1. However., we do not mean to minimize the importance
      2. In the instant cause, it appears that, although

ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
March 7, 1974
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Complainant,
vs.
PCB 73—193
FLEISCHMANN MALTING COMPANY,
Respondent.
Kenneth J. Gumbiner, Assistant Attorney General, on behalf
of the Environmental Protection Agency;
Thomas J. Regan, Attorney, on behalf of Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by Mr. Seaman):
On May 4, 1973, the Environmental Protection Agency
filed Complaint against Fleischmann Malting Company, charging
therein continuing violation of Section 9(a) of the Environ-
mental Protection Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 1ll—l/2,~l009(a)
(1971). A public hearing was held in this matter on September
4, 1973.
Respondent is the owner and operator of a grain
storage and processing facility located at 2143 West 51st Place,
Chicago, County of Cook, Illinois. Complainant alleges that
beginning on or about July 1, 1970, and continuing every day
of operation to the filing of Complaint, Respondent has caused
or allowed the discharge of gaseous organic emissions of such
characteristics and duration as to cause injury to the health
of persons living in the vicinity or to unreasonably interfere
with the enjoyment of life or property of such persons, in
violation of Section 9(a) of the Act.
On June 14, 1973, the Hearing Officer in this cause
ordered Complainant to furnish Respondent with a list of
witnesses expected to be called. Of this list, Complaintant’s
attorney stated as follows:
“Well,
it is absolutely true we did
not provide a list of witnesses, but I
orally advised Mr. Regan, and we weren’t
sure because of the time being taken up
by him procuring an expert, who would be
available to testify.”
11
443

—2—
“Any
time you have a number of citizen
witnesses who have their
own
jobs
and
so
on to attend to
and
their own businesses
to run, you cannot be sure on a particular
date, or ever,
if they will
be able to
appear.
And Mr. Regan
never advised me
it was necessary that he
jiave
that list
subsequent to the request
which
was filed
way back in
June.
It is
now
September,
although we talked
about it
many
times.”
CR. 5).
Respondent submits that it
was error to allow any
of Complainant’s witnesses to testify at the hearing
and
that their testimony should not be considered by this Board.
Rule 313(b) Ci) provides that the Hearing Of ficer
shall order the production of a list of witnesses who
may
be
called at a hearing upon written request by any party. There
is no question that Complainant should have complied with
the Hearing Officer’s order. It is for us to decide whether
Ccmplainant’s failure to produce the list of witnesses resulted
in such prejudice to Respondent that the testimony of Com-
plainant’s witnesses at the hearing should not be considered
in our
deliberation.
We observe, initially, that the effects of failure
to
comply
with Rule 313(b) Ci) must always be considered on
a case by case basis. It cannot be seriously contended that
the mere violation of Rule 313(b) (i), without
more,
constitutes
a fatal error in every circumstance.
Such a rule would be
tantamount to automatic dismissal for violation per se and
such severe application would not be warranted in every case.
However., we do not mean to minimize the importance
of the subject rule as a discovery device intended to insure
a fair opportunity to prepare for hearing and to avoid surprise
at the hearing. Certainly there
are
circumstances
under
which
non-compliance with Rule 313(b)
Ci)
would result in
such
extreme
prejudice that the Board would be warranted in striking
testimony.
In the instant cause, it appears that, although
Complainant was remiss in failing to tender the list of
witnesses before hearing, its failure was due to confusion
and
inadvertence, as will J~ seen below. Respondent’s position
at hearing was that Complainant should proceed with its
case-in-thief but should not be permitted to adduce testimony
relevant to the allegations of the Complaint. Respondent was
unresponsive to offers of continuance.

—3—
During direct examination of Complainant’s
first witness, Howard 0. Chinn, Respondent again objected
as follows:
“MR. REGAN: I will renew the objection
at this point as to his failure to supply
the list of witnesses. To the extent Mr.
Chinn is now directing any testimony toward
this complaint or what it purports to charge,
or any testimony relative to Fleischmann
Malting Company, we renew our objection as
to the witness.
HEARING OFFICER HORNE: Let the record
so state.
MR. GUMBINER: Let the record also state
that if Mr. Regan feels after today that he
would like a day to review the statements of
Mr. Chinn or to take his deposition, that we
would be glad to provide him with time to do
so, and recall r4r.Chinn at a later date.
MR. REGAN: I understand the hearing
has been convened. This is an adversary pro-
ceeding and we are a~issue, as I understand
the practice.
MR. GUMBINER: If Mr. Regan wishes to
withhold his cross examination until he has
taken a deposition, if he feels that it would
prejudice his case not to do so, again I make
the same offer.
MR. REGAN: I have no comment.
HEARING OFFICER HORNE: Okay.” (R. 14,15)
At the close of direct examination of Mr. Chinn,
the following, transpired:
“MR. GUMBINER: I have no further questions
of Mr. Chinn. But I would, for the record,
since I just recalled it with respect to Mr.
Regan’s objection to the list of witnesses, I
recall when I supplied him with the rather ex-
tensive copies of documents that I had in my
possession, that all the witnesses who are
going to be here today were listed on those docu-
ments.
11
445

MR. REGAN:
I object to
Mr. Gurnbiner’s
recall, and again renew the objection that
there is an order here on
the
State to
furnish a list of witnesses, which has not
been done.
HEARING
OFFICER HORNE: Let the record
so show.
MR. GUMBINER: Since the order did not
say written list of witnesses, I did orally
advise Mr.
Regan that the names of the
wit-
nesses would he on that list, that I could
not specifically tell him to limit the
list,
but that he
could
depose any of
the
names on
the list if he so chose.
MR. REGAN: Well, the legal argument now,
Mr. Gumbiner, is now settling the case down
to one of a cvc~~cv
t~
~ist o~~itnesses
I airect
‘ils ~te~:~
a Lccv s
atcvn—
tion to the Civil Practice Act of Illinois,
There are definite cvid. rules for c ~nducting
civil proceedincxs and t rials,
The iist of
witnesses is a written document, and
if he
misunderstands that order, I am sorry for that.
We do not
have a list ci witnesses, nor have
I ever been furnished the name of Mr~Chinn
as a proposed witness in. this case, no way, no
how. But I will get on with the cioss exami-
nation of him now that he is here and! we are
at issue.
MR~
GUMBINER: May I continue, Mr~
Home?
HEARING
OFFICER !iORNE: Yes. Please
do.
MR. GUMBINER:
I would just noint
out that
the rule that
applies in this case is
the Po-
llution Control
Board Procedural Rules,
and
not the
C~v~ racthre
Rui
Ru
entitled
“Discovery,~
says the heaninc officer
may, upon
written request of any narry~ re~u±rea list
of
witnesses
who may be called at the
hearing be
produced.
It says nothing about a written list.
MR. REGAN: Well, we submit that the counsel’s
understandingof the way the order is complied
with, apparently this isn’t a foiim to rectify
that m~suncvrst~rdcv cv
cvw, and
I take it the cvtcv
I t~me

—5—
for cross examination.
HEARING OFFICER HORNE: Right.
MR. GUMBINER: That is might.” (R. 24,25,26).
At the close of Complainant’s case—in—chief, the
following transpired:
“MR.
GUMBINER: We are on the record now,
and I would like to make the statetement that
throughout the proceedings preliminary to
this hearing today, discussions have been had
with Mr. Regan at a pre-trial conference and
elsewhere, whereat it was considered whether
or not the State should delay its case in
order to allow Fleischmann Malting time to
get an expert. That, of course, appeared
to be
a good idea
to the State, until it was
informed that it would take some months to
find an expert and then some more months to
determine—-for a determination by that expert
what would happen.
On Friday I received a hand-delivered letter
from Mr. Regan about 5:30 in the afternoon.
It may have been
delivered earlier, but that
is when I received it. It was a carbon copy
of a
letter
by
Professor First, and just in
general it outlined a rather extensive program
for determining the existence and cause of a
particular odor problem at
Fleischmann
Malting.
At that time I made the determination that it
would
be
in the State’s--to the State’s benefit
to allow that expert time to make a preliminary
study. I was not able to contact Mr. Regan due
t.o the
lateness of the hour and the Labor Day
weekend, and I figured it would be better, and
I assumed it would be acceptable to Mr. Reqan, to
delay this hearing until his expert had time to
make that preliminary determination and possibly
avoid protracted litigation in this case.
At this point I had three witnesses-—actually
there were four witnesses planning to testify
but one woman was unable to make it today. There
are other witnesses whom I advised not to come
today because I assumed that we would be giving
Mr. Regan the time he has been asking for up
until now,
So, for the record! I would like to make that offer
11
447

—6—
to
Mr. Regan to adjourn for some reasonable
period based upon that expert’s statements
as to determing the cause of the problem,
if there is one, at Fleischmann Maltinq. In
the event that is not the case, I would need
at least several days
to recontact these
witnesses and reschedule them.
If Mr. Regan
has people that are ~ere
today and would not
be available some other time, I suggest Mr.
Regan put those witnesses on now and I would
have no objection to interrupting my case to
do that.
MR. REGAN: The position of Fleischmann
Malting is that we are
here today in response
to a notice from yourself, Mr. Home, setting
the hearing,
and.
noting through the summer
months that a delay in the matter was apparently
Working a prejudice o~ some kind.
Accordinqly,
we are here today in response to a
hearing.
Ifthe State’s--I don’t know what
the
State is
doing.
I uflderstand this to be an adversary
proceeding. There
are penal sanctions to
the
Environmental Protection Act. This Board has the
authority to levy a fine and to issue the
highest of chancery edicts, a cease and desist
order.
I view this as an adversary proceeding and I
have come prepared! with my people today. I don’t
need gratuitous offers from the State that they
are going to continue it.” (R. 60,61,62).
Finally, Respondent’s attorney stated as follows:
“MR. REGAN: Well, this gets too lawyer-like.
If the State is resting, I have to rethink my
entire proceedino. If they are going to continue
or make a motion for a continuance here, we are
going to object to it.” (R. 74)
It is apparent from the tenor of the Record that
Respondent’s numerous objections were calculated to place
Complainant in the position of proceeding with its case-in-
chief without the testimonial constituents thereof, Respondent
objected on numerous occasions to a continuance. (P. 67)
At the very inception of the hearing, Hearing Off~:.:~cv
Home inquired:

—7—
“HEARING OFFICER HORNE: Do you think
your case would be prejudiced by not having
the list of witnesses?
MR. REGAN: I am entitled to take the
depositions of all the witnesses.
HEARING OFFICER HORNE: Well, I think
we will have to go on with this hearing.
I think that your objection will be made
a part of the record and the Board will take
note of that.
Any other objections before we start, or any
other motions?
MR. REGAN: I have none, Mr. Home.”
(P. 5,6)
Mr. Began’s answer was clearly unresponsive to Mm,
Home’s question.
Finally, at the close of Complainant’s case—in—
chief, Respondent’s counsel stated as follows:
“HEARING OFFICER BORNE: What is your
objection?
MR. BEGAN: I respectfully object to any
continuance of the hearinq, I am here ready
to go forward, despite the procedural failure
of the State to give us any list of witnesses.
We don’t know what the people are going to
testify, but now that we have heard their testi-
mony, we are prepared to make our legal argu-
ment on the basis of that testimony.” CR. 67).
We note that hearings on matters before this Board
are certainly adversary proceedings, and that attorneys for
the respective parties are obliged to develop and pursue
such tactics as are legally available to them to best serve
the interests of their clients. Counsel for Respondent has
argued this point of law with skill and vigor; however,
the testimonial evidence objected to will be allowed and
considered by this Board.
11
449

—8—
Respondent is in the business of making malt.
Malt is made by soaking grain in water and allowing it
to germinate. Respondent drys the germinated grain by
forcing warm air through it and out certain vents. Mr.
Howard 0. Chinn, Chief Engineer for the Environmental
Control Div’ision of the Illinois Attorney General’s Office
and a registered professional engineer, testified that
he visited Respondent’s facility in July of 1973 and
toured the plant. Mr. Chinn observed six roof ports on
top of the building exhausting warm, moist air which had
a musty, ~damp odor. (R. 16). Mr. Chinn testified to the
odor and the technological feasibility of controlling same.
(R. 17—20)
Three citizen witnesses testified regarding
the
odors emanating from Respondent’s facility. Caroline
Blaha lives 1/2 block from Respondent’s facility and has
lived there for 32 years. She testified to: “Gassy smells,
and then sour smells and like malt smell. Really bad
malt smell.” (R. 43). Mrs.Etaha testified that she smells
the odors almost every day and is frequently forced into
her house so that she cannot enjoy
her backyard. (R. 45)
Respondent attempted to rebut
the testimony of
Mrs. Blaha by presenting the testimony of Mr. Gordon D.
Foster, Respondent’s Executive Vice President, who stated
that Respondent’s facility was shut down during the summer-
time. Mrs. Blaha had testified that she could smell the
odors almost every day. However,’while it
is
true that
Respondent does not operate during the summertime, it is also
true that Respondent devotes this off-time to cleaning its
malting chambers.
CR. 141)
Margaret Koscielski also lives within 1/2 block
of Respondent’s facility and has
lived~there for over six
years. (R. 48)
.
Mrs. Koscielski testtfied to a continual
“awful moldy odor” which is sometimes of such intensity that
she has actually become nausiated. (P. 49). In an attempt
to alleviate the effects of the odor, Mrs. Koscielski bought
an air conditioner as soon as she could afford it.
CR. 49)
She also stated that she was bothered by the odors during
the summer months.
Mr. Joseph Kernic testified that he has lived across
the street from Respondent’s facility on and off for fifty-
two years. CR. 55). Mr. Kemnic stated that not only does
he get a smell “like home brew fermenting but also periodi-
cally puffs of sulphur come out of Respondent’s roof.” (R.
Respondent had stipulated to the testimony of
five additional citizen
witnesses whose testimony is sub—
11 —450

—9—
stantially the same
as
set out above. Now, Respondent
objects to consideration of that stipulated testimony,
because the list of witnesses was not presented before
the hearing began. We have previously ruled on this
question and will, accordingly, accept the stipulated
testimony.
Respondent’s witness. Robert
S. Kelly, is ~ñ
investigator hired by the Respondent to determine the
number of living units within one city block in each
direction froni Respondent’s facility. He testified
“Just in round figures it is in the neighborhood of 360.”
CR. 128) and that “I was about to say approximately
3.6 or 3.5 individuals per dwelling which would put the
number of people residing in that area in the neighborhood
of 1,100 or 1,200 people,” CR. 131).
It is apparent, even taking the population
estimate by Mr. Kelly as true, that Respondent has mis-
interpreted the nature of the Environmental Protection Act.
The Act does not say every person in a neighborhood must
be affected (or come in and testify for that matter).
what the Act does say is that Respondent cannot
unreasonably
interfere with the enjoyment of life or property. The
question is not t~enumber of peoplebut the unreasonable-
ness of the interferences.
Respondent has spent $125,000.00 for a baghouse
at its facility,
but nothing for odOr control.
(R. 101)
We are satisfied that Respondent violated Section
9(a) of the Act by unreasonably interfering and continuing
to unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of life of
citizens in the environs of its facility.
This Opinion constitutes the findings of fact
and conclusions of law of the Board.
IT IS THE ORDER of the Pollution CQntrol Board
that Respondent shall:
1. Within 60 days of the date of this Order cease
and desist violation of Section 9(a) or file with the Agency
a statement detailing the abatement procedures it intends
to implement. In no event shall Respondent achieve compliance
later than 180 days from the date of this Order.
2. Pay to the State of Illinois the sum of $1,000.00
within 35 days from the date of this Order. Penalty payment
by certified check or money order payable
to the State of
Illinois shall be made to: Fiscal Services Division, Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency, 2200 Churchill Road, Spring-
field, Illinois 627.06.
1-1
—451

—10—
Mr. Marder dissents.
I,
Christan L. Moffett, Clerk
of
the Illinois
Pollution Control Board, certify that the above Opinion
and Order was adopted on this
__________
day of
~
1974 by a vote of
~

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