I
LL1NOIS POLLUTION
CONTROL
 BOARD
August
 22,
 1984
DEAN FOODS?
PCB 81—151
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY~
Respondent.
RICHARD
 J.
 KISSEL
 AND THERESA YASDICK (MARTIN,
CRAIG,
CHESTER &
SONNENSCHEIN),
 ATTORNEYS-~AT-LAW,
APPEARED
 ON
 BEHALF
 OF
PETITIONER; AND
WAYNE
L.
 WIEMERSLAGE,
 ATTORNEY-~T-LM~1,
APPEARED
 ON
 BEHALF
 OF
RESPONDENT,
OPINION AND
ORDER
 OF
 THE BOARD
 (by B.
Forcade):
This matter comes before the Board upon a
 petition
 for
review of
 conditions
 of
 an NPDES permit filed
 by
 Dean
 Foods
(‘Dean’s) on October
 1,
 1981.
 The
Illinois
 Environmental
 Pro-
tection Agency
(~Agency~)filed the
Agency
 Record
 on
 December 28,
1981.
 A
public
hearing was held on March
 28,
 1984,
 in
 Chicago.
There is no
 indication
 in
 the
 record
 of
 public
 participation.
This
 matter
 concerns
 NPDES
 Permit
 NO.
 IL
 0003:395
 issued
 to
Dean
 on
 September
 2, 1981.
 The permit authorized
 d:Lscharges
 from
Dean~s
Chemung,
 Illinois
 facility
 to
 Piscasaw
 Creek,
 a
 tributary
of
 the
 Kishwaukee
 River,
 via
 a
small drainage dItch~
Dean
challenges the
location at which sampling for
compliance
 with
certain effluent
 limitations
 is
 designated
 and
 the
 monitoring
frequency for
 fecal coliform.
 The facility occupies 2.8
 acres on
the
 east end
 of
 a
 13-acre
 lot,
 and
 is
the
company~s
largest dairy
processing facility
 (R.
 43).
 It employs approximately 154
 people
and processes over
 one
 million
 pounds of
 milk
 per
 day,
 as well as
numerous
 cultured milk
 products,
 ice
 creani
 and
 nora—dairy
 products.
The
 products
 from
 this
:Eacility
 are distributed primarily in
Northern
 Illinois
 and Wisconsin, with a
 portion
 going
 to
other
 Dean
 plants
 in
 four
 other states
 (R.
 43).
Dean~s
wastewater treatment system consists of an
 activated
sludge wastewater
treatment
process followed by two polishing
lagoons and a
rock
filter.
 The
treatment
 facility
 occupies
 three
acres on the west end
 of
 the
 property.
 During
 the 1960’s,
 Dean
reduced the volume
 of contact processing water flowing
 through
the plant by creating
 a
non—contact
cooling
 stream
 (R.
 45).
 This
modification resulted
 in a
lower
volume of
wastewater
requiring
59-375
treatment.
 Dean recombines the treated contact ~ste
 stream
 and
the non—contact cooling stream immediately prior to discharge
into
 the small drainage ditch leading to Piscasaw Creek.
 Dean
currently has a petition for site—specific watc~pollution
control
 regulations
 f’~t the Chemung facility
 r.~r.gbefore
 the
Board which is docketed as R 82—25.
The first, snd ~o~t eign’ficant, condi~ionof
 the 1981
permit
 that Dean objects to concerns
 the
 location of the
 sampling
point for
 compliancc
 ~it~
 brochcmical
 oxygen
 de:
 nd
 (BOD),
 total
suspended solids (~SS) chlorine and fecal ccli~u~effluent
limitations.
 The permit requires Dean to samp~
 for these
 before
admixture of the treated contact waste strean ~r
 ~
 non—contact
cooling
 water
 stream.
 Prioi
 NPDES
 permits
 issued
 in
 1975
 (Agency
Rec,
 31)
 and 1977
 (Agency Rec
 41 and 43) design~tedthe sampling
point after admixture of the two streams immediately before
 final
discharge.
 This sampling point had been reques~edby Dean in
1973 in a
 letter
 to
 the
 Agency
 on
 the
 theory
 tI at
 Ia
 e
 401,
 now
recodified
 as
 35
 Ill,
 Adm.
 Code
 304.102,
 permitted
 such
 a
 mixing
of waste
 streams
 if
 the
 “best
 degree
 of
 treatment
 of
 wastewater
consistent
 with
 technological
 feasibility,
 e’onomic
 reasonable-
ness
 and
 sound engineering judgment~’were provided
 (Agency Rec.
1).
 The
 Agency,
 in
 a
 response
 letter,
 requested
 more
 information
concerning
 removal
 efficiences
 (Agency
 Rec.
 2).
 Dean
 provided
this information
 (Agency Rec.
 4)
 and,
 in a l~tt
 ~1atedDecember
7,
 1973,
 the Agency granted Dean’s request (f~cncyItec.
 5).
 The
first two
 drafts
 of
 Dean’s
 1981
 NPDES
 permit
 prvided
 for
sampling
 at
 the point after admixture of the two et~eams
 (Agency
Rec.
 49
 and 57)
 lIe third draft and final pev
 t designated
 the
original sampling p
 itt
 for
 flow,
 pH
 and
 am~oni~ bat
 designated
a point before adm xture for BOD
 TSS
 ch o~~nc erd focal
coliform
 (Agency ~Iec
 I
 ani.
 6
 )
The second condition that Dean challenges
 in rte petition is
the monitoring frequency for fecal coliform
 Iae
 1981. permit,
 as
well as all previous permits, require Dean to monitor for fecal
coliform
 on a weekly basis,
 However, past permits included a
 provision whereby monthly monitoring for fecal coliform would be
permitted if done in conjunction with monitoring for chlorine
residual,
 Dean had followed this condition in the past and
monitored on a monthly basis
 (R.
 321).
 The first draft permit
presented to Dean on April
 3,
 1983, dropped this provision
allowing an alternative to weekly monitoring
Dean personnel met with Agency personnel in Maywood on April
14,
 1981, to discuss the monitoring parametsrs,
 as
 well
 as the
monitoring frequency for fecal
 coliform
 (R.
 185
 On April
 17,
1983,
 a second draft permit was issued which r~taned the weekly
monitoring requirement,
 as well
 as the old samp’rng point
 after
admixture.
 Dean personnel met again with Agency ~ersonnel
 in
Springfield on July 10,
 1981,
 At that time,
 Dean saw the
 third
draft permit dated July
 7,
 1981, which changed tn~sampling
 point
from after to before admixtur~(R
 186—7). The Agency explained
that the point had been changed because
 of
 Rule
 401(a)
 (304.102(a))
and requested
 additional
 information
 regardr1g
 Dean’s
 treatment
59-376
system
 (R.
 292).
 Dean’s consulting engineer resp~~nded
 with a
letter exp1aixri~rigthe original
 rationale
 for
 setting
 the
 sampling
point after
 mixture of the two streams and previded
 summarized
water treatment data
 for 1980 and 1981
 (R,
 lbI~.
 rite
 final
permit was issued on September
 2,
 1981.
In
 support of their decision to change
 ti e non toring
 point
the Agency testified that they needed informat~ on the
 basis
 of
design
 and
 the
 eff~ciencesof each of the indrv~duaiunits,
 an
analysis of whether Dean could provide any addil ore
 treatment
that would
 significantly improve their effluent
 a schedule
 of
compliance for TSS eff)u~ntlimitations and ~r
 xalnation of
 the
water
 quality
 impact from its discharge
 in ord~rto properly
evaluate Dean’s
 treatment process
 (R.
 291-292’
 rlIh~~
7~gency
felt that
Dean
 had
 not
 been forthcoming with this informate~aprior to
issuance
 of
 the permit.
 The Agency questioned Dear’s
 assertion
that
 ~best
 degree of treatment” was being provided because
 recent
discharge
 monitoring reports
 (DMR’s)
 showed that
 )ear was
violating both
 the 30 day average and the max~mun limitations
 for
TSS
 on
 a consistent basis,
 even after dilution with non—contact
cooling
 water
 (Agency
 11cc,
 18).
 Dean’s Notice or
 N ncompliance
(NON) for
 May
 1,
 1981, stated that they would nor L? able
 to
 meet
TSS
 standards
 during the coming spring and sumnw
 nonths
 (Agency
Rec, 19).
 The informetion the Agency had on r~
 ~ basis of
design
 for
 treatment was out of date.
 Some
t~t
th~
~nformation
 dated
 from
 the l960’r,
 Since that time, there
 th been
 treatment
modifications
 and the
 -naractcristics and qnrtc’.y
 f Dean’s
waste had
 changed
 (11.
 492)
Dean
 asserts tha
 the Agency is estoppe.
 changing the
sampling point and th~ a ~a~tD.1ngfrequency
 r
 .
 coliform.
Dean also
 argues that they are entitled to sam~l~.after
 admixture
under
 304,102(a)
 because they provide the
 “beet 1~reeof treat-
ment of wastewater
 consistent with technologia.~~asihi1ity,
economic
 reasonableness and sound engineering
 ~,
 lgaeent.”
 The
Agency argues that
 they are not estopped to cnange these
 permit
conditions and
 that 304.102 does not allow
 .re-monitoring
admixture of a
 waste stream and a non-contact cooling stream
prior to monitoring
 regardless of what degre~of treatment is
provided.
After prolonged di~covexv,numerous moticiia
 to the
 Hearing
Officer and appeals to the Board,
 tais mstte~ream~te hearing
 on
March
 28,
 1984.
 Dean p~senteifour witnessn~,John Hetrick, an
environmental
 consultant. to Dean
 and
 former empioJe~Dennis
Busch,
 Dean’s
 Director of Nuvironmental Control
 aLien B.
 Fehr, a
consulting engineer retainea hq Dean;
 and Dr
 llisor
 11. Brigham,
an Associate
 Aquatic Biolo4iCt at the illino
 s
 ~atura1 History
Survey,
 who was
 retained
 ‘oj Dean to study the
 I
 w’w.aw Creek,
The Agency
 presented one ~iitness,Mark B,
 ScholLa b~rger,the
Agency engineer who wrote Dean’s 1981 permit~
 )ean
 incorporated
portions of this witness’ testimony into their
 e~in chief,
The
 Hearing
 Officer,
 in a written statement 07.Juating
 the
4
credibility of
 the
 witnesses,
 felt
 that
 credibi1~ty
 was
 an
 issue
regarding witness Schoilenbergor.
 The Hearing Officer stated
that while he did not believe Schollenberger was lying, he was
 unsure and evasive on cross—examination concerning his reasons
Eor writing
 the permit
 as
 he
 did
 (Hearing Officer’s Statement
of credibility,
 April
 10,
 1984).
DE NOVO HEARING ISSUE A~DEVIDENTIARY
 OBJECTIONS
The Agency,
 at hearing,
 objected to the
 introduction
 of
certain evidence presented by
 Dean
 on the
 basis that
 the proper
evidentiary scope in a permit appeal was limited
 to
 the
 facts
before the Agency
 at
 the
 time
 the permit was
 issued.
 The Agency
cites both Appellate cases and Board decisions
 that have
 con-
sistantly defined the scope of a permit appeal
 under
 Section 40
of the Act as whether or not, based upon the facts
 of
 the appli-
cation, the applicant has provided proof that
 the
 activity in
question will not cause a violation of the Act or
 of
 the
regulations.
 The Agency argues, relying on
 Illinois
 Environmental Protection Agency v.
 Illinois
 Pollution
Control Board and Album, Inç~74 Ill.
 Dec.
 158,
 455
 N.E.
 2d 188
(Ill.
 App.
 1 Dist.
 1983), Oscar Mayer &
 Co..,
 v.
 EPA,
 PCB 78—14,
30
 PCB
 397, June 14,
 1978, and EPA v. Allaert ~nderiLIn~
PCB 76—80,
 35 PCB
 281, September
 6,
 1979, that a petitioner must
show compliance with the Act and regulations
 ‘based solely
 upon
the permit application and supporting
 documentation
 actually
submitted by the applicant.
The Agency specifically objected to a
 1983 report
 prepared
by Dr. Allison
 R.
 Brigham
 on the biology of
 the !?iscasaw
 Creek
watershed
 and
 the
 impact
 of
 Dean’s
 discharger
 aneport
 dated
September
 24,
 :1981, by
 Fehr,
 Graham & Associates evaluating
tertiary
 wastewater
 treatment alternatives
 for
 Dean’s
 Chemung
facility?
 information
 and
 data
 regarding
 Flotafilter
 nriits
 and
microscreeniag;
 BAT-BCT
 Effluent
 Guidelines
 adopted
 Later
 than
September
 2,
 1981,
 and any
 other
 facts
 or
 information
 not
presented
 to
 the
 Agency
 prior
 to
 September
 2,
 1981
 (Agency
Objection
 No.
 1).
 The
 Agency
 also
 objected
 to
 the
 admission
 of
any
 evidence
 relating
 to
 Agency
 procedures,
 criteria
 and
activities
 pertaining
 to the
 permit
 decision—making
 process
relating to Dean’s latest
 and
 earlier NPDES
 permits, or
 relating
to USEPA effluent guidelines for the
 dairy industry
 (gency
Objection No,
 2)..
 The Hearing Officer received
 the
 evidence and
deferred the question
 of
 admissibility to
 the
 Board.
 The
 Agency,
in
 its
 brief,
 requests
 that
 certain
 portions
 of
 the
 hearing
transcript
 that
 relate
 to
 the
 objectionable
 evidence
 be
 stricken.
Dean
 relies
 on
 35
 111.
 Mm,
 Code
 l05.l02(a)(8~ as
 a
 basis
for presenting evidence developed after
 the final NPDES
 permit
was issued on September 1, 1981,
 and not
 contained
 in
 the
 Agency
Record,
 Section 105.102(b)(8) applies to NPDES
 permit
 appeals
and
 provides
 that:
59-378
The hearings before the Board shall exten~
 all questions
of law and facc presented by the entire ~Ld,
 The
Agency’s findi~gsand conclusions on que~t~
 ~ns of fact
 shall
be priwa facie t~e and correct.
 If the A~~‘cy’s
conclusions ci fact are disputed by thc p~:t~or if
 issues
of fact are rsised in the review proc~e~i~’~
 Board
 may
make its own ~et~r~ination of fact has~o
 ~
 ~e
 record.
 If
any party deeire~te
 introduce evidenre
.~
 he Board
with respec~~
 ~
 disputed issue Ci
 ‘
 Board shall
conduc~a de novo hearing and receive ev~.
 with respect
to such issue
 ~i
feat.
This sect~on
 ~.
 n~Lr~’ed
 in Olin Con~.
 ~,
 PCB
 80—126,
45 PCB 389, Febru~ary1/,
 1982,
 as follows:
“The hear rj de novo provisions no~
 ~“~strued
narrowly;
 otherwise
 permit
 applicants
 i’
 ~mpted to
withhold facts at the Agency level in h~
 a more
friendly
 reception
 before
 the
 Board,
 It
 encourage
appeals and wou d place the Board in a p
 of being
 the
first agency to evaluate the factual su
 ~s.
 This
would distort tv. reparation of functi ~
The fourti~~ote~oo
 allows a hGCL
‘~
 ~t’c
 only
 with
respect to ‘any dt~put~dissues of icc
 ‘
 :e~ersonly
to an Agency factual determination wh1f~
 ~sputed before
the Agency”
 (p.
 4)
In the present casc
 Dean has submitt~
 not in the
Agency Record relat~.d~o whether or not the
 ~~reeof
treatment of wastewater consistant with to
feasibility, econ nic r~asoaab1enessand
 s
 ‘
earing
judgment “was provided at the Chemung faci1.~t~
 ~‘nbelieves
that providing this level of treatment entraL~
 on to monitor
aftex their waste ~tr~aamhas been diluted
 w:3h
 ‘~‘~‘
 c~ntact
cooling water,
 After the third draft 1981 per~otwas presented
to
 Dean,
 Dean re~pondedwith two letters
 t
 aLe ~pency objecting
to
 the changed monitoring point and explainin~aLe original
rationale for allowing this monitoring point
 (
 ~
 Rec,
 62 and
63).
 Dean
 also
 submitted
 a
 summary
 of
 trea4inent
 slant
 operation
data for 1980 and part of 1981
 (Agency Rec,
 63).
 D~anhas
disputed the factual issue of whether or not
it
 r
 providing
“best degree of treatment” at the Chemung facC’ty before the
Agency.
 According to the Olin standard, a de nov~hearing on
 this issue should bo ai1owed~
While the Board may
 look at the issue of “best degree of
treatment” in a de rovo manner, the Hearing )ificcr incorrectly
admitted
 evidence beyond the proper scope a11we~
 ri
 a permit
appeal.
 The Appellate Court, in IEPA v.
 PCB arid
 ~
455 N.E.
 2d at 194, clearly held that:
“The sole question before the Board
 i
 review
 of
 the
Agency’s denial of a permit is whether tho
 ~‘
 titioner
 can
prove that its permit application as
 submitted
 to
 the
 Agency
establishes that the facility will not
 cause a violation of
the
 Act,
 (Ill,
 Rev,
 Stat.
 1979,
 ch,
 111½,
 par.
 1040).
 If
the Agency has granted the permit with
 conditions to which
the petitioner objects, the petitioner
 must
 prove
 that
 the
conditions
 are
 not
 necessary
 to
 accomplish
 the
 purposes
 of
the Act and therefore were imposed
 unreasonably.
 The Board
may not be persuaded by new material not
 before the Agency
that the permit should be oranted,
 (Soil
 Enrichment
~
 972),
 5
Ill.
 P.C,B,
 Op.
 715.)
 When reviewing the
 Agency~s
denial
 of
a permit or imposition of any conditions,
 ~the
 decision
 of
the Board shall be based exclusively on
 the record
 before
the Agency including the record of the
 hearing,
 if any
 ~.“
Ill..
 Rev.
 Stat,
 1979,
 ch.
 111½, par.
 1040; ~1CoalC9~
~
 (1979),
 35
 Ill.
 P.C,B.
Op.
 380.”
IEPA
 v.
 PCB and Album,
 Inc. deals with
 construction
 and
operating
 permits
 for a liquid waste
 incinerator.
 However,
Section
 40
 applies to both NPDES and
 non—NPDES
 permits alike.
 In
~
 Coal_Co. v,
 EPA, ~ra,,
 an NPDES permit
 appeal,
 the
Board
 stated that:
 “The issue
 in a Section
 40
 petition
 is
whether
 or not, based upon the facts
 of the
 application,
 the
applicant
 has
 provided
 proof
 that
 the activity
 in question
 will
not
 cause
 a
 violation
 of
 the
 Act
 or
 of
 the
 regulations.~
 The
Board~s scope
 of inquiry
 is clearly limited in
 both
 NPDES
 and
non-NPDES
 permit
 appeals.
The Hearing Officer’s admission of
 evidence
 developed
 after
the issuance of the final permit was in error,
 The
 Board
overturns the Hearing Officer’s admission of the evidence.
However,
 Dean’s
 attempts
 to
 focus
 on the issue
 of
 whether
 or not
~best
 degree
 of
 treatment”
 was
 provided
 at the chemung facility
are misdirected.
 The Board has reviewed the full
 record
 from the
March 28,
 1984, hearing, even including the
 evidence
 developed after
the final permit was issued, and concludes
 that under
 the proper
interpretation of 304.102 this excluded evidence
 is
 irrelevant to
the resolution of this permit appeal.
Dean argues that 35
 ‘Ill.
 Adm. Code 304.102
 entitles
 them to
monitor after admixture of a treated contact waste stream and a
non—contact cooling stream because they provide
 the
 ‘~bestdegree
of treatment of wastewater consistent with
 technological
feasibility, economic reasonableness and sound engineering
judgment.”
 This interpretation of the rule
 is
 not supported
 by
the terms of the rule,
 the intent of its author,
 or Board
opinions on this issue,
 35 Ill. Adm. Code
 304.102 provides as
follows:
Section 304.102 DilutIon
a)
 Dilution
 of
 the
 effluent
 from
 a
 treatment
 works
 or
from any wastewatem source is not acceptable
 as
 a
method of treatment of
 wastes
 in
 order to meet the
standards set forth in this Part,
 Rather,
 it
shall be the obligation of any
 person
 discharging
contaminants of any kind to the waters of the
state
 to
 provide
 the
 best
 degree
 of
 treatment
 of
wastweatem consistent with technological
feasibility, economic reasonableness and sound
engineering judgment.
 In
 making
 determinations
 as
to
 what
 kind
 of
 treatment
 is the “best degree of
treatment” within the meaning
 of
 this
 paragraph,
any person shall consider the following:
I)
 What degree of waste reduction can be
achieved by process
 change,
 improved
housekeeping and recovery of individual waste
components for reuse; and
2)
 Whether individual process wastewater streams
should be segregated
 or combined.
b)
 In any case, measurement of contaminant concen-
trations to determine compliance with the effluent
standards shall be made
 at
 the point
 immediately
following the final treatment process and before
mixture with other waters, unless another point
 is
designated
 by
 the
 Agency
 in
 an individual permit,
after consideration of the elements contained in
this section,
 If necessary the concentrations so
measured shall be recomputed to exclude the effect
of
 any
 dilution
 that
 is
 improper under this Section.
In the Board Opinion adopting the Dilution Rule,
 Mr. Currie
stated that:
“Removal of contaminants from wastewater
 is
 generally
preferable to dilution to meet standards,
 Even if
concentrations
 are
 diluted
 sufficiently
 to
 avoid
 immediate
harm to those using the stream,
 excessive
 reliance
 on
dilution
 rapidly
 exhausts the assimilative capacity of the
water,
 especially
 if,
 as
 is
 often the case, the effluent
standard is more lenient than the corresponding standard for
stream quality.
 Thus in order to make
 room for future
industry and population growth,
 as well as to keep the
waters as clean as practicable rather than seeking merely
marginal compliance with stream quality standards,
 it
 is
desirable
 to require the employment
 of
 readily
 available
treatment methods to reduce as much
 as
 practicable
 the
 total
quantities
 of
 contaminants
 discharged
 to
 the
 waters
 before
resorting to dilution either before or after discharge....
.,,On the basis of this policy
 the
 Board
 initially
proposed
 that the effluent standards be
 met
 without
 any
allowance for dilution,
 Although
 some
 industry
 spokesmen
challenged this in principle, most acknowledged that
intentional dilution in lieu of
 treatment should be
forbidden,
 There was considerable
 controversy,
 however,
over
 the possibility that the absolute
 ban on
 dilution
 might
be construed to prohibit the mixing of several streams
contaminated with different wastes
 before
 treatment.
Recognizing that in many cases more
 effective
 treatment
 can
be obtained by separate treatment
 of
 different waste streams
at their source but that economics
 does
 not always
 permit
such separate treatment,
 we published a revised dilution
standard
 proposal
 leaving some room
 for
 engineering
 judgment
as
 to
 the desirability of separating
 or
 combining
 waste
streams for
 treatment.
 That
 revised
 proposal,
 which has
generally
 met with acceptance, was
 retained
 in the proposed
final draft and in today’s regulation
 with
 the
 addition of
one
 sentence making it clear that the
 provision
 for
measurement after treatment does not undermine the general
prohibition against dilution at any stage.~’
It
 is
 clear
 that the Board intended to
 prohibit
 dilution as
a means
 of
 complying with effluent limitations.
 This general
policy is
 clear from both the language of
 the regulation
 and
 the
opinion..
 In certain circumstances, however, the Board recognized
that it
 may be desirable to combine two
 or
 more
 different
waste
 streams
 rather than treat these
 waste streams
 separately.
The purpose
 for combining two or more waste streams
 is to
increase
 the effectiveness of the treatment
 or to
 treat more
economically.
 The choice of whether to combine separate waste
streams for treatment
 is left to “engineering judgment.”
 It is
clear that
 the streams that may be combined
 must be
 waste
 streams
and the
 purpose of such admixture is for
 effective
 and
 economic
treatment.
 The rule clearly does not create a right to dilute
 a
waste stream with a non~wastestream even if “best degree of
treatment” is provided.
Board opinions in this area support this interpretation of
the Dilution Rule.
 In Revere &o
 eLand Brass_Inc.v,
 IEPA,
 PCB
80—117,
 54 PCB 81, September 23,
 1983, the Board upheld NPDES
permit conditions that designated effluent monitoring of
wastewater before mixture with other waters.
 The Board found
that Revere had not demonstrated “best degree
 of
 treatment” to
 permit combining of wastewater sources,
 Furthermore, the
effluent was impermissibly diluted with non—contact cooling water
and stormwater from roof drains and a parking lot,
 54 P,C,B. at
84.
 In I11inoisNitr~genCorp~1~EPA,PCB 80-144,
 44 PCB 139,
December 3, 1981,
 a variance petitioner requested a measuring
point that would allow and encourage the
 petitioner
 to
 mix
 a
sanitary
 stream with boiler blowdown,
 process
 water
 and
 cooling
water
 prior
 to
 treatment.
 The Board denied this request because
it
 would
 result in a lower level of contaminant removal and
 undue
dilution in violation of Rule 401(a).
 The Board construed Rule
401(a) to proscribe such dilution
 44 PCB
 at
 146.
Section 30~
 ~
 ci~he~dilution as a means of complying
with effluent 1~it~c~o~e.
 The regulation provides for mixture
of waste streams
 I
 ~rta~r
 limited
 circumstances.
 It clearly
proscribes adsix~rt.o~ien~contactcooling
 water
 immediately
prior to me~isur~an ~
 ~~‘ctarge. Dean’s contention that
 they
have earned taL
 ~ J~e as a reward for providing the
“best degree ~
 a
 n
 ‘
 ~sro~supported
 by the
 facts or law.
The admixture
 J1 ~
 r ~
j5
 unrelated to any type of
treatment proce~
.
 ~
 -rrespondence
 in
 1973 between the
Agency
 and. De~
 t
 ~e
ms
 as “waste” streams.
 Whether
or not this wa~
 ~understanding regarding t e
nature of tbe co
 ~.
 c
 ~ar
 n the part of the Agency or a
misrepresentot)c
 J
 ~
 r~1evant,
 The
 overriding
 effect
of combining
 hE
 rc
 r
 3.
 o~utior, Even
 with
 this dilution,
Dean is unable
 1e
 e~
~uuert limitations
 in it
 uermit.
The Agency deci’~aL
 t
 re
 cate the sampling point was reasonable
in
 the
 circumstar
 a
 8
 r:ect
 as
 a
 matter
 of
 law.
L~2OPEL ISSUE
Dean argues th
 be Agency is estopped from changing the
two
 contested
 pa mi
 nc3
ri5.
 The
 estoppel
 principle has
 been
applied to both t~c~crc
 and the Pollution
 Control
 Board in
certain circumstalc
 ~.
 The facts in the
 present
 case,
 however,
do
 not
 create
 a
 .
 -
 n
 ~~horeostoppel can be properly applied.
The
 Board
 r
 Di.
 P
 ri.t Dc Nemours
 & Co.
V.
 EPA,
 PCB
79—106,
 39
 PCB
 348
 ~
 21
 1980,
 outlined the proper
circumstances ~or
 a &~p~
 ~on of estoppel to an Agency
decision.
 The B
 u ad the Agency from reclassifying an
industrial dit
 ~
 ronmental improvement will result,
where
 there
 ta
 i
 he facility or regu~dLins and
where the permit~
 -.~
 rpanded money in
 reliance
 on the
previous class
 tiCf. i~
 3
 PCB at 351,
 In the present case,
the increased fa~
 a
 in nonitoring frequency will
potentially imp;~
i?
 ti
 A en~ys ability to
 analyze
 Dean’s
treatment process.
 hanging the sampling
 point
 will
 precluae
Dean
 from
 using d1u
 a
 as
 ~
 treatment
 process..
 Since
 the
original 1973 Agency -~szgn~ionof the monitoring point there
have been change
 i.
 d-~an’sprocess and treatment operation
 (R.
47—48).
 Dean was ura~a.
 i.ect TSS limitations in the months
prior
 to
 the
 issuance
 )f
 the
 1981
 permit. Dean has not expended
money in reliance on
 his previous determination.
 Dean
 may
 be
required
 to
 expend mo
°‘-‘
 i-i
 tie future as a result of these
conditions but U
 ~~oe
~.
 axoense is clearly within the intent
of the Act and reg~atian~.
 Dean has not
 met
 the
 requirements
for application
 f
~‘~op~cl tc
 either of the contested
conditions,
The burden
 apocal
 is on the petitioner to prove
that,
 in
 the
 ct~a-
 ~
 s~ecpermit
 conditions,
 the
conditions
 are
 Tt.
 ~c~s3ary to accomplish the purposes of the
Act and therefore
 ~
 iiposed unreasonably..
 IEPA v.
 PCB and
Album
 Inc., 45s
 P
 23 a: 194.
 Dean
 has
 not
 met this burden
~~ffE~of
 t~3-~’
i,
d3~iJi~The
 Agency
 has
 the
 duty to impose
10
conditions in permits that will result in
 compliance with
 the
 Act
and Board regulations,
 The permit
 conditions on appeal are,
reasonably directed towards this goal.
 The conditions are
therefore affirmed.
This Opinion constitutes the Board~s
findings
 of
 facts and
conclusions of law in this matter.
ORDER
The Board has reviewed the contested
 conditions
 in
 NPDES
 permit
No.
 IL 0003395 and affirms those
 conditions.
IT IS SO ORDERED,
Chairman J.
 D.
 Dumelle concurred.
I,
 Dorothy M.
 Gunn, Clerk of the
 Illinois Pollution
 Control
Board,
 hereby certify that the above Opinion
 and Order was adopted
on the
 ~‘day
 of
 ~~l984
 by a vote of
 4Q~.
Dorothy
 M.
 unn,
 Clerk
Illinois
 Pollution
 Control
 Board
59~384