ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
June 19, 2003
WASTE MANAGEMENT OF ILLINOIS,
INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
COUNTY BOARD OF KANE COUNTY,
Illinois,
Respondent.
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)
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PCB 03-104
(Pollution Control Facility Siting
Appeal)
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by N.J. Melas):
On January 14, 2003, Waste Management of Illinois, Inc. (WMII) filed a petition to
contest a siting decision made by the County Board of Kane County (Kane County Board or
county board). The Kane County Board denied by resolution WMII’s application to site a waste
transfer facility within the boundaries of the existing Woodland Landfill in unincorporated Kane
County.
A hearing was held in this matter before Hearing Officer Bradley Halloran at the Kane
County Courthouse, 100 South Third Street, Geneva, on April 16, 2003. Approximately 20
members of the public attended the hearing.
1
Tr. at 7, 16. Mr. Derke Price presented public
comment on behalf of the Village of South Elgin (South Elgin). Tr. at 16. Petitioner filed a
post-hearing brief on April 30, 2003 (Supp. Br.). Kane County filed a post-hearing brief on
May 12, 2003 (Resp.). The Village of South Elgin filed an
amicus curiae
brief (Am. Br.) on
May 12, 2003. Twenty-two members of the public filed public comments supporting Kane
County’s decision to deny siting after the hearing.
For the reasons below, the Board affirms the Kane County Board’s denial of WMII’s
application to construct a waste transfer facility at the Woodland Landfill site.
BACKGROUND
The Facility
Waste Management submitted a siting application with the Kane County Board
requesting approval to site a waste transfer facility on the southeastern portion of the existing
Woodland Landfill property. Supp. Br. at 2. The proposed site of the facility is located
approximately 1,500 feet west/southwest of the intersection of Illinois Route 25 and Dunham
1
References to the April 16, 2003 hearing will be cited as “Tr. at __”
2
Road in unincorporated Kane County, Section 1, Township 40 N. Range 8 E. C004837. The
property is 8.93 acres in size.
The proposed facility would have a footprint of 37,800 square feet, including a tipping
area, offices and primary and auxiliary loading areas. C004837. The facility would be used for
the consolidation and transfer of municipal solid waste, landscape waste and general construction
and demolition debris from residential, commercial and industrial waste generators. Waste
Management stated it would not receive special waste, soils, hazardous wastes, industrial process
wastes, pollution control waste, sludge, potentially infectious medical waste, special waste, poly-
chlorinated biphenyls, source, special, or by-product nuclear materials, radioactive waste, high
level or low level radioactive waste, transurantic waste, lead acid batteries or bulk liquid waste or
any liquid waste. C004838.
The facility would process an average of 2,000 tons per day (tpd) of waste materials, with
a maximum processing capability of 2,640 tpd. The proposed duration of operation is indefinite.
C004838.
Public Hearings
The Kane County Board held public hearings on September 17, 19, 24, 26, and 30 and
October 1, 3, 9, and October 10, 2002. C004837. Hearing Officer Patrick Kinnally conducted a
public informational meeting on September 12, 2002, to answer questions that citizens might
have concerning the siting process. C003138.
Waste Management presented six witnesses at the public hearing. Ms. Sheryl Smith
testified that the facility was necessary and was consistent with the Kane County solid waste
management plan. Mr. Andrew Nickodem testified that criteria (iv), (vii), and (ix) are
inapplicable to the facility. C004838-C004839. Mr. Nickodem also testified concerning
criterion (ii) and (viii).
Id
. Mr. J. Christopher Lannert testified that the facility was compatible
with the character of the surrounding area. Ms. Patricia Beaver-McGarr testified that the facility
was located so as to minimize any effect on the value of the surrounding property. Mr. Dale
Koekstra testified that criteria (ii) and (v) were met. Mr. David Miller testified that the traffic
patterns to and from the facility minimized impact on existing traffic flows. C004851-C004852.
Members of the public were allowed to participate by way of asking questions or making
an oral statement. C003165. Mr. Joseph Cluchey testified on behalf of the South Elgin
Countryside Fire Protection District regarding criteria (v) and (vi). His testimony neither
supported not opposed the application. C004161. Mr. Daniel Lynch, on behalf of the Village of
Wayne, presented testimony against the application regarding criterion (vi). C004209. Eight
members of the general public made oral statements and/or submitted various documents that
were admitted into the record at hearing. C004490. The municipalities of St. Charles, South
Elgin, Bartlett, and Wayne oppose the application. C004840.
Ms. Jennifer Sackett Pohlenz represented Kane County. Kane County also retained
Deigan & Associates, L.L.C. and CEMCON, Limited/Coulter Transportation Consulting, L.L.C.
to perform reviews of the application. C004224, C004353. Mr. Gary Deigan testified on criteria
3
(ii) and (v). Mr. Brent Coulter testified on criterion (vi). C004224, C004353. Both Mr. Coulter
and Mr. Deigan stated they were neutral towards Waste Management’s application.
On November 19, 2002, the Kane County Board called a special meeting to begin
discussions concerning Waste Management’s siting application. C004546-C004639. On
December 10, 2002, the Kane County Board deliberated and voted to deny Waste Management’s
siting application. C004642, C004826-4883. Twenty-three members of the Kane County Board
voted in favor of Resolution 02-431 denying siting, and two members voted against that
resolution.
2
The Kane County Board’s written decision includes Resolution 02-431 and adopts
the local hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law to the extent they are
inconsistent with a four-page memorandum prepared by county board member Dan Walter
(Walter Memo). C004826-C004883. The written decision includes the four-page Walter Memo.
Hearing Officer Order
Hearing Officer Kinnally found that Waste Management’s application met all of the
criteria required by Section 39.2(a) of the Environmental Protection Act (Act) subject to certain
conditions that he listed at the end of his findings and conclusions of law. 415 ILCS 5/39.2(a);
C004846, C004848, C004850, C004854, C004855.
Walter Memo
The Walter Memo is a four-page document written by county board member Dan Walter
to the members of the Kane County Board. In the memorandum, Mr. Walter explains why the
county board should deny Waste Management’s application to site a waste transfer facility at the
Woodland Landfill site in Kane County.
See
C004883. Specifically, Mr. Walter discusses why
the application does not satisfy siting criteria (ii), (iii), (vi), and (viii) of Section 39.2(a) of the
Act. 415 ILCS 5/39.2(a). To support his arguments, Mr. Walter summarizes evidence presented
at hearings and references Kane County’s solid waste management plan, Kane County Ordinance
01-281 (Rules of Procedure for New Regional Pollution Control Facility Approval), the Kane
County Solid Waste Transfer Facility Host Community Benefit Agreement (adopted by
Resolution 02-05 on January 8, 2002), and the Kane County 2020 Plan.
MOTIONS RAISED IN POST HEARING BRIEFS
Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief Instanter
On May 20, 2003, Waste Management filed a motion to file a reply brief instanter. The
Board grants Waste Management’s motion and accepts the reply brief. Kane County did not
respond to Waste Management’s motion to file a reply.
Motion to Strike Portions of Waste Management’s Post-hearing Brief
2
See
Kane County’s responses to petitioner’s requests to admit at page 1, filed April 7, 2003.
4
The Kane County Board urges the Board to strike portions of Waste Management’s
memorandum in support of the siting appeal that fall into one of the following categories: (1)
statements of fact or law made without reference to the record or citation to caselaw; (2)
statements of fact not contained in the record; and (3) inaccurate references to facts or legal
authority. The Kane County Board cites State Security Ins. Co. v. Ramon Soto Burgos,
et al
,
145 Ill.2d 423, 430, 583 N.E.2d 587, 550 (S.Ct. 1991), for the principle that statements in a brief
not supported by the record can be stricken.
While Kane County references several discrepancies between the parties’ arguments, the
Board will not strike any portion of Waste Management’s post-hearing brief. The Board finds
Waste Management has not made false allegations of the record or offered new evidence or
arguments regarding matters not discussed in the respondent’s post-hearing brief. Absent any
false allegations or new nonresponsive evidence or arguments, the Board will not strike any
portions of Waste Management’s post-hearing brief.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
An applicant for local siting must submit sufficient details describing the proposed
facility and demonstrate how it will achieve compliance with the statutory criteria. Local siting
approval will only be granted if the proposed facility meets all nine criteria listed in Section
39.2(a) of the Act. 415 ILCS 5/39.2(a) (2002). Here, Waste Management contends that the
Kane County Board’s determination that Waste Management did not satisfy criteria (ii), (iii),
(vi), and (viii) was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Those criteria require the
petitioner to show:
(ii) the facility is so designed, located and proposed to be operated that the public
health, safety and welfare will be protected;
(iii) the facility is so located so as to minimize incompatibility with the character of
the surrounding area and to minimize the effect on the value of the surrounding
property;
* * *
(vi) the traffic patterns to or from the facility are so designed to minimize the impact
on existing traffic flows;
* * *
(viii) if the facility is to be located in a county where the county board has adopted a
solid waste management plan consistent with the planning requirements of the
Local Solid Waste Disposal Act or the Solid Waste Planning and Recycling Act,
the facility is consistent with that plan. 415 ILCS 5/39.2(a)(ii), (iii), (vi), (viii)
(2002).
No later than 120 days after receiving an application for siting of a pollution control
facility, the county board must hold at least one public hearing. 415 ILCS 5/39.2(d) (2002). The
procedures followed in that hearing must have been fundamentally fair. 415 ILCS 5/40.1(b)
(2002).
Section 40.1(a) of the Act provides:
5
If the county board . . . refuses to grant . . . approval under Section 39.2 of
this Act, the applicant may, within 35 days after the date on which the
local siting authority disapproved . . . siting, petition for a hearing before
the Board to contest the decision of the county board . . . . 415 ILCS
5/40.1(a) (2002).
The petitioner has the burden of proof. 415 ILCS 5/40.1(a).
DISCUSSION
The Board will now assess the merits of the parties’ arguments.
Fundamental Fairness
The Board must determine whether the Kane County Board proceeding was
fundamentally fair under Section 40.1 of the Act. 415 ILCS 5/40.1. Proceedings at the local
level must comport with due process standards of fundamental fairness. Waste Management of
Illinois, Inc. v. PCB, 175 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1036, 530 N.E.2d 682, 693 (2nd Dist. 1988); Sierra
Club v. PCB 99-136; 99-139 slip op. at 5 (Sept. 23, 1999); citing E & E Hauling, Inc. v. PCB,
116 Ill App. 3d at 596, 451 N.E.2d at 564.
Waste Management argues the county board’s December 10, 2002 decision to deny siting
was the result of a fundamentally unfair procedure. Waste Management claims the procedures
were fundamentally unfair for the following three reasons: (1) because the county board
considered the Walter Memo, the siting decision was legislative, not adjudicative; (2) the Walter
Memo made inaccurate legal conclusions; and (3) the Walter Memo improperly considered facts
outside the record. The Board addresses each argument in turn.
Siting Decision: Legislative vs. Adjudicative
Waste Management argues that the county board’s consideration of the Walter Memo
rendered the county board’s decision legislative rather than adjudicative, and thus, fundamentally
unfair. Waste Management claims that siting proceedings under the Act are adjudicatory in
nature. Pet. Br. at 6; citing Land & Lakes Co. v. PCB, 245 Ill. App.3d 631, 616 N.E.2d 349, 354
(3rd Dist. 1993). Waste Management states that in adjudicatory proceedings, decisions must be
made only on the evidence presented in the record. Alternatively, in legislative proceedings, a
local government may craft rules of general application based upon facts and considerations that
may not have been presented at hearing, but are known to the decision-maker outside the hearing
process. Pet. Br. at 6; citing People
ex. rel
. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle, 202, Ill. 2d 164, 781
N.E.2d 223, 228-29 (2002).
Waste Management argues that the Walter Memo misapplied the law and misstated facts.
Pet. Br. at 7. Waste Management argues that the inaccurate facts and erroneous conclusions in
the Walter memo rendered the Kane County Board’s decision fundamentally unfair particularly
because the county board gave Waste Management no opportunity to respond to the memo.
Id
.
6
Waste Management contends these legal and factual errors rendered the county board’s decision
legislative rather than adjudicative, and thus, violated Waste Management’s right to a
fundamentally fair decision.
Id
.
Kane County argues that Mr. Walter is a member of the Kane County Board, and the
memo was a summary of his conclusions and opinions regarding the evidence. Kane County
argues Waste Management has no right to respond to Mr. Walter’s memo. Rather Waste
Management’s right to respond arises only during its statutory right to appeal the decision of the
local government. Resp. at 5. Kane County argues that absent a statute granting an applicant a
right to respond, no such right exists. Resp. at 8.
Kane County argues that even assuming the Board considers the Walter Memo evidence,
Waste Management waived any right to respond when Waste Management failed to object at the
December 10, 2002 Kane County Board meeting.
Id
. Kane County cites the Illinois Supreme
Court for the proposition that failure to object at the original proceeding constitutes a waiver of
the right to raise the issue on appeal. Resp. at 10; citing People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576-
77, 404 N.E.2d 233, 238-39 (1980). Kane County argues that Waste Management was present at
the December 10, 2002 meeting at which Member Walter read portions of his memorandum into
the record, yet did not object. Kane County contends that by failing to object, it follows that
Waste Management waived its right to respond to the memo altogether. Resp. at 11.
Kane County also argues the proper standard of review applied to the Kane County
Board’s decision is a review based on the manifest weight of the evidence. Kane County argues
that even if the Board applies the
de novo
standard, there are no inaccuracies of fact or law as
Waste Management claims. Finally, Kane County contends that “reversal” of the Kane County
Board’s decision is not the proper remedy under a fundamental fairness argument. Rather the
remedy for a lack of fundamental fairness is a remand to the Kane County Board to correct the
problem or hold additional hearings. Resp. at 28; citing Land and Lakes Co., 245 Ill. App.3d at
644; City of Rockford v. Winnebago County Board, PCB 87-92 slip op. at 203 (Nov. 19, 1987);
McLean County Disposal Co. Inc. v. County of McLean, PCB 89-108 slip op. at 5 (Nov. 15,
1989).
Legal Conclusions
Waste Management contends that the Walter Memo misstated the evidence relating to
criteria (ii), (iii), (vi), and (viii). Supp. Br. at 13-14. Waste Management argues these
mischaracterizations are fundamentally unfair because the county board relied on them in
deciding to deny Waste Management’s application. Kane County contends Waste Management
fails to reference a legal standard or incorrectly cites the one used by the Kane County Board in
presenting this argument. Resp. at 15.
Facts Outside the Record
Waste Management claims the Walter Memo relied on information not in the record in
arriving at certain conclusions. Resp. at 21. Waste Management concludes that this as well
made the Walter Memo fundamentally unfair. Resp. at 24. Kane County argues that whether or
7
not the Walter Memo contains inaccuracies does not matter because the Board must consider the
entire record, not just the written decision, when reviewing a local siting authority’s rulings.
Kane County states that here the record supports the Kane County Board’s decision. Resp. at 17.
Board Analysis
Waste Management challenges the fundamental fairness of the Kane County Board
proceedings based on the Walter Memo. Waste Management claims that: (1) the Walter Memo
made inaccurate legal conclusions; (2) misstated facts; and (3) because the county board
considered the Walter Memo, the siting decision was legislative, not adjudicative. For all of
these reasons, Waste Management claims the proceedings were fundamentally unfair. As
discussed below, the Board finds the Kane County Board siting proceedings were fundamentally
fair.
Waste Management claims the hearing officer
recommended
that the county board grant
local siting approval subject to certain conditions. However, the Board finds this is untrue. The
hearing officer may only make findings of fact or law, or both, and provide one of three
conclusions for the county board to consider: (1) approve the application as submitted; (2)
approve it with conditions; (3) or deny it. C004836-C004837.
Opportunity to Respond
. The Board finds that the Kane County Board proceedings
were not made fundamentally unfair because Waste Management did not havean opportunity to
respond to the Walter Memo. Parties to a siting approval proceeding do not have a right to
submit public comment or respond to filings more than thirty days after the end of the public
hearing. 415 ILCS 5/39.2(c). In Land & Lakes the court held that in the “site approval process
mandated by 39.2 of the Act, the public hearing is the only opportunity for public comment in
the entire administrative process.” Land & Lakes, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 642. Thus, Waste
Management’s “right to present its case (see Reply at 4)” ended 30 days after the end of the
public hearings before the county board.
Walter Memo
. The Board is also unpersuaded that the Walter Memo is evidence that
may have tainted the Kane County Board proceedings. The Walter Memo is a summary of the
testimony and evidence presented at the public hearings and in public comments, and the
recommendations of Mr. Walter. “[T]he decision of a local siting authority is not tainted merely
because it adopts the findings and recommendations of persons who may have some bias
concerning the merits of the siting application.” Land and Lakes Co. v. PCB, 319 Ill. App. 3d
41, 743 N.E.2d 188 (3rd App. Dist. 2000) (Land and Lakes II). The county board was free to
reject or disagree with the Walter Memo’s findings and recommendations.
Nature of Kane County Board Proceedings
. It is a well-established principle
that the local siting authority’s role in the siting approval process is both quasi-legislative
and quasi-adjudicative. Land and Lakes II, 743 N.E.2d at 193; citing Southwest Energy
Corp. v. PCB, 275 Ill. App. 3d 84, 655 N.E.2d 304 (1995).
Waiver
. Kane County argues that even if the Board finds that Waste Management
should have had an opportunity to respond to the Walter Memo, Waste Management waived that
8
right. Kane County contends that Waste Management heard Mr. Walter read portions of the
Walter Memo into the record at the county board’s December 10, 2002 deliberations, yet did not
object. Kane County states that a failure to object at the original proceeding generally constitutes
a waiver of the right to object to that issue on appeal. Resp. at 10; citing Fairview Area Citizens
Taskforce v. PCB, 198 Ill. App. 3d 541, 545, 555 N.E.2d 1178, 1180-81 (3rd Dist. 1990).
Waste Management states that a waiver is only effective if it is a clear and knowing
waiver. Reply at 6; citing Fairview, 555 N.E.2d at 1180-81. Neither party disputes that the
Walter Memo was presented to the county board on December 10, 2003. However, Waste
Management claims the record lacks evidence that Waste Management ever received, reviewed,
or heard any portion of the Walter Memo at the meeting. Reply at 7. Waste Management
alleges Kane County cannot prove that Waste Management knew of the Walter Memo or its
contents, and therefore, Kane County cannot successfully establish waiver. Reply at 7.
Conclusion
. The Board finds that the Walter Memo did not render the Kane County
Board proceedings fundamentally unfair. Mr. Walter’s memorandum is his summary of the
evidence and his recommendations, but is not evidence itself. The siting application, public
comments submitted to the county clerk, and testimony at the public hearings are all evidence in
the Kane County Board proceedings. The Walter Memo need not adhere to the same rules
required to enter evidence into the record. Accordingly, the Board need not discuss the factual or
legal errors that Waste Management alleges the Walter Memo contains.
Also, the Board finds that siting approval proceedings are both quasi-adjudicative and
quasi-legislative, rather than purely adjudicative proceedings as Waste Management argues.
Therefore, the county board’s consideration of the Walter Memo did not render the proceedings
fundamentally unfair. Finally, Waste Management was not denied an opportunity to respond to
the Walter Memo, as no right to respond to the memo arose. Waste Management was afforded
an opportunity to be heard, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to submit comments during
the statutory period. The Board finds the proceedings before the Kane County Board were
fundamentally fair.
Section 39.2(a) Criteria
The Act requires a party seeking siting approval for a pollution control facility to submit
sufficient details of the proposed facility to meet each of nine statutory criteria. 415 ILCS
5/39.2(a) (2002); Land & Lakes II, 319 Ill. App. at 45, 743 N.E.2d at 191. The local siting
authority considers the evidence presented and must determine by a preponderance of the
evidence that the application satisfies all applicable criteria before granting approval. Sierra
Club v. Will County Board, PCB 99-136 and Land and Lakes Co. v. Will County Board, 99-139
slip op. at 3 (consolidated) (Aug. 5, 1999); affirmed by Land and Lakes II, 743 N.E.2d 188.
2000).
When reviewing a local siting authority decision regarding the Section 39.2(a) criteria,
the Board must determine whether the local siting decision is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Sierra Club, PCB 99-136; 99-139 at 3. A decision is against the manifest weight of
the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident, plain or indisputable. Land and
9
Lakes, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 53, 743 N.E.2d at 197. All of the statutory criteria must be satisfied
before siting can be granted, and the manifest weight of the evidence standard applies to each
criterion on review. Concerned Adjoining Owners,
et al
. v PCB, 288 Ill. App. 3d 565, 576, 680
N.E.2d 810, 818 (5th Dist. 1997).
Waste Management argues that the county board’s failure to find that criteria (ii), (iii),
(vi) and (viii) were met was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the Walter
Memo misapplied the law and misstated evidence. The Kane County Board’s decision to deny
Waste Management’s application, with respect to meeting these criteria, will not be overturned
unless the decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
Several of the statutory criteria are inapplicable to Waste Management’s siting
application. Because the proposed facility is not located within a 100-year flood plain, criterion
(iv) is inapplicable. C004839. Criterion (vii) is inapplicable because the facility will not be
treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous wastes. C004839. Criterion (ix) is also inapplicable
to this facility because it is not located within a regulated recharge area. C004839.
Waste Management does not contest criteria (i) or (v). Kane County contends that
because the hearing officer found that the criteria were only met when subject to certain
conditions, the hearing officer actually found the criteria were not met. Kane County asserts it
follows, therefore, that based on criteria (i) and (v), the Kane County Board decision should be
affirmed on its face. Resp. at 2. However, the Board has held that an approval with conditions is
a definitive approval. Land and Lakes v. Randolph County Board, PCB 99-69, slip op. at 58
(Sept. 21, 2000). Because the Kane County Board adopted the hearing officer’s findings to the
extent they are inconsistent with the Walter Memo, and the Walter Memo does not discuss
criteria (i) and (v), the Board finds the hearing officer’s findings constitute a definitive approval
of those two criteria.
As stated above, the Board reviews the Kane County Board decision to determine if the
decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Board is not in a position to reweigh
the evidence. Fairview , 555 N.E.2d 1178. Therefore, the Board must decide if the evidence in
the record supports the Kane County Board decision that Waste Management failed to meet
criteria (ii), (iii), (vi), and (viii). Based on a review of the record and for the following reasons,
the Board finds that the record supports the Kane County Board's findings on these criteria.
Criterion (ii)
Criterion (ii) of Section 39.2(a) of the Act requires the applicant to show “the facility is
so designed, located and proposed to be operated that the public health, safety and welfare will
be protected.” 415 ILCS 5/39.2(a)(ii) (2002). The Board finds that the Kane County Board’s
decision that waste transfer facility will not protect the public health, safety and welfare is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Waste Management claims that no qualified witnesses testified that the design of the
facility is flawed as related to public health or safety. Supp. Br. at 25. The Walter Memo stated
that criterion 2 was not met because Waste Management’s application did not consider a traffic
10
study, did not consider the end use plan, a condition of the 1988 siting approval of the Woodland
Landfill, or the travel of trucks moving in and out of the facility. Supp. Br. at 26. Waste
Management contends, however, that the Walter Memo is not supported by the evidence in the
record.
Id
.
Kane County provides several reasons why Waste Management’s application did not
meet criterion (ii). Some of the reasons are as follows: (1) Waste Management’s proposed air
ventilation and carbon monoxide monitoring systems are at conceptual stages of design
(C003519-003521, C003557-003558); (2) Waste Management made no accommodation in the
building to attenuate noise (C003586-003587) and made no study to show whether the screening
it does propose would reduce noise (C003587); and (3) Waste Management did not address
existing off-site areas in its design of the stormwater management system. C003614, C003617.
Additionally, Kane County contends a letter Waste Management submitted from the Department
of Conservation stating there exist no sensitive resources in the immediate vicinity of the site that
is nearly ten years old. Resp. at 33; C00196-C00198.
In response, Waste Management claims the Kane County Board’s decision on this
criterion is against the manifest weight of the evidence because the Kane County Board relies on
an environmental consultant who lacks experience in the design and operation of waste transfer
stations. Reply at 26. Additionally, Waste Management contends the testimony of Mr.
Nickodem shows that Waste Management’s application complied with the Kane County
stormwater ordinance. Reply at 27; citing C003615. Waste Management also claims there are
no wetlands on the facility property, so it need not show compliance with wetland provisions of
the Kane County Solid Waste Management Ordinance. Reply at 27.
The Board notes that Waste Management failed to respond to several of the Kane County
Board’s reasons for finding that the application did not meet criterion (ii). Additionally, as
discussed above, the Board finds that the Kane County Board did not rely solely on the Walter
Memo in making its decision to deny siting, but considered all of the evidence in the record
including the hearing officer’s findings to the extent they are inconsistent with the Walter Memo.
See Resp. at 29-30. The Board finds, therefore, that the Kane County Board’s decision regarding
criterion (ii) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Criterion (iii)
Criterion (iii) of Section 39.2(a) of the Act requires the applicant to show “the facility is
so located so as to minimize incompatibility with the character of the surrounding area and to
minimize the effect of the value of the surrounding property.” 415 ILCS 5/39.2(a)(iii) (2002).
The Walter Memo stated the application failed to meet criterion (iii) for three reasons:
(1) the application ignored conditions imposed by the Kane County Board in 1988, specifically
the implementation of the end use plan for the Woodland Landfill site which consisted of a park
and recreation areas; (2) the facility drive will conflict with the future planned use as a park; (3)
Waste Management only evaluated a 1-mile radius around the facility rather than a 5-mile radius.
11
Waste Management presented two witnesses who testified regarding criterion (iii). Mr.
Lannert testified regarding the character of the surrounding area and minimizing incompatibility
with the surrounding area. Supp. Br. at 28. Ms. Patricia McGarr testified on the impact on
surrounding property values.
Id
. Mr. Lannert testified that the facility is compatible with the
surrounding area because of the existing industrial and business uses adjacent to the site, either
zoned industrial or B-3, that agricultural and open space is predominant in the area at issue, and
that screenings and buffers will improve compatibility. Supp. Br. at 29; C003244. Mr. Lannert
testified that the proposed end use will still be a passive recreational area and open space.
Waste Management claims no witnesses testified against criterion (iii). Additionally,
Waste Management claims no evidence supports the assertion in the Walter Memo that the
planned use of the property and the surrounding area will be “forcibly altered” if the facility were
approved. Supp. Br. at 31; citing Walter Memo at 4.
Regarding the size of the area evaluated, Waste Management contends that Mr. Lannert’s
evaluation of the area within a 1-mile radius of the facility is adequate because the Act does not
require a five-mile radius evaluation. Supp. Br. at 32.
Kane County contends the Kane County Board had ample reason to deny Waste
Management’s application based on criterion (iii). Among those reasons, Kane County asserts
that berming and fencing around the facility are important tools in minimizing incompatibility.
However, Kane County states Waste Management proposed no buffer on two sides of the facility
including the portion of the facility that would be adjacent to the Woodland Landfill recreational
end-use. Resp. at 37; citing C004481. Kane County also claims that Waste Management did not
propose an undulating berm, which Mr. Lannert described as “appropriate” and that “it just looks
better.” Resp. at 37; C003308.
Kane County also maintains that a county ordinance requires Waste Management to
study and submit information relevant to criterion (iii) on all property within a 5-mile radius of
the proposed site. South Elgin notes in its
amicus curiae
brief that Section 11-102 of the Kane
County Code petitions for siting new pollution control facilities and subsection 28(a)(4) of that
Section contains the 5-mile radius requirement. Am. Br. at 5. South Elgin alleges that Waste
Management noted this requirement in its petition, but Mr. Lannert testified that the report he
prepared for Waste Management studied only a 1-mile radius.
Id
.
Finally, Kane County argues that according to a 1988 siting approval of the Woodland
Landfill, Waste Management agreed that the end use plan of the Woodland site, adjacent to the
proposed waste transfer facility location, would entail a passive recreation area with trails and
open space. Kane County asserts that the waste transfer station would be incompatible with the
end use of the adjacent Woodland Landfill site. Resp. at 36.
In response, Waste Management contends it must only do what is reasonably feasible to
minimize incompatibility under criterion (iii). Reply at 28; citing File v. D&L Landfill, 219 Ill.
App. 3d 897, 579 N.E.2d 1228 (5th Dist. 1991). The applicant need not take all actions
necessary to guarantee that no impact or incompatibility occurs. Reply at 28; citing Clutts v.
Beasley, 185 Ill.App.3d 543, 541 N.E.2d 844, 846 (5th Dist. 1989). Finally, Waste Management
12
argues that where, as here, the undisputed evidence shows the facility is compatible with the
surrounding area, there is no need to propose measures to minimize incompatibility. Reply at
28; citing Tate v. PCB, 188 Ill. App. 3d 994, 544 N.E.2d 1176, 1197 (4th Dist. 1989).
The Board finds Waste Management’s use of Clutts is misplaced since the cited principle
does not refer to criterion (iii) of Section 39.2 of the Act. Additionally, Tate is unpersuasive
because here the parties dispute that the facility is compatible with the surrounding area.
The Board finds that the record supports the Kane County Board decision regarding this
criterion. Mr. Deigan, and environmental consulting engineer, testified that he has designed a
transfer station with a screening wall on all four sides of the facility. C004481. Waste
Management has proposed berming or fencing on only two of the four sides. Additionally, Kane
County presented evidence that a waste transfer facility is not compatible with a passive
recreation area or open space that Waste Management states it will implement on adjacent
property at the Woodland Landfill site (
see
Supp. Br. at 31). The Board finds that the record
supports the Kane County Board’s denial regarding criterion (iii).
Criterion (vi)
Under criterion (vi) of Section 39.2(a) of the Act, the applicant must show “the traffic
patterns to or from the facility are so designed as to minimize the impact on existing traffic
flows.” 415 ILCS 5/39.2(a)(vi) (2002). Mr Miller testified regarding criterion (vi) on behalf of
Waste Management and Mr. Coulter testified for the county. Both experts rendered opinions on
the impact of the facility on traffic flows. Supp. Br. at 33-34. The possible traffic patterns
discussed during testimony were: (1) Rte. 25 south to Rte. 64 east to Rte. 59 south; (2) Rte. 25
north to Dunham/Kirk, south on Rte. 64, east to Rte. 59; (3) Rte. 25 north to Dunham Road
south, to Stearns east to Rte. 59, and (4) Rte. 25 north to West Bartlett Road east to Rte. 59.
C004851.
Waste Management contends that under this criterion, the issue is not whether there is
any acceptable route or no negative impact, but whether any impact on traffic flow has been
minimized. Supp. Br. at 33; citing Fairview, , 555 N.E.2d at 1187. Mr. Miller’s preferred route
is one where trucks exit the facility and travel south on Rte. 25 to Illinois Rte. 64 and then travel
east to Illinois Rte. 59 (south route). Waste Management emphasizes that this eliminates the
need for trucks to turn left out of the facility and through the busy Rte. 25/Dunham Road
intersection. However, Waste Management stated Mr. Miller was not against the north route
either. Supp. Br. at 38.
Kane County sets forth several reasons why Waste Management’s application did not
meet criterion (iv). Kane County notes that hearing officer Kinnally, in the very first condition
listed on which approval of the application would be contingent, states “[t]he facility will not
open for waste transfer until the first of the following events occur: (1) July 1, 2006; or (2) the
realignment of the Dunham-Stearns corridor.” Resp. at 41; citing C004856. Therefore, Kane
County contends, the evidence does not support a single proposed route for transfer trailers other
than corridor realignment, an option that did not exist at the time of the hearings. Resp. at 41.
13
Kane County also cites testimony demonstrating why Waste Management’s preferred
route, the south route, does not meet criterion (iv). First, the alignment of Rte. 25 is curvy,
rolling, and hilly; it is a residential street with individual driveways entering and exiting directly
from Rte. 25; there is a tight turning radius at Rte. 25 and 64 and a downgrade slope on the
southern approach to that intersection. Kane County also notes that Waste Management stated it
would send most transfer trailers out over off-street peak hours, but did not provide traffic counts
for off-street peak hours at Rte. 25 and Dunham. Resp. at 40.
Criterion (vi) requires the applicant to show the traffic patterns are designed to minimize
impacts on existing traffic flows. Waste Management has failed to provide traffic volume
information on a critical intersection, Rte. 25 and Dunham. The record either lacks information
on traffic patterns or shows the traffic patterns are not designed to minimize impacts on current
traffic flows. The hearing officer did not find that either the south or the north routes proposed
met criteria (vi). Rather, the hearing officer found the facility should not open until 2006, or
realignment of the Stearns-Dunham corridor. The Board finds that the record supports the Kane
County Board’s determination on criterion (vi) of Section 39.2 of the Act.
Criterion (viii)
Under criterion (viii), the applicant must show the facility is consistent with the county
board’s adopted solid waste management plan. 415 ILCS 5/39.2(a)(viii) (2002).
Waste Management claims that strict compliance with the county board’s plan is not
necessary. Supp. Br. at 38-39; citing City of Geneva v. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc. v.
PCB 94058, slip op. at 22 (July 21, 1994). The Walter Memo stated that Waste Management’s
application did not meet criterion (viii) because Waste Management did not address one item of
the plan requiring the applicant to develop traffic characteristics of future growth. Waste
Management asserts that Ms. Sheryl Smith was the only witness who testified regarding criterion
(viii) and she testified that the application was not inconsistent with the county’s plan. Supp. Br.
at 39-40.
Waste Management contends that it substantially complied with the county’s plan and
that is all that is necessary. Waste Management claims it did not develop traffic characteristics
of future growth, but that this information is not required by statute and is arbitrary. Therefore,
failure to provide the traffic characteristics does not make Waste Management’s application
inconsistent with the plan. Supp. Br. at 40.
Kane County argues that requesting information from an applicant is certainly within a
local government’s authority under Section 39.2 of the Act. Kane County contends that not only
has Waste Management failed to produce the traffic characteristics of future growth, but it has
also failed to provide accident histories, as required by Chapter 6, Figure 6.2, Item VI.E of the
Solid Waste Management Plan Five Year Update, for two critical intersections. Resp. at 45.
Neither party disputes that Waste Management failed to provide traffic characteristics of
future growth, required by Kane County’s solid waste management plan. The record supports
the Kane County Board’s decision regarding criterion (viii).
14
CONCLUSION
The Board finds the Kane County Board proceedings regarding Waste Management’s
application to site a waste transfer facility on the Woodland Landfill site in Kane County were
fundamentally fair. The Board also finds that Kane County’s decision to deny siting was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at those proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Section 41(a) of the Environmental Protection Act provides that final Board orders may
be appealed directly to the Illinois Appellate Court within 35 days after the Board serves the
order. 415 ILCS 5/41(a) (2002);
see also
35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.300(d)(2), 101.906, 102.706.
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335 establishes filing requirements that apply when the Illinois
Appellate Court, by statute, directly reviews administrative orders. 172 Ill. 2d R. 335. The
Board’s procedural rules provide that motions for the Board to reconsider or modify its final
orders may be filed with the Board within 35 days after the order is received. 35 Ill. Adm. Code
101.520;
see also
35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.902, 102.700, 102.702.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, certify that the Board
adopted the above opinion and order on June 19, 2003, by a vote of 6-0.
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board