1. DEAN FOODS?
      2. PETITIONER; AND
      3. Dorothy M. unn, ClerkIllinois Pollution Control Board

I
LL1NOIS POLLUTION
CONTROL
BOARD
August
22,
1984
DEAN FOODS?
PCB 81—151
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY~
Respondent.
RICHARD
J.
KISSEL
AND THERESA YASDICK (MARTIN,
CRAIG,
CHESTER &
SONNENSCHEIN),
ATTORNEYS-~AT-LAW,
APPEARED
ON
BEHALF
OF
PETITIONER; AND
WAYNE
L.
WIEMERSLAGE,
ATTORNEY-~T-LM~1,
APPEARED
ON
BEHALF
OF
RESPONDENT,
OPINION AND
ORDER
OF
THE BOARD
(by B.
Forcade):
This matter comes before the Board upon a
petition
for
review of
conditions
of
an NPDES permit filed
by
Dean
Foods
(‘Dean’s) on October
1,
1981.
The
Illinois
Environmental
Pro-
tection Agency
(~Agency~)filed the
Agency
Record
on
December 28,
1981.
A
public
hearing was held on March
28,
1984,
in
Chicago.
There is no
indication
in
the
record
of
public
participation.
This
matter
concerns
NPDES
Permit
NO.
IL
0003:395
issued
to
Dean
on
September
2, 1981.
The permit authorized
d:Lscharges
from
Dean~s
Chemung,
Illinois
facility
to
Piscasaw
Creek,
a
tributary
of
the
Kishwaukee
River,
via
a
small drainage dItch~
Dean
challenges the
location at which sampling for
compliance
with
certain effluent
limitations
is
designated
and
the
monitoring
frequency for
fecal coliform.
The facility occupies 2.8
acres on
the
east end
of
a
13-acre
lot,
and
is
the
company~s
largest dairy
processing facility
(R.
43).
It employs approximately 154
people
and processes over
one
million
pounds of
milk
per
day,
as well as
numerous
cultured milk
products,
ice
creani
and
nora—dairy
products.
The
products
from
this
:Eacility
are distributed primarily in
Northern
Illinois
and Wisconsin, with a
portion
going
to
other
Dean
plants
in
four
other states
(R.
43).
Dean~s
wastewater treatment system consists of an
activated
sludge wastewater
treatment
process followed by two polishing
lagoons and a
rock
filter.
The
treatment
facility
occupies
three
acres on the west end
of
the
property.
During
the 1960’s,
Dean
reduced the volume
of contact processing water flowing
through
the plant by creating
a
non—contact
cooling
stream
(R.
45).
This
modification resulted
in a
lower
volume of
wastewater
requiring
59-375

treatment.
Dean recombines the treated contact ~ste
stream
and
the non—contact cooling stream immediately prior to discharge
into
the small drainage ditch leading to Piscasaw Creek.
Dean
currently has a petition for site—specific watc~pollution
control
regulations
f’~t the Chemung facility
r.~r.gbefore
the
Board which is docketed as R 82—25.
The first, snd ~o~t eign’ficant, condi~ionof
the 1981
permit
that Dean objects to concerns
the
location of the
sampling
point for
compliancc
~it~
brochcmical
oxygen
de:
nd
(BOD),
total
suspended solids (~SS) chlorine and fecal ccli~u~effluent
limitations.
The permit requires Dean to samp~
for these
before
admixture of the treated contact waste strean ~r
~
non—contact
cooling
water
stream.
Prioi
NPDES
permits
issued
in
1975
(Agency
Rec,
31)
and 1977
(Agency Rec
41 and 43) design~tedthe sampling
point after admixture of the two streams immediately before
final
discharge.
This sampling point had been reques~edby Dean in
1973 in a
letter
to
the
Agency
on
the
theory
tI at
Ia
e
401,
now
recodified
as
35
Ill,
Adm.
Code
304.102,
permitted
such
a
mixing
of waste
streams
if
the
“best
degree
of
treatment
of
wastewater
consistent
with
technological
feasibility,
e’onomic
reasonable-
ness
and
sound engineering judgment~’were provided
(Agency Rec.
1).
The
Agency,
in
a
response
letter,
requested
more
information
concerning
removal
efficiences
(Agency
Rec.
2).
Dean
provided
this information
(Agency Rec.
4)
and,
in a l~tt
~1atedDecember
7,
1973,
the Agency granted Dean’s request (f~cncyItec.
5).
The
first two
drafts
of
Dean’s
1981
NPDES
permit
prvided
for
sampling
at
the point after admixture of the two et~eams
(Agency
Rec.
49
and 57)
lIe third draft and final pev
t designated
the
original sampling p
itt
for
flow,
pH
and
am~oni~ bat
designated
a point before adm xture for BOD
TSS
ch o~~nc erd focal
coliform
(Agency ~Iec
I
ani.
6
)
The second condition that Dean challenges
in rte petition is
the monitoring frequency for fecal coliform
Iae
1981. permit,
as
well as all previous permits, require Dean to monitor for fecal
coliform
on a weekly basis,
However, past permits included a
provision whereby monthly monitoring for fecal coliform would be
permitted if done in conjunction with monitoring for chlorine
residual,
Dean had followed this condition in the past and
monitored on a monthly basis
(R.
321).
The first draft permit
presented to Dean on April
3,
1983, dropped this provision
allowing an alternative to weekly monitoring
Dean personnel met with Agency personnel in Maywood on April
14,
1981, to discuss the monitoring parametsrs,
as
well
as the
monitoring frequency for fecal
coliform
(R.
185
On April
17,
1983,
a second draft permit was issued which r~taned the weekly
monitoring requirement,
as well
as the old samp’rng point
after
admixture.
Dean personnel met again with Agency ~ersonnel
in
Springfield on July 10,
1981,
At that time,
Dean saw the
third
draft permit dated July
7,
1981, which changed tn~sampling
point
from after to before admixtur~(R
186—7). The Agency explained
that the point had been changed because
of
Rule
401(a)
(304.102(a))
and requested
additional
information
regardr1g
Dean’s
treatment
59-376

system
(R.
292).
Dean’s consulting engineer resp~~nded
with a
letter exp1aixri~rigthe original
rationale
for
setting
the
sampling
point after
mixture of the two streams and previded
summarized
water treatment data
for 1980 and 1981
(R,
lbI~.
rite
final
permit was issued on September
2,
1981.
In
support of their decision to change
ti e non toring
point
the Agency testified that they needed informat~ on the
basis
of
design
and
the
eff~ciencesof each of the indrv~duaiunits,
an
analysis of whether Dean could provide any addil ore
treatment
that would
significantly improve their effluent
a schedule
of
compliance for TSS eff)u~ntlimitations and ~r
xalnation of
the
water
quality
impact from its discharge
in ord~rto properly
evaluate Dean’s
treatment process
(R.
291-292’
rlIh~~
7~gency
felt that
Dean
had
not
been forthcoming with this informate~aprior to
issuance
of
the permit.
The Agency questioned Dear’s
assertion
that
~best
degree of treatment” was being provided because
recent
discharge
monitoring reports
(DMR’s)
showed that
)ear was
violating both
the 30 day average and the max~mun limitations
for
TSS
on
a consistent basis,
even after dilution with non—contact
cooling
water
(Agency
11cc,
18).
Dean’s Notice or
N ncompliance
(NON) for
May
1,
1981, stated that they would nor L? able
to
meet
TSS
standards
during the coming spring and sumnw
nonths
(Agency
Rec, 19).
The informetion the Agency had on r~
~ basis of
design
for
treatment was out of date.
Some
t~t
th~
~nformation
dated
from
the l960’r,
Since that time, there
th been
treatment
modifications
and the
-naractcristics and qnrtc’.y
f Dean’s
waste had
changed
(11.
492)
Dean
asserts tha
the Agency is estoppe.
changing the
sampling point and th~ a ~a~tD.1ngfrequency
r
.
coliform.
Dean also
argues that they are entitled to sam~l~.after
admixture
under
304,102(a)
because they provide the
“beet 1~reeof treat-
ment of wastewater
consistent with technologia.~~asihi1ity,
economic
reasonableness and sound engineering
~,
lgaeent.”
The
Agency argues that
they are not estopped to cnange these
permit
conditions and
that 304.102 does not allow
.re-monitoring
admixture of a
waste stream and a non-contact cooling stream
prior to monitoring
regardless of what degre~of treatment is
provided.
After prolonged di~covexv,numerous moticiia
to the
Hearing
Officer and appeals to the Board,
tais mstte~ream~te hearing
on
March
28,
1984.
Dean p~senteifour witnessn~,John Hetrick, an
environmental
consultant. to Dean
and
former empioJe~Dennis
Busch,
Dean’s
Director of Nuvironmental Control
aLien B.
Fehr, a
consulting engineer retainea hq Dean;
and Dr
llisor
11. Brigham,
an Associate
Aquatic Biolo4iCt at the illino
s
~atura1 History
Survey,
who was
retained
‘oj Dean to study the
I
w’w.aw Creek,
The Agency
presented one ~iitness,Mark B,
ScholLa b~rger,the
Agency engineer who wrote Dean’s 1981 permit~
)ean
incorporated
portions of this witness’ testimony into their
e~in chief,
The
Hearing
Officer,
in a written statement 07.Juating
the

4
credibility of
the
witnesses,
felt
that
credibi1~ty
was
an
issue
regarding witness Schoilenbergor.
The Hearing Officer stated
that while he did not believe Schollenberger was lying, he was
unsure and evasive on cross—examination concerning his reasons
Eor writing
the permit
as
he
did
(Hearing Officer’s Statement
of credibility,
April
10,
1984).
DE NOVO HEARING ISSUE A~DEVIDENTIARY
OBJECTIONS
The Agency,
at hearing,
objected to the
introduction
of
certain evidence presented by
Dean
on the
basis that
the proper
evidentiary scope in a permit appeal was limited
to
the
facts
before the Agency
at
the
time
the permit was
issued.
The Agency
cites both Appellate cases and Board decisions
that have
con-
sistantly defined the scope of a permit appeal
under
Section 40
of the Act as whether or not, based upon the facts
of
the appli-
cation, the applicant has provided proof that
the
activity in
question will not cause a violation of the Act or
of
the
regulations.
The Agency argues, relying on
Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency v.
Illinois
Pollution
Control Board and Album, Inç~74 Ill.
Dec.
158,
455
N.E.
2d 188
(Ill.
App.
1 Dist.
1983), Oscar Mayer &
Co..,
v.
EPA,
PCB 78—14,
30
PCB
397, June 14,
1978, and EPA v. Allaert ~nderiLIn~
PCB 76—80,
35 PCB
281, September
6,
1979, that a petitioner must
show compliance with the Act and regulations
‘based solely
upon
the permit application and supporting
documentation
actually
submitted by the applicant.
The Agency specifically objected to a
1983 report
prepared
by Dr. Allison
R.
Brigham
on the biology of
the !?iscasaw
Creek
watershed
and
the
impact
of
Dean’s
discharger
aneport
dated
September
24,
:1981, by
Fehr,
Graham & Associates evaluating
tertiary
wastewater
treatment alternatives
for
Dean’s
Chemung
facility?
information
and
data
regarding
Flotafilter
nriits
and
microscreeniag;
BAT-BCT
Effluent
Guidelines
adopted
Later
than
September
2,
1981,
and any
other
facts
or
information
not
presented
to
the
Agency
prior
to
September
2,
1981
(Agency
Objection
No.
1).
The
Agency
also
objected
to
the
admission
of
any
evidence
relating
to
Agency
procedures,
criteria
and
activities
pertaining
to the
permit
decision—making
process
relating to Dean’s latest
and
earlier NPDES
permits, or
relating
to USEPA effluent guidelines for the
dairy industry
(gency
Objection No,
2)..
The Hearing Officer received
the
evidence and
deferred the question
of
admissibility to
the
Board.
The
Agency,
in
its
brief,
requests
that
certain
portions
of
the
hearing
transcript
that
relate
to
the
objectionable
evidence
be
stricken.
Dean
relies
on
35
111.
Mm,
Code
l05.l02(a)(8~ as
a
basis
for presenting evidence developed after
the final NPDES
permit
was issued on September 1, 1981,
and not
contained
in
the
Agency
Record,
Section 105.102(b)(8) applies to NPDES
permit
appeals
and
provides
that:
59-378

The hearings before the Board shall exten~
all questions
of law and facc presented by the entire ~Ld,
The
Agency’s findi~gsand conclusions on que~t~
~ns of fact
shall
be priwa facie t~e and correct.
If the A~~‘cy’s
conclusions ci fact are disputed by thc p~:t~or if
issues
of fact are rsised in the review proc~e~i~’~
Board
may
make its own ~et~r~ination of fact has~o
~
~e
record.
If
any party deeire~te
introduce evidenre
.~
he Board
with respec~~
~
disputed issue Ci
Board shall
conduc~a de novo hearing and receive ev~.
with respect
to such issue
~i
feat.
This sect~on
~.
n~Lr~’ed
in Olin Con~.
~,
PCB
80—126,
45 PCB 389, Febru~ary1/,
1982,
as follows:
“The hear rj de novo provisions no~
~“~strued
narrowly;
otherwise
permit
applicants
i’
~mpted to
withhold facts at the Agency level in h~
a more
friendly
reception
before
the
Board,
It
encourage
appeals and wou d place the Board in a p
of being
the
first agency to evaluate the factual su
~s.
This
would distort tv. reparation of functi ~
The fourti~~ote~oo
allows a hGCL
‘~
~t’c
only
with
respect to ‘any dt~put~dissues of icc
:e~ersonly
to an Agency factual determination wh1f~
~sputed before
the Agency”
(p.
4)
In the present casc
Dean has submitt~
not in the
Agency Record relat~.d~o whether or not the
~~reeof
treatment of wastewater consistant with to
feasibility, econ nic r~asoaab1enessand
s
earing
judgment “was provided at the Chemung faci1.~t~
~‘nbelieves
that providing this level of treatment entraL~
on to monitor
aftex their waste ~tr~aamhas been diluted
w:3h
‘~‘~‘
c~ntact
cooling water,
After the third draft 1981 per~otwas presented
to
Dean,
Dean re~pondedwith two letters
t
aLe ~pency objecting
to
the changed monitoring point and explainin~aLe original
rationale for allowing this monitoring point
(
~
Rec,
62 and
63).
Dean
also
submitted
a
summary
of
trea4inent
slant
operation
data for 1980 and part of 1981
(Agency Rec,
63).
D~anhas
disputed the factual issue of whether or not
it
r
providing
“best degree of treatment” at the Chemung facC’ty before the
Agency.
According to the Olin standard, a de nov~hearing on
this issue should bo ai1owed~
While the Board may
look at the issue of “best degree of
treatment” in a de rovo manner, the Hearing )ificcr incorrectly
admitted
evidence beyond the proper scope a11we~
ri
a permit
appeal.
The Appellate Court, in IEPA v.
PCB arid
~
455 N.E.
2d at 194, clearly held that:
“The sole question before the Board
i
review
of
the
Agency’s denial of a permit is whether tho
~‘
titioner
can

prove that its permit application as
submitted
to
the
Agency
establishes that the facility will not
cause a violation of
the
Act,
(Ill,
Rev,
Stat.
1979,
ch,
111½,
par.
1040).
If
the Agency has granted the permit with
conditions to which
the petitioner objects, the petitioner
must
prove
that
the
conditions
are
not
necessary
to
accomplish
the
purposes
of
the Act and therefore were imposed
unreasonably.
The Board
may not be persuaded by new material not
before the Agency
that the permit should be oranted,
(Soil
Enrichment
~
972),
5
Ill.
P.C,B,
Op.
715.)
When reviewing the
Agency~s
denial
of
a permit or imposition of any conditions,
~the
decision
of
the Board shall be based exclusively on
the record
before
the Agency including the record of the
hearing,
if any
~.“
Ill..
Rev.
Stat,
1979,
ch.
111½, par.
1040; ~1CoalC9~
~
(1979),
35
Ill.
P.C,B.
Op.
380.”
IEPA
v.
PCB and Album,
Inc. deals with
construction
and
operating
permits
for a liquid waste
incinerator.
However,
Section
40
applies to both NPDES and
non—NPDES
permits alike.
In
~
Coal_Co. v,
EPA, ~ra,,
an NPDES permit
appeal,
the
Board
stated that:
“The issue
in a Section
40
petition
is
whether
or not, based upon the facts
of the
application,
the
applicant
has
provided
proof
that
the activity
in question
will
not
cause
a
violation
of
the
Act
or
of
the
regulations.~
The
Board~s scope
of inquiry
is clearly limited in
both
NPDES
and
non-NPDES
permit
appeals.
The Hearing Officer’s admission of
evidence
developed
after
the issuance of the final permit was in error,
The
Board
overturns the Hearing Officer’s admission of the evidence.
However,
Dean’s
attempts
to
focus
on the issue
of
whether
or not
~best
degree
of
treatment”
was
provided
at the chemung facility
are misdirected.
The Board has reviewed the full
record
from the
March 28,
1984, hearing, even including the
evidence
developed after
the final permit was issued, and concludes
that under
the proper
interpretation of 304.102 this excluded evidence
is
irrelevant to
the resolution of this permit appeal.
Dean argues that 35
‘Ill.
Adm. Code 304.102
entitles
them to
monitor after admixture of a treated contact waste stream and a
non—contact cooling stream because they provide
the
‘~bestdegree
of treatment of wastewater consistent with
technological
feasibility, economic reasonableness and sound engineering
judgment.”
This interpretation of the rule
is
not supported
by
the terms of the rule,
the intent of its author,
or Board
opinions on this issue,
35 Ill. Adm. Code
304.102 provides as
follows:

Section 304.102 DilutIon
a)
Dilution
of
the
effluent
from
a
treatment
works
or
from any wastewatem source is not acceptable
as
a
method of treatment of
wastes
in
order to meet the
standards set forth in this Part,
Rather,
it
shall be the obligation of any
person
discharging
contaminants of any kind to the waters of the
state
to
provide
the
best
degree
of
treatment
of
wastweatem consistent with technological
feasibility, economic reasonableness and sound
engineering judgment.
In
making
determinations
as
to
what
kind
of
treatment
is the “best degree of
treatment” within the meaning
of
this
paragraph,
any person shall consider the following:
I)
What degree of waste reduction can be
achieved by process
change,
improved
housekeeping and recovery of individual waste
components for reuse; and
2)
Whether individual process wastewater streams
should be segregated
or combined.
b)
In any case, measurement of contaminant concen-
trations to determine compliance with the effluent
standards shall be made
at
the point
immediately
following the final treatment process and before
mixture with other waters, unless another point
is
designated
by
the
Agency
in
an individual permit,
after consideration of the elements contained in
this section,
If necessary the concentrations so
measured shall be recomputed to exclude the effect
of
any
dilution
that
is
improper under this Section.
In the Board Opinion adopting the Dilution Rule,
Mr. Currie
stated that:
“Removal of contaminants from wastewater
is
generally
preferable to dilution to meet standards,
Even if
concentrations
are
diluted
sufficiently
to
avoid
immediate
harm to those using the stream,
excessive
reliance
on
dilution
rapidly
exhausts the assimilative capacity of the
water,
especially
if,
as
is
often the case, the effluent
standard is more lenient than the corresponding standard for
stream quality.
Thus in order to make
room for future
industry and population growth,
as well as to keep the
waters as clean as practicable rather than seeking merely
marginal compliance with stream quality standards,
it
is
desirable
to require the employment
of
readily
available
treatment methods to reduce as much
as
practicable
the
total
quantities
of
contaminants
discharged
to
the
waters
before
resorting to dilution either before or after discharge....

.,,On the basis of this policy
the
Board
initially
proposed
that the effluent standards be
met
without
any
allowance for dilution,
Although
some
industry
spokesmen
challenged this in principle, most acknowledged that
intentional dilution in lieu of
treatment should be
forbidden,
There was considerable
controversy,
however,
over
the possibility that the absolute
ban on
dilution
might
be construed to prohibit the mixing of several streams
contaminated with different wastes
before
treatment.
Recognizing that in many cases more
effective
treatment
can
be obtained by separate treatment
of
different waste streams
at their source but that economics
does
not always
permit
such separate treatment,
we published a revised dilution
standard
proposal
leaving some room
for
engineering
judgment
as
to
the desirability of separating
or
combining
waste
streams for
treatment.
That
revised
proposal,
which has
generally
met with acceptance, was
retained
in the proposed
final draft and in today’s regulation
with
the
addition of
one
sentence making it clear that the
provision
for
measurement after treatment does not undermine the general
prohibition against dilution at any stage.~’
It
is
clear
that the Board intended to
prohibit
dilution as
a means
of
complying with effluent limitations.
This general
policy is
clear from both the language of
the regulation
and
the
opinion..
In certain circumstances, however, the Board recognized
that it
may be desirable to combine two
or
more
different
waste
streams
rather than treat these
waste streams
separately.
The purpose
for combining two or more waste streams
is to
increase
the effectiveness of the treatment
or to
treat more
economically.
The choice of whether to combine separate waste
streams for treatment
is left to “engineering judgment.”
It is
clear that
the streams that may be combined
must be
waste
streams
and the
purpose of such admixture is for
effective
and
economic
treatment.
The rule clearly does not create a right to dilute
a
waste stream with a non~wastestream even if “best degree of
treatment” is provided.
Board opinions in this area support this interpretation of
the Dilution Rule.
In Revere &o
eLand Brass_Inc.v,
IEPA,
PCB
80—117,
54 PCB 81, September 23,
1983, the Board upheld NPDES
permit conditions that designated effluent monitoring of
wastewater before mixture with other waters.
The Board found
that Revere had not demonstrated “best degree
of
treatment” to
permit combining of wastewater sources,
Furthermore, the
effluent was impermissibly diluted with non—contact cooling water
and stormwater from roof drains and a parking lot,
54 P,C,B. at
84.
In I11inoisNitr~genCorp~1~EPA,PCB 80-144,
44 PCB 139,
December 3, 1981,
a variance petitioner requested a measuring
point that would allow and encourage the
petitioner
to
mix
a
sanitary
stream with boiler blowdown,
process
water
and
cooling
water
prior
to
treatment.
The Board denied this request because
it
would
result in a lower level of contaminant removal and
undue
dilution in violation of Rule 401(a).
The Board construed Rule
401(a) to proscribe such dilution
44 PCB
at
146.

Section 30~
~
ci~he~dilution as a means of complying
with effluent 1~it~c~o~e.
The regulation provides for mixture
of waste streams
I
~rta~r
limited
circumstances.
It clearly
proscribes adsix~rt.o~ien~contactcooling
water
immediately
prior to me~isur~an ~
~~‘ctarge. Dean’s contention that
they
have earned taL
~ J~e as a reward for providing the
“best degree ~
a
n
~sro~supported
by the
facts or law.
The admixture
J1 ~
r ~
j5
unrelated to any type of
treatment proce~
.
~
-rrespondence
in
1973 between the
Agency
and. De~
t
~e
ms
as “waste” streams.
Whether
or not this wa~
~understanding regarding t e
nature of tbe co
~.
c
~ar
n the part of the Agency or a
misrepresentot)c
J
~
r~1evant,
The
overriding
effect
of combining
hE
rc
r
3.
o~utior, Even
with
this dilution,
Dean is unable
1e
e~
~uuert limitations
in it
uermit.
The Agency deci’~aL
t
re
cate the sampling point was reasonable
in
the
circumstar
a
8
r:ect
as
a
matter
of
law.
L~2OPEL ISSUE
Dean argues th
be Agency is estopped from changing the
two
contested
pa mi
nc3
ri5.
The
estoppel
principle has
been
applied to both t~c~crc
and the Pollution
Control
Board in
certain circumstalc
~.
The facts in the
present
case,
however,
do
not
create
a
.
-
n
~~horeostoppel can be properly applied.
The
Board
r
Di.
P
ri.t Dc Nemours
& Co.
V.
EPA,
PCB
79—106,
39
PCB
348
~
21
1980,
outlined the proper
circumstances ~or
a &~p~
~on of estoppel to an Agency
decision.
The B
u ad the Agency from reclassifying an
industrial dit
~
ronmental improvement will result,
where
there
ta
i
he facility or regu~dLins and
where the permit~
-.~
rpanded money in
reliance
on the
previous class
tiCf. i~
3
PCB at 351,
In the present case,
the increased fa~
a
in nonitoring frequency will
potentially imp;~
i?
ti
A en~ys ability to
analyze
Dean’s
treatment process.
hanging the sampling
point
will
precluae
Dean
from
using d1u
a
as
~
treatment
process..
Since
the
original 1973 Agency -~szgn~ionof the monitoring point there
have been change
i.
d-~an’sprocess and treatment operation
(R.
47—48).
Dean was ura~a.
i.ect TSS limitations in the months
prior
to
the
issuance
)f
the
1981
permit. Dean has not expended
money in reliance on
his previous determination.
Dean
may
be
required
to
expend mo
°‘-‘
i-i
tie future as a result of these
conditions but U
~~oe
~.
axoense is clearly within the intent
of the Act and reg~atian~.
Dean has not
met
the
requirements
for application
f
~‘~op~cl tc
either of the contested
conditions,
The burden
apocal
is on the petitioner to prove
that,
in
the
ct~a-
~
s~ecpermit
conditions,
the
conditions
are
Tt.
~c~s3ary to accomplish the purposes of the
Act and therefore
~
iiposed unreasonably..
IEPA v.
PCB and
Album
Inc., 45s
P
23 a: 194.
Dean
has
not
met this burden
~~ffE~of
t~3-~’
i,
d3~iJi~The
Agency
has
the
duty to impose

10
conditions in permits that will result in
compliance with
the
Act
and Board regulations,
The permit
conditions on appeal are,
reasonably directed towards this goal.
The conditions are
therefore affirmed.
This Opinion constitutes the Board~s
findings
of
facts and
conclusions of law in this matter.
ORDER
The Board has reviewed the contested
conditions
in
NPDES
permit
No.
IL 0003395 and affirms those
conditions.
IT IS SO ORDERED,
Chairman J.
D.
Dumelle concurred.
I,
Dorothy M.
Gunn, Clerk of the
Illinois Pollution
Control
Board,
hereby certify that the above Opinion
and Order was adopted
on the
~‘day
of
~~l984
by a vote of
4Q~.
Dorothy
M.
unn,
Clerk
Illinois
Pollution
Control
Board
59~384

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