1. Continuing Violations Observed:
      2. Site Code: 077 809 5036 County: Jackson
      3. )ebris Pile
  1. ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
  2. Open Dump Inspection Checklist
    1. SECTION DESCRIPTION VIOL
    2. ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS
      1. 6. 21(d)CONDUCTANY WASTE-STORAGE, WASTE-TREATMENT, OR WASTE- DISPOSAL
      2. WASTE INTO THE STATE AT/TO SITES NOT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF ACT
      3. ANY OF THE FOLLOWING OCCURRENCES AT THE DUMP SITE:
      4. (1) Litter
      5. 13. 809.302(a)
    3. OTHER REQUIREMENTS
      1. 14.APPARENT VIOLATION OF:(LI)PCB;(0)CIRCUIT COURT
  3. DIGITAL INSPECTION PHOTOS
  4. No Photo
      1. Violations Observed:
    1. ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS
    2. OTHER REQUIREMENTS
  5. DIGITAL INSPECTION PHOTOS
      1. 0778095036-12052003-01
      2. 0778095036-12052003-02
  6. DIGITAL INSPECTION PHOTOS
      1. 0778095036-12052003-03
      2. 0778095036-12052003-04
  7. AFFIDAVIT
      1. Continuing Violations Observed:
  8. OPENDUMPINSPECTION
      1. Page 3077 812 5013Carbondale / Egon KamarasyMarch 11, 2004
    1. SECTION DESCRIPTION VIOL
    2. ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS
      1. 1. 9(a) CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW AIR POLLUTION IN ILLINOIS
      2. 2. 9(c) CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN BURNING
      3. OPERATION:
      4. 7. 21(e)DISPOSE, TREAT, STORE, OR ABANDON ANY WASTE, OR TRANSPORT ANY
      5. WASTE INTO THE STATE ATITO SITES NOT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF ACT
      6. ANY OF THE FOLLOWING OCCURRENCES AT THE DUMP SITE:
      7. 10. 812.1 01(a)
      8. SUBTITLE GFAILURE TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR A PERMIT TO DEVELOP AND
      9. OPERATE A LANDFILL
      10.  
  9.  
    1. Photo File Name:
  10. Digital Inspection Photo Sheet
    1. Photo File Name:
    2. Photo File Name:
  11. Digital Inspection Photo Sheet
  12. Photo File Name:
  13. Photo File Name:
      1. Continuing Violations Observed:
  14. ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCYOpen Dump Inspection Checklist
    1. SECTION DESCRIPTIONVIOL
    2. ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS
      1. 2. 9(c) CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN BURNING
      2. 6. 21(d)CONDUCT ANY WASTE-STORAGE, WASTE-TREATMENT, OR WASTE- DISPOSAL
      3. OPERATION:
      4. 7. 21(e)DISPOSE, TREAT, STORE, OR ABANDON ANY WASTE, OR TRANSPORT ANY
      5. WASTE INTO THE STATE ATITO SITES NOT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF ACT
      6. ANY OF THE FOLLOWING OCCURRENCES AT THE DUMP SITE:
      7. 10. 812.101 (a)FAILURE TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR A PERMIT TO DEVELOP AND
      8. OPERATE A LANDFILL
      9. 13. 809.302(a)
  15. OTHER REQUIREMENTS
  16. Digital Inspection Photo Sheet
  17. Digital Inspection Photo Sheet
  18. Digital Inspection Photo Sheet
    1. ADMINISTRATIVE CITATION
      1. that this is lawfuL
      2. EXHIBIT
      3. L05/03/o4 184285
      4. 784.80
      5. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS REQUIRED
      6. ATTACHMENT A
      7. EXHIBIT
  19.  
    1. MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING AMENDED PETITION TOCONTEST ADMINISTRATIVE CITATION
      1. Memorandum Supporting Amended Petition to Contest Administrative Citation
      2. ~HERESPONDENT DID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN
      3. hazard, a public nuisance, or a fire hazard.
  20. 111111 111111 11111 11111 11111 1111 1111

JACKSON COUNTY
HEALTH
DEPARTMENT
AFFIDAVIT
REC~v~
CLERK’S OF~~E
IN THE MATTER OF:
2Ot~4
Pt
ri
STATEOFlLUNO~S
0778095036
IJackson
County
ri
1
101
~
t~Il
IA\
II
Pollution Contro’
Boarc~
Makanda
I
Egon
Kamarasy
-•
L.
COMPLiANCE FILE
HJ
Ii
Respondent.
Affiant, Don Terry, being first duly sworn, voluntarily deposes and states as follows:
1.
Affiant is a fieldinspector employed by Jackson County Health Department and
has been so employed at all times pertinent hereto.
2.
On March
25,
2004, betweenthe hours of2:32 pm and
2:35
pm,
Affiant
conducted an inspection ofthe open dump site known as MakandslEgon
Kamarasy, Jackson County, Illinois.
3.
Affiant inspected said open dump site by an inspection from a location adjacent to
the site.
4.
As a result ofthe activities referred to in Paragraphs 2 and 3 above, Affiant
completed the Inspection Report form attachedhereto and made a part hereof,
which, to the best of Affiant’s knowledge and belief; is an accurate representation
ofAffiant’s observations and factual conclusions with respect to said Egon
Kamarasy, Makanda, Illinois, open dump site.
Don Terry
ti
Solid Waste Inspector
Subscribed and Sworn To before me
this
c~Z’7
day of
~
,
2004.
(~c~1W~k~
t~ifl
ACY~H~NG1
MY COMMISSION
EXP~RE~
03/04/2006
_,w~
w~w
~
-
~L~-
A

NARRATIVE
INSFECTIONREPORTDOCUMENT
OFENDUMP SITE
Date
ofInspection:
March
25,
2004
Inspector:
Don Terry
Site Code:
077 809
5036
County:
Jackson
Site Name:
Makanda / Egon Kamarasy
Time:
2:32pm
2:35 pm
Location:
Eastern end of
Starvation
Acres Rd
Owner ofProperty:
Egon Kamarasy
Approximate Volume of Waste at site:
110
cu/yds
GPS:
N 37°40.580
W 089°15.105
GENERAL REMARKS
During the above date and time, I conducted an inspection ofthis site as a follow-up ofone done on
December
5,
2003.
According to the Jackson County Assessor’s Office, the site is owned by Egon Kamarasy of474
Egret LakeRd, Carbondaie, 1L 62901.
.The weather conditions at thetime ofthe inspection were:
partly cloudy, windy and a temperature ofabout 72°F.
I did
not enter the property and conducted this follow-up inspection from thegate.
From the gate I observed a debris pile in
approximatelythe
same location as I had observed on
December
5,
2003
(Photo #1, see sketch).
It appeared larger than when I observed it on my last
inspection,
indicating more material has been open
dumped at this location since December
5,
2003.
The approximate volume ofthis debris pile is
110 cu/yds (Photo #1, see
sketch).
It appeared to
consist ofconstruction / demolition debris consolidated from off site and included: dimensional
lumber, dark paneling, metal siding
and other materials not readily identifiable from my location.
My inspection ended at approximately 2:35 pm.

Continuing Violations Observed:
Item
#5(21)(a):
Cause or allow open dumping,
Item #S(21)(p)(1
and 7): Cause
or allow the
open dumping ofany waste in
a mannerwhich results in any of the following occurrences at
the dump
~it~
(1)
1itt~r;
(7) Deposition of
general eonstruetion
or demolition debris; or
clean construction or demolition debris:
During the inspection open dumping on the site was
observed causing litter and the deposition
of
general or clean construction or demolition debris.
Item
#6(21)(d)(1):
Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation:
Without a
permit;
Item #6(21)(dI(2):
Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment,
or
waste-disposal operation: In violation ofany regulations or standards adopted by the Board:
Due to the volume
and typeofwaste observed, the mannerin which it was placed and the location,
it
can
be
assumed that
the
waste was
not generated on site
and was transported
onto
thd
site for the
purpose of
disposal.
Duringthe
inspection violations
of
regulations and standards
were observed.
There
is no record
that
Mr. Kamarasy
was issued
a
pemiit by the Agency to
conduct a waste-
storage,
waste-treatment,
or
waste-disposal
operation.
Item #7(21)(e):
Dispose, treat, store, or abandon any waste, or transport any waste into the
State at/to sites not meeting requirements oftheAct: Violations of
this
section ofthe Act were
observed during the
inspection.
Item #10(812.100(a): Failure to submit an application for a permit to develop
and
operate a
landfill;
Item #15(807.201): Failure to obtain a Developmental Permit to operate a solid
waste management site;
Item #15(807.202): Failure to
obtain
an Operational Permit to
operate a solid waste management site:
There is no record that Mr.
Kamarasy
has submitted
or
received a permit to develop or operate a landfill or to develop or operate a solid waste
management site.

vrc1v
uui~ir
iiv~r&t.iiuiv
SITE SKETCH
I
Date Of Inspection:
March
25,
20204
Inspector:
Don Terry
Site Code:
077 809 5036
County: Jackson
Site Name:
Makanda/ Egon
Kamarasy
Time:
2:32 pm 2:35 pm
Not
Drawn to Scale
All locations are approximate
0
indicates approx. location &
direction
ofphotos
fN
/
/1
/
/
I.
-————j
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
)ebris Pile
0
Starvation Acres Rd
/
/
/
/
/~
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
Fence
/1
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/

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ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY

Back to top


Open
Dump Inspection Checklist
LPc#:
Makanda
I
Egon Kamarasy
County:
Jackson
Location/Site Name:
Date:
0312512004
Time:
From
2:32
pm
Inspector(s):
Don Terry
No. of Photos Taken:
#
1
Interviewed:
no one at site
SECTION
DESCRIPTION
VIOL
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS
1.
9(a)
CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW
AIR
POLLUTION IN ILLINOIS
El
2.
9(c)
CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN BURNING
El
3.
12(a)
CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW WATER POLLUTION IN ILLINOIS
El
4.
12(d)
CREATE A WATER POLLUTION
HAZARD
El
5.
21(a)
CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
6.
21(d)
CONDUCTANY WASTE-STORAGE, WASTE-TREATMENT, OR WASTE- DISPOSAL
OPERATION:
(1)
WIthout a Permit
(2)
In Violation of Any Regulations or Standards Adopted by the Board
7.
21(e)
DISPOSE, TREAT,
STORE, OR ABANDON ANY WASTE, OR TRANSPORT ANY
WASTE INTO THE STATE AT/TO SITES NOT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF ACT
8.
21(p)
CAUSE OR ALLOW THE OPEN DUMPING OF ANY WASTE IN A MANNER WHICH RESULTS IN
ANY OF THE
FOLLOWING OCCURRENCES AT THE
DUMP SITE:
(1)
Litter
(2)
Scavenging
El
(3)
Open
Burning
El
(4)
DeposItion_of Waste
in_Standing_or_Flowing_Waters
El
(5)
Proliferation
of Disease Vectors
El
(6)
Standing or Flowing Liquid Discharge from the Dump Site
El
ts
077
809 5036
Region:
7
-
Marion
To
2:35 pm
Previous Inspection Date:
12/05/2003
Weather:
72°F
--
partly cloudy with
moderate winds
Est. Amt. of Waste:
110
yds3
Samples Taken:
Yes #
Complaint #:
2004-002
Responsible Party
Mailing Address(es)
and Phone
Number(s):
Egon
Kamarasy
474 Egret Lake Rd
Carbondale,
IL
62901
__No~
Revised 06/18/2001
(Open Dump
-
1)

LPC#
0778095036
Inspection Date:
03/25/2004
(7)
Deposition of General Construction or Demolition Debris;
or Clean Construction or
Demolition Debris
9.
55(a)
NO PERSON SHALL:
(1)
Cause or Allow Open Dumping of Any Used or Waste Tire
E~l
(2)
Cause
or
Allow Open Burning of Any Used or Waste Tire
L:I
35 ILLINOIS
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE REQUIREMENTS
SUBTITLE 0
10.
812.101(a)
FAILURE
TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR APERMIT TO DEVELOP AND
OPERATE A LANDFILL
11.
722.111
HAZARDOUS WASTE DETERMINATION
El
12.
808.1 21
SPECIAL WASTE DETERMINATION
El
13.
809.302(a)
ACCEPTANCE
OF
SPECIAL WASTE
FROM AWASTE
TRANSPORTER WITHOUT A
WASTE HAULING PERMIT, UNIFORM WASTE PROGRAM REGISTRATION AND
PERMIT AND/OR MANIFEST
El
OTHER REQUIREMENTS
14.
APPARENT VIOLATION OF:
(LI)
PCB;
(0)
CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NUMBER:
ORDER ENTERED ON:
El
15.
OTHER:
807.201
Developmental Permit & 807.202
Operational
Permit
El
El
El
El
.~.
El
Signature of Inspe9’àr(s)
Informational Notes
1.
illinoisJ
Environmental Protection Act 415 ILCS
514.
2.
Illinois Pollution
Control Board: 35
III. Adm.
Code, Subtitle C.
3.
Statutory and regulatory references herein are provided for convenience only and should
not be construed as legal
conclusions
ofthe Agency or as limiting the Agency’s statutory or regulatory powers.
Requirements of some statutes
and regulations cited
are in summary format.
Full text of requirements can be found
in references listed in 1.
and 2.
above.
4.
The provisions of su•bsectio.n (p) of Section
21 of the Illinois
Environmental
Protection Actshall be enforceable either
by administrative citation under Section 31.1
of the Actor by complaint under Section
31
of the Act.
5.
This inspection was conducted in accordance with Sections 4(c) and 4(d) of the Illinois
Environmental
Protection Act:
415
ILCS
5/4(c) and
(d).
6.
Items marked with an
“NE”
were not evaluated at the time of this inspection.
Revised 06/18/2001
(Open Dump -2)

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DIGITAL INSPECTION PHOTOS
Date: March
25,
2004
J
Site
#:
077 809 5036
County:
JACKSON
Time: 2:32 pm
Site Name:
Makanda/ Egon
Kainarasy
Photograph taken by:
DonTerry
COMMENTS:
Pictures taken toward:
East
PHOTO
FILE
NAME:
0778095036-03252004-01

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No Photo
Date:
Time:
Photograph taken by:
COMMENTS:
Pictures takentoward:
PHOTO
FILE NAME:

NARRATIVE
INSPECTION REPORT DOCUMENT
OPEN DUMPSITE
~
Date ofInspection:
December
5,
2003
Inspector:
Don
Terry
-~ —
-
-
~7~7
C~
(se,
~‘
IV)
.~
I~’
.~
4-....
T.-....1.-.......,
~iLe
‘..oue;
~ii
/
oui
.~i.3u
~uu11Ly.
Site Name:
Makanda / Egon Kamarasy
Time:
9:10 am
9:15
am
Location:
Eastern end of Starvation Acres Rd
Owner ofProperty:
Egon
Kamarasy
Approximate Volume of Waste at site:
100 cu/yds
GPS:
N
370
40.580
W 089°15.105
GENERAL REMARKS
During the above date
and
time, I conducted an inspection ofthe site listed above.
This inspection
was made as a follow up to a report made to
this
office by Jackson County Health Department staff.
According to the Jackson County Assessor’s Office, the
site is owned by Egon Kamarasy of474
Egret Lake Rd,
Carbondale, IL 62901.
I was accompanied on this inspection by Matt Charles a
Sanitarian at the Jackson County Health Department.
The weather conditions at the time ofthe
inspection were: cloudy, with rain/snow drizzle and a temperature of about 35°F.
I drove east on Starvation Acres Road.
I observed a section of dark wood paneling lying on the
north side ofthe road
about 100
feetwest ofthe gate we were approaching.
The road ended at this
gate which opened into a pasture containing a lake (Photo #4, see sketch) and several horses.
A
sign with “Welcome to Bittersweet Farm,
457-6167” was posted at the gate along with a “No
Trespassing”
sign (Photo #1, see
sketch).
After checking the phone book, I found that the phone
number 457-6167 is listed to the name Egon Kamarasy at 474 Egret Lake Rd, Makanda, IL 62958.
I did not enter the property and conducted my inspection from the gate.
From the gate I observed a large debris pile approximately 100 cu/yds in volume
(Photos
#2
and
#3,
see
sketch).
It appeared to
consist of construction / demolition debris consolidated from off
site and included:
dimensional
lumber, dark paneling, metal
siding and other materials not readily
identifiable from my location.
My inspection ended at approximately 9:15
am.

Page 2
077
809
5036
Makanda / Egon Kamarasy
December 5, 2003
Violations Observed:
Item #5(21)(a):
Cause or allow open dumping;
Item #S(2l)(p)(1 and 7~:
Cause or allow the
open dumping ofany waste in
a mannerwhich results in any of the following occurrences at
the dump site: (1) Litter;
(7)
Deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris; or
clean construction or demolition debris:
During the inspection open dumping on the site was
observed causing litter and the
deposition of general or clean construction or demolition debris.
Item #6(21)(d)(1’):
Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation:
Without a permit;
Item #6(21’)(d)(2):
Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or
waste-disposal operation: In
violation of any regulations orstandards adopted by the Board:
Due to the volume and type ofwaste observed, the manner in which it was placed and the location,
it can be assumed that the waste was not generated on site and was transported onto the
site for the
purpose ofdisposal.
During the
inspection violations ofregulations and standards were observed.
There is no record that Mr. Kamarasy was issued a permit by the Agency to conduct a waste-
storage, waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation.
Item
#7(21)(e): Dispose,
treat, store, or abandon any waste, or transport any waste into the
State
at/to
sites
not
meeting
requirements ofthe Act:
Violations ofthis section ofthe Act were
observed during the inspection.
Item #10(812.101)(a): Failure to submit an application for
a permit
to develop and operate
a
landfill;
Item #15(807.201): Failure to
obtain
a
Developmental Permit to operate
a
solid
waste management site;
Item
#15(807.202):
Failure to obtain an Operational Permit to
operate a solid waste management site:
There is no
record that Mr. Kamarasy has submitted or
received a permit to
develop or operate a landfill or to develop or operate a solid waste
management site.
-

ILLINOIS
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
Open
Dump Inspection Checklist
County:
Jackson
-
LPC#:
077 809 5036
Location/Site Name:
Makanda
I
Egon Kamarasy
Date:
12/05/2003
Time:
From
9:10am
Inspector(s):
Don
Terry
No. of Photos Taken:
#
4
Interviewed:
no one
at the site
Responsible
Party
Mailing Add ress(es)
and Phone
Number(s):
To
9:15
am
Previous Inspection
Date:
Weather:
rainy/snow, cloudy
-
31°F
Est.
Amt. of Waste:
100
yds3
Samples Taken:
Yes #
Complaint #:
2004-002
Region:
7
-
Marion
No~
Egon Kamarasy
474 Egret Lake
Rd
Carbondale
IL
62901
SECTION
DESCRIPTION
VIOL
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS
1.
9(a)
CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW AIR POLLUTION
IN
ILLINOIS
El
2.
9(c)
CAUSE
OR ALLOW OPEN
BURNING
LI
3.
12(a)
CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW WATER POLLUTION IN ILLINOIS
El
4.
12(d)
CREATE
AWATER POLLUTION HAZARD
El
5.
21(a)
CAUSE
OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
6.
21(d)
CONDUCT ANY
WASTE-STORAGE,
WASTE-TREATMENT, OR WASTE- DISPOSAL
OPERATION:
(1)
Without a Permit
(2)
In Violation
of Any Regulations or Standards Adopted by the
Board
7.
21(e)
DISPOSE, TREAT, STORE, OR ABANDON ANY WASTE, OR TRANSPORT ANY
WASTE INTO THE
STATE
AT/TO SITES
NOT
MEETING
REQUIREMENTS OF ACT
8.
21(p)
CAUSE
OR ALLOW THE
OPEN DUMPING OF ANY WASTE
IN A MANNER WHICH
RESULTS
IN
ANY OF
THE
FOLLOWING
OCCURRENCES AT THE DUMP SITE:
(1)
Litter
(2)
Scavenging
El
(3)
Open
Burning
El
(4)
Deposition of Waste
in Standing or Flowing Waters
El
(5)
Proliferation of Disease Vectors
-
El
(6)
Standing
or Flowing
Liquid
Discharge from the Dump
Site
El
Revised 06/18/2001
(Open Dump
-
1)

LPC#
0778095036
Inspection Date:
12/05/03
(7)
Deposition of General Construction or Demolition Debris; or Clean Construction or
Demolition Debris
9.
55(a)
NO
PERSON SHALL:
-
-
(1)
Cause or Allow Open Dumping
of Any Used or Waste Tire
El
-
(2)
Cause or Allow Open
Burning of Any Used or Waste Tire
El
35
ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
REQUIREMENTS
SUBTITLE G
10.
812.101(a)
FAILURE
TO
SUBMIT AN
APPLICATION
FOR A
PERMIT TO
DEVELOP AND
OPERATE A LANDFILL
11.
722.111
HAZARDOUS WASTE
DETERMINATION
El
12.
808.121
SPECIAL WASTE
DETERMINATION
El
13.
809.302(a)
ACCEPTANCE
OF SPECIAL
WASTE
FROM A WASTE
TRANSPORTER WITHOUT A
WASTE
HAULING
PERMIT,
UNIFORM WASTE
PROGRAM REGISTRATION
AND
PERMIT
AND/OR MANIFEST
El
OTHER REQUIREMENTS
14.
APPARENT VIOLATION OF:
(El)
PCB;
(LI)
CIRCUIT COURT
CASE
NUMBER:
ORDER
ENTERED
ON:
El
15.
OTHER:
807.201,
807.202
El
El
El
El
nspector(s)
Informational Notes
1.
Illinois
Environmental Protection Act: 415 ILCS
5/4.
2.
Illinois Pollution Control
Board: 35
Ill.
Adm. Code, Subtitle
G.
3.
Statutory
and regulatory references herein are provided for convenience only and should
not
be
construed
as legal
conclusions
of the Agency or as limiting the Agencys
statutory or regulatory powers.
Requirements of some statutes
and
regulations cited
are in summary format.
Full text of requirements can be found
in references listed
in
1.
and
2.
above.
4.
The provisions of subsection (p) of Section
21
of the Illinois
Environmental
Protection Act shall
be enforceable either
by administrative citation under Section 31.1
of the Act or by complaint under Section
31
of the Act.
5.
This inspection was conducted
in accordance with Sections 4(c) and 4(d) of the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act:
415 ILCS
5/4(c)
and
(d).
6.
Items marked with
an “NE” were not evaluated at the time of this
inspection.
El
Revised 06/18/2001
(Open Dump
-
2)

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DIGITAL INSPECTION PHOTOS
Date:
December
5,
2003
f
Site
#: 077 809
5036
County:
JACKSON
Time:
9:12
am
Site Name:
Makanda/
Egon Kamarasy
Photograph
takenby:
Don Terry
COMMENTS: Pictures taken toward:
East
PHOTO
FILE
NAME:
0778095036-12052003-01
Date: December
5,
2003
Time:
9:13am
Photograph
takenby:
Don
Terry
COMMENTS:
Pictures taken toward:
East
PHOTO
FILE NAME:
0778095036-12052003-02

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DIGITAL INSPECTION PHOTOS
Date:
December
5,
2003
Site
#: 077
809 5036
County:
JACKSON
Time: 9:14 am
Site Name:
Makanda / Egon Kamarasy
-
Photograph
takenby:
Don Terry
COMMENTS:
Pictures takentoward:
East
PHOTO
FILE
NAME:
0778095036-12052003-03
Date:
December
5, 2003
Time:
9:14am
Photograph
taken
by:
Don
Terry
COMMENTS:
Pictures
takentoward:
Southeast
PHOTO
FILE NAME:
0778095036-12052003-04

JACKSON COUNTY
HEALTH
DEPARTMENT
IN TilE
MATTER
OF:
077 812
5013/
Jackson County
Carbondale
I
Egon
Kamarasy
COMPLIANCE FILE
Respondent.

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AFFIDAVIT
Affiant, Don Terry,
being first duly sworn,
voluntarilydeposes and states as follows:
1.
Affiant is a field inspector employed by Jackson County Health Department and
has been so employed at all times pertinent hereto.
.
-
2.
On March 25,2004, between the hours of2:25 pm and 2:30 pm, Affiant
conducted an inspection ofthe
open dump site known as Carbondale / Egon
Kamarasy, Jackson County, Illinois.
3.
Affiant
inspected said
open dump site by an on-site inspection.
4.
As a result ofthe activities referred to in Paragraphs
2 and 3 above, Affiant
completed the Inspection Report form attached hereto and made a part hereof,
which, to the best ofAffiant’s knowledge and belief,
is an accurate representation
ofAffiant’s observations and factual conclusions with respect to said Egon
Kamarasy, Carbondale, Illinois, open dump site.
Don Terry
Solid Waste Inspector
Subscribed and Sworn To
before me
this
~
day of1v”C\i~
I
‘OFFICIALSEAL’
___~J~-,___
-~--,~-,,---
-. -
TRACY
L.
HARTUNG
NOTARY PUBUC, STATE OF ILUNOIS
MYOM~US~ONEXP~ESO~!2OO6
j
A
2004

NARRATIVE
INSPECTIONREPORTDOCUMENT
OPENDUMP SITE
.
-
Date ofInspection:
March
25,
2004
Inspector:
Don
Terry
Site
Code:
077 812 5013
County:
Jackson
Site
Name:
Carbondale / Egon Kamarasy
Time:
2:25 pm
2:30 pm
Location:
786 Green Ridge Rd
Owner of
Property:
Egon Kamarasy
Volume of
Waste
at
site:
10 cu / yds
-
GPS:
N 37°40.869
W 089°16.646
GENERAL REMARKS
I
During the stated date and time, I conducted an inspection ofthe site listed above.
This inspection
was made as a follow up to
an inspection made ofthis site on March 11, 2004.
Weather~onditions
at the time ofthe inspection were: cloudy, windy with the temperature about
72°F.
According to the Jackson County Assessor’s Office, the site is owned by Egon Kamarasy of474
Egret LakeRd, Carbondale, IL.
Upon arrival at the site I observed a pile ofdebris in the same general location as on my inspection
visit ofMarch
11, 2004 (Photos
#1
#5,
See sketch).
The
debris pile appeared to have been
reduced in volume by open burning.
Within this pile I observed
landscape waste,
dimensional lumber, and what appeared to be metal
frames from furniture.
I also observed metal fence posts, the remains of what appeared to be a
window air
conditioner, sections oflaminate counter tops, metal
cans and other materialsnot
easily
identifiable (Photos #1
#5,
See
sketch).
Most of
this
material was charred from burning.
My inspection ended at approximately 2:30 pm.

Page 2
077 812
5013
Carbondale
I
Egon Kamarasy
March 25, 2004
Continuing Violations Observed:
Item #1(9)(a): Cause, threaten or allow airpollution in
Illinois;
Item #2(9)(c):
Cause or
allow open burning;
Item #8(2fl(p)(3): Cause or allow the open dumping ofany waste in a
manner which results in any ofthe following occurrences at the dump site:
(3) Open
Burning:
During the inspection,
evidence ofthe open burning
of
waste was observed.
Item #5(21)(a):
Cause
or allow open dumping;
Item #8(21)(p)(1&7): Cause or allow the
open dumping ofany waste in
a mannerwhich results in any ofthe following occurrences at
the dump
site: (1) Litter and (7) Deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris; or
clean construction or demolition debris:
During the inspection, the open dumping ofwaste
resulting in litter and the deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris was observed.
Item
#6(21)(d)(1):
Conduct any
waste-storage,
waste-treatment, or waste-disposal
operation:
Without a permit;
Item
#6(21)(d)(2):
Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or
waste-disposal operation: In violation ofany regulations or standards adopted by the Board:
There is no record ofthe property owner having received a permit from the Agency to conduct a
waste-storage, waste-treatment or waste-disposal operation.
Also, during the inspection, violations
ofstandards
and regulations were observed.
Item #7(21)(e): Dispose, treat, store, or abandon any waste, or
transport
any
waste
into
the
State at/to sites not meeting requirements ofthe Act:
Due
the location ofthe
site and the type
and amount
of
debris observed, it would be reasonable to assume that the waste was transported to
the site from another location for thepurpose
ofdisposal.
Item #9(55)(a)(1):
No person shall: Cause or allow open dumping ofany used or waste tire;
Item #10(812.lOfl(a): Failure to submit an application for a permit to develop and operate a
landfill:
During the inspection, the open dumping ofwaste tires on the site was observed.

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OPENDUMPINSPECTION
SITE SKETCH
~—
~
Date Of Inspection:
March
25,
2004
Inspector: Don
Terry
Site Code:
077 812 5013
County: Jackson
Site Name:
Carbondale / Egon Kainarasy
Time:
2:25
pm
2:30 pm
Not Drawn to Scale
All
Locations Are Approximate
0
Indicates
Approximate
Location & Direction ofPhotos
Debris
I
Euni
Pile
fN
:~
-
I-
4
Green
Ridqe
Rd

NARRATIVE
INSPECTIONREPORTDOCUMENT
OPENDUMP SITE
~
Date of Inspection:
March
11,
2004
Inspector:
Don Terry
Site
Code:
077 812 5013
County:
Jackson
Site Name:
Carbondale / Egon Kamarasy
Time:
11:05 am
11:15
am
Location:
786 Green Ridge Rd
Owner ofProperty:
Egon Kamarasy
Volume ofWaste at site:
16
Cu!
yds
GPS:
N 37°40.869
W
089°16.646
GENERAL
REMARKS
During the stated date and time, I conducted an inspection ofthe site listed above.
This inspection
was made as a follow up to a complaint made to this office by a member ofthe Jackson County
Health Department staff.
Weather conditions at the time ofthe inspection were: sunny, windy with
the temperature about 40°F.
According to the Jackson County Assessor’s Office, the site is owned by Egon Kamarasy of474
Egret Lake Rd, Carbondale, IL
Upon arrival at the site I observed a large pile ofdebris
(Photos #1, #2, #3
& #5,
See
sketch).
Within this pile I observed landscape waste, two
couches, two
mattresses, pallets, plastic items,
charred wire and
other materials not readily identifiable.
To the north ofthe debris pile I observed
three waste tires that had been open dumped (Photos #2 &
#5,
See sketch).
I also observed
in and around the debris pile, evidence ofprevious burning,
including:
charred
dimensional lumber, wall board, metal, mattress springs and earth.
I also observed ash at the
bottom ofthe pile (Photos #4,
#5 & #6, See sketch)
I observed an individual to my east, approximately 30 yards away who appeared to be clearing
brush.
I approached this individual and asked himhis name.
He identified himself as James Taylor.
I asked ifhe was the owner ofthe property on which the
debris pile was located.
He told me no,
the owner was Egon Kamarasy for whom he worked.
(7/

Page 2
077
812 5013
Carbondale / Egon Kamarasy
March 11,
2004
I
asked him if he knew anything about the debris pile.
He said yes and explained that he was told by
Mr. Kamarasy to add brush to the pile and then burn it.
I explained that the burning ofdebris
including the tires lying to the side ofthe pile was not permissible in Illinois.
I stated to Mr. Taylor that he was not to burn the pile and that if he did he
could be held responsible
for open burning and open dumping under Illinois law and that those violations carry civil penalties
beginning at $1500 per offence.
Before leaving I gave Mr. Taylor my business card and asked him to have Mr. Kamarasy call
me to
discuss this situation.
My inspection ended at approximately 11:15
am.
Violations Observed:
Item #1(9)(a): Cause,
threaten or allow air pollution in
Illinois;
Item #2(9)(c):
Cause or
allow open burning;
Item #8(2l)(p)(3): Cause or allow the open dumping ofany waste in
a
manner which results in any of the following occurrences at the dump site:
(3) Open
Burning:
During the inspection,
evidence ofthe open burning ofwaste was observed.
Item #5(21)(a):
Cause or allow open dumping;
Item #8(21)(n)(1&7): Cause or allow
the
open dumping of any waste in a manner which results in any of the following occurrences at
the dump site:
(1) Litter and
(7)
Deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris;
or
clean construction or
demolition debris:
During
the inspection,
the open dumping ofwaste
resulting in litter and the deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris was observed.
Item #6(21)(d)(1):
Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation:
Without a permit;
Item #6(21)(d)(2):
Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or
waste-disposal operation: In
violation of any regulations
or standards adopted by the Board:
There is no record ofthe property owner having received a permit from the Agency to conduct a
waste-storage, waste-treatment or waste-disposal operation.
Also, during the inspection, violations
ofstandards and regulations were observed.

Page 3
077
812 5013
Carbondale / Egon Kamarasy
March
11, 2004
Item #7(21)(e): Dispose, treat, store,
or abandon any waste, or transport any waste into the
State at/to sites not meeting requirements of the Act:
Due
the location ofthe site and the type
and amount ofdebris
observed, it would be reasonable to
assume that the waste was transported to
the site from another location for the purpose of disposal.
Item #9(55)(a)(1):
No person shall: Cause or allow open dumping ofany used or waste tire;
Item #10(812.101)(a): Failure to submit an application for a permit to develop and operate a
landfill:
During the inspection, the open dumping ofwaste tires on the sitewas
observed.

ILLINOIS
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Open Dump
Inspection
Checklist
County:
Jackson
077
8125013
Location/Site
Name:
Date:
03/11/2004
Time:
From
11:05
am
To
11:15
am
Previous Inspection
Date:
06/24/2002
Inspector(s):
Don Terry
Weather:
40°F—sunny
and windy
No.
of Photos Taken:
#
6
Est. Amt. of Waste:
16
yds3
Samples Taken:
Yes #
No
~
Interviewed:
James.Taylor
Complaint #:
2004-057
SECTION
DESCRIPTION
VIOL
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS
1.
9(a)
CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW AIR POLLUTION
IN ILLINOIS
2.
9(c)
CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN BURNING
3.
12(a)
CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW WATER
POLLUTION IN
ILLINOIS
LI
4.
12(d)
CREATE AWATER POLLUTION HAZARD
LI
5.
21 (a)
CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
6.
21(d)
CONDUCT ANY WASTE-STORAGE, WASTE-TREATMENT, OR WASTE- DISPOSAL
OPERATION:
(1)
Without a Permit
(2)
In Violation ofAny Regulations or Standards Adopted by the Board
Z
7.
21(e)
DISPOSE, TREAT, STORE, OR ABANDON ANY WASTE, OR TRANSPORT ANY
WASTE INTO THE STATE ATITO SITES NOT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF ACT
8.
21(p)
CAUSE OR ALLOW THE
OPEN DUMPING OF ANY WASTE IN A MANNER WHICH RESULTS IN
ANY OF THE FOLLOWING OCCURRENCES AT THE DUMP SITE:
(1)
Litter
~________
(2)
Scavenging
LI
(3)
Open Burning
(4)
Deposition
of Waste in Standing or Flowing Waters
U
(5)
Proliferation of Disease Vectors
E
(6)
Standing or Flowing Liquid Discharge from the Dump Site
LI
LPC#:
Carbondale
I
Egon Kamarasy
Region:
7
-
Marion
Responsible Party
Mailing Address(es)
and
Phone
Number(s):
Egon Kamarasy
474 Egret Lake
Rd
Carbondale,
IL
62901
Revised 06/18/2001
(Open Dump
-
1)

LPC#
0778125013
Inspection
Date:
03/11/2004
(7)
Deposition of General Construction or Demolition Debris; or Clean Construction or
Demolition Debris
9.
55(a)
NO PERSON SHALL:
.
(1)
Cause orAllow Open Dumping
of Any Used or Waste Tire
-
(2)
Cause or Allow Open~Burn~p
~
.L
35 ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE REQUIREMENTS
-
LI
10.
812.1 01(a)
SUBTITLE
G
FAILURE TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR A PERMIT TO DEVELOP AND
OPERATE A LANDFILL
11.
722.111
HAZARDOUS WASTE DETERMINATION
LI
12.
808.121
SPECIAL WASTE DETERMINATION
UI
ACCEPTANCE OF SPECIAL WASTE FROM AWASTE TRANSPORTER WITHOUT A
WASTE HAULING PERMIT,
UNIFORM WASTE PROGRAM REGISTRATION AND
LI
13.1809.302(a)IPERMITAND/ORMANIFEST
~
~
.~....
...
..
OTHER REQUIREMENTS
.
__
.~
Informational Notes
APPARENT VIOLATION OF:
(LI)
PCB;
(LI)
CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NUMBER:
ORDER ENTERED ON:
Signature~9f
Inspector(s)
1.
lIlinoisJ
Environmental
Protection Act: 415 ILCS 5/4.
2.
Illinois Pollution
Control Board: 35
III.
Adm. Code, Subtitle
G.
3.
Statutory and regulatory references herein are provided for convenience only and
should not
be construed
as legal
conclusions
of the Agency or as limiting the Agency’s statutory or regulatory powers.
Requirements of some statutes
and regulations cited are in summary format.
Full text of requirements can
be found
in references listed in
1.
and 2.
above.
4.
The provisions of subsection
(p) of Section
21
of the lltinoisj
Environmental
Protection Act shall be enforceable either
by administrative citation under Section 31.1
of the Act or by complaint under Section 31
of the Act.
5.
This inspection was conducted in accordance with Sections 4(c) and 4(d) of the Illinois
Environmental
Protection Act:
415
ILCS
5/4(c)
and (d).
6.
Items marked with an “NE’ were not evaluated at the time of this
inspection.
Revised 06/18/2001
(Open Dump
-
2)

Digital
Inspection
Photo Sheet

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Date:
March
11, 2004
Site #:
077 812 5013
County:
Jackson
11:08 am
-~
Site
Name:
Carbondale
I
Egon Kamarasy
Time:
Photo taken by:
Don
Terry
Comments
Photo taken towards:
Northwest
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03112004-01
)z
~
J/
.,.
Date:
March
11, 2004
Time:
11:08am
Photo taken by:
Don Terry
Comments
Photo taken towards:
Southwest
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03112004-02
P

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Digital
Inspection
Photo
Sheet
Date:
March 11, 2004
Site #:
077 812 5013
County:
Jackson
Time:
11:09am
Site Name:
Carbondale
I
Egon Kamarasy
F
Photo taken by:
Don
Terry
Comments
Photo taken towards:
Southeast
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03112004-03
Date:
March
11, 2004
Time:
11:09am
Photo taken by:
Don
Terry
Comments
Photo taken towards:
Southeast
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03112004-04

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Digital
Inspection
Photo Sheet
Date:
March
11, 2004
Site #:
077812 5013
County:
Jackson
Time:
11:10 am
Site Name:
Carbondale
I
Egon Kamarasy
Photo taken by:
Don Terry
Comments
Photo taken towards:
North

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Photo File Name:
0778125013-03112004-05
Date:
March 11,2004
Time:
11:10am
Photo taken by:
Don Terry
Comments
Photo taken towards:
North

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Photo File Name:
0778125013-03112004-06
.
(

NARRATIVE
INSPECTIONREPORTDOCUMENT
OPENDUMP SITE
~
-
~.
S
Date
of Inspection:
March
25,
2004
Inspector:
Don Terry
Site Code:
077 812 5013
County:
Jackson
Site Name:
Carbondale / Egon Kamarasy
Time:
2:25
pm
2:30 pm
Location:
786
Green Ridge
Rd
Owner
ofProperty:
Egon Kamarasy
Volume ofWaste at
site:
10 cu / yds
GPS:
N 37°40.869
W 089°16.646
GENERAL
REMARKS
During the stated date and time, I conducted an inspection ofthe site listed above.
This inspection
was made as a follow up to
an inspection made ofthis site on March
11, 2004.
Weather conditions
at thetime of the inspection were: cloudy, windy with the temperature about 72°F.
According to the Jackson County Assessor’s Office, the site is owned by Egon Kamarasy of474
Egret Lake Rd,
Carbondale, IL.
Upon arrival at the site I observed a pile ofdebris in the same general
location as on my inspection
visit ofMarch
11, 2004
(Photos #1—
#5,
See sketch).
The debris pile appeared to have been
reduced in volume by open burning.
Within this pile I observed landscape waste, dimensional lumber, and what appeared to be metal
frames from furniture.
I also observed metal fence posts, the remains ofwhat appeared to be a
window air conditioner, sections oflaminate counter tops, metal
cans and
other materials not easily
identifiable
(Photos #1
#5, See sketch).
Most ofthis material was charred from burning.
My inspection ended at approximately 2:30 pm.

Page 2
077 812 5013
Carbondale
I
Egon
Kamarasy
March
25,
2004
Continuing Violations Observed:
Item #1(9)(a): Cause, threaten or allow
air pollution in Iffinois;
Item #2(9)(c): Cause or
allow open burning;
Item #8(21)(p)(3): Cause or allow the open dumping of any waste in
a
manner which results in any ofthe following occurrences at the dump site:
(3) Open
Burning:
During the inspection,
evidence ofthe open burning ofwaste was observed.
Item #5(21)(a):
Cause or allow open dumping;
Item #8(21)(p)(I&7):
Cause or allow the
open dumping of any waste in
a mannerwhich results in
any ofthe following occurrences at
the dump site:
(1) Litter and
(7)
Deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris;
or
clean construction or demolition debris:
During the inspection, the open dumping ofwaste.
resulting
in
litter and the deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris was observed.
Item #6(21)(d)(1):
Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation:
Without a permit;
Item #6(21)(d)(2):
Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or
waste-disposal operation: In violation ofany regulations or standards adopted by the Board:
There is no
record ofthe property owner having received a permit from the Agency to conduct a
waste-storage, waste-treatment or waste-disposal operation.
Also, during the inspection, violations
ofstandards and regulations were observed.
Item
#7’21)(e~:
Dispose,
treat,
store, or abandon any waste, or transport anywaste into the
State at/to sites not meeting requirements ofthe Act:
Due the location ofthe site and the type
and
amount ofdebris observed, it would be reasonable to
assume that the waste was transported to
the site from another location for thepurpose ofdisposaL
Item #9155~a)(1):
No person shall:
Cause
or allow open dumping of any used or waste tire;
Item #10(812.101)(a): Failure to submit an application for a permit to develop and operate a
landfill:
During the inspection, the open dumping ofwaste tires
on the site
was observed.

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ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Open Dump Inspection
Checklist
County:
Jackson
LPC#:
077 812
5013
Region:
7
-
Marion
Location/Site Name:
Carbondale
I
Egori Kamarasy
Date:
03/25/2004
Time:
From
2:25
pm
To
2:30
pm
Previous Inspection Date:
03/11/2004
Inspector(s):
Don
Terry
Weather:
72°F
--
partly
cloudywith moderate winds
No. of Photos Taken: #
5
Est. Amt. of Waste:
10
yds3 Samples Taken:
Yes#
No
~
Interviewed:
no one at site
Complaint #:
2004-057
Egon Kamarasy
Responsible
Party
474 Egret Lake
Rd
Mailing Address(es)
and Phone
Carbondale,
IL
62901
Number(s):
SECTION
DESCRIPTION
VIOL
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS
1.
9(a)
CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW
AIR
POLLUTION IN ILLINOIS
2.
9(c)
CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN BURNING
3.
12(a)
CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW WATER POLLUTION IN
ILLINOIS
E
4.
12(d)
CREATE AWATER POLLUTION HAZARD
0
5.
21(a)
CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
Z
6.
21(d)
CONDUCT ANY WASTE-STORAGE, WASTE-TREATMENT, OR WASTE- DISPOSAL
OPERATION:
(1)
Without a
Permit
Z
(2)
In Violation of Any Regulations or Standards Adopted bythe Board
.
7.
21(e)
DISPOSE, TREAT, STORE, OR ABANDON ANY WASTE, OR TRANSPORT ANY
WASTE INTO THE STATE ATITO SITES
NOT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF ACT
8.
21(p)
CAUSE OR ALLOW THE OPEN DUMPING OF ANY WASTE IN A MANNER WHICH RESULTS
IN
ANY OF THE FOLLOWING OCCURRENCES AT THE DUMP SITE:
(1)
Litter
(2)
Scavenging
.
(3)
Open Burning
(4)
Deposition
of Waste
in Standing or Flowing Waters
0
(5)
Proliferation of Disease Vectors
0
(6)
Standing or Flowing Liquid Discharge from the Dump Site
LI
Revised 06118/2001
(Open Dump
-
1)

LPC
#
077 809
5036
Inspection
Date:
03/25/2004
(7)
Deposition of General Construction or Demolition Debris; or Clean Construction or
Demolition Debris
9.
55(a)
NO PERSON SHALL:
(1)
Cause or Allow Open
Dumping of Any Used or Waste Tire
LI
(2)
Cause or Allow Open Burning
of Any Used or Waste
Tire
LI
35
ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE REQUIREMENTS
SUBTITLE G
10.
812.101 (a)
FAILURE TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR A PERMIT TO DEVELOP AND
OPERATE A LANDFILL
11.
722.111
HAZARDOUS WASTE DETERMINATION
LI
12.
808.1 21
SPECIAL WASTE DETERMINATION
LI
13.
809.302(a)
ACCEPTANCE OF SPECIAL WASTE FROM AWASTE TRANSPORTER WITHOUT A
WASTE HAULING PERMIT, UNIFORM WASTE PROGRAM REGISTRATION AND
PERMIT ANDIOR MANIFEST
LI

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OTHER REQUIREMENTS
14.
APPARENTVIOLATIONOF:
(I)
PCB;
(0)
CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NUMBER:
ORDER ENTERED
ON:
LI
15.
OTHER:
LI
LI
:__
LI
LI
LI
LI
I/i
~
~/4Vff
Signature of Inspeftor(s)
Informational Notes
1.
Illinois
Environmental
Protection Act: 415
ILCS
5/4.
2.
Illinois Pollution
Control Board:
35
Ill.
Adm. Code, Subtitle G.
3.
Statutory and regulatory references herein are provided for convenience only and should
not
be
construed
as legal
conclusions
of the Agency or as limiting the Agency’s statutory or regulatory powers.
Requirements of some statutes
and regulations cited are in summary format.
Full
text
of requirements
can be found in references listed in
1. and 2.
above.
4.
The provisions of subsection (p) of Section
21 of the Illinois
Environmental
Protection Act shall
be enforceable either
by administrative citation under Section 31.1
of the Act or by complaint under
Section
31
of the Act.
5.
This inspection was conducted in accordance with Sections 4(c) and 4(d) of the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act:
415
ILCS
5/4(c)
and
(d).
6.
Items marked with an “NE” were not evaluated at the time of this
inspection.
Revised 06/18/200 1
.
(Open Dump
-
2)

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Digital
Inspection
Photo Sheet
Date:
March 25, 2004
Site #:
0778125013
County:
Jackson
Time:
2:26pm
Photo taken by:
Don Terry
Comments
Photo taken towards:
South
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03252004-01
Date:
March 25,
2004
Time:
2:26 pm
Photo taken by:
Don Terry
Comments
Photo taken towards:
Southeast
Site Name:
Carbondale
I
EQon Kamarasy
Photo File
Name:
0778125013-03252004-02

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Digital
Inspection
Photo Sheet
Date:
March 25, 2004
Site #:
0778125013
County:
Jackson
Time:
2:27 pm
Site Name:
Carbondale
I
E~on
Kamarasy
Photo taken by:
Don
Terry
Comments
Photo taken towards:
Southeast
Photo File
Name:
0778125013-03252004-03
Date:
March 25, 2004
Time:
.
2:27
pm
Photo taken by:
Comments
Photo taken towards:
Northeast
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03252004-04
(7~~

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Digital
Inspection
Photo Sheet
Date:
March 25, 2004
Site #:
077812 5013
County:
Jackson
Time:
2:27 pm
Site Name:
Carbondale
I
Egon Kamarasy
Photo taken by:
Don Terry
Comments
Photo taken towards:
Southeast
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03252004-05
Date:
Time:
Photo taken by:
No Photo
Comments
Photo taken towards:
r
Photo File Name:

L
BEFORE THE ILLINOIS
POLLUTION CONTROL
~
~~C~VED
D’JM~1LJ
CLERK’S OFFICE
COUNTY
~
~
r
vs.
No.
2004-063
EGON
KAMARASY,
)
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM
SUPPORTING
PETITION
TO
CONTEST
ADMINISTRATIVE
CITATION
I
INTRODUCTION
The County of Jackson (“County”) seeks
to
impose civil penalties for two
(2) alleged
violations ofthe Act.
Mr. Kamarasy denies that his
actions violated the
Pollution Control
Act.
He
further
denies that his actions gave rise to
any “pollution”.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March
25,
2004,
an inspector for the County, Don
Terry,
conducted an
“on-site
inspection” of a
site that
he
identified as
the Makanda/Kamarasy
site, located in
Jackson
County, Illinois.
The inspection lasted approximately three (3) minutes, from
2:32
p.m.
until
2:35
p.m.
(See
Jaëkson County Health Department Affidavit of Don
Terry,
dated March
29,
2004,
attached as Exhibit “A” to the Administrative Citation (“D. Terry Aff.”))
Mr. Terry’s Narrative Inspection Report (hereinafter “Report”),
submitted in
support
of the Administrative Citation filed by the County, states that the site investigation
on
March
25,
2004
was
made “as
a follow
up to
an
inspection
.
.
.
done
on
December
5,
2003.”
(See
Narrative Inspection Report Document Open Dump Site,
attached to
Affidavit of Don
Terry,
dated March
29,~2004,
attached as Exhibit
“A”
to
the
Administrative
Citation (“Narrative
Page
1
Memorandum
Supporting
Petition
to
Contest
Administrative
Citation

Report”)
Howe~er,the Report does not
give
any
account of the December
5
investigation.
Nor does it
say~whether
that first
inspection resulted in
any
action being taken against Mr.
Kamarasy, such as
the issuance of a
warning,
which might have contained its
own
separate
terms for compliance.
Mr. Terry is
careful to
say in
this Report “I
did not
enter the property and
conducted
this follow-up inspection from the gate.”
(Narrative Report)
He then alleges,
from that vantage
point,
“I
observed
a debris
pile in
approximately
the
same
location as
I
had
observed
on
December
5,
2003,” but
the pile “appeared larger”
indicating,
in
his
words,
“more
material
has been open dumped at this location since December
5,
2003.” (Narrative Report)
The inspector estimated the size of the debris
pile on
March 25
as being
approximately
110 cubic yards~(NarrativeReport)
Presumably, he also estimated the volume
of the pile on
December 5, 2003
But, he did not
provide documentation from
the December
5
inspection,
to
show whether that previous estimate was smaller or larger.
Mr. Terry claims that thepile
“appeared
to
consist of construction/demolition debris.”
(Narrative Report)
More specifically, he said that the pile contained (1) “dimensional lumber”,
(2) “dark paneling”,
(3) “metal siding”, and
(4) “other materials not readily
identifiable from
my location.” (N~rrative
Report)
He then concludes that this
debris
must have been
generated
off-site and tran~p,orted
to this location, given the size ofthe pile.
(Id.)
To document these observations, Mr.
Terry
took
one photograph, presumably from the
gate where he
was
standing.
(See
Open
Dump
Inspection Site
Sketch, attached hereto
as
Respondent’s Exhibit “R-2”,
and attached to the Administrative Citation filed by the County in
this case.)
This pjcture
shows that Mr.
Terry
was
standing at a very substantial
distance
from
the
alleged “duttip”.
From
that
distance,
as
the picture
clearly shows,
a
pile
of material
is
visible on the sitç~but
it is impossible to say what items were in thepile.
Mr. Terry’s Report states
that, on the
basis of his personal observation, he
concluded
the following violations occurred: (1) causing or allowing the
open
dumping;
(2)
causing or
allowing
the op~.ndumping
of any
waste
in
a manner that_results
in
(a)
litter and
(b)
the

deposition
of general construction or demolition debris or clean
construction or
demolition
debris,
in violation of the
Act;
(3)
conducting
a
waste-storage, waster
treatment, or
waste-
disposal operatidh without a proper permit; (4)
conducting a waste-storage, waste-treatment, or
waste-disposal operation in violation of “any regulations or standards adopted by
the
Board;
(5)
disposing,
treating, storing or abandoning any
waste or transporting
any
waste
into
the
States at or to sites not meeting therequirements ofthe Act; (6) failing
to
submit an
application
for a permit to develop and operate a landfill; (7) failing to obtain a “Developmental Permit”
to
operate a solid waste management site; and
(8) failing
to
obtain
an
“Operational
Permit”
to
operate a solid waste management site
(Narrative Report)
On March
30,
2004,
the County filed an
Administrative Citation with
the
Pollution
Control Board irithis cause.
The Admmistrative Citation states a legal conclusion in
its
so-called “Facts”
section,
namely
that
“tflie
facility
is
an
open
dump,
operating
without
an
Illinois
Environmental
Protection Agency Operating Permit.”
This
is improper because the complaint fails to
allege
any of the underlying facts necessary
to
support
the legal
conclusions that this
was
either
a
“facility” or an ‘~pendump” in the sense regulated by the Pollution Control Act.
In partic~ilar,
proving
that the pile in
question was
an
“open
dump”
is
part
of the
County’s
primafacie
case for both ofthe charges against Mr. Kamarasy.
Therefore,
it cannot
be “fact,” until tl~isBoard says it is.
Nor can it be simply be asserted
as
a conclusory opinion
by the County’s~inspector.The County must
prove
the elements of its
primafacie
case,
not
merely recite them
Furthernläre, it is
a
fact
that neither the Citation, nor any
other charging instrument
from
the
CounW~accusesMr.
Kamarasy of operating
a
commercial
dump
site
“facility”
without a 1icense~ Therefore,
one
must presume that even the
County does not
believe this
accusation by Mr. Terry was a “fact”.
The citatioli document charges that (1) “the
Respondent has caused or allowed litter at
the facility in vi~51ationof 415
ILCS
§
S/2l(p)(l)”;
and (2) “the
Respondent has caused or

u
allowed
the
deposition
of
general
construction
or
demolition,
or
clean
construction
or
demolition debri~~
in
violation of 415 ILCS
§
S/2l(p)(7).”
These charges are improperly stated for the same reason as described above.
The plain
language of the Pollution Control Act requires a showing that the site in question was an “open
dump”, in the precise sense that “open dump”
is
defined in
the
Act, before
showing
that it
“caused or allowed litter,” or that it “caused or allowed the deposition of general
construction
or demolition, or~cleanconstruction or demolition debris.”
The respEndentfiled a Petition
to
Contest Administrative
Citation.
In
it, he
denies
that
P
his conduct viola~d
the Act as alleged.
Mr. Kamarasy will testify, first of all, that the pile in question was placed on
his
own
property.
He w~U
explain that the pile contained the broken
down parts
and
pieces of
some
mobile homes that were abandoned by others on property that he owns.
He will further explain
how this pile cathe to be located on the property in question, as set out below.
Mr. Kamarasy owns and operates a mobile home park.
It
is a
common
problem that
mobile home oWners sometimes
abandon their mobile homes
at the mobile
home park
when
they move.
The~iwner/operatorofthe property is
then left with the problem of disposing
of
these unwanted structures.
Mr.
Kan~arasywill testify
and
documentary evidence
will
show
that
the
Illinois
Department of Public Health (“IDPH”), as a result of its
standard inspections
conducted of
Mr. Kamarasy’&hiobile
home park,
ordered him
to
remove
certain
abandoned and
broken
mobile homes from the mobile home park.
According to
the IDPH,
Mr.
Kamarasy was
not
permitted to
leave the abandoned homes at the mobile home park until he
managed
to
sell or
recycle the usable parts from the homes.
(See
Respondent’s Exhibit “R- 1”, a copy of which
is
attached hereto.)~
Mr. Kamarasy attempted to comply with the IDPH directive.
He had some
open space
on land he owned,~:called
“BittersweetFarm”,
which is
located in Makanda Township,
about a
halfmile from his~own
homestead and farm located in Pomona Township.

r
L
Mr. Kama~asy
will
testify
that he relocated the abandoned mobile home structures
and
L
materials in question to
the Bittersweet Farm site.
From there, workers
continued
the work of
dismantling the Structures, separating the recyclable from the non-recyclable materials, in order
~
to sell whatever naterials from the mobile homes were reusable and dispose ofthe rest.
Mr. Karnarasy will further testify
that,
at the
time, he thought,
and
had every reason to
believe that his
actions were legal and not in
violation of either the
Litter Control Act or the
Pollution Control Act.
There was
nothing
unlawful,
he
believed,
about moving the
materials
from one ofhis
properties
in
the area to
another.
And, the act of depositing
the debris
on the
L
Bittersweet Farm
site did
not
introduce
pollutants
into
the
environment.
Nor
was
Mr.
Kamarasy operating a commercial waste dump
facility on Bittersweet Farm, or allowing
others
to
dump there
Next,
Mt~.i
Kamarasy will testify
that the debris
pile
was
located approximately five
L
hundred (500) feet from the gate where Mr.
Terry says
he
was
standing when he
took his
one
and only
photograph on March
25,
2004.
From that
distance,
Mr.
Terry could not
possibly
have identified the specific items
in the debris pile,
such as dark paneling
and
metal
siding,
that
he
reported
to
mive
personally observed on
his
March
25,
2004
inspection.
Nor
does
the
photograph tak~n
by Mr. Terry make it possible
to
identify,
with
the naked eye,
any
such
L
specific items.
L
Mr. Kaniàrasy can only
guess
that
what Mr.
Terry
did was simply
assume that
all
the
items that he idetitified during his previous inspection of December
5,
2003,
were still
there.
Underlying that a~sumption
is the further conclusory assumption that
Mr. Kamarasy had done
nothing to
address the problems that Mr. Terry had previously identified on December
5.
The County will present no evidence that Mr. Te~ made a
direct
observation of the
L
items he purported
to
have observed
on
March
25,
2004.
And, the
County
can
present
no
evidence
to
supJ~ort
its
conclusory assumption that Mr.
Kamarasy failed
to
do
anything
to
alleviate the problem that Mr.
Terry had previously identified on December
5,
2003.

To the cbntrary, Mr. Kamarasy will testify that all of the
metal parts
from
the
mobile
homes (including all the metal-siding) had
been removed from
the debris
pile
and
taken for
recycling by the~time
Mr. Terry returned for his follow-up inspection on March 25, 2004.
As
a
result, Mr. Terry’s Report was demonstrably inaccurate in identifying metal siding at the
site,
and should be considered suspect with respect to all other specific items
that Mr. Terry claimed
to have identified.
In addition,
Mr. Kamarasy denies having made further deposits of material
on this site, afterhe was warned, in a letter, dated January 9,
2004,
that the debris pile
might be
unlawful.
During that time, thepile clearly was diminished in size, not increased.
In December
2003, Mr. Kamarasy contracted with McMurphy Excavation to remove the debris
and
transport
it to a landfill.
The evidence will show that
all of the materials were removed from the
site and
properly dispos~dof by May 2004.
(See
Respondent’s
Exhibit “R-3”,
a
copy of
which is
attachedhereto.~~
Mr. Kan~arasyhas no
personal
knowledge upon
which
to
deny
that
Mr.
Terry
did
inspect the site ~n December 5,
2003.
Mr.
Terry did not contact Mr. Kamarasy.
He did not
request permission from Mr. Kamarasy to enter the property to
make an inspection.
No prior
notice was given ~to
Mr. Kamarasy concerning the inspection.
And, Mr.
Terry did not give Mr.
Kamarasy a citatiOn, or even an official warning, at that time.
However,
in
January
2004,
Mr. Kamarasy
received a
letter, dated
January
9,
2004,
signed
by
Bart~’Hagston,Coordinator
Solid
Waste
Program,
Jackson
County
Health
Department. (Se~Respondent’s
Exhibit “R-4”, a copy of which is attached hereto.)
That letter
stated that
“a representative
of
the
Jackson County
Health Department”
“completed”
an
investigation on tecember 5, 2003 and believed that he found several violations of theAct.
The
violations a11eged~’werestated as
follows:
(1) causing
or allowing
the open
dumping of any
waste because
‘~evidence
of
waste
was
observed
open
dumped
at
this
site
during
the
inspection”;
(2). conducting
a
waste-storage, waste-treatment,
or waste-disposal operation
without a permit granted by
the IEPA because “no
permits have been issued
for
this
waste
management
facility”;
(3)
conducting
a
waste-storage, waste-treatment, or
waste-disposal

operation in violation ofregulations or standards
adopted under the Act because “no
permits
have been issued
for this
waste-management facility”;
(4)
disposing,
treating, storing
or
abandoning any ~iaste, or transport any
waste into this
State for disposal,
treatment,
storage or
abandonment,
except
at
a site
or facility
that meets the requirements of
the
Act
and
the
regulations and standards thereunder because “violations
of Board regulations
as well as the
Act were observed at the time ofthe inspection”;
(5) causing or allowing the open dumping of
any waste in a manner that results
in
(a)
litter and
(b)
deposition of general
construction or
demolition
debris or clean construction or demolition
debris;
(6) developing
and/or operating a
landfill
without~receivinga
Developmental
Permit
from
the
IEPA
“for
a
solid
waste
management siteLát this
location”;
and
(7) causing or allowing the use or operation of a solid
waste managemeht
site for which a Developmental Permit
is
required without an
Operating
Permit issued by’~the
IEPA.
This letter, contained “an explanation ofthe activities that the Illinois
EPA
and
JCHD
believe may reso1~vethe specified violations, including an estimate ofa reasonable time period to
complete the necessary activities” and
stated that “resolution of the violations
may require the
involvement of ~Pprosecutorialauthority for
purposes
that
may
include,
among others,
the
imposition of statutory penalties”.
The lette~tthen
stated that a written response must be
submitted
to
the County
Health
Department within 45 days ofMr. Kamarasy’s receipt of the letter; the written response “must
address each violation specified.
.
.
and include for each an explanation ofthe activities that
wifi
be implemented~indthe time schedule for the completion
of that activity”;
and,
the
written
response “will
cbnstitute a
proposed Compliance Commitment Agreement
(“CCA”),
which
the County Hea1th~Department
will review and
either accept or reject
within
30 days
of receipt.
No time period fOrcompletion of any remediation activities was given.
The letter~nded
by saying that failing to respond timely in
writing
would be
considered
a
“waiver of
the! opportunity
to
respond and
to meet”
and
the
County
Health Department

“may proceed with a referral to the prosecutorial authority”.
Mr.
Kamarasy was urged to
call
Mr. Terry with any questions regarding this matter.
In respon~e
to this Notice ofViolation, Mr. Kamarasy did call Mr.
Terry on January
15,
and the two ofthem discussed the corrective actions that the County Health Department wanted
done.
(See
Respondent’s
Exhibit “R-5”,
a copy of which is
attached hereto.)
Mr. Kamarasy
will testify that he told Mr. Terry that (a)
he
(Mr.
Kamarasy)
was working on
removing the
materials comprising the pile; (b) he had already arranged for a contractor to
remove
it;
and
(c)
he
believed he could accomplish this
objective by February
13,
2004
Mr
Kamarasy
will
further testify that he understood that Mr. Terry
agreed to this proposal, and that Mr.
Kamarasy
believed Mr
Terry was acting with the authonty ofthe County at this time
By
February
13,
all
of the metal from
the
site had
been removed for
recycling by
Michael Mays, P~rchie
Mays, Lucas
Parrott,
and Danny Morefield, individuals
retained by Mr
Kamarasy
to
dismantle
the
mobile home
structures
and
recycle the
recyclable
matenals
Unfortunately,
the weather
did not
cooperate with removing the rest of
the
debris.
Mr.
McMurphy had to
wait for a “hard freeze” to
make it possible to
get his heavy equipment into
the field in order to load the non-reusable materials into a truck for transportation to
the county
landfill.
The weather wasjust not cold enough and the ground was too wet and muddy for such
equipment to accomplish the job
Mr
McMurphy’s
testimony
is
expected to corroborate
that
he was unable, ot~
believed that he
was unable,
to
complete the job
due to
the conditions
of the
weather and the ground upon which his heavy equipment would have to traverse in order to
load
and haul away th~
materials from the site.
When th~ground
finally
dried enough,
Mr.
Kamarasy had
the
rest of the
debris
removed to the Jackson County landfill.
However, this occurred after March
25,
2004
and
was
too late to prevent him from receiving the Citation in this case
On March~25,2004, Mr. Terry conducted his three-minute inspection from the gate
500
feet from the pile
of matenals and
on March
29,
2004 the Administrative Citation was filed m
this
case.
No
a.ttcmpt
was made by
the
County
to
contact Mr.
Kamarasy
following their

r
communications occurring in January to determine why more of the
pile had not been removed
L
or for any
otherreason.
Mr. Terry did not call or write Mr.
Kamarasy or make any
inquiry
to
determine why the matter had not been resolved to
his
satisfaction
by March
25,
some
six (6)
r
weeks after he believed Mr
Kamarasy had promised to complete the disposal
Mr.
Kamarasy
contends
that
both
he
and
the
County
were
bound
to
honor
this
r
agreement, that he intended
to
honor
it,
and
that he
made all reasonable
efforts
to
comply
with
its terms.
However, he was prevented from fully complying due to circumstances outside of his
reasonable control.
I
In addition, Mr
Kamarasy contends
that
the
debris
pile
he
created, while perhaps
unsightly,
was not
an
“open dump”,
as that
term is
defined
in
the
Pollution
Control
Act,
III
because the nature of the debris and the manner and
location in
which
it
was deposited did not
cause the debris to enter into the
environment, nor make
it
likely
that polluting materials would
be emitted or discharged, or otherwise disseminated from the site
r
For similar reasons, Mr. Kamarasy contends that his debris pile
did
not constitute
litter,
as that term is defined in the Litter Control Act
In fact, a plain reading ofthe Litter Control
Act
r
shows
that Mr
Kamarasy acted lawfully in depositing this material on his own land
Mr. Kam~rasyfinally contends that it was a violation of his due
process rights
and
a
L
violation of the Separation of Powers principle for him to be
charged with two
violations for
what amounts to~one
(allegedly) wrongful act of moving the abandoned mobile home
structures
to a site on Bittersweet Farm to be dismantled, recycled and disposed offrom there.
The County makes no
attempt
to show that there was any litter, apart from5the broken
down parts
of these mobile home
structures at the Makanda/Kamarasy
site.
Therefore,
the
prosecution is eff~ctively
charging Mr. Kamarasy
twice for the
same
demolition debris,
simply
by the deceit of renaming the mobile
home parts
“demolition
debris”,
after first naming them
“litter”.
Finally,
~Mr.Kamarasy
will
argue
that
the
Pollution
Control
Act
should
not
be
interpreted so a~tooutlaw
an
act that
the Litter Control Act expressly
permits,
namely,
the
~
.~.*
~
::
:~
~
~.
.
.~
P ..,.M~th
~
P~titiô~P
tóPCoñtest
Adinin1~t~àti
ciLatid~
:

dumping ofa pik, ofnon-polluting
and non-littering debris on
one’s
own property, some
to be
recycled
and th~restdisposed
of.
To hold
otherwise would render one or
the
other
Acts
unconstitutiona1~~ince,
taken together, the two statutes would then tell Illinois citizens that the
same act of creating a debris
pile on one’s own land in such a way that
it
does not spread or
emit or discharge onto otherland is both lawful and unlawful at the sametime.
III
ISSUES PRESENTED
The Administrative Citation and the Petition to Contest Administrative Citation present
the following iss~s:
A.
Shbuld the inspector’s
Narrative Report, based upon his
March
25
inspection of
the Makanda/K~iarasysite, be
disregarded because the
inspector could
not
possibly
have
observed what he~said
he observed from the location where he claimed to have-observed it?
B.
DidPthe
County
improperly state charges
against
Mr.
Kamarasy
and
fail
to
acknowledge thátias part ofits
primafacie
case, it must prove Mr.
Kamarasy created
an “open
dump”, according to the legal definition of that term?
C.
DidMr. Kamarasy cause or allow “open dumping”
at the Makanda/Kamarasy
site?
D.
If ‘~cpendumping”
occurred
at the
site,
did
the
“open
dumping”
result
in
“litter”?
E.
If ‘~pendumping” occurred at the
site,
did
the “open
dumping”
result in
the
deposition
of general construction or demolition debris or clean
construction or
demolition
debris?
F.
Was the County bound to respect the agreement negotiated between the parties in
January,
2004?
liP so, was Mr. Kamarasy’s
failure to
comply
with that agreement the result of
circumstances
that were beyond
his
control?
G.
Did:-the County and
its
inspector abuse their discretion
and exceed
the intent
and
scope ofthe administrative citation process by broadening the definition of “litter”
beyond the

legislature’s intent,
and by filing
two
charges
against Mr.
Kamarasy
for the
single
act of
creating a pile
of materials by
depositing
on
his
own property the broken
down parts
from
certain mobile homes
that others
had
abandoned on
his own property?
If so,
did
this create a
separation ofpo~ers
problem under the Illinois Constitution?
H.
Is the law, as applied to Mr. Kamarasy,
unconstitutionally vague, in
failing to
give
Mr. Kamarasy reasonable notice of what
constitutes
creating an open
dump on
one’s
own
property, and what constitutes littering on one’s own property?
IV
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE INSPECTOR DID NOT OBSERVE,
ANI5 COULD NOT HAVE OBSERVED,
ON MARCH 25, 2004, THE
SPECIFIC ITEMS THAT HE CLAIMS TO HAVE OBSERVED IN THE
NARRATIVE REPORT, THEREFORE,THIS PART OF THE REPORT
SHOULD BE DISREGARDED AS MERE SPECULATION BY THE
INSPECTOR, LACKING IN ANY FOUNDATION
When a i~itness
such as Mr. Terry attempts to testify about the “facts”
of a case,
he is
required to testify only
about
those
facts of which he has personal knowledge.
Moreover, the
legislature explicitly prescribed, when creating the Administrative Citation process, that
an
enforcement agent, such as Mr. Terry, must base his
testimony
upon
his
direct
observations.
See
415 ILCS
§
5/31.1(b)
It follows that speculative evidence should not be admitted.
By
Mr. Terry’s
own
admission,
he
inspected
Mr.
Kamarasy’s
pile
of material,
on
March 25, 2004 ~r
the sum total ofthree minutes.
This inspection was performed as a follow-
up to a Decemb~5,
2003 inspection.
Mr.
Terry
admits,
however, that
all
he did was
stand on
the side ofthe road by the gate to Mr. Kamarasy’ s property
and
take a photograph of the
pile.
He did not enter-onto the property to make a serious investigation of the pile
or determine what
was in it.
The evide~ice
further shows
that Mr
Terry took
only
one photograph of the
site
on
March 25
That picture is completely unsatisfactory in that
it
does not show
any of the
specific
items
Mr. Terry;âlleges
to
have
seen
in
the
pile
namely,
“dimensional
lumber”,
“dark
paneling”,
and ‘~metalsiding”.
About
the
only
thing the photograph shows
clearly is
that

there was a pile
of materials and it was located at a
great distance
from
the place
where Mr.
Terry stopped toponduct his investigation.
That le~’VesMr.
Terry’s
personal
testimony
as
the only
evidence
the
County
can
produce to supp~rtits claim that the
items
claimed actually were
contained in
the
pile,
as
of
March 25, 2004- --But the questionremains “what
is
the foundation for Mr. Terry’s
testimony
concerning these -items”.
If the camera did
not
“see”
the individual items
Mr.
Terry
alleges,
when and how did Mr. Terry see them?
It is an undisputed fact that Mr.
Terry was
standing very far away from the pile when he
took the photograph on March 25, 2004.
Mr. Kamarasy is
expected to testify
that the
distance
from the gate to the location ofthe pile was
approximately 500 feet.
How could Mr. Terry have
observed
dimensional lumber at this distance,
or “dark paneling”, or “metal
siding”?
The
answer is that he could not have.
It
is
alsø~undisputedthat Mr. Terry only
took
a total of three minutes to
make his
inspection, and much of that time was presumably spent taking
out his
camera, lining
up
the
photograph, andsetting the proper angles on the lens.
He did not have
time to
study
the debris
pile, or scan clos~iy
for signs of lumber or paneling or siding.
His Report shows that
no tests
or samples of any~materialswere taken.
One might
speculate that Mr.
Terry entered
these
items
on
his
report
on
March
25,
based on his
recOllection of having observed them on December
5,
2003.
Even so, Mr.
Terry
simply had no way ofknowing for sure that the items he
saw
on
December
5
were
still
present
on March 25.
As a result, Mr. Terry’s testimony
is either untruthful, if he claims to have
seen
these
items
on March25, or it is inadmissible if he claims to have only seen them on December
6.
The violation thai- Mr. Kamarasy is charged with
is
dated March
25,
2004,
not
December
6,
2003,
and
the legal requirement
is
that
Mr.
Terry can
only
testify
about what
he
directly
observed regarding the alleged violation.

Even
without the requirement set
forth
in
the
Administrative
Citation process,
the
general rules of evidence make Mr. Terry’s evidence
so unreliable that his reference to the
existence ofthe specific items
the metal siding, dark
panelmg,
and dimensional lumber
should
be excisqd from his report and stricken from this record.
Mr. Terry merely
assumed
that those items were there.
And, given the fact that Mr. Terry already knew Mr. Kamarasy
was
trying to clean the place up, Mr. Terry’s assumption was unreasonable.
IfMr. Terry wanted to
testify
about what was
in
the
pile, he
should have taken a close
up look to see what was there.
He did not.
And his speculation now about what
was there then
cannot support a reasonable,
sustainable finding that Mr. Kamarasy’s actions violated the Act.
It follows that the County should only be allowed to
present evidence that the
pile
of
materials from
the’- abandoned mobile home structures still existed as ofMarch 25, 2004, a point
that Mr
Kamaras,y does not dispute
The County should not be permitted to
testify
about what
was in the pile.
pAnd then, it follows that the County cannot make
aprimafacie
case that
the
pile violated the ~Po11ution
Control
Act.
As
a matter of
law, the
mere existence of a
pile of
materials is not enough.
V
IT IS I~ART
OF THE
STATE’S
PRIMA FACIE
CASE TO PROVE THAT
MR. K~MARASYCAUSED
OR ALLOWED
“OPEN DUMPING”, AS
THAT TERM IS DEFINED
IN THE POLLUTION CONTROL ACT:
BUT
MR. KAMARASY DID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW “OPEN DUMPING”
AT THE MAKANDA/KAMARASY SITh
In order
U5
seek enforcement by Administrative
Citation for violations
of Section 21(p),
the Agency, or local governing body, must first establish that the respondent caused or allowed
open dumping
Se~e
Montgomerv County
Illinois
v
Clifford Crispens
Jacqueline R
Cnspens
and Line Pilot Bungee, Inc., AC 95-43.
Section 21(a) ofthe Act sets forth a general prohibition
against open duthping as follows:
“No person shall cause or allow the open
dumping of any
waste.” 415 ILCS
§
5/21(a)
Section 3~385ofthe Act defines “refuse”
as “waste”.
415
ILCS
§
5/3.385.
The Act
then defines “wa’ste” to mean “any garbage, sludge from a waste treatment
plant,
water supply

treatment plant,
-
or air
pollution
control
facility or
other discarded material”.
415
ILCS
§
5/3.535.
-
Section ~‘300of the Act defines “open dumping” as
tl~
consolidation of refuse from one or more sources at a
disposal
si~è
that
does not
fulfill
the
requirements of
a
sanitary
landfill.
(Emphasis added.)
415 ILCS
§
5/3.395.
Thus,
in
order to prove that Mr. Kamarasy
committed “open
dumping”,
the County must show that he created a “disposal site” on his land.
It cannot be true, however,
that any time a
landowner places any
household
item
(for
example, a broken chair) on his
land, or piles up
some
branches and
leaves, that he
or she has
thereby created t “disposal site” under the statute.
Such
an
interpretation would render the
Pollution Contro1~Actso broad as to be arbitrary and unenforceable.
See
Alternate Fuels.
Inc.
v.
Director of the illinois Environmental
Protection Ag~cy,2004 WL 2359398
(Ill.
Sup.
Ct.
2004)
It would mean for example that every homeowner who has everplaced a broken
chair in
his backyard, or-th~old
piece of plywood has thereby created a “disposal
site”
under the
law,
and would be
subject (in the case of the plywood) to charges of both littering
and
depositing
demolition debrisiin violation ofthe Pollution
Control Act.
Hopefully,
this
Board would
agree
that that is not the~type
ofproblem that the Pollution Control Act was meant to address.
Of course,
Mr. Kamarasy recognizes
that
his
pile of materials was
not
equivalent
in
scale
to merely p~tting
out a couple ofbroken pieces ofplywood on one’s land.
However, size
or scale is not a r~1evant
consideration when it comes to determining which piles of materials
do
or do not constitute “disposal sites” under the
Pollution
Control
Act
As will be discussed m
detail below, th~relevant
distinction between a mere “pile of material” and a “disposal site”
has to
do
with
the likelihood that
the “pile of material” will
cause “pollution.”
Roughly
speaking, as willi be discussed in
more detail below,
a disposal
site
is
a place
where
material is
disposed of in suCh a way that it is
likely
to
cause pollution.
So, it
is
not the existence of the

pile ofmaterial that is offensive to the Pollution Control Act; it is
the scattering of that
material,
or constituents thereof, freely into the environment, which the law seeks to prevent.
In the case at bar, Mr. Kamarasy admits that he
organized
and
consolidated the
parts
and material froñ~i-
some mobile homes
that had been abandoned on his
property, moving them
to a single locatio~nat the Bittersweet Farm site at the direction of the IDPH
But none of these
parts
or materials threatened to
scatter
freely into the
environment
Mr
Kamarasy
merely
intended to harvest or recycle the usable parts before disposing ofthe rest.
In so
doing,
he may
have created a ness;
however,
he
did not create a
disposal
site, according
to
the
Pollution
Control Act.
‘~
Admitte4ly, the Act does not provide a single definition for the term “disposal site”, but
the words
“disposal” and
“site”
are
defined separately.
The definition of the term “site”
is
self-explanatory~ee
415 ILCS
§5/3.460
However, the term “disposal”
is
specific enough
as
to
shed light on
s’~’hichdebris piles can be labeled “disposal sites” and which cannot.
Accordin~
to theAct:
“Disposal”
means
the
discharge,
deposit,
injection,
dumping,
spilling, leaking or placing of any waste or hazardous waste
into or
or~
any
land
or
water
or
into
any
well
so
that
such
waste
or
hazardous
waste
or
any
constituent
thereof
may
enter
the
environment
orbe emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters,
-
including ground waters.
415
ILCS
§
5/3.185.
Presumably, then, a “disposal site” under
the Act would be one where
such “disposal”‘takes place.
For purpdses of analysis, there are two main parts
to
the
above
definition.
First, the
definition requires a
showing
that Mr.
Kamarasy “placed
.
.
.
waste
.
.
.
on
his
land.”
Second it requires
that Mr. Kamarasy placed waste of such a kind and
in
such a manner “so
that such waste.
.
.
or any constituent thereofmay
enter the environment
or
be
emitted
into the
air
or discharged’
nto
any
waters, including ground waters.” (Emphasis added.)
Because the County bears
the burden of proving
that Mr.
Kamarasy committed the act
of “open
dumping”
and because
this
requires
a
showing
that
the
respondent created
a

“disposal site”, itis clearly
the County’s
burden to
prove that the
site in
question was truly a
“disposal
site”*-’
As just noted, that would ordinarily require two showings
(1) placing waste on the land,
and (2) doing thi~~
in such a way that the
waste would be
likely to
“enter
the environment”,
or
be “emitted” into the air or “discharged”
into the
water.
But,
since Mr. Kamarasy concedes
the first point, the County’s burden is to show only that
the
waste,
was somehow placed on
the
land in such a way that it, or some
constituent thereof was entering into the environment or
emitting into the~airor discharging into the waters.
Certainly, no evidence will
be presented ofemitting or discharging
Therefore,
it
would
appear
that the Gounty will have to prove “entering into the environment”.
The County will present no evidence that the pile
of material at the site
in question was
likely to cause pollution in the sense just described
Perhaps
the County
means
to
argue,
m
effect, that everyPtime a personplaces waste on his orher land, then he or she automatically, as
a
matter oflogical consequence,
causes that waste to enter into the environment.
But if that
is
the
correct interpretation
of the phrase
“enter
the environment”, namely
that
anything
found
outside of a building is necessarily
in the environment, so that every debris pile
is
a disposal
site, then the entire phrase
“so that such waste.
.
.
or any
constituent thereof may enter the
environment orb~
emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters,
including
ground waters”
would become d~mpletely
superfluous.
If the prohibited act was merely placing the waste on
the land, why did’ the legislature botherto say that it was only prohibited if it was done in
such a
way as to cause the materials to enter into the environment?
It is a standard principle ofstatutory construction that each clause
in
a statute
should be
presumed to have~some
meaning. Alternate Fuels.
Inc.
v.
Director of the Illinois
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
supra,
2004
WL 2359398
Therefore,
it
must
be
presumed
that
the
legislature meant-the concepts of “entering into the environment”, as well as “emitting”
and
“discharging”, t~place
some limitation
on
the
notion of placing
waste
on
the
land.
A

landowner, like Mr. Kamarasy, does not create a disposal site every time
he places waste on his
land.
Li
So how d~iesone know which acts create a disposal site, and which do not?
What
is the
distinction that the legislature
intended to
make?
It
seems
clear
that
by
using
the
words
“entering into
the
environment”, “emitting”, and “discharging” the legislature meant to
imply
a certain lack of~Qntrolorpotential
lack of control by the person who placed
the waste on the
land.
To be a disposal site, it must be shown either that (1) the waste in its
entirety (for example
unprotected paper trash), or else
(2)
some constituent of the
waste (for example oil or paint in
open cans)
did enter or is likely to enter (freely) into the
environment, or be
emitted into the air
or be discharged/ihto the waters.
This is a
Pollution
Control
Act.
It is pollution
that
is
being
regulated, not mere messiness on the part of a landowner
Now, it thMr. Kamarasy’s position, as discussed above, that the County
in general
and
Mr.
Terry in particular failed to provide any credible or substantial evidence
showing the nature
or type ofitems
i-n the pile of materials on March 25, 2004.
Without such evidence,
the County
cannot possibly -~reet
its burden ofproving that such materials were
deposited “so
that such
waste..
.
or any~constituent
thereof may enterthe environment or be
emitted
into the air or
discharged into ahy waters, including ground waters”.
Even iftj~~
Board were to allow the County
to
use Mr. Terry’s
specific
list of items
as
evidence, that wOuld hardly help to prove
this
was a disposal
site.
Does
anyone
seriously
believethat metái~siding,dark paneling,
and
dimensional lumber are likely
to
scatter,
like paper
trash, freely intouPthe environment, or to
leak into the ground water or emit
vapors into
the
air?
And, how did M~-
Terry determine that this scattering or leaking or emitting was going
on,
if he
only inspected
th~
pile visually for three minutes from a distance of500 feet?
ThereforC~
and for all of the reasons cited
above,
the County
cannot and
wifi not prove
that Mr. Kamaras~’smaterial pile at BittersweetFarm, as observed on
March 25,
2004,
was
an
“open dump”.
Since
such a finding is
the necessary predicate to
both of the charges
against
Mr. Kamarasy, l~Othcharges should be
dismissed.
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VI
n
~-MR.
KAMARASY DID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN
j
DUMPING THAT RESULTED IN “LITTER” AS
THAT TERM IS
‘~-•P
USED IN THE POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
Even if the Board
should find that Mr. Kamarasy did commit “open dumping,” each of
the two charges against Mr. Kamarasy still require a further showing.
Count
(19 states that the respondent caused or allowed open
dumping that resulted in
r
“litter” in violatiOn of
§
2l(p)(l)
of the Act.
But,
Mr. Kamarasy does not believe that his
act
of placing
a pile~
of materials on his
land, consisting of
materials from
abandoned mobile
homes, in a locatiOn that was a substantial distance
from both the road and
any neighbors,
and
in a mannerthat-~posed
no threat that the items
might migrate towards someone else’s
property,
can reasonably
characterized as “littering”
Of cours~I,
Mr. Kamarasy
is
well aware that
the
term
“litter”
has
been
interpreted
expansively in ~rior
cases
before the Pollution Control Board.
See e.g.
Illinois
Environmental
Protection Agency v.
Springer,
supra,
AC 02-7
at p.
6
But,
again, if the legislature had merely
intended that every landowner who everplaced waste on his
land in such a way as to
constitute
“open dumping~’
was
also
and
automatically guilty
of littering,
then the legislature would not
have
added the ~ua1ifying phrase
“that resulted in
litter.”
See
e.g.
Alternate Fuels.
Inc.
v.
Director of the Illinois
Environmental Protection
Agency,
supra,
2004 WL 2359398
It would
havejust defined~thecrime as “open dumping”.
By addingthe phrase “that resulted in litter”, the legislature made it clear that it believes
that
not all discâ~ded
items left at a “disposal site” are litter.
So
the question remains what
constitutes “litt&-~ng”under the
Pollution
Control Act, and what does
not.
Unfortunately,
the
Act does not
sa~:?This
failure
to define littering would have the
potential to
pose
serious
enforcement problems of constitutional dimension: how can a homeowner, even one
who has
studied the statute in
elaborate detail, possibly
know if he
is
performing the kind of “open
dumping” that
results
in litter, if the
Act does not define “litter”?
See e.g.
People
v.
Einoder,
209 Il1.2d 443. 450.
283
I11.Dec.
551.
808
N.E.2d 517
(2004)

U
The Pollution Control Board has attempted to
answer this
problem in
previous
cases,
responding
to
charges
that
the term
“litter”
in
the
statute
is
too
vague
by
adopting
the
definition oflitter from the Litter Control Act
See e g
St
Clair County v
Louis
Mund, AC 90-
n
64.
This approach by the Board is both logical and reasonable.
It has the virtue of relying on
a
legal notion of “litter” that was created by
the legislature precisely for the purpose of going
beyond the simplistic notion that litter is just “messy
stuff left outside,” and identifying
with
r
some precision which messy stuffleft outside shall be treated by
the law as “litter”
and
which
shall not, so that littering can be either prevented orpunished.
By adopting the meaning of “litter” as it is
used in the Litter Control
Act, the Board
has put homeowners like Mr. Kamarasy
on
notice
that unlawful “littering”
in
the
Pollution
Control Act
mea*s exactly the same thing
as unlawful “littering” in the Litter Control Act.
The Littei
Control Act provides.
“Litter”
means
any
discarded,
used or unconsumed substance
or
waste.
“Litter”
may include,
but
is
not
limited
to,
any
garbage,
ti~ash,
debris, rubbish, grass clippings
or other lawn or garden
waste,
newspaper, magazines,
glass, metal, plastic or
paper
containers or
otherpackaging
construction material,
abandoned vehicle.
.
.
motor
vehicleparts, furniture, oil, carcass ofa dead animal, any nauseous
or
offensive matter of any kind, any object likely to injure
any
person
or create a traffic hazard, potentially
infectious
medical waste
as
defined in
Section
3.360
of the
Environmental Protection
Act, or
anything
else of an unsightly or unsanitary nature, which has been
discarded,
abandoned or otherwise disposed of improperly.
415 ILCS
§1051-3
But this paragraph, though properly taken from the Litter Control Act, does not give a
complete definition oflitter.
Indeed, it is
transparently incomplete, if one reads
it carefully.
It
consists of two sentences.
The first sentence
is
obviously definitional
in syntax.
“Litter means any
discarded,
used or unconsiti~ied
substance
or waste.”
But
this
sentence,
taken
alone, suffers
from the
same vagueness-lproblem as discussed above.
In fact, based solely on
this
sentence
the
trash
that
one
puts
inside
one’s garbage
can and
takes
to
the
curb
is
“litter,”
since
it
certainly
consists
of “discarded, used or consumed
substance or waste.”
Likewise, a
small
pile
of
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leaves in one’s own back yard would be litter, and subject to
whatever enforcement measures
the Litter ContrOpAct
provides.
Certainly, that is not what the legislature intended.
b
For one
thing, the second sentence is there for a reason.
It appears to
be
intended to
give some help
in
understanding “litter”, by providing a list (though not complete) of concrete
examples.
But the key word in the second
sentence
is
“may”.
For example according
to
this
so-called definition, “grass clippings or other lawn or garden waste”, may
be
considered litter
under the Litter-Control Act.
Or, they may
not.
One
simply does
not
know, without
more
guidance from tl~ë
statute.
Mr
Kamarasy
does
not
say
this
to
be
tricky,
or try
to
win
this
case
on
a
mere
technicality.
The
question raised here
is
one
about
fundamental fairness.
This
so-called
definition, cited frequently by the Board, completely fails to
answer the basic question posed
above: what
kin~i-
of dumping
on one’s own property is
the kind
that results
in
littering,
and
what kind does not?
Without that
answer, how can a landowner ever know
what is prohibited
and what is not?’
For example, if this
one
paragraph were
the
entire
definition of
litter,
even such
a
common practice as mulching one’s grass
clippings back into
one’s
lawn would
be
fraught
with unknown and unknowable danger
The inspector might cite
it
as
a violation
Or
he
might
not.
And, the onI~y
way for a homeowner to
know in
advance would be to read the inspector’s
mind.
Thereforê~
in effect, the interpretation ofthe Litter Control Act that Jackson
County is
asking this Board to
adopt for use in the Pollution
Control Act
would grant the inspector sole
and absolute pow~r
to decide what is litterand what is not.
Perhaps-‘~41r.Terry
believes
that he
can enforce the Pollution
Control Act merely by
insisting that he knows litter when he
sees
it, but if
so, this
would
lead to a blatant violation of
the Separation of~~owers
Clause of the Illinois Constitution.
See e.g.
People
v.
Izzo,
195
Il.2d
109,
115-6, 253~Ill.Dec.
425,
745 N.E.2d 548
(2001)
It is up to
the legislature to
give
clear
guidelines abou~~’
hat litter is
and what it is not; the inspector, and even the Pollution Control
Board, should have only a very limited discretion in this matter

Ofcourse~P
the legislature knew this when it wrote the Litter Control Act.
It did not
give
broad discretion to inspectors to define litter
Instead,
in
plain language,
the
legislature gave
fairly detailed guidelines about what is litter and what is not.
In the legislature’s own words:
t~his Act is, therefore, necessary
to
provide for
uniform prohibition
throughout the
State
of any
and all littering
on
public
or
private
property so as to protect the health,
safety and welfare of the people
of
this State.
415 ILCS §105/2 (Legislative Findings and Determinations) (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, it was the legislature’s intent that the notion of unlawful littering should be
“uniform”
in the State of Illinois,
and
that one has
to
examine the
entire
statute
to
ascertain
what “any and all littering” means.
Merely reading one paragraph from
the statute
will not
suffice.
Itfollow;that the criterion for
whether a landowner has
committed
open dumping
that
resulted in litter
in violation of the Pollution
Control Act is
to
determine
whether or not
the
landowner comn~ittedopen dumping
thatresulted in litter
in violation ofthe Litter Control Act.
In other~~ords,
to
prove
that
Mr. Kamarasy’s
alleged “open dumping”
resulted
in
“litter”, the County must prove that his actions constituted a violation of the Litter Control Act.
But, the County cannot do so, because Mr.
Kamarasy did not violate the Litter Control Act.
The Litter Control Act contains four sections that describe prohibited
acts.
See
415
ILCS
§~
105/4 tl~pugh105/7
Two of these are not relevant to this hearing
in
that they refer to
dumping from a
otor vehicle orabandoning a motor vehicle.
See
415 ILCS
§
105/5
(dumping
from
motor vehicle)
and 415
ILCS
§
105/7
(abandonment of
motor
vehicle)
That leaves
Section 4 (dumping and the deposit oflitter) and Section 6 (accumulation of litter)
Section -4~~f
the Litter Control Act provides in relevant part, as follows:
No person shall dump, deposit,...
or
discard.
.
.
litter.
.
.
unless
*
*
*
*
(c)
the person is the owner or tenant in
lawful possession
of the
property
.
.
.
and
does
not
create
a
public
health
or
safety
hazard,
a public nuisance, or a fire hazard.

r
(Emphasis added)
L
Section
-6-of the Litter Control Act
addresses accumulation of litter.
It
provides
in
relevant part, as follows:
T
No person shall allow
litter to
accumulate upon
real
property, of
-
which theperson charged is
the owner or tenant
in
control, in
such
a
manner
as
to
constitute
a
public
nuisance
or
in
such
a
r
manner that the litter may be
blown
or
otherwise
carried
by
I
-
the natural elements on to the real property of another person.
r
There is
no evidence to
support
a claim that Mr. Kamarasy’s
so-called “open
dump”
I
-
created a public health or safety hazard, a public nuisance, or a fire hazard.
There
is
also
no
evidence that he ~depositeditems in the
so-called “open
dump”
in
a manner as to
constitute a
-
public
nuisance Or such that items may be blown or otherwise carried by the natural elements
on to the real prO~ertyof another person.
Therefore~
Mr. Kamarasy should not be
found in violation of the Act
on
the charge of
L
open dumping that resulted in litter, because he did not cause or allow litter in violation of either
p
the Pollution Control Act or theLitter Control Act.
L
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT
CAUSE
OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
-
‘-THAT RESULTED
IN THE DEPOSITION OF GENERAL
CONSTRUCTION OR DEMOLITION OR CLEAN CONSTRUCTION
OR
DEMOLITION DEBRIS IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT
Count (2) against Mr
Kamarasy
(if it
had
been properly stated in
the Citation)
charges
L
him
with open
dumping that
“caused or allowed the deposition
of general
construction or
demolition
orclean construction or demolition debris in violation of415 ILCS
§
5/21 (p)(7).”
As already explained, Mr.
Kamarasy concedes that the pile of materials that Mr.
Terry
observed
on
Match
25,
2004,
at Mr.
Kamarasy’s
Bittersweet Farm
property
contained the
remaining parts from
several abandoned mobile home
structures, after Mr
Kamarasy
had
disposed ofcertain recyclable and reusable parts.
Mr. Kamarasy denies,
however, that the
pile
was an “open dump”
and he denies, as ofMarch 25, 2004, that the pile contained the particular

items
that Mr. Terry claims
to have
seen.
In particular, Mr. Kamarasy denies that the pile
contained
dimenaional lumber, or metal siding.
Mr. Kamarasy does not know whether the materials that remained in
the pile
on March
25,
formally met- either of the
definitions of “general
construction or demolition
debris”
or
“clean construction or demolition debris”, since he does
not
know if
his
actions constituted
“demolishing”
the
abandoned mobile
homes,
or
whether the
materials therefrom
should
technically be described as “debris.”
See
415
ILCS
§
5/3.160(a)
and
415
ILCS
§
5/3.160(b).
Thatis a matter fOrthe Board to decide.
But, regardiess ofthe Board’s decision on this point, and even assuming further
that the
Board
decides
~ifr. Kamarasy did
create an
“open
dump” in
the
sense
intended
by
the
Pollution Control Act, the Board still must dismiss
this
“depositing
demolition debris”
charge
essentially forth~
same reason as the Board must dismiss the littering charge.
As
discu~s~ed
above, the littering
charge must be dismissed because the
Litter
Control
Act
expressly ~lgrants
a
landowner
the
right
to
deposit
on his
own
land
the
kind
of
“stuff”(which dOes
not spread freely onto
other people’s
land)
that Mr. Kamarasy deposited
at Bittersweet Fath, in the manner that he deposited it (so that it did not cause a public
nuisance,
or health, safety,Pand fire hazards).
Now, theCounty simply wants
to
rename
the same materials
the alleged dimensional
lumber, metal
siding, and dark paneling
as “demolition debris” rather than “litter”.
But,
Mr.
Kamarasy contends that merely changing the names of those
items
cannot transform the reality
of whetherMr. Kamarasy’s action in depositing them was lawful or unlawful.
Mr.
Kan~iarasy’scontention on
this
point
is
two-fold.
First,
he
cannot rightfully
be
convicted
of
both
charges
littering
and
depositing
demolition material.
Second,
if this
Board
agrees that he was not guilty of littering
because the Litter Control Act expressly
permits
his
action in
depositing material
from
abandoned mobile homes
on his
own property,
then
the
Board
must alsoPfind
that Mr. Kamarasy was not guilty
of unlawfully depositing demolition
debris for depositing these same items on the same land.

o
In addressing the first of these two arguments, Mr. Kamarasy wants to be very clear not
to
overstate
it. ‘While
fundamental fairness
dictates that
a
person not
be
convicted
(and
punished) twice~for
the exact same act, even if the act is
given two
separate
names by
the
prosecution, Mt~’
Kamarasy does recognize that in
some instances,
the prosecution may
be
unsure how to
characterize certain items,
whether as “litter”
or as “demolition
debris”
under
the Pollution
Control Act.
In that event, it
might make sense for the
prosecution to
bring
forward both charges and let the Board sort it out.
But this
Board
should
still only
convict on
one count.
Mr. Kam’arasy further recognizes that
in some cases, a person could run an
open
dump
site in which both~
litter, such as paper trash,
and
demolition debris,
such as broken
concrete or
bricks, are preselit.
In that case, the State, in principle,
could
charge the person separately
with
“littering” and
“~depositingdemolition debris.”
But that i~
not true ofthe case at bar.
Neither the inspector nor the County has
accused
Mr. Kamarasy
C-f depositing
different kinds
of “stuff’
in
his
pile.
There
is
only
one kind,
namely
the parts~from
the abandoned mobile homes
that
others left upon
Mr.
Kamarasy’s
mobile home park.
The County may
call this
“litter”.
Or it may call this “demolition
debris”.
But it cannot convict Mr. Kamarasy of two counts, littering and depositing demolition
debris,
on the basis ofa single act ofdepositing a single type ofmaterial.
In effect, iJackson County
is
asking this
Board
to
impose two
separate
fines
on
Mr.
Kamarasy for th~
exact same action involving
the exact same materials.
This
Board
should
decline to do so.
In makinig
the second argument
--
that this Board cannot simultaneously hold that the
items deposited ate lawful, whencalled litter, but unlawful, when called demolition debris
--
Mr.
Kamarasy also wishes to be
careful
not to
overstate his
argument.
Of course, it is
possible to
be acquitted und~r
one law because it does not apply, and then be convicted under
a
separate
law that does apply to the same act.

L
But the
difference in the case at bar is
that the
stuff at Bittersweet Farm is
the kind of
L
stuffthat the Litter Control Act was
intended
to regulate.
The County
already
conceded that
it
believes this is so, when
it
chargedMr
Kamarasy with pollution by
littering
for depositing
this
stuff on his property.
Of coursç~when one
checks the Litter Control
Act, it is
not
absolutely
clear on
this
r
point.
As already. noted, the LitterControl Act provides a long list of examples of items
that are
r
regulated under the Act.
The list does not
include
“material
from
abandoned mobile homes.”
-
But
the legislature was
careful
to
say that this
is
not the complete or defmitive list.
Items
like
the items on the list should also be regulated.
Materials from abandoned mobile homes
are the types of items
that might be unlawful
litter, if disposed:of in a
manner that violates
the Litter Control
Act.
The list also
specifies
furniture, and presumably the broken down pieces of furniture, as items that may be unlawful
L
litter, if disposedofin violation ofthe Litter Control Act.
Mr.
Kamarasy believes that any
dark
L
paneling or pieces of wood found at his
site, and
coming from the broken mobile homes
that
others
abandone;c~-:inhis mobile home
park,
are of
a type that
could be
compared
to
broken
L
down pieces of ftu
iture.
Mr. Kamarasy believes
the same can be
said of any pieces of wood
found at the site.
They likely came from items
that were furniture inside
the mobile
homes.
P
Mr. Kamarasy f
i~ther
believes that any metal
siding found at the site, -too,
would be
the type of
stuff the LitterControl Act was meant to
address.
In other Words, the materials from the abandoned mobile homes
are a subset of the stuff
-
that is potentiallytonsidered to be litter and addressed under the Litter Control
Act.
That being
so, sections
4
and 6
of the
Litter Control Act
expressly
say
to
a
landowner,
such as
Mr.
Kamarasy, that h~’
is lawfully entitled to deposit those things
on his
own land, so
long
as those
things do not fotm a public
nuisance, migrate to
the neighbor’s
property, or create
a
health,
safety, orfire hazaid.
Now, theprosecution wants to
argue that, nevertheless,
it
is
unlawful to
deposit
these
materials on
one’s own land, provided that
one
calls
them
“demolition
debris”
instead of

“litter”.
This is like believing that eating too much sugar-is unhealthy, but if the label
on the
box calls it sucrose instead, one can eat as much as one wants.
The prosecutor in this case, in effect, is asserting that the legislature has written two laws
on the subject.
Under one
law,
a landowner is
expressly
entitled to
deposit materials from
abandoned mobile homes on his own land (so long as certain
conditions
are
met);
under
the
other, it
is
always
unlawful
to
do
so
(at
least without obtaining
a
permit).
The
two
laws
therefore contradict each otherand cannot both represent the nature ofthe law in this State.
Furthermore, and not coincidentally, the Pollution Control
Act happens
to
have adopted
the definition of~~~tter
from the Litter Control Act.
In effect, that means that every landowner
had
a right to e4iect that any action of depositing
stuff on
his or her own land that
is
lawful
under the Litter Control Act would also be lawful under the Pollution Control Act.
By
contrast, the prosecutor wants this
Board to
declare that
Mr. Kamarasy’s
act
of
depositing materials from mobile homes that others
abandoned in
his
mobile home park on his
own land is both expressly unlawful under the littering section ofthe Pollution Control Act,
and
also expressly unlawful under the depositing demolition debris section of the
Pollution
Control
Act.
This positiOn is contradictory and should be adopted by the Board.
This
Board
should
rule
that the prosecution’s
theory
of
the
case
is
untenable,
and
dismiss Count (2) of the charges against Mr. Kamarasy.
VIII
IN JANUARY 2004,
THE PARTIES REACHED AN AGREEMENT
BY WHICH MR. KAMARASY PROMISED TO DISPOSE OF THE
MATERIALS ON
THE
STARVATION ACRES SITE BY
FEBRUARY 13, 2004, MR.
KAMARASY
ATFEMPTED TO HONOR
THE AGREEMENT, BUT WAS UNABLE TO DO
SO DUE TO
PROBLEMS OUTSIDE
HIS CONTROL, AND HE HAS SINCE
-
-
COMPLETELY
CLEANED UP THE
SITE
The Adthnistration Citation procedure
in
the Pollution Control Act provides a defense
in the case ofunavoidable circumstances.
If
the Board finds that the person appealing the citation
has
shown
that the violation resulted from
uncontrollable
circumstances, the

n
BOard shall adopt a final order which
makes
no
finding of violation
and which imposes no penalty.
-
~
415
ILCS
§
5/3f1(D)(2)
Mr.
Kamarasy will present evidence that, after receiving the January
9,
2004
letter from
Mr.
Hagston ab’out his
pile
at the Bittersweet Farm
site, he
came
to
an
agreement with
Mr.
Terry about cleaning
up the site.
The agreement was reached
in
January.
It
called for Mr.
Kamarasy to cle~n
up the site by February
13, 2004.
At
the time
he
entered
into the
agreement, Mr. Kamarasy
already
had
called Mr.
McMurphy to
haul away the non-recyclable materials and fully believed
that he
could meet the
February
13 target date
And, he will present evidence to
this Board that he did proceed with
due diligence
to iattempt to comply.
He
succeeded
in
arranging
to
have
all
the
recyclable
materials, including themetal
siding, taken to Karco Metals forrecycling; and,
as mentioned,
he
already had arranged with Mr. McMurphy to pick up the remaining materials and
take them to
a landfill.
1-
Unfortuñ~te1y,Mr. Kamarasy did
not
account
for
the
weather.
Mr.
McMurphy
intended to takethis heavy equipment onto the property to pick up the remaining material,
but
the ground was too wet and muddy.
Mr. McMurphy proposed to
wait for a solid freeze, but
such a freeze didnot occur prior to March 25.
Therefore,
Mr. Kamarasy was forced to
wait
until the ground dried up later in the spring before having the remainder of the material taken to
the landfill for disposal.
In Il1inois~Environmental
Protection Agency
v.
Marshall Pekarsky, AC 0 1-37 (Feb.
27,
2002), the Pollution Control Board
held that snow
was a sufficient excuse for not meeting the
terms of a compliance
agreement.
Rain
and mud
are just
as paralyzing in
circumstances
such
as this.
Therefore,
this
Board
should hold
that Mr. Kamarasy
was unable to comply with the
agreement with M:r. Terry due to circumstances (weather) that were beyond his controL
Of course~the County may argue that this is not a case of uncontrollable
circumstances
because Mr. Kamarasy had control when he created thepile.
But this is not the proper standard

for the defense-as defined by
the
statute.
See
Illinois
Environmental Protection
Agency
v.
Marshall Pekarsky,
supra.
Most
violations of the Act involve
some willful or negligent action
on the part of the alleged wrongdoer at some point
in the chain of circumstances that led to
the
violation.
Ifone willful or negligent act in the chain of circumstances
is
sufficient to
negate the
statutory defense ofuncontrollable circumstances, then the defense itself couldnever be used.
Again, under the principle that the legislature does not introduce language,
and
certainly
not whole defenses, that are superfluous, one must
presume that the words “resulted
from”
in
the phrase
“the violation resulted from
uncontrollable
circumstances”
does
not
subsume
everything in the chain of events that led to the violation, but
only
refers
to
those
events
that
triggered the final act ofissuing
a citation.
With that~jnmind, this Board should
note that,
in
January
2004,
the County
agreed that
it
would not proceed with prosecutonal action
if
Mr
Kamarasy complied with the agreement
It
is an uncontested-and uncontestable fact that
no administrative citation would have beenfiled ~
Mr. Kamarasy had
complied with
the agreement to
remove the material
to
the landfill by the
promised target date.
But Mr. Kamarasy was diligent in
trying to comply
with the agreement,
and the only reason he did not fully succeed in complying is
due
to
circumstances that were
truly beyond his control.
Had the County’s
inspector undertaken any
effort to
inquire of Mr.
Kamarasy why some of the material had not beenremoved by February
13, 2004,
it would have
learned about the -contractor’s inability to complete the job
due to
adverse weather conditions
and could have i~ade
a determination
whether to extend the target date to allow completion of
the job, or take sOme other action.
For thesei~reasons
alone, and in
accordance with the Marshall Pekarsky case, the charges
in this case should be dismissed.

IX
IT IS
UNFAIR,
AND A VIOLATION OF MR.
KAMARASY’S CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS, TO ACCUSE HIM
OF IMPROPERLY
CREATING AN OPEN DUMP SITE,
LITTERING, AND/OR
DUMPING DEMOLITION DEBRIS AT A SITE WHERE HE
IS
EXPRESSLY ENTITLED TO DEPOSIT THOSE SAME
MATERIALS
UNDER THE LITTER CONTROL ACT
The same act by
a
landowner cannot be
declared by
the State to
be
both
lawful
and
unlawful.
Yet,-äs discussed above
in
Section
VII, the
County
is
seeking
to
convict
Mr.
Kamarasy oftwo counts of pollution in
this
case, for an
act that
is
expressly
permitted by the
Litter Control Act.
The irony of this is
clear.
The Pollution Control Board
has adopted
the definition of
“litter”
as
it
is ~described in
the Litter Control
Act.
That should
mean that lawfulness
and
unlawfulness with respect to the matters covered by both Acts should be
the
same.
Yet, Mr.
Terry and the Jackson County prosecutor are asking this Board to hold, in effect, that it is
much
easierto
convictalandowner
ofpollution
(under the Pollution Control Act)
by littering
than it is
to convict the landowner simply oflittering (under the Litter Control Act).
But the problem goes deeper than irony.
It raises serious Constitutional concerns.
A basic tenet of due process is
that
a
citizen must
be
able to
reasonably
ascertain
whether an act that he is contemplating is lawful or not.
See e.g.
Granite City
Div.
Of Nat.
Steel
Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control
Board,
155
Ill.2d
149,
163,
184
Ill.Dec.
402,
613
N.E.2d 719
(1993)
Where the State has two laws, one of which tells the citizen unequivocally that the act
is
lawful, while the~ther tells the citizen, in effect, that the actis not lawful, it must be
true that one
or both of those
laws is unconstitutional.
Id.
Otherwise,
there would be
no possible
way for a
citizen to make the necessary determination about what is lawful conduct and what is not.
A landowner who wants
to
know
whether depositing
materials from
abandoned mobile
homes on his property is
perse
unlawful as littering has every reason to expect that reading the
Litter Control Act-will provide guidance.
And it does.
The LitterControl
Act specifically
states
that this is lawfuL

Now, the County wants to argue that,
while this
may be lawful under the Litter Control
Act, it is not lawful under the Pollution Control Act, and Mr. Kamarasy can still be charged with
unlawful “littering”
under the Pollution
Control Act.
In other words, the County
is
trying to
tell landowners that an act that is lawful as littering under the Litter Control
Act may
still be
unlawful for creating an open dump that results in littering
under the Pollution Control
Act.
How
could a landowner,
such
as
Mr.
Kamarasy, reasonably
be
expected to
ascertain this
twisted
logic?
The
answer
is
that
he could not!
And therefore,
the
charge
against
Mr.
Kamarasy for open dumping that resulted in
litter should
be
dismissed
by
this
Board
as an
unconstitutional charge.
Although-it is not quite as obvious,
the
same problem applies
to
the charge against Mr.
Kamarasy for open dumping that resulted in
depositing
demolition
debris
(meaning material
from the abandoned mobile homes)
on
his
land.
Given that the Litter Control Act instructs
landowners in plain language that they are permitted to deposit such material on their land, as
long as they do -~iot
thereby create
a
public nuisance, or a
health,
safety, or fire hazard, how
could Mr. Kamaràsy have reasonably anticipated that doing
so
would
violate the
Pollution
Control Act?
Thd answeris that he could not.
And, therefore, the charge against Mr. Kamarasy
for open dumping that resulted in depositing demolition
debris
should
also
be
dismissed by
this Board as an unconstitutional charge.
Every citizen of the United States
and the State of Illinois must be
able
to
reasonably
ascertain what is~awfuland what is not.
Otherwise law enforcement becomes simply a random
and uninte1ligible~
act.
For the State
to have
two laws, one of which told Mr. Kamarasy his
act
was lawful,
and~
One of which
supposedly
tells him that his
act was
unlawful
is
untenable.
Therefore, all charges against Mr
Kamarasy in AC 04-63 should be dismissed

X
IT WOULD BE UNFAIR, AND A VIOLATION OF MR. KAMARASY’S
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED DUE PROCESS RIGHTS, IF THIS
BOARD
INTERPRETED THE LEGAL MEANING OF “DISPOSAL
SITE”, “OPEN DUMP” AND/OR “LITTER” IN SUCH
A WAY AS
TO
IGNORE
OR RENDER
DE MINIMUS
THE NOTIONS OF SCATTERING
FREELY OR EMITTING INTO THE ENVIRONMENT AND OF
CAUSING SOME HARM TO OTHERS, WHICH THE LEGISLATURE
INTENDED TO BE INCORPORATED INTO THE MEANING OF
“POLLUTION”; AND SINCE THE COUNTY HAS NOT EVEN
ATTEMPTED TO PROVE THAT SUCH HARM ACTUALLY OCCURRED
ATTHE MAKANDAIKAMARASY SITE, IT HAS FAILED TO MAKE A
PRIMA FAC~IE
CASE OF POLLUTION AGAINST MR. KAMARASY
The problems inherent in the County’s interpretation of the Pollution Control
Act,
as
evidencedby the manner in which the prosecutor has
stated and presented its
case
against Mr.
Kamarasy, have already been discussed extensively in this
memorandum.
When the legislature
wished to defin~-~an
open dump,
it did not describe it merely as a location where a landowner
places some ofhis
orher
waste.
The legislature said
that,
to
be an
open dump, the debris
pile
must
also
be
placed
in
such a
way
that
either
the
debris
itself
is
free
to
enter
into
the
environment, o~
else
constituents
of the
debris
may
be
emitted
or
discharged
into
the
environment.
04e must assume that the legislature used this language for a reason,
namely
to
distinguish the r~-~re
serious crime of “pollution”
from the lesser notions of litter or of mere
“messiness”.
One
must also
assume
that by using
the word “may”
the legislature meant to
require the County to prove a significant likelihood, not simply an
infinitesimal
possibility of
entering
into the environment. Otherwise
an
overzealous
prosecutor can
always
claim
the
existence ofa small possibility.
Similar1~with respect to “litter”,
the legislature said
that,
if it occurs
only
on
the
alleged offender’s
own private property,
and
the
accusation
is
unlawful
“dumping,”
the
allegedly offending stuff must be shown to “create a public health or safety hazard, a
public
nuisance, or a firehazard.”
Or
alter-mitively,
where
the
accusation
is
that
the
stuff
is
being
unlawfully
“accumulated”, it~mustbe
shown that the stuff also
constitutes
a “public
nuisance”
or that it

“may be blown or otherwise carried by
the natural
elements on
to
the real property of another
person.”
These additional criteria in
the Pollution
Control
Act and the Litter Control
Act are not
identical but the~I
are consistent in requiring that the County prove something
more than merely
that the respondent placed some waste on
his
land.
The
something
more,
particularly in
the
case of the Pollution Control Act, is that some form of pollution was actually occurring.
But
common sense, as well as the language of the two statutes, shows that pollution
(by
littering)
requires
a showiiig of some actual harm either to neighbors or the public in general.
Where w~s
this
irreducible element of harm
in
the case at bar7
The County has
never
made, much less given Mr. Kamarasy the opportunity to
defend against any, such allegation.
Mr. Terry did not discuss this element ofharm in his Report.
He did not
claim to
have
observed a fire hazard, or other safety hazard.
He did not
claim to see
materials being “blown
or otherwise carried by the natural elements on to the real property of another person.”
See e.g.
County of Sangàrnmon v. Everett Daily, AC —1-16,
17, at p.
10
Nor
did
he
claim to
see
any of
the materials at the site emitting or discharging into the environment.
How could he have?
By his own admission, he only observed the pile for three minutes
from a distance of500 feet?
And. most ofthat time was spent taking
a photograph,
which does
not show any significant scattering ofthe pile ofmaterials at this site.
The only possible argument that the County
can make here is
to
exaggerate the
law,
since it lacks th~
facts.
The County may try to convince this Board
that merely setting
waste
out on the land
iS
a sufficient recitation of fact to
imply
that entering
into the environment has
occurred.
But it-has already been explained
above, in
Section V, that if this
were true, it would
-
CT
o-~
~
~
Ut ~
render the entire clause,”so
~.
.
t~
supeffluous’,
a
result to be
avoided.
‘~
Entering into the environment is not a mere trivial point in
the
County’s
case against
Mr. Kamarasy. ~:itis an
essential point, which
the County
must
prove.
But
the County has
presented and ca~
present no facts to support this claim.

n
Therefore, if this
Board upholds
the County’s
argument in
this
case, it will in
effect
write the requirement to
show
that pollution
was
actually occurring completely
out
of
the
Pollution
ContrOl
Act.
This
will
not
encourage respect
for
and
compliance
with
the
r
environmental la~s of the State.
Such an approach to the law would have the virtue of making it much easier in the
future
for the County to prove its case against any
landowner who
creates
a pile of material on
his
or
her own land.
T-he County
would no
longer need
to
demonstrate any
pollution in
order
to
convict for “pollution”
under the Pollution Control Act.
But,
as the respondent discussed in
Section
IX
(imiediately)
above,
that
would
also
render
the
Pollution
Control
Act
unconstitutionally vague, at least as applied to Mr. Kamarasy’s case.
To avoid~thisresult, this
Board
must interpret the Pollution
Control
Act in such a way
that it is constitutional.
That is, the Board must hold the County to its responsibility to prove,
in
addition
to
the tbther elements
of its
prima facie
case, that
some
form
of
pollution
was
emanating from Mr. Kamarasy’s pile of materials
at the Makanda/Kamarasy site.
Since the’ County has not even attempted to
make such a
prima facie
showing,
this
Board’s decisioii~
should be easy.
The charges against Mr. Kamarasy must be
dismissed for
failure to
state
akrimafacie
case.
XI
~
IT WOULD BE
UNFAIR, AND A VIOLATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, IF THIS BOARD WERE
TO~PERMITTHE INSPECTOR AND JACKSON COUNTY TO
SIMPLY USE THE “I KNOW IT WHEN I SEE IT” DEFINITION OF
Pt~LLUTION
(BY LITTERING)
UNDER THE POLLUTION
CONTROLACT OR LITTERING UNDER THE LITTER CONTROL
ACT~ATHER
THAN CAREFULLY APPLYING THE GUIDELINES
SET FORTH BY THE LEGISLATURE IN THE TWO LAWS
If this Board holds
as unlawful acts that are explicitly lawful under
the Litter Control
Act (forexampleplacing waste on
one’s
own property in
such -a way that
it is
not likely
to be
carried onto
a neighbor’s property by the natural elements) or which
are explicitly lawful under
the Pollution Control Act (for example burning landscape, household,
and agricultural
waste on
-
~
P,-P
-
pPag~-3~::--P~p
~
-
~
-~p~
p-

o
one’s own property), then this Board would
be,
in effect,
making new legislation about what is
and what is not
unlawful pollution.
That would be
a
violation of
the Separation of Powers
principle of the Illinois Constitution.
Making law is not a proper administrative function.
This
Board is only authorized to enforce the law.
By the same token, if this Board permits
an inspector to exercise
unbridled discretion
about what is lit~rand what is pollution, under the guise of “I
know it when I
see
it,”
that
would
be
a
violation of the
Separation of Powers
principle.
The
inspector
is
no
more
authorized than the Board to make new law about what is and is not pollution.
Nor
is
this
some
minor matter in
which
the exercise
of discretion
is
proper
and
necessary.
If littering
is
the crime in question, it cannot be left to
the executive branch
of
government, whether that means a county health department inspector or this Board, to
decide
arbitrarily and on its
own what constitutes unlawful litter and what does not
There must be
clear guidelines from the legislature, and those guidelines must be
followed, or the enforcement
itself is unconstitutional.
Of course~the legislature did
give
guidelines, if the two
statutes
are
analyzed with care,
as has been discussed throughout this memorandum.
But
Jackson County
seems
to
believe
that such careis
not required, and it can make up its own guidelines.
Any
time it sees a pile
of
material on a person’s land, the County claims that it can simply decide arbitrarily, or merely on
the basis ofits
inspector’s conclusory opinion, that the pile constitutes unlawful pollution.
If that is~allthat
this
Administration Citation process
requires, then
the
inspector
becomes both th~1awmaker
and the enforcer ofthe law, in violation of the Separation of Powers
clause ofthe Il1ii~dis
Constitution.
Therefore~in
order to
preserve
the constitutionality
of
the
Administration
Citation
process, this Board must hold Jackson County to its
irreducible duty
to
prove concrete
facts,
and
not
simply
~tate mere conclusory
opinions,
that
some form
of
pollution
was
actually
occurring at the-~Makanda/Kamarasysite, in violation of the specific terms
of
the
Pollution
Control Act.

-
XII
-
IT WOULD ALSO BE UNFAIR, AND SIMILARLY A
VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, IF
THIS BOARD WERE TO PERMIT THE INSPECTOR AND JACKSON
COUNTY TO PILE ON MULTIPLE CHARGES FOR WHAT
AMOUNTED TO A SINGLE ACT OF DEPOSITING ABANDONED
-
MOBILE HOMES AT THE STARVATION ACRE SITE
The legislature
designed the
Administration Citation process
in
order
to
expedite
enforcement andstreamline the adjudication process for violations ofthe Pollution
Control Act.
Naturally, this streamlining creates the risk of giving too much power to the executive branch,
and
thereby
abandoning the
checks
and
balances
upon
which
our
constitutional
system
depends.
The
legislature was well
aware of this
concern when it created
the
Administrative
Citation proceduie
That is why the legislature made a substantial effort to
limit the discretion
of the
executiv&branch,
in
applying
this
procedure.
The
more
control
exercised
by
the
legislative branch through
strict crafting of the law, the less discretion would remain
in
the
hands of the exec-titive branch.
Perhaps i-he most important element of the legislature’s plan to limit discretion was
to
strictly limit the4ines that this Board can assess for violations of the statute.
A landowner is to
be assessed $1500 for a violation ofthe Act,
no more and no less.
The Board is
not entitled
to
look at mitigating- circumstances, such as the size ofthe debris pile, the length of time that it had
been present on-~theland, or the intention
of the
landowner, unless
the violation itself was
somehow due to--uncontrollable circumstances.
Similarly
the Board is
not
allowed to consider
exacerbating circumstances such
as
deliberate
polluting,
the
extent of
the
pollution, or
the
belligerence ofthe landowner.
Yet, Mr.~Terry
and JacksonCounty
have managed
to
undermine this
most fundamental
pillar of the Administration Citation process by
finding a
sneaky
way
to
bring
two
charges
against Mr. Kamarasy for the same act.
Page
35
Memorañdñm
Su~pôrtiñg-Petition ~to~~PContest
Administrative~
-Citatioñ-.

Mr. Kamarasy admits that he deposited some material from abandoned mobile
homes
on his
own land,: only after the IDPH ordered it removed from the mobile
home park.
As
discussed above~the
prosecutor may label this material “litter”, and charge Mr.
Kamarasy
with
unlawful littering under the Pollution
Control Act.
Or, the prosecutor may
label
these parts
“demolition
debris”
and charge for
the
unlawful
depositing
of
demolition
debris.
The
prosecutor can even charge for both and
let the Board decide which one
is
most
likely
to
be
applicable.
But, in tl~efinal analysis, this
Board
cannot sustain
both
charges
where,
as
here,
the
prosecution did ~pt even attempt
to allege any different underlying facts for the two charges.
They are simply -the same charge, with a different name.
Under th~-
Administrative Citation process, a single
violation can only
be given a single
fine of $1500.
If this
Board
upholds
more,
its
ruling
will
violate the Separation of Powers
principle, and will have the effect of rendering the Pollution Control Act unconstitutional,
at
least as applied ~
Mr. Kamarasy.
The only?alternative is for the Board to limit its considerations in this
proceeding to
one
charge only, and:not two.
It follows that, the maximum charge against Mr. Kamarasy in
this
proceeding shouiid be $1500,
not $3000, if his conduct in this case is found to violate the Act.
What the~
County
is proposing
amounts to
trying to use the
law punitively, to
fine Mr.
Kamarasy twice~vhere
the legislature only authorized one
fine.
In that sense, both Mr. Terry
and the prosecuthr ofJackson
County, as members of the executive branch,
are attempting to
overrule the legi~lature
and create new law of their own.
In their view, the fine for creating
an
open dump
that~--resultedin the deposition
of abandoned mobile
home
materials should
be
$3000, not
$1500.
But
the
l~gislaturedid
not
write
such
a
provision
into the
Pollution
Control
Act.
Therefore, this ~oardshould insist that,
even if it finds
Mr.
Kamarasy
guilty,
the fine must be
limited to $1500.~Otherwise,theAct as applied to Mr. Kamarasy would be unconstitutional, in
violation ofthe Separation ofPowers clause ofthe Illinois Constitution.

r
XIII
CONCLUSION
Li
The inspector investigated the pile at Starvation Acres on March
25,
2004
for a total of
r
three minutes.
He did
so by
standing
at
a
gate on
the
side
of the
road
at
a
distance of
approximately
500
feet and taking a single photograph ofthe pile.
The inspector could not
possibly
have observed
what was
in
the pile with
any
detail
from
the
distance
he
was
observing,
in
the
time
described.
The Act
requires
that
an
administrative citationbe based onthe direct observation of the inspector. 415 ILCS
§
5/31.1(b)
Nor does the photograph itself reveal what was in
the pile. Therefore, the only
specific point,
which the County can prove
about this pile,
is
that it contained materials from
abandoned
mobile homes.
Mr. Karnarasy
concedes that
the
pile contained
materials from
abandoned
mobile
homes and adds-that, by March 25, 2004,
the recyclable parts,
such
as
the
metal
siding,
had
beenremoved frOm the pile
and
taken to
a metal recycling center,
leaving
only
those parts
that
could not readily-be reused or recycled,
and of which he intended to
dispose,
and
did
dispose,
as soon as
the weather
permitted.
Mr. Kamarasy affirmatively notes that he had
an
agreement with Mr. Terry
to clean up
the site, and thathewasproceeding with due diligence to abide by that agreement. He
arranged
for and did have all therecyclable material removed from the site,
and
he has provided concrete
evidence ofthat fact.
He also arranged for a contractor to dispose of the remaining items.
But,
the weather made~it
impossible to carry out
this part of his
agreement in the time allotted.
Mr.
Kamarasy believ~s
that even if the pile
was
unlawful, the bad
weather was
an
uncontrollable
circumstance prOvided for by the law as a legitimate defense.
Furthermore, Mr. Kamarasy contends
his
pile
was not unlawful because it
did
not
constitute
a
“disposal site” or an
“open dump”
as those terms
are defined in
the
Pollution
Control
Act.
N~r
has the County even attempted to
present evidence that
the materials were
scattering freely
iii-
theenvironment in someway, or wereemitting ordischarging,
as
is
required

to meet the defiI4-~ionsofboth open dump and littering.
If the County
had
attempted to present
some evidence of- this kind,
the
evidence
would have been inadmissible
anyway, because the
County’s
evidence must be based on
the direct observations of Mr. Terry, and Mr. Terry did
not and could not have observed
any such thing during his three-minute inspection on March
25.
Mr. Karnarasy notes that the stuff in the pile, being materials from
abandoned mobile
homes, is
stuff that is explicitly
regulated by
the Litter Control
Act.
The Litter Control Act
makes it lawful t. deposit such stuffonto one’s
own land,
provided that
stuff is
not carried
by
the natural e1em~tsonto the property of another, and does not cause a public
nuisance, or
a
health, safety, orthe hazard.
The County
has made no
allegations, nor presented any
evidence
that Mr. Kamara~y’
s pile was doing any of these unlawful things.
Therefore, it was a
lawful
pile, and this action against Mr. Kamarasy amounts to unjustified
and
unjustifiable harassment
by Jackson County.
Mr. Kamarasy is not
sure whether materials from abandoned mobile homes constitute
construction or demolition
debris
as intended by
the Pollution
Control Act.
But if so,
that
would simply mean that materials from abandonedmobile homes are at the intersection of stuff
regulated by
bOth
the ban
against pollution by
littering
and
the ban
against
pollution
by
depositing demoljtion debris as set forth in the Pollution Control Act.
Itwould constitute an abuse of discretion to charge Mr. Kamarasy with two separate
violations
for one
allegedly wrongful act,
simply because the same
stuff, the
materials from
abandoned mol~i1ehomes, can be characterized in two separate ways under the Act.
The
essential “crime~
~whichMr. Kamarasy committed, if any,
was to set materials from abandoned
mobile homes
on his land at
Starvation
Acres.
If it
is
a
violation of the
Act,
it
is
only
one
violation, not two, and should only be fined in the amount of $1500, not $3000.
The only-way for this Board to
convict Mr.
Kamarasy on
either of the counts herein is
to
interpret
the~—iegalterms “open
dump”
and
“litter’
so
expansively
and
arbitrarily
as
to
violate Mr. Kamarasy’s due process right to be able to reasonably anticipate what is
illegal
and

what is not.
Such an
interpretation necessarily would be
so
broad
that it
gives
the
executive
branch ofgoverri~i-ent
too
much
discretion
regarding both
the decision about
what is
litter and
about
how
large. a
penalty
should
be
imposed
in
this
case
and
this
would
violate
the
Constitutional principle of Separation ofPowers.
The respondent did not violate the Act as alleged in
the Administrative
Citation and, for
all of the foregoing reasons, the Administrative Citation shouldbe dismissed.
Dated
this
I
~
day ofNovember, 2004.
EGON KAMARASY, Respondent
By________
-
G~r~ory
jA~ATQach,
IARDC # 2893061
Attorneyforrespondent
LAW OFFICES,
OF
GREGORY A. VEACH
3200 Fishback Road,
P. 0.
Box
1206
Carbondale IL 62903-1206
Telephone:
(618) 549-3132
Telecopier:
(618) 549-0956
e-mail
: gveach@gregveachiaw.com
Attorney forrespondent

m
0~
-1-
-~

~\
illinois
Department
of
~ PUBLIC
?\
HEALTH
~-
-
-.F
-
-:
--
‘U’,
2-309
West
Main
Sraet
Marion,
riols
~29:j9.1
187
www
hit~,
stale
-
Novem
her
19,
2003
JACKSON
COUNTY
-
Makanda
Raccoon Valley Mobile Home
~rk!1.D,ffOl59-0
t4O~-t)
Arututal Licensure
Inspection
EgonKamarasy
C~RTIFWt)
!V!A!L
474
Egret Lake Road
7002
2410
C002
7S61
1940
Carbondale, IL 62901
Dear
Mr
Kam
arasy:
~onald 0. Clark,
a repre~er.tative
of this Depm~ment,
conducted ar annual licensure irspectior~
i:f
Raccoon Valley
Mobile Home
Park
on
Nc-vernber 12,
2003~
Thepurpose
of this
inspection was to d~errnine
compliance with
the
Mobile
Home
Park Act
and Manufactured
Home Community Code.
The inspectionrevealed that your
manufactured home cc~mmunityi~
n~tbeing opeiate4 andmaintained in
accordance with theMobile
Home Park Act and Manuf~cr~red
Home
Cormnunity
Code.
The following actions ore
requiied to correct the vioations
that were kuid
to exist:
Section 8o0.~5Ofc)The elec~ic~l
box
behind the Ionic at si~c2~
is not covered and locked.
Provide a coverand lock the bo~to prevent acdd~atalcontact.
Correct by
November26, 2003.
2.
~ect1on 860.300(ai Assure that community
resident5properly
stoic alt
rehire
at
all
times.
The
followingwere observed in your community:
Jitter
arcuxidthe dumpster across from site 5~
and at
site
35B~
an
old
mahress at site 34; the commode, eec. at site 8A:
the
bathtub, commode,
etc. at site
12; the
debris and robbk
at site 46; the undeq inn tn~ai site 47A.
Correct by Noveiatber 10, 2003.
3.
-
~
Remove
the plastic bags- ifrefuse which we-re noted on tbe
grour-id
at
sites
13,
25,
46, and
51.
Sealed plastic
bass may
be used
to ;upplernent
the required containerson
the
day
of
garbage collection only.
At
all
other tunes. h4gsofgarbagej~jbe
stored in
rust
resistant, watertight and fly-proof containers
with
the lids closed.
C:orrcct ~ithln 48 hours.
4.
Section
~6O.304)(1a16)
An
apparent
burn pus was observed
at
sitc
27.
iMMEDIATELYcease
burning
of
refuse
and
properly dispose oLall ashes,
metals,
etc.
5.
Section ~60.3lOf~)Remove
the household iten’,~
such
as
the rimmed
tire at
site 2; the
air
conditioner
at
site
14; thed~’er
at
the
2~the
wi:;dows, etc. at site 3JA
the washer
at
site
35B:
rimmed tire
at
site 36,
aIr conditioner,
old desk
er-c.
-a
site
5l~
rimmed tires at
sac 58;
and
the aIr
conditioner, etc. at site 59A that were ~tore-d
o-.itjc
its,
Househ’i!d furniture and appliances, eiito
parts
inc1ud~ng
tires
aid
batteries,
bailding materials- abandoned
equipmenl, and ~,imi1ar
items
shall not be
stored in ;h~
community
except in ~ied~or garages ~
~h
doors.
tn~povlng
pufrff~
fte~lTh.,
U#~
eunniwivily ~Ia~
printei o; re~cyc/ed
pdp&!
EXHIBIT

L
JACKSON
COUNTY
-
Makanda
Raccoon Valley Mobile Home ParkJT.L).~i59.0I4O5-0
Page 2
t
~J5.
~~*Ion86O.310~
Remove
or repair th~
mani~factured
homes
at sites 9.
5)A, and
59
which
have
the
appearance of being abandoned.
The homes are
potentially hazardous
to children and
other
community
residents due to available access through
broken windows
and/or unsecured doors.
T
The home at site
59
is a REPEAT v~oiation.Rema~
and ~pr~
dis
oso of the rubble
ibm
I
-
homes being dismantled at sites 12~nd
31. ~irect
ov
~
tLI.
7.
Section
860.310(d)
Remove all apparently
abandoned or unu~eri
‘.ehicles.
All
automobiles,
trailer3.
~ndsimilar
vehicles
s~b,eca
to
licensursby
the Secretaiy of State
sitali
have
current
licenses diaplayed.
Remove or license
the
following
vehicles
by
December
12,
2003:
theyello~~
Pontiac statioa wagon
at
site
30;
the
whiteVolkswagen van
at site 59:
and the
red
Ford
Prohe at
Site
59A.
8
Section ~6U.~0(a~ Remove the tires
located c,utdoors a’
site-s
t2,
13, 14,
36, and
4~A.Correct
by November 26,
2003.
Section
~6G.~6Qth~
Remove the motorized recreationai
vehicle fror~
site 7.
Motorized
recreational
vehicles shall not be located in a manufactured home
ocmrnvsoiy
as a residence.
Correct by
December
12, 2003.
The above actions to elinunate
the
violations ofthe Act and Code shall be
carried
out by the date(s) specil~ed,
Enclosed are copies of the
inspection
repo~
and a ~otification
of
Coirection
of’ Code
Violatiora;.
Please
complete
the
Explanation of Corrections section
on the
notification
form, sign
and date
the
form,
and
returr.
it
to this
office by
December
12, ~003.
Upon receipt
of the signed not~ficationform,
we
will s~hedute
a reinspection.
~jj~
reinspection~c~iirms
correction
~fj~e
~
we will
recommend
that your hcerse he renewed for next
ycar.
Your current
Manufactured
Home
Community
License uxpires on
April
30,
2004.
Theannual
License renewal
form
will be
sent to you prior to that
date
from
our Springfield Central
Office.
Ifyou ha’~e
any questions regarding the Mobile Home Park Act and Manufactured Home
Community
Code, please
contact Ronald 0. Clark at
The Marion Regional
Cities,
telephone 6I8i993-~0l0,
Sinc,erely,
Walter
G.
Ward
Acting
Regional Soparvisor
ROC’by
cc:
Div. of Env. Health.
MRO
-
MHC

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-1-
N)

OPENDUMP INSPECTION
SITE SKETCH
Date Of Inspection:
March
25,
20204
Inspector:
Don Terry
Site Code:
077 809
5036
County:
Jackson
Site Name:
Makan
da / Egon
Kamarasy
Time:
2:32 pm
2:35
pm
Not Drawn to Scale
All locations
are
approximate
0
indicates approx. location& direction ofphotos
IN
Starvation
Acres Rd
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
Fence
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/1
/
/
_____.1
It
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/

m
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(J)

CWI OF
ILLINOIS
.
1540 LANDFILL RD
DESOTO,
IL 62924
INVOICE
DATE
INVOICE
NO.
ACCOUNT
NO.
FOR
BILLING
INQUIRIES.
CALL
SERVICE ADDRESS
L05/03/o4
184285
PAGE NO.
1
EGON KAMARASY
END OF STARVATION ACRE RD
CARBONDALE
IL
62901
DATE
DESCRIPTION
OTY.
RATE
TOTAL
WORK
ORDER*:
178644
4/05/04
30 YD DELIVERY
WORK ORDER*:
179038
4/09/04
30 YD PULL & RETURN-FLAT
WORK ORDER*:
179285
4/12/04
30 YD PULL & RETURN-FLAT
WORK ORDER*:
179632
4/14/04
30 YD PULL & RETURN-FLAT
4/14/04
TONNAGE OVER 6 TONS
WORK ORDER*:
179884
4/15/04
TONNAGE OVER 6 TONS
4/16/04
30 YD PULL $ REMOVE-FIAT
Net
10 days
ACCOUNT STATUS
TOTAL THIS
INVOICE
PLEASE
PAY
THIS AMOUNT
784.80
10 22454 3
f
(800)
631-1156
FOR
PERIOD:
r
r
1.00
6.16
16.50
45.00
355.00
355.00
355.00
4.80
315.00
355.00
30.000
30. 000
CURRENT
31
-
60
DAYS
61
-
90
DAYS
OVER
90
DAYS
I
.
~,
I
I
I
I
1.7Rtii
Rfl

m

Jackson
County
Health
Department
Promoting Health,
Preventing Illness,
and Protecting our Environment
618/684-3143, ext.
128
CERTIFIED MAIL
January
9,
2004
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Egon
Kamarasy
474
Egret Lake
Rd
Carbondale
IL
62901
RE:
Violation Notice, L-2004-JC119
~-—-~
r
~.
~
.——
077
809
5036
--
Jackson County
Makanda
/ Egon Kamarasy
Compliance File
Dear Mr. Kamarasy:
This
constitutes a Violation Notice pursuant to Section
31 (a)( 1) ofthe Illinois
Environmental
Protection Act, (“the Act”) 415 ILCS
5/31 (a)( 1), and is
based upon an inspection completed on
December
5,
2003
by a representative ofthe Jackson County Health Department (“JCHD”).
The
open dumpi~~g
site is located in
Makanda Township, Section 06, on
a road known as Starvation
Acres.
The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (“Illinois
EPA”) and JCHD hereby provide notice
ofviolations ofenvironmental statutes, regulations, or permits as set forth in Attachment A to
this letter. Attachment A includes an explanation ofthe activities that the Illinois EPA and JCHD
believe may resolve the specified violations, including an estimate ofa reasonable time period to
complete the necessary activities.
Due to
the nature and seriousness ofthe violations cited,
please be advised that resolution ofthe violations may require the involvement ofa prosecutorial
authority for purposes that may include, among others, the imposition of statutory penalties.
A written response, which may include a request for a meeting with representative ofJCHD must
be submitted via certified mail to the JCHD within 45
days ofreceipt ofthis letter.
The response
must address each violation specified in Attachment A and include for each an explanation ofthe
activities that will be implemented and the time schedule for the completion of that activity.
The
written response will constitute a proposed Compliance Commitment Agreement (“CCA”)
pursuant to Section
31 ofthe Act.
The JCHD will review the proposed CCA and will accept or
reject it within 30 days of receipt.
P.O.
Box 307
+
Murphysboro, IL 62966-0307
+
Phone (618) 684-3143
+
Fax (618) 684-6023
www.jchdonline.org
+
Printed on
Recycled Paper

r~
Ifa timely written response to this Violation
Notice is not provided, it shall be considered to be a
waiver ofthe opportunity to respond and to meet and the Illinois EPA and JCHD may proceed
j
with a referral to the prosecutorial authority.
-~
Written communication should be
directed to:
-
Jackson County Health Department
r
Attn:
Don
Terry
Solid
Waste Management Division
POBox 307
Murphysboro,
IL
62966-0307
All
communications must include reference to
this
VIOLATION NOTICE NUMBER,
L-2004-JC119.
Questions regarding this matter should be directed to Don Terry at 684-3143, ext.
128.
Sincerely,
Bart
Hagston,
oordinator
Solid
Waste Program
Lj
BH/th
enclosure
Certified Return Receipt No. 7003 2260 0005 0889 6105
L

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS REQUIRED
IMMEDIATELY cease all open dumping
and/or open burning.
You shall not dispose ofany
waste by open burning.
The following corrective actions
must be completed by February
13,
2004.
A.
Remove all general refuse from this site and properly transport to a permitted landfill or
transfer station.
B.
Scrap metal not disposed at a permitted landfill or transfer station
may be taken to a scrap
metal facility or recycling center.
Retain and submit to the Jackson County
Health Department’s Solid
Waste Management
Section copies of receipts that document the proper disposal or recycling of the wastes by
February 27, 2004.

L-2004-JC 119
ATTACHMENT A
Pursuant
to Section 21(a) ofthe Act, no person shall cause or allow the open dumping of
any
waste.
A violation ofSection 21(a) ofthe Illinois
Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS
5/21(a))
is alleged for the following reason: Evidence ofwaste was
observed open
dumped
at this site during the inspection.
2.A.
Pursuant to Section 21(d)(1) ofthe Act, in relevant part, no person shall conduct any
waste-storage,
waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation
without a permit granted by
the Agency or in violation of any conditions imposed by such permit, including periodic
reports and full access to adequate records
and the inspection of facilities, as may be
necessary to assure compliance
with this Act and with regulations and standards
adopted
thereunder.
A violation ofSection 21(d)(l) ofthe
Illinois
Environmental Protection Act
(415
ILCS
5/21(d)(1))
is
alleged for the following reason: No permits have been issued forthis waste
management facility.
2. B.
Pursuant to
Section 21(d)(2) ofthe Act, no person shall conduct any waste-storage,
waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation in violation ofany regulations or standards
adopted by the Board under this Act.
A violation ofSection
21 (d)(2) ofthe Illinois
Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS
21 (d)(2)) is alleged for the following reason:
No permits
have been issued
forthis
waste
management facility.
3.
Pursuant to Section 2 1(e) ofthe Act, no person shall dispose, treat, store
or abandon any
waste, or transport any waste into this State for disposal, treatment, storage or
abandonment, except at a site or facility which meets the requirements ofthe Act and
of
regulations and standards thereunder.
A violation of Section 21(e) ofthe
Illinois
Environmental
Protection Act (415 ILCS
5/21(e)) is
alleged for the following reason: Violations of Board regulations as well as the
Act were observed at the time of the inspection.
4.
Pursuant to Section 21(p) ofthe Illinois
Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS
5/21
(p)), no person shall, in violation ofsubdivision (a) ofthis Section
21,
cause or allow
the open dumping ofany waste in a manner which results in:
1.
litter;

2.
deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris as defined in
Section
3.160(a) ofthis Act; or clean construction or demolition debris as defined
in
Section 3.160(b) ofthis Act.
The prohibitions specified in the subsection (p) shall be enforceable by the Agency either
by administrative citation under Section
31.1
ofthis Act or as otherwise provided by this
Act.
The specific prohibitions in this subsection do not limit the power ofthe
Board to
establish regulations or standards
applicable to
open dumping.
A violation of Section 21(p) ofthe Illinois
Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS
5/21(p))
is alleged for the following reason: Items land 2
above were not complied with.
5.
Pursuant to Section 812.101(a),
all persons, except those specifically exempted by
Section
2 1(d) ofthe Environmental Protection Act (Act) (Ill. Rev.
Stat.
1991, ch.
111
1/2,
par.
102 1(d))
415
ILCS
5/21
(d)
shall submit to
the Agency an application for a permit
to develop and operate a landfill.
The application must contain the information required
by this Subpart
and by
Section 39(a) ofthe
Act, except as otherwise provided in
35
Ill.
Adm. Code 817.
A violation of
35
Ill.
Adm. Code 8 12.101
(a) is
alleged for the following reason: No
Developmental Permit has been issued for a solid waste management site at this location.
6.
Other: Pursuant to 35
Iii.
Adm. Code
Section 807.201
Development Permits: No person
shall cause or allow the development of
any
new solid waste management site or cause or
allow the modification ofan existing solid waste management site without a
Development Permit issued by the
Agency.
Also Section 807.202 Operating Permits: No
L
person shall cause or allow the use or operation of any solid waste
management site for
which a Development Permit is required under section 807.201
without an Operating
Permit
issued by the agency, except for such testing operation as
may be authorized by
L
the Development Permit.
You
are
in apparent violation of
35
Ill.
Adm.
Code Section 807.201
and Section 807.202:
No Developmental Permits or Operating Permits have been
issued for a solid waste
management site at this location.

m
:3-
0~
-4-
Ci

Jackson
County
Health
Department
Promoting Health,
Preventing
Illness,
and Protecting our Environment
January
16,
2004
Certified Mail
Return
Receipt Requested
Mr.
Egon
Kamarasy
474 Egret Lake Rd.
i’~~
~
/
Carbondale, IL 62901
/
~‘
u.-.
.
Dear Mr.
Kamarasy:
This letter is to act as a confirmation and summary of our phone conversation
of January 15,
2004.
——
You called
our
office in reference to the
Violation
Notice L-2004—JCI 19 that was sent to you
regarding the open
dumping of demolition debris on
property owned
by you.
This property is
on Starvation Acres Rd and is listed in the Jackson County Assessor’s Office under
Parcel # 19-06-400-008.
During our phone
conversation, you admitted that the debris was on
the site and had originated
from the demolition of mobile homes you were being
required to remove by
the I. 0.
P.
H.
You
explained
that debris was taken to the above listed
site-so that recyclable and non-recyclable
materials could be separated.
You also stated that you wanted
to work with
us and the date
given to you
in the violation noticeletter
to properly clean
up the
open dump
site (February
13,
2004)
was more than
sufficient to be able to accomplish the task.
—.--
I
explained that the process
of taking
demolition debris from one site to another for the
purpose
of salvaging was not permissible under Illinois law and that the demolition would have
to take
place where the
mobile
home had been place.
I
also explained that this process should take
place as
quickly as
possible; any materials that were going to be
used or
recycled should be
covered
until moved,
and all waste would have to be properly disposed of at theJwj~IJ.I also
asked that you provide
us copies of all landfill and recycling tickets relating to the d1~posalof
the debris
from the Starvation Acres open
dump site.
I______
P.O.
Box 307
+
Murphysboro, IL 62966-0307
+
Phone (618) 684-3143
+
Fax
(618)
684-6023
www.jchdonline.org
+
Printed
on
Recycled Paper
EXHIBIT
LR~

Finally,
I asked that you contact me when the site was clean so
I could come do a compliance
U
inspection.
You stated that you would do this and also would be happy to accompany me on
the
inspection
of the site.
L
appreciate
all of your efforts to correct this matter.
If you have any questions,
please do
not
hesitate to contact me at 618-684-3143,
Ext. 128.
Sincerely,
Don Terry
r
Solid Waste
Inspector
Jackson County
Health Department
cc: file
n
Certified Return
Receipt # 70032260000508895993

BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL

Back to top


ARD
COUNTY
vs.
)
AC
No.
2004-064
EGON
KAMARASY,
)
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM
SUPPORTING
AMENDED
PETITION
TO
CONTEST
ADMINISTRATIVE
CITATION
I
INTRODUCTION
The County ofJackson (“County”) seeks to impose civil penalties for three (3)
alleged
violations ofthe Act.
The respondent denies that his actions violated the Act.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March25, 2004,
an
inspector for the County of Jackson, Don Teny, conducted
an
“on-site inspectjpn” of a
site known as Carbondale/Kamarasy, located in Jackson
County,
Illinois.
The inspection lasted five
(5)
minutes, from 2:25 p.m.
until
2:30
p.m.
(See
Jackson
County Health Department Affidavit of Don Terry, dated March 29,
2004,
attached as Exhibit
“A” to
the Admii~istrative
Citation (“D. Terry Aff.”))
Mr. Terr~
s Narrative Inspection Report (hereinafter “Report”), submitted in
support
of the Administrative Citation filed by the County of Jackson, states that the site investigation
on March 25, 2004 was made “as a follow up to an inspection of this
site
done
on March
11,
2004.” (D. Terry Aff.)
However, the Report does not give
any
account or explanation for the
alleged March
UI
“inspection”.
Nor does not it say whether that
inspection resulted in
any
action being take~
againstMr. Kamarasy, such as the issuance ofa warning, prior to March
25.

The Report doesnot even say whether Mr. Terry discussed the March 11,
2004
inspection with
Mr. Kamarasy prior to March 25.
The Report does state that,
on March
25,
Mr. Terry “observed a pile of debris
in the
same general location as on
his
inspection
visit of March
11, 2004”,
but
that
“the
debris
pile appeared to, have been reduced in
volume by open burning”
(D.
Terry Aff.)
Mr.
Terry
thenestimated the volume ofthe debris to
be ten
(10)
cubic yards.
(Id.)
Again, Mr.
Terry did
not state that he had warned Mr. Kamarasy that he would have to remove the material by March
25 or any other date.
(See
Administrative
Citation)
Mr.
Terry
also
did
not give any
indication
that
he told
Mr.
Kamarasy
that
it would
be
unlawful
to reduce the
pile
by
burning
the
flammable material, and that Mr. Kamarasy
should take those materials, including yard waste, to
a public dump rather than burning them.
(Id.)
Moreover; Mr. Terry
did not
state by
what
authority
he
conducted
either
of these
investigations: fi1~st,the one on
March
11,
2004
for which
six
photographs,
but
no
narrative
report or otherdocumentation, have beenprovided; and, second, the one on March 25 that led
to
theAdministrative Citation filed in this cause on or about March 30, 2004.
Mr.
Terry does not
say, for example~.whether
he was able to
observe the alleged dump site from the side of a public
road, or whetherhe entered onto Mr. Kamarasy’s
private property
with the express purpose of
looking for a dump
site, or whether he had simply entered onto Mr.
Kamarasy’s
property
at
random and stumbled upon this dump site.
Nor does Mr.
Terry say whetherhe believed he had
permission from~iVIr.Kamarasy
to inspect his home and farm for debris
piles
or whether he
believed he had some special statutory license for entering
onto
Mr.
Kamarasy’s
homestead
without first obtaining a search warrant.
In any event, Mr. Terry claims
he
observed
the following materials within the
debris’
pile:
(1) “landsc~tpe
waste”,
(2) “dimensional lumber”,
(3) “what appeared to be
metal
frames
from furniture”,(4) “metal fence posts”, (5) “the remains of what appeared to
be a window
air conditioner”;~(6)“sections
of
laminate counter tops”,
(7)
metal cans,
and
(8)
“other

materials not easily identifiable”.
He observed that most of the
material “was
charred from
burning”.
(D. Terry Aff.)
To document these observations, Mr. Terry took five
(5)
close-up photographs of this
site on March 25~2004. Mr. Terry also took six (6) photographs on March
11.
2004.
The five
(5)
photographs taken on March 25 might be said
to
show
two
(2) pieces of charred and half-
burnt wood that~before they
were
burned,
could
have been characterized as
“dimensional
lumber.”
But, none ofthe pictures show a window air conditioner.
Mr.
Terry’s Report then states on the basis of his
observations, the following violations
occurred:
(1) causing or allowing the open dumping of any waste in
a manner that results
in
open burning ofwaste
in violation of the Act; (2) causing or allowing
open
dumping of
any
waste that results in litter and
the deposition
of general
construction or demolition
debris or
clean
constructipn or demolition
debris; (3)
conducting
a
waste-storage
or
waste-disposal
operation withoüta proper permit; (4) disposing, treating, storing or abandoning any
waste or
transporting any.~waste
to the site from another site for the purpose of disposal; and
(5) causing
or allowing openumping
ofany used or waste tire. (D. Terry Aff.)
Photographs
taken by Mr. Terry on
March
11,
2004 show
two
(2)
or three (3)
used
tires.
None is in.~the
burn pile, but instead lie off to
the
side.
Photographs
taken by Mr.
Terry
on March
25,
2004 do not show any tires. (D. Terry Aff.)
Mr. Kamarasy properly disposed of
used tires from his property and has a receipt for the disposal
from
Davis Tire Center.
(See
Respondent’s Exhibit “R- 1”, a copy ofwhich is attached hereto.)
On March 30, 2004, Jackson County filed an Administrative
Citation with
the Pollution
Control Board ii~iwhich
the following violations
are
alleged: (1) that the respondent caused or
allowed open dumping that resulted in
“litter”
at the
site in
violation of
§
21(p)(1) of the
Act;
(2) that the respondent caused or allowed open dumping that resulted in “open
burning”
at the
site in violation ~f
§
2l(p)(3) of the Act; and (3) that the respondent caused
or allowed open
dumping at the ~ite that resulted in “the deposition of general
construction or demolition;
or

clean construction or demolition debris”
in
violation of
§
21(p)(7) of the Act.
(Administrative
Citation, p. 2)
The respc’ndent filed an Amended Petition to
Contest Administrative Citation, denying
that his conduct violated the Act as alleged
(See
Amended Petition to
Contest Administrative
Citation (“Am.
Pet.”))
Mr. Kamarasy will testify, first of
all, that the pile of material
at the
site in
question
rested entirely on his
homestead, where
he maintains
his
personal residence and a
working
farm.
The pile
is
located between four (4) pastures on
his farm.
It cannot be
seen
from
the
road.
In order to observe the pile, one would have to
enter onto Mr. Kamarasy’s property,
walk
up a hill to a gatedpasture, open the gate, and proceed for about another 500
feet.
Not only
is
the pile not visible from the public road, it would also not be visible from the
gateway
that
is
on
Mr.
Kamarasy’
property.
Mr.
Terry
could only
have discovered the pile
by
making
a
determined effort to search
Mr. Kamarasy’s property for possible violations.
Mr.
Kamarasy
did not give Mr. ~Terrypermissionto enter his premises for any purpose.
Next,
M~:
Kamarasy will testify
that the
pile
of
material
about which
Mr.
Terry
complains
consisted primarily of landscape waste,
with
a small
amount of household
waste
(being some used furniture), generated through ordinary residential and household use of the
premises in question, together with
a
small
amount
of
agricultural
waste
generated by
his
farming operation~that were conducted on thepremises.
Mr. Kamarasy will further testify
that
there
were metal~fenceposts in the pile.
He was using the fire to burn the poison ivy off the
fence posts.
Butthere
was no
window air conditioner in the pile,
and Mr. Kamarasy
did
not
attempt to burn ~ñy such thing.
His explanation is that he had an old Coleman
water heater that
he used to preveni freezing of drinking water in a water trough for the livestock that was
located
at about sixty (60) feet from the pile.
Mr. Kamarasy will testify that none ofthe materials he burned at this site
were “general
construction or demolition”
material or “demolition debris”
Furthermore,
according
to
the
I
Page4
I
Memorand~nnSupporting
Amended
Petition
to
Contest
Administrative
Citation

n
o
meaning of the tçrm
“litter” as set forth in the Litter Control Act,
(see
discussion below), none
1
of
it was “litter.”
Li
Nor was Mr
Kamarasy
attempting to create a waste disposal site
As
he
will testify, he
merely collected~thesematerials in one place, for the purpose ofburning them.
Finally, Mr. Kamarasy will point out that the Pollution
Control
Act makes
an
exception
forburning landsç ape, household, andlor agricultural waste, provided that
waste
is
generated by
p
farming operations conducted on
the premises.
Therefore, even if the waste in question could
be characterized ~islitter or construction material,
Mr. Kamarasy’s
act in
burning this
material
would not be
a s~atutory
violation,
whence, a
priori,
it
could not be unlawful to collect the
material in one p1~ce
in preparation forburning.
With tha~inmind, Mr. Kamarasy does not know
why he
is
being prosecuted in
this
o
matter.
He had nb way ofknowing that he was violating any law by burning his
household and
farming waste in~rural area, even if he had read all the statutes
in question and consulted with
a
lawyer in advanc’&
Furthermore, despite the implication in
Mr. Terry’s
Report
that this
was a
follow-up inspection, Mr. Kamarasy was not
given notice or warning of a possible
violation,
together with a reasonable time period in which to clean up the site.
III
ISSUES
PRESENTED
The Adnijnistrative
Citation
and
the
Amended Petition
to
Contest
Administrative
Citation present
the
following issues:
A.
Did~theState violate Mr. Kamarasy’s Fourth
Amendment right to
privacy, by
entering
onto hi~
land for the purpose
of inspecting for
illegal debris
piles
without either
obtaining Mr. Kamarasy’s permission first, or obtaining a search warrant?
B.
Did~r.Kamarasy cause or allow open dumping
on
his homestead,
the so-called
Carbondale/Kamarasy site?
C.
If open dumping occurred at the site, did the open dumping result in litter?

D.
If open dumping occurred at the site,
did
the open dumping result in
burning
at
the
site?
And,
if
so,
was
that
open
burning
permitted by
IEPA
regulations
and
other
environmental laws~
E.
If
open
dumping
occurred
at
the
site,
did
the
open
dumping
result
in
the
deposition of general construction or demolition debris
or clean
construction or
demolition
debris?
F.
Given that IEPA regulations
and
other environmental laws expressly
permit the
kind of burning ~allegedlycommitted
by
Mr.
Kamarasy,
how
can it be
unlawful
for
Mr.
Kamarasy to first gather in one place the materials he intended to burn?
G.
Did~Mr.
Terry
and Jackson County abuse their discretion
and
exceed
the
intent
and scope ofthe administrative citation process by broadening the definition of “litter”
beyond
the legislature’s intent,
and
by
filing
multiple
charges against Mr
Kamarasy for the single
act
of burning a relatively small amount of landscape, household,
and
agriculture waste
from his
farm and, therefore, violate the separation ofpowers under the Illinois
Constitution?
H.
Is the law, as applied to Mr. Kamarasy,
unconstitutionally
vague, in
failing to
give
him reasonable notice of what constitutes
creating an open dump on
one’s own property, and
what constitutes ~1
jttering on one’s own property?
I.
Were the enforcement actions taken against Mr. Kamarasy with respect to this
site
so overzealous
as to be
arbitrary
and
capricious
and
in
violation of
his
constitutional
due
process rights?
~
Iv
THE~COUNTY
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY ITS
WARRANTLESS
ENTRY ONTO PRIVATE PROPERTY TO
SEARCH
FOR
ILLEGAL
ACTIVITY
Section 4(d) of the Act grants the IEPA “in
accordance with
constitutional limitations,
authority to ~hterat all reasonable times upon any private or public property for the purpose
of
.
.
.
inspeciing
to
ascertain possible
violations of the
Act or
of
permits
or
terms
or
conditions thereof.
.
.
“.
415
ILCS
§
5/4(d)(1)

This provision has been heldto authorize the IEPA to
go
before a court and
request an
administrative inspection warrant in order
to
carry
out
its
duties
under
the
Act,
where
the
violations
are not in open
or plain view and require entry
and
a
“search”
to
venfy
See
e
g
Tippin
v.
Rockciale Sash &
Trim Co..
Inc.,
196
Ill.App.3d
333, 336-7,
143
Ill.Dec. 22,
553
N.E.2d 729
(3d Dist.
1990);
People
v.
Van
Tran
Electric
Corp.,
152
Ill.App.3d
175,
105
Ill.Dec.
173,
5O~
N.E.2d
1179
(5th
Dist.
1987);
Miller
v.
Pollution
Control
Board,
276
Ill.App.3d
160/204
Ill.Dec.
774,
642 N.E.2d 475
(4th
Dist.
1994)
reh.
den.;
Village of
Bridgeview v.
Slominski, 74 Ill.App.3d
1, 29 I1l.Dec. 944, 392 N.E.2d 641
(1st
Dist.
1979)
Clearly, there was a search in this case.
The inspector, Mr.
Terry,
could not observe the
debris pile on Mr. Kamarasy’s
farm from the public
road or from neighboring property.
He
had to leave the public
road,
traverse more than 200
feet across Mr.
Kamarasy’s
property
to
a
gate, open the gate, and
then proceed another 300
feet before reaching the debns pile
that
is
alleged to
constitute a violation of the Act
in
this
case
He
did
this
on
two
(2)
separate
occasions, according to
his
Affidavit:
the first
time
on
March
11,
2004;
the second
time
on
March
25,
2004.~
Following his entry and search on March
11, 2004, he did not contact Mr.
Kamarasy
about the existe~1ceof the debris pile
or its
disposition;
nor,
did
he
seek
an
administrative
warrant to returfl~tothe site for any further inspections.
Instead, h~
returned to
the site a second time,
without notice to
Mr.
Kamarasy,
entered
again
Mr.
Kam~arasy’sprivate
property,
without
warrant
or
consent
or
any
exigent
circumstance, and took additional photographs
TheAdministrative Citation then was filed only
days after Mr. T~rr~’s
second, unannounced,
warrantless entry onto
Mr.
Kamarasy’s
property
and the search undertaken by the taking of the second photographs showing the debris pile.
Under these circumstances,
it
is
clear that
the County violated Mr
Kamarasy ‘s Fourth
Amendment right
to be
secure in
his
property from unreasonable
searches
and
seizures.
Consequently, the~
evidence obtained from
the warrantless searches should
not
be
allowed
to
Memorandum
Supporting
Amended
Petition
to
Contest
Administrative
Citation

support a finding~that
Mr. Kamarasy violated the Act by assembling and burning the material in
thepile.
V
~HERESPONDENT DID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN
‘DUMPING AT THE CARBONDALE/KAMARASY SITE
In order to seek enforcement by Administrative
Citation for violations of Section 21(p),
the Agency, or kcal governingbody, must establish that the respondent caused or allowed open
dumping.
See
Montgomery County, Illinois
v.
Clifford Crispens.
Jacqueline
R.
Crispens
and
Line Pilot Bungèe. Inc.,
AC 95-43.
Section
2 1(a) of the Act
sets
forth
a
general prohibition
against open
dur~pingas follows:
“No person shall cause or allow the open
dumping of any
waste.”. 415 ILCS
§
5/21(a)
Section 3:385 of the Act defines “refuse”
as “waste”.
415
ILCS
§
5/3.385.
The Act
then defines “wa~te”
to mean “any garbage, sludge from
a waste treatment plant,
water supply
treatment plant,
dr air pollution
control facility or
other discarded material”.
415
ILCS
§
5/3.535.
None
of the “stuff’
in
the pile
on
the site in
question was “garbage,
sludge
from
a
waste treatment i~:iant,water supply treatment plant, or airpollution
control facility.”
Therefore,
the State
must mean
to
incorporate
all
the
items
in
question
under
the
catch-all phrase
“discarded material.”
While that term can be stretched to mean most
anything, it is
hard
to
believe that the Illinois legislature intended the Pollution Control Board to
consider vegetative
matter, such as free branches, set out in a pile
to
burn, as the kind of “discarded
material” that
creates
an “opeE~dump”.
See
Alternate Fuels,
Inc.
v.
Director of the Illinois
Environmental
Protection Agency, 2004 WL 2359398 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 2004)
Section
3.300 ofthe Act defines “open dumping” as
the~
consolidation of refuse from one or more sources at a
disposal
site
that
does not fulfill
the
requirements
of
a
sanitary
landfill.
(Ei~nphasis
added.)

415 ILCS
§
5/3.300.
Thus,
in order to prove
that Mr.
Kamarasy
committed “open
dumping”,
H
the County must’first show that he created a “disposal site” on his
land.
L
It canno~betrue,
however,
that
any
time
a
homeowner
and/or
farmer
places
any
n
household item (for example, a broken piece of furniture) outside his
or her home
or on
his
or
her farm, or piles’up some branches and leaves outside his
or her house, that he
or she thereby
has created a
“disposal
site”
under
the
statute
Such
an
interpretation would
render
the
Pollution ContrOFAct so broad as to be arbitrary and unenforceable.
See
Alternate Fuels,
Inc.
v.
Director ofthe Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
supra,
2004 WL 2359398
It would mean, for example, that every homeowner who ever burned a pile of leaves or
branches
in
the
backyard
thereby
created
a
“disposal
site”.
Consequently,
any
such
homeownerwould be guilty of open dumping, which would then make him or her strictly
liable
for at least two
counts of “littering”
and
“burning”,
and a fine
of
at least $3000
under the
Pollution Control~iAct. Hopefully,
this Board would agree that that
is
not the type of problem
that the Pollution Control Act was meant to
address
The
case
at
bar
is
not
really
all
that
different.
The
respondent
organized
and
consolidated sothe old household items that he no longer wanted, some
landscape
waste,
and
some waste froth this farming operations, and placed them at a
site
on
the
farm, far
from
the
road.
He then p~ceeded
to burn the material in the pile.
Of course,
Mr. Kamarasy concedes that the items in question were “waste”.
In fact,
almost all ofit
Wà~
vegetative waste, as the County’s inspector’s photographs plainly show.
He
further concedesthat he attempted to destroy this
waste by
burning it.
However, he denies
the
rest ofthe allegations contained in the Administrative Citation.
In the first place, the words “allowed or caused
open
dumping”
sound
so
grandiose
that they make Mr. Kamarasy seem
like some kind of willful
and repeat
offender.
He
is
not.
This
was not a repeat offense.
Mr.
Kamarasy
was not “allowing”
others to
dump
their waste
items on his land~

r
In fact, by Mr. Terry’s own admission, the total amount of waste at this
site was only
about ten (10) cubic yards
(D
Terry Aff)
Yet, in Mr
Terry’s
Report,
he
manages to
accuse
Mr. Kamarasy
cf~
“conducting a
waste-storage or waste-disposal operation
without a
proper
r
permit.”
Common sense says that an inspector, acting in good faith, could not accuse a person
of conducting
a waste-disposal operation
without a license on the basis of discovering a mere
L
ten (10) cubic yards ofhousehold, agricultural and landscape
waste
in
a pile
on
his
or her own
r
farm property!
It is true, and Mr.
Kamarasy understands, that the commercial dump
site charge was
later dropped by~ieJackson County prosecutor
presumably because it was
too preposterous
to be believed
iut the fact that Mr.
Terry could
have made such an
allegation
after observing
this site suggests his prejudice or animus againstMr
Kamarasy
To set thørecord straight, Mr. Kamarasy merely set out some landscape waste
on
his
L
farmland, together with some household and agriculture waste, for the purpose of disposing of
fl
the waste by burning it.
At the time, Mr. Kamarasy had no way ofknowing,
or even suspecting,
I
that this act ofburning one’s own refuse, in
such a rural setting, was illegal.
In the second place, the Mr. Kamarasy had no intention ofcreating a “disposal site” on
his
land.
Of course,
the respondent understands
that
his
lack of intent
is
not,
by
itself,
a
sufficient defens:&
Mr.
Kamarasy duly
acknowledges that the charges
in
section 21(p) of the
Act were meant
to
be enforced strictly and
with little discretion on
the part of the inspectors or
the IEPA and its designated agents, such as Jackson County
See e
g
IEPA
v
Spnnger, Illinois
Pollution Contro1~Board
Case No. AC 02-7
However, if one reads
the definitions as
set forth
in the Act,
it appears that
Mr.
Kamarasy
cannot be
said
to
have unintentionally created
a
“disposal site” either.
While there is no
single
definition for the term “disposal
site”, the words “disposal”
and
“site”
are
defined separately in
the
Act.
The
definition of
the
term “site”
is
self-
explanatory.
See;415
ILCS
§5/3.460
However, the term “disposal” is
specific enough
as
to
shed light on
whj’ch debris piles can be labeled “disposal sites” and which cannot.

Accordiiig to the Act.
“bisposal”
means
the
discharge,
deposit,
injection,
dumping,
spilling, leaking or placing of any waste or hazardous waste into or
on
any
land
or
water
or
into
any
well
so
that
such
waste
or
hazardous
waste
or
any
constituent
thereof
may
enter
the
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters,
including ground waters.
415
ILCS
§
5/3485
Presumably, then, a “disposal site” under
the Act would be
one
where
such “disposal” .~akes
place.
This
definition
of “disposal”
involves
two
parts.
First,
the
definition
requires
a
showing
that
M~.
Kamarasy “placed
.
.
.
waste
.
.
.
on
his
land.”
Second
it requires
showing that M~
.Kamarasy placed waste of such
a kind and in
such a manner “so
that
such
waste
.
.
.
or any constituent thereof may
enter the environment
or
be
emitted
into the
air
or
discharged
into ~ny waters, including ground waters.” (Emphasis added.)
Because the County bears the burden ofproving that
a respondent committed the act of
“open
dumping’~jandbecause open dumping requires a showing that the respondent created a
“disposal
site”, itiis clearly the County’s
burden to
prove
that the site in question was
truly a
“disposal site”.
As just noted, that would ordinarily require two showings
(1) placing
waste
on the
land;
and
(2)
doing
this
in
such a
way that the
waste
would be
likely to
“enter
the
environment”, dr be
“emitted” or “discharged” into the environment.
Since the
respondent
concedes the
first
point, the County’s burden in the case at bar is
to
show that the
waste,
which
Mr. Kamarasy had burned incompletely, was
somehow placed on the land in
such a way that
it,
or any
constituent thereof,
was entering
into the environment or emitting
into
the
air
or
discharging into the waters.
Certainly~
no evidence has been or wifi be presented of emitting or discharging, unless
the County seeks~io
claim that the burning itself
is
per se
unlawful, which it is
not.
As
wifi be
discussed in
detail below, the burning
was lawful in this
setting and,
in
any
event, the charge
under consideration is
whether the respondent caused or allowed “open dumping” at the site in

n
o
question, not whether there was open
burning.
Therefore,
the County
must
prove
“entering
into the environment”.
Of course, the County might argue
that every
time a person places waste
on his
or her
land, then he or she has
automatically, as a matter of logical consequence,
causes
that waste
to
enter into the environment.
But
if
that
is
the correct interpretation of the phrase
“enter
the
environment”, namely that anything found outside ofa building or enclosure necessarily
enters
or is emitted into, the environment, so that there is nothing which needs to be proved, then the
whole phrase “spthat such waste.
.
.
or any
constituent thereof may enter the environment or
be
emitted into l~heair
or
discharged into
any
waters,
including
ground
waters”
becomes
completely superfluous.
Merely placing waste
on
the
land, without more, would automatically
imply that one had caused it to enter into the environment.
It is
a standard principle of statutory construction that each clause
in
a statute should be
presumed to have~
some meaning
Alternate Fuels
Inc
v
Director of the Illinois
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
supra,
2004
WL 2359398
Therefore,
it
must
be
presumed
that
the
legislature meant
the concepts of “entering into the environment”, as well as “emitting”
and
“discharging”,
to place
some
limitation on
the
notion of
placing
waste
on
the
land.
A
homeowner, likeMr.
Kamarasy, does not create a disposal site every time he places waste on
his land.
So how dOes one know which acts create a disposal site, and which do not?
What
is the
distinction that the legislature intended to
make?
It
seems
clear
that
by
using
the words
“entering into thetenvironment”, “emitting”, and “discharging” the legislature meant to
imply
a certain lack of controlor potential lack of control by the person who placed the waste
on
the
land.
To be a disposal site,
the County
must
show
either the waste in its
entirety (for example
unprotected papertrash), or else some constituent of the waste (for example oil or paint in
open
cans) did enter orhas the potential to enter (freely) into the
environment, or be
emitted into
the
air or be discharged into the waters.
This is a
Pollution Control Act.
It
is
pollution
that
is
being regulated, not mere messiness on thepart ofa landowner.

But, the specific items
observed at this
site, and
listed in
the fact section above,
are not
items likely to blbw, scatter,
or spread
freely, escape, leech, or be emitted into the environment.
Nor are they itenis likely to emit or discharge.
A fence post,
for example, lying
on the ground,
is not going to scatter into the environment, nor is it going to
emit or discharge anything into the
environment.
Neither is the metal frame from some piece of furniturethat burned incompletely.
It is not even possible for Mr. Terry to claim that these items
were
abandoned on
the
land or forgottenby Mr. Kamarasy.
By Mr.
Terry’s own admission, Mr.
Kamarasy must have
conducted a burning of some of the
materials at some time between March
11
and
March
25,
2004,
when the citation was issued.
Therefore, Mr. Kamarasy had not forgotten or ignored this
pile ofmaterial.
‘He was trying to get rid ofit!
It fo1lows~that
the County has failed to prove an essential element of its
charge
that
Mr. Kamarasy c~mmitted
the act of “open
dumping”
at the site in
question.
For
that reason
alone, the charge of causing or allowing
“open dumping”
against Mr. Kamarasy in this case
should be dismissed.
VI
THE R~SPONDENTDID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
THAT RESULTED IN “LITTER” AS
THAT TERM IS USED IN THE ACT
Even if this Board
should find that Mr. Kamarasy did commit “open dumping,”
this
would not in itself be an actionable offense under the Act.
Each of the three specific charges
against Mr. Kaffiarasy requires further showings.
The County’s
first claim is that Mr. Kamarasy caused or allowed open
dumping that
resulted in “litter”
in
violation of
§
2l(p)(l) of the
Act.
But,
Mr. Kamarasy does not believe
that his act ofburning some stuffat a site on
his
own
homestead, in
a location
not
visible from
the public road,~àndin a
manner that
did
not
cause
a
public
nuisance, can reasonably be
characterized as c~using
litter.
Mr. Kanj4rasy is well aware that the term “litter” has been interpreted expansively
in
prior cases
before the
Pollution
Control
Board.
See
e.g.
Illinois
Environmental
Protection
Page
13
~‘Meniorand~ciin
: Supporting~AmendedPetition
to
contest
:iAdministrativé ::Citation

Agency v. Springer,
supra,
AC 02-7 at p.
6
But, again, if the legislature had
intended that every
homeowner whoever placed waste on his land in such a way as to
constitute “open
dumping,”
was also and automatically guilty of littering, then the legislature
would not
have bothered to
add the qualifying phrase “that
resulted in litter.”
See e.g.
Alternate Fuels,
Inc.
v.
Director of
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
supra,
2004
WL
2359398
It
would
have just
defined the crime
as
“open dumping”.
By
adding the
phrase
“that resulted in litter”
the
legislature madeit clear that it believes that not all items left at a “disposal site” constitute litter.
So the question remains, what constitutes
“littering” under the Pollution
Control
Act,
and what does not’~Unfortunately, the Act does not say
The failure
to
define littering poses a
serious enforcement problem ofconstitutional dimension: how can a homeowner, even
one who
has studied the statute in elaborate detail,
possibly
know if an
act constitutes
“open
dumping”
that results in “litter”,
given that the Act does not
define “litter”?
See e.g.
People
v.
Einoder,
209
Il1.2d 443, 450, 283
Ill.Dec. 551,
808 N.E.2d 517 (2004)
The
Pollution
Control Board
attempted
to
answer this problem
in
previous
cases,
responding
to
qharges
that
the
term “litter”
in
the
statute
is
too
vague
by
adopting
the
definition oflitterfrom the Litter Control Act.
See e.g.
St. Clair County
v.
Louis
Mund, AC
90-
64.
This approaeh by the Board is both logical and reasonable.
It has the virtue of relying on
a
legal notion of ‘~1itter”that was created by
the legislature precisely for the purpose of going
beyond the simplistic notion that litter is just “messy stuff left outside,” and identifying with
some precision which messy stuff left outside shall be treated by
the law as “litter”
and
which
shall not, so that littering can be either prevented or punished.
By adopting the meaning of“litter” as it is used in the Litter Control Act, the Board put
homeowners, like Mr. Kamarasy,
on notice that unlawful “littering” in
the Pollution Control
Act
means exactly the same thing
as unlawful “littering” in the Litter Control Act.
The Litter Control Act starts out by providing as follows:
“J~itter”means
any
discarded, used or unconsumed
substance
or
waste.
“Litter”
may include,
but
is
not
limited to,
any
garbage,
trash, debris, rubbish, grass clippings
or other lawn or garden
waste,

~~paper
magazines, glass, metal, plastic or paper
containers or
otherpackaging construction
material,
abandoned vehicle.
.
.
motor
v~ëhicle
parts, furniture, oil, carcass ofa dead animal, any
nauseous or
J
offensive matter of any kind, any
object likely to
injure any
person
ôi
create a traffic
hazard, potentially
infectious
medical waste
as
defined in
Section
3.360
of the
Environmental
Protection
Act, or
ahything
else of an unsightly or unsanitary nature, which
has
been
I.
discarded, abandoned or otherwise disposed ofimproperly.
415 ILCS
§
105)3
But this paragraph, though properly taken from the Litter Control Act, does not
give a
complete definition of “litter”, in the sense oftelling a homeowner what is
unlawful.
Indeed, it
is transparently incomplete, if one reads it carefully.
It consists of two sentences.
The first sentence
is
obviously
definitional in
syntax
“Litter means any
discarded,
used
or unconsu~edsubstance
or
waste.”
But
this
sentence,
taken alone, suffers
from
the
same
vagueness.ii~roblem
as discussed above.
In fact, based solely on this
sentence
the
trash
that one puts insj~.e
a garbage can and takes to the curb is
“litter,”
since it certainly consists
of
“discarded,
used or consumed substance or waste.”
Likewise,
a small pile
of leaves in one’s
own back yard
~~uld probably be “litter”,
and
subject to
whatever enforcement measures
the
Litter Control Act provides.
Certainly, that
is not what the legislature intended,
For one
thing, the second sentence
is there for a reason.
It appears to
be
intended
to
give some help in understanding “litter”, by providing a list (though
not complete) of concrete
examples
But the key word in the second
sentence is
“may”
For
example, according
to
this
so-called definition, “grass clippings or other lawn
or garden waste”, may be considered litter
under the Litter G;bntrol Act.
Or,
they may not.
One simply does not know, without
reading
the entire statute~to
get more guidance.
The respondent does
not
say
this
to
be
tricky,
or try
to
win
this
case
on
a
mere
technicality.
Th~question raised here
is
one
about
fundamental fairness.
This
so-called
definition, cited frequently by the Board, completely fails to
answer the basic
question posed
above: what kind)of dumping
on
one’s own property
is
the kind that results
in
litter,
and
what

U
kind is not?
Without that answer, how can a homeowner everknow what is prohibited and
what
is not~
For example,
if
this one
paragraph were
the
entire
definition of
litter, even
such
a
common practice as mulching one’s grass
clippings
back into one’s
lawn
would
be
fraught
with unknown and unknowable danger.
The Inspector might cite it as a violation.
Or
he
might
not.
And, the oril~’
way for a homeowner to
know in advance
would be
to
read the Inspector’s
mind.
Therefore, in effect, the interpretation of the Litter Control Act that Jackson County
is
asking this Board to adopt for use in the case at bar would grant the Inspector sole
and absolute
power to decide ~hat
is litter and what is not.
Perhaps Mr. Terry
believes
that he
can enforce the Pollution
Control Act
merely by
insisting that he knows litter when he
sees
it,
but
if
so,
this
would lead to
a blatant violation of
the Separation of~PowersClause of the Illinois
Constitution because the inspector would then
have the authority
to determine if and
when individuals
should be
prosecuted for “littering”.
See e.g.
People v~Izzo,
195
Il.2d
109,
115-6, 253
Ill.Dec. 425, 745 N.E.2d 548
(2001)
It is
up
to the legislature
to
give clear guidelines
about what litter is and what it is not; the inspector, and
even the
Pollution
Control
Board,
should
have
only
a
very
limited
discretion
in
this
determination.
Ofcours~’
the legislature knew this when it wrote the Litter Control Act.
It
did not give
broad discretionito inspectors to define litter.
Instead, in
plain language,
the legislature gave
fairly detailed guidelines about what is litter and what is not.
In the legislature’s own words:
tj’his
Act is, therefore,
necessary
to provide for
uniform prohibition
throughout the State
of any
and
all littering
on
public
or
private
prbperty so as to protect the health,
safety
and
welfare of the people
of this State.
415
ILCS
§
l05/~
(Legislative Findings and Determinations) (emphasis added).
Therefor~
it was the legislature’s intent that the notion ofunlawful littering should be
“uniform” in the~
State of Illinois,
and that one
has to
examine the entire
statute to
know
what
“any
and all
littering” means.
Merely reading one paragraph from the statute will not suffice.

fl
o
It follows that the criterion for whether a landowner has
committed open
dumping
that
p
resulted in litterin
violation of the Pollution
Control Act
is
to
determine whether or not
the
landowner comnutted open dumping
that resulted in litter
in violation ofthe Litter Control Act
n
In other words,
to prove
that Mr.
Kamarasy’s
alleged “open dumping”
resulted
in
“litter”, the State iwill have to prove
that Mr.
Kamarasy’s
actions constituted
a violation of the
Litter Control Act.
But, the County cannot do so, because Mr.
Kamarasy did
not violate the
r
Litter Control Act.
The Litter Control Act contains four sections that describe prohibited
acts.
See
415
P
ILCS
§~
105/4 thiough
105/7
Two ofthese are not relevant to this
hearing in
that they refer to
li
dumping from a motor vehicle or abandoning a motorvehicle.
See
415 ILCS
§
105/5
(dumping
from
motor vehiCle)
and 415
ILCS
§
105/7
(abandonment of motor
vehicle)
That leaves
o
Section 4 (dumprng and the deposit oflitter) and Section
6
(accumulation of litter)
L
Section
4
ofthe Litter Control Act provides in relevant part, as follows:
No person shall dump, deposit,...
or
discard..
.
litter.
.
.
unless
(a)
the person
is the owner or tenant in
lawful possession
of the
property
.
.
.
and
does
not
create
a
public
health
or
safety
hazard,
a
public nuisance, or a
fire hazard.
(Emphasis added)
Section 6 of the Litter Control Act addresses
accumulation of litter.
It
provides
in
relevant part, as føllows:
No persoti shall allow litter to
accumulate upon
real property,
of
which the person charged is
the owner or tenant in
control, in
such
a
manner
as
to
constitute
a
public
nuisance
or
in
such
a
manner that the litter may be blown or
otherwise
carried
by
the natural
elements on to the real property of another person.
There
is
no
evidence to
support
a
claim that Mr. Kamarasy’s
so-called “open
dump”
created a
public health or safety hazard, a public nuisance, or a fire hazard.
There
is
also
no
evidence that he deposited items
in the
so-called “open
dump”
in
a manner
as to
constitute
a
~
~
~
~
~Memo~d~’~i
S~pó~tiiig
Amènde&~etfli~n~t~Contest
A~thiiistrathe~
CitatiOi~

o
public nuisance or such that items may be blown or otherwise carried by the natural elements
on to the real property ofanother person.
Therefore, Mr. Kamarasy should not be
found in violation of the
Act on
the charge of
open dumping that resulted in litter, because he did not cause or allow litter in violation of either
the Pollution Control Act or theLitter Control Act.
p
VH
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN
DUMPING AT HIS HOMESTEAD THAT RESULTED IN OPEN
P.
BURNING IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT
IEPA
regrilations exempt several activities from the general prohibition against open
burning under the Act.
For
exaffiple,
open
burning
of “agricultural
waste” is
not
a violation
of
the
Act,
o
provided the burning occurs on the premises
on
which such waste is
generated, the area of the
burn is not a resfricted area, atmospheric conditions will dissipate readily the
contaminants,
no
visibility
hazarcF~iscreated
on roadways,
railroad
tracks
or air
fields,
residential or
other
populated areas are not closer than 1,000 feet, and
it can be demonstrated that no
economically
reasonable altei~ativemethod
of disposal
is
available
35
Illinois
Administrative Code
§
237.120(a)
“Agriculjiiral waste”
is
defined as
“any
refuse,
except
garbage and dead
animals,
generated on a farm or ranch by crop and livestock production practices including such items as
bags, cartons, dry
bedding, structural
materials and
crop
residues
but
excluding
landscape
wastes”. 35
IllinOis Administrative Code
§
237.10 1
Open burning of “domicile waste” is not a violation of the Act, provided the burning
occurs on the premises on which such waste is
generated, the burn area is
not a restricted
area,
atmospheric conditions
will dissipate readily
the contaminants,
and no
visibility hazard
is
created on road~áys,railroad tracks or airfields. 35 Illinois Administrative Code
§
237.120(a)
“Domicile waste” is
defined as “any
refuse generated
on
single-family domiciliary
property as a resiXlt of domiciliary activities”. 35 Illinois Administrative Code ~ 237.101

o
Open burning of “landscape waste”
is
not
a violation of the Act, provided the burning
occurs on the premises
on which such waste is generated, atmospheric conditions
wifi dissipate
readily the contaminants,
and no
visibility hazard is
created on
roadways, railroad tracks or air
fields”. 35
Illinois Administrative Code
§
237.120(a)
“Landscape waste” is defined as “any
vegetable or plant
refuse, except garbage and
• •
agricultural waste”, including trees, tree trimmings,
branches, stumps,
brush,
weeds, leaves,
grass,
shrubbery and yard trimmings.
35
Illinois Administrative Code
§
237.10 1
In the case
at bar, Mr.
Kamarasy
consolidated items
from his
household,
which
is
located on the farm where the Carbondale/Kamarasy site is situated,
and burned
them.
He also
consolidated items of landscape waste, such as branches, vines, leaves and brush,
which
were
generated on his~farm,
and burned them.
Also
in
the burn,
were items
of
agricultural
waste,
such as fence posts (formerly contaminated with
poison
ivy),
boxes, cartons,
structural items
and crop residue~
These activities by the respondent did
not
violate the Act’s
ban
on
“open
burning”.
Therefore,
this claim should be dismissed.
VIII
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
ON
HIS HOMESTEAD THAT RESULTED
IN THE DEPOSITION OF
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION OR DEMOLITION OR CLEAN
CONSTRUCTION DEBRIS IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT
TheAct defines “general
construction or demolition
debris”.
The term means “non-
hazardous, uncontaminated materials resulting from the construction,
remodeling, repair, and
demolition ofutilities, structures, and roads, limited to
the followmg
bricks, concrete,
and
other
masonry materials; soil; rock; wood, including non-hazardous painted, treated,
and coated wood
and
wood
products;
wall
coverings;
plaster;
drywall;
plumbing
fixtures;
non-asbestos
insulation;
roofing
shingles
and
other roof
coverings;
reclaimed
asphalt
pavement; glass;
plastics that are not sealed in a manner that conceals waste,
electrical wiring and
components

fl
D
containing no hazardous substances; and piping or metals incidental to any of those materials”.
H
415 ILCS
§
5/3.460(a)
U
The
Act~defines“clean
construction
or
demolition
debris”.
The
term
means
“uncontaminated~
broken concrete without protruding
metal bars, bricks, rock,
stone, reclaimed
asphalt pavement, or soil generated from
construction or demolition
activities”.
415
ILCS
§
5/3.160(b).
p
Nothing,’in
the
debris
pile
discovered by
Mr.
Terry
was
construction
material or
demolition debris.
Mr. Kamarasy or his
farm employees placed
all of the
materials contained
P
in the debris pile7
Mr. Kamarasy was not constructing a structure, nor was he
demolishing one,
and
so the “stuff~in his burn pile could not have been the waste
generated by
such an
activity.
For
the
words
l’t~onstruction”and
“demolition”,
which
modify
“debris”
in
this
charge
against Mr.
Karnarasy, to have any meaning, there must be at least some
circumstantial evidence
that some construction and/or demolition of structures was taking
place.
The
County
has
presented and can present none.
The photpgraphs that Mr. Terry took do not show
piles
oflumber ofthe type that might
lead
to
a reasor~áb1einference
that
construction
activity
had
taken
place
resulting
in
the
deposition
of materials therefrom.
Nor do they
show debris from the demolition of a non-farm
structure.
Rather, they appear to
show
a
few
pieces
of
debris
from
some
old
household
furniture and th&iike.
Even if the inspector did observe
a few damaged pieces of “dimensional lumber”
in the
debris pile,
this
~nalysis is not
changed.
Obviously, no
farm can be
run without generating
some scrap pieces of wood.
And it
is
simply not
reasonable to
say that if the inspector finds
one or two scrap pieces of wood, or even a couple of “2
x
4’s”
in
a debris pile, that he or she
can reasonably cOnclude that the debris
pile
consists
of construction
materials or
demolition
materials.
Otherwise, any time any homeowner puts a couple ofpieces ofscrap wood out in his
or her backyard, ~bra farmerputs
a couple of scrap pieces of wood on the burn pile,
he or she
will
stand
accuged of having committed
open
dumping that resulted
in
the
deposition
of
Mónornd~
Supporting
1Aniè~dødPetitioi
~
~

r
construction or demolition
debris
in
violation of
the
Pollution
Control Act.
It
should
be
L
obvious that true construction and demolition activity would
generate substantially
more than
one or two pieces of wood that a homeowner might scrap or that a farmer might
discard
and
r
seek to burn.
The respondent wishes to emphasize that the burden of proof lies
with
the County
to
I
show that the materials comprising the burn pile
on the Carbondale/Kamarasy site constituted
“general construction or demolition
debris” or “clean construction
or
demolition debris”.
The respondent contends that
they did
not,
and
the
visual evidence,
in
the
form
of
the
r
photographs taken by Mr. Terry during his
warrantless, unannounced entry and search of the
premises, seems i~atherclear on this point.
However, it is
not the respondent’s
burden
to
make
out
his
defense~tbthis
charge, until
the
State
first
shows
that there was
construction
or
demolition debris in
this burn pile.
L
The State
has made
no
showing of fact on this
point,
only
Mr. Terry’s
conclusory
L
allegation.
Consequently,
no
finding is
warranted that the respondent allowed or caused open
dumping that
resulted
in
the
deposition
of
general
construction
or demolition
or
clean
construction or demolition debris on the Carbondale/Kamarasy site.
Moreover,
even if this
Board
should
find
as
a
matter of fact that Mr.
Kamarasy
did
E
stack some “din~nsionallumber” in this
debris pile and burn it,
Mr.
Kamarasy finds it hard
to
believe that
this
Board
would
describe
that
act
as
depositing
the
lumber, rather than
attempting to burti it.
And, as already discussed, even if
it might be unlawful
to
abandon a pile
ofwood in a scrap heap, it is not unlawful to burn it in
an unrestricted
area, such as where Mr.
Kamarasy burned it.
Therefore, this Board should dismiss the charge of open dumping that resulted in
the
deposition ofgeneral construction
or demolition
or clean construction or demolition
debris on
the Carbondale/Kamarasy site.

IX
IT~SUNFAIR, AND A VIOLATION OF MR. KAMARASY’S
j
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED DUE PROCESS RIGHTS, TO
ACCUSE HIM OF IMPROPERLY CREATING AN OPEN DUMP SITE,
LITTERING, OR DUMPING CONSTRUCTION DEBRIS AT A
SITE
r
WHERE HE IS LAWFULLY ENTITLED TO DEPOSIT THOSE SAME
1.
MATERIALS FOR THE PURPOSE OF BURNING THEM
r
By claiming that Mr.
Kamarasy created an
open dump,
the County
appears
to
suggest
that it was unlawful for Mr. Kamarasy to collect landscape, household, and agricultural
waste
r
and deposit it ma single site on his farm in preparation forburning it.
It
was shown in
Section
VII of this
Memorandum
that
IEPA regulations
expressly
L
permit the burning of such materials if they
result from domiciliary
waste,
landscape waste, or
farm waste generated on
the premises.
Thus,
unless
the County
can prove that this
waste
was
somehow generated by activities outside Mr
Kamarasy’s house or farm, he was entitled by
law
to burn the mater~iä1s.
But there is no way to burn the materials without first gathering them.
So, if this
Board
L
were to
uphold the County’s interpretation of the Pollution
Control
Act,
it would be
holding
r
that the laws in the State ofIllinois contradict themselves.
On the
one hand,
it is
lawful to burn
materials in the maimer that Mr.
Kamarasy
did, but,
on the other hand,
it is
unlawful
to
gather
them for burningL
-~
One ofthe.most basic notions ofdue process is that a citizen must be able to reasonably
L
ascertain whethet’àn act that he is contemplating is
lawful or not.
See e.g.
Granite City Div.
Of
Nat.
Steel Co. vjtTllinois Pollution
Control Board,
155
I11.2d
149,
163,
184
Ill.Dec. 402,
613
N.E.2d 719
(199~)Where the State
has two
laws, one of which
tells
the citizen unequivocally
that the act is lawful, while the other tells the citizen,
in
effect,
that the act is
not lawful,
it must
be
true
that
onecor both of those
laws
is
unconstitutional.
Otherwise,
there would
be
no
L
possible way fo~acitizen to
make the necessary determination
about lawful versus
unlawful
behavior.

Of course,
the respondent does not say this by way of arguing that this Board should
find that the Pollution
Control
Act is
unconstitutional
on
its
face.
Rather, the respondent says
this by way ofarguing that this Board must
interpret the Pollution Control
Act so as to
keep it
within constitutional bounds
That is,
this
Board must
find
that
the Pollution
Control
Act
permits the gathering of “discarded”
materials or “waste”
in one place,
even if that might be
described as creating an open dump site, so
long
as the
materials consisted only of domiciliary
waste, landscape waste,
and/or agricultural waste
generated on the premises
and
the purpose of
gathering the materials was to burn them or otherwise dispose ofthem in a lawful manner.
Assumir~g
that the above is the correct interpretation of the law, Mr. Kamarasy cannot
be found
to
have
committed
the violations
described in
the Administrative
Citation.
Mr.
Kamarasy’s onl~demonstrab1e
intention was to burn the materials in question.
Mr
Terry effectively conceded as much in
his
original
Report
According
to
that
Report, Mr. Terr~
first observed the debris
pile
on
March
11,
and
it had not
yet been burned.
Mr. Terry then observed the debris pile on March
25,
and he
noted that it had been charred by
burning,
and
that the pile had
been reduced in
size since March
11.
The
only
reasonable
inference is
that Mr. Kamarasy collected the
materials at some
time prior
to
March
11
for the
purpose ofburnig them at some time prior to March 25.
Becausethe
collecting of the
materials for burning in
this
case,
and the burning of the
materials was really a single continuous
act,
the Board
should
find
that
the
collecting of the
materials (1) waS not an act of open dumping; (2) was not an act oflittering;
and
(3) was not an
act of depositing construction or demolition debris
in the sense intended by the legislature when
it passed the Pollution Control Act.

x
n
IT WOULD BE UNFAIR, AND A VIOLATION OF
DUE PROCESS,
IF THIS BOARD WERE TO INTERPRET THE LEGAL MEANING
OF
“DISPOSAL SITE”,
“OPEN DUMP” AND/OR
“LITTER” IN
SUCH A WAY AS TO IGNORE OR RENDER
DE MINIMUS
THE
NOTIONS OF SCAYI’ERING FREELY INTO THE
ENVIRONMENT AND OF CAUSING SOME HARM TO OTHERS,
WHICH THE LEGISLATURE CLEARLY INTENDED TO BE
INCORPORATED INTO THE MEANING OF “POLLUTION”
The problems inherent in the County’s interpretation of the Pollution
Control Act,
as
evidenced by the manner in which the prosecution has stated and presented its
case against Mr.
Kamarasy, have already been discussed extensively in this memorandum.
When the legislature
wished to describe an open dump, it did not describe it merely
as a location where
a landowner
places some of his or her waste.
Even if the placing of one or more
items
in
a
pile seems
unsightly, that does not make the pile an open dump, especially
if
the site is discrete and
limited
The legislature said in plain language that,
to be
an
open
dump,
a pile of material must
also be
placed in such a way that
either the material
itself
is
free to
enter into the environment, or else
constituents of
th~
material may be emitted or discharged into the environment.
One
must
assume
that
the legislature used
this
language
for a
reason,
namely
to
distinguish the more serious
crime
of “pollution”
from the relatively
insignificant
and
not
unlawful case of;mere “messiness”.
One must
also
assume that by
using
the word “may”
the
legislature
meant
to
require the
State
to
prove
a
significant likelihood,
not
a
remote
possibility,
of euI~teringinto the environment.
Otherwise,
an overzealous prosecutor could
always claim the~existenceofan infinitesimal possibility.
Similarlyywith respect to “litter”, the legislature said, if it occurs
only
on
the
alleged
offender’s
own private
property, and
the
accusation is
unlawful “dumping,”
the
allegedly
offending
stuff must be shown to “create a public health or safety hazard, a public
nuisance, or
a fire hazard,”
Or alternatively, where the accusation
is
that
the
stuff is
being unlawfully
“accumulated”,
~itmust
be
shown
that
the
stuff is
a
“public
nuisance”
or that it “may
be
blown or otherwise carried by the natural elements on to the real property of anotherperson.”

o
Any homeowner whoreads these provisions would have
to believe
that it is
lawful, say,
p
to make a modest leafpile
in his or her backyard, or to
stack a few branches from a fallen tree,
or to
set out a wood pile for aging first before burning it in a fireplace or wood stove.
More
particularly, if Mr. Kamarasy had read the statutes with a fine-toothed comb, before creating his
burn site, he would have had no way of anticipating
that an overzealous inspector might enter
p.
I
onto his propert)y without a warrant, discover his pile of material, and then cite him,
not just once
p
but three times, for “polluting”, merely because the pile looked messy
to
the inspector and not
because it was actually scattering or threatening to be carried offby the natural elements onto
I
someone else’s property.
That means it would be a violation of Mr. Kamarasy’s due process rights to convict him
of these charge~:A citizen of the United
States
and the
State
of
Illinois
must
be
able
to
reasonably ascertain what is
lawful and what is
not.
Otherwise
law
enforcement becomes
L
simply a random~
and unintelligible act.
Furthermdre, if Mr. Kamarasy had read the
Litter Control Act
carefully before
creating
the pile,
he woukthave rightfully determined not only that he was not violatingthat
Act, but
also
that he was exphcitly permitted by the Act to gather the materials that he did in the pile
and burn
them.
That brings us back to
the same dilemma
described above.
The
legislature
cannot
reasonably declare to its citizens that it is lawful to place some
debris in
your backyard
(if it
meets the requisite standards), but then in a separate law declare that it is
unlawful, even if
it
does meet those same standards.
Consequently, the Board must conclude either
(a) that the
Pollution
Control
Act
as
applied to
Mr. Kamarasy is unconstitutional; or (b) that
the Pollution Control Act was
never
intended to apply; and in fact does not apply,
to items that
one
can lawfully dispose of in
one’s
backyard according to the Litter Control Act.
It was only meant to
apply to such items
as pose
a real threat to b~carriedonto
the property of others
by
the
natural
elements.
None
of the
materials deposited by Mr. Kamarasy posed that threat.

r
IT WOULD BE UNFAIR, AND A VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
j
SEPAI~ATION
OF POWERS, IF THIS BOARD WERE TO PERMIT THE
INSPECTOR AND JACKSON COUNTY SIMPLY
TO USE THE “I
KNOWIT WHEN I SEE
IT” DEFINITION OF LITTER RATHER THAN
T
CAREFULLY APPLYING
THE
GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN THE
1.
P
LITTER CONTROL ACT
r
If this B&ird holds that acts which are explicitly lawful under the Litter
Control Act
(for
-
example placingwaste on one’s own property in such a way that it is not likely to
be
carried
I
onto a neighbor~’propertyby the natural
elements) or
which are explicitly lawful under the
IEPA regulatiois accompanying the Pollution Control Act (for example burning
landscape,
L
household, and ~tgricultura1
waste
on
one’s
own property) violate the Pollution Control
Act,
then this Board,~in
effect,
would be making new legislation about what
is
and
what is
not
pollution
That would be
a violation of the
Separation of
Powers
principle of
the
Illinois
Constitution.
Making
law
is
not
a
proper
administrative function.
This
Board
is
only
authorized to enfOrce the law.
T
L
By the same token, if this Board permits an
inspector to exercise unbridled discretion
r
under the guise of “I can’t define litter, but I know it when I
see it,”
that would
be
a violation
ofthe Separatioiiof Powers principle.
The inspector is
no
more authorized than the Board to
L
make new law about what is and is not pollution.
Nor
is
this
some
minor matter in
which
the
exercise of
discretion
is
proper
and
L
necessary.
If littering
is
the crime in question, it cannot be left to
the executive branch of
p
government, whether that means an Inspector or this Board,
to decide arbitrarily and on its
own
what constitutes
“litter”.
There
must be
clear
guidelines
from
the legislature,
and
those
guidelines must be followed, or the enforcement itself is unconstitutional.
As stated previously in this
memorandum, the legislature has set
forth
some
guidelines
L
for this
case, th~Countyand
its
inspector have not
followed
them,
and
this
Board
should
implement those~guidelines
by exonerating Mr. Kamarasy ofthe charges in this
case.

XII
IT WOULD ALSO BE UNFAIR, AND SIMILARLY A VIOLATION
OF’ THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, IF THIS
BO~DWERE TO PERMIT THE INSPECTOR AND JACKSON
COUNTY TO PILE ON MULTIPLE CHARGES FOR WHAT
REASONABLY SHOULD AMOUNT TO A SINGLE ACT OF
COLLECTING MATERIALS IN ONE SITE AND BURNING
THEM
The legislature only intended one fine for one
violation of the
Act.
It
surely
did
not
intend the legal trickery by
which
the prosecution has managed to
subdivide that
same act into
three aspects, eaCh ofwhich is alleged to constitute a separate violation.
By
the *Osecution’s
reasoning, if
a
homeowner were
to
take a
collection of dead
branches and place them in a fire pit in his backyard, and
if
he were then to
strip off a damaged
piece of plywoc~from an
old door and
throw it on the debris pile,
and if he then burned
the
pile, he could be Charged with not just one but
three violations of the Pollution
Control Act.
One count coulc~be
for littering, one count could be for burning, and one count could be
for
demolition
debris
as a result of having demolished the old
door.
Or, the prosecutor might
charge only for otie count.
This decision
would be purely discretionary.
In the case at bar, Mr.
Terry
and the Jackson County
prosecutor used their apparently
unbridled
discr~ionto
file three complaints for what was really a single
act of burning
some
debris,
the extent of which was
to
create
only
ten
cubic
yards
of
waste.
The
prosecution
exercised
this
discretion
to
pile
on
the
charges, even though
by
its
own
admission,
Mr.
Kamarasy created less than ten cubic yards ofwaste, whereas the typical case before
this
Board
involves hundreds
of cubic yards
of waste.
That
alone
makes
the
charges
against Mr.
Kamarasy in this action arbitrary
and unreasonable, and an abuse ofdiscretion.
The essence of the legislature’s thinking in
creating the Administrative
Citation process
was
to reduce th~
discretion
of the executive branch
in enforcing the law.
For
example, by
imposition offixed penalties
neither
prosecutors
nor this
Board
are allowed to
say: this
is
a
$1500 litterpile, this is
a $1000 pile, and this
one only seems like a $500 one, either on account
of its size or the degree to which it presents problems to others.
This lack of discretion
is
a

U
significant part ~f legislature’s
intent under
the Act.
Yet
the prosecutor,
in
this
case, has
managed to
intrOduce a much larger degree of discretion in
a back-door maimer.
Whether it is
10
cubic yardsor
10,000,
the
fine
for
littering
if
the
prosecution
chooses
to
use
the
Administrative
Citation process
must
always
be
$1,500.
Yet,
in
this case
against
Mr.
Kamarasy, the prosecution has figured out a way
to
charge Mr.
Kamarasy with $4500
in fines
for one tiny alleged dump site.
FurthermOre, and as previously discussed, before one can commit the alleged crime of
“open burning” under the Pollution Control Act, it is
a logically
necessary
antecedent that
one
first must have gathered the materials in
a
debris
pile.
For
the prosecution to
automatically
charge
separate”fines,
and
in
Mr.
Kamarasy’s
case
two
separate
fines,
for
this
logically
necessary antecedent step, before charging for the “burning” amounts
to
setting
a minimum
fine of $3000 for all open burning cases.
Alternatively, for the prosecution to
decide
at its
own
discretion whethCr to charge a separate
crime for the antecedent steps,
violates the legislature’s
intent in creating~the
Administrative
Citation process, because the legislature intended the fines
to be enforced without discretion.
The pur~oseof eliminating discretion
in the matter of fines
was to avoid giving the
executive branch~
too much power in
these
cases.
If this
Board
were
to
decide to
grant the
prosecutor discretion to
charge Mr. Kamarasy
with three separate
counts for
what
was
in
essence a single act of open burning,
it would be
endorsing
a
violation of the Separation of
Powers Clause of-the Illinois Constitution.
If the legislature had
intended for the
single
act of burning
some
debris
on
one’s
property to carrya $3000 fine, it would have said so in the Act.
It did not.
Therefore; thepiling on of multiple charges in this case, even if a violation of the Act is
found to have occurred when Mr.
Kamarasy gathered
the materials for the purpose of burning
them,
should not~be
countenanced and Mr. Kamarasy found liable for no
more than one
(1)
violation of the Act, if any is foundto have occurred.

XIII
CONCLUSION
The inspector discovered the pile at the site in question only by
conducting
an
illegal
search ofMr. Kamarasy’s property.
Therefore, all evidence of the existence of this pile
should
be suppressed and disregarded.
The pile
of material in
question did
not
constitute a
“disposal
site”
or an
“open
dump”, as those terms are defined in the Pollution Control Act.
There was no general construction or demolition debris within the pile.
The pile itself would not be considered “litter”
in violation of the Litter Control
Act.
Therefore,
it cannot be considered “litter”
in violation ofthe Pollution Control Act.
It was an abuse of discretion to charge Mr.
Kamarasy
with three separate
violations for
one allegedly wrongful act.
The essential “crime”,
which
Mr.
Kamarasy
committed,
if
any,
was to create a burn site on his farm to
dispose of household,
landscape,
and agricultural
waste
generated on
the farm by his
farming activities.
At most,
he
should have been
issued
one
citation for open burning.
But
that~openburning
charge
must
be
dismissed
because
the
IEPA
regulations
expressly permitthis kind ofburning activity, provided certain conditions
are met, which
Mr.
Kamarasy obviously did meet.
The only ~wayfor this
Board
to
convict Mr.
Kamarasy
on
any
of these three counts
would be to
interpret the legal terms “open
dump”
and “litter’
so
expansively
and
arbitrarily
as to
violate Mr.~Kamarasy’sdue process
right to
be
able to
reasonably anticipate what
is
illegal and what isnot.
In addition, the
interpretation
would have to
be so broad as to
give the
administrative branch ofthe government too much discretion regarding both
the decision about
what is litter and the amount of penalties to be imposed for a particular act.
This would be
a
violation
of the Constitutional principle of Separation ofPowers.
TherespOndent did not violatethe Act as alleged in the Administrative Citation.

Therefore, and for all of the foregoing reasons, the
Administrative Citation should
be
H
dismissed.
Dated this 19th day ofNovember, 2004.
EG~JJ~MARASY,
Respondent
By~~-~
-‘
Gregory~~each,
IARDC # 2893061
Attorney forrespondent
p
fl
I
I
LAW OFFICES
OF GREGORY A. VEACH
3200 Fishback Road
P. O.Box
1206
Carbondale IL
62903-1206
Telephone:
(618) 549-3132
Telecopier:
(618) 549-0956
e-mail: gveach@gregveachlaw.com
Attorney forrespondent

————.-.......-.....
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~
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m

Davis Auto Center
356 Cedar Creek
Rd.
Makanda
IL 62958
(618)549-3675
Thank you for your business.
page
1
Repair Order #4582
Egon Kamarasy
Day
Phone
: 618-457-6167
474 Egret Lake
Rd.
Carbondale
IL 62903
Vehicle
:
1986 BMW 325e 2693CC 2.7Liter L6
Tag/State
: RWCI94 /
IL
VIN
: WBAAB5404G9681384
Color
: White
Created
: 06/02/04 5:22:00
PM
Odometer In
:
0
Qty
Code/Tech”
Reference
Description
3
-
DISPOSAL FEE
DISPOSAL OF
OLD TIRE
Odometer Out:
0
Condition
Unit Price
$1.25
Price
$3.75
Labor
$0.00
Parts
$0.00
Sublet/Misc.
$0.00
Shop Supplies
$0.00
Charges
$3.75
Sales Tax
Tax
@
$0.00
*
6.2500
Repair Total
$0.00
$3.75
I
hereby authorize the repair work herein set forth to
be done along with the
necessary material and
agree that you are not responsible for loss or damage to vehicle or articles left in vehicle
in case of fire,
theft or any other cause
beyond
your control.
I
hereby grant
you and/or your employees permission
to
operate the vehicle herein described
on streets,
highways or elsewhere for the purpose of testing and/or
Inspection.
An express garagekeeper’s lien is hereby acknowledged on
above vehicle to secure the
amount or repairs thereto. All Vehicles left over 48 hrs. after repairs are completed WILL INCUR A
$5.00
PER
DAY STORAGE FEE.
: Customer Signature

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