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CL~
~E
OF~!r’p
BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
1J~I~
t;
WASTE MANAGEMENT OF ILLINOIS, COUNTY OF
)
STATE OF ~LL1NOi5
KANKAKEE, ILLINOIS and EDWARD D. SMITH.
)
Pollution Control
&QT~
KANKAKEE COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY,
)
And BYRON SANDBERG
)
)
Petitioners
)
v.
)
PCB Nos 04-33, 04-34, 04-35
THE CITY OF KANKAKEE, ILLINOIS. TOWN AND
)
COUNTRY UTILITIES, INC. and KANKAKEE
REGIONAL LANDFILL, L.L.C.
)
LIVINGSTON COUNTY, ILLINOIS
)
Respondents
NOTICE OF FILING
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 9, I caused to be flied, with the Board’s
Clerk’s Office, via fax, with permission, one copy of the attached RESPONSE TO THE
COUNTY’S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY. I also placed, on December 9, 2003, in United States
mail, copies of tile attached RESPONSE to all those on the effective service list, as set forth in
the attached PROOF OF SERViCE. I also placed, in United States overnight mail, on December
9, 2003, an original and nine (9) copies of this document, addressed as follows:
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
100 W.
Randolph, Suite 11-500
Chicago, Illinois 60601-32 iS
Claire A. Manning, Attorney
Printed on Recycled Paper
In
accordance with 35 III.
Adrn.
Code 101.202 and 101.3(~(g)
Dec 09 03 01:43p
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:RE ~
~VED
~‘
L.t~t-
~
BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTiON CONTROL BOAR!)
~
~ 2
S’l~T~OF ILLINOIS
\VASTE MANAGEMENT OF ILLINOIS. COUNTY OF
)
Pollution
Control
Board
IKANKAKEE. ILLINOIS and EDWARD D. SMITH.
)
KANKAKEE COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY,
)
And BYRON SANDBERG
)
)
Petitioners
)
V.
.
)
PCB Nos 04-33. 04-34, 04-35
THE CiTY OF KANKAKEE, ILLiNOIS, TOWN AND
)
COUNTRY UTILiTIES. iNC. and KANKAK.EE
)
REGIONAL LANDFILL, L.L.C,
)
LiVINGSTON COUNTY, ILLINOIS
)
)
Respondents
RESPONSE TO COUNTY’S MOTION TO DISOU~LffY
Now comes CLAIRE A. MA~ING,of counsel to Pos~gate& Denes, P.C., and in
response to the County’s Motion to Disqualify (“Motion”), filed with Board Hearing Officer
Bradley Halloran on December 1, 2003, provides the following.
As a preliminary matter, the County’s Motion is unnecessary, in that it was preceded by a
“Request Concerning Appearance” (“Request”) which I myself filed with the Board on
November 20, 2003, to which the County had already responded. While my Request was not
styled a “motion,” it nonetheless “moved” for a Board determination regarding the applicability
ofBoard procedural Rule 101.112(b) (35 Ill Mm. Code 101.112(b)) to my continued appearance
in this matter as counsel to Town and Country Utilities, Inc. As a question concerning the
application of that procedural rule to my appearance in this matter had been raised, and could
only be resolved through the Board’s own processes, I sought tile Board’s determination on this
matter and, clear from my request, would accept the Board’s interpretation ofthis rule to these
circumstances. Accordingly, there is and was. no need for the County’s Motion to Disqualify.
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Nonetheless, since such motion was filed, I
offer the
following
in
response to the
County’s Motion,
as well as to its
“Response and Objections
to Attorney Manning’s Request
Concerning Appearance” (County’s Response) flIed with the Board on November 25. 2003.
Since the County’s filings are replete with misrepresentations concerning the events that gave
rise to my Request, this Response will also attempt to offer clarification and context to that
Request.
First and foremost, regardless of the attempts of County’s counsel to portray it otherwise,
the Board is well aware that I am not seeking to appear in a proceeding that was pending while I
was at the Board. Recognizing that my participation in most cases that were filed and docketed
during my tenure as Chairman would be “personal and substantial,” I have already determined
that I will not appear in any proceeding that was docketed and pending while was at the Board.
Thus, the Board’s recent decision in
People v. Skokie Vailep Asphalt Co., inc.,
PCB 96-
98 (October 16, 2003), while raised by the county and argued to be dispositive ofthe issue ofmy
participation in this matter, is really not even relevant to the applicability o~’Rule101.112(b) to
tile instant circumstances. In that case the Board disqualified former Board Attorney Assistant
Joel Sterustein, now an Assistant Attorney General, from participating in that proceeding, as a
representative ofthe People, because the case was docketed and pending while Mr. Sternstein
was at the Board. The Board determined that, as an Assistant to a Board member, Mr.
Sterustein’s participation in any pending proceeding would have been “personal and substantial”
and accordingly would require the application of Rule 101.112(b), which requires consent ofall
parties prior to participation:
“No former Board Member or Board employee may represent any other person in any
Board proceeding in which he or she participated. personally and substantially as a Board
Member or Board employee, unless the Board and, as applicable, all parties or
Printed
on
Recycled Paper
In accordance with
35 111. Adni.
Code 101.202 and 101.302(g)
,~
Pa~e2
Dec
09 03
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proponents in the proceeding consent in writing afler disclosure of the participation.” 35
Ill. Adm Code 101.112
By
its
very language this rule only applies to the representation of a party in any
~‘Board
proceeding” in which the tbrmer Member or attorney participated “personally and substantially”
while he or she was at the Board. Yet. the County uses the Board’s deterrninatioii in
Skokie
Valle)’
to call for a Board determination as to whether my participation in the earlier proceeding
wtis
personal and substantial and, if it
was, bootstrap the application ofRule 01.112(b) to the
instant proceeding as well.
However, the Board’s focus on my Request ought not to be whether my participation in a
prior and different proceeding was personal and substantial as the Board interpreted that
phraseology in
Skokie Valley.
Indeed, such argument puts the “qart before the horse” because
Rule 101.112(b) only presumes conflict (and accordingly requires consent olihe parties) in those
proceedings that were pending while I was at the Board. Thus, since the instant PCB 04-33, 04-
34. 04-35 (consolidated) is an entirely different docketed proceeding than PCB
03~-3
1,
03-33
and
03-35 (consolidated), Board Rule 101.112(b) neither requires consent for my appearance in this
proceeding norprohibits that appearance.
The argument urged by the County not only fails to focus on the language of the rule
itself, it urges a reading ofthe rule that expands it well beyond its intended prohibition. A
review ofthe letter from Kankakee County State’s Attorney Ed Smith to me dated October 28,
2003 (see Request, Attachment
C),
makes that expansion clear. It was, indeed, Mr. Smith’s
letter, and his application of
Skokie Valley
to the instant proceeding, that motivated me to file the
Request so that the Board might clearly address the application ofRule 101.112(b) to this
particular proceeding.
Printed on Recycled Paper
In accordance with 35 111. Adxri. Code 10 1.202 and 101.302(g)
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Page
3
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05
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County’s
counsel, in its obvious zeal to preclude
me
from representing
Town & Country
in
this matter, ignores
the language of the rule itself and, regrettably and seriously, misinterprets
the arguments I made in my Request. I did not indicate that Rule 101.112(b) would unduly
restrict me
in the practice of law (County
Response,
Paragraph 19), nor did I attempt to “draw
this Board’s
attention away
from her conflict ofinterest in this case by insinuating that some
other attorney who has entered an appe4rance in this proceeding also has a conflict ofinterest.”
(County Response, Paragraph 17). Rather, my comments in paragraph IX, set forth verbatim
below, were simply made in response to the County’s attempts to broaden the intended
application of Rule l0l.112(b)’s restrictions to proceedings that, while not the same as the one at
issue, nonethcless have a dearee of commonality of issues and parties:
“Since there is, quite often a similarity of issues and identity of parties in the practice of
law, and especially so in a specialized practice, the Board should exercise great care in its
interpretation of Rule 101.112(b). Specifically, to interpret the rule so broadly that it
applies, and consent is required, whenever there is a similarity of issues and identity of
parties would unduly restrict me, and others, in the proper and appropriate practice of
law. As the Board knows, the environmental law community has a myriad of lawyers
within its ranks that were once members or employees of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board. Indeed, there is another attorney in this very proceeding, engaged by the county,
who was au attorney assistant at the Board during the late 80’s and 90’s who, during her
tenure, provided considerable input into the landfill siting decisions that today serve as
the precedent for other landfill siting issues, some ofwhich are
~e1evantto the legal issues
in this very proceeding.” (Request, Paragraph 18)
Those comments were no more intended to impugn the integrity of an excellent former
Board attorney, regardless ofher actual status in this proceeding, than theywere intended to
impugn my own. The point is simply that rules are written so that those who practice before the
Board know what their obligations and responsibilities are. Rule 101. 112(b), on its face,
requires that if a party desires to engage me to represent them in a proceeding that was pending
while I was at the Board, I can only do so with the consent of all parties. For my own personal
Printed on Recycled Paper
In accordatice
with 35
Iii.
Mm.
Code 10 1.202 ai-id 10 1.302(g)
~ Page 4
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reasons.
I
have deteniiined never to represent any party in any proceeding that was pending
while I was at the Board. Thus, issues concerning the nature ofmy participation in a proceeding
that had been pending while I was Chairman should never be the focus of inquiry and “consent”
to my participation generally should not be required.
The County asks the Board in this proceeding, however, to obscure that bright line. In a
not so slight ofhand County’s counsel: ignores the language of the Board’s rule; makes no
argument concerning
why these separate “proceedings” should be considered the same for
purposes of Rule 101.112(b); obfuscates the fact that it waslwho sought the Board’s
clarification of the application of Rule 101.112(b) to my appearance in this proceeding; and,
generally, misconstrues the nature and intention of my Request. The Board should not be
hoodwinked by such chicanery.
To get to the meat of this issue, there are several reasons why the Board, for purposes of
Rule 101.112(b), should declare that this rule does not apply to my participation in the instant
proceeding and that this proceeding, for purposes of Rule 101.112(b) is simply not the same
proceeding
as the earlier City of Kankakee landfill siting appeal. Those reasons are as follows:
(1)
The rule uses the word “proceeding;” it does not use any other word or concept; a
basic and general rule of statutory and regulatory construction is that words ought to be given
their generally understood meaning;
(2)
The gencrally understood meaning of“proceeding” in Board practice, and in the
Board’s definition contained in its procedural rules, is
that a
proceeding is an “action” (sec
35
Ill.
Adrn. Code 101.202), docketed and numbered at the time of filing. While dockets may get
consolidated, and then would constitute the same “proceeding,” such is not the case here.
Printed on Recycled Paper
In accordance with 35 Ill. Adrn. Code 101.202 and 10 1.302(g)
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(3)
The instant
three
cases, filed in September of 2003, and docketed into a single
proceeding (PCB 04-33, 04-34, 04-35), constitute three
separate appeals of a siting determination
made by the City ofKankakee in August of 2003, pursuant to an application filed by Town and
County in March of 2003, and a hearing held before the City on that application in June of 2003.
All those actions occurred after I left the Board (December 31, 2002).
(4)
The prior three cases, filed with the Board on September 20, 2002 and docketed
into a single proceeding (PC.B 03-31, 03-33, 03-35)
constituted
an appeal of an earlier siting
determination made
by
the City of Kankakee, pursuant to a different
application and, obviously,
with an entirely different set ofhearings.
(5)
That proceeding
was filed in my waning days as Chairman and Ihad the
following role: (a)
I
authored
and moved the Board’s
administr~tive“Set for Hearing Order”;
(b) I authored and moved a Board order denying the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment;
(c)
I
assigned the matter to the authoring Board member.
(6)
The
swnmary judgment motion and
order, referenced above, solely concerned the
County’s argument that the City’s hearing, held in June of2002, was fiLudamentallyunfair.
Certainly a rarity in a landfill siting appeal, the County’s summaryjudgment motion, filed with
the Board on October 23, 2003, itself stated that it was brought “on the sole issue ofthe failure to
provide a public hearing, as such is
aper se
violation of fundamental fairness, and dispositive of
the entire case.” (October 23 Motion at p. 2) The order denied the motion, so that all substantive
matters would be decided in the Board’s final Opinion and Order concerning th.is appeal.
(7)
The entirety of the substantive issues before the Board in PCB 03-31, 03-33, and
03-3
5
were decided by the Board in its Opinion and Order which was rendered after I left the
Printed
on.
Recycled Paper
In accordance
with
35
Iii. Adni.
Code 10 1.202
and 101.3O2(g) ~ Page 6
Dec 09 03 01:45p
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Board and
in which I did not participate. Further, I did
not articipate
in any of the deliberations
or Board or staff discussions that led to the Board’s decision on the issues in that proceeding.
Clearly, the County desires that the Board expand the scope of Rule lOLll2(
),
so that
the issue of consent will preclude me from appearing in this matter. While I certainly appreciate
that the rule was promulgated to serve as a watchdog for conflict, the rule should he interpreted
as written. As I stated in my Request, when Town and Country approached me in October of
2003, I reviewed this rule, as well as the Rules of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys. I was
also, ofcourse, aware of the degree of my participation, and non-participation, in PCB 03-3 1, 03-
33 and 03-35. Obviously, I did not consider that my participation in that proceeding created a
conflict in terms of my representation of Town and County in this proceeding. For the Board to
broaden the scope of its rules, by analyzing the degree of my participation in an earlier.
tangentially related proceeding, is to add unwritten requirements to Rule 101 .112(b)
—
requirements that
were not there when I agreed to serve as counsel to Town and County.
I appreciate the Board’s attention in this matter and will, of course, abide by the
consequences ofits interpretation ofRule 101.112(b).
Res ectfully submit
Claire A. Manning, Attorney
CLAIRE A. MANNING
/
Posegate & Denes, P.C.
lit N. Sixth Street
Springfield, Illinois 62705
(217) 522-6152
(217) 522-6184 (FAX)
claire@.ppsegate-denes. corn
Printed on Recycled Paper
In accordauce with
35 Ill. Adni.
Code
101.202 arid 101.302(g)
Page 7
Dec 09 03 01:45p
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Ct.FT~’~
C1~C
- ~
02003F~JCE
BEFORE THE ILLiNOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
Pdll~tj~
~
Board
WASTE MANAGEMENT OF ILLINOIS, COUNTY OF
KANKAK.EE, ILLINOIS and EDWARD D. SMITH,
KANKAKEE COUNTY STATE’ S ATTORNEY,
And BYRON SANDBERG
)
)
)
)
V
Petitioners
THE CITY OF KANKAKEE, ILLINOIS,
TOWN
AND
COUNTRY UTILITIES, INC. and KA.NKAKEE
REGIONAL LANDFILL, L.L.C.
LIVINGSTON COUNTY, ILLINOIS
Respondents
)
)
PCB Nos 04-33, 04-34. 04-35
)
)
)
)
)
AFFIDAVIT
OF CLAIRE A. MANNING
Now comes affiant, CLAIRE A. MANNING, of Posegate & Denes, P.C. and states that
all of the facts set forth in the preceding document, entitled RESPONSE TO COUNTY’S
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY are, to the best of my kno\vledge, true and accurate.
Furthereth, Affiant sayeth not.
)
ss
County of Sangarnon
)
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
9th
da of December
•~
.Y PUBLIC, STATE OP
ll.UNO~
~
Public
~.)MMISSIONEXPIRES 11’2~2O~
Printed on Recycled Paper
In accordance with
35
111. Adrn. Code 101.202 and l01.30~(g)
State of Illinois
)
Claire A.
Manning, Attorney
Dec 09 03 01:46p
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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby under penalty ofperjury under the laws of the United States of
America, certifies that on December 9, 2003 she served a copy ofthe for.egoing upon:
Dorothy M. Guim, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
100W. Randolph, Suite 11-500
Chicago, Illinois 60601-3218
Bradley P. Halloran, Hearing Officer
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
100W. Randolph, Suite 11-500
Chicago, Illinois 60601-3218
(312) 814-8917
(312) 814-3669 FAX
George Mueller
501 State Street
Ottawa, IL 61350
(815) 433-4705
(815) 433-4913 FAX
Donald J. Moran
Pedersen & Houpt
161 North Clark Street
Suite 3100.
Chicago, IL 6060 1-3224
(312) 261-2149
(312) 261-1149—FAX
Elizabeth S. Harvey
Swanson, Martin & Bell
One IBM Plaza, 330 North Wabash
Suite 2900
Chicago, IL 60611
(312) 321-9100
(312) 321-0990
FAX
Edward
Smith
Kankalcee County Administration Bldg
189 B. Court St.
Kankakee,
IL
60901
(815) 937-3932 FAX
Kenneth A. Leshen
Leshen & Sliwinski
One Dearborn Square, Suite 550
Kankakee, IL 60901
(815) 933-3385
(815) ~933-3397FAX
Christopher Bohien
Barmann, Kramer and Bohlen, P.C.
200 East Court Street, Suite 602
P.O. Box 1787
Kankakee, IL 60901
(815) 939-1133
(815)
939-0994 FAX
L. Patrick Power
956
NorthFifth Avenue
Kankakee, IL 60901
(815)
937-6937
(815) 937-0056 FAX
Richard S. Porter
charles F. Heisten
Hinshaw & Culbertson
100 Park Avenue
P.O.
Box 1389
Rockford, IL 61105-1389
(81 5)490-4900
(815) 937-3932 FAX
Byron Sandberg
109 Raub St.
Donovan, IL 60931
~onsandber~@starband.net
Anjanita Dumas, Clerk
City of Kankakee
385E. Oak Street
Kankakee, IL 60901
(815) 933-0480
(815) 933-0482 FAX
Printed on Recycled Paper
In accordance with 35111.
Adm. Code
101.202 and 101.302(g)
• Dec 09 03 01:46p
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p.12
by depositing a copy thereofenclosed in an envelope in the U.S. Mail at Springfield, Illinois.
proper postage prepaid, before the hour of 5:00 p.m. addressed as above.
2
~ / /1
Claire A. Manning
Posegate
&.
Denes. P.C.
111 N. Sixth Street
Springfield, Illinois 62701
(217) 522-6152
(217) 522-6184
(FAX)
c1aire~,posegate-denes.corn
Dec 09 03 01:43p
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p.t
POSEGATE & DENES,, P.C.
Attorneys
at Law
111 North
6U1
Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box
338
Springfield, IL 62705-0338
•C~ ~p~-~ç.
dEc -
9
2003
SD-\TE OF ILLINOIS
PoIl~t,0~C’ontroi Board
Telephone (217) 522-6152
Facsimile (217) 522-6184
TO:
FROM:
RE:
MESSAGE:
FAX
TRANSMISSION
DATE:
~
Q2~
FAXNO:
~
~1+~-3~~
FAX NO: (217) 522-6184
NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS SHEET:
I
s.—.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: The documents accompanying this fax transmission contain confidential information
belonging to the sender which is legally privileged. The information is intended only for the
use
of the individual or entity
named above, If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that
any
reading, disclosure, copying, distribution
or the taking of any action
in
reliance on or regarding the contents of this faxed information is st:rictly prohibited. If you have
received this fax in error, please immediately notify us by telephone to arrange for return of the original documents to us.
NOTE: IF ANY PART OF THIS TRANSMISSiON WAS MISSING OR UNREADABLE, PLEASE CALL THIS OFFICE
IMMEDIATELY AT (217) 522-6152.
Carol Hansen Posegate
Jane Nolan Denes
ClaireA. Manning
Of Counsel
4: