ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
June
18,
1976
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Complainant,
v.
)
PCB 75—494
PIELET BROS. TRADING,
INC.,
an Illinois Corporation, and
Seymour Pielet,
)
Respondents.
Mr.
M.
Barry Forman, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for
Complainant
Mr.
A.
J.
Nester, Attorney for Respondent
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by
Mr.
Young):
This matter comes before the Board on a Complaint filed
December
19,
1975 by the Environmental Protection Agency
(Agency)
charging that the Respondents, Pielet Bros.
Trading,
Inc.
or
Seymour Pielet, owned and operated certain air pollution control
equipment without first obtaining operating permits from the
Agency as required by Rule 103(b) (1)
of the Air Pollution Regu-
lations and in further violation of Section 9(b) of the Environ-
mental Protection Act
(Act)
*
The subject matter of this Complaint is an automobile
shredding facility located at 1200 North First Street, National
City,
St. Clair County, Illinois.
As an integral part of the
aforesaid facility, the Company operates two cyclones to collect
particulate emissions from the facility’s shredding unit and
from certain pickup points over the conveyors.
At
the hearing held on March 9,
1976, the parties
stipulated
to the following facts.
Work for the construction of the
facility
began in April of 1975.
No attempt was made to secure an Agency
construction permit prior to initiating this work,
and in May
an Agency representative informed Respondent of a need for a
construction permit for the installation of the equipment.
Following correspondence between the parties a construction per-
mit was issued on November 5,
1975.
This installation process
was completed on August 22,
1975,
at which time the facility began
operation.
While it is not clear when Respondent first made appli-
cation for an operating permit, such permit was issued by the Agency
on February 19,
1976.
22
—
153
—2—
The Complaint in this matter concerns only the operating
permit violation from September 9, 1975 until December
19,
1975
and on the basis of the record, there can be no doubt that an
operating permit violation is established.
Respondent offers several matters in mitigation that require
attention.
First, Respondent alleges that the equipment was
especially fabricated for the project and that no test data was
available to be submitted to the Agency.
This argument has abso-
lutely no merit.
In fact, specifications and data were available
for similar equipment, and Respondent used this data in obtaining
the Agency permits.
(R.
17).
Assuming for the moment that speci-
fications were not available,
the Board would still remain unrecep-
tive to this argument.
It is just this type of equipment which
accentuates the value of the construction and operating permit
system.
Because the equipment is unique and no specifications
are available,
all the more necessitates that the operator obtain
the permit prior to operation to assure that environmental harm
will not result from its operation.
Second, Respondent argues that the Agency did not show that
particulate emissions occurred in violation of the regulations.
This argument implies that since the operation of the equipment
did not cause a violation of the regulations
(an after the fact
determination), no penalty should be assessed.
Acceptance of
this argument would greatly diminish the value of the permit
system which has as one of its goals an Agency predetermination
whether the operation of the equipment will cause a violation of
the regulations.
Our cases are replete with operators who have
side-stepped the permit system producing results causing serious
environmental damage.
Thus, while the Board will consider such
evidence
in partial mitigation,
to consider such in complete
mitigation would totally emasculate the permit system.
Third, Respondent argues that it acted
in good faith in
its attempt to comply with the permit requirements after being
contacted by the Agency.
This allegation
is not supported by
the record.
While Respondent did engage in a course of conduct
which eventually led to the issuance of an operating permit, the
Board believes that its actions should have been taken with greater
alacrity.
Respondent was apprised of the operating permit re-
quirement in May of 1975, and began operating the facility on
August
22,
1975.
The Complaint in the instant matter was filed
on December
19,
1975.
Nonetheless it was not until January
16,
1976 that the Agency finally received an application
for the
operating permit,
almost five months after the facility was in
operation.
On the basis
of these facts the Board finds that
Respondent’s actions were not taken in good faith, but rather
were dilatory.
The Supreme Court has upheld the imposition of a
penalty where equipment was installed and operated after Agency
denial of the permit application
(Mvstik Tape
v
PCB,
60
Ill.
2d
330,
(1975).
Since Respondent should not be able to place itself
22—154
—3—
in a more advantageous position by merely refusing to applv
for the requisite permit,
the Board
finds that a penalty is
likewise appropriate in this matter because Respondent delayed
almost five months after beginning operation before filing an
operating permit application.
Although the Respondent alleges that the Agency acted un-
reasonably with the construction permit application,
it nonetheless
failed to file a permit denial appeal with the Board.
Although
the Respondent alleges that it was initially unaware of the permit
requirements, even after being informed of the requirements it
chose
to operate without a permit.
If Respondent had filed a
variance petition with the Board in May when informed of the permit
requirements,
the 90 day decision period would have expired by
the time the plant was placed
in operation.
Both the permit denial
appeal and the variance procedure could have provided Respondent
with the relief that it desired and needed.
At hearing Respondent
did not satisfactorily explain why it failed to follow either of
these procedures.
In view of the foregoing the Board finds that Respondent
operated its facility without the requisite operating permits and
the Board will assess $1,000.00 as
a penalty for such violations.
Seymour Pielet was charged in the alternative with the Company
with these violations.
The record does not support such a charge
and the Complaint as regards to this Respondent shall be dismissed.
This Opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law in this matter.
ORDER
1.
Respondent,
Pielet Bros.
Trading,
Inc., has violated
Rule 103(b) (1)
of the Air Rules and Section 9(b) of the Act and
shall pay $1,000
as penalty for such violations.
Penalty payment
by certified check or money order payable to the State of Illinois
shall be made within 35 days of the date of this Order to:
Fiscal
Services Division, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
2200
Churchill Road,
Springfield, Illinois,
62706.
2.
That portion of the Complaint as it concerns Seymour
Pielet is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
22—155
—4—
I, Christan L. Moffett, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution
Control Board, here
certify the above Opinion and Order were
adopted o
the
)
day of
~
,
1976 by a
vote of
..~
Illinois Pollution
22—156