1. RE CE * \7 ED
      2. NOTICE OF FILING
      3. TO LOWE TRANSFER, INC.

BOARD
LOWE TRANSFER, IN
LOWE,
Petitioners,
vs.
)
Case No.
PCB
03-221
)
RE CE
* \7 ED
(mAccL:
SEP
0
2
Z003
STATE OF ILLINOIS
Poliut~onControl Board
COUNTY BOARD OF
MCHENRY COUNTY,)
ILLINOIS
Respondent.
)
)
)
TO:
See Affidavit of Service
PLEASE
TAKE NOTICE that
on September
g
&~,
2003,
we hand delivered for filing
with the Illinois Pollution
Control
Board, the attached Ilespondent County
Board
of Mdllenry
County,
Illinois’
Reply Brief in
Support
of its
Decision
to Deny Siting Approval
to
Lowe
Transfer, Inc., a copy ofwhich is attached hereto.
,2003
Respectfully
Submitted,
On behalf ofthe County Board ofMcHenry
County, Illinois
By:
Hinshaw & Culbertson
N/P
~
One of itI Attorneys
~7
)
)
NOTICE OF FILING
Dated:
HINSHAW & CULBERTSON
100 Park Avenue
P.O. Box
1389
Rockford, Illinois
61105-1389
815/490-4900
70375125v1 830017

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STATE OF ILLINOIS
The undersigned, pursuant to the provisions of Section
1-109
of4Jffi~lJSi&9e~Wt~’ivil
Procedure,
hereby
under
penalty
of perjury
under
the
laws of the
United
States
of America,
certifies
that
on
ii
~1.
,
2003,
a
copy
of the
Respondent
County
Board
of
Mdllenry
County,
Illinois’
Repl~’Brief in
Support of its Decision to Deny Siting Approval
to Lowe Transfer, Inc., served upon:
Via U.S. Mail and e-mail:
David McArdle
Zukowski, Rogers, Flood
& McArdle
50 Virginia Street
Crystal Lake, IL
60014
Via Hand Delivery:
Dorothy M. Gunn
Bradley Halloran
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
100W. Randolph St.,
Ste.
11-500
Chicago, IL
60601
By
depositing
a
copy
thereof,
enclosed
in
an
envelope
in
the
United
States
Mail
at
Chicago,
Illinois, proper postage prepaid, before the hour of5:00 P.M~,
addressed as above.
HINSHAW & CULBERTSON
100 Park Avenue
P.O.
Box 1369
Rockford,IL 61101
(815) 490-4900
70374162v1 830017

~flRR~1RII
r\
j
RECEIVED
BEFORE THH
Itll~9~~
NH
f~ftONTROLBOA1WERRg OFFICE
LOWE TRANSFER, INC.~
SEP
02
ZUO3
LOWE,
)
STATE OF ILLINOIS
Pollution
Control Board
Petitioners,
)
vs.
)
Case No.
PCB 03-221
)
Pollution Control Facility Siting Appeal
COUNTY
BOARD OFMCHENRY COUNTY,)
ILLINOIS
)
)
Respondent.
)
RESPONDENT
COUNTY BOARD OF MCHENRY COUNTY, ILLINOIS’ REPLY
BRIEF
IN SUPPORT
OF ITS
DECISION TO DENY SITING APPROVAL
TO LOWE TRANSFER, INC.
For the reasons
set forth
herein, Respondent,
County Board
of McHenry County
(“McHenry County Board”), respectfully requests that this Board affirm
its decision to deny
siting approval to
Lowe Transfer,
Inc.
and Marshall Lowe, the Co-Petitioners herein.
I.
THE EVIDENCE AMPLY SUPPORTED MCHENRY COUNTY BOARD’S DECISION
TO DENY SITING APPROVAL.
As set
forth
in
both
Co-Petitioners’
and Respondent’s opening briefs, this Board must
determine whether the McHenry County Board’s decision to deny siting approval was against the
manifest
weight of the evidence.
See
Waste
Management
of Illinois,
Inc.
v.
Illinois
Pollution
Control Board,
160 Ill.App.3d 434,
441-42,
513
N.E.2d
592, 597
(2d Dist.
1987).
According to
this Board:
“A verdict is
.
.
.
against the manifest weight of the evidence where it is palpably
enoneous,
wholly
unwarranted,
clearly the
result of passion or prejudice, or
appears to
be
arbitrary, unreasonable,
and not based
upon the evidence.
A verdict
cannot be set
aside merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences
and
conclusions
from
conflicting testimony
or because a reviewing
court would
have reached
a different conclusion.
.
.
when considering whether a verdict was
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contrary to the weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must viewthe evidence
in the light most favorable to the appellee.”
A.R,F.
Landfill,
Inc.
v.
Lake
County,
PCB
87-51
(Oct.
1,
1987), slip op.
at
*6,
quoting Steinberg
v.
Petra,
139
Il1.App.3d
503,
508
(1986).
As
explained
in
A.R,F.,
if “this Board finds
that the
County
Board
could have reasonably arrived at its conclusions,
the County
Board’s
decisions
must
be
affirmed.”
A.R.F.,
PCB
87-51,
slip
op.
at
*6.
A review
of the
record
in
this
case
establishes
that
it
was
clearly
reasonable
for
the
McHenry
County
Board
to
determine
that
criteria (ii),
(iii) and (v) were not satisfied by the Applicant.
Therefore, this Board should affirm
the McHenry County Board’s decision to
deny siting approval to Lowe Transfer, Inc.
While
Co-Petitioners
contend that
this
Board
and
courts
have been
willing
to
reverse
decisions of local
hearing bodies
with
respect
to
one
or more criteria,
Co-Petitioners
were only
able to
locate
12
cases where
the Board and appellate
courts have actually reversed a decision of
local hearing body
on
any criterion, in
spite ofhundreds ofpollution control facility siting cases
that have been appealed to the Pollution
Control Board
and
appellate
courts.
(Pet.
Br. pp.
5-6).
The fact that the Board and appellate
courts have so seldom found that decisions of local
hearing
bodies
are against the manifest weight ofthe evidence establishes how difficult it is
to
meet that
standard.
A review of the
12 cases cited by Co-Petitioners further establishes that Co-Petitioners
are not entitled to the relief that they
seek because out ofthe
12 cases cited by Co-Petitioners, the
appellate
court
or
Board
have
only
completely
reversed
a
County
Board’s
denial
of
siting
approval
three
times.
See
Industrial
Fuels
&
Resources/illinois,
Inc.,
v.
Illinois
Pollution
Control
Board,
227
Ill.App.3d
533,
592
N.E.2d
148
(1st
Dist.
1992);
Watts
Trucking
Service,
Inc.
v.
City ofRock Island,
PCB
83-167 (March 8,
1984);
Frink’s Industrial
Waste,
Inc.
v.
City of
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Roc/eford,
PCB
83-41
(June
30,
1983).
In most of the other
cases
cited
by
Co-Petitioners,
the
Board
found
that while
the
lower
tribunal’s decisions with respect to one or two criteria were
against the
manifest weight of the evidence, the tribunal’s decisions with respect to the remaining
criteria were correct,
and
the
tribunals’ overall
decisions to deny siting approval were
affirmed.1
In
the
remaining
cases,
the
Board
actually
reversed
approval
of
a
pollution
control
facility,
finding that the
local hearing body improperly
found that
a
certain criteria had
been met when it
actually had not.2
Furthermore, the
only three cases in
which this
Board or an appellate
court have actually
reversed a local
governing body’s decision to
deny
siting approval are all clearly distinguishable
from
the
facts presented
in
this
case.
Unlike
the case
at
hand,
where
three
experts
testified
against
the
Applicant
with
respect
to
criteria
(ii)
and
(v),
in
Industrial
Fuels
(which
Co-
Petitioners cited
in their brief as being “almost
identical”
to
this case
(Pet.
Br.
p.
7) there was no
testimony
contrary
to
that
provided
by
the
Applicant’s witnesses with
respect
to
those
criteria.
227 Ill.App.3d at 547-48, 592 N.E.2d at
157-58.
The Court found this fact to be significant,
noting
that
with
respect
to
criterion
(ii),
“no
one
testified,
for example, how particular design
See CDTLandfihl Corp.
v. City ofJo/jet,
PCI3
98-60 (March
5,
1998)
(affirming
City’s decisions
on criteria
(i) and
(iii)
and affirming denial
of siting
application);
Waste Hauling,
Inc.
v.
Macon County Board,
PCB 91-223
(May 7,
1992)
(affirming County Board’s decisions
on criteria
(i), (iii), (v) and
(viii)
and affirming
denial of
siting
application);
Clean
Quality
Resources,
Inc.
v.
Marion
County Board,
PCB 91-72
(Aug.
26,
1991)
(affinning County
Board’s decisions
on
criteria
(i), (ii),
(v),
(vi) and (vii)
and affirming
denial
of siting
approval);
Waste
Management of Illinois,
Inc.
v.
McHenry
County
Board,
PCB
86-109
(Dec.
5,
1986)
(affirming
County
Board’s
decisions
on
criteria
(ii),
(iv),
(v)
and
(vi)
and
affirming
denial
of
siting
application);
McHenry County Landfill,
Inc.
v. County Board ofMcHenry County,
PCB 85-192
(March
14,
1986) (affirming
board’s decisions
with respect
to criteria
(i), (ii),
(iii), (v) and (vi) and affirming denial of
siting approval);
A.R.F.
Landfill v. Lake
County,
PCB
87-51
(Oct.
I,
1987) (affirming board’s decision
with
respect to criteria
(i),
(ii) and
(vi)
and affirming siting
denial);
Industrial Salvage,
Inc.
v. County Board of
Marion,
PCB 83-173
(Aug. 2,
1984) (affirming County’s decision with respect to criterion (i)
and affirming
denial
of
siting approval).
2
See
Slates
v.
Illinois
Landfills,
Inc.,
PCB
93-106
(Sept.
23,
1993)
(reversing approval
based
on
criterion
(0);
County of Kankak.ee
v.
City of Kankakee,
PCB
03-3!,
33,
35
(Jan.
9,
2003)
(reversing
siting
approval
because Board found that criterion (ii) was notmet).
3
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features or operating
procedures might increase the risk
of the harm to
the residents.
No expert
witness
testified
that
the
design
and
proposed
operation
of the
facility
were
flawed
or
that
IndustriaPs
application ignored or violated any ofthe applicable
governmental regulations.”
227
IlLApp.3d
at
546,
592
N.E.2d
at
157.
Because
the
objector
“failed
to
rebut
or
contradict
Industrial’s showing that the
facility was designed
in
light of
the
public
health,
safety
and
welfare,” the Court determined that
it was forced to reverse the City Council’s decision with
respect
to
criterion
(ii).
227 Ill.App.3d at 547, 592 N.E.2d at 157.
Likewise, this Board found
that
the
City’s
decision regarding criterion (v) was against the manifest
weight of the evidence
because the
Applicant’s
presentation
with
respect
to
criterion (v)
was
unrebutted,
and
without
contradiction
or impeachment.
227
Ill.App.3d
at
548,
592
N.E.2d at
158.
Far, far
from
being
“almost identical”
to this case,
Industrial Fuels
is actually very factually different because in
this
case, there
was
ample
testimony
from Mr. Thomas, Mr. Nickodem and
Mr. Sutherland that the
location, design and
plan of operations of the Lowe
facility were
flawed
in many respects, such
that
the facility
was not
protective of the public
health,
safety
and
welfare
and
did
not
have a
plan
of operations that
would
minimize the danger to the surrounding area from fire,
spills,
and
other operational accidents.
(C.00189,
pp.
9-10,
61,
C.002l5,
p.
54,
55,
C.002l8,
p.
79,
80).
Consequently,
the McHenry County
Board
was correct
in
finding,
as it
did,
that the Applicant
failed to satisfy criteria (ii) and (v).
The facts of this
case are
also
distinguishable from
those
presented
in
Watts
Trucking
because
in
Watts
the facts
clearly demonstrated
that criteria (ii),
(Hi)
and
(v) were
met by
the
Applicant.
In
Watts,
this
Board
found that
the City
Council’s decisions
with
respect
to
those
criteria were
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
PCB 83-167.
In doing so,
the Board
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noted
that
the
location of the
facility
was compatible
with
the
surrounding
area because
the
facility was located in
an highly industrialized
area, immediately
adjacent
to
a rubber
plant
and
in
close proximity to the City’s
wastewater treatment plant and
three plating plants.
PCB 83-167,
slip op.
at *3•
Even though
the area where the facility was to be
located was once residential,
it
had
become
more
and
more
industrial.
Id.
at
*4
In this
case, the
exact
opposite
is true; rather
than becoming
more
industrial,
the
area
surrounding
the
Lowe
Transfer
Station
is
becoming
more
residential
(because
of
Bright
Oaks
and
now
the
Plote
development
being
zoned
residential).
The
Board
in
Watts
also
found
that
criterion
(v)
was
satisfied
by
the
applicant
because
“the plant
will have
alarms,
an
automatic
sprinkler
system
and
two
fire extinguisher
stations,”
and
the Board pointed
out that “there
is virtually no possibility
of fire itself spreading
from
the facility to
the surrounding area.”
Id. at
*7~ In this
case, however,
the
facility
is
not
equipped with
sprinklers
(COOl 79,
pp.
69-70), and
Mr Nickodem specifically testified that
fire
could quickly spread
to The Hollows because of the plethora of vegetation in that area, as well as
its close proximity to the transfer
station.
(C.00215, pp. 32-33).
Finally, with respect to criterion
(ii), the Board in
Watts
found that it was “unable
to
find any
evidence
other than that the facility
was designed, located and proposed to
be operated
so that
the public
health,
safety
and
welfare
will
be
protected.”
Id.
at
*12.
Here,
however,
there
was ample
evidence presented
by
three
experts
regarding
deficiencies
in
the
location,
design
and
operations
of the
facility
that
will
adversely impact the public
health,
safety
and
welfare.
(C.O0188-90;
C.00214-19).
Therefore,
while
the
City
Council’s
decisions
in
Watts
may
have
been against
the
manifest
weight
the
evidence,
the
McHeniy
County
Board’s
decisions
regarding
criteria
(ii),
(iii)
and
(v)
are
not
againstthe manifest weightof the evidence,
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Finally,
the
facts presented
in
Frink’s
Industrial
Waste
establish that while the City of
Rockford’s decisions with respect to criteria (ii) and
(iii)
were against the manifest weight ofthe
evidence in
that case, the same is not true in the present case.
In
Frink’s,
the City determined that
criteria (ii)
and
(iii)
were
not
satisfied because the facility was
located
2000
feet from
a school,
and
there were
fears
that
the area may become
exclusively devoted
to
disposal
facilities.
PCB
83-41, slip
op.
at
*4
The
Board found that “unsupported opinion
and
fears
that the industrial
park
would
‘deteriorate
into
an
exclusive
site for disposal
facilities”
were
unfounded.
Id. at *4~
The
Board
also
found
that
the
area
surrounding the
facility
was compatible
with
the
facility
because
immediately
adjacent
to
the
facility was
a
building
occupied
by
Interstate
Pollution
Control,
which
processed
industrial
oils
and
wastewater
and
there
were
several
other
nearby
buildings that
were
industrial
in
nature,
including
a
large
new industrial
building
occupied
by
Honeywell
Motor
Products.
Id.
at
*2.
The
facility was
also
located
in
close proximity
to
the
Rockford
Sanitary District Treatment Plant.
Id. at *3~Because this Board
found that the record
revealed
“the predominantly industrial nature of the area as a whole,” the Board determined that
the
City’s
findings
as to criteria (ii)
and
(iii) were
against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
Id.
at
*6.
However,
a
review
of
the
record
in
this
case
clearly
establishes
that
the
area
surrounding
this
facility
is
not
mainly
industrial.
Although
Lowe
Enterprises
and
Welsh
Brothers operates next to the proposed transfer station on one
side, the remaining character ofthe
property
surrounding
the
transfer
station
is
not
industrial,
with
The
Hollows
and
the
Plote
property directly
adjacent
to
the
facility,
and
Bright
Oaks
less
than a
quarter of a
mile
away.
(C.00215, pp.
54-55).
Consequently,
the character of
the area surrounding this proposed facility
is much different
than the
area
surrounding the proposed facility in
Frink’s,
which
is just
one
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reason
why the
Mdflenry
County
Board’s
decision with respect
to
criteria
(ii)
and
(iii)
are not
against the manifest weight ofthe evidence.
As
has been made clear
by
appellate
courts
and
this
Board,
much deference
is
given
to
local hearing bodies
in
pollution
control facility
siting hearings.
Therefore,
a
decision of local
hearing body should only
be
reversed if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Waste
Management ofillinois,
Inc.
v.
Illinois Pollution Control Board,
160 Ill.App.3d 434, 441-42, 513
N.E.2d 592,
597
(2d Dist).
The evidence presented to the McHenry County Board
in the siting
hearings with respect
to
the
Lowe
Transfer Station
establishes that
the County
Board’s decision
was
not
only
not
against
the
manifest
weight
of the
evidence,
but
was
the
only
reasonable
decision based on the evidence and testimony presented.
Consequently, this Board should affirm
the County Board’s decisions with respect to criteria (ii),
(iii) and (v).
II.
THE MCHENRY COUNTY BOARD’S DECISION WITH RESPECT
TO CRITERION
(ii) WAS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
It
is
well-settled
that
it
is
inappropriate
for
the
Pollution
Control
Board
to
reweigh
evidence and reassess the credibility ofwitnesses.
See Concerned Adjoining Owners v.
Pollution
Control Board,
288
Ill.App.3d
565,
576,
680 N.E.2d 810,
818
(5th Dist.
1997) (explaining that it
is
up to
“the siting authority
to determine the credibility of witnesses, to
resolve conflicts
in the
evidence,
and
to
weigh
all
of
the
evidence
offered.”)
However,
this
is
precisely
what
Co-
Petitioners
ask
this
Board
to
do
in
their
Memorandum.
Specifically,
Co-Petitioners
spend
several
pages
emphasizing
the
credentials
of
their
own
witnesses,
while
minimizing
the
credentials ofthe objectors’ witnesses (Pet.
Br., 8-10, 23), thereby, in essence,
seeking a
de facto
determination from this Board
that the Applicant’s witnesses were superior to the objectors’
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witnesses
and,
therefore,
in
turn,
necessarily
more
believable
than
the
objectors’
witnesses.
Clearly,
it
would
be
inappropriate for
this
Board
to
judge
or
weigh
the
qualifications
of the
experts who testified at the hearing because it is
not the function of the Board or the courts
“to
determine which
witnesses
are more expert than
others.”
Metropolitan
Waste
Systems,
inc.
v.
Pollution
Control Board,
201
Jll.App.3d
51,
56,
558
N.E.2d
785,
788
(3d
Dist.
1990);
City
of
Rockford
v.
County
of
Winnebago,
186
Ill.App.3d
303,
315,
542
N.E.2d
423,
432
(2d
Dist.
1989).
Furthermore,
there
was
ample
evidence
in
the
record
as
to
the
qualifications
of the
objectors’
experts,
which
established
that
the
objectors’
witnesses
were
clearly
qualified.
(C.00188, pp.
6-18, C.00214, pp.
3-6, C.002l8, pp. 63-65).
The Board members had the benefit
of
observing
the
testimony
and
determining
which
witnesses
were
more
credible,
which
is
precisely
what
the
County
Board
is
obligated
to
do.
See
Concerned Adjoining
Owners,
288
Ill.App.3d at
576,
680 N.E.2d at 818.
Co-Petitioners
also
ask
this
Board
to
reweigh
the evidence
and
conclude
that
simply
because their witnesses testified
that the facility satisfied criterion (ii),
the County’s
decision on
this
criterion must
be
against the
manifest
weight
of the evidence.
However,
simply
because
there
is
some
evidence which,
if accepted, would
support
a
contrary conclusion does not
mean
that the County Board’s decision is against the manifest weight ofthe evidence.
See Wabash and
Lawrence
Counties Taxpayers and
Water Drinkers Association
v.
Pollution Control Board,
198
I1l.App.3d 388,
393,
555
N.E.2d 1081,
1086
(5th
Dist.
1990).
Here,
there was ample
evidence
presented by objectors’ witnesses, which directly contradicted the testimony of the Applicant’s
experts, and the County Board was free to accept that evidence over that of the Applicant’s.
Because there were
experts that
specifically found that
the facility did
not
satisfy
criterion
(ii),
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the County
Board’s
decision
is
not
against the manifest
weight of the evidence
and
should be
affirmed
by
this
Board.
See Metropolitan
Waste Systems,
201
Ill.App.3d
at
56,
558
N.E.2d at
788;
City ofRoclcford,
186
Ill.App.3d at 315,
542 N.E.2d at 432.
Furthermore,
Co-Petitioners
are
incorrect
in asserting that they have proven that the
transfer station satisfies criterion (ii) simply because the
Lowe
Transfer Station allegedly met or
exceeded
the
standards
for
transfer
stations,
(Pet.
Br.
pp.
7,
23).
First
of
all,
there
are
no
industry
standards
or state regulatory
standards
with
respect
to
transfer stations.
(C.0021 8,
p.
17).
Rather, there is only conflicting testimony from experts as to what is desirable or accepted
practice.
Even
if there were such standards, Co-Petitioners’ argument would still
fail based on
the
court’s
holding
in
McHenry
County
Landfill,
Inc.
v.
illinois
Environmental
Protection
Agency,154
lll.App.3d
89,
506
N.E.2d 372
(2d Dist.
1987).
In
McHenry
County,
the applicant
contended
that
the
county
board
could
not
deny
siting
approval
for
its
landfill
because
the
landfill
met
or exceeded
State design
and
operation
requirements.
154
Ill.App.3d
at
100,
506
N.E.2d at 380.
The appellate court disagreed, and held that a county board may deny siting
approval “where
it determines that the
proposed landfill presents a potential
health hazard to the
surrounding community, notwithstanding the applicant’s complete compliance with the EPA’s
and PCB’s technical requirements.”
154 Ill.App.3d
at
101,
506
N.E.2d 372, 381.
In McHenry
County,
the Court concluded that the record amply supported the county board’s conclusion that
the
landfill did not satisfy criterion (ii) despite the fact that the facility met applicable EPA
requirements.
id.
Likewise, in this case, there wasample
evidence
in the record to establish that
the Applicant did not
satisfy
criterion
(ii)
even
if,
assuming
arguendo,
the facility did
comply
withoreven exceed applicable design standards, as asserted by Co-Petitioners.
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In support
of its
argument that
this facility must
satisfy
criterion (ii) because it meets or
exceeds
design
standards
for
transfer
stations,
Co-Petitioners
cite
to
Clutts
v.
Beasley,
185
Ill.App.3d 543,
541
N.E.2d 844 (5th Dist.
1989).
(Pet. Br.
pp.
7, 23).
However,
Clutts
is clearly
not
controlling
because
Clults
is a
case
where
Illinois
Environmental
Protection
Agency
standards were directly at issue, while there are noEPA standards at issue in this case.
See 185
Ill.App.3d at 546-47,
541
N.E.2d at 846.
Clutis
is also distinguishable because it is a case where
appellate
court upheld a
local
siting
authority’s approval of a
landfill, not
a
case
in
which
the
Board or court reversed the
local siting authority’s denial of siting approval for a transfer station.
See
Id.
That distinction
is
extremely
significant because the
Court
in
Clutts
merely found that
the County Board’s decision granting siting approval was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
Id.
The Court never asserted, as Co-Petitioners contend, that complying with EPA
regulations
and standards
is all that is required to meet criterion (ii).
In fact, suchan assertion is
nonsensical
because if criterion
(ii)
only
required that
a
facility
comply
with
EPA
rules
and
regulations
or existing
design
standards,
there would
be
no
need
for
a
local
hearing body
to
determine if that
criterion was met, as such a determination could simply
be made by the EPA or
the IPCB.
However, it clearly
not the province ofthe EPA or IPCB to
determine if an Applicant
has satisfied criterion
(ii).
See
McLean
County
Disposal,
Inc.
v.
County
of
McLean,
207
Ill.App.3d
477,
566
N.E.2d
26
(“The
legislature has
charged the county
board, rather than the
PCB,
with
resolving
the
technical issues such as public health ramifications of the landfill’s
design.”).
Therefore, it is
clear that
more than mere compliance with
EPA rules and
regulations
is required to satisfied criterion (ii). Even where standards exist,
it is the siting authority’s role to
consider the application of those standards to
a given location, and
it is theprovince of the local
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siting authority to determine
if an Applicant has located designed and planned to operate a
facility that will
protect the public health, safety and welfare in spite ofan applicant’s compliance
with applicable rules,
regulations and industry standards,
Throughout theirMemorandum, Co-Petitioners selectively pick
and
choose evidence and
testimony
that
they apparently
believe
establishes that
their
facility satisfied
criterion
(ii).
In
doing so, Co-Petitioners are asking this Board to reweigh the evidence in this case, which this
Board has no authority to do.
See
Concerned Adjoining
Owners,
288
Ill.App.3d at 576, 680
N.E.2d at 818.
Additionally, in presenting its version of the facts, Co-Petitioners leave outmuch
of the testimony of the witnesses opposing the Applicant, which clearly establishes that the
facility is not located, designed and operated to protect the public health, safety and welfare. By
failing to refute much ofthe testimony elicited from the objectors’ witnesses, Co-Petitioners have
established that their facility will not be located, designed or operated to protect the public
health, safety
and
welfare.
A.
The McHenry County Board’s decision that the transfer station is not located to
protect the public health, safety and welfare is amply supported by the evidence.
The evidence and testimony cited by Co-Petitioners in their briefclearly fails to establish
that the location of the transfer station will protect the public health safety and welfare because
while the Co-Petitioners focus on specific areas of the facility that they believe
are
“state of the
art,” Co-Petitionerssimply do not address problem areas of the facility that show that the transfer
station is not located to protect the public health, safety
and
welfare.
One of the major problems that Co-Petitioners do not even mention in their brief, even
though much testimony was presented at the
siting hearing with respect to the topic,
is the
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inadequate size of the facility. Instead, Co-Petitioners focus on the queuing distance
and
internal
traffic, contending that the queuing distance and traffic patterns on the site will not cause any
problems or back-ups.
(Pet Br.
p.
12).
While there may be adequate queuing in this facility a
majority ofthe time, nonetheless, direct testimony from Mr. Nickodem established that there will
likely be traffic back-ups on Route 14 basedon the inadequate size of the site.
(C.00214, pp. 29,
55).
Mr. Nickodem also found that the traffic patternson site were poorly designed because they
could cause back-ups and even accidents.
(C.00214, pp. 33-34).
Furthermore, testimony at the
siting hearing establishes that once on the site, trucks will not have room to maneuver around the
site.
(C.00214, pp. 34-51).
Obviously, Co-Petitioners could not refute this point and, therefore,
did not even address this issue.
Because the size of the facility is not protective of the public
health safety and welfare in that
its inadequate size can quite possibly lead to accidents and
traffic back-ups, the County Board could have concluded on that basis alone that the transfer
station did not satisfy criterion (ii).
Co-Petitioners also fail to adequately explain how this facility is located to protect the
public health,
safety and welfare when
it
is located immediately adjacent
to The Hollows.
Instead of simply admitting the obvious
fact that the transfer station
is located next
to an
environmentally sensitive area, the Co-Petitioners in their brief place much emphasis on the fact
that the site is zoned 1-2, and seem to suggest that the zoning ofthe site should be determinative
with respect to the whether the location meets criterion (ii), just as they did at the siting hearing.
(Pet. Br.
p.
22).
However,
it
is clear
that zoning
is not
all
that should be considered
in
determining if a pollution control
facility, such as a transfer station,
is located to protect the
health, safety
and
welfare of the public.
If this were true, there would be no need for
any
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demonstration beyond compliance with local zoning standards.
However, this
is not the case,
and
the McHenry County Board was allowed, and even obligated, to consider how the property
surrounding this transfer station was actually being used instead of examining only thezoning of
such property. As such, the County Board had more than ample evidence to establish that the
facility
was
not located to protected the public health, safety and welfare because of its close
proximity to The Hollows.
Another major problem with the
site’s location
is the absence of an adequate buffer
between the site and The Hollows.
While Co-Petitioners contend that screening is adequate at
the facility in large
part
due to the scale house and the concrete structures on the site (Pet. Br. p.
13), Mr. Nickodem specifically found that the scale house was not a complete buffer for litter or
noise.
(C.00216, pp.
6-7).
Furthermore, Mr. Nickodem explicitly
stated that the screening
designed for the facility was inadequate to minimize the effect on the Hollows as well as abate
noise thatmay be experienced on the Plote property. (C.00215, pp. 64-65).
B.
The Mcflenry County Board’s decision that the transfer station is not designed to
protectthe public health, safety
and
welfare is amply supported by the evidence.
While Co-Petitioners repeatedly assert in their brief that elements of the design on the
transfer station “exceed” standard designs for a transfer station, Co-Petitioners fail to point out
there are “no industry standards.”
(C.00218, p. 17).
Co-Petitioners also
fail to mention many
areas where
their facility
is lacking, all
of which were specifically noted by the objectors’
witnesses at the siting hearing,
and
are set out below.
Co-Petitioners also fail to acknowledge
that some of the design features that they contend exceed design standards actually provide no
benefit, andmay even be harmful. Twosuch examples
are
the indoor scale house and the indoor
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untarping of vehicles. While Co-Petitioners seem to suggest that these
are positive components
of the design of the facility
(Pet.
Br. pp. 13-14), Mr. Nickodem disagreed.
Mr. Nickodem
testified that there was “no advantage” to an indoor scale house,
and
actually stated that an
indoor scale house wasa disadvantage because it would be “just another building where you can
build up carbon monoxide from vehicle exhaust.
(C.00215, pp. 81-82.
Mr. Nickodem also
testified that untarping inside
the transfer station presented a safety hazard in that the goal in
designing transfer stations is to minimize the number of people on the floor because “the more
people you have on the floor, the morepotential there is for another truck to hit thatperson or the
front end loader backing or going forward to hit that person.” (C.00217, pp. 20-21). Because the
design features that Co-Petitioners assert enhance their facility may in fact actually be harmful to
the facility,
it is clear why the Mcflenry County Board correctly found that the Applicant failed
to satisfy criterion (ii).
Furthermore,
the evidence presented
at
the hearing
established
that certain
design
components were missing in this
facility, which made the facility not designed to protect the
public health, safety and welfare.
Likely the most pressing problem is that the groundwater in
and
around the site was not adequately protected.
(C.0O1 88, p. 33).
Co-Petitioners, however,
argue that the Applicant was the only party to provide testimony from a hydrogeologist, and,
therefore, that witness’ testimony must have been accepted since the County made no credibility
finding against
its hydrogeologist.
(Pet. Br.
17).
That contention, however, is clearly specious
as the McHenry County Board was not required to make any record of its credibility findings in
its resolution.
Rather,
it
is well-settled that a local hearing body does not have to indicate
specific facts uponwhich itmade its decision, but only has to “indicate which of the criteria, in
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its
view,
have
or
have not
been met.”
E
&
E
Hauling,
Inc.
v.
Pollution
Control
Board,
451
N.E.2d
555,
577-578
(2d
Dist.
1983).
Additionally,
Co-Petitioners
ignore
the
fact
that
Lawrence
Thomas,
a
professional
engineer
with
23
years
of
experience
in
hydrogeology,
provided testimony directly
refuting that of the Applicant’s witness,
Mr.
Dorgan.
(C.00l 88,
pp.
6-7, 33).
Consequently,
the County
Board
was clearly
within
its
rights
to
accept
Mr.
Thomas’
testimony
over that ofthe
Applicant’s witness
and
find that the groundwater was not
adequately
protected because ofthe inadequate groundwater
monitoring
plan,
and the further fact that there
was no ability to stop the flow of contaminants into the groundwater (C.0O188, pp. 43-44, 48-
51).
Co-Petitioners
assert
that
the
groundwater
will
be
adequately
protected
because
the
facility is equipped with groundwater monitoring wells.
(Pet. Br. p 19). However, the presence
of the two wells proposed by the Applicant does not establish that the facility
is protective of
groundwater in
the area.
In fact, the testimony at the hearing establishes that those
groundwater
monitoring wells will be of little, if any, assistance in determining whether there is groundwater
contamination.
(C.Ol 88, pp.
48-49).
That is true because there are no up-gradient wells and also
because the wells
are
only testing the top layer of the stratigraphy.
Id.
The groundwater
monitoring
system
is also
inadequate because there is nothing that will stop
“sinkers,” or objects
denser than water, including
contaminants,
from moving
into the groundwater.
(C.001 88,
p.
36).
The contamination of groundwater is a particular problem because the shallow groundwater will
undeniably
flow to
Lake
Plote,
Lake
Atwood, Lake Killarney and the nearby
“irreplaceable”
wetlands
(C.00188,
pp.6-7,
25-28,
C.00l90,
pp.
44-45).
Mr.
Zinnen
agreed
would
that
the
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groundwater would flow to
those areas and
even stated that the groundwater flows at a rapid rate
to the wetlands.
(C.00181, p.25, C.00l86, p. 87)
The
storm
water management
system
is
also
not
designed to
protect
the
public
health,
safety and welfare because storm water falling into the ramps and apron of the facility will be
treated as storm water, rather than contact
water, even though
such water may come into contact
with contaminants on the apron and on the trucks themselves.
(C.00215, pp.
11-12, 21-22).
Finally,
the most
discussed problem with
the
storm
water
system,
which
Co-Petitioners did
not
even acknowledge in their brief,
is
the fact that there
is no
ability to
stop materials
in the
storm
water system from migrating into the sewer system and on
into
groundwater
if,
in
fact,
contamination
is
detected.
(C.00 188,
p.
43).
Co-Petitioners
seem
to
suggest
that
the
County
Board
should
not
have even
considered the possibility
of groundwater contamination
because
Mr.
Thomas did
not
know
of any
transfer stations
that
caused
groundwater contamination,
but
Mr. Dorgan, the Applicant’s own
witness, admitted that he was not aware oftesting to determine
ifany contamination existed.
(C. 00224, p. 19).
Additionally,
Co-Petitioners’
assertion
that
the
storage
tanks
designed
to
hold
contact
water are
“more than sufficient” (Pet. Br. 17) is unfounded because the Applicant’s
own experts
admitted
that
they did
not
perform
any
calculation to determine
if the proposed capacity was
sufficient to properly contain
all run-off
(C.00181,
p. 48), and Mr. Nickodem stated that he
did
not believe that the
tanks
were ofadequate size. (C.00214, pp.
59-60,
C.00215, p. 86).
Co-Petitioners also point
out the facility’s
“special and unique design features,”
including
its automatic doors, which
they contend will reduce the potential for noise and litter.
(Pet.
Br. p.
19).
However, Co-Petitioners fail to point out
that the automatic doors
to
the transfer station are
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only at the ends of the building for the transfer truck tunnel, while the doors on the west side,
which is directly facing The Hollows, will generally be opened.
Furthermore,
it is clear that the
automatic
doors will
not
be
closed
at
all
times
and,
in
fact, the
doors will be opened whenever
vehicles
are
fueled
in
the
facility
(C.002l6,
p.
28)
as
well
as
when
trucks
are
entering
and
exiting.
When
the
doors
are
not
closed,
noise
and
litter
will
surely
travel
to
surrounding
neighbors,
including
Bright
Oaks,
The
Hollows
and
the
Plote
property.
Co-Petitioners
also
contend that the building
being
designed to have
its
open
side
face the prevailing wind will
be
beneficial
because
it
will
minimize
the
potential
for
the
wind-blown
distribution
of
litter.
However,
Mr.
Nickodem
testified
that
location
of the
open
side
of the
building
would
not
necessarily be beneficial, as wind could swirl around and travel out of the building instead of
stopping inside, thereby sending noise, odor and
litter to neighboring properties.
(C.00216, pp.
4 1-42).
Co-Petitioners
also
point
out
its
landscaping
plans,
which
it
believes
are
adequate
in
minimizing potential
impacts
to
surrounding
areas.
(Pet.
Br.
p.
21).
However, Mr.
Nickodem
testified, and the
Applicant’s own witness, Mr.
Gordon, agreed that the way to most successifilly
minimize sound to neighbors
would be through
the use of a barrier wall, which was not included
in
the
Applicant’s design
of the
facility
(C.00215,
pp.
64-65;
00816,
p.
10).
Although
Co-
Petitioners
place much emphasis on the fact that the landscaping was developed after consulting
with
the
Conservation
District
(Pet.
Br.
p.
21),
Co-Petitioners
fail
to
point
out
the
McHenry
County Conservation District drafted a resolution that opposed the transfer station (C.07203-07),
indicating
that
the
McHenry
County
Conservation District
obviously
did
not
believe
that
the
landscaping would be
adequate to protect its property.
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Throughout their brief, Co-Petitioners point out that certain design
features ofthis facility
meet
or exceed design
features that were
proposed on the Woodland facility in
Kane
County,
a
facility
designed
by
Mr.
Nickodem
for
which
siting
approval
was
denied.
However,
Co-
Petitioners
fail to point out
the important features that were present in the Woodland facility that
Mr. Nickodem specifically
found were lacking
in
this
facility that
caused it to be
designed in
a
way that did not protect the health,
safety
and welfare of the public.
The major features that are
missing
in
this
facility, which
were
present
in
the Woodland
facility,
include
paving
over
the
entire
site, as well as curbing,
gutters
and
multiple valved catch basins
to
stop and
isolate
spills.
(C.00216,
pp.
25-26,
53-54;
C.00218,
pp.
16-17).
Additionally, the
Woodland
facility was
equipped with
a sprinkler
system,
a
200-pound wheeled water fire extinguisher
and
a
detention
pond
which
would
supply
water
for fires
(C.00218,
pp.
29-30),
while the only
fire
protection
equipment proposed for the
Lowe Facility consists of hand-held fire extinguishers and
a fire pit
with
no
on-site
water
source.
(C.00215,
pp.
31-32;
C.00179,
pp.
78-79).
Furthermore,
the
Woodland
facility
was
proposed
to
be
equipped
with
a
screening
wall,
similar
to
a
tollway
screening
wall
(C.00214,
pp.
25-26),
unlike
the
minimal
screening
proposed
for
the
Lowe
facility.
(C.00 186, pp.
9-10).
Based on the design features set out
above that were present in the
Woodland facility and missing in the
Lowe Transfer Station, it
is clear that while Mr. Nickodem
believed that the facility he
designed for Woodland would satisfy criterion (ii), the facility in this
case would not,
as McHenry the County Board properly found.
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C.
The
McHenry
County
Board’s decision that
the plan
of operations
of the
Lowe
Transfer Station was not designed to
protect the public
health,
safety
and
welfare
is amply supported by the evidence.
Co-Petitioners
contend
that
the
transfer
station
will
be
operated
to
protect
the
public
health,
safety
and
welfare
because no hazardous waste
will be
accepted
(Pet.
Br.
p.
22).
However, this fact, in
and of itself,
does not establish that the facility will be operated in a way to
protect the health, safety and welfare. Even though hazardous waste will not be accepted into the
facility,
it is clear that approximately two tons of household hazardous waste will come through
the transfer station
per year as people often include
household hazardous waste
in their garbage.
(C.00180,
pp.
33-35;
C.00187,
pp.
33-34, C.00l90,
p.
86).
It is also
undisputed that if a portion
of this
waste,
which
is
liquid,
flows
onto
some
part
of the site that
is not covered by the
geomembrane liner, such as the ramp or apron,
this waste will flow directly into the storm water
system
and
then
to
groundwater
in
the
area.
(C.00215,
pp.
11-12,
21-22).
Even
if
it
is
discovered that a truck is
spilling household hazardous
waste
onto an area of the site, there
is
no
way
to
prevent that
waste
from
reaching
into the
groundwater,
as the
storm
water connection
system
is
not
equipped
with
a
control
valve
or other shut-off mechanism.
(C.00 188,
p.
43).
Because
there
is
not
an
adequate
plan
of
operations
that
appropriately
deals
with
possible
household hazardous waste spills or other types of spills
which may
leave the
site
and
find their
way
to
the nearby
environment,
the
McHenry County
Board
correctly
found
that
the
plan of
operations of the facility was not designed to protect the public health, safety and welfare.
In addition to an inadequate plan ofoperations that fails to minimize
noise,
lifter
or odors,
the Applicant’s plan of operations
is also not designed to minimize dust.
The Applicant’s own
witness
testified
that
dust
will
exist
in
the
facility.
(C.001 84,
pp.
75-76).
The amount of dust
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present on this
site
is actually more than on most
other transfer facility sites
because some
areas
of site
are
covered
in
gravel, rather than
being
entirely
paved,
as
most
sites
are.
(C.00215,
pp.
29-30,
C.002 18,
pp.
16-17).
The
prevalence of dust
will
also
be
increased
because
the site
is
expected to handle a significant
amount of construction and demolition debris.
(C.00215, pp.
34-
36).
Despite the distinct presence of dust
in
and
around
the transfer station, the Applicant
will
not
provide misters
to
reduce the amount
of dust.
(COOl 84,
pp.
75-76).
Because the plan of
operations of the Lowe Transfer
Station
is
not designed
to
control and
minimize
the amount
of
dust
on
the
property,
the
McHenry
County
Board
was
correct
in
finding
that
the
plan
of
operations was not protective of the public,
health safety
and welfare.
Furthermore,
Co-Petitioners
contend that
their
facility
will
be
operated
in
a way
that
protects
the public health,
safety
and
welfare simply based
on
promises of what Mr.
Lowe
will
do in the future, with no proof of such.
(Pet. Br. pp. 22-23).
For example, Co-Petitioners
contend that they will hire a certified transfer station operator as manager of the facility, but
Mr.
Lowe admitted that he currently has “no clue” who will be the operator ofthe facility. (C.00202,
pp.
59).
Additionally, Co-Petitioners promises to hire an emergency response contractor to
identify, test,
isolate
and
haul off materials that
are
deemed
hazardous, but Co-Petitioners
have
not
yet determined who
that
will
be
or
what
exactly the contractor will be
required to
do
with
hazardous material.
(C.00180,
pp.
32-33).
Finally,
the Applicant
asserts that he
will adequately
control
vectors
on
the
site,
but
there
is
no
commitment
yet
for
any
type
of vector
control.
(C.00185,
p. 96).
It is
especially troubling that Mr.
Lowe expected the County
Board
to
trust him to
fulfill
the
promises
that
he
made because
Mr.
Lowe
has no
experience
in
running
a
transfer station
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facility and
apparently was
not
interested enough
in his
own facility to read
the application that
he
filed and
signed.
(C.00203,
p.
48)
It
is even
more troubling that
Mr.
Lowe promised to
have
his
entire
staff trained
in waste
screening, health and
safety protocol and
emergency response
in
light
of the
fact
that
Mr.
Lowe
himself admitted
that
he
would
not
know
what
to
do
in
an
emergency
situation.
(C.0020
1,
p.
19).
Mr.
Lowe’s
own witness,
Mr.
Gordon, admitted
that
“experience
is
a
very
important component of making
sure that
the facility operates properly.”
(C .00186,
p. 28).
Because of Mr.
Lowe’s lack of experience in
the transfer station
business and
the
fact that he
has failed
to
create
a plan of operations that
will adequately protect
the public
health,
safety and
welfare, it was
entirely appropriate for the McHenry County Board to
find that
Lowe Transfer, Inc. failed to satisfS’ criterion (ii).
III.
THE
MCHENRY COUNTY BOARD’S DECISION WITH RESPECT
TO CRITERION
(iii) IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Co-Petitioners
devote
substantial
time
and
effort
to
discussing
the
qualifications
of its
own witnesses,
Larry Peterman
and
Frank
Harrison, and
attempting
to
discredit
the Village of
Cary
and
Bright
Oaks
Subdivision
witnesses.
However,
when
reviewing
a
decision
under
a
manifest
weight
of the
evidence
standard,
the reviewing
court may not
reweigh
evidence
and
may not reassess the credibility of witnesses.
Worthen
v.
Roxana,
253
Ill.App.3d
378,
384,
623
N.E.2d
1058,
1062
(5th
Dist.
1993);
Wabash,
198
Ill.App.3d
at
392,
555
N.E.2d
at
1085.
Therefore,
Co-
Petitioners’
argument
that
his
witnesses
were
superior
and/or more
credible
is
irrelevant.
After
hearing
testimony
of
all
the
witnesses over
the
course
of
11
days,
no
basis
exists to challenge the decisions ofthe Mcflenry County Board as to
the credibility or superiority
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of each witness.
The Mdllenry
County Board
had the clear prerogative to
believe
whomever it
chose
to believe.
Co-Petitioners
hinge
their
argument
that
the
transfer
station
is
compatible
with
surrounding
property
by
looking
at the
zoning
of the
surrounding
properties.
However, Co-
Petitioners
failed
to
take into account
the
actual
and
planned
uses of the surrounding
property.
The
Plote
property was,
during
the
siting
hearing process,
being
zoned
residential
and
being
developed as residential property, rather than industrial (as it was previously zoned).
(C.04057-
7235).
The
McHenry
County
Conservation
District
Hollows
Conservation
Area
was
zoned
industrial,
but
it was reclaimed
and
devoted
to
conservation
and
recreational open
space
uses.
Co-Petitioners
did
not
examine
or
consider
the
impact
of the
transfer
station
on
the
Kaper
development across the street.
(C.0O205, p.
9,
15).
Finally,
testimony was given that the trend in
surrounding
area was to
be
a
residential
and
not
heavily
industrial,
according
to
the Village of
Cary Comprehensive Plan.
(C.00205, p.
21; C.00402-403).
Co-Petitioners’
experts clearly
did
not take these
actual uses
into
account when reaching
their conclusion
that
the transfer
station
was
compatible
with
the
surrounding
property.
The
applicant, Mr. Lowe
himself,
acknowledged
that
the Village of Cary
was becoming
a bedroom
community.
(C.00205,
p.
11).
Testimony
regarding the proposed landscaping,
which
the Co-
Petitioners
claim was
designed
to
protect
the
surrounding area, raised
doubts
as
to
the actual
protection given.
For example, although the Bright Oaks subdivision
was supposedly
protected
by
a
berm,
testimony
showed
that
it was
not,
as the second
story
of the homes
were
actually
visible
above
the
berm
from
the
transfer station
site.
(C.00204,
p.
24).
Co-Petitioners’
own
experts
admitted
on
cross-examination
that
they
would
not
recommend
having
the
transfer
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station,
or any
heavy industrial use, next to a residential neighborhood.
(C.OO 194, p. 14).
Mr.
Peterman,
Co-Petitioner’s
witness,
also
agreed
with
the Village
of Cary’s
City Administrator,
Cameron
Davis,
that
it
was
not
preferable
to
put
a
transfer station at the gateway to
Cary.
(C.00193, p. 96-98).
Co-Petitioners also argue
that Mr.
Peterman
set forth 14 factors, which demonstrated that
the transfer facility met the first
part
of criterion
(iii),
and
that since these factors were not
contradicted
by
the Village
of Cary,
the application was sufficient as to compatibility.
Again,
Co-Petitioners
fail
to
acknowledge
that
the
McHenry
County Board has the ability
to
make
credibility
determinations,
and
to
believe
or
disbelieve
any
testimony
given.
Tate,
188
Ill.App.3d at 1022.
Furthermore,
Mr. Petterson testified as to the incompatibility of the transfer
station, notonly under the present uses, but with the future uses under the
McHenry
County 2010
Plan and the Cary
Comprehensive Plan, which was never contradicted.
(C.00208, p. 97).
Co-Petitioners’
argument
that the transfer station was compatible with the surrounding
property was essentially
that
it was
proper
under
the
current zoning scheme.
(C.00193, p.
125).
This
ignores the
actual
and
future
surrounding uses of the property, and
in examining the actual
and
future uses of the property, the McHenry County Board’s decision against the compatibility
ofthe transfer station withthe surrounding
area
was fully supported.
The
second
part of criterion (iii)
is that the transfer station is located so as to minimize
the impact on property values.
First of all, Co-Petitioners’ own expert witness, Mr. Frank
Harrison, was only
able
to
find
one
comparable study
relating
to
the proposed
location of this
transfer station,
although
his
report included
eight
stations.
Such
a
lack of comparable studies
indicates that
an
inherent
incompatibility
may
exist.
(C.00220,
p.
33).
Co-Petitioners’
own
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witness
agreed, and
stated that he was not
surprised that
there were no
other comparable studies,
since transfer stations are essentially
an
industrial use, thus
implying
that industrial
uses
do not
belong next to residential neighborhoods.
(C.00l93, p.
115).
However,
the
one
comparable
study
that
did
exist,
pertaining
to
the
Princeton Village
subdivision
adjacent
to
the Northbrook Transfer Station,
in
fact directly supports the McHenry
County Board’s decision that this facility would
be incompatible
with the surrounding area, and,
therefore, in turn, adversely impact property values.
Co-Petitioners’ expert attempted to show
that the houses closest to the transfer station appreciated at the same rate as those further away.
(C.00193,
p.
72).
However,
what
was
“close”
and
what
was
“far
away”
were
apparently
arbitrarily decided.
In addition, Mr.
John
Whitney testified that Applicant’s appraisal expert did
not remove
all
other significant influences
on the property value so
as to
sufficiently isolate
the
actual effect of a
transfer
station
on
adjoining
property values.
(C.00220,
pp.
30-31).
In fact,
Mr. Harrison admitted that
if the entire neighborhood was affected by the transfer station, then
the appreciation rates of the “close” and “faraway” properties would be similar, which is exactly
what
his
report
concluded.
(C.00l 93,
p.
72).
Mr.
Harrison
also
failed
to
acknowledge
the
significant
fact
that
Princeton
Village
was
built
after
the
transfer
station,
thereby
taking
the
transfer station into account during the initial sales and development of the property.
Therefore,
there
is sufficient
evidence for the McHeniy
County Board
to discredit the comparison study
by
Co-Petitioners which purported to
show no significant impact on property values.
However,
what the
study
did
show,
which
was pointed
out
by
Mr.
Klasen
at the siting
hearing
and
during
the Committee’s
deliberations was that many of the
properties
in
the
Princeton
Village
area
had
appreciated
very
little,
or,
worse
yet,
had
actually
depreciated
in
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value.
(C.00220, p. 88; C.07237, pp. 16-18).
The average appreciation rates in the Princeton
Village
study
(approximately
1)
were
significantly
lower
than
an
average
expected
appreciation
rate
in
Cook
County
of 5-6,
or,
more importantly,
the
16
rate
found
in
the
neighboring Northbrook area.
(C.00220,
p.
88).
Mr.
John Whitney
also
criticized Mr.
Harrison’s
report.
Co-Petitioners attempt
to
discredit
Mr. Whitney
as he did
not
make any
independent study
of the transfer station
and
had
no opinion of the impact on property values and thatsomehow Mr. Whitney’s failure to perform
an
independent study
or have such
an opinion made his critique of the methodology employed by
Applicant’s appraisal
witness unbelievable.
(Pet.
Br.
p.
36).
However, Co-Petitioners
carry
the
burden
of proof to show that the transfer
station
is compatible with the surrounding area, and that
impacts
on
surrounding property
sales
are
minimized.
Waste
Management
of Illinois,
Inc.
v.
Pollution
Control
Board,
123
Ill.App.3d
1075,
1083,
463
N.E.2d
969,
975
(2d
Dist.
1984).
Further, Mr. Whitney was not required to testilS’
as to a final quantitative opinion on the effect of
the transfer station on property values. Mr. Whitney’s testimony that Co-Petitioners’ witness did
not
properly
study potential
property value impact,
along
with his
reasons for believing
so, was
sufficient.
The
local
siting authority has
the
sole
decision-making authority,
and
it has
been
determined that
expert testimony showing deficiencies under the statutory criteria is sufficient to
deny siting
approval.
CDTLandJ1I1 Corp.
v.
City of.Joliet,
1998WL 112497,PCB 98-60 (March
5,
1998).
Again, it
is
up to the
McHenry
County
Board to
make credibility
determinations,
and
give Mr.
Whitney’s testimony the weight it felt it deserved.
Tate,
188 Ill.App.3d
at
1022.
Finally,
Co-Petitioners
rely
on
two
letters
solicited
from
Princeton
Village
property
owners to
attempt
to demonstrate a lack of impact on
neighborhood property values.
(Pet.
Br.
p.
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33).
However,
these
letters
do
not
support
Co-Petitioners’
case because
there
is
no
objective
support
for the assertions contained in them.
There
is no
determination of what their statements
to the effect that property values had “increased” meant, in that they could be referring to the 1
increase
in
valuation, rather than the normal appreciation
rate in the
area.
Public comments
are
not entitled to the
same
weight as expert testimony submitted under oath and subject to cross-
examination.
CDT,
1998
WL
112497 at
*5~
The McHenry County
Board could determine how
much weight to give these comments,
and
its determination should not be reversed. The lack of
support and
lack of cross-examination to
determine the
writer’s intent weakens
the credibility to
be
given to these
letters.
Again, the McHenry County Board has the power
to determine
credibility.
Tate,
188 Ill.App.3d
at
1022.
For the foregoing reasons, the McHenry County Board’s decision that the transfer station
was incompatible withthe surrounding area
was
not against themanifest weight ofthe evidence.
IV.
THE
MCHENRY COUNTY BOARD’S
DECISION WITH RESPECT
TO
CRITERION
(v)WASNOT AGAINSTTHEMANIFESTWEIGHTOF THEEVIDENCE.
The testimony at the local siting hearing clearly established that the plan ofoperations of
Lowe
Transfer
Station,
Inc.
was
not designed to
minimize
the danger to
surrounding areas
from
fires, spills or other operational accidents, all as found by Mr. Thomas, Mr. Nickodem
and
Mr.
Sutherland.
(C.00189, pp. 9-10, C.002l5, p.
55,
C.00218,
p.
80).
Co-Petitioners contend that the facility is designed to protect the groundwater because the
floors of the
facility will
be
concrete,
and
because
the facility will
have a
geomembrane liner
beneath it.
(Pet.
Br. p.
39).
However, these features in and ofthemselves may not be
adequate to
prevent groundwater contamination,
which
is
a
serious concern.
It is
undisputed that
the liner
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spans only
tipping floor and tunnel
(C.001 87, p.
11), so if any spills occur elsewhere on the site,
such as the ramps or the apron, the
spill
will
go
directly
into
the
storm
water collection
system,
which, in turn, would flow into the groundwater in the area.
This is particularly problematic
because there are no valves or other devices designed to shut off the flow of water if such a spill
or leak does occur.
(C.0018l,
pp.
82-83).
Further,
there is
also
no
curbing
to
stop
the flow of
contaminants onto
neighboring properties, save for a curb
separating Lowe Transfer Station from
Lowe
Enterprises,
Inc.
(C.00215,
pp.
18-19).
Therefore,
adequate
safeguards
have
not
been
proposed
to
stop
contaminated run-off from
flowing
into
The
Hollows
or Plote
Property.
As
such, the plan of operations will not minimize the danger ofspills to neighboring property,
and
criterion (v) is not satisfied.
The plan of operations
is also not designed to minimize the danger of operational
accidents because while Co-Petitioners contend that the internal traffic flow is designed in a safe
manner (Pet.
Br.
p.
40), this was directly refuted
by
Mr. Nickodem, who testified that the traffic
pattern
designed
by
the
Applicant,
which
allows
for merging
traffic,
can cause back-ups
and
even accidents.
(C.00214, pp. 33-34).
The risk of accidents on the site is increased because
there is not enough room for vehicles to maneuver around that site.
(C.00214, pp. 34-35,
45-51).
Because
the
site
is
not
large
enough,
and
because
of the
designated
traffic
patterns, there
are
likely be to bottlenecks and possible collisions at the entrance of the facility as well as large
traffic
back-ups.
(C.002 14, pp.
50-51).
Therefore, the internal flow of traffic is
not designed
to
minimize the danger ofoperational accidents, but actually will contribute to such accidents.
Co-Petitioners
also
contend that their facility has a plan of operations that minimizes
the
danger of fires
because they have a pit
into
which
burning debris
can be
pushed, a sand pit
and
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an alarm
system (Pet. Br. p. 40-41).
Apparently,
Lowe
believes
that such features are all
that
is
necessary
to
adequately
protect
against
fires
inside
the
facility.
However,
expert
testimony
established
that this
was clearly inadequate.
Co-Petitioners
assert
that
it was not
necessary
to
have sprinklers
in this
facility because sprinkler systems are
“not a standard design feature in the
solid
waste
industry.”
However,
Co-Petitioners
fail
to
point
out
that
because of the
facility’s
location
and
certain
operations
within this
facility,
it
is
at
a
much
greater
risk
of fire.
Mr.
Nickodem explained
that the
risk
of fire
was
greater at
this
facility because of the
vegetation
directly adjacent to the facility in The Hollows. (C.00215, pp. 32-33). A fire is also more likely
to
occur at this
facility because the Applicant
has decided to fuel
its
vehicles
inside the transfer
station.
(C.00215,
p.
30).
Mr.
Nickodem explained that
it
is
quite
possible
for
fueling
in
the
building
to
cause a
fire because
a front-end loaders
often scrape
the
floor,
which
could
cause
sparks
that
ignite
the
fuel.
(C.00216,
p.
28-29).
This
is
precisely
why
transfer
stations
are
typically
designed
so
that
trucks
are
not
fueled indoors.
Id.
Therefore,
while
it may
not
be
standard to
have a sprinkler system
in a transfer station,
it is reasonable for the McHenry County
Board to conclude
that a sprinkler system would be necessary
to minimize
the danger of a fire in
to this facility.
Co-Petitioners
point out
the fact that
fueling will
occur
inside the transfer station
as
a
positive
feature
of their
plan of
operations
(Pet.
Br.
41-42).
However,
Co-Petitioners
fail
to
acknowledge
or even consider
that
fueling inside
the transfer station
will actually increase
the
risk offires,
which is
why transfer stations do not
fuel
vehicles inside
buildings.
(C.00216,
pp.
24-25, 28-29).
Because of the increased risk of fire, it is clear to see
why it is not beneficial, and
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in
fact
actually
detrimental,
to
propose
a
plan
of operations
that
includes
indoor
fueling
of
vehicles.
Although
Co-Petitioners
point
out
that
Mr.
Nickodem
stated
that
it
is
rare
for
fire
protection
services
to
come
to
a
waste
facility to
assist
in
a fire,
Co-Petitioners
have failed
to
point
out
the
testimony
of
other
witnesses
which
established
that
fires
do,
in
fact,
occur
at
transfer stations.
In fact, Applicant’s own witness testified that he
has known of fires
occurring
in transfer stations (COO179,
p.
75).
Additionally, Mr. Nickodem
testified
that there
is a
potential for fires
to
occur in transfer stations, and personally knows of one transfer station
that
actually burned
down
as a result of a fire.
(C.002 16, pp. 13-14). Because of the danger of fires,
Mr.
Nickodem testified that transfer facilities
“need to
have fire suppression systems in
place to
be
able
to
handle
that
occurrence.”
(C.00216,
pp.
14).
With
respect
to
the
Lowe
Transfer
Station,
a
fire suppression system
does not
exist,
as the facility
is
not
only
lacking a
sprinkler
system,
but is also
lacking a storm water detention pond,
from which water can be drawn to help
combat a fire if necessary. (C.00l79, pp.
78-79).
Furthermore, there are no
procedures proposed
concerning
who to
notify
in
the
case of a
fire.
(C.00 179,
pp.
70-71).
Because the
evidence
clearly
showed that
the
facility’s plan of operations was not designed
to
minimize
the danger of
fires,
the County Board wasjustified in
finding that the Applicant failed to satisi~
criterion (v).
A
review
of
industrial
Fuels
establishes
that
while
the
fire
protection
services
with
respect
to
the
facility
at
issue
in
that
case
were
clearly
adequate,
the fire protection
services
proposed for the
Lowe
Transfer
Station are clearly inadequate.
This
is
true because the facility
in
industrial Fuels
was equipped with a fire suppression system matched to the type of fire that
might occur and the specific location ofsuch a fire, as well as a comprehensive sprinkler system.
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227 Ill.App.3d at 537, 592 N.E.2d at 152. TheCourt also noted that “fire
hydrants are adjacent
to the site, which is located close to fire, medical,
and
police services,
and
all necessary utilities
are available,
including
water, sanitary sewer, storm
sewers,
natural
gas
and
electricity.”
Id.
In
this case, not only is the facility not equipped with a sprinkler system, but there are no nearby
fire hydrants or other sources of water, which is why the Applicant’s own
witness suggested that
a fire truck would have to transportwhatever water
was necessary to fight a fire.
(C~00179,78-
79).
Based
on
all of the features of an
adequate
fire protection system
that
are missing
in the
Applicant’s
plan
of
operations,
the
McI-Ienry
County
Board
appropriately
found
that
the
Applicant failed to satisfy criterion (v).
Co-Petitioners
also
contend
that
the
facility
is
designed
to
minimize
the
danger
of
accidents because there is an emergency access gate into the facility (Pet.
Br.
41).
However, Mr.
Gordon and Mr. Zinnen conceded that an easement has not yet been dedicated for that purpose,
and
they
do
not
know
if
a
dedicated
easement
will
be
obtained.
(C.OO 186,
pp.
49-51).
Furthermore,
Mr. Nickodem testified that he did not believe that any emergency vehicles would
be
able to
get into
the facility from the emergency access point as trucks
would be blocking that
gate
due
to
the
small
size
of the
site.
(C,00214,
pp.
56-57).
As
a
result,
the access
gate
is
questionable at
best.
Even assuming
that
the proposed
emergency
access
gate will
be
properly
dedicated, and will be able to
be utilized effectively by emergency vehicles, this does not create a
plan of operations that
is
designed to
minimize the danger of spills,
fires
and
other operational
accidents because,
as
noted
above,
there are
many
other
problems
with
the
facility’s
plan
of
operations that will not be remedied simply by quick and easy access
to the facility.
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For the reasons set
forth
above,
as well
as those
contained in
Section
II,
the Mdllenry
County
Board
had
ample
evidence
upon
which
to
conclude
that
the
plan
of operations
with
respect
to
this
facility
was
not
designed
to
minimize
the
danger
of
fires,
spills
and
other
operational
accidents.
Consequently,
the
McHenry
County
Board
appropriately
denied
Mr.
Lowe’s application for siting approval on this criterion.
V.
THE MCHENRY COUNTY BOARD’S IMPOSITION OF A “HOST FEE” WAS
LAWFUL.
In the present case,
the
Co-Petitioners’
argument
that
the County
Board’s imposition
of
the “host fee” was unlawful is not ripe for adjudication because the County Board denied siting
approval
to
the Applicant,
and
because of that denial,
the Applicant will clearly
not be
required
to pay any
“host fee.”
Because any decision by this Board as to whether that host fee was lawful
would have
no
effect on
the issues
it this case,
any such decision would be
an
advisory
opinion,
which
is
strictly
prohibited
under
Illinois
law.
See
Barth
v.
Reagan,
139
11l.2d
399,
419,
564
N.E.2d 1196, 1205 (1990).
However, ifthe Board decides to address this issue,
it is clear that
the imposition of the host fee was lawful
and authorized.
The imposition
of a
condition
is specifically
authorized by
Section 39.2(e)
of the
Environmental
Protection
Act.
Section
39.2(e) of the Act
specifically
provides
that
a
County
Board
“may
impose
such
conditions
as
may
be
reasonable
and
necessary
to
accomplish
the
purposes of this Section and as are
not inconsistent with regulations promulgated by the Board.”
415
ILCS
5/39.2(e).
Section
39.2(e) specifically allows
a local
unit of government
to
negotiate
and
enter
into
a
host
agreement
with
a
local
siting
applicant,
and
requires
the
terms
and
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conditions
of that agreement to
be
disclosed
and
made a part of the hearing record.
415
ILCS
5/39.2(e).
Co-Petitioners
argue
that
Section
39.2
does not
allow for the assessment of fees
against
an
applicant, and
that
it does not grant authority
to
require financial responsiblity.
(Pet.
Br.
p.
48).
However,
Section
39.2(e)
specifically
allows
a
local
unit of government
to
negotiate and
enter into a host agreement with a local siting applicant, and requires the terms
and conditions of
that
agreement to be disclosed and
made
a
part
of the hearing record.
415 ILCS 5/39.2(e).
Illinois has also
determined that
economics is a relevant consideration
under Section 39.2,
and
it
is within the local siting authority’s discretion to consider it.
See ConcernedAdjoining Owners
v.
Pollution
Control
Board,
288
Ill.App.3d
565,
535,
680 N.E.2d 810, 817 (5th Dist.
1997).
Under
Section
39.2(e),
the
McHenry
County
Board
was
clearly
authorized
to
examine
the
economic impact that the transfer station would have on the County,
and impose such conditions
on approval ofthe transfer station.
Co-Petitioners argue
that there was
no discussion by
the McHenry County Board prior to
the adoption of the host fee agreement.
This is plainly wrong. Not onlydoes theboard not have
to
conduct any debate
so
long as the members have
an opportunity
to
review the record prior to
the vote
(Slates
v.
Illinois
Landfills,
inc.,
1993
WL
387195
(IPCB
Sept.
23,
1993),
but
a
discussion did in fact take
place. The
McI-Ienry County
Landfill Siting Committee discussed the
imposition
of
the
host
fee,
and
decided
that the $1.90
fee was reasonable and appropriate.
(C.07237, pp. 29-36).
Furthermore,
Mr.
Lowe
himself,
specifically
agreed
to
accept
a
condition
of a
host
community payment equal to what the evidence showed was necessary to defray the impact of
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the facility on the County.
(C.00203, pp.
26, 28).
Co-Petitioners
do not
acknowledge this
fact
in its
brief.
In fact, Mr.
Lowe agreed
to
the
host
fee structure adopted by
the McHenry County
Board.
(C.00203,
pp. 25-28).
Accordingly, the host fee imposition as a special condition ofthe approval ofthe transfer
station was lawful and authorized.
VI.
THE
MCHENRY
COUNTY
BOARD
DID
NOT
MISAPPLY
THE
UNNUMBERED
CRITERION.
As is
made clear by section 39.2(a), the McHenry County
Board was able
to consider
“as
evidence
the
previous
operating
experience
and
past
record
of convictions
or
admissions
of
violations of the
applicant (and
any
subsidiary
or
parent company)
in
the
field of solid
waste
management
when
considering
criteria
(ii)
and
(v)
under
this
Section.
415
ILCS
5/39.2(a).
Despite the clear language of this statutory
provision,
Co-Petitioners contend that
the McHenry
County Board had no authority to consider Mr.
Lowe’s lack of experience.
The
cardinal
rule of statutory
construction
is
to
give statutory
language
its
“plain
and
ordinary
meaning.”
Vicencio
v.
Lincoln-Way
Builders,
inc.
204
Ill.2d
295,
789
N.E.2d
290
(2003);
Paris
v.
Feder,
179 Ill.2d 173,
177,
688
N.E.2d
137
(1997).
Despite this
well-settled
rule, Co-Petitioners contend that the language in 39.2(a) that allows county boards and municipal
governing bodies to consider the “previous operating
experience” of an
applicant does not in fact
mean what
it actually says.
Rather, Co-Petitioners contend that
section 39.2(a)
does not
allow
the County Board to
consider Mr.
Lowe’s “lack of experience.”
However, the plain language of
section 39.2(a) does allow county boards to
consider whatever experience an operator may have,
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whether it is good, bad,
a little, a lot or none at all.
Any other interpretation ofthat phrase would
defy logic and reason and
contradict the cardinal rule ofstatutory construction.
Co-Petitioners
also
seem
to
erroneously
suggest that
the McHenry County Board denied
siting approval and found that criteria (ii) and (v) were not met solely based on the “previous
operating experience”
and
“prior operating record” ofthe Applicant.
However, there are no facts
to
support
such an
assertion, and,
in
fact, when
viewed as a whole,
the evidence
clearly shows
that
the
County
Board
considered
the
unnumbered
criterion
only
as
one
factor
in
deciding
whether criterion
(ii)
and
(v)
were
met,
and
not
as the
sole
determinant
with
respect to those
criteria.
When providing
an
explanation of the unnumbered criterion,
Mr.
Heisten specifically
stated that County Board members did not evenhave to consider this criterion, andsimply polled
the Board
members
to
determine if,
in
fact, they
did
consider the
Applicant’s prior
experience
and
prior
operating
record when
deciding
criteria
(ii) and
(v).
(C.07244,
p.
19).
The
Board
members were never told that they
could
solely
base
their decision on those factors,
but,
rather,
were simply told that they may ormay not take them into consideration.
id.
The statements made by Mr. Klasen at theRegional Pollution Control Facility Committee
meeting
establish
that
the
Committee
members
clearly
were
not
basing
their
decisions
with
respect to criteria (ii) and (v) solely on Mr. Lowe’s lack of experience.
In fact, when Mr. Klasen
stated that he thought criteria (ii)
and (v) were not met, he did not even mention Mr.
Lowe’s lack
of experience but, rather, found that those criteria were not met because the facility was located
next to The Hollows, and
because he was concerned about spills that may affect the Hollows
and
other
areas
(C.07237,
pp.
15,
20),
Because
there
is
no
evidence
to
support
Co-Petitioners’
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contention that
the only
basis for the
County
Board’s decisions with respect to
criteria (ii)
and
(v), their argument should fail.
VII.
THE
MCHENRY
COUNTY
BOARD’S
DECISION
PROPERLY
SET
FORTH
THE
REASONS FOR ITS DECISION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 39.2 AND THE
MCHENRY COUNTY ORDINANCE.
For some reason,
Co-Petitioners fail to address in their brief paragraphs 4(d) and 4(e) of
their underlying Petition.
This
lack of discussion
bears
out the absolute ridiculousness of Co-
Petitioners’
argument.
In addition,
claimed grounds
for appeal
not
pursued or argued in a brief
results
in a waiver of those issues.
See
Ill.
Sup.
Ct. Rule 34l(e)(7);
Concerned Boone Citizens,
Inc.
v.
MIG.
Investments, Inc.,
144
Ill.App.3d
334, 344,
494 N.E.2d 180,
186
(2d Dist.
1986);
Albert
Warner
v.
Warner Bros.
Trucking,
Inc.
and Urbana
& Champaign Sanitary District,
1994
WL
163958,
PCB
93-65, n.3
(April
21,
1994).
Therefore,
Co-Petitioners
have
waived these
issues.
However, even if the Pollution Control Board addresses these issues, Co-Petitioners have
failed to demonstrate that the McHenry County Board’s decision was improper.
Paragraph 4(d)
alleges
a
violation of Section
39.2(e)
of the
Act,
which
states that
the
decision of the County Board
must be
in writing
“specifying the reasons for the decision.”
415
ILCS
5/39.2(e).
This argument has no merit, as case law clearly shows that so long as a decision
is
in
writing
and
a
record has been
made of the decision, neither
a
detailed statement
finding
specific
facts, nor a detailed explanation of the relationship between the
facts, the criteria, and
the conclusions is necessary.
E & E Hauling,
Inc.
v.
PCB,
451
N.E.2d
555
(2d Dist.
1983),
affd
107
Ill.2d
33,
481
N.E.2d
664
(1985);
Clutts
v.
Beasley,
541
N.E.2d
844
(5th
Dist.
1989);
Sierra Club
v.
City of WoodRiver,
1995 WL
599852 (Oct.
1995).
The decision can be framed in
the language
set out in the statute.
See
id.
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The McHenry County Board’s decision denying the siting approval for the transfer station
was
set
forth in Resolution No. R-200305-12-104, which contained a vote on each criterion.
A
voluminous record of the hearing, which
took place
over
the course of
13
days,
resulting
in
a
transcript
of approximately
4,000
pages.
Furthermore,
discussions
by
the
McHenry
County
Landfill
Siting Committee regarding each criterion took place.
Under existing Illinois
and PCB
caselaw, it
is
clear
that the
record supports the determination and
Resolution of the
McHenry
County Board,
and Co-Petitioners’ request to reverse the determination ofthe Board for failing to
set forth its reasons for its determination should fail.
Paragraph
4(e)
of
Co-Petitioners’
petition
alleges
a
violation
of a
County
ordinance;
however,
Co-Petitioners fail to even mention this
argument in their brief
Even if this
argument
is
considered,
case
law
shows
that
the
Illinois
Pollution
Control
Board
will
not
review
procedures employed
in a
siting proceeding to
determine if they are in compliance with a local
siting ordinance, nor will it compel performance of a local
ordinance.
See Residents Against a
Polluted Environment,
PCB 96-243, slip
op.
at 6
(Sept.
19,
1996);
Smith
v.
City of Champaign,
PCB 92-55, slip
op.
at
3
(Aug.
13,
1992).
Therefore,
Co-Petitioners’
argument is
inappropriate
and
should be denied.
However,
even it the Pollution
Control Board
decides to
examine this
issue, it
is
clear
that the County
Board’s
decision is
in
accordance with the
McHenry County
siting ordinance.
All the ordinance
requires
is
a decision
in writing in accordance with
Section 39.2
of the
Act.
(Mdllenry
County
Regional
Pollution
Control Facility
Siting
Ordinance No.
0-9412-1200-88;
attached to Lowe’s Petition for Hearing as Exhibit B).
Section 39.2 does not require a decision to
be
set forth detailing each and
every consideration ofthe Board in denying the application.
See
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discussion
supra.
The Resolution
issued
by
the County
Board
in
this
matter
is
obviously
in
writing, and complies
with the requirements of Section 39.2, as discussed previously.
Therefore,
Co-Petitioners’
argument that the Mdllenry County Board’s determination is
contrary to the local
McHenry ordinance is
inappropriate and without merit.
VIII.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Mdllenry County Board, respectfully requests that the
Illinois
Pollution
Control Board uphold
the County
Board’s decision to
deny
siting approval
to
Lowe Transfer, Inc.
Dated: September 2,
2003
Respectfully
Submitted,
RESPONDENT COUNTY BOARD
OF MCHENRY COUNTY, ILLINOIS
By:
~
~A,1x~)
‘One of its~ftorneys
Charles F. Heisten
Heather K. Lloyd
Timothy J. Leake
HINSHAW & CULBERTSON
100 Park Avenue
P.O. Box 1389
Rockford, IL 61105-1389
815-490-4900
37
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