ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
September
29,
1975
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Complainant,
v.
)
PCB 74—131
WATTS TRUCKING SERVICE,
INC.,
an Iowa corporation,
Respondent.
Mr. Stephen
Z.
Weiss, Assistant Attorney General, appeared
for the Complainant;
Mssrs. Dan A. Ribble,
and Marvin L.
Schrager, Attorneys,
appeared for the Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by Mr.
Zeitlin):
The Complaint in this matter was filed by the Environmental
Protection Agency
(Agency) on April
4,
1974.
The Complaint
alleges
that,
in the operation of a solid waste management
site near Andalusia,
in Rock Island County,
Illinois, Respondent
Watts Trucking Service,
Inc.
(Watts) violated various provisions
of the Environmental Protection Act
(Act),
the Rules and
Regulations for Refuse Disposal Sites and Facilities
of the
Illinois Department of Public Health,
(old Rules), and the
Illinois Pollution Control Board
(Board)
Rules and Regulations
governing solid waste, air pollution,
and water pollution
(“new Regulations”,
“Air Regulations”, and “Water Regulations”,
respectively).
An abbreviated tabulation of the alleged
violations
is as follows:
COUNT
ALLEGED ACTIVITIES
ALLEGED VIOLATION
(Summary of Dates)
Old
New2
Ai~5 Water
Rules’ Regs
Regs
Regs4
Act5
I
Failure to have
21(e)
proper permits
(Oct.
1,
‘71 to
Dec.
12,
1972)
T
(116)
No fencing to
5.04
...
21(b)
prevent litter
(Various dates,
7/1/70
—
7/27/73)
18—
611
—2—
COUNT
ALLEGED ACTIVITIES
ALLEGED VIOLATION
(Summary
of Dates)
Old
New
Air
Water
Rules1 Regs2
Regs3 Regs4
Act5
(1j7)
Failure to apply
5.07(a)
...
...
21(b)
adequate daily
cover
(Id.)
(118)
Inadequate fencing
4.03(a)
21(b)
to control access
(id.)
(119)
Accepting sewage
5.08
21(b)
liquids, hazardous
substances, without
approval.
(Id.)
111(115)
Failure to properly
303(b)
21(b)
use cells
(Various
dates, 7/27/73
—
4/4/74)
(j(7)
Failure
to
use
6”
305(a)
21(b)
cover
(Id.,)
(118)
Litter not in
306
21(b)
containers or
working face of
fill area.
(119)
Vectors
(Id.)
314(f)
21(b)
(1110)
Failure to apply
305(b)
21(b)
intermediate
cover
(Id.)
(1111)
Inadequate fire
314(d)
21(b)
protection.
(1112)
Access control
314(c)
21(b)
(fence)
inadequate
(1113)
Noncompliance with
302
...
...
21(b)
special conditions
of Agency permit
(Id.)
18—612
—3—
COUNT
ALLEGED ACTIVITIES
ALLEGED
VIOLATION
(Summary of Dates)
Old
New
Air
Wat~r
Rules1 Begs2
Begs3 Begs
Act5
IV
Odor,
Eiiiission
312
9(a)
of Air Pollution
21(b)
(Various dates,
2/17/72
—
4/4/74)
V(115)
Leachate discharges
313
...
21(b)
(Various dates,
12(a)
7/27/73
—
4/4/74)
(116)
Iron effluent levels
...
203(f)
12(a)
excessive
(id.)
(117)
Creation
c~f
water
12(d)
pollution hazard
(Id.)
VI(1(6)
Open burning
3.05
502
9(c),
(2/23/73)
21(b)
(117)
Open burning
311
502
9(c)
without permit
21(b)
(12/15/73,
1/5/7 4)
1.
Rules and Regulations for Refuse Disposal Sites and
Facilities of
the Illinois Department of Public Health,
continued in effect by Sec.
49(c)
of the Environmental
Protection Act, until July
27,
1973.
2.
PCB Begs,
Ch.7:
Solid Waste
(1972).
3.
PCB Begs,
Ch.
2.
AIr Pollution.
4.
PCB Begs,
Ch.
3:
Water Pollution.
5.
Illinois Environmental Protection Act,
Ill.Rev.Stat.,
Ch.
111—1/2,
§1001
et.
Seq.
(1973).
18— 613
—4—
At a hearing held in Rock Island on November 8,
1974,
the parties entered a Stipulation into the record.
The
Stipulation contains no admission of violation by Respondent
Watts, but instead sets put abbreviated versions of testimony
which would have been offered by various witnesses,
and
includes a series of exhibits which were also entered into
the record at hearinç.
The parties also made allowance for
entering into the record three evidentiary depositions, with
attendant exhibits submitted by both the Agency and Watts.
BACKGROUND
The following general background of the subject solid
waste management site and its operator,
Watts,
is taken from
the Stipulation.
1.
Respondent,
an Iowa corporation,
has owned and
operated a refuse collection and/or disposal business at the
subject site since October 27,
1971.
2.
The following is a
summary
of deposits accepted at
the site
by Respondent
(Stip., p.3):
Apr.
71-
Jan. 72-
Jan. 73-
Jan. 74-
Dec.
71
Dec.
72
Dec.
73
May
74
inc.
inc.
inc.
inc.
Commercial
& Industrial
49,315
135,777
257,712
97,864
Sludge
(yds.)
Residential
(yds.)
16,454
19,735
74,486
26,050
Filtered
Sludge
(yds.)
5,823
3,876
8,537
3,627
Industrial
Oils
and
224,000
401,100
396,000
62,000
Sludge
(gallons)
Respondent’s landfill should be able to accept refuse at its
present rate for approximately 40 more years.
3.
In response to an inquiry made by Respondent prior
to acquisition of the landfill on July 22,
1971, an Agency
reply
of
August
25,
1971,
stated
that
a
permit
would
be
required
for
the
subject
site.
A
permit
application
for
Respondent
site
was
first
received
on
January
18,
1972;
that
application
was denied for insufficient information on February 17,
1972.
Following additional submissions of information by Respondent
on June 19,
1972, and September
6,
1972,
the Agency on
18
—
614
—5—
December 12,
1972,
granted Respondent an operating permit
for the facility in issue here.
A supplemental permit,
allowing Respondent to accept chemical waste and brines, was
issued by the Agency on August 20,
1973.
A further supplemental
permit, dated August 27,
1973, allows Respondent to accept
empty solvent cans and contaminated clay dust.
Over the past several years, apparently as the result
of heavy capital equipment purchases,
Respondent Watts’
financial position,
has,
in some ways,
significantly deteriorated
(Complaint’s Depo.
Ex.
1,
2,
3,
5; Respondent’s Depo.
Ex.
1-
5; Anderson Depo.
p.40; see generally, Depositions of Golden
and Miller).
Watts presently has an inverse current ratio,
that is to say, its
current liabilities exceed its current
assets.
Agency Deposition Exhibit
5 shows a continual
worsening of the ratio of current liabilities to current
assets, with the ratio being 1:2.4,
1:3.0, and 1:3.9,
for
years ending January 31,
1973, 1974,
and 1975
(est.).
During the same period of time,
the “productivity ratio”,
the ratio of net income after taxes to average total assets
has declined from 10.3
to 3.1.
Similarly,
stockholder’s
investment returns have declined from 24.3
to 11.3.
The
Respondent company has notes payable to its bank exceeding
$500,000; those borrowings, which have been used to finance
capital equipment purchases,
take the form of 90—day notes,
which the bank may renew or call at its option.
(It
should
be noted that the bank has consistently chosen to renew
these notes, rather than foreclose.)
VIOLATIONS
The
Stipulation and Exhibits in this matter support
findings
of violation with regard to the majority of the
allegations in the Complaint. Respondent does not contest
the majority of the allegations made by the Agency.
Respondent
has instead concentrated on,
(a)
its efforts to achieve
compliance,
and
(b)
its inability to pay any civil penalty
which the Board might levy in this instance.
We shall
limit our discussion to those allegations
contested by Respondent
(Ex.
15)
as contained in the Agency’s
Complaint.
1.
Count VI of the Complaint alleges open burning on
February 23,
1973,
in violation of old Rule 3.05, Air Regulation
502,
and
Sections
9(c)
and 21(b)
of the Act. Also alleged is
open burning on December
15,
1973, and January
5,
1974,
in
vjolation of new Regulation
311, Air Regulation 502, and the
same Sections of the Act.
Paragraphs
7b(2) (r) through
7b(~(t)
of
the
Stipulation,
with Exhibits 7(K),
7(R),
7(S),
and 12(C), would,
if uncontested,
support a finding
18
—
615
—6—
of violation.
In Exhibit 15,
(Statement of James Watts),
Respondent sets out purported explanations for two fires.
Respondent states that one fire was set by the accidental
placement of hot refuse into an existing cell,
and that
another was set by
a muffler on a truck unloading at the
site.
Respondent also sets out immediate actions that were
taken
to control these fires.
However, Respondent states
only that these statements are made “particularly, regarding
the fires mentioned in the Complaint.”
Respondent does not
attempt to relate the causes for the fires, as detailed in
Exhibit 15,
to the specific dates shown in the Complaint,
and
in the stipulated testimony.
Further, Respondent has
wholly failed to address at least one date of alleged violation.
In this respect,
the Agency has carried its burden and
shown violation of the open burning Regulation by a preponderance
of the evidence.
Respondent’s response, by way of explanation,
is insufficient to overcome the facts
shown by the Agency.
(We must,
however, note that in reaching this decision we
did not rely on the Agency’s statement that the site was
sealed, by the Agency,
on January
5,
1974;
that action may
tell us the Agency’s opinion of matters at the Watts
site,
but is not competent evidence of violation.
But we may rely
on the Agency’s statement,
also in Paragraph 7b(2) (s)
that
there were on that date uncontrolled fires at the site.)
2.
Paragraph 11 of Count III, alleges inadequate fire
protection at the Watts
site,
in violation of new Regulation 314(d)
and Section 21(b)
of
the Act.
Again,
if uncontested,
Paragraphs
7b(2)
(I),
7b(2) (r),
and 7b(2) (t)
of the Stipulation
would support a finding
of violation in this regard.
Respondent,
however,
states that It
has taken considerable measures to
protect against fires
on the site.
These have included the
purchase of
a pumper truck with a 3500 gallon water capacity,
and the outfitting of
all landfill equipment and trucks with
fire extinguishers;
in
addition, the Andalusia Fire Protection
District has provided help
at the site at several occasions.
The weight of
the evidence favors a finding of violation.
New Regulation 314(d)
requires “adequate
measures for fire
protection as approved by the Agency”.
We find, based on
the stipulated facts and exhibits that the fires which have
taken place on the Watts site are due,
at least in part,
to
the inadequacy of daily and intermediate cover on the Watts
site.
While daily and intermediate cover on these sites are
the subjects of separate,
specific regulations, we find that
they are also an integral part of a
“adequate” set of measures
for fire protection on a solid waste management site.
That
18
—
616
—7—
being our finding of fact, which will itself support a
finding of violation in this regard, we need not address the
question of whether the fire protection measures taken by
Respondent were timely, which is itself unclear.
3.
Respondent states that it has,
on many different
occasions, used portable fencing to control litter on the
site.
That fact,
in conjunction with the policy of manual
policing of the area,
(which Respondent claims
is allowed
under the Regulations),
is simply insufficient
to overcome
the bulk of stipulated facts and evidence indicating violation
of old Rule 5.04,
new Regulation 306,
and Section 21(b)
of
the Act.
While the record
is replete with matters which
would support a finding of violation in this regard,
the
reader is specifically directed to Exhibits
7 (e)
,
(f), (g), (h), (k),
(0)
(p), (q), (t), (u), and
10 and 11, which are photographs submitted
by the Agency and citizen witnesses.
4.
Respondent has also contested the Agency’s allegation
that the site was operated without a permit In violation of
Section 21(e)
of the Act.
Again, the Stipulation and Exhibits
would,
if uncontested., support a finding of violation.
(Stip. para.
7;
Ex.
1—3,8).
In this instance, Watts’ defense
consists of a boldly made statement that the company had
oral permission from individuals within the Agency to operate
without
a permit.
This simple allegation, however,
is
insufficient as a defense, and a finding of violation
is
mandated.
5.
In Counts
II
and
III
the Agency has alleged inadequate
fencing
to control access on the Watts site,
in violation of
old Rule 4.03(a), new Regulation 314(c), and Section 21(b)
of the Act.
To support these allegations,
the Agency has
entered stipulated testimony
to the effect that the site was
“not completely fenced”, and that
“access to the site was
not adequately controlled”
(Stip.
para.
7(b) (2) (c)).
Neither
Rule 4.03(a)
nor new Regulation 314(c) requires that a site
be completely fenced.
Rule 4.03 requires that a site be
“adequately” fenced, and the new Regulation requires fencing,
c’ates, or other measures to control access.
(emphasis added)
Therefore,
in light of the contrary testimony presented in
Exhibit
15,
to the extent that the site was inaccessible to
vehicular traffic, and regarding the addition of a 30 foot
high berm in areas without fencing, the Agency’s presentation
is in~dequateto support a finding of violation.
The Agency’s
statement that
“access to the site was not adequately controlled”
is ~onc1usory,
and cannot, alone,
support a
violation.
18— 617
—8—
6.
In
paragraph
9
of
Count
II,
the
Agency
alleged
violations of old Rule 5.03 and Section
21(b)
of the Act,
claiming that Watts had accepted sewage liquids and hazardous
substances without approval, as required in old Rule 5.08.
The specific dates alleged for such violations were
October 27,
1971, February
8,
1972,
April
11,
1972, May 10,
1972,
August
7, 1972,
September
1,
1972, and November
17,
1972.
While the Agency has in fact shown that sewage liquids,
etc.,
(Stip. para.
7b(2) (d), were disposed of at the site,
the stipulated testimony fails to show that permission for
such disposition of those materials on the site had not
been obtained by Watts.
Although Exhibit
8 does show that
no such permission had been received on the October 27,
1971
date,
that fact is lacking for the remainder of the dates
for which violation is charged.
While we doubt that Watts
subsequently received such permission,
we cannot find
violations,
based on the record before us, for the remaining
dates.
Violation,
then, will be found only in this regard
for October 27,
1971.
7.
The remaining alleged violations
have been proved
up by the Stipulation and exhibits, and were not controverted
by the Respondent:
a.
Failure to apply adequate daily or intermediate
cover,
in violation of old Rule 5.07(a)
,
a new
Regulation
305(a), 305(b),
and Section 21(b)
of the
Act,
is shown both by Exhibits
7,
10 and 11 photographs
and paragraph 7b and
7d of the Stipulation.
b.
Failure to properly use cells for disposal on
the site,
in violation of new Regu1~tion303(b)
and
Section
21(b)
of the Act,
is shown in paragraph
7b(2) (e)
of the Stipulation.
c.
Inadequate vector control in violation of new
Regulation
314(f)
and Section
21(b)
of the Act is shown
by paragraph
7b(2) (g)
of the Stipulation,
and is not
refuted
in Exhibit 15.
d.
Paragraph
7b(2)
(j),
the testimony of an Agency
employee,
shows violation of the special conditions
in
the Permits entered as Exhibits
1,
2,
and
3,
in violation
of new Regulation 302 and Section
21(b)
of the Act.
e.
Odor and air pollution violations are shown by
Stipulation paragraphs 7b(2)(k),
7d(l),
7d(2)
and
7d(4), supporting findings of violation with regard
to new Regulation 312 and Sections 9(a)and 21(b)
of
the Act.
18
—
618
—9—
f.
Violations of Sections 12(a),
12(d)
and 21(b)
of
the Act, and Water Regulation 203(f), relating to
leachate and water pollution problems were proved by
paragraphs
7b(2) (1),
7b(2) (c)
.
7b(2) (g)
,
7d(i)
and
7d(3), and exhibits
4,
5(a)—5(j),
6(a)—6(c) and
9.
§33 (c) CONSIDERATIONS
Turning to consideration of those factors mandated by
§33(c)
of the Act, we find that, except as noted above, all
of the violations alleged by the Agency can be found here.
Particularly in the
stipulated citizen testimony
(Stip.
para.
7d), and in the remaining stipulated testimony and
exhibits,
it is plain that operation of Respondent’s
site
has resulted in significant interference with both the
citizens’ enjoyment of life and property and the quality of
the environment.
Operation on the Watts site has resulted
in significant emissions of odor,
smoke from open burning,
and leachate discharges.
Further, operation of such a large
site
(see Table, supra) without the necessary permits and
permissions, presents a serious challenge to the permit
system which the Board has instituted to protect against
just such interference.
The Respondent’s failure
to observe
substantive rules designed to protect citizens and the
environment presents a clear danger to our regulatory system.
As noted
in the Agency’s opening argument,
(March 19, 1975),
there can be no question of the fact that the Watts operation
does have social and economic value.
But a portion of that
value is predicated upon the sheer size of this site;
that
value must then be weighed against the damage which so large
a site may result
in,
to both the rights of citizens and to
the environment.
The suitability of the site here has never been an
issue. As was pointed out by the Agency~, a potentially
suitable landfill site,
if operated contrary to the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, remains unsuitable for such use.
As regards priority of location, we note that the
Respondent became owner of the site in 1971.
Since that
time, regarding waste disposal on the site,
(see Table,
supra),
Watts has significantly increas.ed the level
of activity on
the site.
Such
a change in the magnitude of operations on
the site
is
a factor which should be weighed
in determining
the effects of any violations found,
and the effect of a
landfill
site’s priority
in location,
in
reaching our determination
as
to such violations.
Here,
Respondent’s site priorityin
location cannot excuse the violations which we find.
18—
619
The technical practicability and economic reasonableness
of compliance with Board Regulations have not been questioned
here.
Respondent Watts has, as part of the Stipulation,
submitted
a comprehensive plan to achieve compliance on its
site.
As part of its agreement with the Agency, these
actions, for the most part, have already been undertaken by
Respondent.
If carefully followed, the provisions of
Paragraphs
6 and
9 of the Stipulation, and Respondent’s
commitments in Exhibits
14 and 15 should result in full
compliance.
It is our feeling, however, in finding a violation,
that such compliance could have been achieved earlier,
so
that the violations found here need not have occurred.
In applying these same factors to the imposition of a
penalty, we reach Respondent’s major contention:
it cannot
presently afford to pay a penalty.
Although the Agency has
nominally requested a penalty of
$619,000, based on the
number of vio1ation~, and the number of days those violations
continued,
the thrust of its argument,
including testimony
by an accountant,
(Depo. Anderson), has been that a penalty
of $15,000 would be reasonable for the violations
shown, and
can be reasonably accessed against a company of Watts’
size.
Complainant’s Exhibit
2, comprising Watts’
financial statements
for the period ending January 31,
1973,
(unaudited),
shows
net assets exceeding $600,000,
and total income of approximately
$648,000.
Net earnings for that year were shown as $59,493.33,
with retained earnings at the end of the year exceeding
$200,000.
The July 31,
1974 unaudited balance sheet shows
total assets of $1,439,950, and total revenue for the six
months ending July 31,
1974,
of $712,000
(Complainant’s
Dept.
Ex.
3).
Weighing these figures, along with the potential
dangers which may arise from violations of the sort proved,
at
a landfill of this size,
we agree that a penalty of
$15,000
is justified.
While the Board sympathizes with
Respondent’s present cash—short financial condition, we do
not feel that this would justify a failure to Impose such a
penalty.
In fact, were
it not for Respondent’s present cash
strain,
as well as Respondent’s apparent
(but unproven in
the record)
acquisition of some capital assets as part of a
plan to achieve compliance pith the solid waste Regulations,
a higher penalty might be justified in this situation.
The
types and numbers of violations found, especially when seen
next to the potentially damaging types of materials accepted
at the landfill site,
certainly justify a penalty of $9,000.
In reaching this decision, we have also measured Respondent’s
apparent good faith,
seen in its commitment
to achieve
future compliance as expeditiously as possible.
Respondent’s
18—
620
—11—
plan for diking to prevent leachate run-off,
and the plans
shown in Exhibit
14, will prevent future violations of the
same nature.
In arriving at that penalty figure, we have examined
each of the many violations
found here, and determined the
amount appropriate under our mandate in the Act.
Spe-
cifically,
the penalty is broken down as follows:
a.
Count
I,
(permit violations):
$
500
b.
Counts
II,
III,
(land pollution):
Certain of those violations are substantive,
and have
resulted in acutal and potential harm to both the land and
the public health.
Those violations are as follows:
1.
Count II,
¶7,
(cover violations
under the old Regulations and the Act):
$
500
2.
Count III,
¶5,
(failure to properly
use cells at the landfill site)
:
$
500
3.
Count III,
¶7,
(inadequate daily
cover,
in violation of the newer Board
Regulations, taking note of the problems
caused by such failure to apply daily cover,
and the potential problems therefrom):
$
1,000
4.
Count
111,
¶9,
(vectors)
:
$
250
5.
Count III,
¶10,
(intermediate
cover violations):
$
250
For the remaining violations found
under Counts
II and III of the Complaint,
largely housekeeping—type violations:
$
1,000
c.
Counts
IV, VI,
(odor,
air pollution
violations)
:
$
1,500
d.
Count V,
(various water pollution,
leachate discharge violations;
we note
that this site accepted hazardous materials,
and that downstream users have been harmed,
including farmers and livestock):
$ 3,500
TOTAL PENALTIES:
$
9,000
18
—621
—12—
This Opinion constitutes the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the Board in this matter.
ORDER
IT IS THE ORDER OF THE POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD THAT:
1.
Respondent Watts Trucking Service, Inc.,
is found
to have violated the following statutory and regulatory
provisions:
a.
Environmental Protection Act: Sections 9(a),
9(c),
12(a)
,
12(d),
21(b)
and 21(e)
b.
Rules and Regulations for Refuse Disposal Sites and
Facilities
of the Illinois Department of Public Health,
continued in effect by Section 49(c) of the Environmental
Protection Act until July 27,
1973:
5.07(a),
4.03(a),
5.08.
c.
Pollution Control Board Rules and Regulations,
Chapter
7:
Solid Waste:
Rules 302,
303(b),
305(a),
305 (b)
,
306,
311,
312,
313,
314 (d) and 314 (f)
d.
Pollution Control Board Rules and Regulations,
Chapter
2:
Air Pollution: Rule 502.
e.
Pollution Control Board Rules and Regulations,
Chapter
3:
Water Pollution: Rule 203(f).
The dates for the above violations are as shown in the
Complaint in this matter, received April
4,
1974,
except as
shown
in
the accompanying Opinion.
2.
For the violations found above, Respondent Watts
Trucking Service,
Inc.,
s1~iallpay a penalty of
$9,000,
payment to be made
within 45 days of date of this Order by
certified check or money order,
to:
State of Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency
Fiscal Services Division
2200 Churchill Road
Springfield, Illinois
62706
18
—
622
—13—
3.
Respondent Watts Trucking Service shall comply with
all provisions for present and future compliance as specified
in Paragraphs
6 and
9 of the Stipulation submitted in this
matter,
and Exhibits 14 and 15 thereto.
Except in so far as
additional
time may be provided therein to achieve compliance,
as noted in paragraph
9 of the Stipulation, Respondent shall
immediately cease and desist all such violations of the
Environmental Protection Act and the Pollution Control Board
Rules and Regulations as shown above.
4.
The following charges are dismissed:
a.
Alleged violation of Rules 4.03(a), on Feb.
17,
1972,
Apr.
11,
1972, May 10,
1972, Aug.
7,
1972,
Sept.
21,
1972,
Nov.
17,
1972,
Feb.
16,
1973,
Feb.
23,
1973, Mar.
27,
1973,
Mar.
30,
1973, May 18,
1973, and June
25,
1973,
for
failure
to have adequate fencing; and 5.03, on Feb.
8,
1972,
Apr.
11,
1973, May 10,
1972,
Aug.
7,
1972, Sept.
1,
1972,
and Nov.
17,
1972, for disposal of sewage liquids and
hazardous wastes without proper written permission, of
the old Rules and Regulations for Refuse Disposal Sites
and Facilities of the Illinois Department of Public Health.
b.
Alleged violations of Rule 314(c),
on Aug.
9, 1973,
Aug.
30,
1973, Aug.
31,
1973,
Sept.
17, 1973,
Oct.
4,
1973,
Oct.
10,
1973,
Oct.
29,
1973,
Nov.
14,
1973, Nov.
17,
1973,
Dec.
11,
1973,
Dec.
15,
1973,
Dec.
17,
1973,
Jan.
2,
1974,
Jan.
3,
1974,
Jan.
5,
1974,
Jan.
7,
1974,
Jan.
8,
1974,
Jan.
9,
1974,
Jan.
10,
1974,
Jan.
16,
1974, Mar.
19,
1974
and Mar.
20, 1974,
for failure to control access to the
site,
of Chapter
7:
Solid Waste of the Pollution Control
Board Rules and Regulations.
c.
Alleged violations of Section 21(b)
of the
Environmental Protection Act on the dates and for the
reasons shown
above
in Order paragraphs
4a and 4b.
I,
Christan
L. Moffett, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution
Control Board,
hereby certify the above Opi ion and Order
were adopted on the
_________
day of
,
1975
by
a vote of
‘~I-o
Christan L. Moff~
,
Clerk
Illinois Pollutio
ontrol Board
