in ‘a-- -position to make timely
discovery of ammonia releases. Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation
and
Liability Act of 1980,
§
103, 42 U.S.C.A.
§
9603.
24 Environmental Law ?~441
l49Ek441 Most Cited Cases
Wholly
owned subsidiary of food production
company was a “person in charge” of
two chicken
production facilities for which
it had contracts with
chicken growers, for purposes of reporting alleged
ammonia
releases
-
from
facilities
under
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
and
Liability Act (CERCLA), though subsidiary merely
provided
chicks,
feed,
veterinary
services,
medication, and technical advice to growers;
Copr. ©
2004
West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw.com1delivery.html?dest=~tp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 6 of26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 5
subsidiary had its,
own
technical advisors who
monitored facilities on weekly basis, subsidiary was
involved
in facility design and equipment
specifications, directed growers how to build and
orient chicken houses, how to heat,
cool, and
ventilate buildings, and how to illuminate houses to
ensure optimum chicken growth. Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation
and
Liability Act of 1980, §
103,
42
U.S.C.A.
§
9603.
25 Environmental Law ?~415
-
149Ek4l5 Most Cited Cases
Wholly owned subsidiary of food production
company was an “operator” of chicken production
farms which released ammonia from chicken
droppings, for purposes of reporting requirements
under Emergency Planning and Community Right
to Know Act (EPCRA); subsidiary managed and
directed many
of the operations related to the
venting of ammonia. Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986, § 304(a),
42 U.S.C.A. §
11004(a).
261
Environmental Law ?~415
l49Ek4l5 Most Cited Cases
For purposes of reporting requirements under
Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know
Act
(EPCRA), an “operator” is someone who
directs the workings of, manages, or conducts the
affairs of a facility. Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986, § 304(a),
42U.S.C.A. § 11004(a).
27 Environmental
Law ?~441
149Ek441 Most Cited Cases
Partnership that
-
leased chicken production facility
to chicken production farm was not “person in
charge”
of facility, as required for partnership to be
liable for alleged failure to report ammonia releases
from
farm in
violation
of Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation
and
Liability Act (CERCLA); partnership was not
involved in daily production operations and was not
in a position to detect, prevent and abate a release
of
hazardous
substances.
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation
and
Liability Act of 1980,
§
103, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9603.
28 Environmental Law ?~415
-
149Ek415 Most Cited Cases
Partnership that leased chicken production facility
to chicken production farm was not an “owner” or
“operator” of facility, as required for
partnership to
be liable for alleged failure to report
ammonia
releases from farm in violation of Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act
(EPCRA); there was
no evidence that partnership
managed, directed, or conducted activities of
facility related to pollution. Emergency Planning
and
Commumty Right-To-Know
Act of 1986,
§
304(a), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 11004(a).
*698
Aaron Isherwood, Barclay Rogers, Patrick
Gallagher, San Francisco, CA, John Harbison,
Ronald Shems, Shems
Dunkiel &
Kassel,
Burlington, VT, Phillip J. Shepherd, Frankfort, KY,
for Plaintiffs.
*699
James Wendell Taylor, Lexington, KY,
Judith A. Villines,
Frankfort, KY, Laura D. Keller,
Louisville, KY, Stites & Harbison, Flem Gordon,
Gordon & Gordon, P.S.C., Madisonville, KY, for
Defendants.
IVEMORANDTJM
OPINION
AND ORDER
McKINLEY, District
Judge.
‘~‘1
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the
First and Second Causes of Action DN 44; on a
motion by Defendants for summary
judgment on the
CERCLA and EPCRA issues DN 49; on a motion
by Defendants, Tyson Food on its behalf and on
behalf of Tyson Chicken for partial summary
judgment on the issue of “person in charge” DN
50;
on a motion by Defendant, Tyson Children
Partnership, for partial summary judgment on the’
issue of “person in charge” DN 48; on a
motion
by Plaintiff to stay consideration of Tyson Food’s
motion for partial summary judgment on the issue
of “person in charge” DN 61. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants have
failed to report ammonia
emissions from
certain chicken production
operations in Kentucky in violation of the
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42
U.S.C.
§~960
1-9675,
and the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”), 42
U.S.C.
§
11001-11050, and also allege that the
operations constitute nuisances under state law.
Plaintiffs seek damages and penalties, as well as
declaratory and injunctive relief, By agreement of
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http
://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page
7 of26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 6
the parties, the parties are
attempting
to simplify the
litigation by
submitting
dispositive motions on
certain threshold issues at the initial phase of the
litigation.
See
Joint Status Report and Rule 26(f)
Report of Counsel, September 10, 2002 DN -
18.
A limited amount of discovery has been conducted.
Fully briefed, these matters are ripe for decision.
STANDARD
OF
REVIEW
In order to grant a motion for
summary judgment
or for partial summary judgment, the Court must
fmd that the pleadings, together with the
depositions, interrogatories and affidavits, establish
that there ‘is no genuine issue of material fact and
- that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P.
56.
The moving party
bears the initial burden of specifying the basis for
its motion and of identifying that portion of the
record which demonstrates the absence -of a genuine
issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477
U.S. 317, 3,22, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986). - Once
the
moving party satisfies this
burden,
-the non-moving
party thereafter must
produce specific facts demonstrating a genuine
issue of fact for trial.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.,
477 U.S.
242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Although the Court must review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, the
non-moving party
-
is required to do more than
simply show that there is some “metaphysical doubt
as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Co.,
475 U.S. 574,
586,
106
S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The Rule
requires the non-moving party to present
“specific
facts
showing there is a
genuine
issue for trial.”
Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(e)
(emphasis added). Moreover,
“the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support
of the plaintiffs position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the
jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”
Anderson,
477 U.S.
at 252, 106 S.Ct.
2505.
FACTS
**2 There are four chicken production operations
at issue in this case: (1) the’ “Tyson *700
Operation,” consisting of 24 poultry houses, is
located at or near 4200 Ilsey Road in Earlington,
Hopkins
County,
Kentucky,
and is owned by Tyson
Children Partnership and leased by Tyson Chicken,
Inc.; (2) the “Adams Operation,” consisting of 16
poultry
houses, is located near
2300 Kentucky
593
in Cathoun, McLean County, Kentucky, and is
owned by Adams; (3) “Buchanan # 1 Operation,”
consisting of 24 poultry houses,
is located at or near
1886 Gravel Pit Road and/or 53 Honeysuckle Lane,
and/or 63 Davis Road
in Sebree, Webster County,
Kentucky, and is owned by Buchanan; and (4) the
“Buchanan # 2 Operation,” consisting of 16 poultry
houses, is located at or near 1061 Collins Road
and/or 1097 Collins Road in Sebree, Webster
County, Kentucky, and is ‘owned by Buchanan.
See
Declaration of
John
Blair, Exhibits A-D
DN
45.
The broiler houses are generally 40 to 43 feet wide
and 400 to 500 feet long and generally 50 to 60 feet
apart. The houses are roofed and insulated, and
constructed to prevent entry of other animals. The
chicken production farms share common access
roads and interconnecting roads. Tyson Chicken
FN1
typically delivers between
160,000 and
180,000 chickens to a farm at a time, roughly
enough to fill 8 chicken houses. Tyson Chicken
delivers feed
to all
of Defendants’ operations almost
daily. Tyson Chicken formulates, makes, and owns
the feed and maintains feed delivery records. Tyson
Chicken
retains ownership of the chickens and feed
while at the
chicken production operations.
Through its contracts with the growers, Adams and
Buchanan, Tyson Chicken mandates that they
cooperate with it in adopting and/or- installing
recommended
management
practices
and
equipment. Tyson Chicken provides their growers
with a “Broiler Growing Guide” to ensure that they
raise the chickens according to Tyson
Chicken
standards. Under the contract, Tyson Chicken
reserves the right to unfettered access to the
growers’
property. ‘ Tyson - Chicken
technical
advisors visit the Adams and Buchanan operations
on approximately a weekly basis. The chickens are
fed, watered, and cared for by the growers--e.g.
Adams and Buchanan FN2-- for approximately
forty-nine to fifty-one days. At that time, Tyson
Chicken picks up the chickens from the facilities.
FN1. As discussed more fully below,
because of the early stage of this litigation,
the Court is
unable
-
at this time to
determine the role Tyson Foods plays in
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http://print.westlaw.conildelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005 580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 8 of26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
-
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 7
both
the operation of its subsidiary Tyson
Chicken and in the operation/management
of the poultry houses in question.
-
FN2. The grower for the Tyson Operation
is
Tyson Chicken. Tyson Chicken leases
the operation from Tyson Children
Partnership.
Ammonia is a colorless, irritant gas produced by
decomposing animal waste. For purposes of
chicken production
operations, the growers grow
chickens in houses on a floor of litter, generally a
layer of rice hulls. When the birds defecate, their
waste collects in the litter. Ventilation in the
poultry houses is necessary to protect the health of
the chickens and is accomplished by a combination
of exhaust fans and vents. The grower controls
ventilation by adjusting which fans are operating
and which vents are open. Many of the ventilation
tasks, along with feed, water,
and heating or cooling
tasks, are automated. After a flock is caught and
removed for prdcessing, the grower generally will
remove a small layer of 1 or 2 inches of the litter
that
is usually found below the watering lines and
that is found
in clumps due to higher moisture
content; this
process of removal is called
“decaking.” Proper decaking is necessary to
provide a *701
suitable environment for the
placement of
baby chicks for the next production
cycle. The growers decake the litter after every
flock,
but they do a total cleanout--that is, removal
of the litter, about every
two years.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
**3 Plaintiffs complaint alleges the chicken
production operations discharge dangerous
quantities of ammonia into the environment.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have failed to
report these releases to the appropriate authorities in
violation of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C.
§~
9601-9675 and the
Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know Act
(“EPCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §~11001-11050.
CERCLA and EPCRA provide, in combination, for
federal, state, and local governments to receive
immediate notification of releases of hazardous
substances into the environment so that these
govemment agencies can
initiate appropriate
responses. Specifically, Section 103 of CERCLA
provides that any person in charge of a facility from
which a hazardous substance has been released in a
reportable quantity (RQ) must immediately notify
the National Response Center (“NRC”). 42 U.S.C. §
9603(a). Releases that exceed
100 pounds per day
must be reported under section 103. 42 U.S.C.
§
9603; 40 C.F.R.
§
302.4. Section 103(f)(2) of
CERCLA
further provides for relaxed reporting
requirements for substances that
are classified as a
continuous release. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(f).
EPCRA requires owners or operators of facilities to
provide immediate notice of the release of an
extremely hazardous substance or CERCLA
hazardous substance to the designated state
emergency response commission (“SERC”) and the
emergency coordinator for the appropriate local
emergency planning commission (“LEPC”). 42
-U.S.C. § 11004(a); 40 C.F.R. §
355.40(b)(l).
The
statute also requires a written follow-up emergency
notice to the SERC and the LEPC “as soon as
practicable after a release.” 42 U.S.C. § 11004(c).
CERCLA authorizes
any person to “commence a
civil action on his own behalf
...
against any person
who is alleged to be in violation of any standard,
regulation, condition,
requirement, or order which
has become effective pursuant to this chapter....” 42
U.S.C.
§
9659(a)(1). Similarly, enforcement of
EPCRA can occur through the
- citizen-suit
provision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11046(a)(1), which
authorizes civil penalties and injunctive relief
against “an owner or operator of a facility for
failure,” among other things,
to “submit a
followup emergency notice” as required under
Section
304(c)
of EPCRA.
42
U.S.C.
§
1 1046(a)(l)(A)(i).
-
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs have moved for partial summary
judgment as to the First and
Second Causes of
Action set forth in the First Amended Complaint
arguing that (1) a “facility” under the definitions
contained in both CERCLA and EPCRA includes
multiple chicken houses that are located on single
or adjacent sites within a concentrated area; and (2)
that Tyson Foods, including its wholly -owned
subsidiary, Tyson Chicken, Inc., is an operator and
Copr. © 2004 West, No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005 580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page
9 of26
Page 8
thus liable under ,CERCLA for the unreported
ammonia
releases occurring at the chicken
production facilities. DN 44. Defendants have
moved for summary judgment on the CERCLA and
EPCRA claims as well arguing that (1) the Plaintiffs
lack standing to assert their federal statutory claims
because they cannot demonstrate that non-reporting
of ammonia emissions *702 under CERCLA and
EPCRA has caused them any injury in fact; (2) that
the Defendants are not in violation of CERCLA and
EPCRA because they have no knowledge that a
reportable quantity of ammonia has been released
from any facility at issue herein; (3) that no
reporting of releases under EPCRA and CERCLA is
required because if any releases from chicken
production operations are reportable, they are
continuous; (4) that the Defendants are not
required
to report ammonia releases
from chicken production
operations because it is used
in routine agricultural
operations;
(5)
that
each poultry house or litter shed
is a separate facility under CERCLA and EPCRA;
(6) that notification of the EPA and other agencies
is not necessary ‘because those agencies have actual
knowledge of the
releases in question;
(7) that
Defendants have been denied fair notice of any
requirement to report ammonia emissions
-
from
poultry
waste; (8) that the Defendants are not
required to report ammonia releases from the
chicken production operations because the release
falls within the Fertilizer Exception under
CERCLA; (9) that Tyson
Foods and Tyson
Chicken are not persons in charge of the Adams and
Buchanan Facilities; and
(10) that Tyson Children
Partnership is not a person in charge of the Tyson
Facility DN 48, DN 49, DN 50.
I. STANDING
**4
l23
Before the Court
can examine the
other issues raised by the parties, the Court must
address whether the Plaintiffs have standing to
assert claims under CERCLA and EPCRA. A party
may not bring a suit
in federal court without
standing. Standing is a “core component” of the
“case or controversy” requirement of Article III of
the United States Constitution.
Broadened Horizons
Riverkeepers v. United States Army
-
Corps oJ
Engineers,
8 F.Supp.2d 730, 733 (E.D.Tenn.1998).
The standing doctrine is designed to confine the
courts to adjudicating actual cases and controversies
by ensuring that the “plaintiff
has ‘alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as
to warrant his invocation of federal court
jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s
remedial powers on his
behalf.”
Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 498-499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d
343 (l975)(quoting
Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186,
204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). To
establish
Article
III standing to sue in federal
court,
an individual plaintiff must establish three elements:
First,
the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury
in fact--an invasion of a legally protected
interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) “actual or immirent, not ‘conjectural’
or ‘hypothetical,’
“....
Second, there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of--and the
injury has to be
“fairly
...
traceable
to the challenged action of
the defendant, and not
...
the
result of
the
independent action of some third party not
before
the court.’.... Third, it must be “likely,” as
opposed
to merely “speculative,” that the injury
will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
Broadened Horizons Riverkeepers,
8 F.Supp.2d at
733 (quoting
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504
U.S.
555,
560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351
(1992) (citations omitted));
see also Bennett v.
Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 167, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137
L.Ed.2d 281 (1997);
Cox v. City of Dallas, -Texas,
256 F.3d 281, 304 (5th Cir.200l);
Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,
528
U.S. 167, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).
“The ‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an
injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the
party seeking review be himself among the injured.”
*7O3Lujan,
504 U.S. at 563, 112 S.Ct. 2130. In
short, the
three
constitutional requirements are
injury, causation, and redressability.
45
An organization has standing to bring suit on
behalf of its members when: “(a) its members,
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c)
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit.”
Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Com’n,
432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct.
2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). The party invoking
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing
that it has standing to pursue the action.
FW/PBS,
Inc. v. City ofDallas,
493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct.
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 10
of26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 9
596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990).
Defendants allege that Plaintiffs are unable to
establish an
injury
in fact. Defendants maintain that
the only injury
that could result from the alleged
reporting violation of CERCLA and EPCRA would
be that the EPA would not have sufficient
information to evaluate the need for action.
Defendants contend that the EPA has knowledge
concerning
ammonia releases from
chicken houses
since it is now attempting to ascertain whether the
current state of scientific knowledge is sufficient for
establishing a reliable emission factor that could be
used to determine whether reporting is required at
all. Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs
do not contend that they have any current evidence
of the amount of any release on any particular day
in a reportable amount at the farms in question-they
merely contend that if they are allowed’ to test at the
farms they
believe they can show the farms will
have reportable emissions. Defendants assert that
Plaintiffs’ claims are therefore purely hypothetical
and
conjectural.
Further, Defendants contend that
Plaintiffs cannot establish that they have an injury
that will not be redressed without a decision
favorable to the Plaintiffs. Except for the argument
that the individual
Plaintiffs do not have standing,
the Defendants have not challenged whether the
organization
has
met
the
other
standing
requirements.
-
A. Injury in Fact
-
**5 6 Plaintiffs have
plainly demonstrated injury
in fact. The individual Plaintiffs have alleged a
violation of their
right to use the area around the
-
chicken production operations without being
-
exposed,,, either
-
knowingly or unknowingly, to
harmful pollutants allegedly
released without proper
notice. Plaintiffs allege that the ammonia emitted
by Defendants’ operations greatly diminish their
ability to use and enjoy their property. Odors
associated with the Defendants’ operations force the
Plaintiffs to curtail their activities on their farms and
often force them to cancel outdoor events because
of the odors and potentially dangerous chemicals
-
allegedly released from Defendants’ facilities.
Plaintiffs have both
detailed their use of the affected
area, as well as the ways
in which their use is
threatened by the alleged releases of ammonia.
FN3
The faCts alleged in these declarations are
sufficient to meet the
injury in fact
requirement
under
Lujan. Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct.
2130;
Heart of America Northwest v. Westinghouse
Hanford,
820
F.Supp.
1265,
1266-70
(E.D.Wash.1993).
FN3. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have
failed to allege injury in fact because the
alleged injury results from releases, not
from the failure to give notice. The Court
will consider this
argument in the
discussion of causality.
-
7 Further, Plaintiffs also allege an injury to their
right
to be informed in a
timely
manner of any
releases from the *704 operations so that they may
take whatever precautionary steps are necessary.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ failure to report the
ammonia releases has harmed the Plaintiffs because
it has denied them access to critical information and
has impaired the ability of government agencies to
properly respond to releases. Plaintiffs have alleged
precisely the type,
of injury--failure to receive
information--that Congress intended to prevent by
enacting the reporting requirements of both
CERCLA and
EPCRA. Notably, the Supreme
Court in discussing the purpose
of
EPCRA has
stated as follows: “EPCRA establishes
a
framework
of state, regional and local agencies designed to
inform the public about the presence of hazardous
and toxic chemicals, and to provide for emergency
response in the
event
of health-threatening
releases.”
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment,
523 U.S. 83, 86, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140
L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). It is well established that the
“injury required by Article III may exist solely by
virtue
of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion
of which creates standing.’
“
Warth,
422 U.S. at
500,
95
S.Ct. 2197 (citations omitted);
see also
Lujan,
504 U.S. at 578, 112 S.Ct. 2130;
Federal
Election Com’n v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11, 20, 118 S.Ct.
1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998)(Supreme Court noted
that it “has previously held that a plaintiff suffers an
‘injury in fact’ when the plaintiff fails to obtain
information which must be publicly disclosed,
pursuant to a statute.”
Id.
at 21, 118 S.Ct. 1777).
FN4
FN4. The Court recognizes that the
Supreme Court in
Steel Co.
noted that they
had “not had occasion to decide whether
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataithrBo05 580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 11 of26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as:
299 F.Supp.2d 693,
2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 10
being dep~ived of information that is
supposed to be disclosed under EPCRA-or
at least being deprived of it when one has a
particular plan for its use-is a concrete
injury
in fact that satisfied Article III.”
Steel Co., .523
U.S. at 105, 118 S.Ct. 1003.
The Supreme Court declined to reach that
question because it found that the
- complaint
in that case failed the third test
of standing, redressibility. From a review
of the case law, and as discussed above,
the Court believes that under the facts of
the present case, the Supreme Court
would
find an injury in fact that satisfies Article
III.
8
The Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs
have failed to allege an
injury in fact because they
can not prove that the Defendants have released a
reportable quantity of ammonia triggering the
reporting requirement under either CERCLA or
EPCRA. Requiring the Plaintiffs at this
stage of the
litigation to show the exact amount of the release of
ammonia from the chicken production operations as
a condition for standing “confuses the jurisdictional
inquiry (does the court have
power under Article III
to hear the case?) with the merits inquiry (did the
defendants violate the law?).”
Ecological Rights
Foundation v. Pac(flc Lumber Co.,
230 F.3d 1141,
1151(9th Cir.2000).
See also Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,
528
U.S. 167, 182, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610
(2000). Plaintiffs have presented evidence that
poultry houses emit ammonia and that studies exist
that estimate the amount of ammonia a poultry
house emits- over a specific period of time. Whether
this will be sufficient to establish violations of the
reporting requirements of CERCLA and EPCRA
remains to be seen. However, considering that little
discovery has been conducted at this stage of the
litigation, the Plaintiffs need not prove that the
Defendants have, in fact, violated the reporting
requirements in order to obtain
standing; this is
instead a question of whether Plaintiffs can
prove
their case.
Id.
**6 For these reasons, the Court concludes that the
Plaintiffs have alleged facts, supported by
declarations, which demonstrate a concrete, actual
injury and thus satisfy the first standing
requirement--injury in fact.
*705 B. Causality
9
Similarly, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs have
demonstrated a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of. The Court
rejects the Defendants argument that the injury in
question results from the release of the
ammonia
and not the Defendants failure to give notice of the
release.
The purpose of CERCLA notice requirement is to
provide the EPA
and other regulatory agencies with
the information they need to assess hazards and
mitigate potential
injury
from releases.
Similarly,
EPCRA establishes a framework of agencies
designed to inform
the public about the presence of
hazardous and toxic chemicals, and to provide
emergency
response
in
the
event
- of
health-threatening releases. Without the required
notices of, alleged releases, regulatory agencies are
without knowledge of the releases; and are
consequently impeded from adequately mitigating
the releases. As a- result, Plaintiffs who use the
affected environment are therefore injured by
potential exposure to the hazardous releases.
See
Heart of America Northwest,
820 F.Supp. at 1271.
The procedures which Plaintiffs seek to enforce are
designed to protect Plaintiffs’ interest in avoiding
exposure to hazardous substances in the
environment.
Id.
at 1273. Therefore, the Court
fmds that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged actions of Defendants and thus
satisfies the second standing
requirement.
C.- Redressability
10 11 The redress ability requirement ensures
that a plaintiff “personally
would benefit in a
tangible way from the court’s intervention.”
Warth,
422 U.S. at 508, 95 S.Ct.
‘2197;
Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.,
204
F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir.2000). A plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief, as in
the present case,
demonstrates
redressability by
“alleging
a
continuing violation or the imminence of a future
violation” of the statute at issue.
Steel Co.,
523 U.S
at 108, 118 S.Ct. 1003. Plaintiffs seek injunctive
and other relief for Defendants alleged continuing
and threatened future violations of the reporting
requirements.
Copr, © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 12 of26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 11
12 In the present case, a decision favorable to the
Plaintiffs would redress their injuries because it
would
require the Defendants to provide notice that
a specific
episodic release of a hazardous substance
has occurred or that specific continuous releases
will occur in the future which would allow the
Plaintiffs to take whatever precautionary steps
necessary to protect themselves from the ammonia
releases.
Furthermore, although the EPA, along with other
govemmental agencies, may already know that the
poultry houses emit high levels of ammonia and, as
Defendants argue, may be studying ways
to
effectively measure such release, such defense is
inappropriate to challenge standing where what the
Plaintiffs seek is enforcement of statutes Congress
designed in part for Plaintiffs’ benefit.
See Heart of
America Northwest,
820 F.Supp. at 1273 (citing
Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos,
879
F.2d 880, 886 (D.C.Cir.1989)). The notice
requirements under CERCLA and EPCRA are
designed to enable the appropriate governmental
agencies’ to respond to hazardous releases and under
EPCRA,
specifically, to notify
the public of such
releases. It is therefore reasonable for the Court to
also fmd that if Defendants complied with the
notice
requirements,
then
the
appropriate
govemmental agencies might respond to the release.
**7 For these reasons,
Plaintiffs’ alleged injury
redressed by a decision
favorable to Plaintiffs.
Based on the above discussion, the Court finds that
the individual Plaintiffs, as well as Sierra Club,
have standing to
assert
claims under CERCLA and
EPCRA.
II.
EXEMPTION
FOR
ANIMAL
PRODUCTION OPERATIONS
13 Defendants argue that there is no generally
accepted methodology
or model for estimating the
amount of ammonia chicken production facilities
emit. According to Defendants, the EPA is currently
addressing the issue of whether there is reliable
science to determine whether reporting is required
for these type
of facilities, and as a result, they are
not required to report ammonia releases. The
problem with this argument is that Defendants cite
no authority which exempts animal production
facilities from the reporting requirements of
EPCRA
and CERCLA. If Congress had intended
such a result, it could have excluded animal
production facilities, such as poultry and swine,
from the reporting requirements. Congress clearly
knew how to exempt certain items from the
reporting requirements of CERCLA and
EPCRA as
demonstrated by the fertilizer exclusion’ under
CERCLA Section lOl(22)(D) which
exempts “the
normal application of fertilizer” from the definition
of release. 42 U.S.C.
§
960 1(22)(D).
14
Furthermore, the fact that the EPA has not
chosen to enforce these provisions against animal
production facilities does -not prohibit a citizen
enforcement suit for
violation of the reporting
requirements. The Supreme Court has recognized
that the purpose of citizen suits is not to supplant
governmental enforcement by subjecting a
defendant to duplicative enforcement, but to step in
when local agencies fail to exercise their
enforcement responsibility.
Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
484 U.S. 49,
60, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987). If the
EPA were enforcing these provisions,
this suit
would not be necessary.
15
Similarly,
- the fact that the government has
knowledge of ammonia emissions from chicken
houses does not necessarily exempt Defendants
from the reporting requirements. The Government
would not require notice of specific releases of
hazardous substances if it was not already aware
that such substances at or above the reportable
quantity were
harmful.
FN5
‘FNS.
The Defendants do not dispute that
both CERCLA and
EPCRA require
-
persons in charge or owners and operators
of facilities
to report releases of ammonia
in excess of 100 pounds per day to the
appropriate federal, state and
local
authorities. 42 U.S.C. §
9603(a); 40
C.F.R.
§
302.6; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1l004(a)(3).
What is in dispute in this case is whether
these notice requirements apply to releases
of ammonia from chicken production
Operations.
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
the Court finds that
is likely to be *706
on the
merits that is
--
L
http://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005 580000004016000396482...
11/29/2004
Page 13 of26
299F.Supp.2d693
-
-
Page 12
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
the release of more than one 1
pound of
asbestos....’
“Id.).
However,
the cases cited by the Defendants reflect
that courts interpreting the knowledge requirement
have indicated that knowledge can be either actual
knowledge or’ constructive knowledge.
See In the
Matter of Thoro Products Co.,
1992 EPA AU
LEXIS 523, 1992 WL 143993 (May 19, 1992).
The
Administrative Law Judge in
Thoro Products
held that to establish a violation of the reporting
provisions, a plaintiff must present facts which
show the following:
first, that the owner or operator or person in
charge of the
...
facility had actual knowledge of
a
release of an RQ or more of a hazardous
substance or that he or she possessed knowledge
of
such circumstances ,as would ordinarily lead
upon investigation, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence which a prudent person ought to
exercise, to a knowledge of a release of an RQ or
more of a hazardous substance
...,
and, second,
that the owner or operator
failed to report the’
release
immediately after such knowledge was
acquired or may be constructed....
Id.
Therefore, actual or- constructive knowledge of
a release of a reportable quantity creates a duty to
report.
-
Copr. ©
2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
Additionally, the Defendants maintain that if the
Court determines
that reporting of poultry emissions
is required, it would be a violation of due process to
penalize them
because the laws and regulations do
not provide fair warning that they must file
emergency reports for routine agricultural
emissions. The
Defendants ask that the Plaintiffs’
claim for penalties be dismissed. As stated
above, it
appears to the Court that
statute clearly does not
exclude the release of ammonia
from chicken or
livestock production operations, and as a result,
Defendants are required to report releases that meet
or exceed the reportable quantity. For purposes of
the motion for summary judgment, the Court denies
*707 Defendants’
-
motion to dismiss the civil
penalties with leave to reargue this issue at a
later
date after the liability of Defendants has been
determined.
III.
KNOWLEDGE
**8 16
Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendants
have violated ‘the reporting requirements of
CERCLA
and EPCRA. Plaintiffs maintain that they
need only demonstrate that Defendants knew of a
release of ammonia, not that the Defendants knew
that it was of a reportable quantity. Defendants
disagree.
-
CERCLA Section 103(a) provides:
Any person in charge of
...
an onshore facility
shall, as soon as
he has knowledge of any
release (other than a federally permitted
release) of a hazardous substance from such
facility in quantities equal to or greater than
- -
those -determined pursuant to section 9602 of
this title,
immediately notify the National
-
‘
-,
Response Center
42 U.S.C. § 9603(a). The language in the statute
is
plain.
To prove a violation of the reporting
requirements, Plaintiffs must show not merely that
Defendants knew of a release, but that Defendants
knew that a reportable quantity of ammonia was
released. The EPA, administrative law judges, and
other
courts
have indicated that knowledge that a
release is of
a reportable quantity is necessary to
impose a requirement to file a report.
See United
States v. Buckley,
934 F.2d 84, 89 (6th Cir.l99l)
(“The district court properly charged jurors that to
prove Buckley guilty of failure to notify, the
government needed -,to prove that Buckley
‘knew
of
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have failed to
set
forth
proof that emissions from the
poultry
houses exceed the reportable quantities, and as a
result, Plaintiffs’ claims fail. Plaintiffs have
presented evidence that poultry houses emit
ammonia and that studies exist that estimate the
amount of ammonia a poultry house emits over a
specific period of time. For example, Plaintiffs’
have alleged that a 24-house chicken production
facility, like the Tyson Facility, releases at the
lowest estimate approximately 235 pounds of
ammonia into the environment every day. As
noted
above, whether this will be sufficient to establish
violations of the reporting requirements of
CERCLA and EPCRA remains to be seen.
However, considering that little discovery has been
conducted at this stage of the
litigation, the
Plaintiffs *708
need not prove that the Defendants
have, in fact, violated the reporting requirements in
order to survive this initial motion. There are
currently genuine issues of material fact regarding
the amount of ammonia released by each facility
http://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005 580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 14 of 26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 13
and whether “the owner
or
operator” or “person in
charge” had knowledge or was aware of such
release.
-
IV. FACILITY
**9
One of the main issues before the
Court is
whether
under
the
emergency
reporting
requirements of both CERCLA and EPCRA the
term “facility” includes every poultry house or litter
shed at the farm site. Plaintiffs argue that each farm
site, consisting of several poultry houses on a
contiguous site, releases more than 100 pounds of
ammonia
daily. Plaintiffs maintain that the whole
farm site is the proper regulated entity for
purposes
of
the
CERCLA
and
EPCRA
reporting
requirements. The Court agrees.
A. CERCLA
CERCLA Section 101(9) defmes “facility” as
follows:
(A)
any
building,
structure,
-
installation,
equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe
into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works),
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch,
landfill, storage container,
motor vehicle, rolling
stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored,
disposed of,
or placed, or otherwise come to be
located; but does not include any consumer
product in consumer use or any vessel.
42 U.S.C.
§
960 1(9).
17 Defendants maintain that under CERCLA
each
poultry
house is a “facility” for purposes of
CERCLA’s Section 103 reporting requirement.
Defendants argue that because CERCLA
-
defmes
“facility” as “any building” each poultry house is a
facility. Defendants contend that each case relied
upon by the Plaintiffs addresses cost recovery
actions under Section
107
and/or Section 113(1) of
CERCLA and,
therefore, none of those cases have
any applicability to this case. Defendants argue that
the detailed definition set forth in definition (A) of
“facility” should be selected to accomplish the
purpose of CERCLA Section 103 which is prompt
notification of emergency releases, rather than the
broad definition set forth in definition (B).
Defendants rely on an unpublished Western District
of Oklahoma case in which the district court held
that “facility” refers to each separate building or
structure,
not the
entire site.
Sierra Club v.
Seaboard
Farms,
Inc.,
No.
CIV-00-997-C
(W.D.Okla. July 18, 2002).
After a review of the parties arguments and case
law, the Court fmds that a whole chicken farm site
is a facility from which releases must be reported
under CERCLA. First, Defendants
are correct that
CERCLA § lol(9)(A), defmes facility to mean
“any building, structure, installation, equipment
42 U.S.C. 9601(9)(A). But in relying on this
provision,
they ignore CERCLA § l0l(9)(B) which
defmes a facility as “any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored,
disposed of,
or placed, or otherwise come to be
located....” 42 U.S.C. §
960l(9)(A). Under
CERCLA § lOl(9)(B), the entire farm site,
including all the chicken houses on a single site,
qualifies as a facility.
18 Courts have consistently interpreted the term
‘facility” broadly. In instances where ‘the hazardous
substance or contamination is confmed to an
individual building or -structure, the facility is
properly limited to this unit. However, when
multiple sources of hazardous substances *709 are
grouped together, the facility encompasses the
entire area and extends to “the bounds of the
contamination.”
United States v. Township of
Brighton,
153 F.3d 307, 313 (6th Cir.1998). Under
the case law, if an area is managed as a whole, it is
a single facility for CERCLA purposes.
Id., United
States v. 150 Acres of Land,
204 F.3d 698, 709 (6th
Cir.2000);
Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina
Oil Co., Inc.,
191 F.3d 409, 417-18 (4th Cir.1999)
(because “a property could be divided into multiple
facilities does not, however, mean that it must be
so divided
for
CERCLA purposes”);
Akzo
Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.,
960 F.Supp. 1354,
1359 (N.D.Ind.l996),
affd in part, vacated in part
by,
197 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the
argument that each contamination source is a
separate facility because such argument “could have
disastrous consequences, for ultimately every
separate instance of contamination, down to each
separate barrel of hazardous waste, could feasibly
be construed to constitute a separate CERCLA
facility”);
Cytec Industries v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,
232 F.Supp.2d 821 (S.D.Ohio.2002)~’This court
concludes that usually, although perhaps not
Copr.
©
2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 15 of26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 14
always, the defmition of facility will be the entire
site or area, including single or contiguous
properties, where
hazardous wastes have been
deposited as part- of the same operation or
management.”
Id.
at 836);
Clear Lake Properties
v. Rockwell Int’l Corp.,
959 F.Supp. 763, 767-68
(S.D.Tex.1997)(rejecting an - attempt to create
unnatural boundaries between
a building and the
site on which it is located). Under the facts of the
present case, each of the four chicken production
operations, encompassing all the poultry houses at
one site, is operated together for a singular purpose.
The poultry houses at a particular site function
together to produce chickens. Chickens -of an
identical age typically occupy multiple chicken
houses at once. They are delivered
and picked up
from the site as a whole.
Tyson Chicken’s technical
advisors visit the multiple
houses within the site
during
their periodic visits. Since each chicken
production operation operates as a single operation,
it is a single facility for CERCLA purposes.
Id.
**J() Second, the Defendants are correct in that
the
cases upon which both the Plaintiffs and the Court
rely to support the expansive definition of “facility”
have involved Section 107 and Section 113(f) cost
recovery actions. CERCLA permits government
agencies and private parties that have
incurred
cleanup costs to sue potentially responsible parties
to recover their costs pursuant to CERCLA Sections
107 and 113(f). 42 U.S.C.
§~
9607, 9613(f). While
the Defendants are correct that none of these
cases
that have explored the defmition of “facility” were
Section 103 reporting requirements cases, the Court
can fmd no rational reason to disregard
these cases
in discussing the ‘definition of the term “facility” in
a Section 103 reporting case. The Supreme Court
has recognized that “identical words used in
different parts of the same act are intended to have
the same meaning.”
Sorenson v. Secretary of
Treasury,
475 U.S.
851, 860, 106 S.Ct. 1600, 89
L.Ed.2d
855
(1986.). CERCLA defines “facility”
once in the definition section of the statute and its
meaning should be interpreted consistently
throughout the entire statute. Accordingly,
“facility”
for reporting
purposes, cleanup purposes or any
other statutory purpose extend under the case law to
the bounds of the contamination.
Defendants cite
Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms,
Inc.
in support of their position.
Seaboard Farms
is
the only federal
court
opinion cited to the Court that
deals with the term “facility” under Section 103 of
CERCLA. The district court
in
Seaboard Farms
held that “facility” refers to each *710 separate
building and structure, not the entire site.
Sierra
Club v. Seaboard Farms, Inc.,
No. Civ-00-997-C
(W.D.
OkIa. February
5,
2002 and July 18, 2002).
This case is currently on appeal to ‘the Tenth
Circuit. Specifically, in
Sierra Club v. Seaboard
Farms, Inc.,
the
district court examined Section 103
reporting of ammonia releases from hog waste. The
site at issue contained multiple wastewater lagoons
and sow barns. The Sierra Club argued that the
entire site was the “facility” from which the alleged
releases occurred, and that all emissions from the
lagoons and barns should be aggregated before
determining whether the reportable quantity for
ammonia
had
been reached
or
exceeded.
Ultimately, the district court concluded that each
lagoon and barn was a separate facility under
CERCLA relying on the fact that facility was
defmed to mean “any buildings,” not “all
buildings.” Ultimately, the problem with the district
court opinion in
Seaboard Farms
is that while the
court quoted the entire defmition of facility under
42 U.S.C.
§
9601, the court did not address whether
the hog farm, including the lagoons or barns, was
“any site or area where a hazardous substance has
been deposited,
stored, disposed of, or placed or
otherwise come to be located.” 42 U.S.C. §
9601 (9)(B).
Third, contrary to the Defendants’ argument, the
purpose of Section 103 is best served by a broad
definition.
CERCLA is a remedial statute designed
to protect human health and the environment from
potentially hazardous substances. The purpose of
Section 103 has been described by the EPA as “to
alert the appropriate govemment officials to
releases of hazardous substances that may require
rapid response to protect public health and welfare
and the environment.” 50 Fed.Reg. 13,456 (1985).
Including all chicken houses on
a single site within
one facility will
further the purposes of the statute
by determining the aggregate emission from the
chicken houses on that site. Plaintiffs’ have alleged
that a 24-house
chicken production facility, like the
Tyson Facility, releases approximately 235 pounds
of ammonia into the environment every day. Under
the Defendants’ interpretation, the Tyson Facility
would not be required to report any releases
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 16 of26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989~(W.D.Ky.))
-
Page 15
because each chicken house only releases
approximately 10 pounds of ammonia per day, even
though each site as a whole releases more than
twice the reporting threshold. A defmition of a
facility that
encompasses the entire chicken
production facility is the only interpretation of the
statute that meets CERCLA’s basis purpose: to
protect and preserve public health and the
environment. The Court finds no reason to treat the
definition of facility any differently in emergency
reporting cases.
‘~‘1
1 Finally, both parties cite EPA regulations and
guides in support of their respective positions. The
Court has reviewed these references and fmds
arguable support for both of their positions. While
the Court is cognizant that where a statute is
unclear, the Court must defer to the EPA’s
interpretation so long as it is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Chevron USA. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council~Inc.,
467 U.S.
837, 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694
(1984). However, where as here, the EPA
regulations are not helpful in answering the question
before the Court, no deference is required. Congress
has defmed the term “facility” and courts have
interpreted that provision. The Court shall instead
defer to this case law.
Therefore, for purposes of the CERCLA Section
103
reporting
requirements,
each
chicken
production
operation,
including the
separate
chicken houses, is a facility. Emissions from the
separate poultry houses are required to be added
together to *711 determine
if a reportable quantity
has been reached for the facility.
B. EPCRA
Under EPCRA, an owner or operator of a facility
must report to state and local
emergency planning
committees the release of a hazardous substance.
42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(l), (3). Specifically, EPCRA
provides that “if a release of an extremely
hazardous substance referred to in Section 11002(a)
of this title occurs from a facility at which a
hazardous chemical is produced, used, or
stored,
and such release requires
notification under section
103(a) of CERCLA, the owner or operator of the
facility shall immediately provide notice as
described in subsection (b) of this section.” 42
U.S.C. § 11004(a)(l). EPCRA defmes “facility” as
follows:
The
term “facility”
means
all
buildings,
equipment, structures, and other stationary items
-which are located on a single site or on
contiguous or adjacent sites and which are owned
or operated by the same person (or by any person
which controls,
is controlled by, or under
common
control with,
such person).
For
purposes of section 11004 of this title, the term
includes motor
vehicles, rolling stock, and
aircraft.
42 U.S.C. § 11049(4).
Each of defendants’ chicken production operations
is a facility under this defmition. The chicken
production operations include multiple chicken
houses that are located on single or adjacent sites
within a concentrated- area. These chicken houses
are owned by the same person for purposes of
producing
chickens.
Accordingly,
each
of
defendants’ chicken production operations is clearly
a facility under EPCRA from which ammonia
releases must be reported on a site-wide basis.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court
concludes that a whole chicken farm site is a facility
under
both CERCLA and
‘EPCRA
for which
releases must be reported.
V. EPISODIC OR CONTINUOUS RELEASES
Under
CERCLA, a continuous release is subject to
reduced
reporting
requirements.
Specifically,
Section
103(1) provides that “no notification
shall
be required under subsection
--
(a) or (b) of- this
section for any release of a hazardous substance
-
(2) which is a continuous release, stable in quantity
and rate
....“
and has been’ qualified as a’ cotitintiOtis
release. 42 U.S.C.
§
‘9603(f)(2). In order to qualify
for reduced
reporting under CERCLA
§ 103(f), the
person in charge must demonstrate a “sound
technical basis” for claiming that a release is
continuous rather than episodic. 40 C.F.R.
§
302.8(e). Specifically, the EPA has provided that
**12 to
qualify a release for reporting as ‘a
continuous release, you must establish a basis for
asserting that the release is continuous and stable
in quantity and rate. The Continuous Release
Rule provides you with
flexibility in establishing
this basis. You may report the release to either
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 17 of26
the
NRC (for CERCLA hazardous substances) or
the appropriate SERC and LEPC (for CERCLA
hazardous substances and non-CERCLA EHSs)
on a per-occurrence basis for the period of time
necessary to establish that the pattern of the
release is continuous and stable. However, if
you
have a sufficient basis for establishing the
continuity, quantity, and regularity of a release,
multiple reports are not necessary. A one-time
telephone call to each of the appropriate
authorities (the
NRC,
SERC,
‘and
LEPC for
CERCLA hazardous substances, or only the
SERC and LEPC for non-CERCLA EHSs)
will
*712 alert them to your
intent to report the
release as a continuous release.
EPA
Guide,
Reporting
Requirements
for
Continuous Releases of Hazardous Substances at
5
(1997). Additionally, the EPA has provided that
“if
the person in charge does not have a basis
supported by existing~data, engineering estimates,
operating history and experience, or professional
judgment sufficient to qualify for reporting under
section l03(f)(2), the release must be reported
under section 103(a) for
the length of time
necessary to establish it as continuous and stable
under the definition
in today’s rule.” 55 Fed.Reg.
30172 n.
5 (1990). Therefore,
the person in charge
must “qualify releases as continuous and stable” to
benefit from the reduced
reporting requirement of
CERCLA
§
103(f). If the
person in charge fails to
do so, any release
equaling or exceeding the
reportable quantity must be reported as episodic
release under CERCLA §
103(a).
-
Similarly, the regulations implementing EPCRA
provide that the reporting requirements of this
section do not apply to “any release that is
continuous and
stable in quantity and rate under the
definitions of 40 C.F.R. 302.8(b). Exemption from
notification under this
subsection does not include
exemption from: (A) Initial
notifications as defined
in 40 C.F.R. 302.8(d) and (e)....” 40 C.F.R.
§
355 .40(a)(2)(iii)(A).
-
19
Defendants argue that any releases occurring
at the facilities are continuous releases subject to
reduced CERCLA reporting
requirements and
entitled to full exemption from EPCRA reporting
requirements. Defendants further contend that even
if initial reporting of continuous releases is required
under EPCRA
under §
304(a) and (b), no follow-up
Page 16
- notification under
§ 3
04(c) is required. Defendants
maintain that because citizen suits under EPCRA
are only authorized to enforce
§
304(c), not
§~
304(a) and (b), Plaintiffs’
claims under EPCRA
must be dismissed.
First, and most significantly, Defendants have not
met the requirements necessary to classify the
releases as continuous
under §
l03(f)(2). The
person in charge (or the owner or operator) has not
notified any agency of any releases, let alone
established that these releases are continuous rather
than episodic and warrant reduced reporting
requirements. The person in charge under
CERCLA or the owner or operator under EPCRA
has the responsibility to qualify the releases as
continuous and stable. Since the person in charge
has not done so, any release equaling or exceeding
the reportable quantity must be reported as an
episodic release under both CERCLA and EPCRA.
**j3
Second,
if the Defendants had complied with
Section
103(f) and the’ ammonia releases were
classified as continuous, the reduced reporting
requirements under CERCLA and EPCP.A would
apply. Defendants have
argued that EPCRA
requires no reporting of continuous releases because
the initial notification referenced at
40 C.F.R.
§
355.40 require initial telephone notification and
initial written notification only under CERCLA
Section 103.
See
40 C.F.R. § 302.8(d) and (e).
Additionally, the Defendants argue that even if
initial notification is required, follow-up notification
under Section 304(c) is not required for continuous
releases under EPCRA. However, after a review of
the regulations, the Court concludes that initial
notification under Section 304(a) and (b) and
follow-up written notification under Section 304(c)
of EPCRA are still required fof’dontinuous releases. -
The regulations provide that
“initial notifications as
defined
in
40 C.F.R. 302.8(d) and (e)” are not
exempt from the EPCRA reporting requirements.
*71340 C.F.R.
§
355.40(a)(2)(iii)(A).
Title 40
C.F.R. Section 302.8(e) provides that in addition to
the CERCLA initial reporting requirements, the
reporting requirements of EPCRA require “initial
telephone and written
notifications of continuous
releases to be submitted to the appropriate” SERC -
and LEPC.
Therefore, under EPCRA, the initial
telephone
notification occurs under Section 304(a)
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
299 F.Supp.2d
693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.SUPP.2d 693,
2003
~L 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
http://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
299 F.Supp.2d 693
-
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 ‘WL
22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 18 of26
Page 17
and (b)
and
written notification occurs in an
“emergency follow-up report” pursuant to
Section
304(c). The Court’s interpretation of this regulation
is
confirmed by the
EPA’s comments concerning
continuous release reporting
requirements:
To the extent that releases are continuous and
stable in quantity and rate as defined by CERCLA
section 103(f)(2) and today’s fmal rule, they do
not occur in
a manner that requires notification
under CERCLA section 103(a). Accordingly,
when persons in charge of facilities or vessels
releasing EHSs or CERCLA hazardous
substances submit the initial notification reports
(including the initial written reports, which
should be submitted with the follow-up report
required by
SARA
Title III section 304(c))
to
the appropriate SERC and LEPC, identifying
releases of EHSs and CERCLA hazardous
substances as continuous and stable in quantity
and rate under the definition in today’s final rule,
they need not report again to SERC and LEPC,
except
for
reports
of
SSIs
Statistically
Significant Increase.
No
CERCLA section
103(f)(2) follow-up reports are required
under
SARA Title
III section 304.
55 Fed.Reg. 30166,
30179
(emphasis added).
Therefore, under the regulations, both initial
telephone notification under Section 304(a) and (b)
and follow-up written notification under Section
304(c) are required under EPCRA. Therefore,
Plaintiffs may maintain a claim against Defendants
for their alleged violation of EPCRA’s § 304(c)
reporting requirements even if the releases could be
characterized as continuous.
**14
As discussed above, however, Defendants
have not met the requirements of
§ l03(f)(2), the
appropriate initial notification’ has not ,been made,
and as result, the ammonia releases from
Defendants’ facilities have not been classified as
continuous. Accordingly, episodic reporting
appears to be required if the ammonia releases from
the facilities in question equal or exceed the
reportable quantity. Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ EPCRA claims is
denied,
VI. ROUTINE
AGRICULTURAL
OPERATIONS
20 Defendants
argue that as “routine agricultural
operations”
poultry production operations are
exempt from EPCRA reporting. EPCRA Section
311 provides an exemption for reporting releases
when the regulated substance “is used in
routine
agricultural operations or is a fertilizer held for sale
by a retailer to the ultimate consumer.” 42 U.S.C.
§
1 102
l(e)(5).
Defendants claim that the EPCRA
exemption applies because chicken waste is
removed from chicken production operations and
used on other farms for fertilizer. The Court
disagrees.
-
-
The EPA has indicated that this exemption is
intended to “eliminate reporting of fertilizers,
pesticides, and other chemical substances when
applied, administered,
or
otherwise used as part of
routine agricultural activities
...
The exemption for
substances used in routine agricultural operations
applies only to substances stored or used by’ the
agricultural user.” 52 Fed.Reg. 38344, 38349
(1987). In the present case, Plaintiffs contend that
the
venting
of gaseous
ammonia into
the
atmosphere *714 must be reported under EPCRA,
not that the storage of chicken manure or the
application of chicken manure to farm fields is
subject
to the
reporting requirements. The
Defendants do not store gaseous ammonia in their
chicken houses for agricultural use. They do not
use this ammonia in an
agricultural
operation.
Instead, as pointed out -
by the Plaintiffs, the
Defendants try to get
rid
of it because it is harmful
to the chickens. Accordingly, the Court finds that
the routine agricultural use exemption does not
apply to the facts ofthis case.
VII.
APPLICATION OF FERTILIZER
EXEMPTION
-
21 CERCLA §
lOl(22)(D) exempts
“the normal’
application of fertilizer” from the definition of
“release.” 42 U.S.C. §
9601(22)(D). This
exemption is incorporated into EPCRA by 40
C.F.R. §
355.40(a)(2)(v).
Defendants argue that
under this exemption their releases of ammonia
to
soils, water or air as a consequence of spreading
chicken waste on fields as fertilizer do not require
reporting under either CERCLA or EPCRA.
- The Plaintiffs state in response to this argument
that they do
not allege that the land application of
chicken manure as fertilizer is a release under
CERCLA or EPCRA.
Instead, the Plaintiffs allege
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 19 of26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 18
that venting gaseous ammonia into the atmosphere
from the chicken houses is subject to the reporting
requirements of
CERCLA
and EPCRA. The
Defendants are not applying ammonia to farm fields
when they vent it into the atmosphere, and as a
result, the exemption for land application of
fertilizer does not apply.
**~5
It should
be noted that the Plaintiffs have
stated that they are not alleging in their complaint
that the storage of chicken manure or the
application of chicken manure to farm fields is
subject to
CERCLA or
EPCRA. The case is
therefore limited to the allegations that the venting
of gaseous ammonia into the atmosphere from the
chicken houses must be reported under these
statutes.
VIII. PERSON IN CHARGE/OWNER OR
OPERATOR
Plaintiffs have filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on th~issue of whether Tyson Foods,
Inc., including its wholly owned subsidiary, Tyson
Chicken, Inc., is a person in charge or “operator” of
the chicken
production facilities at issue in this
case, and thus liable for unreported ammonia
discharges under CERCLA and EPCRA DN 44.
Defendant, Tyson Foods, on its behalf and on
behalf of its wholly owned subsidiary,
Tyson
Chicken, Inc., has filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on the issue of whether it is a
“person in charge” of a facility and on other issues
related to corporate liability DN 50. Tyson Foods
argues that it is neither a person in charge under
CERCLA or an owner or operator under
EPCRA
of
any of the chicken production
operations at issue in
this matter. Similarly,
it argues that Tyson Chicken
is neither a person in
charge nor an owner or
operator of the chicken production operations
owned by Adams or Buchanan. Defendant,
Tyson
Children Partnership, has also filed a motion for
partial summary judgment on the issue of whether it
is a “person
in charge” of a facility and on other
issues related to corporate liability DN’48.
The relationships
between Tyson Foods, Tyson
Chicken, and Tyson Children Partnership and the
chicken production operations at
issue in this case
are central to the
determination of whether these
Defendants are persons in charge or owners or
operators of the chicken production facilities in
question. Generally, Tyson
Foods *715
produces,
distributes, and markets chicken, beef, pork,
prepared foods and related products.
Tyson
Chicken, Inc., is a
wholly owned subsidiary of
Tyson Foods. Under the facts currently available,
Tyson Chicken manages the Tyson Facility and
supplies, pursuant to contract, chicks, feed,
technical
advise and veterinary
services, among
other things, to both the Adams and Buchanan
Facilities. Tyson Chicken, Inc. operated under the
Hudson Foods name until January 1, 2001, when it
changed its name to Tyson Chicken. All shares of
Tyson Chicken are owned by Tyson Foods and
Tyson Chicken is identified as a subsidiary of
Tyson Foods, Inc. Additionally, Tyson Chicken
currently leases property on which the Tyson
Facility is located from Tyson Children Partnership.
A. Definitions
1. Person in Charge
22 Plaintiffs contend
CERCLA, ‘42 U.S.C.
that:
Any person in
charge of
...
an onshore facility
shall, as soon as he has knowledge of any release
(other than a federally permitted release) of a
hazardous substance from such
...,
facility in
quantities equal to or greater than those
determined
pursuant to section
§
9602
- of this
title, immediately
notify the National Response
Center....
**16 42 U.S.C.
§
9603(a). Therefore, to be
liable
under 42 U.S.C.
-- §
9603(a), a Defendant must be
considered a person in charge of a facility. A
corporation is included in the defmition of “person”
under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.
-.
§ 9601(21).
Unfortunately, “person
in charge” is not defined
either in CERCLA or its implementing
regulation.
Plaintiffs contend that a “person
in charge” under
CERCLA includes not only supervisory personnel
who have the responsibility for the facility, but also
the owner or operator of a facility. Defendants
disagree that an owner or operator is automatically
a “person
in charge” under CERCLA.
In
United States v. Carr,
880 F.2d 1550 (2d
Cir.1989), the Second Circuit discussed the
definition of
“person in charge” under
42 U.S.C.
§
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
that
the Defendants violated
§
9603(a), which provides
http ://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005 580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 20 of26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d
693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 19
9603(a) in the context of a
criminal action against a
supervisor who directed a work crew to dispose of
waste cans of paint at an Army base in an improper
manner and failed to
report the release of hazardous
substances under
-CERCLA. A jury convicted the
supervisor of CERCLA reporting violatipns. The
supervisor
appealed on the basis of the jury
instruction regarding the meaning of “in- charge.”
The question before the Second Circuit was whether
an employee who had actual supervisory control
over the releases of hazardous materials
could be
held liable as a “person in charge.”
After recognizing that CERCLA contained no
definition for the term “in charge,” the Second
Circuit
turned
to CERCLA’s legislative history,
which showed that this provision of CERCLA was
modeled after the reporting requirement section of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § l321(b)(5). The
Second Circuit held:
The legislative history of section 311 bears out
appellant’s argument that CERCLA’s reporting
requirements should not be extended to
all
employees involved in a release. “The term
‘person in charge’ was
deliberately designed to
cover only supervisory personnel who have the
responsibility for the particular vessel or facility
and not to include other employees.” H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 940, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
34
(1970),
reprinted in
1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.
-
News 2691, 2712, 2719. Indeed, as the Fifth
Circuit
has stated, “to the extent that legislative
history *716 does shed light on the meaning of
‘persons in charge,’ it suggests at the very most
that Congress intended the provisions of section
311 to extend, not to
every person who ‘might
have knowledge of a release (mere employees,
for example), but only to persons who
occupy
positions of responsibility and
power.rt
United
States v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
464 F.2d 1124, 1128
(5th Cir. 1972).
That is not to say, however, that section 311 of
the
Clean Water Act--and section 103 of
CERCLA--do not reach lower-level supervisory
employees. The reporting requirements of the
two
statutes do not apply only to owners and
operators,
see United States v. Greer,
850 F.2d
1447, 1453 (11th Cir.1988), but instead
extend to
any person who is
“responsible for the operation”
of a facility from
which there is a release,
Apex
Oil Co. v. United States,
530
F.2d 1291, 1294
(8th Cir.),
cart. denied,
429 U.S. 827, 97 S.Ct.
84, 50 L.Ed.2d 90
...
(1976). As the Fifth Circuit
noted in
Mobil Oil,
imposing liability on those
“responsible” for a facility is fully consistent with
Congress’ purpose in enacting the reporting
requirements. Those in charge of an offending
facility can make timely discovery of a release,
direct the activities that result in the pollution,
and have the capacity to prevent and abate the
environmental damage.
See Mobil Oil,
464 F.2d
at 1127.
**17
Carr,
880 F.2d at 1554. Plaintiffs claim that
under
Carr,
an owner and operator is always a
“person
in
charge” for
CERCLA reporting
purposes. According to Plaintiffs, in addition to
imposing reporting
-
requirements on owners and
operators,
CERCLA
also
extends
reporting
obligations to other persons who are likewise in a
position to detect the release, including those of
relatively low rank.
See also United States v. Mobil
Oil Corp.,
464 F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th Cir.l972).
The Court has reviewed
Carr,
as well as the cases
cited. by the Second Circuit in
Carr,
and finds that
in
each case the
courts focused on the fact that
the
“person” in question was “actively involved in the
daily operation of the business,” had “the capacity
to make timely discovery of oil discharges,” and
had the “power to direct the activities of persons
who control the mechanisms causing the pollution.”
See Greer,
850 F.2d at 1453;
Mobil Oil,
464 F.2d
at
1127. - Each
of
the
powers
of
the
“owner-operator” discussed in these cases concerns
the element of
control
exerted over the facility.
From a review of this case law, the Court concludes
that the proper inquiry
in determining whether the
Defendants qualify as a “person in charge” should
be whether the Defendants
“occupy positions of
responsibility and power” and whether they are in a
position to “make timely discovery of a release,
direct the activities that result in the pollution, and
have the capacity
to prevent
and abate the
environmental damage.”
Carr,
880 F.2d at 1554,
Therefore, the Court declines to define person in
charge to always include “owner or operator.”
While in most cases an owner or operator will
qualify as a “person in charge,” this determination
will depend on the nature and degree of control the
person has over the facility in question.
2. Operator
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http://print.westlaw. comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
299 F.Supp.2d
693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 21 of26
Page 20
Plaintiffs contend -that the Defendants violated
EPCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§
11004(a), which provides
that:
If a release of an extremely hazardous substance
referred to in section 11002(a) of this title occurs
from a facility at which a hazardous chemical is
produced, used, or stored, and such releases
requires notification under section 103(a) of
CERCLA
...,
the owner or operator *717 of the
facility shall immediately provide notice....
42 U.S.C.
§ 11004(a). Therefore, to be liable
under 42 U.S.C.
§ 11004(a), a
Defendant must be -
considered an “owner
or operator” of the facility.
The term operator is not defined in either EPCRA
or its
regulations. However, in light of EPCRA’s
close connection with CERCLA, the
-
Supreme
Court’s analysis of “operator” found in
United
States v. Bestfoods
is also applicable to EPCRA.
United States v. Bestfoods,
524 U.S. 51, 66- 67, 118
S.Ct. 1876, 141
L.Ed.2d
43 (1998). The Supreme
Court has held that
An operator
is simply someone who directs the
workings
of,
nIanages, or conducts the
affairs of a
facility. To sharpen the definition for
purposes of
CERCLA’s concern with environmental
contamination, an operator must manage, direct,
or conduct
operations specifically related to
pollution, that is, operations
having to do with the
leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or
decisions about con~pliance with
environmental
regulations.
**lSIdat66..67, 118 S.Ct. 1876.
B. Tyson Foods
Plaintiffs have moved to stay consideration of
Tyson Foods, Inc.’s motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of whether it is a “person in
charge” of a facility and other issues related to
corporate liability DN
61. Plaintiffs maintain that
Tyson Foods has not
meaningfully responded to the
Plaintiffs’ discovery requests regarding Tyson
Foods involvement with the chicken production
facilities at issue in this litigation, including its
relationship with its subsidiary, Tyson Chicken.
Specifically, Plaintiffs complain that Tyson Foods
did not produce the documents requested by
-
Plaintiffs until after it filed its motion for
summary
judgment. And
when Tyson Foods did finally
produce
the
additional
documents, Plaintiffs
maintain that its limited production did not satisfy
the Plaintiffs’ request. As a result, Plaintiffs claim
that they lack essential facts to oppose Tyson Foods’
motion for partial summary judgment on the issue
of “person in charge.”
Summary judgment is improper if the non-movant
is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for
discovery.
Vance v. United States,
90 F.3d 1145,
1148
(6th Cir.1996). Rule
56(1)
of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential
to justify the
party’s opposition, the court may
refuse the application for judgment or may order
a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained
or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had
or may make such other order as is just.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f).
Plaintiffs have informed the Court that additional
discovery is needed to defend against Tyson Foods’’
motion for partial summary judgment. Because of
the limited amount of discovery conducted, the
Court will allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to seek
further discovery regarding the relationship between
Tyson Foods and the chicken production facilities,
including Tyson Chicken. The Court is cognizant
of Defendants’ claims that Plaintiffs have failed to
file a motion to compel discovery of this
information. However, with discovery limited to
select threshold issues and given the recent addition
of Tyson Chicken into this litigation, FN6
the
Court is
-
reluctant
*718
to
conclude that the
Plaintiffs have not been diligent in seeking the
discovery necessary to respond to Tyson -
Foods’
-
motion for summary judgment.
-
-
FN6. In November of 2002, the “Court
granted Defendant Tyson
Foods’ motion to
amend its answer to assert that Tyson
-
Chicken was actually the corporation
involved with
the chicken production
facilities. The
-
motions
for summary
judgment were filed in March of 2003.
The Plaintiffs are reminded that under CERCLA
and EPCRA, they -are required to prove that Tyson
Foods is a person in
charge or an operator as the
Court has defined these terms in order to
impose the
reporting requirements of CERCLA and EPCRA on
Copr. © 2004
West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw.com1delivery.html?dest’~’atp&dataidB005 580000004016000396482...
11/29/2004
299 F.Supp.2d 693
-
-
299
F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC
1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 22 of 26
Page 21
Tyson Foods. Plaintiffs have repeatedly stated that
they need more discovery to determine the
relationship between
Tyson Foods and Tyson
Chicken. However, the Court would
caution the
Plaintiffs that the United States Supreme Court in
Bestfoods,
524 U.S.
51,’
118 S.Ct. 1876, has held
that the
focus should instead rest “on the
relationship between the parent corporation and
the
...
facility itself.”
Id.
at 68, 118 S.Ct. 1876.
**19
For the reasons set forth
above, Tyson Foods’
motion for summary judgment on the “person in
charge” issue is denied with leave to refile after
completion of discovery. Because the Court has
chosen to reexamine this issue as it relates to Tyson
Foods after completion of discovery, Plaintiffs’
motion to stay consideration of Tyson Foods’
motion on the issue of person in charge is therefore
denied as moot. Plaintiffs
should seek appropriate
discovery motions to obtain the information
allegedly withheld by the Defendants pursuant to
the new scheduling order which shall be prepared
by the Magistrate
Judge.
C. Tyson Chicken
Tyson Foods on behalf of its wholly owned
subsidiary, Tyson Chicken, has filed a motion for
partial summary judgment arguing that Tyson
Chicken is not liable for the alleged unreported
ammonia releases under CERCLA and EPCRA
because it is not a person in charge, owner or
operator of the Adams and Buchanan Facilities.
Plaintiffs have also filed a motion for summary
judgment against
Tyson Chicken arguing that it
is a
person in charge and operator of the Adams,
Buchanan, and Tyson Facilities.
I. CERCLA
As discussed above, to be held liable under
CERCLA section 103(a),
a
Defendant must be
considered a “person in charge” of a facility. The
factors that determine whether Tyson Chicken is a
“person in charge” of a facility include whether
Tyson Chicken “occupies a
position
of
responsibility and power,” and whether Tyson
Chicken is in a position to “make timely discovery
of a ‘release, direct the
activities that result in the
pollution, and have the capacity to prevent and
abate the environmental
damage” at the facility in
question.
Carr,
880 F.2d at
1554.
-
23 Tyson Chicken is clearly a person in charge of
the Tyson Facility and is directly responsible for the
alleged ammonia
discharges from that chicken
production facility. Tyson Chicken leases this
facility from th~Tyson Children Partnership, and
Tyson employees perform all the duties necessary
to raise the chickens at this facility. It clearly
occupies a position of responsibility and power and
is in a position to make timely discovery of releases,
directs the activities that result in the pollution, and
has the capacity to prevent and
-
abate the
environmental damage.
Carr,
880 F.2d at 1554.
Tyson Chicken appears to concede its role as a
“person in charge” of the Tyson Facility.
24
As to the Adams and Buchanan facilities,
Tyson Chicken asserts that it is not a
“person in
charge” of those facilities. Tyson Chicken argues
that under the *719 terms of its Grower Contracts
with the Adams
and Buchanan farms, Tyson
Chicken merely provides chicks, feed, veterinary
services, medication, and technical advice to the
contract growers. According to Defendants, the
Broiler Growing Guide only provides written
guidelines that have proven effective. The technical
advisors are the only employees of Tyson Chicken
who have regular contact with the farms and the
farm managers. Defendants assert that the technical
advisors visit the farms periodically to observe the
growing conditions and to make recommendations
to aid in the contract grower’s performance.
According to Defendants, these technical advisors
are not at the farms every day, and even when they
are there, they are not present for an entire
day--they may visit one or more farms in a day.
Defendants argue that the broiler visitation
reports
reflect that the technical advisors do not have
sufficient involvement with the farms
so as to be
considered persons in charge of the facilities as that
term is applied for purposes of the CERCLA
reporting requirement. FN7 Defendants argue that
since the technical advisors who are Tyson Chicken
employees are only
present on the farms a few days
during
a grow cycle, they are not involved in the
daily operations of the farms, and they are not in the
best position to detect, prevent or abate a release of
a substance. As a result, Defendants argue that
Tyson Chicken is not a person in charge of the
Adams and Buchanan Farms. The Court disagrees.
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B 005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 23 of 26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299
F.Supp.2d
693, 2003 WL
22595989
(W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 22
FN7. Specifically, Defendants point to the
documents presented in Jeffrey Power’s
deposition which showed that a technical
advisor visited the Onton # 1 farm six
times in connection with one flock. One
of
the six visits was for a pre-brood report
and one was on the day of placement, on
June 14, 2002. These reports suggest that
once the chicks were placed on the farm,
the technical
advisor, who is an employee
of Tyson Chicken, visited the farm only
four more times during the 49 to 51 day
grow period, on June 18, 20,
25 and July
24, 2001. Similar frequencies of visits are
suggested by other reports.
**20 Contrary to
Defendants’
argument, the
standard is not whether Tyson Chicken is in the best
position to detect, prevent or abate a release of
ammonia. Instead, the reporting requirements apply
to any person who is a position to detect, prevent,
and abate a release of hazardous substance. There
may be several’ “persons in charge” at the same
fa:cility.
See United States v. Hansen,
262 F.3d
1217, 1253-54 (11th Cir.2001),
cert. denied,
535
U.S. 1111, 122 S.Ct. 2326, 122 S.Ct. 2327, 153
L.Ed.2d 158 (2002).
Therefore, under the
definition of person in
~hargeboth the
growers and
Tyson Chicken -could be found to be a person in
charge.
Tyson Chicken seeks to insulate itself from the
reporting requirements of both CERCLA and
EPCRA by claiming that Adams and Buchanan are
independent contractors solely responsible for
environmental
compliance-
,
at
the
chicken
production facilities. Whether Tyson Chicken is a
person
in charge is determined by examining the
relationship between it and the facility and not by
how the parties choose
to characterize, their
relationship. The Alabama Supreme Court in
Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Stevens,
783 So.2d 804, 809
(Ala.2000) addressed a similar issue. In
Stevens,
the Alabama Supreme Court found
Tyson’s control
of
its
growers so complete
that it held that an
individual that raised hogs for Tyson was its “agent”
and upheld a $25,000 punitive damages verdict
against Tyson and its grower for mismanagement of
the hog operation. Interpreting a contract similar to
the ones in this case,
the Alabama Supreme Court
refused to find the grower to be an “independent
contractor,” as the contract provided. The Supreme
Court noted stated that:’
*720 The plaintiffs
presented evidence
indicating
that Tyson specified where the hog
houses should be located and how large each
house should be, and that Tyson even arranged
for financing of the houses. Tyson required that
the
growers
implement
a
specific
waste-management
system. It inspected the
grower’s hog operation almost every week and,
as evidenced by the inspection reports and
photographs, recommended solutions for
Bumett’s waste-management problems. Tyson
provided the hogs and provided food, veterinary
supplies, and veterinary care for the hogs. The
grower’s primary
responsibility was to feed,
water, and
otherwise care for the animals. The
evidence was sufficient to create a
jury
question
as to the existence of an agency. Therefore, the
trial court did not
err
in sustaining the jury’s
verdict as to this issue.
Stevens,
783 So.2d at 809. While the
Stevens
case
does not address liability under CERCLA or
EPCRA, the Court finds that it does adequately
describe the Tyson’s
relationship, or
in this case
Tyson Chicken’s
relationship, with its growers.
After a review of the
record, the Court concludes
that no reasonable juror could differ on the issue of
whether Tyson
Chicken is a person
in charge of
both the Adams and Buchanan Facilities. Tyson
Chicken is clearly in a position of
responsibility and
power with -respect to each facility and is in a
position to make a timely
discovery of a release,
direct the activities that result in the ammonia
releases, and has the capacity to prevent and abate
the alleged environmental damage.
See Carr,
880
F.2d at 1554.
**21 Tyson Chicken is involved in the facility
design
and
equipment
specifications.
Tyson
Chicken directs growers how to build and orient the
houses, how -to heat, cool, ventilate the buildings,
and how to illuminate the house to ensure optimum
chicken growth. Tyson Chicken provides exacting
equipment specification and advises growers as to
the proper retailers from which to purchase this
equipment. If a grower chooses
-
~todeviate from
Tyson
Chicken’s
specification
or
growing
instructions, Tyson Chicken reserves the right to
refuse to deliver chicks or seize the property in
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005 580000004016000396482...
11/29/2004
Page 24 of26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
-
-299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.), 58,ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 23
question. Tyson chicken owns the chickens
throughout the production process, including the
period the chickens are located at the chicken
production
facility. In fact, Tyson Chicken
provides not only the chicks, but the feed, technical
support, medicine, and veterinary dare for the
chicks.
Additionally, the evidence reflects Tyson
Chicken not
only controls’ the product, but payment
and some expenditures at the chicken production
facilities.
-
Most
importantly,
Tyson
Chicken
technical
advisors monitor the Adams and Buchanan
facilities, They provide detailed instructions to the
growers. Tyson technical advisors test ammonia
levels inside the house and direct ventilation
program to exhaust ammonia into the environment.
The record reflects that Tyson Chicken directs its
growers to discharge ammonia from the chicken
houses at the production facilities. The Broiler
Growing Guide specifically instructs growers -
to
exhaust ammonia into the environment to
limit
ammonia buildup inside the chicken houses. Tyson’
technical advisors also routinely visit the production
facilities and tell the growers to discharge ammonia
into the enyironment. For example, (1) one Tyson
Chicken technical advisor noted in his broiler
visitation report that “ammonia is in
all of the
houses” and
instructed
Adams to “up the ventilation
to
thirty
more seconds,” (Rogers DecI.
¶ 11, Exh. I
Broiler Visitation Report, TY-BVR-000104); (2)
another Tyson Chicken technical adviser noted in a
broiler visitation report that *721 “the ventilation
set up at the Adams facility looks good and is
according to our program,” (Rogers Decl. ¶
11,
-
Exh. I Broiler Visitation Report, TY-BVR-000120);
(3) another Tyson Chicken technical advisor
-- -
directed Adams
-
to
“run
ventilation fans 30
seconds
out of 10 minutes to evacuate
ammonia,” (Rogers Decl. ¶
11, Exh. I Broiler
Visitation Report, TY-BVR-000l59); (4) one
Tyson
Chicken
technical
advisor
informed
Buchanan “I tested the Ammonia Levels in houses 1
& 8.... These levels are too high,” (Rogers Decl., ¶
11, Exh. I Broiler Visitation Report, TY BVR
000669); and (5) a different Tyson Chicken
technical advisor told Buchanan “to increase Fan
time. I am ‘starting to see some blind birds in the
houses. We need to get the Ammonia out of these
houses.” (Rogers Decl. ¶ 11, Exh. I Broiler
Visitation Report, TY BVR 000602). Tyson
Chicken technical advisers are present at the facility
on weekly basis and are in a position to make a
timely discovery of some of the releases, Tyson
Chicken directs the discharge of ammonia from the
chicken, production facility through the Broiler
Growing Guide and individual instructions from the
technical advisOrs, and Tyson Chicken has the
capacity to prevent and abate the alleged
environmental damage.
**22 For these reasons, the Court concludes that
Tyson Chicken is a “person in charge” of the Tyson,
Adams, and Buchanan Facilities and is subject to
the reporting requirements of CERCLA.
‘2. EPCRA
- 25 As discussed
-
above, to be held liable under
EPCRA section 304(a), a defendant must be
considered an “owner or operator” of a facility.
The parties agree that Tyson Chicken is not the
-
owner of the Tyson; Adams or Buchanan Facilities.
Therefore, the question is whether Tyson Chicken is
an operator of those facilities.
26 “An operator is simply someone who directs
the workings of, manages, or
conducts the affairs of
a facility.”
Bestfoods,
524 U.S. at 66, 118 S.Ct.
1876. More specifically, the Supreme Court has
-
held that
to be considered an operator a defendant
must “must manage, direct, or conduct operations
specifically related to pollution, that is, operations
having to do with the leakage or disposal of
hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance
with environmental regulations.”
Id.
at 66-67, 118
S.Ct. 1876. Clearly, Tyson Chicken is an operator
of the Tyson Facility. It manages, directs
-and
conducts the affairs of the facility. Similarly, for
the reasons set forth in the Court’s discussion of
“person in charge,” the Court concludes that these
facts clearly demonstrate that Tyson Chicken is an
operator of the chicken production facilities owned
by Adams and Buchanan as well. Tyson Chicken
manages andlor directs many of the operations
related to the venting of ammonia. Finding that no
reasonable juror could differ on this issue, the Court
concludes that Tyson Chicken is an operator of the
Adams and Buchanan Facilities and is subject to the
reporting requirements of EPCRA.
For all the reasons set forth above and finding no
Copr. ©
2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw. com/delivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
Page 25 of 26
299 F.Supp.2d 693
‘
,
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL
22595989
(W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 24
genuine issues of material fact with respect to these
issues,
the Court grants’ Plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment with respect to whether Tyson
Chicken is a “person in charge” or an “operator” of
the Adams, Buchanan, and Tyson Facilities under
CERCLA and
EPCRA.
D. Tyson Children Partnership
Tyson Children Partnership has filed a motion for
-
partial summary judgment arguing that it is not
liable for alleged unmeported ammonia releases at
the Tyson Facility *722 under CERCLA or
EPCRA. The Partnership leases the
“Tyson
Facility” property to Tyson Chicken, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Tyson Foods, Inc. The
Partnership acquired the property from owners who
were parties to a grow contract with Hudson Foods,
the predecessor of Tyson Chicken. The former
owners informed Hudson that they intended to
abandon the property and the flocks of chicken then
housed there. Exercising its rights under the
contracts, Hudsdn stepped in to manage the flocks
until the birds reached maturity. The Partnership
bought -the property, and by lease dated September
15,
2000, leased it to Hudson for fifteen years.
Tyson Chicken is now the lessee.
, -
The Partnership is only a lessor of property and has
no other role in these broiler production facilities.
The question before the Court is whether the
Partnership is liable under CERCLA or EPCRA for
the alleged failure to report ammonia releases at the
Tyson Facility. The Partnership’s role, or lack of
role, at the Adams and Buchanan Facilities is not at
issue.
1. CERCLA
**23 As discussed above, to be held liable under
CERCLA section 103(a), a Defendant must be
considered a “person in charge” of a facility. In
order for the Partnership to be deemed a “person in
charge” of the Tyson Facility, the Partnership must
“occupy a position
of responsibility and power,”
and must be in a position to “make timely discovery
of a release, direct the activities that result in the
pollution, and have the capacity to prevent and
abate the environmental damage.”
Carr,
880 F.2d
at
1554.
27
The Partnership is not involved in the daily
operations of the chicken production operations and
is not in a position to detect, prevent and abate a
release of, hazardous substances. The Partnership
does not contract with any- growers. No evidence
suggests that the Partnership plays any role in the
chicken production operations at issue on a routine
basis such that it could be said that it is responsible
for the operations or that it is a position to detect,
prevent, and abate the release of hazardous
substances. For these reasons, as a lessor of the
property in question with no active role in managing
the property, the Partnership is not a “person in
charge” of the Tyson Facility and as result, had no
responsibility under CERCLA to report the alleged
releases of ammonia.
See, e.g., Neighbors for a
Toxic Free Community v. Vulcan Materials Co.,
964 F.Supp. 1448, 1454 (D.Colo.1997). All
claims
against Tyson Children Partnership under CERCLA
are dismissed.
2. EPCRA
28 As discussed above, to be held liable under
EPCR.A section 304(a), a Defendant must be
considered an “owner or operator” of a facility.
“An
operator is simply someone who directs the
workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a
facility.”
Bes~foods,
524 U.S. at 66, 118 S.Ct. 1876
Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that to be
deemed an operator a defendant “must
-
manage,
direct,
or
conduct operations specifically related to
pollution, that is, operations having to do with-- -the~
leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions
about compliance with environmental regulations.”
Id.
at 66-67, 118 S.Ct. 1876.
For the reasons set
forth in the Court’s discussion of the Partnership’s
liability under CERCLA, no evidence suggest that
the Partnership manages, directs, or conducts the
activities of the Tyson Facility related to pollution.
Therefore, the Partnership is not an “operator” of
the Tyson Facility.
*723
Plaintiffs
argue
that Tyson
Children
Partnership is still liable under the EPCRA
reporting statutes because of the clear statutory
requirements that owners of facilities must report
releases
of
hazardous
substances.
Plaintiffs
maintain that it is clear that the Partnership owns
the Tyson Facility and leases it to Tyson Chicken,
Inc.
L
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://print.westlaw.comldelivery.html?dest=atp&dataid=B005580000004016000396482... 11/29/2004
-
-
Page26of26
--
-
299 F.Supp.2d 693
299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL
22595989
(W.D.Ky.), 58ERC 1076
(Cite as: 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 2003 WL 22595989 (W.D.Ky.))
Page 25
The Court agrees -with the Plaintiffs that Tyson
Children Partnership owns the land and its buildings
on which the Tyson Facility is located. However,
this fact alone does not resolve the question of
whether Tyson Children Partnership is subject to
the
reporting requirements
of EPCRA.
In
Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community v. Vulcan
Materials Co.,
964
F.Supp. 1448 (D.Colo.l997),
the court rejected arguments similar to those made
by the Plaintiffs. In that case, General American
Transportation Corporation (GATC) owned a
railroad tank car that it leased to Vulcan Material
Company. Toxic materials were released from the
tank car
while it was at the Vulcan
terminal. In
determining the liability of the lessor under the
EPCF.A reporting statute, the district court held that
“since
GATC was not in charge and had no
knowledge,
notification by
GATC was not
required.”
Vulcan Materials, 964
F.Supp. at 1454.
The district court further held that the plaintiffs
interpretation of the
statute
and regulations
unreasonable “since it would require any lessor of
any type of equipment to
file a full EPCRA report
when a toxic spill occurs, even when the lessor has
no knowledge or ability to do this.”
Id.
**24 Applying the principle in
Vulcan Materials
to
this case, a lessor of property who has no control
over the operations of a facility or knowledge of a
release of a reportable quantity of a hazardous
substance is not subject
to the
reporting
requirements of EPCRA. This is consistent with the
purpose of EPCRA which is to establish a
framework of agencies designed to inform the
public about the presence of hazards and toxic
chemicals, and to prOvide emergency reporting in
the event of health-threatening releases. Under the
facts of this case, it is clear that Tyson Children
Partnership is a lessor of the property and that
Tyson Chicken is the lessee of the property and is
the “operator” of the chicken production facility in
question. A question of, fact exists concerning
whether Tyson Children Partnership, as the lessor
of the property, is in a position to have knowledge
of the alleged releases or the ability to report the
alleged releases. The facts may reveal that the
Partnership is not in such a position. However, at
this stage of the litigation, the Court finds that a
genuine issue of material fact exists concerning
whether the Partnership had knowledge of releases
of ammonia at or above the reportable quantity or
had the ability to report such releases from the
Tyson Facility.
For these reasons, the motion by Defendant, Tyson
Children Partnership, for partial summary judgment
against Plaintiffs on the issue of “person in charge”
and “operator” is granted and the motion by
Defendant for partial summary judgment on the
issue of “owner” is denied.
IX. CONCLUSION
For
the reasons set forth
above, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED as follows:
(1) The motion by plaintiffs for partial summary
judgment as to the First and Second Causes of
Action
-
DN 44 is
granted in part and denied in
part.;
(2) The motion by Defendants for
summary
judgment on the CERCLA and EPCRA issues DN
49 is
denied;
(3) The motion by Defendant, Tyson Foods on its
behalf, for partial summary
*724 judgment on the
issue of “person in charge” DN
50
is denied with
leave to refile after discovery;
(4) The motion by Defendant, Tyson Foods on
behalf of Tyson Chicken, for partial summary
judgment on the issue of “person in charge” DN
50
is
denied;
(5)
The motion by Defendant, Tyson Children
Partnership,
for partial summary judgment on the
issue of “person
in charge” DN 48 is
granted and
the
motion
by,
Defendant,
Tyson
Children
Partnership, for partial
summary judgment on the
issue of “owner and operator” DN 48 is granted
in part and denied
iii
part.
-
(6) The motion
by Plaintiff to stay consideration
of
Tyson Foods’ motion for partial summary judgment
on
the issue of “person in charge” DN 61 is
denied as moot.
299
F.Supp.2d
693,
(W.D.Ky.), 58 ERC 1076
END OF DOCUMENT
2003
WL
22595989
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
http ://pri nt.westlaw.comldelivery.htrnl?dest=atp&dataid=B005 580000004016000396482...
11/29/2004