ILLINOIS POLLUTION
CONTROL BOARD
February 20,
1985
ILLINOIS
ENVIRONMENTAL
)
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
)
)
Complainant,
v.
)
PCB 83-~23
ARNOLD~S
SEWER AND SEPTIC
)
SERVICE and
JIMMY MCDONALD
)
Respondent.
CONCURRING STATEMENT
(by J.
D.
Dumelle):
The
majority of the Board
has
examined
the Environmental
Protection
Act,
They have
bootstrapped a legal requirement to
publish
an opinion containing
~facts and reasons~via the
Administrative Procedure Act into
an assumed requirement for
admission of vJ,lations,
Admittedl\
the Environmental
Protection Act. is silent on
settlement
proc
dures
(see
~emetco
major~ty order, p.
8).
One
must then
look
~t legislative intent,
The courts have long held that
~the legislative declaration
of. the purpose
of
the
Environmental
Protectionj
Act
(par.
1002)
indicates
that the principal reason
for authorizing the
imposition of civil penalties (par~
l042~was to provid~ea method
to
aid the enforcement of the Act and
that the punitive
considerations were secondary~ (City
of Monmouth v.
Pollution
Control Board
(1974)
57 Ill.2d
482,
490,
313 N.E.
2d 161,
166),
I
find no reason to conclude that
compliance
with the Act
cannot be encouraged through settlements
which do
not allow for
the finding of violation,
A large
penalty absent such a finding
clearly would be a greater deterrent
than a sniall penalty
in
conjunction with such a finding.
Thus,
the
Board~s“principal
reason~
for imposing a penalty is better
met.
The Environmental Protection Act
has as one of its goals the
establishment of a spe~alizedtechnical
tribunal to ~$mi~cate
environmental
disputes ~nvo1ving
its
own rules and the
Act,
That
tribunal
is this Pollution Control
Board.
Implicit in establishing that
tribunal is the power
to
accept
(not ~order~) settlements
freely arrived at by the
parties.
And
if
a party chooses
to make a contribution or pay
a
penalty
to
an Illinois fund, why
should the Board not accept
it
it if
it
appears reasonable?
After
the Board order has been
63~49
2
issued acceptinj U
stipulation, the penalty or contribution
payment
is really ro
rordered,~ The
word ~order~
merely shows
the Board~soffi
~al acceptance
consistent with the
stipulation~
The Attorney ~ereral of Illinois
has brought this case
on
behalf of the IEPA~ His office
is
also the lawyer
for the
Pollution Control Board,
Obviously,
his staff saw no
legal
impediment to approval by the Board
of the stipulation here
presented and now
e~ectedby the
majority.
Further, rothing prevents the
Attorney General
from entering
into a contract w ~h n~iyperson
against whom he has brought
an
enforcement a
racing to dismiss
the proceeding
upon a
contribution
n ironmental
Trust Fund,
If
the Attorney
General were
sich a course,
the same “settlement” could
be reached bu
t the Board nor
the public would
have any
opportunity
t
nto that agreement
in a public
forum,
Alternatively,
maJority acknowledges, the same settlement
offered here c~o
•
accomplished
before
the court
system.
In
either case,
thr
~d loses the
opportunity to oversee
the
settlement proces
If the Board
i~
to fully operate
as the state’s
specialized
technical tribunal
i~
ewironmental
matters,
it must have
the
power
to accep
all
ypes of reasonable
stipulations.
My feeling
is that
it ha~ w~y~had that power.
Some cond
iow
in the proposed
stipulation are not
explained0
TI’
icoosed oayment
of $300 appears too low,
The
need to retair
irasdiction is not
given.
And finally, the
condition that
i
si.
cc
change its
name
is
certainly not
substantiated,
The st~.pu1ationshould
be rejected for
these
reasons only~
I
oncur
in the
rejection but not for
the
main reason atate’~
Us ‘rajority
the issue of the need to
find violat~~~
I, Dorothy M
(~ci
Clerk of the
Illinois
Pollution Control
Board, hereby cc
t ~
tlr,
he above
Concurring
Statement was
submitted on t~e
~.
,
1985.
Dorothy M.
Gunn, Clerk
Illinois
Pollution Control
Board