ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD 
April 3, 2003 
 
MINERAL SOLUTIONS, INC., 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
 v. 
 
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, 
 
 Respondent. 
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     PCB 03-39 
     (Permit Appeal – Land)  
 
 
 
ORDER OF THE BOARD (by G.T. Girard): 
 
       On March 6, 2003, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) filed a motion 
(Mot.) asking the Board to reconsider a January 23, 2003 opinion and order striking a contested 
condition from a permit.  On March 20, 2003, Mineral Solutions, Inc. (Mineral Solutions) filed a 
response to the motion (Resp.).  For the reasons discussed below, the Board denies the motion to 
reconsider. 
 
       The Board will briefly summarize the arguments put forth by the Agency and Mineral 
Solutions.  The Board will then delineate the standard used by the Board in ruling on motions to 
reconsider and the Board’s reasons for denial. 
 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
 
       The Agency asks the Board to reconsider because the Board “erred in failing to 
acknowledge, consider and discuss all arguments raised” by the Agency.  Mot. at 2.  The Agency 
maintains that the Board “neglected to consider an argument in” the Agency’s post-hearing 
 response brief.  
Id
.  Specifically, the Agency maintains that the Board did not discuss the 
Agency’s argument which addressed the possibility that the Board might find that the fly ash 
received at the Indian Creek Landfill was not a waste.  
Id
.  The Agency’s argument was that if 
the Board found that the fly ash received in 1996 was not waste then Mineral Solutions was an 
on-site manufacturing process generating waste.  Mot. at 3.  The Agency asserts that such 
activity is exempt from the permitting process under Section 21(d) of the Environmental 
Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5/21(d) (2002)).  
Id
. 
 
The Agency argues that since the Board’s finding was that the material accepted in 1996 
was not waste, failing to address the Agency’s argument “was tantamount to conceding the 
appeal to Mineral Solutions without having heard” the Agency’s argument on that key point.  
Mot at 2.  The Agency argues that if the case is appealed to the appellate court it would be 
advantageous to all parties if a “complete discussion and analysis of the parties’ arguments were 
present for review.”  Mot. at 4.  The Agency submits that failure to “consider” the Agency’s 
argument was error.  Therefore the Agency argues that the Board should reconsider the January 
 
 2
23, 2003 opinion and order to either reverse the Board’s decision or at a minimum discuss the 
Agency’s argument.  
Id
. 
 
RESPONSE TO THE MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
 
       Mineral Solutions argues that the Agency’s motion is based on a “mistaken belief” that 
the Board failed to consider an Agency argument because the argument was not mentioned in the 
Board’s opinion.  Resp. at 1.  Mineral Solutions states that this “fallacy is made even the more 
egregious when one considers that the location of [the argument on] this allegedly ‘key point’.”  
Id
.  Mineral Solutions states that the “key point” was “buried” in the middle of arguments in the 
response brief and was not raised in the letter or the Agency’s original brief.  
Id
.  Mineral 
Solutions asserts that the argument “should have remained buried since it is inconsistent with 
positions already taken” by the Agency in this “permit review and in previous permit reviews 
regarding this facility.”  
Id
. 
 
       Mineral Solutions also argues that the Board did not “neglect any duty” in issuing the 
opinion.  Resp. at 2.  Mineral Solutions asserts that the Agency has not identified any legal 
obligation or requirement that the Board failed to apply.  Conversely, Mineral Solutions 
maintains that the Agency did neglect to act in that the Agency’s failure to include in the letter 
the “perceived applicability of Section 21(d) of the Act” was a failure to meet a legal 
requirement.  Resp. at 2.  Mineral Solutions argues that the Board must confine the Board’s 
considerations to the decision of the Agency (Resp. at 2, citing Illinois Environmental Protection 
 Agency v. Illinois Pollution Control Board 86 Ill. 2d 390, 405 (1981)) and the Agency’s failure 
to include Section 21(d) of the Act as a reason for the condition on the permit means the Board 
need not consider the argument.  Resp. at 2-3. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
       In ruling on a motion for reconsideration, the Board will consider factors including new 
evidence or a change in the law, to conclude that the Board’s decision was in error.  35 Ill. Adm. 
Code 101.902.  In Citizens Against Regional Landfill v. County Board of Whiteside, PCB 93-
156 (Mar. 11, 1993), we observed that "the intended purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to 
bring to the court's attention newly discovered evidence which was not available at the time of 
hearing, changes in the law or errors in the court's previous application of the existing law.”  
Korogluyan v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 213 Ill. App. 3d 622, 627, 572 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (1st 
Dist. 1992).  For the following reasons, the Board finds that the Agency’s motion to reconsider 
presents the Board with no new evidence, change in the law, or other reason to conclude that the 
Board’s January 23, 2003 decision was in error.  Therefore the motion to reconsider is denied. 
 
       The law is clear that the Agency’s letter frames the issues on appeal.  ESG Watts, Inc. v. 
PCB, 286 Ill. App. 3d 325, 676 N.E.2d 299 (3rd Dist. 1997).  In this case the Agency issued a 
permit that was conditioned on Mineral Solutions receiving siting approval and a new operating 
permit because “the last time Indian Creek Landfill ‘accepted waste disposal’ was more than five 
 years prior” to the receipt of the application for temporary suspension of waste acceptance.  R. at 
0003.  This was the only condition challenged and the issue as framed by the Agency’s letter was 
what constitutes “accepted waste disposal” under the facts of this case.  The Board’s January 23, 
 
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2003 opinion analyzed the arguments regarding what constitutes “accepted waste disposal” and 
found that the Agency’s condition was not necessary to meet the purposes of the Act. 
 
       The Board did review, but did not and will not discuss, the Agency’s hypothetical 
argument that is unrelated to the issue as framed by the Agency’s letter.  The law requires the 
Board to review the Agency’s decision to determine if conditions imposed by the Agency are 
necessary to meet the purposes of the Act.  
See
 415 ILCS 5/40 (a)(1) (2002); 35 Ill. Adm. Code 
Section 105.204(a); Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. v. PCB, 179 Ill. App. 3d 598, 534 
N.E. 2d 616, (2nd Dist. 1989) and John Sexton Contractors Company v. Illinois (Sexton), PCB 
88-139 (Feb. 23, 1989).  Further, the Act requires that the Board make final decisions on permit 
appeals in 120 days (
See
 415 ILCS 5/40(a)(3) (2002)) and at most that final decision need only 
be a written decision stating the facts and reasons leading to the decision (415 ILCS 5/33(a) 
(2002) and 5 ILCS 100/10-50(a) (2002)).  Neither the Act nor case law requires that the Board 
discuss 
every
 argument raised before the Board and the Board sees no reason here to do so. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
       The Board finds that the Agency’s motion to reconsider presents the Board with no new 
evidence, change in the law, or other reason to conclude that the Board’s January 23, 2003 
decision was in error.  Therefore the motion to reconsider is denied. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Section 41(a) of the Environmental Protection Act provides that final Board orders may 
be appealed directly to the Illinois Appellate Court within 35 days after the Board serves the 
order.  415 ILCS 5/31(a) (2002)); 
see also
 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.300(d)(2), 101.906, 102.706.  
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335 establishes filing requirements that apply when the Illinois 
Appellate Court, by statute, directly reviews administrative orders.  172 Ill. 2d R. 335.  The 
Board’s procedural rules provide that motions for the Board to reconsider or modify its final 
orders may be filed with the Board within 35 days after the order is received.  35 Ill. Adm. Code 
101.520; 
see also
 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.902, 102.700, 102.702. 
 
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, certify that the Board 
adopted the above order on April 3, 2003, by a vote of 7-0. 
 
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk 
Illinois Pollution Control Board