ILLINOI.S POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
November
8, 1973
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Complainant,
v.
)
PCB 72-78
GIL MIRANDA, d/b/a JO-LOCK AUTO
WRECKERS,
Respondent.
Nicholas
G. Dozoryst II, Assistant Attorney General
for the EPA
Gil Miranda appeared on his own behalf
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by
Mr.
Henss)
Respondent operates an automobile wrecking and salvage yard
in Lockport, Illinois.
The Environmental Protection Agency filed
a Complaint alleging that Respondent repeatedly operated his
business in such manner as
to cause or allow the open burning of
refuse and automobile appurtenances.
Respondent’s acts, according
to the Complaint,
were violations of Section 9(a)
and 9(c)
of the
Environmental Protection Act,
Rules 2-1.1 and 2-1.2 of the Rules
and Regulations Governing the Control of Air Pollution,
and
Rule 3.05 of the Rules and Regulations for Refuse Disposal Sites
and Facilities.
A hearing on this matter was originally scheduled for May 1,
1972 but was continued and rescheduled by the hearing officer for
June
5,
1972 because Miranda said he had not yet retained an
attorney.
On June
5,
1972,
Miranda failed to appear for the hearing
and attempts
to contact him by telephone were
unsuccessful since
the business phone had been disconnected.
In Miranda’s absence, the Agency presented its case which
rested solely on the testimony of Agency Investigator William
Zenisek.
Zenisek testified that he had investigated Respondent’s
place of business on April
29, 1970 and observed “about 4 burned
automobiles,
car bodies”.
One or two of the automobile hulks
were observed still smoldering
(6/5/72,
R.
5)
.
After receiving
a
complaint from the Will County Health Department,
Zenisek returned
to the site on March
23, 1971 where he observed “some cushions
burning”, and “the emission of very dense black smoke” at about
4:15 p.m.
He also noticed
“a second area that had been burned
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—2—
out”.
This appeared to be
a “burned out pile of salvage material”.
Zenisek suspected that the burned out area was the burn which had
been mentioned by the Will County Health Department
(6/5/72,
R.
9)
On April
28, 1971 the Agency sent a letter advising Respondent
that his activities were probable violations
of the law which
prohibits open burning.
Zenisek returned to the salvage yard on April
30, 1971
to
investigate dense black smoke coming from the site.
On that date
he saw the burning and smoldering remains of approximately five
burned out automobile cushions and three burned out tires.
Zenisek’s
report
(Agency Exhibit #4)on the investigation shows that he talked
to Al Usery, one of Respondent’s employees.
The report states:
“Mr.
Usery was surprised that there was burning
in the scrap yard and immediately spoke to one
of the workers to get water and extinguish the
fire.
Mr. Usery said that they try to be careful
to prevent fires but they occasionally have an
accidental fire in the yard which they try to
extinguish as soon as possible with water.
When
I left the site the fire was fairly well extinguished.”
On December
20,
1971,
at 4:35 p.m.,
Zenisek returned to the
site where he observed a small pile of material burning and what
appeared to be
a newly installed incinerator device.
As shown in
Agency Exhibit #5, dark smoke was coming from the stack of the
incinerator and a small
fire was burning in the salvage yard.
The
record does not indicate what actions Zenisek took after he dis-
covered
the fire on this date.
At the conclusion
of the Zenisek testimony,
the Agency moved
for a summary judgment and requested a penalty in the amount of
$1,000.
However,
the hearing officer reopened the record on
June
8,
1972 and Miranda appeared without counsel and pleaded his
own case.
He stated that he had not deliberately burned anything
at the site except in an incinerator which had not been used since
“one of them told us we couldn’t use it”.
Miranda indicated that
it was possible that some of his employees had set small fires
in
the winter time for warmth without his knowledge.
He said that
his operation generally closes at 4:00 p.m. and that he didn’t know
how the fires which had been observed after 4:00 p.m.
could have
started.
Respondent testified that after the Agency sent him the
warning he had issued orders prohibiting any fires.
On one occasion Miranda had observed smoke coming from
automobiles which another firm had delivered to his salvage yard
about 2 hours earlier.
Ills statement,
however, did not indicate
whether the automobiles were smoldering at the time of delivery
or if Respondent’s employees were responsible for the fire.
Miranda
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—3—
also offered to present data showing that the price he received
for his salvage materials was about 90~per 100 lbs. instead of
the 95~per 100
lbs.
payable for burned out automobiles.
He
received less income since he didn’t burn.
A later hearing
established that Miranda did send the data
to Assistant Attorney
General Nicholas Dozoryst but the stubs were never entered
as
evidence by either party.
Respondent stated several times that he did not burn for
salvage.
He indicated that a nearby tire business had caused
several
fires on his property and that one fire at night could
have been caused by vandalism.
Miranda testified that he has ceased operation at the salvage
yard and has released all employees.
He has reduced his automobile
inventory from 400 to 70 and will either sell
the operation or
continue as a parts operation only.
Nothing in the record proves that Miranda “caused or allowed”
open burning for the express purpose of disposing of unsalvageable
materials.
No proof was adduced to refute Respondent’s claim that
the open burning was accidental, caused by an adjacent business
firm,
or caused by vandalism.
There is no evidence that Respondent
failed to extinguish fires when he became aware of them.
The Agency failed to produce one shred of solid evidence to
prove that Respondent’s incinerator was operating outside the
Regulations.
We have only vague testimony alluding to the incin-
erator operation,
two photograohs,
one having the notation
“unapproved incinerator”.
This type of evidence is not sufficient
to prove
a violation.
Finally, although Pespondent was charged with a violation of
the Refuse Disposal Regulations, we find not the slightest hint in
the record that Respondent was operating or had operated a refuse
disposal
site.
Thus,
the Board is compelled to find that the Agency failed to
prove its case on any of the charges.
Accordingly,
all charges
against Gil Miranda are hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, Christan L. Moffett, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, h~rebycertify the above Opinion and Order was
dopted
this
t
day of
~
1973 by a vote of ____to~
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