RECE~VED
CLERK’S OFFICE
AUG
092004
STATE OF ILLIMOIS
Pollution
Control Board
NOTICE
DorothyM. Gunn, Clerk
Carol Sudman, Hearing Officer
Illinois Pollution Control Board
illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
1021 North Grand Avenue, East
100 West Randolph
Street
P.O. Box 19274
Suite 11-500
Springfield, IL
62794-9274
Chicago, IL 60601
Dean E. Sweet, Assistant State’s Attorney
Madison County Administration Building
-
157 North Main Street
Suite 402
Edwardsville, IL 62025-1964
PLEASE TAKE
NOTICE
that
I have
today filed
with
the
office of the
Clerk
of the
Pollution
Control
Board
a
RESPONSE
TO
PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
AND
REPLY TO PETITIONER’S RESPONSE, copies of which are herewith served upon you.
Respectfully submitted,
ILLiNOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Assistant Counsel
Special Assistant Attorney General
Division ofLegal Counsel
1021 North Grand Avenue, East
P.O. Box 19276
Springfield, Illinois 62794-9276
217/782-5544
217/782-9143 (TDD)
Dated: August 6, 2004
BEFORE THE
POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
CASSEN
AND
SONS,
INC.,
)
Petitioner,
)
V.
ILLINOIS
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
PCB No.
01-102
(UST Fund)
BEFORE THE POLLUTION
CONTROL BOARD
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
CASSENS AND SONS, INC.,
)
Petitioner,
)
v.
)
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
)
PROTECTION AGENCY,
)
Respondent.
)
RESPONSE
TO PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND
REPLY TO PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO
RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
NOW COMES
the Respondent,
the Illinois
Environmental Protection
Agency (“Illinois
EPA”), by one
of its
attorneys, John J. Kim,
Assistant
Counsel
and
Special
Assistant Attorney
General,
and,
pursuant
to
35
Ill.
Adm.
Code
101.500,
101.504
and
101.516,
and
the
Hearing
Officer’s
order
dated
July
16,
2004,
hereby responds
to
the
motion
for
summary judgment
(“Motion”) filedby the Petitioner, Cassens and Sons, Inc. (“Cassens”) and replies to the response to
the
Illinois
EPA’s
motion
for
summary judgment.
Because
of the
duplicative
nature
of the
Petitioner’s
Motion
and
the
Petitioner’s response
to
the
Illinois
EPA’s
motion
for summary
judgment, only this onepleading need be filed.
In support of said response arid reply, the Illinois
EPA states as follows:
I.
The Petitioner Misstates The Facts And
Makes Erroneous
Conclusions
In its
Motion,
the Petitioner makes several
factual misstatements
and
draws erroneous
conclusions from those misstatements.
The Petitioner first focuseson the two formsincluded
within
the Administrative Record’
in support ofits arguments.
The !etitioner claims neither a document
signed by the Office ofthe State Fire Marshal (“OSFM”) inspector at the time ofthe tank removal
nor the accompanying permit
for removal
of the
tanks
indicates there
has been
any
release
of
REC~JV~D
CLERK’S OFFICE
AUG
092004
STATE OF ILLNOIS
Pollution Control Board
PCB No.
01-102
(UST Fund Appeal)
1
petroleum or othermaterials.
Petitioner’s Motion, p. 2; AR, pp.
8, 9.
However, the permit for removal was issued before the removal ofthe tanks was conducted,
therefore it would be impossible for that document to make reference to any leak discovered at the
time ofremoval.
AR, p.
9.
Looking to the document signed by the OSFM inspector, it indeed does
not
indicate
any
notation
by
the
inspector
that
a
release
had
occurred.
That
omission
notwithstanding, there is
no
relevance attached to
that fact since the issue here does not turn on
whether the OSFM inspectorproperly detected a release at the time ofthe tanks’ removal.
Rather,
the
issue
turns
on
whether certain
activities
conducted
by
the
Petitioner pre-dated
the date of
notification to the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (“IEMA”) ofa possible release.
The
Petitioner
acknowledges that
the activities
in
question pre-dated
the
notification.
Petitioner’s
Motion,
p.
2.
Thus,
the
costs
associated
with
those
activities
are
clearly
ineligible
for
reimbursement.
Further, the Petitioner somehow claims that the actions ofthe Petitioner at the time ofthe
removal ofthetanks in questionput the Illinois EPA on actual and substantive knowledge that there
was a possibility 6f a release
from
those
tanks.
Petitioner’s
Motion,
p.
2.
That
is
a statement
stretches the facts at best.
The Illinois
EPA did
apparently receive a copy ofthe removal report
signed by the OSFM inspector.
To conclude, however, that
receipt of such a document puts the
Illinois EPAon notice that there was a possibility ofa release is both irrelevantanthnconsequential.
There was no actual or substantive notice on the part ofthe Illinois EPA that a release had occurred
as evidenced by a report ofa release provided to IEMA.
The Illinois
EPA and IEMA are separate
state agencies,
and
even if there was actual notice of a release (which in this case there was not)
provided to the Illinois EPA, such actual notice would still not constitute notice to the proper state
I
References to the Administrative Record will henceforth be done as~
“AR,
p.
2
agency (JEMA) as clearly required by the Act.
The
issue
here does not
turn
on whether the
Illinois
EPA had
reason to
believe that
the
Petitioner’s tanks, or any underground storage tanks in the State, carry with them a possibility ofa
release.
The issue here is whetherthe steps taken by the Petitioner, and not assumptions it seeks to
impute upon the Illinois EPA, were such that
costs associated with
the steps are not eligible for
reimbursement.
Whether ornot the Illinois EPA had reason to think that the Petitioner’s tanks may
have experienced a release does not change the fact that the Petitioner conducted activities prior to
notifying IEMA ofa release and that the Petitioner now seeks to be reimbursed for ineligible costs
associated with those activities.
For the Petitioner to
state that the Illinois EPA had actual knowledge of a possibility of
release from
tanks,
and that actual knowledge of a possibility
is akin to the Petitioner satisfying
necessary notification
requirements clearly set forth in
the Illinois Environmental Protection Act
(“Act”) and related Board regulations, is an incredulous stretch ofthe facts and law.
ThePetitioner’s
statement that it literally and substantively compliedwith applicable lawsandregulationsis~patently
false.
Petitioner’s Motion, p. 3.
The costs under appeal were indisputably incurred before the date
that the Petitioner notified IEMA ofa release from the tanks.
There is nothing in the facts that can
cause that fact pattern to change or be rendered immaterial.
The Petitioneralso states that it was the fault ofthe State, and not the Petitioner, that created
the situation athand.
The Petitioner argues that the document signed by the OSFM inspectordid not
include any notation ofa release, and therefore the document was erroneous.
Petitioner’s Motion, p.
3.
Thus, the reasoning goes that this inaccurate information from the State was relied upon to the
detriment ofthe Petitioner.
Setting aside that the Petitionerhas not attempted to make any credible
3
argument regarding detrimental reliance, the lack ofsucha notation in the OSFMdocument does not
in any wayalleviate the Petitioner from its responsibilities and obligations set forth in the Act and
Board
regulations.
It
is
the Petitioner’s
obligation to
make a
timely notification
to
IIEMA of a
release, and it is the Petitioner’s restriction that costs associated with activities conducted prior to
such notification to IIEMA are not eligible for reimbursement.
II.
The Financial Impact Of This Situation Does
Not Justify Reversal
ThePetitioner argues that the present situationregardingthe tanksiteand the costs associated
with the remediation are such that an inequity will be created ifthe Illinois EPA’s final decision is
not overturned. Petitioner’s Motion, pp. 3-4.
The Illinois EPAacknowledges that the final decision
under appeal maycreate a hardship to the Madison County TransitMass TransitDistrict (“District”),
and that is certainlyregrettable.
However, in order forthere to be some redressto the District in this
situation, there must be a corresponding legal authority allowing fora change in the final decision.
The Petitioner has identified none,
as none exists.
Indeed, if the Board were to
go beyond their statutory authority and attempt to resolve this
case
on the basis ofargued inequities, it would do more extensive damage to
the application and
utilization ofthe Leaking Underground Storage Tank Program as a whole, since it would resultin a
decision that
is without basis in either fact or law.
That the District
has found itselfin
a difficult
positionnot necessarilyofits own doing may be true, but equally true is that theIllinois EPA’s final
decision comported with the relevant law and properly applied the undisputed facts.
4
III.
Conclusion
Forthe reasons stated herein,the Illinois EPA respectfullyrequests that the Board affirm the
Illinois EPA’s final decision, under appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Responde
Jo
.m
Assistant Counsel
Special Assistant Attorney General
Division ofLegal Counsel
1021
North Grand Avenue, East
P.O.Box
19276
Springfield, Illinois 62794-9276
217/782-5544
217/782-9143 (TDD)
Dated: August 6, 2004
This filing
submitted on recycled
paper.
5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned attorney
at law,
hereby certify that
on
August
6,
2004,
I served true
and
correct
copies
of
a
RESPONSE
TO
PETITIONER’S
MOTION
FOR
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND REPLY TO PETITIONER’S RESPONSE, by placing true and correct copies
thereof in properly sealed and addressed envelopes and by depositing said sealed envelopes in a
U.S. mail drop box located within Springfield, Illinois, with sufficient First Class postage affixed
thereto, upon the following named persons:
Dorothy M.
Gunn,
Clerk
Carol Sudman, Hearing Officer
Illinois Pollution Control Board
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James
R. Thompson Center
1021 North Grand Avenue, East
100 West Randolph Street
P.O.
Box 19274
Suite
11-500
Springfield, IL
62794-9274
Chicago, IL 60601
Dean
E.
Sweet, Assistant State’s Attorney
Madison
County
Administration Building
157 NorthMain Street
Suite 402
Edwardsville, IL 62025-1964
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Res
nd
nt
~1
John
.Kim
Assistant Counsel
Special Assistant Attorney General
Division ofLegal
Counsel
1021
North Grand Avenue, East
P.O. Box 19276
Springfield, Illinois 62794-9276
217/782-5544
217/782-9143
(TDD)