ILLINOIS POLLUTION
    CONTROL
    BOARD
    February
    I7~ 1977
    ASHLAND CHEMICAL COMPANY,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    )
    PCB
    76—186
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
    Respondent.
    Mr.
    James
    Gladden
    and
    Ms. Percy Angelo, of Mayer, Brown & Platt,
    appeared on behalf of Petitioner;
    Mr. Ernest Nielsen, Environmental Protection Agency, appeared
    Ofl
    behalf of Respondent.
    OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by Mr. Goodman):
    On June 30, 1976, Petitioner Ashland Chemical Company (Ashland)
    filed a permit denial appeal before the Pollution Control Board (Board)
    appealing the Environmental Protection Agency’s (Agency) denial of its
    application for
    an
    operating permit for two coal—fired boilers at its
    Mapleton, Peoria County, Illinois plant. A hearing was held in this
    matter on December 14, 1976. Ashland has filed a waiver of the 90—day
    rule until February 17, 1977.
    At the plant in question, Ashland manufactures a number of
    chemicals from beef tallow and vegetable type
    oils.
    The boilerhouse
    at the Mapleton plant
    contains two
    coal—
    fl
    red and
    OflC’
    gas— fired
    boilers.
    The coal—fired boilers have a combined input of 147 million
    BTU s per hour (Petitioner
    ExhLblL 1, p.6; Tr. 10) and a steam output
    of 60,000 pounds of steam per hour each or 120,000 pounds per hour
    total (Petitioner
    Exhibit 7 and 15; Tr.lO—11).
    In April, 1975, Ashland applied for an operating permit for its
    boilers.
    That application
    was denied by the Agency on June 10, 1975,
    for failure to meet the particulate
    and sulfur dioxide regulations
    then in force, Rules 203(g) (1) (B) and 204(c) (1) (A) of the Air Regu-
    lations
    (Chapter 2 of the Board1s Rules and Regulations)
    as well as
    24
    789

    —2—
    Rule 203(e)(3). On April 25,
    1975, Ashland filed a Petition for
    Variance (PCB 75-174) before the Board seeking variance from Rules
    203(g) (1) (B) and 204(c) (1) (A). Pursuant
    to Board order, Ashland sub-
    sequently filed additional information on the Mapleton plant’s impact
    on air quality. The Board granted the variance until June 1, 1976,
    holding that Ashland had met its burden under Train v. NRDC,
    as the Board interpreted the impact of the Train decision at that time.
    Chairman Dumelle filed a dissenting
    opinion. Ashland’s compliance
    plan included installation
    of fabric baghouse filters
    for the control
    of particulate
    emissions and the use of low sulfur western coal for
    the reduction of SO2 emissions.
    On January 20, 1976, the Illinois
    Supreme Court, in Commonwealth
    Edison Company v. Pollution Control Board, 62 Ill,2d 494(1976), re-
    versed the Board’s adoption of Rules 203(g) (1) and 204(c) (1) (A) and
    remanded those rules to the Board.
    On March 24, 1976, Ashland
    in-
    formed the Agency that it intended to continue its fabric baghouse
    filter installation but that it would postpone entering into any
    contract for low sulfur coal pending resolution of the sulfur dioxide
    emission regulations applicable to the Mapleton plant (Petition,
    pp.6-7).
    On April 23, 1976, Ashland resubmitted an application to the
    Agency for the operation of
    its coal-fired boilers.
    Along with its
    application, Ashland submitted a copy of the Board’s Order in
    PCB 75—174, the variance case. On June 10, 1976, the Agency denied
    Ashland’s application, stating that Rules 102, 303, 307 and 308 may
    be violated if the permit were granted. The Agency indicated that
    the application failed to provide sufficient information to prove
    that the source’s emissions would not prevent the attainment or main-
    tenance of applicable ambient air quality standards for particulates
    and SO2. The Agency indicated at the hearing that its current policy
    is that sources may demonstrate acceptable air quality impact in one
    of two ways:
    either by an extensive modelling and monitoring program
    in accordance with Agency Guidelines or, as an alternative,
    by showing
    compliance with the remanded rules.
    The Agency has since withdrawn
    its contention that Rule 303 was applicable
    Lo the Mapicton plant.
    The Board concurs with the conclusion that Rule 303 is inapplicable.
    Ashland indicates
    in its Petition
    that, upon completion of the
    baghouse filter installation,
    particulate
    emissions from its plant
    will be substantially less than the limit previously imposed by Rule
    203(g) (1) (B). The average sulfur content of the Illinois coal pre-
    sently used on the boilers is 2.9 by weight, resulting in average
    sulfur dioxide emissions of 5.7 lbs/MBTU.
    The issues raised in this permit appeal are primarily legal
    24
    790

    rat or than factu~1 in nature
    fcLi no’ pliJiary con~~cti~ ~
    the Board and the Agency are hon
    ic
    Lce principle
    e ~ ~e: e
    ~i ~
    to the Boara’
    h~io~nc ~
    i~nce case that em~sJior~ rr~
    -
    Mapleton plant
    dc
    not ca s~or con~~Dute to a violatic~
    i -too
    ambient air quai~t’ standcrds
    Agercy~
    0.
    the other thnd ar~~es
    t at the pric th ~d ~ror~ ~
    sot ~-d~
    ci
    review process and
    that in its ao11caT~on Ashiand d~dno. ~
    burden of proving tha~the facility ould not ~i~se a viol ~
    the
    Act or Regulations
    Although both Peti tent arr tie A~ency pie .F~ ap~cacilii~
    or
    non—app1icabi1~tyof res uce
    o decthicne 01 the Boar the
    Board finds that
    it
    need no~addtess the
    questrcii
    of ~hother
    C
    not
    that principle applies to it.~decCsio s, A basic premise of rcs
    judicata is that the subseqtcnt prc-c P ug involve ident sal cairs
    and issues, including looncieil I c I issues, to those the prior
    proceeding. Howeve ttie Board an Agen~j in the permit r~ ia~~cr0—
    cess herein are faced witn a d±ffe~entset of circumstances thai. ~ne
    Board faced in the variance iro~ee~irJ. The Board’s determir~thun
    that Ashland’s emissror~did cot c use or contribute to a violation
    of ambient air qoaliry :tandards c n oily be construed to app’~ th the
    time the decision was writccn and for the period of the variance.
    Surely Ashland would not claim that such a determinntion on air quc lity
    would be binding upon the Board for an indefinite period of time. The
    variance decisior wa~ basi~on a st of dynamic, rather than static,
    facts, and once the variacc~.expired the legal force of the Board’s
    holding on air quali-~r impact also expired. Because the permit would
    extend well beyond the can ince period, the determination of air quality
    impact pursuant to thc variance does not apply to the permit consider-
    ation.
    Section 39 of the Act places the burden upon the applicant to
    submit proof that its facility will not cause a violation of the
    Act
    or the Rules, In the present case, Ashland merely submitted its
    application and the Board’s Opinion and Order in PCB 75-174. Ashland
    did not submit any of the background data from the variance case nor
    did it submit any information as to its current impact on air quality
    or the projected
    impact
    for the period of the applied-for permit.
    Ashland,
    thorefofl
    ,
    failed to meet its
    burden under
    Section
    39 of the
    Act, and the Agency was correct in denying the permit based on a lack
    of information.
    Ashland in its brief raises several other issues, which we
    will
    briefly address herein. First of all, the Board notes that
    matters
    such
    as
    the Powerton SCS construction permit and permits granted
    or
    denied other facilities are not before the Board in
    this matter and
    are wholly irrelevant to the question of whether Ashland has sub—
    stained its burden under Section 39. Other issues Ashland raises are
    24
    — 791

    —4—
    that the Agency withdrew the air quality impact issue as to particu-
    lates in its answers to interrogatories, that prior to the September,
    1976, Agency issuance of “Guidelines for the Performance of Air Quality
    Impact Analyses to be Used in Support of Permit Applications” an
    applicant would have no way of knowing what kind of air quality show-
    ing would be acceptable, and that the Agency’s motive in denying the
    application was to keep a potential enforcement action alive and to
    continue to enforce the remanded regulations.
    In its Answers to Interrogatories the Agency listed only sulfur
    dioxide as the contaminant emitted from Ashland’s boilers that could
    cause a violation of Rule 102 (Petitioner Exhibit No. 19, p.1). ,The
    Agency indicated in its Brief that the omission of particulates from
    the answers to interrogatories was an error based on a misunderstand-
    ing on the part of the Agency attorney,
    and
    testimony at the hearing
    revealed that Ashland’ s attorney had been informed prior to hearing
    that the Agency still intended to pursue the air quality issue as re-
    lated
    to particulates (R.5). The issue facing the Board in a
    permit
    appeal is whether the Agency’s action in denying a
    permit
    was proper
    at the time of denial, and a subsequent change of opinion on the
    Agency’s part is irreleurant once the case is under the Board’s juris-
    diction. The Petition has not been amended. Furthermore, Ashland has
    not been preju4iced by the inclusion of particulates as an issue
    because its attorney had notice prior to hearing that the Agency still
    considered particulates an issue and because the hearing officer,
    rather than removing the issue, reserved such ruling to the Board.
    As to the other issues raised by Ashland, the Board recognizes
    that there was to some degree a lack of guidance for sources applying
    for a permit between the time of the Counnonwealth Edison decision and
    the Agency’s issuance of Guidelines in September, 1976. However,
    applicants were on notice that they would have to prove compliance
    with all regulations still in force, including Rules 102, 307
    and
    308. Furthermore, the Board again notes that Ashland has submitted
    no air quality impact information in support of its permit applica-
    iton.
    The Board finds the Agency’s motives in denying the
    permit
    to be
    irrelevant in that the denial has a clear and justifiable basis in
    law. The Board notes that the showing of compliance with the remanded
    rules is only offered by the Agency as an alternative to a monitoring
    and modelling program as a means of demonstrating acceptable air
    quality impact. The Board, however, need not herein reach the question
    of the reasonableness of the Agency’s current policy or the accept-
    ability of the Guidelines. The issue before us is whether Ashland met
    its burden of proof. Having submitted no information whatsoever on
    air quality impact, Ashland has clearly failed in its burden, and the
    permit was properly denied.
    24— 792

    This Opinion
    constrtut~s :hc
    ~
    ~ts ~
    o i~w
    ~ the Bonn in i~h
    s
    n61tr
    it is the Ornor or L~ ?
    _
    i
    ~c~rol
    dcnial apoeal subrnit~t
    b~
    •~
    ~
    1
    C~ ~ar
    I
    30,
    1976, be and is h~eb~
    ~e
    i~
    Mr Zertii~i con~ur~
    I, Chnistan L~Moffett, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereby certify ~he above Opinion and Order were adopted on the
    J~~day ~
    1977
    by a vote
    Christan L~ Moffett~~erk
    Illinois Pollution
    Control Board
    24
    793

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