BEFORE THE
ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
CITY OF CHICAGO
)
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT,
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v.
)
ACO3-11
)
RECEIVED
CLERK’S
OFF~CF
JUL
7
2003
STATE OF ILLINOIS
Pollution
Control Bocird
CITY WIDE DISPOSAL, INC.,
)
)
Respondent.
)
NOTICE OF FILING
To:
Edward W. Pirok
Frank &
Associates, Ltd.
734 N. Wells St.
Chicago, IL 60610
(viafirst class
US.
Mail)
Bradley P. Halloran
Illinois Pollution Control Board
100 W. Randolph St., Suite 11-500
Chicago, IL 60601
(via hand delivery)
Please take notice that on July 7,
2003, I filed the attached
Petitioner’s Post-Hearing
Brief with the Clerk ofthe Illinois Pollution Control Board.
Mara S. Georges
Corporation Counsel
Charles A. King
Assistant
Corporation Counsel
Chicago Department ofLaw
30 N. LaSalle St., Suite 900
Chicago, IL
60602
(312) 742-0330
Fax:
(312) 744-6798
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Charles A. King,
an attorney, certify that I caused copies ofthis notice and the
document referenced herein to be
served on the parties to
whom the notice is directed by in the
manner indicated above on July 7, 2003
BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
CITY OF CHICAGO
)
JUL
7
2
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT,
)
3
OF lLLlrv~
Petitioner,
)
flControj Board
)
v.
)
ACO3-11
)
CITY WIDE DISPOSAL, INC.,
)
)
Respondent.
)
PETITIONER’S POST-HEARING BRIEF
The City ofChicago Department ofEnvironment
(“CDOE”), by and through its
attorney,
Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel for the City ofChicago, submits this brief in support ofa
finding of liability on both charged violations in the above-captioned administrative citation.
As
is discussed below, the evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the respondent, City
Wide Disposal, Inc.
(“City Wide”), is
liable for violations ofboth sections 2l(p)(l) and 2l(p)(7)
ofthe Environmental Protection Act, 415
ILCS
5
(“Act”).
Background and Chronology
This is the second administrative citation issued to
City Wide for violations of sections
2l(p)(l) and 21@)(7) of the Act.
On May 23, 2002, CDOE issued an
administrative citation to
City Wide for violations ofthose sections, based on an
inspection ofCity Wide’s
facility at 3910
South Loomis Street in Chicago, Illinois, on April
16, 2002.
See
City of Chicago Department of
Environment v. City Wide Disposal,
Inc., AC 02-57 (citation filedwith the Board on May 29,
2002).
City Wide did not request a hearing to protest that citation, and
on August
8, 2002, the
Board adopted an order finding that City Wide committed
the charged violations
and imposing
the statutory penalty of$1,500.00 per violation, in accordance with Section
42(b)(4-5)
ofthe Act
(415 ILCS
5142(b)(4-5)).
See City ofChicago Department ofEnvironment v. City Wide
Disposal, Inc., AC 02-57 (August 8, 2002).
On August 28, 2002, CDOE again inspected City Wide’s South
Loomis Street facility.
Based on conditions observed on that date by CDOE’s inspector, on October 25, 2002, CDOE
issued this administrative citation to
City Wide.
On November 27, 2002 City Wide filed its
request for a hearing.
The hearing was held on June 3, 2003.
Relevant Law
The administrative citation charges City Wide with violations of sections 21(p)(1) and
2l(p)(7) ofthe Act (415 ILCS
5/21(p)(l),
(7)).
The relevant parts ofsection 21
provide:
No person shall:
(a)
Cause or allow the open dumping of any waste.
***
(p)
In violation ofsubdivision (a) of this Section, cause or
allow the open dumping ofany waste in a maimer which
results in any ofthe following occurrences at the dump site:
(1)
litter;
(7)
deposition of:
(i)
general construction or demolition debris as
defined in Section 3.160(a) of this Act.J
Several important terms in section 21
are defined elsewhere in the Act.
“Open dumping”
is
defined in section 3.305 ofthe Act (415 ILCS 5/303.5), which provides:
2
“Open dumping” means the consolidation ofrefuse
from one or
more sources at a disposal
site that does not fulfill
the requirements
ofa sanitary landfill.
“Refuse is defined in section 3.385 of the Act (415 ILCS
5/3.385),
which provides:
“Refuse” means waste.
“Waste” is defined in section 3.535 ofthe Act (415 ILCS
5/3.535),
which provides:
“Waste” means
any garbage, sludge from a waste treatment plant,
water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility or
other discarded material, including solid,
liquid, semi-solid,
or
contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial,
mining and agricultural operations, and
from community activities,
but does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic
sewage, or solid or dissolved materials
in irrigation return flows, or
coal combustion by-products as defined in Section 3.135, or
industrial discharges which are point sources subject to permits
under Section
402 ofthe Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as
now or hereafter amended, or source,
special nuclear, or by-product
materials as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (68 Stat. 921) or any solid or dissolved material from any
facility subject to the Federal Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977
(P.L. 95-87) orthe rules and regulations
thereunder or any law or rule or regulation adoptedby the State of
Illinois pursuant thereto.
“Disposal”
is defined in section 3.185 of the Act (415 ILCS
5/3.185),
which provides:
“Disposal” means the discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping,
spilling, leaking orplacing ofany waste or hazardous waste into or
on any land or water or into any well so that such waste or
hazardous waste or any constituent thereofmay enterthe
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters, including ground waters.
“General construction or demolition debris”
is defined in section 3.160(a) ofthe Act (415 ILCS
5/3.160(a)),
which
provides:
(a)
“General construction or demolition debris” means non-
hazardous, uncontaminated materials resulting from the
3
construction, remodeling, repair, and demolition of utilities,
structures, and roads, limited to the following: bricks,
concrete, and other masonry materials;
soil; rock; wood,
including non-hazardous painted, treated, and coated wood
and wood products; wall coverings; plaster; drywall;
plumbing fixtures; non-asbestos insulation; roofing
shingles and other roofcoverings; reclaimed asphalt
pavement; glass; plastics that are not sealed in
a manner
that conceals waste; electrical wiring and components
containing no hazardous substances; and piping ormetals
incidental to any ofthose materials. General construction or
demolition debris does not include uncontaminated soil
generated during construction, remodeling, repair, and
demolition of utilities, structures, and roads provided the
uncontaminated soil is not commingled with
any general
construction or demolition debris or other waste.
“Litter” is not defined in the Act, but the appellate
court has noted:
A person ofcommon intelligence can understand the term “litter.”
* *
*
Given its
ordinary meaning,
“litter” refers
to material oflittle
orno value which has not been properly disposed of
The
examples oflitter set forth in the Litter Control Act 415
ILCS
105
provide additional guidance.
Miller v.
Pollution Control
Board, 642 N.E.2d 475,
483
(Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist.
1994).
Section 3(a) ofthe Litter Control Act, 415 ILCS
105/3(a) (2000), provides:
As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a)
“Litter” means
any discarded, used or unconsumed
substance or waste.
“Litter” may include, but is not limited
to, any garbage, trash, refuse, debris, rubbish, grass
clippings or other lawn or garden waste, newspaper,
magazines, glass, metal, plastic or paper containers or other
packaging
construction material, abandoned vehicle (as
defined
in the Illinois Vehicle Code),
motor vehicle parts,
furniture, oil,
carcass ofa dead animal, any nauseous or
offensive matter ofany kind, any object likely to injure any
person or create a traffic hazard, potentially infectious
medical waste
as defined in Section 3.360 of the
Environmental Protection Act, or anything else of an
4
unsightly or unsanitary nature, which has been discarded,
abandoned or otherwise disposed ofimproperly.
Thus,
litter, for the purposes ofthe Act, “may include,
but is not limited to, any.
.
.
refuse, debris
or any thing else ofan unsightly.
.
.
nature.J”
Facts
The facts regarding the events underlying this administrative citation are, for the most
part, not
in dispute.
The
South Loomis Street site is leased by City Wide.
Hearing Transcript
(hereinafter “Tr.”) at
14,
38.
On the afternoon ofAugust 28, 2002,
CDOE inspector Lafayette
Robertson visited the
site, where he observed piles ofconstruction debris, concrete blocks, dirt,
wooden pallets, brick, and scrap
metal.
Tr.
at 8-9,
18-19;
Complainant’s Exhibit A
(photographs)’.
The material was dumped by a truck driver working for City Wide.
Tr. at 41,
50.
City Wide did not have a permit to operate
a waste disposal facility at the South Loomis
Street site.
Tr. at 13-14.
CDOE’s and
City Wide’s witnesses disagreed regarding the volume of
material dumped at the site (see Tr.
at 19, 40-41,
55),
but a minimum volume ofmaterial is not
an
element of either ofthe charged violations.
In any event, even according to
City Wide’s
witness, Mr. Barbara, approximately twenty cubic yards ofmaterial was dumped at the site.
Tr.
at 40-41.
Complainant’s Exhibit A, admitted into evidence (Tr. at 36), is the inspection report
prepared by Mr. Robertson after his visit to
City Wide’s site.
It includes copies ofphotographs
taken by Mr. Robertson.
The original color photographs taken by Mr. Robertson were attached
to
the original administrative citation filed by the City, and
are in the Board’s files.
5
Analysis
Dumping ofthe material at the
South Loomis Street site constituted “open dumping”.
As the photographs included in Complainant’s Exhibit A make clear, the dumping of
material at the South Loomis Street site was consolidation ofwaste
from one or more sources:
the piles ofwaste photographed by Mr. Robertson include a variety oftypes of construction and
demolition debris (bricks, scrap metal, wood, concrete) combined into a series ofpiles.
The
dumping furthermore clearly constitutes “disposal” inasmuch as the waste was placed out in the
open where it could enter the environment.
Under Section 3.185
(quoted above)
this is
sufficient; there is no requirement that the material be left permanently where dumped.
Thus,
City Wide’s subsequent removal ofthe material does not obviate the violation.
Finally, as noted
above, City Wide did not have a permit to operate a waste disposal facility at South Loomis
Street.
Thus,
all elements of“open dumping,” as defined in Section 3.305 ofthe Act
(quoted
above), are met: consolidation ofrefuse (waste) from one or more sources at a disposal site that
does not meet the requirements (including having a permit) for a sanitary landfill.
Open Dumping at the Site Resulted in Litter.
“Litter,” as defined in the Litter control
Act, includes “any.
.
.
debris..
.
or anything else of an unsightly.
.
.
nature.
.
.
disposed of
improperly.”
415 ILCS
105/3(a).
The material pictured in the photographs
included in
Complainant’s Exhibit A obviously falls into one, if not both, ofthese categories.
Put another
way, the pictured material constitutes material of little or no value (City Wide pays to
get rid of
such material;
see Tr. at 47-48) disposed ofimproperly, meeting the definition in Miller v.
Pollution Control Board,
supra,
642 N.E.2d at 483.
Because the open dumping at the site
resulted in litter, City Wide violated Section 2l(p)(l) of the Act.
6
Open Dumping Resulted in Deposition of General Construction or Demolition Debris.
The material dumped at the South Loomis Street site included “bricks, concrete, and other
masonry materials;
soil; rock; wood,.
.
.
;
and.
.
.
metals incidental to any ofthose materials.”
All these constituents of the waste dumped at South Loomis
Street are listed
in the illustrative list
ofmaterials constituting “general construction or demolition debris” in
Section 3.160(a) ofthe
Act (quoted
above).
As the photos in Complainant’s Exhibit A indicate, the material was
deposited on the ground.
Because the open dumping at the South Loomis Street site resulted in
deposition of general construction or demolition debris,
City Wide has violated Section 21(p)(7)
of the Act.
City Wide’s Asserted Defenses are Insufficient
City Wide claims that the open dumping at the South Loomis Street site occurred as the
result ofan “uncontrollable circumstance”.
The alleged uncontrollable circumstance was that a
language barrier resulted in City Wide’s driver failing to understand what he was told by City
Wide’s dispatcher.
Tr.
at 61.
This circumstance
is far from unavoidable; it could have been
avoided ifCity Wide had made even the most rudimentary efforts
to ensure that drivers and the
dispatcher could communicate.
Contrary to City Wide’s argument, the length oftime the debris remained on the ground
is
not an element ofthe violation.
In his closing argument
CityWide’s attorney cited to Rochelle
Disposal Service, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board,
639 N.E.2d 988
(Ill. Ct. App. 2d Dist.
1994), for the proposition that refuse must remain overnight to constitute a violation.
Tr.
at 62-
63.
This argument misapplies Rochelle Disposal.
In that case, a landfill operator received
administrative citations for failing to apply daily cover to the landfill, in violation of Section
7