ILLINIOS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
December 19, 2002
MAC INVESTMENTS d/b/a OLYMPIC )
OLDSMOBILE, )
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v. ) PCB 01-129
) (UST Appeal)
OFFICE OF THE STATE FIRE MARSHAL, )
)
Respondent. )
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by M.E. Tristano):
On March 19, 2001, Mac Investments, doing business as Olympic Oldsmobile
(petitioner) filed a petition for review with the Board pursuant to Section 57.9(c)(2) of the
Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5/57.9(c)(2)), and Sections 105.500-105.510 of
the Board’s procedural rules (35 Ill. Adm. Code 105.500-105.510). The petition asks the Board
to reverse the Office of the State Fire Marshal’s (OSFM) determination that a $15,000 deductible
applied to an underground storage tank (UST) at Mac Investment’s property located at 3350 N.
Cicero Ave., Cook County, Chicago. The Board reverses the OSFM’s determination that a
$15,000 deductible applied to the UST.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 22, 2001, the respondent filed an answer to the petition. On July 3, 2001,
petitioner filed a supplement to the petition for review. On July 3, 2001, interrogatories were
filed by the petitioner. On July 26, 2001, the Board granted respondent’s motion to file the
record instanter and accepted the OSFM record in this matter.
On July 23, 2002, a hearing in this matter was held in Chicago. Four witnesses testified
at the hearing. Petitioner presented testimony from Ms. Margaret Wisniewski, an administrative
business manager at Mac Investments. Respondent presented testimony from Mr. Bernard
Nessler, a senior environmental inspector with the City of Chicago Department of Environment;
Mr. Charles Southern, a storage tank safety specialist with OSFM; and Ms. Deanne Lock, an
administrative assistant with OSFM. Based on the legal judgment, experience and observations
of the hearing officer, the credibility of the witnesses are not an issue in this matter.
FACTS
This action involves the property commonly known as 3350 N. Cicero Ave., Chicago.
The dimensions of the site are 266.4 feet x 125.0 feet. Tr. at 15-16. The site is bound on the east
by N. Cicero Ave., on the north by W. Roscoe St., on the south by W. Henderson St., and on the
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west by an alley. Tr. at 14-15. The site is not divided by any road, any alley, and is not
separated by any public right-of-way. Tr. at 25.
The site is owned by MAC Investments and was acquired in the 1980s. Tr. at 35-36.
The site was treated as a single enterprise by MAC Investments. Tr. at 24. Six underground
storage tanks were on the site. All six of the UST’s found on the site existed on the site before
MAC Investments acquired the property. Tr. at 25, 36-37.
On or about April 12, 1999, five tanks were removed from the site. A sixth tank was
subsequently removed on or about October 16, 2000. According to Ms. Wisniewski of Mac
Investments, the demolition of the building, the cleaning of the site, and the removal of the tanks
was all one continuous project. Tr. at 25, 39.
On or about June 13, 2000, MAC Investments submitted to OSFM an “Underground
Storage Tank Fund Eligibility and Deductibility Application.” This application dealt with the
five tanks removed from the site on or about April 12, 1999. These five tanks contained
gasoline, waste oil, and heating oil or waste oil. Tr. at 19-20. After reviewing the application,
OSFM determined that MAC Investments was eligible to access the Underground Storage Tank
Fund and that a $15,000 deductible applied. The deductible determination was made by Deanne
Lock, an Administrative Assistant with OSFM. Tr. at 90, 97.
Nine months later on January 19, 2001, MAC Investments submitted a second
“Underground Storage Tank Fund Eligibility and Deductibility Application” to OSFM. This
application covered a sixth tank found on the site, which contained heating oil. Tr. at 21-23.
After reviewing this second application, OSFM determined that MAC Investments was eligible
to access the Underground Storage Tank Fun with respect to the sixth tank, but determined that a
further/second $15,000 deductible applied. Ms. Lock also made this deductible determination
for OSFM. Tr. at 101.
According to Ms. Lock, the second deductible was assessed because the two applications
were submitted under separate incident numbers and were, therefore, considered by OSFM to be
“ … complete and separate incidents.” Tr. at 102.
GOVERNING STATUTE
The provisions of the Act governing the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Program are
set out in Title XVI of the Act. Section 57.9(b) in Title XVI sets forth the statutory provisions
governing deductible determinations and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(b) An owner or operator may access the Underground Storage Tank Fund for costs
associated with an Agency approved plan and the Agency shall approve the payment
of costs associated with corrective action after the application of a $10,000
deductible, except in the following situations:
* * *
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(3) A deductible of $15,000 shall apply when one or more, but not all, of the
underground storage tanks were registered prior to July 28, 1989, and the
State received notice of confirmed release on or after July 28, 1989.
A deductible shall apply annually for each site at which costs were incurred under a
claim submitted pursuant to this Title, except that if corrective action in response to an
occurrence takes place over a period of more than one year, in subsequent years, no
deductible shall apply for costs incurred in response to such occurrence. 415 ILCS
5/57.9(b)
A number of definitions are critical in an examination of OSFM’s actions. They are site,
occurrence, and corrective action.
“Site” means any single location, place, tract of land or parcel of property including
contiguous property not separated by a public right of way. 415 ILCS 5/57.2
“Occurrence” means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions, that results in a sudden or nonsudden release from an underground storage tank. 415
ILCS 5/57.2
“Corrective action” means activities associated with compliance with the provisions of
Sections 57.6 and 57.7 of this Title.
OSFM’s ARGUMENT
The respondent argues that while the site where the underground storage tanks were
located is a single tract of land which is not separated by a right of way or street or alley, this is
not the only factor considered in a deductible determination. Numerous other factors, including
but not limited to the locations of the USTs on the site, the timing of reported releases, as well as
public policy contribute to the determination of a deductible for a site and an occurrence at the
site. Resp. brief at 2.
The respondent argues that the determination of the applicable deductibles for the first
removal of five USTs and the second removal of the sixth UST was not based on there being a
single/multiple sites, the distance between the USTs, or the lapse in time between the removals.
Respondent contends that its determination was made solely on factors set out in the Act. The
factors which the respondent took into consideration were as follows: (1) The dates the USTs
were registered; and (2) dates of reported releases from the UST. Further, “a deductible shall
apply annually for each site … except that if corrective action in response to an occurrence takes
place over a period of more than one year, in subsequent years, no deductible shall apply … ”
415 ILCS 5/57.9(b). The respondent argues that in addition to the dates of registration and
reported release, a deductible is only applicable for one year and for one occurrence. Resp. brief
at 2-3. The respondent argues that a proper determination of deductible was made based on
these factors:
Dates of Registration
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The dates of registration of the USTs are as follows:
UST #1 12/10/85
UST #2 12/10/85
UST #3 12/10/85
UST #4 exempt 6/13/2000
UST #5 exempt 6/13/2000
UST #6 exempt 6/13/2000
UST #7 exempt 6/13/2000
UST #8 6/13/2000
UST #9 10/17/00
The dates the State received notification of the releases from the USTs, are as follows:
UST #1 4/12/99
UST #2 4/12/99
UST #3 4/12/99
UST #4 n/a
UST #5 n/a
UST #9 10/17/00
Based on the dates of registration and reported releases for the first five USTs, the
respondent argues, a $15,000 deductible shall apply when one or more but not all of the USTs
were registered prior to July 28, 1989, and the State received notice of the confirmed releases on
or about July 28, 1989. USTs #1, #2, and #3 were registered in 1985, prior to the statutory date,
#4, #5, #6, and #7 are exempt from registration, #8 was registered 6/13/2000, and #9 was
registered 10/17/2000. Based on these dates, some but not all of the USTs were registered prior
to the July 28, 1989 date contends the respondent. The releases were all reported after July 28,
1989; and therefore the $15,000 deductible applies. Resp. brief at 4.
The sixth UST was registered after 1989 and the release was reported after 1989.
Because there are other USTs on the site registered prior to July 28, 1989, they act as the “some”
tanks registered before 1989. The respondent argues that because the registration dates and the
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release dates match the language of the Act for a $15,000 deductible, a $15,000 deductible was
properly applied to this application for reimbursement relating to the sixth UST. Resp. brief at 4-
5.
The first five USTs were removed on April 12, 1999. The last UST was removed on
October 16, 2000. The respondent argues that the time in between these two removals is over 18
months which is beyond the year allowed for in the Act and because the deductibles shall apply
annually per the Act, the sixth USTs removal would fall outside of the year. Resp. brief at 5.
Deductible Good for Each Occurrence
The respondent argues that because the two removals and releases were greater than a
year apart, they are not the same occurrence according to the Act. Because the second removal
is not a corrective action of the first removal, it is a separate occurrence from the first occurrence
and was properly assessed a separate deductible. The respondent argues that the removal of the
first five USTs and the later removal of the sixth tank were two separate occurrences and this is
why they were assigned two different Illinois Emergency Management Agency numbers and two
separate deductibles. Resp. brief at 5.
Public Policy
The respondent argues that there are three compelling public policy arguments for the
proper assignment of the second deductible for the sixth UST: (1) in order to avoid applicants
from grouping unrelated occurrences which would enable them to have a single deductible and in
turn deplete the fund; (2) in order to allow those with larger remediations to be able to access
funds up to $1,000,000.00 where needed for each occurrence, instead of for each site; and (3)
assessing a deductible to an applicant on a per occurrence basis encourages the applicant to avoid
occurrences thereby protecting the environment and the access to the fun itself encourages
reporting of occurrences when they do happen and thereby invokes the state oversight to insure
proper corrective action is taken. Resp. brief at 9-10.
Petitioner’s Argument
The Statute Provides that Deductibles Are to Be Determined for a “Site”
The petitioner argues that the statute provides that deductibles are to be determined for a
site and that all the tanks in question were located within a single site. The petitioner states that
the property at issue is not separated by any public right-of-way or divided by any road or alley.
Tr. at 24-25. Petitioner states that even OSFM’s own witness, Deanne Lock, admitted that the
property at issue constitutes a single “site” for purposes of deductible determinations. Tr. at 104-
105.
Response to OSFM’s Two Arguments
The petitioner believes that OSFM’s separate “tank field” argument is flawed for five
reasons which are (1) there is no regulation which makes the defined term “tank field” applicable
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to deductible determinations; (2) there is no written regulatory direction on how the term “tank
field” is to be applied; (3) OSFM could not change the statutory provision that deductibles are to
be determined by “site” by adopting a regulation; (4) there was no fairness or opportunity to
measure; (5) and the wrong measurement was used.
First, petitioner argues that the definition of “tank field”, which is contained within Part
732, does not make the term applicable to deductible determinations. The term “tank field” is
used only in 732.307(c), dealing with soil boring requirements for purpose of site evaluation.
Subpart F of Part 732 deals with applications for payment or reimbursement. But petitioner
argues that nothing in Subpart F provides that deductible determinations shall be based on “tank
fields” or distances between “tank fields.” The term “tank field” does not appear anywhere in
Subpart F. The petitioner argues that OSFM’s position comes down to the argument that
because the term “tank field” is a defined term in regulations dealing with the Underground
Storage Tank Program, it should apply to deductible determinations. Petitioner argues that
OSFM does not have any specific provision which expressly says that separate deductibles are
charged for each “tank field.” Pet. brief at 13-14.
Second, petitioner argues that assuming that the concept of “tank fields” somehow
applies to deductible determinations, there is nothing that specifies how it should be applied.
Namely should a separate deductible be charged for any tank which is outside of a tank field?
And should a separate deductible be charged for any tank that is more than 100 feet away from
the next closest tank field? And should a separate deductible be charged when two tank fields
are separated by more than 100feet Pet. brief at 14-15.
Third, the petitioner argues that even if there were some specific regulation which
provided that separate deductibles are to be charged on the basis of tank fields, that regulation
would be invalid under long-standing principles of statutory construction. Pet. brief at 15.
Fourth, the petitioner argues that if distances between tanks or tank fields is to be the
basis on which deductibles are to be charged, there should be some notice to applicants and some
opportunity for applicants to measure or verify such distances. There is nothing in the
application form which calls for any such information or puts the applicant on notice that this is a
factor. Petitioner argues the issue is left to the inspector raising the subject which is
fundamentally unfair and violates equal protection. Pet. brief at 17.
And fifth, petitioner argues that if the definition of tank field is to be the basis for
determining deductibles, OSFM did not apply it correctly. The regulation says that “tank field
means all underground storage tanks at a site that reside within a circle with a 100 foot radius.”
OSFM’s witnesses, Mr. Nessler and Mr. Southern, did not draw geometric circles, but measured
from what they estimated to be the edge of the nearest of the tanks. Petitioner argues that all six
tanks lie within a single tank field in that they all fall within a circle having a 100 foot radius.
Pet. brief at 18.
OSFM’s More Than One Year Argument
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At the hearing, OSFM took the position that because there are two separate occurrences,
more than a year apart, each occurrence has a separate $15,000 deductible. Petitioner argues that
this argument fails for four reasons. Pet. brief at 22.
First, petitioner states that the statutory language speaks to duration of the corrective
action, and not the time between occurrences. It is the corrective action which is the focus and
not the occurrence. If the corrective action takes place over more than one year, no separate
deductible is assessed in the second or subsequent years. Petitioner states that this is true for the
first five tanks found on the site but questions why should these five tanks be treated one way
and the sixth tank found on the site be treated differently. Pet. brief at 22-23.
Second, petitioner argues that the provision of the Act dealing with eligibility and
deductibles does not say that deductibles are to be assessed based on the number of occurrences.
Rather, the deductibles are assessed per site. Petitioner argues that definition of occurrence looks
to the circumstances which lead to a release. It does not look to either the lapse of time between
releases or distances between tanks as the respondents argue. OSFM says that occurrence is
related directly to the work involving the USTs and the clean up of any releases. The petitioner
argues that this is a misreading of the clear and unambiguous statutory language. The term
occurrence does not mean clean up work or remediation, as OSFM concludes. It is the event
which resulted in the release.
Third, the petitioner argues that the undisputed testimony was that the demolition of the
building, the cleaning of the site, and the removal of the tanks was all one continuous project.
This would satisfy the continuous corrective action exception. Pet. brief at 23.
Fourth, the petitioner argues that the second deductible determination cannot be sustained
on any basis other than that made at the time of the original action. Petitioner states that the
“agency action may only be sustained on the rationale offered by the agency at the time the
action is taken.” Grand Boulevard Improvement Association v. City of Chicago, 553 F.Supp.
1154, 1166 (N.D.Ill. 1982). Pet. brief at 23-24.
DISCUSSION
Whether to reverse OSFM’s determination that a $15,000 deductible applied to the sixth
tank centers around three issues: (1) Does the property constitute one site; (2) Was there one or
two occurrences; and (3) was there corrective action.
As to the first issue, the property does constitute one site. The property is not separated
by any public right-of way or divided by any road or alley. OSFM’s witness, Deanne Lock, who
makes deductible determinations under the LUST program for OSFM, admitted that the property
constitutes a single site.
As to the second issue the Board finds that there was only one occurrence. OSFM argues
that the second deductible was assessed because the removal of the first five tanks and the later
sixth tank were separate occurrences. The Board finds, however, that Section 57.9 of the Act
dealing with eligibility and deductibles does not say that deductibles are to be assessed based on
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the number of occurrences. To the contrary, it says that deductibles are assessed per site. Under
Section 57.2 of the Act, occurrence looks to the circumstances which lead to the release. It does
not look to either lapse of time between releases or distances between tanks. The term
occurrence does not mean clean-up work or remediation. It means the event which resulted in
the release. The undisputed testimony of Ms. Wisniewski for the petititioner showed that the
demolition of the building, the cleaning of the site, and the removal of the tanks was all one
continuous project.
The Board does not accept OSFM’s position that the sixth tank was in a separate tank
field from the first five tanks and should have a separate deductible. The Act provides that
deductibles apply to a site. There is nothing in Title XVI of the Act which provides for the
assessment of more than one deductible based on any 100-foot rule or on the fact that tanks are
situated more than 100’ apart. The definition of tank field is contained within Part 732, Title 35
of the Illinois Administrative Code. There is nothing in Part 732 which purports to make the
term “tank field” applicable to deductible determinations.
Finally, the Board finds there was a continuous corrective action. Under the Act, if the
corrective action takes place over more than one year, no separate deductible is assessed in the
second or subsequent years. There is no dispute that the demolition of the building, the cleaning
of the site, and the removal of the tanks was all one continuous project. This satisfies the
continuous corrective action exception. In this case, a single building which covered most of the
site was being demolished and the site remediated. During the course of the demolition, an
additional tank was discovered. In terms of the corrective action, the Board does not see how the
sixth tank is any different than the first five tanks.
CONCLUSION
The Board reverses the OSFM’s determination and assessment of a second $15,000
deductible for the site and there should be no second deductible charged for or in connection
with the sixth tank located on the site.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Section 41(a) of the Environmental Protection Act provides that final Board orders may
be appealed directly to the Illinois Appellate Court within 35 days after the Board serves the
order. 415 ILCS 5/41(a) (2000);
see also
35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.300(d)(2), 101.906, 102.706.
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335 establishes filing requirements that apply when the Illinois
Appellate Court, by statute, directly reviews administrative orders. 172 Ill. 2d R. 335. The
Board’s procedural rules provide that motions for the Board to reconsider or modify its final
orders may be filed with the Board within 35 days after the order is received. 35 Ill. Adm. Code
101.520;
see also
35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.902, 102.700, 102.702.
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I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, certify that the Board
adopted the above opinion and order on December 19, 2002, by a vote of 6-0.
Dorothy
M.
Gunn,
Clerk
Illinois
Pollution
Control
Board