V.
PUREX
INDUSTRIES, INC., a Delaware
corporation, FEDERAL
DIE CASTING CO.,
an Illinois corporation, FEDERAL
CHICAGO CORP.,
an Illinois corporation,
RAYMOND E. CROSS, an Illinois resident,
BEVERLY BANK TRUST NO. 8-7611,
an
Illinois trustee, and
LAKESIDE BANK
TRUST NOS. 10-1087 & 10-1343,
an Illinois
trustee,
STATE OF
ILLINOIS
Pollutj0~Control Board
PCB No.
03-5
5
(Citizens UST Enforcement)
NOTICE OF FILING
To:
For Purex Industries, Inc.:
Robert L. Graham
Bill S. Forcade
Jason B. Yearout
Jeimer & Block, LLC
One IBM Plaza
Chicago, Illinois
60611
For Federal Die Casting Co., Federal
Chicago Corp., Raymond E. Cross,
Lakeside Bank, Trust Nos. 10-1087, 10-1343,
Beverly Bank, Trust No. 8-7611:
Cary R. Perlman
Carrie L. Taubman
Latham & Watkins
5800
Sears Tower
233
South Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois
60606
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE
that I have today filedwith the Office ofthe Clerk ofthe
Pollution Control Board the 2222
ELSTON LLC’S REPLY TO RESPONDENT PUREX
INDUSTRIES, INC.’S ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, and
CERTIFICATE
CLERK’S
OFFICE
BEFORE THE
ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOAR~p
2
62003
2222
ELSTON LLC, an Illinois limited
liability company,
Complainant,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Respondents.
THIS FILING IS
SUBMITTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
OF SERVICE
filed on behalfofComplainant, 2222 Blston LLC, a copy ofwhich is herewith
served upon you.
Dated:
September 22, 2003
Respectfully submitted,
::E~ERG
TRA~G,P.C.
ig V. Rich
son
Attorneys for
omplainant 2222 Elston LLC
Francis A. Citera, Esq.
Daniel T. Fahner, Esq.
Greenberg Traurig,
P.C.
77 West Wacker Drive
Suite 2500
Chicago, Illinois
60601
Telephone: (312) 456-8400
Facsimile:
(312)
456-8435
CraigV. Richardson, Esq.
Christopher J. Neumann, Esq.
Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P.
1200 Seventeenth Street
Twenty-Fourth Floor
Denver,
Colorado 80202
Telephone: (303)
572-6500
Facsimile: (303) 572-6540
#77457
2
BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
CLERK’S
OFFICE
SEP
2
62003
2222 ELSTON LLC,
an Illinois limited
)
STALE OF ILLINOI~
liability company,
~°“UtIon
Control Board
Complainant,
)
)
PCB
No.
03-55
v.
)
(Citizens UST Enforcement)
)
PUREX INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a Delaware
)
corporation, FEDERAL
DIE
CASTING CO.,
)
an Illinois corporation, FEDERAL
)
CHICAGO CORP.,
an Illinois corporation,
)
RAYMOND E. CROSS,
an Illinois resident,
)
BEVERLY BANK TRUST NO. 8-7611,
an
)
Illinois trustee, and LAKESIDE
BANK
)
TRUST NOS. 10-1087 & 10-1343,
an Illinois
)
trustee,
)
)
Respondents.
)
)
)
2222
ELSTON LLC’S REPLY TO RESPONDENT PUREX INDUSTRIES,
INC.’S
ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Complainant 2222 ElstonLLC (“Elston”), by and through its attorneys, Greenberg
Traurig, LLP, for its reply to
Respondent Purex Industries, Inc.’s (“Purex”) Answer and
Affirmative Defenses (filed on August 22, 2003), responds as follows:
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:
LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In the alternative, without admitting any ofthe Complaint’s allegations that it has denied
or otherwise contradicting its answers and solely by way ofaffirmative and/or additional
defense, Purex alleges as follows:
1.
In March 1982,
Purex was created under the name P11 Holdings, Inc. (“P11
Holdings”) to effect a leveraged buyout ofPurex Industries, Inc. (a Delaware corporation
incorporated in
1978 and not the Respondent Purex Industries, Inc.) by private investment
groups consisting ofcorporations, banks, and insurance companies.
THIS FILING IS SUBMITTED ON
RECYCLED PAPER
RESPONSE:
Elston lacks sufficient information to
form a belief as to the truth ofthe allegations
contained in Paragraph
1, and therefore denies each and every allegation contained therein.
2.
On August 30,
1982,
P11 Holdings
changed its name to
Purex Industries, Inc. (the
Respondent in this proceeding).
RESPONSE:
Elston lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth ofthe allegations
contained in Paragraph 2,
and therefore denies each and every allegation contained therein.
3.
In order for the Board to
exercise personaljurisdiction over Purex, Complainant
must demonstrate that Purex has sufficient contacts with the State ofIllinois so as to satisfy
Illinois’
long-arm statute.
RESPONSE:
The allegations contained in Paragraph
3 are legal conclusions for which no
answer is
required.
4.
Since its inception in March 1982, Purex has not transacted business within
Illinois, committed any tortious acts within Illinois, or otherwise had any contacts with Illinois so
as to subject it to the jurisdiction ofthe Illinois courts.
RESPONSE:
Elston denies the allegations stated in Paragraph 4.
5.
As such, the Board lacks personal jurisdiction over Purex.
RESPONSE:
Elston denies the allegations stated in Paragraph
5.
Responding further, Elston objects to
Purex‘s First Affirmative Defense inasmuch as it does not assert any new facts which would
defeat Elston’s right to recover, but rather merely refutes the allegations stated by Elston in its
Complaint.
See, e.g., People
v.
Wood RiverRef’g Co.,
PCB
99-120 (Aug. 8, 2002), at 9 (striking
affirmative defense simply refuting allegations ofcomplaint.).
2
Wherefore, Purex asks that the Board enter an order that Complainant be awarded
nothing as against Purex and denying Complainant any
and all of the relief it seeks herein against
Purex; and such other and further reliefto which Purex is entitled under the law.
RESPONSE:
The allegations and other statements contained in Purex’s prayer for reliefrequire no
answer from Elston.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:
LACHES
In the alternative, without admitting any ofthe Complaint’s allegations that it has denied
or otherwise contradicting its answers and solely by way ofaffirmative and/or additional
defense, Purex alleges as follows:
1.
Upon information and belief, Complainant acquired the property comprising the
Site in or about January 2000.
RESPONSE:
Elston admits the allegations stated in Paragraph
1.
2.
Upon information and belief, before Complainant acquired the Site, it was fully
aware ofthe fact that USTs and various contaminants were present on and beneath the property
comprising the Site.
RESPONSE:
Elston denies the allegations stated in Paragraph 2.
3.
Upon information and belief, Complainants remained aware ofthe potential
environmental concerns at the Site for at least two years after purchasing the Site, and elected not
to
file the Complaint now pendingbefore the Board until October 25, 2002.
RESPONSE:
Elston denies the allegations stated in Paragraph 3.
4.
Purex has been prejudiced by Complainant’s unreasonable delay in filing its
Complaint.
RESPONSE:
Elston denies the allegations stated in Paragraph 4.
3
Wherefore, Purex asks that the Board render a judgment in its favor and against the
Complainant; and that the Board enter an order that Complainant be
awarded nothing as against
Purex and denying Complainant
any and all ofthe relief it seeks herein against Purex; and such
other and
further relief to which Purex is entitled under the law.
RESPONSE:
The allegations and other statements contained in Purex
‘
s prayer forrelief require no
answer from Elston.
THIRD
AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE:
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL/WAIVER
In the alternative, without admitting any ofthe Complaint’s
allegations that it has denied
or otherwise contradicting its answers and solely by way ofaffirmative and/or additional
defense, Purex alleges as follows:
1.
Upon information and belief, prior to acquiring the Site in 2000, Complainant was
aware that the Site was contaminated and that USTs were present at the Site.
RESPONSE:
Elston admits that prior to acquiring the Site in 2000, Die Casting Respondents provided
Elston with information indicating the presence ofonly six USTs at the Site.
Except
as expressly
admitted, Elston denies the remaining allegations stated in Paragraph
1.
Further, Elston contends
that no affirmative defense that might otherwise be applicable in a civil action in contract is
relevant to, or applies in,
an action brought before the Illinois Pollution Control Board pursuant
to
the Illinois Environmental Protection Act.
2.
Upon information and belief,
Complainant’s knowledge, awareness, and
acceptance of these environmental concerns and conditions was reflected in both conversations
and correspondence during contract negotiations, as well as the final purchase price for the
property comprising the Site.
RESPONSE:
Elston denies the allegations stated in Paragraph 2.
3.
Upon information and belief,
Complainant was afforded the opportunity to
conduct further investigation ofenvironmental conditions prior to
acquiring the Site;
Complainant,
however, elected not to conduct further environmental investigation ofthe Site.
4
RESPONSE:
Elston admits that it relied on misrepresentations by Respondent Lakeside concerning the
presence of only six USTs at the Site and, on the basis ofthose misrepresentations, Elston
determined that no further environmental investigation was required.
Except
as expressly
admitted, Elston denies the remaining allegations stated in Paragraph 3.
Further, Elston contends
that no
affirmative defense that might otherwise be applicable in a civil action in contract is
relevant to, or applies in,
an action brought before the Illinois Pollution Control Board pursuant
to the Illinois Environmental Protection Act.
4.
Complainant knowingly waived its right to perform additional environmental due
diligence prior to acquiring the Site.
RESPONSE:
Elston admits that it relied on misrepresentations by the Die Casting Respondents
concerning the presence ofonly six USTs at the
Site and, on the basis of those
misrepresentations, Elston determined that no further environmental investigation was required.
Except as expressly admitted, Elston denies the remaining allegations stated in Paragraph 4.
Further, Elston contends that no affirmative defense that might otherwise be applicable in a civil
action in contract is relevant to, or applies in,
an action brought before the Illinois Pollution
Control Board pursuant to the Illinois Environmental Protection Act.
Finally, Elston contends
that since the contract forthe purchase and sale ofthe Site was between Elston and Lakeside,
Elston had no contract with any other Respondents, and it therefore had no contractual rights to
waive vis-à-vis any other Respondents.
5.
As a result ofthe facts set forth in Paragraphs
1 through 4 above, Complainant is
estopped from recovering any response costs relating to environmental conditions at the Site
from Purex.
5
RESPONSE:
Elston denies the allegations stated in Paragraph
5.
Responding further, Elston objects to
Purex’s assertion ofan equitable estoppel defense inasmuch as Purex has failed to plead the
elements of such a defense with the requisite specificity.
In order to plead an affirmative defense
ofequitable estoppel, Purex must allege:
(1) words or conduct by theparty against whom the estoppel is
alleged constituting either a misrepresentation or concealment of
material facts; (2) knowledge on the part ofthe party against whom
the estoppel is
alleged that representations made were untrue; (3)
the party claiming thebenefit of an estoppel must have not known
the representations to be false either at the time they were made or
at the time they were acted upon; (4) the party estopped must either
intend or expect that his
conduct or representations will be acted
upon by the party asserting the estoppel;
(5)
the party seeking the
estoppel must have relied or acted upon the representations; and
(6) the party claiming the benefit ofthe estoppel must be in a
position ofprejudice if the party against whom the estoppel is
alleged is permitted to deny the truth ofthe representation made.
See, e.g., People v.
QCFinishers, Inc.,
No. PCB 01-7 (June 19, 2003), at 4 (citations omitted)
(striking affirmative defense ofequitable estoppel for failure to plead elements with specificity.).
Purex has failed to allege that Elston made any misrepresentation or concealment, or to allege
any ofthe remaining five elements ofthe defense ofequitable estoppel.
Elston further objects to Purex’s assertion ofan affirmative defense based on waiver.
The Board has previously held that in order to state an affirmative defense ofwaiver a party must
have both knowledge ofthe existence ofa right and an intention to relinquish it.
QC Finishers,
No. PCB 01-7, at
5
(striking affirmative defense ofwaiver.).
Elston has not intentionallywaived
any right.
The arguments raised by Purex fail to state an affirmative defense inasmuch as they
speak to the issue ofthe penalty and not the cause ofaction.
Id.
Wherefore, Purex asks that the Board render ajudgment in its favor and against
Complainant;
and that the Board enter an order that Complainant be awarded nothing as against
6
Purex and denying Complainant
any and all ofthe relief it seeks herein against Purex; and such
other and further relief to which Purex is
entitled under the law.
RESPONSE:
The allegations and other statements contained in Purex
‘
s prayer forrelief require no
answer from Elston.
FOURTH
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:
PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY
In the alternative, without admitting any ofthe Complaint’s allegations that it has denied
or otherwise contradicting its answers and solely by way ofaffirmative
and/or additional
defense, Purex alleges
as follows:
1.
Section 58.9 ofthe Illinois Environmental Protection Act (the “Act”),
415
ILCS
5/58.9,
states:
Notwithstanding any other provisions ofthis Act to
the contrary, including
subsection (f) ofSection 22.2, in no event may the Agency, the State ofIllinois,
or any person bring an
action pursuant to
this Act.
.
.
to require any person to
conduct remedial action or to
seek recovery ofcosts for remedial activity
conducted by the State ofIllinois or any person beyond the remediation of
releases ofregulated substances that may be attributed to
beingproximately
caused by such person’s act or omission orbeyond such person’s proportionate
degree ofresponsibility for costs ofthe remedial action ofreleases ofregulated
substances that were proximately caused or contributed to by 2
ormore persons.
RESPONSE:
The allegations contained in Paragraph
1
are conclusions of law forwhich no answer is
required.
Responding further, Elston objects to Purex
‘
s assertion of an affirmative defense based
on Section 58.9 ofthe Act.
The Board has previously held that:
“Proportionate share liability is
a limitation on remedies, not a bar to
a cause of action.”
Cole Taylor Bank v. Rowe Indus., Inc.,
No. PCB 01-173 (June 6, 2002), at
5
(striking affirmative defense based on proportionate share
liability).
2.
In its prayer for relief, Complainant seeks an
order requiring Purex to reimburse
Complainant for cleanup costs it has incurred and will in the future incurrelating to the Site.
7
RESPONSE:
Elston admits the allegations stated in Paragraph 2.
3.
Pursuant to
Section
58.9 of the Act, Purex may only be liable for those costs of
remedial activities relating to
contaminationproximately caused by Purex’s acts or omissions.
RESPONSE:
Elston denies the allegations stated in Paragraph 3.
Responding further, Elston objects to
Purex’s assertion ofan affirmative defense based on
Section 58.9 ofthe Act.
The Board has
previously held that: “Proportionate share liability is a limitation on remedies, not a bar to a
cause of action.”
Cole Taylor,
No. PCB 01-173, at
5
(striking affirmative defense based on
proportionate share liability).
4.
Purex was not and is not responsible by act or omission for any response costs
associated with the Site.
RESPONSE:
Elston denies the allegations stated in Paragraph 4.
Responding further, Elston objects to
Purex’s assertion ofan affirmative defense based on Section 58.9 ofthe Act.
The Board has
previously held that:
“Proportionate share liability is
a limitation on remedies, not a bar to a
cause of action.”
Cole Taylor,
No. PCB 01-173, at
5
(striking affirmative defense based on
proportionate share
liability).
Wherefore, Purex asks that the Board render a judgment in its favor and against
Complainant; and that the Board enter an order that Complainant be awarded nothing as against
Purex and denying Complainant any and all ofthe relief it seeks herein against Purex; and such
other and
furtherrelief to which Purex is entitled under the law.
RESPONSE:
The allegations and other statements contained in Purex
‘
s prayer for relief requireno
answer from Elston.
8
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:
PROHIBITION ON RECOVERY OF RESPONSE COSTS
In the alternative, without admitting any of the Complaint’s allegations that it has denied
or otherwise contradicting its answers and solely by way ofaffirmative
and/or additional
defense, Purex alleges as follows:
1.
By this Complaint, Complainants seeks to
recover its costs in remediating alleged
environmental contamination at the Site.
RESPONSE:
Elston admits the allegations stated in Paragraph 1.
2.
Section 45(b) ofthe Act, 415 ILCS 5/45(b),
allows private parties to obtain only
injunctive relief, attorney’s fees,
and court costs
from another private party for violating the Act.
RESPONSE:
The allegations contained in Paragraph 2 are conclusions of law forwhich no answer is
required.
Responding further, Elston objects to Purex’s Fifth Affirmative Defense inasmuch as it
does not assert
any new facts which would
defeat Elston’s right to recover, but rather merely
refutes the allegations stated by Elston in its Complaint.
See, e.g., People v.
WoodRiver Ref’g
Co.,
PCB 99-120 (Aug.
8, 2002), at 9 (striking affirmative defense simply refuting allegations of
complaint.).
3.
The Act contains no
explicit provision by which a private citizen may sue another
private citizen to
recover costs associated with remediating contaminatedproperties.
RESPONSE:
Elston denies the allegations stated in Paragraph 3.
Responding further, Elston objects to
Purex‘s Fifth Affirmative Defense inasmuch as it does not assert any new facts which would
defeat Elston’s right to recover, but rather merely refutes the allegations stated by Elstoirinits
Complaint.
See, e.g., People v.
WoodRiver Ref’g Co.,
PCB 99-120 (Aug.
8, 2002), at 9 (striking
affirmative defense simply refuting allegations of complaint.).
9
Wherefore, Purex asks that the Board render a judgment in its favor and against
Complainant; and that the Board enter an order that complainant be awarded nothing as against
Purex and denying Complainant
any and all ofthe relief it seeks herein against Purex; and such
other and further reliefto which Purex is entitled under the law.
RESPONSE:
The allegations and other statements contained in Purex’s prayer forrelief require no
answer from Elston.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:
PROHIBITION ON RECOVERY FOR ALLEGED
VIOLATIONS OCCURRING BEFORE 1970
In the alternative, without admitting any ofthe Complaint’s allegations that it has denied
or otherwise contradicting its answers and solelyby way ofaffirmative and/or additional
defense, Purex alleges as follows:
1.
Counts I and sic
through VII ofComplainant’s Complaint allege various
violations ofthe Act.
RESPONSE:
Elston admits the allegations stated in Paragraph
1.
2.
Without an express statutory provision stating that a statute has retroactive effect,
that
statute can be applied only prospectively, not retroactively.
RESPONSE:
The allegations contained in Paragraph 2 are conclusions oflaw for which no answer is
required.
3.
The Act contains no provision expressly stating that it is to be applied
retroactively, nor does the Act’s legislative history indicate any such intent by the Illinois
legislature.
RESPONSE:
The allegations contained in Paragraph 3
are conclusions of law for which no answer is
required.
4.
The effective date of the Act was July
1,
1970.
10
RESPONSE:
The allegations contained in Paragraph 4
are conclusions of law for which no answer is
required.
5.
Thus, Complainant’s sic
are barred from recovering damages for any activities
that are alleged to have occurred prior to
July 1,
1970.
RESPONSE:
Elston denies the allegations stated in paragraph
5.
Responding further, Elston states
that:
1) it has only alleged violations
which occurred after the enactment ofthe Act, and
2) regardless, it is
entitled to recover damages from activities which occurred prior to the
enactment ofthe Act which result in continuing violations ofthe Act.
Wherefore, Purex asks that the Board render a judgment in its
favor and against
Complainant to
the extent that Complainant seeks damages for activities that are alleged to have
occurred prior to
July
1,
1970; and such other
and further relief to which Purex is entitled under
the law.
RESPONSE:
The allegations and other statements contained in Purex’s prayer for relief require no
answer from Elston.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:
ATTORNEYS’ FEES
In the alternative, without admitting
any ofthe Complaint’s allegations that it has denied
or otherwise contradicting its answers and solely by way ofaffirmative and/or additional
defense, Pure alleges as follows:
1.
In its prayer for relief, Complainant seeks attorneys fees, expert witness fees and
costs.
RESPONSE:
Elston admits the allegations stated in Paragraph 1.
2.
Section 42(f) ofthe Act, 415
ILCS 5/42(f),
authorizes the Board to award
attorneys’ fees
only in cases
in which the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney prevails on
behalf ofthe People ofthe
State ofIllinois.
11
RESPONSE:
The allegations contained in Paragraph 2
are conclusions of law for which no
answer is
required.
3.
The Board has already acknowledged that it cannot award attorney fees or other
ordinary expenses oflitigation in this case.
RESPONSE:
Elston admits the allegations stated in Paragraph 3.
Wherefore, Purex asks that the Board enter an order denying Complainant’s request for
attorney’s fees,
expert witness fees, and other costs from Purex, and provide such other and
further relief to which Purex is entitled under the law.
RESPONSE:
The allegations and other statements contained in Purex’s prayer forrelief require no
answer from Elston.
12
Dated:
September 22, 2003.
Respectfully submitted,
GREENBERG TRAURIG, L.L.P.
By:
(i~
~&~Th
aig V. Rich~rdson
Attorneys for Complainant 2222 Elston LLC
Francis A. Citera, Esq.
Daniel T. Fahner, Esq.
Greenberg Traurig, P.C.
77 West Wacker Drive
Suite 2500
Chicago, Illinois
60601
Telephone: (312) 456-8400
Facsimile: (312) 456-8435
Craig V. Richardson, Esq.
Christopher J. Neumann, Esq.
Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P.
1200 Seventeenth Street
Twenty-Fourth Floor
Denver, Colorado 80202
Telephone: (303) 572-6500
Facsimile: (303) 572-6540
#77473
13
RE
CE ~VE~
BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOA~RK’S
OFFICE
SEP
2
62003
2222
ELSTON LLC,
an Illinois limited
)
STATE ~
ILLINOI
liability company,
)
Poll~tj0~
Control Board
Complainant,
)
)
PCB No. 03-55
v.
)
(Citizens UST Enforcement)
)
PUREX INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a Delaware
)
corporation, FEDERAL
DIE CASTING CO.,
)
an Illinois corporation, FEDERAL
)
CHICAGO CORP.,
an Illinois corporation,
)
RAYMOND E.
CROSS,
an Illinois resident,
)
BEVERLY BANK
TRUST NO. 8-7611,
an
)
Illinois trustee, and
LAKESIDE
BANK
)
TRUST NOS. 10-1087 & 10-1343,
an Illinois
)
trustee,
)
)
Respondents.
)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE
I, the undersigned, certify that I have served the attached 2222 ELSTON
LLC’S
REPLY TO RESPONDENT
PUREX INDUSTRIES, INC.’S ANSWERAND
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES,
and
NOTICE
OF FILING upon the Respondents on
September
22nd
2003, by:
certified mail
_____
registered mail
messenger service
_____
personal service
X
U.S. Mail
at the addresses below:
THIS FILING IS
SUBMITTED
ON RECYCLED
PAPER
For Purex Industries, Inc.:
Robert L. Graham
Bill S. Forcade
Steven M. Siros
Jason E. Yearout
Jenner &
Block, LLC
One IBM Plaza
Chicago, Illinois
60611
Hearing Officer:
BradleyP. Halloran
Hearing Officer
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
100 W. Randolph Street, Suite 11-500
Chicago, Illinois
60601
Francis A.
Citera, Esq.
Daniel T. Fahner, Esq.
Greenberg Traurig, P.C.
77 West Wacker Drive
Suite 2500
Chicago, Illinois
60601
Telephone: (312) 456-8400
Facsimile:
(312) 456-8435
Craig V. Richardson, Esq.
Christopher J. Neumann, Esq.
Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P.
1200 Seventeenth Street
Twenty-Fourth Floor
Denver, Colorado 80202
Telephone: (303) 572-6500
Facsimile:
(303) 572-6540
#77459
For Federal Die Casting Co., Federal
Chicago Corp., Raymond E. Cross,
Lakeside Bank, Trust Nos. 10-1087, 10-1343,
Beverly Bank, Trust No. 8-7611:
Cary R. Perlman
Carrie L. Taubman
Lathani & Watkins
5800 Sears Tower
233
South Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois
60606
City of Chicago
Mara S Georges
Diane M. Pezanoski
George D Theophilos
Charles A. King
Chicago Department ofLaw
30 N. LaSalle St., Suite 900
Chicago, IL
60602
Craig V. ~cI1ardson, Esq., Attorney for
Complai~~,
2222 Elston LLC
2
