ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    April 1, 2004
     
    ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL,
    PROTECTION AGENCY
    Complainant,
     
    v.
     
    VINCE HARVEY,
     
    Respondent.
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    AC 03-27
    (IEPA No. 144-03-AC)
    (Administrative Citation)
     
     
    MICHELLE RYAN APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE ILLINOIS ENVIRONMETNAL
    PROTECTION AGENCY; and
     
    VINCE HARVEY APPEARED
    PRO SE.
     
     
    INTERIM OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by J.P. Novak):
     
    The Board today decides whether the presence of materials observed on January 31,
    2003, on property owned by respondent Vince Harvey constituted the open dumping of waste
    resulting in litter and in the deposition of demolition debris in violation of the Environmental
    Protection Act (Act). 415 ICLS 5/1
    et seq.
    (2002). For the reasons provided below, the Board
    finds that the presence of those materials at that site on that date violated Sections 21(p)(1) and
    21(p)(7) of the Act. 415 ILCS 5/21(p)(1) and (p)(7) (2002). The Board assesses Mr. Harvey the
    statutory penalty of $3,000 as well as costs as described below.
     
    In this interim opinion, the Board first describes the administrative citation process and
    the procedural history and background of this case. The Board then sets forth pertinent
    provisions of the Act. Next, the Board analyzes the issues and makes its conclusions of law
    regarding the alleged violations before addressing the question of penalties.
     
    ADMINISTRATIVE CITATION PROCESS
     
    Section 31.1 of the Act authorizes the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
    (Agency) and units of local government to enforce specified provisions of the Act through an
    administrative citation. 415 ILCS 5/31.1 (2002). Part 108 of the Board’s procedural rules
    provides the process of a citation before the Board. 35 Ill. Adm. Code 108
    et seq
    . Unlike other
    environmental enforcement proceedings in which the Act prescribes a maximum penalty,
    see,
    e.g.,
    415 ILCS 5/42(b)(1), the Act sets specific penalties for administrative citations. 415 ILCS
    5/42(4, 4-5) (2002). In cases such as this, the Board has no authority to consider mitigating or
    aggravating factors when determining penalty amounts.
    Id
    .
     
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
     

     
     
    2
     
    On March 26, 2003, the Agency issued to the respondent an administrative citation
    alleging violations of the Act at the respondent’s facility located at 1458 North East Street,
    Kewanee, Henry County, Illinois. The citation specifically alleges that the respondent violated
    Section 21(p)(1) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/21(p)(1) (2002)) by causing or allowing the open
    dumping of waste in a manner resulting in litter. Comp. at 2. The citation further alleges that the
    respondent violated Section 21(p)(7) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/21(p)(7) (2002)) by causing or
    allowing the open dumping of waste in a manner resulting in deposition of general construction
    or demolition debris or clean construction or demolition debris. Comp. at 2.
     
    On May 1, 2003, the respondent filed a request for an extension, which the Board
    construed as a Petition for Review. On May 9, 2003, the respondent filed an amended Petition
    for Review. The Board accepted the amended petition for hearing on May 15, 2003.
     
    On November 12, 2003, Board Hearing Officer Carol Sudman conducted a hearing in
    Kewanee. At hearing, Special Assistant Attorney General Michelle M. Ryan appeared and
    participated on behalf of the complainant; and respondent Vince Harvey appeared and
    participated
    pro se.
    Two witnesses testified during the hearing: Mr. Jeffrey A. Port of the Illinois
    Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) on behalf of the complainant, and Vince Harvey on
    his own behalf. Based upon her legal judgment and experience, Hearing Officer Carol Sudman
    found that both witnesses testified credibly in this matter. On January 7, 2004, the complainant
    filed its post-hearing brief in this proceeding (Comp. Br.). The respondent filed a one-page post-
    hearing brief on January 14, 2004 (Resp. Br).
     
    FACTS
     
    On January 31, 2003, Agency field inspector Jeff Port inspected property located at 1458
    North East Street, Kewanee owned by Vince Harvey. Tr. at 8-9; Exhibit 1. In the course of that
    inspection, Mr. Port observed twelve piles of material, eleven of which had been generated at the
    former Kewanee Steel and Iron site and brought to the Harvey property. Tr. at 12. Those 11
    piles consisted of materials including dirt, branches and roots, gravel, rocks, metal slag, bricks,
    pieces of plastic, and pieces of wood and processed wood. Tr. at 10-11; Exhibit 1. The twelfth
    pile consisted of materials including a cabinet and pieces of wood that remained from a burned
    home on the site and that had been removed from its basement or foundation. Tr. at 11; Exhibit
    1. Mr. Port took a number of photographs of the Harvey site on January 31, 2003, and
    documented its appearance on that date. Exhibit 1.
     
    Mr. Harvey is the owner of the property at issue at 1458 North East Street in Kewanee.
    Tr. at 8. He had brought materials from the former Kewanee Steel and Iron property (Tr. at 12),
    including dirt (Tr. at 9, 17; Exhibit 1, photograph 3), branches and roots (Exhibit 1), rocks
    (Exhibit 1), metal slag (Tr. at 10; Exhibit 1, photograph 3), scrap metal (Exhibit 1, photograph
    1), bricks (Tr. at 9-10; Exhibit 1, photographs 1 and 3), pieces of plastic (Tr. at 10; Exhibit 1,
    photograph 3), and pieces of wood and processed wood (Tr. at 10-11; Exhibit 1, photographs 1,
    5, 8, 11, and 14) to the site on January 31, 2003. Tr. at 9-12, 17-18; Exhibit 1
    STATUTORY BACKGROUND
     
    Section 21(a) of the Act provides that no person shall:

     
     
    3
     
     
    Cause or allow the open dumping of any waste. 415 ILCS 5/21(a) (2002).
     
    Section 21(p) of the Act provides that no person shall, in violation of subsection (a) of
    this Section:
     
    Cause or allow the open dumping of any waste in a manner which results in any
    of the following occurrences at the dump site:
     
    (1) litter
    * * *
    (7) deposition of:
     
    (i) general construction or demolition debris as defined in Section
    3.160(a) of this Act; or
     
    (ii) clean construction or demolition debris as defined in Section
    3.160(b) of this Act. 415 ILCS 5/21(p) (2002).
     
    Section 3.160 of the Act provides that:
     
    (a) “General construction or demolition debris” means non-hazardous,
    uncontaminated materials resulting from the construction, remodeling, repair, and
    demolition of utilities, structures, and roads, limited to the following: bricks,
    concrete, and other masonry materials; soil; rock; wood, including non-hazardous
    painted, treated, and coated wood and wood products; wall coverings; plaster;
    drywall; plumbing fixtures; non-asbestos insulation; roofing shingles and other
    roof coverings; reclaimed asphalt pavement; glass; plastics that are not sealed in a
    manner that conceals waste; electrical wiring and components containing no
    hazardous substances; and piping or metals incidental to any of those materials.
     
    General construction or demolition debris does not include uncontaminated soil
    generated during construction, remodeling, repair, and demolition of utilities,
    structures, and roads provided the uncontaminated soil is not commingled with
    any general construction or demolition debris or other waste. 415 ILCS
    5/3.160(2002).
     
    * * *
     
    Section 3.305 of the Act defines “open dumping” as:
     
    “[T]he consolidation of refuse from one or more sources at a disposal site that
    does not fulfill the requirements of a landfill.” 415 ILCS 5/3.305 (2002).
     
    Section 3.385 of the Act defines “refuse” as “waste.” 415 ILCS 5/3.385 (2002).
     

     
     
    4
     
    Section 3.535 of the Act provides that:
     
    “Waste” means any garbage, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply
    treatment plant, or air pollution control facility or other discarded material,
    including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous material resulting from
    industrial, commercial, mining and agricultural operations, and from community
    activities, but does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or
    solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows, or coal combustion
    by-products as defined in Section 3.135, or industrial discharges which are point
    sources subject to permits under Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution
    Control Act, as now or hereafter amended, or source, special nuclear, or
    by-product materials as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
    (68 Stat. 921) or any solid or dissolved material from any facility subject to the
    Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-87) or the
    rules and regulations thereunder or any law or rule or regulation adopted by the
    State of Illinois pursuant thereto. 415 ILCS 5/3.535 (2002).
     
    Section 31.1(d)(2) of the Act provides that:
     
    “[I]f the Board finds that the person appealing the [administrative] citation has
    shown that the violation resulted from uncontrollable circumstances, the Board
    shall adopt a final order which makes no finding of violation and which imposes
    no penalty.” 415 ILCS 5/31.1(d)(2) (2002).
     
     
    ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
     
     
    Mr. Harvey raises two issues on his own behalf. First, he states that he did not intend to
    violate the Act (Resp. Br.), and that he did not know he was violating the Act (Tr. at 16).
    Second, he states that he has removed materials from the site. (Tr. at 16). Specifically, he states
    that the last of 146.81 tons of material was removed from the site on December 31, 2003. (Resp.
    Br.) Mr. Harvey has not claimed that any violation of the Act resulted from uncontrollable
    circumstances (415 ILCS 5/31.1(d)(2) (2002)). Tr. at 16-18; Resp. Br.
     
    With regard to the first issue, the Board has previously stated that “[a] person can cause
    or allow a violation of the Act without knowledge or intent.” IEPA v. Charles Goodwin, AC 02-
    17, slip op. at 8 (July 11, 2002), citing County of Will v. Utilities Unlimited, Inc., AC 97-41
    (Sept. 18, 1997). In fact, the Board has compared an administrative citation to a traffic ticket.
    See
    Lincoln Chamber of Commerce, AC 89-26, slip op. at 2 (May 25, 1989). The Board finds
    that Mr. Harvey’s intention and knowledge are not elements of the violation. Therefore, the
    Agency does not have the burden of proving either that he knew he violated the Act or that he
    intended to do so.
     
    With regard to the second issue, the Board has held that, “even in the context of a
    contested violation, post-citation activities of the citation recipient are not material” to whether a
    violation has occurred or to the Board’s review of the citation.
    Id
    . Specifically, the Board has

     
     
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    stated that “[t]he Act, by its terms, does not envision a properly issued citation being dismissed
    or mitigated because a person is cooperative or voluntarily cleans-up the site.” IEPA v. Jack
    Wright, AC 89-227, slip op. at 14 (Aug. 30, 1990). “The administrative citation process is
    structured to provide an inherent incentive to people to comply with the Act. It is clear that if the
    recipient of an administrative citation does not correct an on-going violation, the Agency can
    issue subsequent citations to that person.” Lincoln Chamber of Commerce, AC 89-26, slip op. at
    4 (May 25, 1989). It appears that the risk of subsequent citations for on-going violations has in
    this case provided its intended incentive for compliance.
    See id
    . Although Mr. Harvey states
    that he has completed clean-up of his site, (Resp. Br.), “such actions are not a mitigating factor
    under the administrative citation program.” IEPA v. Dennis Grubaugh, AC 92-3, slip op. at 6
    (Oct. 16, 1992). In light of Board precedent and the policies underlying the administrative
    citation process, the Board will not dismiss this citation, and it does not have authority to reduce
    the penalty in this case.
    See
    415 ILCS 5/42(4, 4-5) (2002).
     
    The Act defines “open dumping” as “the consolidation of refuse from one or more
    sources at a disposal site that does not fulfill the requirements of a landfill.” 415 ILCS 5/3.305
    (2002). Because “refuse” means “waste,” 415 ILCS 5/3.385 (2002), and because the Act defines
    “waste” to include “any garbage . . . or other discarded material,” 415 ILCS 5/3.535 (2002), the
    Board finds that Mr. Harvey has caused or allowed the open dumping of waste on January 31,
    2003.
     
    Although the Act does not define the term “litter,”
    see
    415 ILCS 5/3.105-3.555 (2002),
    the Board in other administrative citation cases has looked to the definition provided by the
    Litter Control Act. St. Clair County v. Louis I. Mund, AC 90-64 (Aug. 22, 1991) (slip op. at 7).
    Under the Litter Control Act definition, “litter” means:
     
    [A]ny discarded, used or unconsumed substance or waste. “Litter” may include,
    but is not limited to, any garbage, trash, refuse, debris, rubbish, grass clippings or
    other lawn or garden waste, newspaper, magazines, glass, metal, plastic or paper
    containers or other packaging construction material, abandoned vehicle (as
    defined in the Illinois Vehicle Code), motor vehicle parts, furniture, . . . or
    anything else of an unsightly or unsanitary nature, which has been discarded,
    abandoned or otherwise disposed of improperly. 415 ILCS 105/3 (2002).
     
    Because Mr. Harvey caused or allowed open dumping of waste including dirt, branches and
    roots, gravel, rocks, metal slag, bricks, pieces of plastic, and pieces of wood and processed wood,
    the Board finds that his activities resulted in litter in violation of Section 21(p)(1) of the Act.
    415 ILCS 5/21(p)(1) (2002).
     
    Likewise, because the definition of “general construction or demolition debris”
    specifically includes items such as:
     
    [B]ricks, concrete, and other masonry materials; soil; rock; wood, including
    non-hazardous painted, treated, and coated wood and wood products; wall
    coverings; plaster; drywall; plumbing fixtures; non-asbestos insulation; roofing
    shingles and other roof coverings; reclaimed asphalt pavement; glass; [and]

     
     
    6
     
    plastics that are not sealed in a manner that conceals waste (415 ILCS 5/3.160
    (2002));
     
    the Board also finds that Mr. Harvey has violated Section 21(p)(7) of the Act. 415 ILCS
    5/21(p)(7) (2002).
     
    PENALTY
     
    In an administrative citation proceeding, any person found to have violated subsection (p)
    of Section 21 must pay a penalty of $1,500 for each violation of each provision of the section
    and $3,000 for each violation of each provision that is a second or subsequent offense, plus any
    hearing costs incurred by the Board and the Agency. 415 ILCS 5/42(b)(4-5) (2002). Because
    the Board finds that Mr. Harvey has violated two subsections of Section 21 and that these are
    first offenses, Mr. Harvey is ordered to pay a civil penalty of $3,000, plus costs.
     
    CONCLUSION
     
    After reviewing the record in this case and the relevant portions of the Act, the Board
    finds that Mr. Harvey caused or allowed the open dumping of waste resulting in litter. The Board
    also finds that Mr. Harvey caused or allowed the open dumping of waste resulting in the
    deposition of general construction or demolition debris. The Board further finds that none of the
    issues raised by Mr. Harvey justify dismissing the administrative citation. While the Board in
    rare cases will dismiss an administrative citation without finding uncontrollable circumstances,
    see IEPA v. Jack Wright, AC 89-227 slip. op at 14 (Aug. 30, 1990), the record in this case does
    not lead to that result. Consequently, the Board finds that Mr. Harvey violated Sections 21(p)(1)
    and 21(p)(7) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/21(p)(1) and 21(p)(7) (2002)) and will order him to pay a
    civil penalty of $3,000. As set forth below, the Board directs the Agency and the Clerk to
    document hearing costs, after which the Board will issue a final order.
     
    This interim opinion constitutes the Board’s interim finding of fact and conclusions of
    law.
     
    ORDER
     
    1. The Board finds that Vince Harvey violated Sections 21(p)(1) and 21(p)(7) of the
    Environmental Protection Act. 415 ILCS 5/21(p)(1) and 21(p)(7) (2002).
     
    2. The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency must file a statement of its hearing
    costs within 14 days of the date of this order, on or before April 15, 2004. The
    statement must be supported by affidavit and served on Mr. Harvey. Within the
    same 14 days, the Clerk of the Board must file and serve a statement of the
    Board’s hearing costs supported by affidavit. Respondent may file any objections
    to those statements within 14 days of service, on or about April 29, 2004.
     
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
     

     
     
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    I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, certify that the Board
    adopted the above interim opinion and order on April 1, 2004, by a vote of 4-0.
     
     
      
      
      
      
     
    Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
    Illinois Pollution Control Board

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