ILLINOIS POLLUTIO~JCONTROL BOARD
September
23,
1983
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
)
Complainant,
v.
)
PCB 76—84
SANTA FE PARK ENTERPRISES, INC.,
)
Respondent.
ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by J.
Anderson):
This matter comes before the Board on the Attorney General’s
March
24,
1983 Motion to resume action on the March 26,
1976
complaint in this matter, alleging violations of Section 24 of
the Environmental Protection Act and Rule 102 of Chapter
8:
Noise Pollution.
Pursuant to the Board’s Order of April
7,
1983
granting the motion for briefing purposes and denying Santa Fe’s
March 31,
1983 motion to dismiss, the Attorney General filed a
brief May 27,
1983 and Santa
Fe filed a response May 27,
1983.
Procedural History
This action had been dismissed by the Board on April 12,
1979, which decision was confirmed upon reconsideration May
24,
1979.
Subsequent to several hearings on the complaint, P.A.
80—1422, signed September
8,
1978 amended Section 25 of the Act.
P.A.
80—1422 provided, in pertinent part,
that
“no Board standards for monitoring noise or
regulations prescribing limitations on noise emis-
sions shall apply to...any sanctioned motor racing
event at a motor racing facility
in existence prior
to January
1,
1975, or..,”
other
sporting events
sanctioned by various entitiesi.
On November 20,
1978,
Santa Fe moved to dismiss on the
grounds that its activities were sanctioned by the Association
for Motor Sports of Illinois,
and hence that P.A.
80-1422
deprived the Board of authority to regulate noise emissions, to
adjudicate claims that noise emissions unreasonably interfere
with legitimate pursuits, or to impose penalties for any previous
non—compliance
(Santa
Fe Brief of March 19,
1979,
p.
20).
The
2
Attorney General argued that the statute was unconstitutional
on various grounds.
It further argued that,
even
if
constitu-
tional,
the
statute
exempted
Santa
Fe
only
from
the
monitoring
standards and noise limitations of Chapter
8 contained in Part
2
“Sound Emission Standards and Limitations
for Property-Line—Noise
Sources”, and then—existing Part
4,
“Rules
and Regulations
for
the Control of Noise
from Motor Racing Facilities”.
Citing
Ill.
Coal Operator’s Assn.
v. PCB, 59 Ill.
2d 305,
319 N,E.2d 782
(1974), the Attorney General argued
P.A.
80—1422 did not affect
the
Board~s
ability
to
deal
with
actions
based
on
the
general
nuisance
provisions
of
Rule
102
and
Section
24
(A.G,
Brief
of
January 31,
1979,
p.
32—33),
The
Board’s
Order
of
April
12,
1979
held
that
“.,,the
Board
finds
that
this
is
not
a
proper
forum
to
decide
the
constitutionality
of
a
statute
enacted
by
the
Legislature
of
the
State
of
Illinois.
In
addition,
the
Board
finds
that
in
cases
such
as
this
the
Board
is
constrained
to
apply
the
law
as
it
is
currently
stated.
Finally,
the
Board
is
not
persuaded
by
technical
arguments
about
the
language
of
P.A.
80—1422
put
forth
by
Complainant.”
On
appeal,
the
Appellate
Court, First District reversed the
Board’s
dismissal
and
remanded
the
cause
for
further
proceedings.
People
of
the
State
of
Illinois
v.
Santa
Fe
Enterprises~Inc.
and
IPCB,
83
Ill.App.3d
802,
404
N.E.2d
352
(April
10,
1980).
The
court
found that
in exempting “sanctioned sporting events”,
P.A.
80—1422
unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority
to
private
organizations,
not
accountable
to
the
public,
“whose
interests
may
be
adverse
to
the
interests
of
others
similarly
situated
or directly affected by the
exercise
of
the
power dele-
gated”.
Given its finding on this issue,
the Court saw “no need
to address the question of whether the Board should have and
could have addressed those issues”, or to address other issues
concerning the statute.
The mandate of the Appellate Court was issued May 12,
1981,
after denial of Supreme Court review.
On September 25, 1981,
Section 25 of the Act was again amended by P,A,
82-654,
P.A.
82—654 amends Section 25 and Section 1(v)
to provide that
“...no Board standards for monitoring noise or
regulations prescribing limitations on noise
emissions shall apply to any organized amateur or
professionalp~n~2tivity.”
Sec.
25, emphasis
added
“Organized amateur or professional sporting
activity” means an activity or event carried out at
a facility by persons who engaged in that activity
as
a business or for education, charity or entertain-
ment for the general public,
including all necessary
actions and activities associated with such an
54-66
3
activity.
This
definition
includes,
but
is
not
limited
to,
skeet,
trap
or
shooting
sports
clubs
in
existence prior to January
1,
1975, organized motor
sports,
and sporting events organized or controlled
by school districts,
units
of
local
government,
state
agencies,
colleges, universities or professional
sports clubs offering exhibitions to the public.
Sec.
1(v)1*
No
further
proceedings
have
been
held
in
this
matter
subsequent
to
the
appellate
remand or passage
of
P.A.
82_654.**
Issues Presented
The issues here presented are three:
whether the
statutory exemption applies to Santa Fe, whether P.A.
82—654 is
constitutionally defective on any of various asserted grounds,
and whether,
if
it is not,
the Board continues
to have juris-
diction to hear a noise nuisance action based on the remainder
of Section 25 and Rules
102 and 101(j).
Santa Fe argues, and the Attorney General does not contend,
that the exemption would apply to Santa Fe, based on testimony
and exhibits presented by the Attorney General at hearings
in
this case.
“Organized motor sports” are specifically included
in the definition of “organized..,sporting activities”.
The
definition also generally includes “an activity or event carried
out at a facility by persons who engage
in that activity as
business”.
Santa Fe has been operating its motor raceway
facility business at the same location for over 26 years.
*The Board has examined the legislative history of P.A.
82—654,
RB
998.
Comments illustrative of
legislative intent were
made only
in the Rouse.
On third reading, Representative Bartulis
explained that
“House Bill 998 is meant to clarify the Legislature’s
intention to meet the court’s objection by deleting
the definition of sanctioned sporting event and
providing an exemption for amateur or professional
sporting events which was not objected to by the
courts.”
(State of Ill.
82nd General Assembly,
House of Rep.,
Transcription Debate,
p.
302),
**Sjnce passage of P.A.
82—654, another bill,
P.A.
82—959
(RB 1955) has been enacted.
This amends Section 25 to allow
for night time noise regulation of certain sporting events in
the City of Chicago, primarily affecting the use of Wrigley
Field.
This legislation
is not specifically considered
in
this Order,
54-67
4
Prior to considering the constitutional
issues,
the Board
will consider the effect,
if
any,
of
P.A.
82—654 on its juris-
diction to entertain noise nuisance actions,
Santa Fe argues
that,
since P.A.
82-654 provides that “no Board standards
.
.
.shall
apply”
to organized sporting activity, the logical extension of
that prohibition is that the Board has been precluded from
requiring compliance with the
7&.ct,
Since no enforcement is
authorized, the Board can impose no penalty.
Santa Fe argues
that since Section 25 prohibits
regulation of sporting events noise,
that the general Rule 102
Board
prohibition of noise pollution
defined
in Rule 101(j)
as
“unreasonable interfere(nce) with the enjoyment of life or with
any lawful business or activity”
may not be applied to Santa Fe’s
activity.
No cause of action based on Section 24 of the Act
can
therefore be brought before the
Board, Santa Fe continues,
because Section
24 prohibits unreasonably interfering noise
emissions which “violate any
regulation or
standard
adopted by
the
Board under
this Act”.
The result, according
to Santa Fe,
is
that
to the extent sporting event noise may create a
nuisance,
that relief from such nuisance must
be sought in Circuit
Court,
based on a common law or constitutional cause of action.
The Attorney General does not specifically counter Santa Fe’s
contention that Section 25 operates to negate the nuisance
provision of Section 24.
The Board finds Santa Fe’s construction
of the plain wording of
P.A.
82-654 to be persuasive,
and finds
that the effect of that specific legislation was to entirely
deprive the Board of sporting event noise jurisdiction.
The Attorney General
forwards arguments that this divistiture
of
Board jurisdiction violates Article XI of the Illinois
constitution——the “healthful environment guarantee——and that
it
violates
presumably both the federal and state constitutions by
way of being vague,
and by being special legislation denying
equal protection of the law.
The threshold question here
is
whether the Board can or should consider these contentions,
The
Attorney General argues that,
as
a
matter of
policy, the Board
must necessarily be empowered to reach determinations of con-
stitutional questions,
in furtherance of
its
mandate under the
Act to “adjudicate the controversy
before
it”
Ill, Power Co.
v,
IPCB,
100 Ill.App.3d 528,
531
(3rd Dist,
1981), particularly
since such issues must be raised at the Board
level Bulk
Terminals
V.
IEPA,
65 Ill.2d
31, 357 N,E,2d 430
(1977).
The Attorney General argues that,
if the Board has no
such
power, that every time a constitutional question arises calling
for the exercise of legal judgment
the
parties or the Board
would be required to proceed to the
Illinois Circuit
or federal
District Courts
for an opinion on the question,
thus resulting in
a multiplicity of
litigation,
fragmentation of issues,
and delay
in enforcement of the Act,
Santa Fe’s response
is the bald
contention that the Board cannot adjudicate
such questions.
54-68
It has o~ner~l~
~i
crc
~t~ci
~f
norrb
k
l~sthat “we
commit
to acin~isc~
~.
c
~ccr
Lc
cetcrriine
consti-
tutional appi
d1.
t~
;
c
~
ic~cristrative
agencies Ju~
~(
~
.gislation”,
although
it
i
:.
~o
u
rrt
because
aqerL:c
~
Davis,
AdministratJ
U
L~O
osition
that thc
it
relates
to the
COh~
-
3~a~has been
charged to
cm
ct
~
I.
t
ci
?gulations,
cf,
Celo
x
~
-~
S.
Steel
~
J~
40.1
of
-t
oS
local
governmcr
I
S
ard
is
persu
s3
i
t
ard
is
necc
e~
and
that,
in
a~p.
i
teused
by
the
Board
ii
c
oL
the
entlre
controver y
t
S
-r
as a unique,
surroga
c
~nviron—
mental
matter~
ufli
~i
i
~
-.
~mJra~e
iev~ew
directly
by
tIe
i~
c
~\c~
s
~econism
for
arrivinq
at
prompt
environmenta~
anoiecs
is
oh~ri’ns~y frustrated
where,
as
in
the
firt
q
—s.
ou~
o
Jc~
ny
caso
~he
constitutional
issue
is centra
~i
U
sid ac~rding to
accepted prf~
-
1
p~
~-d
uom~-rd
for
determin~
io
~-
is
r
1
it
r
~iven
the
constit~itL
x
s ow, the
Board
rr
th
rule
i
General
5~
ni
ntal
Protect
icr
Sssenbly
has
acted
“dir
~c
r~- contained
in
Arts
V
“Iha Ge
imici
Santa
c
Illinois
So
“Eacn
per~cP
~-
E
environ~enL~
Sa
r
~
ia~
pf
‘~
q rujct
against any oarty
gove~.inentul
~r oriva~e, through
appropriate
~e~il o~o~eed~nqc
:~e
to reasonable
limitation a~drequatinr. a~t5
dc~sral hssembly
may provide by
a~i
It suggests
tb
c
tE. 0751
o~
orti
e
~n~s
noise
from
the
purview of tIe
T~
aid
c
r
c
~orcereic
trereof,
and
the vest~ngo
a c
~i
-
d
~or
i
I
-
~
ui4
Court
is
merely
an exercLic oy anc ce~e
1
a
s
~r y
~.
r
grit
or
“reasonable
Ii
r
r
ii
activit
an
a
that
tIe
p
eccder
i
gaping
exce~-io
o
environre
tal
y
e
a
he
pointS
01
a?
Liy
a
to
c
-
s
F
9~
P
82—959
has
taken cert
i
a
‘~
Ic Cl
a
a
-
arts
(specifically
in effec
y
q.~ r
at I1rijley
Field)
out
of
tIe
abr
1
a
c
~ncorp-lo
c
ra
ri.d
i
P,A,
82—654,
The Board
finds that P.A~ 82-654’s
events
noise
fro
the
p
iviow
of
the
~v
(as
oppo~ed
to
nei
bly
a’-
a
Li
Section
2 enfc
-
~nc
o~
-
j
-
Deletio
of
U-
~-a
us
elimination
-
‘-
f
r
v
c
less
y
i
courts,
rerd
1
o
virtually
mea
~j a
s
removaJ
ol
most
sporting
a
o
its
to
an
unreasonable
ir.ita
I
n
of
the
article
XI,
a ~
I a varo merit.
U-
c up ad with
a
md~
~r,
and
Giver
t
General
s
vaguen~
cause
will
be
ass~
ordered
to
es
T
ad
ccia
egi
a
a
ea
~r
c
+
orrey
-
o
an
et
This
Li
at
a
I
re
?ar~les
are
Board
ne
e
:ea~
c
B
and
V
~rbars
~
An
a
I,
Christrn
I
oftet
Li-
a
t
e
Control BoD~d, hereby cer if~te~ tIc ate c
on the ~
day
of
*
3
reasor.aLie
,j
a
c
1
3
a
or purposes
a-
this
Ec-onsti
iti
J
a
purposes of the ~ t
ccci
s
a
unifit.d,
at
ía
thequa
ty
t
on
the
a
cause
then
a
a
‘
vol
ion
)f
s
c
general
Sc ~a
r
a
-
eatablrsh
a
t
a
I
en
a~ce
a
Ic
of
i’-
Sub
has,
der
wa-s adopted
a
vcte
~
~i~erk
Chnist~j.
f
1Ilir-~~I
aU-on
Control
Board