1. NOTICE
      2. RECEIVED
      3. BEFORE THE POLLUTION CONTROL BOARDOF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
      4. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
      5. A. Relevant Facts
      6. C. The Illinois EPA Is Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law
      7. III. CONCLUSION
      8. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)
PCBNo.96-lO
)
(UST Appeal)
)
)
NOTICE
RECEIVED
CLERK’S OF~’~
JUN
202003
STATE OF ILLINOIS
Pollution
Control
Board
DorothyM. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution
Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
100 WestRandolph
Street
Suite 11-500
Chicago, IL 60601
Dolores Ayala
Schuyler, Roche & Zwirner
One Prudential Plaza
Suite 3800
130 East Randolph
Street
Chicago, IL
60601
BradleyP. Halloran, Hearing Officer
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
100 WestRandolph Street
Suite
11-500
Chicago, IL
60601
PLEASE
TAKE
NOTICE
that
I have
today filed
with the
office of the Clerk ofthe
Pollution
Control Board
a MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT,
copies of which
are
herewith served
upon
you.
Respectfully submitted,
ILLINOIS
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
JC’u~L,,.
Assistant Counsel
Special Assistant Attorney General
Division ofLegal Counsel
1021 North Grand Avenue, East
P.O. Box
19276
Springfield, Illinois 62794-9276
217/782-5544
217/782-9143 (TDD)
Dated: June 10, 2003
BEFORE THE POLLUTION
CONTROL BOARD
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
VOGUE TYRE & RUBBER COMPANY,
)
Petitioner,
)
V.
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.

BEFORE THE POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
RECEIVED
CLERK’S
~
VOGUE TYRE & RUBBER COMPANY, an)
Illinois corporation,
)
JUN
202003
Petitioner,
)
V
)
PCB No
96-10
STATE OF ILLINOIS
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
)
(UST Appeal)
Pollution
Control
Boarr~
PROTECTION AGENCY,
)
Respondent.
)
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
NOW
COMES
the
Respondent,
the
Illinois
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(“Illinois
EPA”),
by
one
of its
attorneys,
John J. Kim,
Assistant
Counsel
and
Special
Assistant
Attorney
General, and,
pursuant
to
35
Iii.
Adm.
Code
101.500,
101.508
and
101.516,
hereby respectfully
moves
the
Illinois
Pollution
Control
Board
(“Board”)
to
enter summary judgment in favor of the Illinois
EPA and against the Petitioner,
Vogue
Tyre and Rubber
Company (“Vogue Tyre”), in that there exist herein no
genuine issues
of material fact, and that the Illinois
EPA is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law with
respect to the
following grounds.
In
support of said motion,
the Illinois
EPA
states
as
follows:
I.
STANDARD
FOR
ISSUANCE AND REVIEW
A
motion
for
summary
judgment
should
be
granted
where
the
pleadings,
depositions,
admissions
on
file,
and
affidavits
disclose
no
genuine
issue
as
to
any
material
fact and the moving party
is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
Dowd &
Dowd,
Ltd.
v.
Gleason,
181
Ill.2d
460,
483,
693
N.E.2d
358,
370
(1998);
Ozinga
Transportation
Services
v.
Illinois
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
PCB
00-188
(December 20,
2001), p.
2.
1

The Board’s
authority to
review a
determination by the
Illinois
EPA that plans
submitted to
it are not subject to regulation pursuant to the Leaking Underground Storage
Tank (“LUST”) Program arises from
Section
57.7(c)(4)(D)
of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act (“Act”) (415
ILCS
5/57.7(c)(4)(D)).
Section
57.7(c)(4)(D)
provides that
such an
action
is
subject
to
appeal
to
the Board
in
accordance with
the procedures
of
Section 40 of the Act (415 ILCS
5/40).
II.
THE ILLINOIS EPA IS ENTITLED TO
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BASED ON THE FACTS
AND
LAW
A.
Relevant Facts
Vogue Tyre owned a facility at 4801
GolfRoad in Skokie,
Cook
County,
Illinois
until
July
7,
1995.
Vogue
Tyre kept
two
10,000-gallon
gasoline underground
storage
tanks (“USTs”) on this facility~The Office ofthe State Fire Marshal assignednumber 2-
021982
to the facility.
These USTs were
removed in
1986.
Vogue Tyre’s
Petition for
Review ofJEPAFinal Decision,
pp.
1-4.
On December 7,
1994,
Vogue Tyre reported releases of gasoline from the
10,000
gallon USTs to
the Illinois
Emergency Management Agency (“IEMA”).
IEMA assigned
the
releases
Incident
Number
94-2751.
Vogue
Tyre
began corrective
action
and,
in
December
1994, submitted to the OSFM an Eligibility and Deductibility Application.
On
February
1,
1995,
the
OSFM
declared
that
since
the
two
10,000
gallon
USTs
were
removed prior to September 24,
1987, they were ineligible for reimbursement pursuant to
415
ILCS
5/57.9
and 430
ILCS
15/4.
Vogue Tyre appealed the OSFM’s decision to the
Board on March 6,
1995.
On December
5,
2002, the Board found in favor of the OSFM.
On February 26, 2003, Vogue Tyre appealed that decision to the Illinois
Appellate Court
2

for the First District (Vogue Tyre & Rubber Company v. Office ofthe State Fire Marshal,
Appellate Court No. 03-0521).
That case is still pending.
Vogue Tyre’s Petition, pp. 2-4.
Vogue Tyre also submitted numerous reports to the Leaking Underground Storage
Tank section ofthe Illinois EPA for review.
The Illinois EPA received Vogue Tyre’s 20-
Day
Report,
45-Day
Report,
Site
Classification
Completion
Report,
and
Corrective
Action Plan
on
April
3,
1995,
Vogue Tyre’s
Corrective Action Completion
Report
on
May 2,
1995,
and
Vogue Tyre’s
Site Classification Work
Plan and Budget
on
May
19,
1995.
Vogue Tyre’s Petition, p. 3.
On June
15,
1995, the Illinois
EPA issued
a letter denying Vogue Tyre’s reports,
stating
that
because the
tanks
at
issue
were
removed in the
mid-i 980s, they
were
not
subject to regulation
and remediation by the Illinois EPA.
The Illinois EPA declared this
decision final, and Vogue Tyre has appealed to the’Board.
Vogue Tyre’s Petition,
p. 3.
B.
No Genuine Issues
Of Material Fact
Exist
The
reports
denied
by
the
Illinois
EPA were
related
to
the
two
10,000
gallon
USTs
assigned Incident No. 94-2751.
This is the only incident number, and therefore the
only
tanks,
the
Illinois
EPA
addresses
in
its
denial
letter.
Consequently,
no
issue
of
material
fact exists
regarding
which
tanks
are
the
subject of this
case.
Furthermore,
neither party contests
that
these two
tanks
were
removed in
1986,
the
sole
fact
upon
which the Illinois
EPA based
its
denial of Vogue Tyre’s
reports.
No genuine issues of
material fact thus exist.
3

C.
The Illinois EPA Is
Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law
There are several bases the Board could and should rely on in recognizing that the
Illinois
EPA’s
decision
to
deny
the
reports
in
question
was
appropriate
given
the
circumstances and underlying law.
1.
The Illinois EPA’s
denial of Vogue Tyre’s reports should
be
upheld because
the tanks
at issue
were removed prior to
the date the LUST
program became
effective
The
Illinois
EPA
lacks
regulatory
authority
over
Vogue
Tyre’s
10,000-gallon
tanks because the tanks
were removed prior to the effective date of the LUST program.
When a statute involves “prior activity or a certain course ofconduct.
.
.
the applicable law
is
the statute
in place
at the time of tank removal.”
Chuck
and
Dan’s Auto
Service v.
Illinois
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
PCB
92-203
(August
26,
1993).
The
only
relevant law
is
the one
in place
at the time
the conduct actually occurred, regardless of
whether
or
not the
course
of conduct
was
discovered or reported
after the
statute
or
amendment became effective.
Id.
In
Chuck
and
Dan’s,
the
Illinois
EPA
denied
the
Petitioner’s
reimbursement
application for certain costs associated
with tank removal.
Chuck and Dan’s at 2.
The
basis ofthis denial
was that the tanks were not removed in response to a release,
as was
requiredthrough the adoption ofP.A. 87-323, an amendment to Section 22.i8(e)(i)(C) of
the LUST program.
~
at 7.
On appeal to
the
Board by Petitioner, the
Illinois
EPA’s
denial was overturned.
Id.
The Board
stated that
since the amendment did not become
effective until September 6,
1991, and Petitioner’s tanks were removed on May
14,
1990,
the amendment did not
apply to or govern reimbursement for the previous tank removal;
the applicable
law was instead the
one
in place in
1990.
Id.
Also,
since Petitioner was
4

seeking reimbursement for a prior course of conduct, the Board deemed it irrelevant that
Petitioner submitted
the reimbursement
application
to
the Illinois
EPA on
February
4,
1994,
after the
amendment became
effective;
this
amendment
was
still
inapplicable to
Petitioner’s activity. j~
This
same concept
applies to
the
Illinois
EPA’s
denial of Vogue Tyre’s
reports.
Here,
Vogue
Tyre
removed
the
10,000-gallon tanks
in
1986.
Following
the
Board’s
decision in
Chuck
and Dan’s, the
law
governing this removal
is
the
statute that
was in
place
at the time of removal
in that
same year.
The earliest version of Illinois’s LUST
program, though, did not become
effective until
approximately three years
later, on July
28,
1989 through
the adoption of P.A.
86-125
§
1.
As
a result, the LUST
law did not
apply at the time
of removal
and
accordingly did
not
apply at the time
of the
Illinois
EPA’s
decision to reject Vogue Tyre’s reports.
Also similar
to
Chuck
and
Dan’s,
it
is
irrelevant that
Vogue Tyre
reported the
release to
the Illinois EPA in
1994, after the LUST program became effective, for Vogue
Tyre’s reports were in regard to a prior course of conduct, i.e. tank removal and releases
that
occurred before July
28,
1989.
The LUST program therefore
cannot be
applied
to
Vogue
Tyre’s tank
removal,
meaning
the
Illinois
EPA has
no
regulatory
authority
to
require remediation ofreleases from such tanks or review related reports.
Lacking such
authority, the Illinois EPA’s denial ofVogue Tyre’s reports was valid.
2.
The Illinois EPA’s
denial of Vogue Tyre’s reports
should
be upheld because
tanks removed prior to the effective date of the LUST program should not be
subject to its regulations as a matter ofpublic policy
The
LUST
program
should
not
be
applied
to
the
tanks
removed in
1986
as
a
matter
of public
policy.
The
tanks
were
not
subject
to
regulation
under
the
LUST
5

I
program when they leaked or when they were
removed.
They should not
be
subject to
regulation
now.
In
other words, if Vogue Tyre
had
discovered the releases when they
occurred, or even
up
to
three years after they occurred,
the LUST
program would
not
have applied.
It should not
apply now simply because Vogue Tyre happened to find the
releases after the LUST program took effect.
Public policy thus favors the Illinois EPA’s
denial of Vogue Tyre’s reports.
Further,
to
allow
for
the
submission
of
these
reports
by
Vogue
Tyre
would
effectively reward them
for belated conduct and activity
in that they would potentially be
able
to
seek
reimbursement from
the
Underground
Storage
Tank Fund.’
To
allow
an
owner or operator that would not have qualified for eligibility under the LUST program
due
to
removal
of tanks
prior
to
the
effective
date
of
the
LUST
program
itself
to
nonetheless “backdoor”
themselves
into eligibility by reporting a suspected release after
the
effective
date of the program
simply
allows
the
owner
or operator a
benefit
(i.e.,
reimbursement
of costs)
to
which
they
were
never
entitled.
The
Illinois
EPA
has
recognized that
its
authority has
limitations
that
must
be
respected,
and
similarly the
Board
should make clear
to
the Petitioner that an owner or operator of an UST also
has
certain limitations that cannot be circumvented.
3.
The
Illinois
EPA’s
denial
of Vogue
lyre’s
reports
should
be
upheld
since
applying the LUST program would
constitute retroactive statutory application
The
Illinois
EPA
cannot
regulate
Vogue
Tyre’s
10,000-gallon
tanks
because
doing
so
would
constitute
retroactive
statutory
application.
Unless
the
legislature
As
noted earlier,
the
Board’s decision to uphold OSFM’s determination that
the
two
10,000
gallon tanks
were ineligible for reimbursement is currently under review by the Appellate Court.
If the Appellate Court
affirms
the
Board’s decision, and if the Board in this
case reverses the
Illinois
EPA and determines that the
reports
should have
been
accepted and.that
the
Illinois
EPA does have authority over the releases,
then
Vogue Tyre would be obligated
to perform remediation without the possthiity:of=reinthursement.
6

indicates what the temporal reach of a statute should be, it is up to the court to determine
whether application of the statute
would have a “retroactive impact, i.e., whether it would
impair
rights
a
party
possessed
when
he
acted,
increase
a
party’s
liability
for
past
conduct,
or
impose
new
duties
with
respect
to
transactions
already
completed.”
Commonwealth Edison Co.
v. Will
County Collector,
196
Ill.2d 27, 38,
749 N.E.2d 964,
971
(2001).
The mere
fact that
a
statute
is
applied
to
conduct predating
the statute’s
enactment does not necessarily mean it has retroactive impact.
Id.
at 39,
971.
“Rather,
the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences
to
events
completed before
its enactment.”
j4.~
at 39, 972.
Ifthe court finds there would
in fact be
retroactive impact, the presumption
is that the legislature did not intend the statute to be
applied retroactively.
~
at 38, 971.
Here,
application of the
LUST
law
to
Vogue Tyre’s
tank
removal
would
have
retroactive
impact.
Ifthe LUST
program were
applied, it would increase
Vogue Tyre’s
liability
for past
conduct,
for
Vogue lyre
would
be
required
to
comply
with
LUST
standards
regarding
cleanup of the previously
removed tanks
and
would
be
subject to
penalty for failure
to do
so.
Applying LUST requirements would also
impose new duties
on
Vogue lyre with
respect to transactions
already completed.
The
10,000-gallon tanks
were removed before the LUST program went into effect.
The releases occurred prior to
the LUST
program as well,
for they had
to
have happened prior to
tank removal.
The
tank removallrelease “transaction” had therefore been completed.
Yet, as just mentioned,
Vogue lyre
would
now acquire
new duties, namely
the
duty to
remedy releases
from
those
tanks
in
compliance
with
LUST
standards.
Finally,
the LUST
program
attaches
new legal consequences
to
events completed before
its
enactment.
As just outlined, the
7

events
at issue in
the case (removal
and release)
had
already been completed when the
LUST
program
became
effective.
The
LUST
program
would
attach
new
legal
consequences to
these
events
in
that
Vogue lyre
would
now be
potentially
subject to
enforcement action if it
failed
to
comply
with
all
LUST
program
provisions
regarding
release remediation.
Application
of the
LUST
program
to
Vogue
lyre’s
two
10,000-gallon
tanks
would
therefore
have
a
retroactive
impact.
As
a
result, the
Board must
presume
the
General Assembly
did
not
intend
the
LUST
law
to
be
applied
retroactively.
Vogue
lyre’s
10,000-gallon
tanks
are
thereby
not
subject
to
regulation
under
the
LUST
program, and the Illinois EPA’s
denial ofreports relatedto these tanks was
legitimate.
III.
CONCLUSION
Vogue lyre’s
reports
are not
subject to
review by
the
Illinois
EPA
under
the
LUST program.
The removal of Vogue lyre’s
10,000-gallon tanks is
subject to the
law
existing at the time the tanks were removed in
1986.
The LUST program did not exist in
1986,
but rather
became
effective
three
years
afterwards.
Cànsequently,
the
1 0,OCO-
gallon tanks,
as well as any
substances
released from
such tanks,
are not
subject to the
LUST program or to
Illinois EPA regulation in pursuance of the LUST program.
Along
with the
legal
guideline set
forth by the Board in Chuck and Dan’s, public policy
favors
such a
conclusion as
well.
Furthermore,
application of the
LUST
law
would
have
a
retroactive impact and would therefore constitute unenforceable retroactive application of
the statute.
The LUST
program, then, cannot be
applied
to the tanks
at issue,
meaning
the Illinois
EPA’s denial of Vogue lyre’s reports was appropriate.
8

For the reasons stated herein, the Illinois EPA respectfully requests that the Board
affirm the Illinois EPA’s decision to deny Vogue Tyre’s reports.
Respectfully submitted,
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Assistant
Counsel
Special Assistant
Attorney
General
Dana Vetterhoffer
Legal Intern
Division ofLegal Counsel
1021
North Grand Avenue, East
P.O. Box 19276
Springfield, Illinois
62794-9276
217/782-5544
217/782-9143 (TDD)
Dated: June 10, 2003
This filing submitted on recycled paper.
9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned attorney at
law, hereby certify that on
June
10, 2003, I served true and
correct copies ofa MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by placing true and correct copies
thereof in properly sealed and addressed envelopes and by depositing
said sealed envelopes in a
U.S. mail
drop box located within Springfield,
Illinois, with sufficient
First Class postage affixed
thereto, upon the following named persons:
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Bradley P. Halloran, Hearing Officer
Illinois Pollution Control Board
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph Street
100 West Randolph Street
Suite 11-500
Suite 11-500
Chicago, IL
60601
Chicago, IL
60601
Dolores Ayala
Schuyler, Roche & Zwirner
One Prudential Plaza
Suite 3800
130 East Randolph Street
Chicago, IL
60601
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent
John.~Kim
i:
Assistant Counsel
Special Assistant Attorney General
Division ofLegal
Counsel
1021 North Grand Avenue, East
P.O. Box 19276
Springfield, Illinois 62794-9276
217/782-5544
217/782-9143 (TDD)

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