ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
July
18,
1996
C & S RECYCLING, INC.,
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
PCB 95-100
v.
)
(Permit Appeal
-
Land)
)
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
)
PROTECTION AGENCY,
)
)
Respondent.
)
ORDER OF THE
BOARD
(by
E.
Dunham):
Motion for Stay
On June 3,
1996,
C & S Recycling
(C & S) filed a Motion to Stay
Proceedings along
with its Status Report.
C & S has waived the decision deadline until May
1,
1997.
The
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
(Agency) filed its Status Report
and Objection to
Petitioner’s Motion to
Stay Proceedings
on June 10,
1996.
C &
S
requests a stay in this matter until December
1996 while
it pursues
legislation
which may render this proceeding moot.
C &
S reports that H.B.
1089 which provides an
exemption to the setback requirements of Section 22.14 of the Environmental Protection Act
(Act)
(415
ILCS
5/22.14
(1994)) has
passed the Senate and is currently before the Rules
Committee ofthe House ofRepresentatives.
C &
S
intends to pursue passage of the bill
during the fall veto session of the 1996 legislature.
C & S maintains that passage ofthe bill
would render the permit appeal moot.
The
Agency requests that the Motion for Stay be denied and that the Board decide the
Agency’s Motion for Summary Judgment which is currently pending before
the Board.
The
Agency maintains that even ifH.B.
1089
is enacted the petitioner would be required to file a
new permit application.
The Agency
argues that petitioner would not be prejudiced if the
Board were to
deny the motion to stay.
The Agency contends that continuing to stay this
matter,
especially if the proposed bill
is not passed during the fall veto session, would result in
a waste ofAgency and Board resources.
The Agency asserts that it is prepared to move
forward on the merits of this case.
The Board has previously granted stays in this matter by order of November
16,
1995
and April 4,
1996 to allow petitioner to pursue changes in the legislation.
The
Board will not
continue to
stay this matter since
the pending appeal does not affect petitioner’s attempts to
pursue a change
in the legislature.
2
The Board hereby denies
the motion for
stay.
Having
denied the motion for
stay
the
Board will proceed to decide the motion for summary judgment.
Motion for
Summary Judgment
On September
15,
1995, the Agency filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment”.
Petitioner has not filed a response to
the motion for summary judgment.1
Pursuant to
35
Ill.
Adm.
Code 103.140(c) petitioner is deemed
to have waived objection to
the granting of the
motion,
but such waiver does not bind the Board in its
determination.
C &
S
Recycling’s petition seeks
review of the Agency’s February
10,
1995
denial of
its
application for a permit to
develop and operate a solid waste management
site in the City of
Chicago.
On November
18,
1994, petitioner filed an application for
a permit to develop and
operate a municipal waste transfer station.
In
its
February 10,
1995
denial letter, the Agency
states that one reason for denial was that the application failed to demonstrate that the
proposed facility is located at least 800 feet from the nearest residence or property
zoned for
primarily residential uses as required by
Section 22.14 ofthe Act (415 ILCS
5/22.14
(1994)).
The
Agency maintains that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact in this
matter.
The Agency states that Section 39(1) of the Act (415 ILCS
5/39(1)
(1994)) prohibits
the issuance of a permit for a facility located within the boundaries of any setback zone
established by the Act.
The
Agency contends
that petitioner’s
application states that the
facility is approximately
300 feet from the nearest residential
district.
(Rec. at 42.)
The record
also states that the facility has been in operation since November
1989.
(Rec. at
2 &
108.)
The Agency maintains that issuance of the permit would violate Sections
39(1) and 22.14 of the
Act (415 ILCS
5/39(1)
and
22.14
(1994)).
In its petition, the petitioner asserts that Section 22.14
applies prospectively to permit
applications filed on or after the effective date of December 22,
1994.
(Pet.
at
4.)
The
Agency
contends that when
reviewing a permit application the law to be applied is the law that is in
effect when the decision is made and not when the application is filed.
(Gallatin National Co.
v.
IEPA (January
18,
1991), PCB 90-183; City of Herin v. IEPA (March
17,
1994), PCB 93-
195;
Ziffrmn v.
U.S.,
318 U.S.
73,
63
S.Ct.
465
(1943).)
The Board finds that there are no genuine
issues of material
fact,
so the motion for
summary judgment is properly before the Board.
The
Board finds that the law to be applied
when
reviewing a permit application is the law in effect at
the time the decision is made.
This
finding
is supported by
the case
law cited by the Agency.
Therefore,
for the Agency to
issue
the permit in this matter petitioner must show that the proposed facility would not violate the
Act in effect on February
10,
1995,
the date of the Agency’s denial letter.
Based on the
Pursuant
to 35 Ill. Adm.
Code
103.140(c) a party may file a response to
a motion within
seven days after service of the motion.
The time allowed for the filing of a response
lapsed
prior to the filing of a motion for
stay by the petitioner.
3
application,
petitioner admits that the proposed facility does not satisfy the statutorily required
setback requirements.
(Ag.
Rec.
at 42, 44
and
45.)
Section 22.14(b) provides an exception
to the setback requirement of Section 22.14(a)
for
facilities used as a garbage transfer station within one year prior to ianuary 1,
1988.
(415
ILCS
5/5/22.14(b).)
According to the petition for review
and documentation
submitted in
support ofthe application,
petitioner admits that the recycling facility has
been in operation at
this location since November
1989.
(Ag.
Rec.
at 2
&
108.)
The Board finds that the exception
to
the setback rule does not apply to this facility since
it began operation after January
1,
1988.
Therefore,
issuance of a permit for the proposed facility would result in a violation of
the Act.
Petitioner also contends that it is subject only to the home rule requirements of the City
of Chicago
and not to the setback requirements of Section 22.14.
(Pet.
at 4.)
The Agency
maintains that the home rule
exemption is not applicable because
Section 22.14
is a permit
standard and not a siting requirement.
The Board agrees that the home rule exemption does not apply to permitting
issues
and
therefore is not applicable to
this appeal.
Petitioner also asserts that Section 22.14 is unconstitutional and deprives petitioner of
its
rights to due process,
equal protection, uniformity of laws and constitutes a taking without
just compensation.
Having found that issuance of the permit would
violate the Act,
the Board
finds that it is unnecessary to further consider petitioner’s constitutional
objections to Section
22.14 ofthe Act.
Further, even if the Board found
in favor of the petitioner on these
arguments, without a legislative change
in the Act,
issuance of the permit would still result in
a violation of the Act.
The Board grants the respondent’s motion for summary judgment.
The Board affirms
the Agency’s denial of the permit.
This docket
is hereby closed.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.
Board Member J.
Theodore Meyer dissented.
Section 41
of the Environmental Protection Act,
(415 ILCS
5/41
(1994)),
provides for
appeal of final orders of the Board within 35
days of the date of service of this order.
The
Rules of the Supreme Court ofIllinois establish filing requirements.
(See
also 35
Ill. Adm.
Code 101.246,
Motion for Reconsideration.)
4
I, Dorothy M.
Gunn,
Clerk oft
Illinois Po lution Control Board,
hereby certify that
the above order
was adopted on the
~
day of~~’-~
,
1996,
by a vote of
A
Dorothy M.,9~nn,Clerk
Illinois PolJj4ion Control Board