ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    October 31,
    1972
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
    #71-293
    v.
    15TH STREET AUTO PARTS and
    CLARENCE HUTCHINSON
    JOHN W. LESKERA, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, ON BEHALF OF THE
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
    MICHAEL CONSTANCE,
    ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
    OPINION AND
    ORDER
    OF THE BOARD
    (BY SAMUEL T.
    LAWTON,
    JR.)
    Complaint,
    later amended, was filed against 15th Street Auto
    Parts and Clarence Hutchinson, its owner, alleging that on June
    5,
    June 10, June
    28 and September 28,
    1971,
    and July 12, 1972, Respon-
    dent conducted an auto salvage business
    in violation of Section 9(c)
    of the Environmental Protection Act, by causing, permitting or
    allowing the open burning of automobiles.
    Complainant further
    alleges that on those dates, the operation of the facility caused,
    threatened or allowed the discharge of large quantities of dense
    black smoke,
    so as to cause or tend to cause air pollution,
    either
    alone or in combination
    with
    contaminants from other sources in
    violation of Section 9(a)
    of the Act
    (Ill.
    Rev.
    Statutes,
    1971,
    Chapter 111—1/2,
    Sec.
    1009)
    Hearings were held in East St. Louis on November 24,
    1971 and
    continued until September 28,
    1972.
    Such an
    inordinate delay
    is without explanation,
    and contrary to approved
    practice before the Board.
    See Environmental Protection Agency v.
    Acme Solvents Reclaiming,
    Inc.,
    et al,
    #72—288,
    5 PCB
    ,(Oct.
    17,1972.)
    Respondent operates an auto salvage yard within the corporate
    limits of East St. Louis.
    During the period covered by the com-
    plaint,
    Respondent salvaged parts from autos by means of both
    acetylene torches and mechanical apparatus.
    In this operation,
    certain parts of the car are removed and segregated for sale or
    other disposal,
    including the body and frame, seats,
    tires, wheels
    and engine block.
    Environmental Protection Agency witnesses testified to obser-
    vations of open burning on June 10,
    1971,
    June 28, 1971 and July 12,
    1972
    (11/24/71 R.16 and following,
    H,
    24 and following)
    (9/28/72
    R.5 and following).
    Respondept concedes that fires occurred on
    6—
    71

    each of
    these occasions although disagrees as to the extent and
    intensity
    (9/28/72 R.47)
    .
    The evidence with respect to the
    June 10, 1971 fire
    is meager,
    a member of the local
    fire department
    merely testifying that the department was called and the fire was
    extinguished in less than an hour.
    The fire of June 28, 1971 was
    extensive,
    requiring six hours to extinguish.
    (11/24/71 R.16).
    Black smoke billowed 300 or 400 feet into the air (11/24/71
    H.
    26)
    and flames were estimated to be six to eight feet
    in height.
    Several cars were observed burning on this occasion.
    (11/24/71
    H.
    28)
    A pile of rubber tires caught fire and smoke having Ringelmann opacity
    of
    5 was observed.
    (11/24/71 R.26)
    .
    On July 12,
    1972,
    another fire
    took place at which the fire department was at first denied access,
    and later permitted on the premises to extinguish
    it.
    This fire
    appeared to involve tires, and car seats that had been segregated and
    spread to include other automotive parts.
    (9/28/72 R.ll)
    .
    Dense
    black s~iokeand flames ten to twelve feet high were observed (9/28/
    72,
    H,
    16)
    Respondent contends that the fires have either been caused by
    vandalism or the use of acetylene torches which have now been dis—
    continued.
    (9/28/72,
    R.47
    arid
    56)
    Respondent concedes awareness
    that open burning was prohibited on the occasions when the fire took
    place
    (9/28/72,
    R,30) and that he had been told by representatives
    of
    the
    Environmental Protection Agency that his method of storing
    parts and tires created a
    fire hazard
    (9/28/72,
    R.47)
    .
    Respondent~s
    offenses are due to his negligent method of conducting his salvage
    operation and the manner in which materials,
    including those of
    a.n inflammable nature are arranged within his yard.
    Respondent
    has now segregated his operation from the adjacent property and has
    erected a new fence.
    He has also stated that he will take improved
    measures
    in the policing of his yard to prevent any recurrence.
    We have
    held
    in
    previous cases that negligent conduct of a salvage
    operation
    is
    sufficient
    to
    establish
    violation
    of
    Section
    9 (a)
    of
    the
    Act.
    See
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency
    v.
    Neal
    Auto
    Salvage,
    #70-5,
    1 PCB 7l(OCt,2d,
    1970) ,Environmèntal Protection Agency v.
    J.
    M.
    Cooling, #70—2,
    1
    PCB 85, (Dec.9,
    1970) ~
    v.
    Jesse N. Farley,
    Sr.,
    #72—267,
    5
    PCB
    ,(Oct.
    31,
    1972).
    Furthe
    more,
    conduct necessitating repeated calls for the local fire depart-
    ment constitute a violation of Section 9(a)
    of the Act, with respect
    to the causing of air pollution as defined in the Act.
    Fires
    necessitating employment of a municipal fire department
    to the extent
    caused by the Respondent clearly constitutes an interference with
    the enjoyment of life and property by others
    in the community.
    Furthermore,
    the evidence sustains the fact that the salvage yard
    is in the immediate vicinity of
    a housing project, whose residents
    have undoubtedly been affected by the sloppy operation of Respondent!
    business.
    We find that Respondent,
    by his negligent and indifferent opera-
    tion,
    has conducted his auto salvaging business in violation of
    —2—
    6
    72

    Sections
    9(c) and 9(a)
    of the Environmental Protection Act, with
    respect to open burning and the causing of air pollution.
    We
    assess a penalty in the amount of
    $1,000 and order Respondent
    to cease and desist the operation of his business,
    in violation
    of the statute and regulations.
    The intensity of the fires, the
    general sloppiness of the operation and the possible dangers
    to adjacent properties calls
    for the imposition of a penalty in
    excess of that assessed in
    Environmental
    Protect~2~Aencyv.
    Farley,
    supra, decided this day.
    This opinion constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions
    of law of the Board.
    IT
    IS
    THE
    ORDER
    of the Pollution Control Board that:
    I.
    Respondent cease
    and
    desist the operation of his auto
    salvaging facility
    in
    violation
    of
    the Environmental
    Protection Act and
    the
    Rules
    and
    Regulations
    Governing
    the
    Control
    of
    i~~ir
    Pollution.
    2.
    Penalty
    in
    the
    amount
    of
    $1,000
    is
    assessed
    against
    Respondent for violation of Sections 9(c)
    and 9(a) of
    the Environmental Protection Act,
    as found in this
    proceeding..
    Payment
    shall
    he
    made
    within
    35
    days,
    by
    certified
    check
    or
    money
    order
    made
    payable
    to
    the
    State
    of
    Illinois
    and
    sent
    to:
    Fiscal
    Services
    Division,
    Illinois
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency,
    2200
    Churchill
    Drive,
    Springfield,
    Illinois
    62706.
    3,
    Respondent
    shall
    take affirmative steps to secure
    entrance
    to
    his
    salvage
    yard against trespassers;
    such
    steps
    shall
    have
    the approval
    of
    the
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency.
    Respondent
    shall
    permit
    repre-
    sentatives
    of the Environmental Protection Agency to
    enter
    his
    premises
    at
    reasonable
    hours
    for
    inspection
    of
    the
    facilities
    to
    determine
    whether
    the
    operation
    is
    in
    compliance
    with
    the
    applicable
    statutory
    and
    regulatory
    provisions.
    I,
    Christan
    Moffett,
    Clerk
    of
    the
    Illinois
    Pollution
    Control
    Boar~,
    certify
    that
    the
    above
    Opinion
    and
    Order
    was
    a~opted
    on
    the
    ~/
    ~
    day
    of
    ~
    ~..
    ,
    1972,
    by
    a
    vote
    of
    ~Y
    to
    Cj
    7
    /~
    j
    ~
    777
    —3—
    6
    73

    .
    .

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