ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    July
    18,
    1996
    C & S RECYCLING, INC.,
    )
    )
    Petitioner,
    )
    )
    PCB 95-100
    v.
    )
    (Permit Appeal
    -
    Land)
    )
    ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
    )
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    )
    )
    Respondent.
    )
    ORDER OF THE
    BOARD
    (by
    E.
    Dunham):
    Motion for Stay
    On June 3,
    1996,
    C & S Recycling
    (C & S) filed a Motion to Stay
    Proceedings along
    with its Status Report.
    C & S has waived the decision deadline until May
    1,
    1997.
    The
    Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
    (Agency) filed its Status Report
    and Objection to
    Petitioner’s Motion to
    Stay Proceedings
    on June 10,
    1996.
    C &
    S
    requests a stay in this matter until December
    1996 while
    it pursues
    legislation
    which may render this proceeding moot.
    C &
    S reports that H.B.
    1089 which provides an
    exemption to the setback requirements of Section 22.14 of the Environmental Protection Act
    (Act)
    (415
    ILCS
    5/22.14
    (1994)) has
    passed the Senate and is currently before the Rules
    Committee ofthe House ofRepresentatives.
    C &
    S
    intends to pursue passage of the bill
    during the fall veto session of the 1996 legislature.
    C & S maintains that passage ofthe bill
    would render the permit appeal moot.
    The
    Agency requests that the Motion for Stay be denied and that the Board decide the
    Agency’s Motion for Summary Judgment which is currently pending before
    the Board.
    The
    Agency maintains that even ifH.B.
    1089
    is enacted the petitioner would be required to file a
    new permit application.
    The Agency
    argues that petitioner would not be prejudiced if the
    Board were to
    deny the motion to stay.
    The Agency contends that continuing to stay this
    matter,
    especially if the proposed bill
    is not passed during the fall veto session, would result in
    a waste ofAgency and Board resources.
    The Agency asserts that it is prepared to move
    forward on the merits of this case.
    The Board has previously granted stays in this matter by order of November
    16,
    1995
    and April 4,
    1996 to allow petitioner to pursue changes in the legislation.
    The
    Board will not
    continue to
    stay this matter since
    the pending appeal does not affect petitioner’s attempts to
    pursue a change
    in the legislature.

    2
    The Board hereby denies
    the motion for
    stay.
    Having
    denied the motion for
    stay
    the
    Board will proceed to decide the motion for summary judgment.
    Motion for
    Summary Judgment
    On September
    15,
    1995, the Agency filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment”.
    Petitioner has not filed a response to
    the motion for summary judgment.1
    Pursuant to
    35
    Ill.
    Adm.
    Code 103.140(c) petitioner is deemed
    to have waived objection to
    the granting of the
    motion,
    but such waiver does not bind the Board in its
    determination.
    C &
    S
    Recycling’s petition seeks
    review of the Agency’s February
    10,
    1995
    denial of
    its
    application for a permit to
    develop and operate a solid waste management
    site in the City of
    Chicago.
    On November
    18,
    1994, petitioner filed an application for
    a permit to develop and
    operate a municipal waste transfer station.
    In
    its
    February 10,
    1995
    denial letter, the Agency
    states that one reason for denial was that the application failed to demonstrate that the
    proposed facility is located at least 800 feet from the nearest residence or property
    zoned for
    primarily residential uses as required by
    Section 22.14 ofthe Act (415 ILCS
    5/22.14
    (1994)).
    The
    Agency maintains that there is no genuine
    issue as to any material fact in this
    matter.
    The Agency states that Section 39(1) of the Act (415 ILCS
    5/39(1)
    (1994)) prohibits
    the issuance of a permit for a facility located within the boundaries of any setback zone
    established by the Act.
    The
    Agency contends
    that petitioner’s
    application states that the
    facility is approximately
    300 feet from the nearest residential
    district.
    (Rec. at 42.)
    The record
    also states that the facility has been in operation since November
    1989.
    (Rec. at
    2 &
    108.)
    The Agency maintains that issuance of the permit would violate Sections
    39(1) and 22.14 of the
    Act (415 ILCS
    5/39(1)
    and
    22.14
    (1994)).
    In its petition, the petitioner asserts that Section 22.14
    applies prospectively to permit
    applications filed on or after the effective date of December 22,
    1994.
    (Pet.
    at
    4.)
    The
    Agency
    contends that when
    reviewing a permit application the law to be applied is the law that is in
    effect when the decision is made and not when the application is filed.
    (Gallatin National Co.
    v.
    IEPA (January
    18,
    1991), PCB 90-183; City of Herin v. IEPA (March
    17,
    1994), PCB 93-
    195;
    Ziffrmn v.
    U.S.,
    318 U.S.
    73,
    63
    S.Ct.
    465
    (1943).)
    The Board finds that there are no genuine
    issues of material
    fact,
    so the motion for
    summary judgment is properly before the Board.
    The
    Board finds that the law to be applied
    when
    reviewing a permit application is the law in effect at
    the time the decision is made.
    This
    finding
    is supported by
    the case
    law cited by the Agency.
    Therefore,
    for the Agency to
    issue
    the permit in this matter petitioner must show that the proposed facility would not violate the
    Act in effect on February
    10,
    1995,
    the date of the Agency’s denial letter.
    Based on the
    Pursuant
    to 35 Ill. Adm.
    Code
    103.140(c) a party may file a response to
    a motion within
    seven days after service of the motion.
    The time allowed for the filing of a response
    lapsed
    prior to the filing of a motion for
    stay by the petitioner.

    3
    application,
    petitioner admits that the proposed facility does not satisfy the statutorily required
    setback requirements.
    (Ag.
    Rec.
    at 42, 44
    and
    45.)
    Section 22.14(b) provides an exception
    to the setback requirement of Section 22.14(a)
    for
    facilities used as a garbage transfer station within one year prior to ianuary 1,
    1988.
    (415
    ILCS
    5/5/22.14(b).)
    According to the petition for review
    and documentation
    submitted in
    support ofthe application,
    petitioner admits that the recycling facility has
    been in operation at
    this location since November
    1989.
    (Ag.
    Rec.
    at 2
    &
    108.)
    The Board finds that the exception
    to
    the setback rule does not apply to this facility since
    it began operation after January
    1,
    1988.
    Therefore,
    issuance of a permit for the proposed facility would result in a violation of
    the Act.
    Petitioner also contends that it is subject only to the home rule requirements of the City
    of Chicago
    and not to the setback requirements of Section 22.14.
    (Pet.
    at 4.)
    The Agency
    maintains that the home rule
    exemption is not applicable because
    Section 22.14
    is a permit
    standard and not a siting requirement.
    The Board agrees that the home rule exemption does not apply to permitting
    issues
    and
    therefore is not applicable to
    this appeal.
    Petitioner also asserts that Section 22.14 is unconstitutional and deprives petitioner of
    its
    rights to due process,
    equal protection, uniformity of laws and constitutes a taking without
    just compensation.
    Having found that issuance of the permit would
    violate the Act,
    the Board
    finds that it is unnecessary to further consider petitioner’s constitutional
    objections to Section
    22.14 ofthe Act.
    Further, even if the Board found
    in favor of the petitioner on these
    arguments, without a legislative change
    in the Act,
    issuance of the permit would still result in
    a violation of the Act.
    The Board grants the respondent’s motion for summary judgment.
    The Board affirms
    the Agency’s denial of the permit.
    This docket
    is hereby closed.
    IT
    IS SO ORDERED.
    Board Member J.
    Theodore Meyer dissented.
    Section 41
    of the Environmental Protection Act,
    (415 ILCS
    5/41
    (1994)),
    provides for
    appeal of final orders of the Board within 35
    days of the date of service of this order.
    The
    Rules of the Supreme Court ofIllinois establish filing requirements.
    (See
    also 35
    Ill. Adm.
    Code 101.246,
    Motion for Reconsideration.)

    4
    I, Dorothy M.
    Gunn,
    Clerk oft
    Illinois Po lution Control Board,
    hereby certify that
    the above order
    was adopted on the
    ~
    day of~~’-~
    ,
    1996,
    by a vote of
    A
    Dorothy M.,9~nn,Clerk
    Illinois PolJj4ion Control Board

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