BEFORE THE
    ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    CITY OF CHICAGO
    )
    DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT,
    )
    )
    Petitioner,
    )
    )
    v.
    )
    ACO3-11
    )
    RECEIVED
    CLERK’S
    OFF~CF
    JUL
    7
    2003
    STATE OF ILLINOIS
    Pollution
    Control Bocird
    CITY WIDE DISPOSAL, INC.,
    )
    )
    Respondent.
    )
    NOTICE OF FILING
    To:
    Edward W. Pirok
    Frank &
    Associates, Ltd.
    734 N. Wells St.
    Chicago, IL 60610
    (viafirst class
    US.
    Mail)
    Bradley P. Halloran
    Illinois Pollution Control Board
    100 W. Randolph St., Suite 11-500
    Chicago, IL 60601
    (via hand delivery)
    Please take notice that on July 7,
    2003, I filed the attached
    Petitioner’s Post-Hearing
    Brief with the Clerk ofthe Illinois Pollution Control Board.
    Mara S. Georges
    Corporation Counsel
    Charles A. King
    Assistant
    Corporation Counsel
    Chicago Department ofLaw
    30 N. LaSalle St., Suite 900
    Chicago, IL
    60602
    (312) 742-0330
    Fax:
    (312) 744-6798
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I, Charles A. King,
    an attorney, certify that I caused copies ofthis notice and the
    document referenced herein to be
    served on the parties to
    whom the notice is directed by in the
    manner indicated above on July 7, 2003

    BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    CITY OF CHICAGO
    )
    JUL
    7
    2
    DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT,
    )
    3
    OF lLLlrv~
    Petitioner,
    )
    flControj Board
    )
    v.
    )
    ACO3-11
    )
    CITY WIDE DISPOSAL, INC.,
    )
    )
    Respondent.
    )
    PETITIONER’S POST-HEARING BRIEF
    The City ofChicago Department ofEnvironment
    (“CDOE”), by and through its
    attorney,
    Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel for the City ofChicago, submits this brief in support ofa
    finding of liability on both charged violations in the above-captioned administrative citation.
    As
    is discussed below, the evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the respondent, City
    Wide Disposal, Inc.
    (“City Wide”), is
    liable for violations ofboth sections 2l(p)(l) and 2l(p)(7)
    ofthe Environmental Protection Act, 415
    ILCS
    5
    (“Act”).
    Background and Chronology
    This is the second administrative citation issued to
    City Wide for violations of sections
    2l(p)(l) and 21@)(7) of the Act.
    On May 23, 2002, CDOE issued an
    administrative citation to
    City Wide for violations ofthose sections, based on an
    inspection ofCity Wide’s
    facility at 3910
    South Loomis Street in Chicago, Illinois, on April
    16, 2002.
    See
    City of Chicago Department of
    Environment v. City Wide Disposal,
    Inc., AC 02-57 (citation filedwith the Board on May 29,
    2002).
    City Wide did not request a hearing to protest that citation, and
    on August
    8, 2002, the
    Board adopted an order finding that City Wide committed
    the charged violations
    and imposing
    the statutory penalty of$1,500.00 per violation, in accordance with Section
    42(b)(4-5)
    ofthe Act

    (415 ILCS
    5142(b)(4-5)).
    See City ofChicago Department ofEnvironment v. City Wide
    Disposal, Inc., AC 02-57 (August 8, 2002).
    On August 28, 2002, CDOE again inspected City Wide’s South
    Loomis Street facility.
    Based on conditions observed on that date by CDOE’s inspector, on October 25, 2002, CDOE
    issued this administrative citation to
    City Wide.
    On November 27, 2002 City Wide filed its
    request for a hearing.
    The hearing was held on June 3, 2003.
    Relevant Law
    The administrative citation charges City Wide with violations of sections 21(p)(1) and
    2l(p)(7) ofthe Act (415 ILCS
    5/21(p)(l),
    (7)).
    The relevant parts ofsection 21
    provide:
    No person shall:
    (a)
    Cause or allow the open dumping of any waste.
    ***
    (p)
    In violation ofsubdivision (a) of this Section, cause or
    allow the open dumping ofany waste in a maimer which
    results in any ofthe following occurrences at the dump site:
    (1)
    litter;
    (7)
    deposition of:
    (i)
    general construction or demolition debris as
    defined in Section 3.160(a) of this Act.J
    Several important terms in section 21
    are defined elsewhere in the Act.
    “Open dumping”
    is
    defined in section 3.305 ofthe Act (415 ILCS 5/303.5), which provides:
    2

    “Open dumping” means the consolidation ofrefuse
    from one or
    more sources at a disposal
    site that does not fulfill
    the requirements
    ofa sanitary landfill.
    “Refuse is defined in section 3.385 of the Act (415 ILCS
    5/3.385),
    which provides:
    “Refuse” means waste.
    “Waste” is defined in section 3.535 ofthe Act (415 ILCS
    5/3.535),
    which provides:
    “Waste” means
    any garbage, sludge from a waste treatment plant,
    water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility or
    other discarded material, including solid,
    liquid, semi-solid,
    or
    contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial,
    mining and agricultural operations, and
    from community activities,
    but does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic
    sewage, or solid or dissolved materials
    in irrigation return flows, or
    coal combustion by-products as defined in Section 3.135, or
    industrial discharges which are point sources subject to permits
    under Section
    402 ofthe Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as
    now or hereafter amended, or source,
    special nuclear, or by-product
    materials as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
    amended (68 Stat. 921) or any solid or dissolved material from any
    facility subject to the Federal Surface Mining Control and
    Reclamation Act of 1977
    (P.L. 95-87) orthe rules and regulations
    thereunder or any law or rule or regulation adoptedby the State of
    Illinois pursuant thereto.
    “Disposal”
    is defined in section 3.185 of the Act (415 ILCS
    5/3.185),
    which provides:
    “Disposal” means the discharge, deposit, injection,
    dumping,
    spilling, leaking orplacing ofany waste or hazardous waste into or
    on any land or water or into any well so that such waste or
    hazardous waste or any constituent thereofmay enterthe
    environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
    waters, including ground waters.
    “General construction or demolition debris”
    is defined in section 3.160(a) ofthe Act (415 ILCS
    5/3.160(a)),
    which
    provides:
    (a)
    “General construction or demolition debris” means non-
    hazardous, uncontaminated materials resulting from the
    3

    construction, remodeling, repair, and demolition of utilities,
    structures, and roads, limited to the following: bricks,
    concrete, and other masonry materials;
    soil; rock; wood,
    including non-hazardous painted, treated, and coated wood
    and wood products; wall coverings; plaster; drywall;
    plumbing fixtures; non-asbestos insulation; roofing
    shingles and other roofcoverings; reclaimed asphalt
    pavement; glass; plastics that are not sealed in
    a manner
    that conceals waste; electrical wiring and components
    containing no hazardous substances; and piping ormetals
    incidental to any ofthose materials. General construction or
    demolition debris does not include uncontaminated soil
    generated during construction, remodeling, repair, and
    demolition of utilities, structures, and roads provided the
    uncontaminated soil is not commingled with
    any general
    construction or demolition debris or other waste.
    “Litter” is not defined in the Act, but the appellate
    court has noted:
    A person ofcommon intelligence can understand the term “litter.”
    * *
    *
    Given its
    ordinary meaning,
    “litter” refers
    to material oflittle
    orno value which has not been properly disposed of
    The
    examples oflitter set forth in the Litter Control Act 415
    ILCS
    105
    provide additional guidance.
    Miller v.
    Pollution Control
    Board, 642 N.E.2d 475,
    483
    (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist.
    1994).
    Section 3(a) ofthe Litter Control Act, 415 ILCS
    105/3(a) (2000), provides:
    As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:
    (a)
    “Litter” means
    any discarded, used or unconsumed
    substance or waste.
    “Litter” may include, but is not limited
    to, any garbage, trash, refuse, debris, rubbish, grass
    clippings or other lawn or garden waste, newspaper,
    magazines, glass, metal, plastic or paper containers or other
    packaging
    construction material, abandoned vehicle (as
    defined
    in the Illinois Vehicle Code),
    motor vehicle parts,
    furniture, oil,
    carcass ofa dead animal, any nauseous or
    offensive matter ofany kind, any object likely to injure any
    person or create a traffic hazard, potentially infectious
    medical waste
    as defined in Section 3.360 of the
    Environmental Protection Act, or anything else of an
    4

    unsightly or unsanitary nature, which has been discarded,
    abandoned or otherwise disposed ofimproperly.
    Thus,
    litter, for the purposes ofthe Act, “may include,
    but is not limited to, any.
    .
    .
    refuse, debris
    or any thing else ofan unsightly.
    .
    .
    nature.J”
    Facts
    The facts regarding the events underlying this administrative citation are, for the most
    part, not
    in dispute.
    The
    South Loomis Street site is leased by City Wide.
    Hearing Transcript
    (hereinafter “Tr.”) at
    14,
    38.
    On the afternoon ofAugust 28, 2002,
    CDOE inspector Lafayette
    Robertson visited the
    site, where he observed piles ofconstruction debris, concrete blocks, dirt,
    wooden pallets, brick, and scrap
    metal.
    Tr.
    at 8-9,
    18-19;
    Complainant’s Exhibit A
    (photographs)’.
    The material was dumped by a truck driver working for City Wide.
    Tr. at 41,
    50.
    City Wide did not have a permit to operate
    a waste disposal facility at the South Loomis
    Street site.
    Tr. at 13-14.
    CDOE’s and
    City Wide’s witnesses disagreed regarding the volume of
    material dumped at the site (see Tr.
    at 19, 40-41,
    55),
    but a minimum volume ofmaterial is not
    an
    element of either ofthe charged violations.
    In any event, even according to
    City Wide’s
    witness, Mr. Barbara, approximately twenty cubic yards ofmaterial was dumped at the site.
    Tr.
    at 40-41.
    Complainant’s Exhibit A, admitted into evidence (Tr. at 36), is the inspection report
    prepared by Mr. Robertson after his visit to
    City Wide’s site.
    It includes copies ofphotographs
    taken by Mr. Robertson.
    The original color photographs taken by Mr. Robertson were attached
    to
    the original administrative citation filed by the City, and
    are in the Board’s files.
    5

    Analysis
    Dumping ofthe material at the
    South Loomis Street site constituted “open dumping”.
    As the photographs included in Complainant’s Exhibit A make clear, the dumping of
    material at the South Loomis Street site was consolidation ofwaste
    from one or more sources:
    the piles ofwaste photographed by Mr. Robertson include a variety oftypes of construction and
    demolition debris (bricks, scrap metal, wood, concrete) combined into a series ofpiles.
    The
    dumping furthermore clearly constitutes “disposal” inasmuch as the waste was placed out in the
    open where it could enter the environment.
    Under Section 3.185
    (quoted above)
    this is
    sufficient; there is no requirement that the material be left permanently where dumped.
    Thus,
    City Wide’s subsequent removal ofthe material does not obviate the violation.
    Finally, as noted
    above, City Wide did not have a permit to operate a waste disposal facility at South Loomis
    Street.
    Thus,
    all elements of“open dumping,” as defined in Section 3.305 ofthe Act
    (quoted
    above), are met: consolidation ofrefuse (waste) from one or more sources at a disposal site that
    does not meet the requirements (including having a permit) for a sanitary landfill.
    Open Dumping at the Site Resulted in Litter.
    “Litter,” as defined in the Litter control
    Act, includes “any.
    .
    .
    debris..
    .
    or anything else of an unsightly.
    .
    .
    nature.
    .
    .
    disposed of
    improperly.”
    415 ILCS
    105/3(a).
    The material pictured in the photographs
    included in
    Complainant’s Exhibit A obviously falls into one, if not both, ofthese categories.
    Put another
    way, the pictured material constitutes material of little or no value (City Wide pays to
    get rid of
    such material;
    see Tr. at 47-48) disposed ofimproperly, meeting the definition in Miller v.
    Pollution Control Board,
    supra,
    642 N.E.2d at 483.
    Because the open dumping at the site
    resulted in litter, City Wide violated Section 2l(p)(l) of the Act.
    6

    Open Dumping Resulted in Deposition of General Construction or Demolition Debris.
    The material dumped at the South Loomis Street site included “bricks, concrete, and other
    masonry materials;
    soil; rock; wood,.
    .
    .
    ;
    and.
    .
    .
    metals incidental to any ofthose materials.”
    All these constituents of the waste dumped at South Loomis
    Street are listed
    in the illustrative list
    ofmaterials constituting “general construction or demolition debris” in
    Section 3.160(a) ofthe
    Act (quoted
    above).
    As the photos in Complainant’s Exhibit A indicate, the material was
    deposited on the ground.
    Because the open dumping at the South Loomis Street site resulted in
    deposition of general construction or demolition debris,
    City Wide has violated Section 21(p)(7)
    of the Act.
    City Wide’s Asserted Defenses are Insufficient
    City Wide claims that the open dumping at the South Loomis Street site occurred as the
    result ofan “uncontrollable circumstance”.
    The alleged uncontrollable circumstance was that a
    language barrier resulted in City Wide’s driver failing to understand what he was told by City
    Wide’s dispatcher.
    Tr.
    at 61.
    This circumstance
    is far from unavoidable; it could have been
    avoided ifCity Wide had made even the most rudimentary efforts
    to ensure that drivers and the
    dispatcher could communicate.
    Contrary to City Wide’s argument, the length oftime the debris remained on the ground
    is
    not an element ofthe violation.
    In his closing argument
    CityWide’s attorney cited to Rochelle
    Disposal Service, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board,
    639 N.E.2d 988
    (Ill. Ct. App. 2d Dist.
    1994), for the proposition that refuse must remain overnight to constitute a violation.
    Tr.
    at 62-
    63.
    This argument misapplies Rochelle Disposal.
    In that case, a landfill operator received
    administrative citations for failing to apply daily cover to the landfill, in violation of Section
    7

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