ILLINOIS
    POLLUTION
    CONTROL BOARD
    August 20,
    1981
    REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY,
    )
    Petitioner,
    )
    v.
    )
    PCB 79—81
    ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
    )
    AGENCY,
    Respondent.
    OPINION AND
    ORDER
    OF THE BOARD
    (by J.D. Dumelleh
    This matter comes before the Board upon a petition and
    amended petition for variance filed April
    9 and April
    26,
    1979 by Reynolds Metals Company (Reynolds) seeking a variance
    front Rules 303,
    305(a) and 305(b) of Chapter
    7:
    Solid Waste,
    in connection with operation of a landfill adjacent to Reynolds’
    L4cCook plant in Cook County.
    On May
    31.,
    1979 the Illinois
    Environmental Protection Agency
    (Agency) recommended that the
    variance be denied or, in the alternative, be granted with
    conditions.
    Public hearings were held in Chicago on
    January 12
    and April 23,
    1981.
    No members of the public attended and
    the Board has received no public comment.
    At the second hearing
    the parties presented a stipulation of facts as well as an
    exhibit and testimony.
    The hearing consisted solely of testimony
    regarding two Agency recommended conditions which are contested
    by Reynolds.
    Reynolds has agreed to all other conditions.
    The plant is situated at First Avenue and 47th Street
    in McCook.
    It employs about 2500 people and produces aluminum
    sheet, plate and other aluminum products.
    The landfill
    is in
    an old quarry covering approximately three and one—half acres,
    ranging in depth from eighty to eighty—five feet
    (Stip.
    1).
    Part of the quarry has been completely
    filled, with an area of
    about
    acres remaining only partially filled (2:96)~ The
    completed area has been covered and graded,
    and a berm has been
    constructed to prevent entry of surface water into the active
    area.
    *J3ecause the transcripts are not numbered sequentially, references
    will indicate both volume and page number.
    Page fifty
    in volume
    two will be indicated thus:
    (2:50).
    43—161

    —2—
    The pit was formed by mining silurian dolomite.
    The
    dolomite
    is
    fifty to 500 feet thick in the Chicago
    area.
    it
    is overlain by glacial till,
    through which it is recharged
    with water.
    It is porous and contains man~3fissures.
    It
    exhibits an average permeability of
    3 x
    10
    cm/sec and an
    average transmissibility of 25,000 gal/day/ft(sic).
    It is a
    major aquifer of the area
    (Ex.
    1,
    P.
    6,
    8).
    Any leachate
    entering the dolomite has the potential to move large distances
    with little attenuation
    (2:29,
    58).
    At one time Reynolds utilized the quarry
    for disposal
    of a range of wastes.
    From 1970 through 1979 waste included
    construction waste, banding
    iron,
    fluxing tubes and sludge
    from the plant’s wastewater treatment plant
    (2:44).
    It
    is not
    clear whether the sludge was from sanitary or process wastewater.
    Reynolds presented no evidence concerning the identity of
    materials deposited prior to 1970
    (2:43).
    However,
    the Agency
    took samples of the sludge during 1979.
    Neutral extracts
    were analyzed.
    The aluminum content was found to be 55 ppm,
    but chromium,
    copper,
    iron, and lead were all 0.45 ppm or
    less.
    (Acid extracts ranged from 11 ppm for lead to 1500 ppm for
    iron.)
    Currently Reynolds utilizes the quarry only for disposal
    of construction waste produced by modifications
    in the plant.
    At the time the petition was filed this was about fifty trucks
    per day, but by the time of the second hearing the amount had
    been reduced to five trucks per day.
    There are eight to twelve
    cubic yards per truck load
    (Pet.
    2;
    Stip.
    2;
    2:7,
    31).
    Reynolds seeks
    a variance from Rules 303,
    305(a) and
    305(b).
    Rule 303 requires that refuse be deposited at the
    toe of the fill and that it be spread and compacted into cells
    not more than two feet thick.
    Rule 305(a) requires six inches
    of daily cover, and Rule 305(b) requires twelve inches of inter-
    mediate cover in all areas where no refuse will be deposited
    within sixty days.
    Reynolds does not comply with these operating
    requirements because it has no road down into the pit.
    Instead it
    merely pushes the refuse off the edge.
    These operating requirements of Chapter
    7 contemplate that
    waste should be spread and compacted into thin cells with a layer
    of material between cells which will prevent transmission of
    water.
    Sites are to be given a final cover of low permeability
    and to be graded to prevent infiltration of water.
    The demolition waste dumped at this site has not been
    compacted or separated into cells with daily cover.
    In its
    loose state
    it likely contains many voids and is probably highly
    permeable.
    When final cover
    is applied there may be problems
    with
    subsidence due to these voids.
    The first question the Board must reach is whether Reynolds
    must have
    a permit for this site.
    If
    a permit is required,
    then
    Rules 303 and 305 allow methods of operation and cover to be
    specified in the permit which differ from those normally imposed.
    That being the case,
    variance may be unnecessary.

    —3—
    The Board finds that a permit is required for this site.
    The language of Section 21(d)
    of the Environmental Protection
    Act
    (Act) which requires a permit for “refuse—collection or
    refuse—disposal operations, except
    for refuse generated by
    the operators own activities” has been limited by both
    the
    Board and the Third District Appellate Court.
    In EPA v. City of Pontiac, PCB 74—396,
    18 PCB 303
    (August 7,
    1975), t1~Boardheld that the exception “only exempts minor
    amounts of refuse which could be disposed of without environmental
    harm upon the site where it was generated.”
    In R.E.
    Joos
    Excavating~v. EPA,
    58 Ill. App.
    3d 309,
    374 N.E.
    2d 486
    (March 31,
    1978),
    the Court also found it necessary to limit this exception,
    stating:
    Limiting the exception to refuse or material generated
    on site where it will be disposed of operates to
    prevent the objectives the Legislature envisioned
    in passing the Environmental Protection Act from
    being readily circumvented (374 N.E.
    2d 489).
    Generally, the type of debris disposed of here would
    fall under this more limited exception.
    However,
    the limited
    evidence presented as to the materials previously dumped at
    the site, the permeability of the site, the location of the
    site above the area aquifer, and the lack of cover combine
    to present a real potential for serious environmental harm.
    Certainly,
    the legislative intent is circumvented where a
    potential for serious environmental harm is allowed.
    The Board finds that a 3½ acre quarry which is to be
    completely filled with refuse generated by the operator’s own
    activities
    is not the type of activity which was envisioned by
    the legislature in enacting this exception.
    The amounts of
    refuse involved here are too great and the site too unsound
    to allow such a site to be exempted from the Agency oversight
    which is inherent in the Agency’s permitting program.
    A quarry,
    unless properly managed,
    is an extremely dangerous
    site for a landfill.
    In general, permeability is high,
    and this
    problem is compounded by the cracks and fissures.
    Any leachate
    production can be readily transmitted to the groundwater which
    necessitates greater digilence in oversight and control
    of such
    a site compared to a non—quarry landfill.
    In this particular
    case,
    leachate is presently being produced which could cause
    major pollution problems but for dewatering activities at an
    adjacent quarry owned by Material Services Corporation
    (Ex.
    1,
    pp.
    1,
    15; 2:53).
    However, Reynolds has no control over this
    and the Board cannot determine how long these activities will
    continue
    (2:45).
    Only through the requirement of a permit can
    the Agency properly inspect and oversee operations to insure that
    the environment is protected.
    43—163

    —4—
    The Board further finds the fact that the quarry
    is a
    leasehold to be inconsistent with the exception.
    The
    record discloses little about the relationship of the ownership
    of the quarry
    to the ownership of the remainder of
    the site.
    If the Board were to allow a site operator to dispose of refuse
    in a leasehold without a permit, many facilities could simply
    lease adjacent property for a short period of
    time,
    dump their
    refuse in this unpermitted site, and leave.
    This also would allow
    the objectives of the Act to be readily circumvented.
    A landfill site has an extended life.
    Wastes cannot simply
    be covered and neglected.
    State and federal post—closure
    regulations
    are predicated upon the necessity of long—term
    oversight of such facilities.
    Someone must remain responsible
    for insuring that environmental problems do not arise in the
    future and must be liable for rectifying problems that do arisc~.
    A lessee does not generally have the necessary ongoing interest
    in the property to give this protection.
    A lessee need not
    be
    as seriously concerned with what he does to a leasehold
    as an owner must be of his property.
    Therefore,
    the Section
    21(d) exemption should not be applicable
    to leaseholds.
    The Board, therefore,
    dismisses the variance petition
    in this matter for failure to establish an arbitrary or un-
    reasonable hardship in that
    the Agency may issue an acceptable
    permit to Reynolds upon proper application.
    If the Agency
    denies the permit or includes conditions which are unacceptable
    to Reynolds,
    that decision may be appealed to the Board.
    This
    Opinion
    constitutes
    the
    Board’s
    findings
    of
    fact
    and
    conclusions of law in this matter.
    ORDER
    Reynolds
    Metal
    Company’s
    request
    for
    variance
    from
    Rules
    303,
    305(a)
    and 305(b)
    of Chapter
    7:
    Solid Waste is hereby denied,
    and
    proceedings in PCB 79-81 are hereby dismissed.
    IT
    IS
    SO
    ORDERED.
    I, Christan L. Moffett, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution
    Control Board, hereby certify that the abpve Opinion and Order
    was adopted on the c~O~day of
    4u.
    ~
    ,
    1981 by
    a vote
    of-~Y-~).
    Christan
    L.
    Mo
    Clerk
    Pollution
    Contril
    (Board
    43—164

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