ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    May 15, 1997
    EDWARD M. PEARL,
    Complainant,
    v.
    BICOASTAL CORPORATION, SINGER
    CORPORATION, and EATON
    CORPORATION,
    Respondents.
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    PCB 96-265
    (Enforcement - Land)
    ORDER OF THE BOARD (by J. Yi):
    This matter is before the Board pursuant to several motions filed by complainant,
    Edward M. Pearl (Pearl or complainant), and respondent, Eaton Corporation (Eaton). Eaton
    filed a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment and a motion for oral argument on
    April 21, 1997. The Board notes that Bicoastal Corporation (Bicoastal) and Singer
    Corporation (Singer) are still a named respondents in this matter, but did not join Eaton's
    motions. On April 28, 1997, complainant filed two motions: a motion for clarification of the
    Board's April 3 order which granted a stay in this matter, and a motion for an extension of
    time to file a response to Eaton's motions which was directed to the Board's hearing officer in
    this matter, Deborah Frank. Additionally, Eaton sent a letter, dated May 2, 1997, to the
    Board member assigned to this matter in response to complainant's filings.
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    Finally,
    complainant filed a motion for leave to file instanter additional statements in support of the
    motion for clarification and the motion for an extension of time to file a response on May 7,
    1997.
    Today the Board reserves ruling on Eaton's motions, but will address complainant's
    motions. For the reasons stated below, the Board lifts the stay granted in the April 3 order in
    this matter, denies the motion for clarification, grants complainant an extension of time to
    respond to Eaton's pending motions, and denies complainant's motion for leave to file instanter
    statements in support of its motions for clarification and extension of time. Additionally, the
    Board directs the complainant to address whether Bicoastal and Singer should remain
    respondents in this matter.
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    The complainant's motion for clarification will be referred to as (Clarification at );
    complainant's motion for an extension of time will be referenced to as (Extension at ); and
    Eaton's letter will be referred to as (Resp. at .)

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    MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
    On April 28, 1997 complainant filed a motion for clarification of the Board's April 3,
    1997 order. In its motion, complainant states that "[d]espite the stay and without any
    discovery being undertaken, Eaton now moves, again, to dismiss and for summary judgment."
    (Clarification at 2.) Furthermore, complainant states that:
    Given the fact of the pending stay, Complainant is uncertain how to respond to
    Eaton's motion. For instance, given the need for discovery, should
    Complainant now undertake discovery in response to the motions, or does the
    Board intend to rule on the motions in six months, when the stay expires?
    (Clarification at 2)
    Complainant requests the Board to clarify the order and to give direction as to whether
    complainant should undertake necessary discovery now, or wait until the stay expires in six
    months. (Clarification at 2.)
    On May 2, 1997 Eaton sent a letter to the Board member assigned to this matter. This
    letter was not properly filed with the Board pursuant to the Board's procedural rules.
    Additionally, the Board notes that it is improper for parties to individually contact Board
    members concerning contested case proceedings. (See 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.200, Ex Parte
    Contacts.) Nevertheless, the Board will treat the letter as a properly filed response to
    complainant's motions since Eaton does have the right to respond to complainant's motions.
    (See 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.140.) Eaton asserts that its filings are appropriate and cites to the
    language on page 8 of the April 3 order which states “the parties may file any other
    appropriate motion(s) to address any change in circumstances during the period of the stay.”
    (Resp. at 1.) Furthermore, Eaton states that the April 3 order is perfectly clear and that the
    motion for clarification "is just as disingenuous, and just as abusive of the Board’s process, as
    the underlying Complaint." (Resp. at 1.) Eaton concludes by requesting that the motion be
    stricken. (Resp. at 1.)
    MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME
    Also on April 28, 1997, complainant filed a motion for an extension of time to respond
    to Eaton's April 21, 1997 motions which was directed to the Board's hearing officer. In the
    motion for an extension of time complainant states that due to the uncertainty of the Board's
    meaning of its April 3 order granting a stay in the matter and its motion seeking clarification,
    complainant requests an extension of time "at least until after the Board responds to
    Complainant's Motion for Clarification". (Extension at 2.) However, complainant also
    requests adequate time to conduct and conclude appropriate discovery if the Board rules on
    Eaton's motions prior to the close of the six month stay. (Extension at 2.)
    In response, Eaton simply states that "[f]iling a frivolous motion such as a 'Motion for
    Clarification,' and then using it as a pretext for a 'Motion for Extension of Time,' and all of
    this in response to a motion to dismiss that contains serious allegations of professional

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    misconduct, is equally disingenuous and abusive of the Board’s process." (Resp. at 2.)
    Additionally, Eaton requests that the motion be stricken. (Resp. at 2.)
    DISCUSSION
    The Board denies the complainant's motion for leave to file instanter additional
    statements in support of the motions for clarification and extension of time. Complainant does
    not state how it will prejudiced by Eaton's response and in fact states that Eaton has the right
    to file a response under the Board procedural regulations. The Board finds that complainant
    will not be prejudiced if not allowed to reply to Eaton's May 2, 1997 filing.
    The Board's April 3, 1997 order in this matter was properly interpreted by both parties
    in that we granted a stay in the matter pending some action by the parties based on a change in
    circumstances. In that order, we interpreted the parties' desired stay as a request to stay
    hearings and other associated proceedings, such as discovery, in the matter until circumstances
    changed so that either party felt that it was appropriate and necessary to restart the
    proceedings. The Board envisioned any of number of situations, including but not limited to
    action in the matter filed in the District Court of the Northern District of Illinois, Western
    Division (Federal Complaint) on January 10, 1997; Eaton's motions are appropriate. Thus,
    the Board will lift the stay in this matter and rule on the motions filed by Eaton in the time
    frame as established in this order. Since the Board's April 3, 1997 order does not need
    clarification the complainant's motion is denied.
    Having removed the stay in this matter the Board finds it appropriate for discovery to
    take place in this matter prior to ruling on Eaton's motions. Therefore, the Board grants the
    parties 90 days to conduct any appropriate discovery and for the complainant to file a response
    to the motions filed by Eaton. The complainant's response is due on or before August 13,
    1997. The Board directs the hearing officer to schedule any discovery matters in accordance
    with this order.
    The Board notes that the stay in this matter has been lifted for all parties including
    Bicoastal and Singer. Neither Bicoastal nor Singer have been active in this matter since a letter
    of October 16, 1996 and neither has joined in Eaton's motions. In the
    letter, that was sent to
    the attorney of complainant, it explained that the Singer changed its name to Bicoastal and that it
    filed for Bankruptcy in United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida. The
    Board notes that it has been unable to serve Singer while it has served Bicoastal with the Board's
    previous orders in this matter and no appearances have been filed.
    The Board directs
    complainant to file, along with its response to Eaton's motions, reasons why Bicoastal and
    Singer should remain as two separate respondents and whether either should remain as
    respondents in this matter.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.

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    I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, hereby certify that
    the above order was adopted on the 15
    th
    day of May, 1997, by a vote of 6-0.
    Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
    Illinois Pollution Control Board

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