ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
July 25, 1972
CONGREGATION AM ECHOD
)
# 72—202
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY
Dissenting
Opinion
(by
Mr.
Currie):
Am Echod sought a variance from our prohibition of new
sewer connections tributary to overloaded treatment plants in
the North Shore Sanitary District (League of Women Voters
v.
EPA,
#70—7, March
31,
1971)
,
asking to connect a one—family
residence to
a Waukegan sewer.
We dismissed the petition as
moot on the ground that we had allowed the
District
to
grant
additional connections on the basis of treatment plant improve-
ments.
North Shore Sanitary District v.
EPA, #71-343, March
2,
1972; Congregation Am Echod
v.
EPA,
#72—lI, April
4,
1972.
A
second petition was then filed, alleging that the District
coulã
not allow the connection because
the
sewer
transporting
wastes
to the treatment plant was itself overloaded.
The
Agency
re-
commended that the variance be granted because of hardship but
affirmed that the sewer was overloaded.
We ordered the parties to submit more information:
It
is our responsibility to balance the hardships of
a
variance denial against the harm that would occur if the
variance were granted.
We cannot intelligently do
so on
the present record, for we do not know the effect of
adding the wastes
in question to an already overloaded
sewer.
If,
for example, the variance would mean raw
sewage in somebody~sbasement7
a very great hardship indeed
would be required to justify a grant.
We therefore post-
pone decision pending receipt of additional information from
the parties as
to the adverse effects of allowing the
connection sought.
The petitioner~sresponse was that it was the Agency that
had originally designated the sewer as inadequate,
for reasons
undisclosed;
that the Agency apparently considered the effect
of an additional connection de minimis, since it had recommended
a grant of the variance; and
that
consultations
with
City
officials
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led to the conclusion that there was adequate capacity during
dry weather but that storm water infiltration caused overflows
to occur “when there is an exceptionally heavy rain.~ The
Agency disagrees with the assessment of an added connection
as
de minimis but adheres to its recommendation that the variance be
granted because the alleged hardship is “unique and severe.”
The
Agency gives us no facts as to the effect of the proposed connection~
saying only in general terms that
sewers designated
as inadequate to transport additional
wastewater were so classified because they are subject to
excessive flows from storm water runoff during periods
of wet weather.
These excessive flows result in illegal
bypassing of untreated wastes into the waters of the state
and/or sewer backups sending untreated wastes into the
homes of various individuals.
.
.
.
Any connections to these
inadequate sewers should be closely scrutinized and limited
since the number of such connections to these sewers is
bound to make the situation worse for individuals already
adversely affected
during
periods
of
wet
weather.
The alleged hardship if the connection
is refused, which is
not disputed,
is that
the Congregation~srabbi, who now lives
a
mile from the temple, suffers from a leg disability that makes it
difficult for him to walk and for religious reasons will not ride
in motor vehicles on the Sabbath.
The Congregation has built
him a home near the temple and wishes to connect it to the over-
loaded sewer to relieve his burden and that of his wife, who also
finds walking difficult during inclement weather,
in getting to
and
from
religious
services.
Our task is to balance this hardship, which granting the
variance
would
alleviate,
against
the
harm
to
others
that
the
grant would cause.
The test
is a strict one.
The statute
requires
a
showing
by
the
petitioner
that
compliance
with
the
law would impose an “arbitrary or unreasonable hardship,”
and
this Board has variously said that the cost of compliance must be
“wholly disproportionate to the benefits”
or must ‘1substantially
outweigh”
them.
See,
e.g., EPA
V.
Lindgren Foundry Co.,
#70-1
(Sept.
25,
1970)
(Opinions of Messrs. Currie and Kissel)
.
The
statute
is
clear
that
the
burden
of
proof
is
on
the
petitioner
to
show the cost of compliance
is arbitrary, and this includes
the
bur-
den of proving the adverse effects of granting the variance would
be small in comparison.
E.g.,
Norfolk
&
Western
Ry..
V.
EPA,
#70—41
(March
3,
1971)
In
our
opinion
of
June
20
we
expressed
our
concern
over
the
virtually complete lack of information before
us
as
to
the
adverse
effect of granting this requested variance and gave the parties an
opportunity to rectify it.
Unfortunately,
we know essentially no
more now than we did then.
The Agency has given us
its repeated
conclusion
that
it
views
the
adverse
effect
of allowing the
connection
as
small
in comparison with the hardship of having the
rabbi and his wife continue to walk the mile to and from the tem-
ple.
We value the
Agency’s advice,
as we are directed to do
under the statute, but the decision is for us to make, and we
cannot make it without the facts.
No one told us what will
actually happen
if an extra 300 gallons of waste per day,
as alleged
in the petition, are put into this overloaded sewer at times of
heavy rain.
If present conditions are such that a two-inch
storm falls 200 gallons short of putting raw sewage into someone’s
basement, then making this connection would mean that in such a
storm there would be 100 gallons of sewage in that basement that
otherwise would not be there,
Nothing in the papers before
us in any way rules out ~thispossibility.
Since the burden
is on
the petitioner to prove its case,
and since there is no evidence
to the contrary, we must assume that the connection would mean
sewage in otherwise clean homes.
And that,
I think,
is a prospect
we cannot view with anything less than horror.
I cannot say
it is clearly preferable
to put raw sewage in some innocent person’s
home than to have
a man with a bad leg walk to work and back on
days when his religion counsels him not to ride.
No mention has been made by the parties of
the twin
constitutional provisions protecting freedom of religion and for-
bidding the establishment of religion.
Even after rereading the
Supreme Court’s most recent explication of these clauses, which
appears to require special privileges for persons with religious
restrictions in certain narrow circumstances Wisconsin v.
Yoder,
92 Sup,
Ct. 1526
(1972),
I cannot believe that freedom
of religion goes so far as to include the right to injure innocent
people by putting raw sewage into their homes.
M~ichpublic attention ha~been focused on the problem of
sewaqe treatment,
and we have repeatedly stressed in our decisisons
the paramount importance of assuring that sewage treatment plants
are upgraded to provide the necessary degree of treatment,
See,
e.g.,
In re Water Quality Standards Revisions,
#R 71-14
(March
7,
1972);
League of Women Voters
v. North Shore Sanitary District,
supra.
The present case,
however, brings to light a problem of
potentially equal importance that has not been so prominently in
the public mind.
It does little good to build exotic facilities
to treat sewage if the sewers are too small to take the sewage
there to be treated,
Wastes discharged to an overloaded sewer,
as the Agency tells us in its supplemental recommendation in the
present case, overflow untreated into
a stream, or are backed into
someone’s home,
or,
as we saw in an earlier case
(School Building
Commission v.
EPA,
#71—247
(Oct.
18,
1971)),
into the streets.
The public health risks of such
a situation are obviously intoler-
able and inexcusable.
The answer to the problem of overloaded
sewers is not to grant variances allowing the problem to get worse;
it is to build decent sewers as fast as
is humanly possible.
It
is imperative that public pressure,
as well as the pressure of
refusing
additional
connections, he brought with all strength to
—4—
bear
upon
those
municipalities
and
other governments responsible
for inadequate sewers in order to eliminate this disgraceful
situation,
I
believe
the
variance
should
be denied.
I,
Christan
Moffett,
Clerk
of
the
Pollution
Control
Board,
certify
that Mr. Currie submitted the above dissenting
Opinion
this
25
day of July,
1972,
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