RECEIVED
CLERK’S OFFICE
MAY
18
2004
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Pollution Control
Board
STATE OF
ILLINOIS
Lisa Madigan
ATTORNEY GENERAL
February 17, 2004
The Honorable Dorothy Gunn
Illinois Pollution Control
Board
James
R.
Thompson Center, Ste.
11-500
100 West Randolph
Chicago,
Illinois
60601
Re:
People v. Emmett Utilities and Russell D.
Thorell
PCB
No. 04-81
Dear Clerk Gunn:
Enclosed for filing please find
the original
and
ten
copies of a NOTICE
OF FILING
and
COMPLAINANT’S
RESPONSE
TO
MOTION
TO
DISMISS
BY
RESPONDENT
RUSSELL
D.
THORELL
in
regard
to
the
above-captioned
matter.
Please file
the
originals
and
return
file-
stamped copies of the documents to our office in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope.
Thank
you for your cooperation and
consideration.
Very truly yours,
Thomas
Davis,
Chief
Environmental Bureau
500 South
Second Street
Springfield,
Illinois 62706
(217) 782-9031
TD/pp
Enclosures
500
South
Second
Street, Springfield,
Illinois
62706
•
(217)
782-1090
•
TTY:
(217) 785-2771
•
Fax: (217)
782-7046
100
\Vest
Randolph
Street, Chicago,
Illinois
60601
•
(312)
814—3000
•
‘l’TY: (312)
814—3374
•
Fax:
(312) 814-3806
1001
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RECE
WED
CLERK’S OFFICE
BEFORE
THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION
CONTROL
BOARD
MAY
182004
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
)
STATE OF ILLINOIS
ILLINOIS,
)
Pollution Control Board
Complainant,
vs.
)
PCB
NO.
04-81
)
(Enforcement)
EMMETT
UTILITIES,
INC., an Illinois
)
corporation,
and
RUSSELL D.
)
THORELL, individually
and as
president
of EMMETT UTILITIES,
INC.,
)
Respondent.
NOTICE
OF
FILING
To:
Mr.
John
Meyers
Rabin, Myers & Hanken,
P.C.
1300 South
Eighth Street
Springfield,
IL 62703
PLEASE TAKE
NOTICE
that on
this date
I
mailed for filing with the Clerk of the Pollution
Control
Board of the State of Illinois, COMPLAINANT’S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS
BY
RESPONDENT
RUSSELL
D.
THORELL
,
a
copy
of which is attached
hereto
and
herewith
served upon you.
Respectfully submitted,
PEOPLE OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS
LISA MADIGAN,
Attorney General
of the
State
of Illinois
MATTHEW
J.
DUNN, Chief
Environmental Enforcement/Asbestos
Litigation
Division
BY:_____________________
THOMAS
DAVIS,
Chief
Assistant Attorney General
Environmental Bureau
500
South
Second Street
Springfield,
Illinois 62706
217/782-9031
Dated:
May
14, 2004
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I
hereby certify that
I
did on
May
14,
2004,
send by
First Class
Mail, with
postage thereon
fully
prepaid,
by depositing
in a
United States
Post Office
Box a true and correct copy of the
following instruments
entitled
NOTICE OF
FILING and COMPLAINANT’S RESPONSE TO
IMOTION TO DISMISS
BY
RESPONDENT RUSSELL D.
THORELL
To:
Mr.
John Meyers
Rabin,
Myers
& Hanken,
P.C.
1300 South
Eighth Street
Springfield,
IL 62703
and
the original and ten copies by First Class
Mail with postage thereon fully prepaid of the
same foregoing
instrument(s):
To:
Dorothy Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control
Board
James
R. Thompson Center
Suite
11-500
100
West
Randolph
Chicago,
Illinois 60601
A copy was also sent to:
Carol Sudman
Hearing Officer
Illinois Pollution
Control Board
1021
N.
Grand Avenue East
Springfield,
IL 62794
Thomas Davis,
Chief
Assistant Attorney General
This filing is submitted on recycled
paper.
ERi
S OFFICE
MAY
1820
BEFORE
THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION
CONTROL BOARD
STATE OF ILL(NOI~
PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF ILLINOIS,
)
POIIUtIOfl Control Board
Complainant,
-
)
v.
)
PCB
NO.
04-81
)
(Enforcement)
EMMETT UTILITIES,
INC.,
)
an Illinois
corporation,
and
)
RUSSELL 0.
THORELL,
individually
and
)
as president
of EMMETT UTILITIES,
INC.
)
Respondents.
COMPLAINANT’S RESPONSE
TO
MOTION
TO
DISMISS
BY
RESPONDENT
RUSSELL D.
THORELL
Complainant,
PEOPLE OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS,
by LISA MADIGAN,
Attorney
General of the State of Illinois,
hereby respectfully responds
to the
Motion to
Dismiss filed by
Respondent Russell D.
Thorell,
and states
as follows:
The Board’s Order dated
May
6,
2004, which Complainant received on
May
13,
2004,
allows the Complainant
leave to respond to Thorell’s Motion
to
Dismiss.
This motion
raises,
in
a cursory fashion,
two legal grounds for dismissal.
First,
Respondent contends that “Illinois
does not recognize
a ‘responsible
corporate officer’ doctrine.”
Secondly,
Respondent, while not
even
mentioning estoppel, cites
a Circuit Court ruling which rejected the People’s
attempt to
pierce the corporate veil
of Emmett Utilities,
Inc., and
thereby impose personal
liability upon
Thorell.
Respondent also
suggests that the Complaint
lacks specificity.
When
ruling on
a motion
to dismiss,
the
Board
takes
all well-pleaded
facts as true
and
draws
all inferences
from them in
favor of the non-movant;
dismissal
is proper only if
it
is clear
that no set of facts could
be
proven that would
entitle
complainant to
relief.
See,
e.g.,
People
v.
Peabody
Coal Co.,
PCB 99-134, slip opinion at
1-2 (June 20, 2002).
1
The legal
precedent for personal liability is provided by
People
v.
C.J.R.
Processing,
Inc.,
269
Ill.
App.3d
1013,
647 N.E.2d
1035,
207
III.
Dec.
542 (3rd
Dist.1995), which
held that
“corporate officers may be
held
liable for violations of the Illinois
Environmental Protection
Act
when their active
participation or personal involvement is shown.”
Personal
involvement and
active participation on the part of Thorell
in the acts
and omissions resulting in the violations are
alleged on the basis
of
People
v.
C.J.R.
Processing,
which found that the definition of “person”
in the Environmental Protection Act did
not exclude corporate officers.1
In
general, a corporate officer or employee
is not individually liable for the corporation’s
actions.
The applicable law is clear,
however, that an individual
acting
in a corporate capacity
may be
individually liable either as
a responsible
corporate officer,
as a direct participant under
general
legal
principles,
or under specific statutes or provisions. These doctrines
can
apply to
both
criminal
and
civil liability,
though their application
in either
context varies with the
circumstances.
Over the past sixty years, the law has
developed these
bases of individual
responsibility to
heighten
attention
to
regulatory compliance and
also to prevent operators from
placing
upon the public the cost of their irresponsible operations.
The responsible corporate officer doctrine derives from a
1943 case
in which the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the federal Food,
Drug,
and
Cosmetic Act to
impose criminal
liability on any person within a corporation
“responsible” for introducing an adulterated
or
misbranded
drug
into interstate commerce.
United States
v.
Dotterweich,
320 U.S.
277, 64
S.Ct.
134,
88
L.Ed. 48
(1943).
“An
offense
is committed.
.
.
by all who do have
such a
responsible share
in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws.
.
.
.“
Id.
at
284,
64
S.Ct.
134. The Court reasoned,
“The
only way in
which a corporation
can
act is
1
“Person’ is any individual,
partnership, co-partnership,
firm, company,
limited liability company,
corporation, association, joint stock company, trust, estate,
political subdivision, state agency, or any other
legal entity, or their legal
representative, agent or assigns.”
415
ILCS 5/3.315.
2
through the individuals who act on its behalf.”
Id.
at 281,
64
S.Ct.
134.
This liability was justified
on the
basis
that the Food,
Drug, and
Cosmetic Act “touches
phases of the
lives
and health of
people which,
in the circumstances of modern industrialism,
are largely beyond self-protection.”
Id.
at 280,
64 S.Ct.
134.
In
United States v.
Park,
421
U.S. 658,
673-74, 95
S.Ct.
1903, 44 L.Ed.2d 489
(1975),
the Supreme Court, drawing
on
Dotterweich,
concluded that there
is a
prima facie
violation of
the Food,
Drug, and
Cosmetic Act by a responsible corporate officer when “the defendant had,
by reason of his
position
in the corporation,
responsibility and
authority either to
prevent in the
first instance, or promptly
to
correct,
the violation
complained of,
and
that he failed
to do
so.”
The responsible
corporate officer doctrine
has
been applied
to public welfare offenses
whenever “a statute
is intended
to
improve the common
good and
the legislature eliminates the
normal requirement for culpable intent, resulting
in strict liability for all those who
have a
responsible share
in the offense.”
Matter of Dougherty,
482 N.W.2d 485,
489 (Minn.Ct.App.1992).
Although
it originated
as a criminal law doctrine,
the responsible corporate officer
doctrine
has
been applied
to civil liability under a number of federal statutes.
See,
e.g.,
United
States
v.
Northeastern Pharm.
&
Chem.
Co.,
810
F.2d
726,
743-44 (8th Cir.1986)
(addressing
personal liability under CERCLA);
United States
v.
Hodges X-Ray, Inc.,
759
F.2d
557,
560-61
(6th
Cir. 1985) (assessing a violation of the Radiation Control for Health
and
Safety Act
:
“The
fact that a corporate officer could be subjected to
criminal punishment upon
a showing
of a
responsible relationship to the acts
of a corporation
that violate health
and safety statutes
renders civil liability appropriate as well.”);
United States
v.
Conservation
Chem.
Co.,
660
F.Supp.
1236,
1245-46
(N.D.Ind.1987) (president and
principal stockholder of a corporation
operating hazardous waste facility may be personally liable for violation of RCRA).
3
The responsible
corporate officer doctrine is distinct from piercing
the corporate veil,
and
explicitly expands liability beyond veil
piercing.
See
United States
v.
Dottetweich,
320
U.S.
277,
282 (“If the
FDCA
were construed
to
limit liability only to the
corporation,
the
penalties of
the law could
be imposed only in the rare
case where the
corporation
is merely an individual’s
alter ego.”). The same is plainly true of statutory
liabilities.2
A corporate officer is not liable
simply because of his
position within the corporation and
may be
held personally liable
if he
was
actively involved
in the activity that violates the statute.
United States
v.
Conservation
Chem.
Co.,
733
F.Supp.
1215 (N.D.Ind.
1989).
Similarly, several other States have adopted the responsible corporate officer doctrine
as appropriate under legislation addressing
public safety,
in
particular environmental regulatory
laws.
See,
e.g.,
Matter of Dougherty,
482 N.W.2d
at 488-90
(Minnesota’s hazardous waste
laws
are public welfare statutes and subject
to the responsible
corporate officer doctrine);
State
exrel.
Websterv.
Mo. Resource Recovery,
Inc.,
825 S.W.2d 916,
924-26
(Mo.Ct.App.1992)
(applying the
doctrine to
Missouri’s hazardous waste management
law);
State,
Dep’t of Ecology
v. Lundgren,
94 Wash.App. 236,
971
P.2d
948, 951-53
(1999) (sole shareholder of a
corporation that
operated sewage treatment plant is personally liable for violation of
Washington’s Water
Pollution
Control Act);
Commissioner v. RLG,
Inc.,
755 N.E.2d
556
(Sup.Ct. 2001)
(evidence of active
involvement of officer in violations of environmental
laws was
2
Under State law, a corporate officer may also
be liable for tortious conduct.
See,
Mann/on
v.
Stallings
&
Co.,
204
Ill.
App. 3d
179,
191-92,
561
N.E.2d
1134,
1141
(1st Dist.
1990).
Moreover,
individual liability may be imposed where
the conduct
is
unauthorized:
“all persons who assume to
exercise corporate powers without authority to do
so
shall be jointly
and severally liable for all debts and
liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof.”
805
ILCS 5/3.20 (2000).
See, e.g., Estate
of Plepel
v
Industrial Metals,
/nc.,115 lll.App.3d 803,71111.
Dec. 365, 450 N.E.2d 1244
(Pt
Dist.
1983);
Chicago Title
&
Trust Co.
v Brooklyn Bagel Boys,
Inc.,
222
III.App.3d 413,
164
III.
Dec.
930, 584
N.E.2d
142 (Pt
Dist.
1991),
appeal denied
144
III
2d 632;
H
& H Press
v Axe/rod,
265 IlI.App.3d 670,
202
Ill.
Dec. 687, 638
N.E.2d
333 (1st
Dist.
1994).
For
instance,
the court
in
Cardem, Inc.
v. Marketron Int’l,
322
lll.App.3d
131,
25
III. Dec.
376, 749 N.E.2d 477 (2~
Dist. 2001), held that an officer of a corporation that has been
involuntarily dissolved and is later reinstated is not relieved of personal
liability for debts incurred
by the
business during the dissolution.
4
sufficient to impose personal
liability);
and
State v.
Rollfink,
162 Wis.2d
121, 475 N.W.2d
575,
576
(Sup.Ct.1991) (corporate officer may be
held personally liable
for violations
of Wisconsin’s
solid and
hazardous waste laws
if the “officer is responsible for the overall operation
of the
corporation’s facility which violated the law”).
The application of
C.J.R.
Processing
to the facts of the present case could benefit from
a close
review of the Minnesota case,
because the latter takes
a pragmatic approach to
what
the
Illinois case has
termed
“active participation or personal involvement.”
In
Dougherty,
the
court agreed that
the defendant
had
not personally committed
the alleged violations,
but rather
found him personally liable
as
a responsible corporate officer.
Following
United States
v.
Park,
421
U.S. 658,
673-74,. the
Minnesota court formulated
the standard as
follows:
Three essential
elements must be satisfied
before
liability will
be imposed
upon a corporate officer under the responsible corporate officer doctrine:
(1) the
individual
must be in
a position of responsibility which allows the person to
influence
corporate policies or activities;
(2) there
must be a
nexus
between the
individual’s position and the violation
in question such that the individual
could
have
influenced the corporate actions which constituted the violations; and
(3)
the individual’s actions or inactions facilitated the violations.
482
N.W.2d
at 490.~According to the facts alleged in the Complaint,
and for purposes of the
motion
to dismiss taken
as true, Thorell meets each of these criteria.
He
plainly
had
a position
that allowed
him to
influence the utility’s policies and
functions.
Thorell often dealt directly with
regulatory and
enforcement matters with the
Illinois
EPA,
thereby establishing the necessary
nexus between his
position and environmental compliance.
Finally,
his acts
controlling
all
expenditures
by Emmett
Utilities and
his omissions regarding equipment maintenance allowed
the problems
to occur.
The facts of this case
are analogous to
Dougherty,
where that defendant “was
in a
The same standard was adopted
by the Indiana Supreme Court in
Commissioner
v. RLG,
Inc.,
755
N.E. 2d 556 at
561.
5
position of responsibility as
president,” the violations were within his
“sphere of influence,” he
“was the primary contact with
all
regulatory bodies,” and
he “failed
to
prevent the violations
and
take proper corrective action
once the violations
occurred.”
Dougherty,
482 N.W.2d
at 490.
Emmett Utilities
has
no subordinate or intermediate
officer principally responsible for
compliance, and Thorell was directly involved
in all
of the various corporate activities.
Either
may be sufficient,
and
in
concert they demonstrate that Thorell had
both the responsibility and
authority
to
prevent the regulatory violations
in the first instance and to correct the violations
once they were
brought to his attention.
Lastly,
the court in
Dougherty
also
utilized the statutory
definition
of “person” as a legal
premise for liability;
rejecting the argument that neither
“corporate officer” nor “shareholder” was explicitly included,
the court found
the provision to be
“a singularly encompassing definition.”
Dougherty,
482 N.W.2d
at 491.
The recent decisions
in
People
v.
Tang,
Ill.
App. 3d
—‘
281
lll.Dec.
875 (1st Dist.
2004), and
People v.
Ag Pro,
Inc.,
—
III.
App. 3d
—‘
281
III.
Dec.
386
(2nd
Dist.
2004),
are
pertinent because each
cites and discusses
People
v.
C.J.R.
Processing
and the issues
attendant to
the imposition
of individual liability upon a corporate officer.
However, contrary to
Respondent’s
argument that “the First
District Appellate
Court
in
Tang
has
pretty
much
rejected,
or at least severely limited,
the doctrine,” the court did
not criticize the Third District’s
1995 decision
in
C.J.R.
Processing
but rather addressed the pleading
requirements to properly
allege the necessary active participation or personal involvement of a corporate officer.
More
importantly,
in the
Ag Pro
case
(which Respondent totally ignores) the Second District Appellate
Court clearly adopted the
C.J.R.
Processing
rationale
in affirming
the imposition of individual
liability upon
a corporate officer.
The
Ag Pro
court reviewed
the factual
findings of the trial
court in the context of the
C.J.R.
Processing
standard:
“This
‘personal involvement’ or ‘active participation’
does not..
6
mean
that the corporate officer has to
perform the actual
physical act that constitutes a violation
in order to
be
held individually liable.”
281
Ill.
Dec.
at 397-98.
The trial court had found
that the
company’s president “had
control over the pollution or was in control of the area from where the
pollution occurred,
and did not take precautions to prevent the pollution.”
281
III.
Dec.
at
398;
emphasis added.
These are the fundamental grounds as to
any liability for environmental
violations.
See Meadow/ark Farms,
Inc.
v. Pollution
Control Board,
17
III.
App.
3d
851, 308
N.E.2d
829 (5th
Dist.
1974) (ownership of the source
of pollution and the capability of
controlling the pollutional discharge);
Phillips Petroleum Co.
v.
Pollution
Control Board,
72
Ill.
App.
3d
217 (2nd
Dist.
1979);
and
Perkinson
v.
Pollution
Control Board,187
III. App. 3d
689
(3rd
Dist.
1989) (failure to take reasonable precautions
to
prevent such occurrences).
The evidence
as discussed by
the appellate court clearly involved
not just acts
but omissions as
well.
As
stated
by the appellate court, the issue
in
Tang
was one of sufficiency of the
pleadings, which
had been dismissed by the trial court:
In
this case, we are
not asked to
determine whether,
as a general
proposition,
a corporate officer may ever be held
liable for corporate wrongs
under the Environmental
Protection
Act;
both parties
concede that,
under
certain
circumstances,
a corporate officer may be
individually liable.
Instead,
we
must determine whether the pleadings in this case are sufficient
to state a claim
for Tang’s
individual
liability.
Apparently,
only one
Illinois case
has
specifically
addressed the issue of a corporate officer’s
potential individual
liability under the
Act.
The trial
court relied
on this case
in
rendering
its decision,
and
both
parties
claim the case supports
their contentions on
appeal.
Slip
opinion
at
11.
After a summary of the
C.J.R.
Processing
decision,
the First District outlined
some of the principles of corporation
law
in
Illinois
and
reviewed
the out-of-jurisdiction
cases;
“the cases
are
useful to
our analysis
because they are premised on
the same general
principles
of corporation
law.
.
.
.“
Slip opinion at
15.
These cases
“confirm that more than
a corporate
title is required
in
order for an officer to
be held
liable for corporate violations of environmental
7
protection
laws.
There
is,
however,
no precise definition
as to what
must be alleged to state
a.
claim for personal liability.”
Slip opinion
at
18.
In discussing several
of the federal cases that
upheld
individual
liability, the
Tang
court
emphasized that federal actions must only satisfy a notice-pleading
standard while
Illinois
is a
fact-pleading jurisdiction.
The court upheld
the dismissal of the pleadings due to the conclusory
nature
of the allegations.
“These allegations are significantly deficient as compared to the
allegations
in
C.J.R.
and
other cases
finding
individual
liability.”
Slip opinion at
27.
Therefore,
it
is not accurate
to
argue as Thorell does that the
Tang
court rejected
or limited
the responsible
corporate officer doctrine.
Indeed, after a careful reading
of this decision,
it is hardly even
fair
to say that the First
District “distinguished” the
C.J.R.
Processing
decision,
especially in
light of
its
conclusion:
From our analysis of
C.J.R.,
the other cases
cited
by the parties,
and the
Environmental
Protection
Act itself, we
conclude that
in
order
to state
a claim
for personal
liability against a corporate officer under the Act,
a plaintiff must do
more
than
allege corporate wrongdoing.
Similarly, the plaintiff must allege
more
than that the corporate officer held a management
position, had
general
corporate authority,
or served
in a supervisory capacity
in
order to
establish
individual
liability under the Act.
The plaintiff must allege facts establishing that
the corporate officer had
personal involvement or
active
participation in
the acts
resulting in
liability,
not just that he
had personal
involvement
or active
participation
in the management of the corporation.
Slip
opinion at 25-26.
The court essentially adopted
the
C.J.R.
Processing
standard of
“personal involvement or active participation.”
269
III. App. 3d
at
1020 (“We hold
.
.
.
corporate
officers may be
held
liable for violations of the Act when their active
participation or personal
involvement is shown.”).
Complainant has
not merely alleged “corporate wrongdoing,” or that Thorell was
personally involved or actively participated
in
the “management”
of Emmett Utilities,
Inc.,
but
rather that his omissions
and
acts resulted in the violations.
The allegations of fact are well-
8
pleaded and
provide a cause of action
against Thorell for the public
water supply violations.
For instance,
Count
I, paragraph
12, states as follows:
“On August 28, 2003,
the
Illinois
EPA
contacted
RUSSELL THORELL and directed
the Respondents to
replace the well
pump and
to
restore service.
RUSSELL THORELL stated that the Respondents would not replace the well
pump and
restore service
until a pending rate increase might be granted by the
Illinois
Commerce Commission.”
In
addition,
Count
II,
paragraphs
14
and
15,
state as follows:
“By
allowing the well pump
to fail
on August 27, 2003.
.
.
.
and
By subsequently failing or refusing
to
repair or replace the well pump, the Respondents failed
to
provide continuous operation
and
maintenance of public water supply facilities so that the water shall
be assuredly safe in quality
and
adequate
in
quantity for ordinary domestic consumption..
If the State can
prove that Thorell
refused
to
replace or repair the well pump,
then
he
should
be held responsible.
This type of “active” omission
is qualitatively different evidence
than
proof of neglect and
lack of maintenance.
The failure of a 20 year old
piece of critical
equipment is one thing;
the failure of the
sole
corporate officer to
report the water outage and to
arrange for the well
pump to
be replaced is another thing
altogether.
For the purposes of the
motion
to
dismiss, the Board
must accept that such
refusal and failures
indeed
occurred.
As to
the water pollution violations
in the three other counts of the Complaint, the State
alleges that Thorell and the utility “have
allowed discharges
of untreated effluent,
raw sewage,
and overflows from the treatment system and sanitary sewers.”
~J
12,
Counts
III,
IV and V.
Overflows of untreated or raw sewage are expressly prohibited,
of course, but the key point
is
that such
overflows are
preventable.
Thorell failed to
prevent the overflows and thereby
“allowed” such pollutional
discharges.
As a responsible corporate officer,
Thorell controlled
the
source of pollution
“and did not take precautions to prevent the pollution.”
AgPro,
281
III.
Dec.
9
at 398
(emphasis added).
These
are
proper inferences to draw from the well-pleaded factual
allegations.
Lastly, Complainant
has not made any
attempt to pierce the corporate veil as was
unsuccessfully done in the previous
circuit court action.
The case
before the
Board
is premised
upon an
entirely different set of facts.
It
is important to
note that personal
liability is distinct
from the derivative
liability that results
from
piercing corporate veil.
See,
e.g.,
Northeastern
Pharm.
&
Chem.
Co.,
810
F.2d
at
744;
New York v.
Shore Realty Corp.,
759
F.2d
1032,
1052
(2nd
Cir.
1985)
(corporate officer may be
held personally responsible without piercing
the
corporate veil).
WHEREFORE,
Complainant respectfully asks that the
Motion
to
Dismiss be DENIED.
Respectfully submitted,
PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF ILLINOIS,
LISA MADIGAN
Attorney General
State of Illinois
MATTHEW J.
DUNN, Chief
Environmental Enforcement
Division
BY~_______________________
THOMAS
DAVIS,
Chief
Envftonmental Bureau
Assistant Attorney General
500
South Second Street
Springfield,
Illinois 62706
Dated:
May
14,
2004
10
