ILLINOIS

POLLUTION

CONTROL

BOARD

February 20, 1985

ILLINOIS

ENVIRONMENTAL

)

PROTECTION.

AGENCY,

)

Complainant,

)

PCB 83~2

)

CHEMETCO,

INC~

)

)

ORDER OF THE

BO2~n~

~y J~

Anderson):

On June

14,

the Board entered an Opinion ~nd Order

in

this actions Th~~~tccepted

a stipulation and proposal for

settlement contaL~

~j

a compliance Order and provision for

payment of a

stip~:edpenalty into the Environmental Trust Fund

(Trust Fund),

in

~~~nce

upon

the condition that the parties

certify

their acce~:anceto

the Board’s finding of violation

of

the Environmental

i~:otection

Act

(Act)

(Ill. Revs StaL

ch~lll1/2 51001 etjp~j~jand various regulations~ Such

certification ~u1d

be tantamount to the

parties’

agreement to

modification o~that portion of the

stipulation

which provided

that Chemetco

3ither admits nor denies

tviolations~,*

On July

1

1984, Chemetco filed a Motion

for Modification

of the Board!s

tine 14,

1984 Orders

On August

7,

1984,

the

Agency

filed an Objection

to the same

Board Order,

and on

August 13,

1984 Chemetco

filed

a Response objecting to part of

the Agency’s

Motion and reasserted

its

earlier Motion to modify

the Board’s

order~

*The Board notes that this is the second “go around~’on the

issue

of settlement of this case~ An April

12,

1983 proposed

settlement

agreement which provided that

Chemetco “denies

violations”

was rejected by the Board

because,

inter alia,

“the imposition of a $20,000~00stipulated penalty

appears~inappropriateunder

the Act in

light

of the

Board’s

inability to find violations, since

a)

the

Agency has not withdrawn any of the charges or

allegations n~ade ~n Counts I,

II, III, and IV of

January

6,

1983 Complaint;

and

b)

the

Respondent,

althouØ agreeing to the

imposition

of a penalty, has

nonetheless steadfastly denied that any violations

occurred (including possible

‘technical’

violations due

to permit

expiration)~” j~y~Ch~~1IncG, PCB

83~2,54 PCB 157, Interim

Order October

6, 1983

(footnote omitted

---

The above filings all

request that the stipulation be

accepted

exactly as originally proposed,

thus eliminating

the

Board’s

modification of the stipulation to include findings of

violation

against Chemetco and a certificate of acceptances

The

Board hereby denies the modifications requested by the

parties~

On its own motion,

the Board vacates its Opinion and

Order

of June 14,

1984 in their entirety~ The proposed

stipulation

in rejected,

and the parties are ordered

to proceed

to hearing

in this matter, which shall be scheduled within 30

and

held

within 60 days

of

the date of this Orders

ci Histor

Prior tohiscussion of the Board’s rationale for rejecting

this stipulation, the Board will recapitulate the procedura1~

history in

thin action~

This mattes~comes before the Board

on the January 6,

1983

Complaint

brought by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency

(Agency)

Count

I of the Complaint alleged that,

from June 14,

1578

to

January

6,

1983,

the Respondent intermittently allowed

contaminants frmn its facility into the

atmosphere causing air

pollution in~v~lation of Rule

102

of Chapter

2:

Air Regulation

(now

35 IlL A

Code 20Ll4l)

and

Section 9(a)

of the

Illinois

Environmental

)tection Act

(Act).

Count

II

leged

that, from January

1, 1980 until January

6,

1983, the Respondent operated its plant so as

to

cause emissions

of

fugitive particulate

matter

in violation

of Rule 102 of

Chapter

2

(now 35 Ill, Adm. Code 201), Rule

203(f) (1) of Chapter

2

(now 35

III, Adm. Code 212.301),

and Section

9(a) of the Act.

Count III alleged that,

from June 14, 1978 until January

6,

1983,

the Respondent operated each of its

three 70~tonfurnaces

in

such a manner as to allow particulate emissions into

the

atmosphere which exceeded the allowable emission rates

in

violation of Rule 102 of Chapter

2

(now

35

Ill Adm. Code

201.141),

Rule 203(a)

of Chapter

2

(now 35

Ill. Adm. Code

212~321),and Section 9(a)

of the Act.

Count IV alleged

that,

from June

5,

1978 until

December

12,

1978

and from December

8,

1981 to January

6,

1983,

the Respondent

operated

its three 70~tonfurnaces without

an Operatiun

?~mit

from

the Agency in vic ition of Rule 102

of Chapter

2

~i~O

35

IlL

Adm.

Code 201.141), Rule 103(b) (2)

of

Chapter

2

(now 35

Iii.

Adm~Code

21.144,

and Section 9(b)

of the Act,

The

initial hearing on this matter was held

on March

4,

1983~

The parties filed a Settlement Agreement on March

7,

1983,

On

April 12,

1983, the

parties filed

a second Settlement

Agreement

which was

identical in substance

to the first

63~30

---

Settlement Agreement,

but which contained some minor language

changes

which had been read into the record at the hearing and

had been requested by

the Agency.

On October

6,

1983, the Board entered an Interim Order which

rejected the proposed settlement agreements

Deficiencies in the

initially proposed stipulation included the fact that:

(1)

Chemetco did not admit to any violations, but

did

agree to pay a

$20,000 penalty and to undertake a compliance program;

(2)

the

parties stated that the settlement agreement could be amended

if

they agreed

in writing,

but did not state that the Board’s

approval would be necessary (thereby creating a mechanism by

which they

could

amend the compliance plan without first

consulting th~

~~~ard),

and

(3)

the possibility of carcinogens

being

released into the atmosphere from arsenic—bearing materials

during scrap

metal processing operations

(thereby

possibly

jeopardizing the health and safety of

individuals who live near

the

metal reclamation and smelting facility) was not specifically

addressed by the parties.

On March

28,

1984,

a

Joint Motion

for Approval of an Amended

Settlement Agreement and Exhibits, along with the aforementioned

amended stipulation and exhibits,

was filed,

On April

6,

1984,

a

hearing was held and the third Amended Settlement Agreement

(Stip.)

and var~ousexhibits were admitted into evidence

as

Parties’ Exhib

No,

1.

(R.

7_20,)*

In the th

I Amended Settlement Agreement,

the

parties

amended

the pr

bus stipulation in an attempt to

meet the

Board’s

concer~

On page seven, paragraph two of the most

recent

stipulation, Chemetco has stated that it

“neither

admits

nor denies the alleged violations”, rather than simply denying

the

violations.

The objectionable language on

page seven

in

paragraph four pertaining to amendment of the agreement without

prior Board approval was deleted

in the latest stipulation, and

the

parties have noted that the compliance program was completed

on

October

6, 1983.

(R.3.)

Additionally, the Agency has

indicated that “having investigated the potential for arsenic

emissions during operation of Chemetco’s process,

it has

determined that arsenic

is driven off only during the heating

stage and

is therefore captured by the serubbers and not released

during

charging and tapping.”

*Citations to the record

(H,)

refer

to

the transcript of the

April

6, 1984 hearing,

The parties filed the proposed

settlement

agreement

before a hearing was held on the amended

agreements

The

Board will consider

the official filing date

of the third

Amended

Settlement Agreement to be April

30,

1984

(the date that

the hearing transcript was filed with the Board).

6S~3i

---

—4—

In its

June 14,1984 Opinion and Order,

the Board granted the

parties’

Joint Motion for Approval

of the Amended Settlement

Agreement.

However, the Board also noted

that because the Board

deemed

it appropriate to include

a finding of violation as item

#1

in its

Order,

a

Certificate of Acceptance and

Agreement was

included as

item #5

in the Order,

As

detailed

in the

stipulation,

the Respondent, Chemetco,

Inca

(Chemetco),

is a Delaware corporation duly authorized by the

Illinois

Secretary

of State to transact business

in Illinois,

Chemetco owns

and

operates a metal reclamation and secondary

copper smelting facility

(facility)

in Hartford, Madison County,

Illinois

which has

a plant site of 108

acres

(located about 10

minutes

by mr

north

of Granite City,

Illinois) which employs 176

people~

Ch~::m~~etco’s

site

is zoned for heavy industrial use and is

surrounded hy

farmland,

The nearest houses not occupied by

Chemetco

personnel are about 1/4 mile from the plant site,

An

oil

refinery,

power plant, petrochemical plant, brass mill,

and

other

large industrial

facilities are all located within

a 10—

mile radius

of the Respondent’s plant.

(See:

Exhibit

1;

R,8,)

Chemetco acquires a broad range of copper—bearing raw

materials

from scrap metal dealers and industry and produces

copper

cathodes from these raw materials, as well as recovering

other non—ferrous

metals as by—products.

During

smelting,

refining and

pr

cessing operations at its plant,

Chemetco used

three

(now

fow

70—ton rotating furnaces equipped

with overhead

hoods which

co~ ~tina scrubber system to capture

particulate

emissions.

Du.

ig part of the operations at

Chemetco’s facility,

each of

the fu;

aces are tilted, allowing the

emission of odors,

dust,

and gases

(including zinc oxides)

to escape

beyond the

furnace

hoods and roof of the plant into the atmosphere0

During Chemetco’ s processing operations,

copper—bearing

scrap is

smelted and refined.

The slag

is

treated in three

(now

four)

top—blown, 70—ton rotating Kaldo furnaces which are called

“converters”.

(See:

Exhibits

2 and 3.)

Some particulate

emissions

from these three

(now four) converters are captured by

separate

hoods and then are ducted

to,

and cleaned

in, separate

venturi~

scrubbers

(Stip.

2—3;

H.

8—9.)

Exhaust from this

process

reaches the atmosphere through three

(now

four) separate

stacks0

However,

some particulate emissions

are not captured by

the hoods,

ducts,

and scrubbers.

(Stip.

2;

R,

9,)

The

three rotating furnaces and associated

air pollution

control

equipment

(including the three venturi

scrubb~n~~

tre

*Between April 12,1983 and the present

date,

a fourth

rotating

rotary furnace

(i,e,, another

“converter”)

has come

into

operation at the Respondent’s facility0

(See:

page

5

of this

Opinion.)

---

—5—

existing

emission sources which were constructed and

in operation

before

April 14, 1972,

The Agency issued the requisite operating

permit

for the three furnaces on November

16,

1972 and renewed

the permit

on June 18,

1974 and April

2, l976~

However, because

an Agency

inspection on June 14,

1978

indicated possible

violations of

Rule 103(b) (2)

of

Chapter

2:

Air Regulations (now

35 Iii. Adm.

Code 201,144)

and Section

9(a)

of the Act,

the

Agency denied

permit renewal on July

20,

1978.

After corrective

measures

were taken by the Respondent,

subsequent permit renewals

occurred on

December 12,

1978; July

20, 1979;

and September 8,

1980,

(See:

Exhibit

6).

On

February 26,

1981,

the Agency

received

a petition, signed

by 52

individnulm.? which alleged that

Chemetco had violated Rule

203(f) (1)

of Ch.n ter

2:

Air Regulations

(now 35 Ill. Adm, Code

212,301)

by improper emissions into the

atmosphere.

(See:

Exhibit

7.)

On March 10,

1981,

the

Agency notified the

Respondent

that its inspection indicated

apparent violations

of

Rule 203(f)(1)

of Chapter

2:

Air

Regulations

(now 35

Ill. Adm,

Code 212.301.)

On May

13,

1981,

the Respondent put

forth a proposal to

modify the

air pollution control

equipment on its three rotating

furnaces and

to construct a fourth

furnace.

This proposal was

based on

varions reports from consulting

engineers (dating as

early

as

April

1980)

which indicated

that it would be possible

to design air

llution control

equipment which could capture

additional par

culate

emissions from the charging and tapping

operations of

emetco’s

three furnaces and also introduce a

change in

the

asic process

(utilizing

four,

rather than three,

furnaces)

to

reduce overall particulate

emissions from he

Respondent’

s plant.

While

negotiations were pending

with the Agency,

the

Respondent

submitted permit renewal

applications for the three

existing

furnaces on June 5,

1981,

After notice from the Agency

on July 9,

1981 that it intended to deny

Chemetco’s pending

permit

renewal applications,

the Respondent withdrew the

applications.

On June 16,

1981 and September

10,

1981, Chemetco

submitted

applications to the Agency

for

a construction permit

for the

fourth furnace.

However,

the

Agency deemed these

applications

incomplete, and sent

notices of incompleteness to

the Respondent

on July 8,

1981 and

October

6,

1981.

On

December

3,

1981, Chemetco resubmitted

its permit renewal

application

for the existing three

furnaces and its construction

permit

application for the fourth

furnace, but withdraw these

applications

following the Agency’s

Dece~ber30,

1981

nct~ce

of

intention

to deny these permits.

On

February 10,

1982,

the Respondent

again applied for a

construction

permit for the fourth furnace.

On March 22, 1982,

the Agency

issued Construction Permit No,

1198OIAAC to Chemetco

which

authorized the construction of a

fourth converter and~the

concomitant

air pollution control equipment.

On July

2,

1982,

---

the

Respondent applied for a construction permit to retrofit the

three

existing furnaces.

On August 16,

1982,

the Agency issued

the requisite construetbon permit which authorized

the Respondent

to modify

and install the necessary air pollution control

equipment

on Chemetco’s three rotating

furnaces.

(See:

Exhibit

6.)

During

ongoing settlement negotiations,

the parties were

initially

in dispute as to whether or not:

(1) Chemetco was

lawfully

entitled to renewal of

its

operating permit

after the

expiration

date of December

8,

1981;

and

(2)

the charging and

tapping

emissions from the Respondent’s

three furnaces were

insufficiently

cont;jplled on the dates alleged

in the

Complaint.

(H.

li~~~tip.

5.)

The

Respondent has neither denied

nor admitted

the

a

~ jatlons

in the

Complaint, but has agreed

to

improve

control of t~;arging and tapping

emissions

by following an

agreed—upon

compliom~program and

schedule

involving

retrofitting

of

t’m

~ree exist~ng

furnaces to improve the

snorkel

hoods and thu charging and

tapping controls,

(See:

Exhibits

3 and

5.)

hdditionally, after

the completion

of the

retrofitting

program,

the Respondent has

agreed to

conduct the

necessary

stack tests, and

to notify the

Agency

in advance of the

stack

sampling so that Agency personnel

may witness

these

tests

and make

simultaneous visual observations

of the fugitive

emissions

from ‘~hemelt shop building

to determine compliance.

(See:

Exhibits

and 5,)

Although

C

rnetco has neither

admitted nor denied

the

allegations

of

e Complaint, the

proposed settlement agreement

provides that

t

~ Respondent agrees to

promptly pay a stipulated

penalty of

$20,U00 into the Environmental Protection Trust Fund.*

*This

penalty

is to be made payable to

the Environmental

Protection

Trust Fund

(Trust Fund), pursuant

to the authority to

so order

granted to the Board in Section 42(a)

of the Act as

amended

by P,A. 83—0618, effective September

19, 1983.

The

legislation

creating the Trust Fund and a Commission to

administer

it was P,A, 81—951 effective January

1,

1980 and

codified

as Ill. Rev, Stat, 1983,

ch.

111 1/2 ~l06l~

That

legislation

provides

in pertinent part

that

“The

Commission may accept, receive

and administer

.

.

any grants, gifts,

loans,

or other

funds*** providz~6

that such monies niall be used only

for the

purporns for

which

they are contributed and any

balance remaining

shall

be returned to the contributor

,

,

The Board

wishes to emphasize that

it does

not construe the

quoted portions

of the Trust Fund Act

as

giving a potential right

of recovery

for penalties ordered to be paid into the Trust Fund

pursuant

to Section 42(a)

of the Environmental Protection Act.

(continued)

---

—7—

of

The

basis

for rejection of this stipulation

is

the Board’s

conclusion

that it lacks statutory authority to accept

settlements

requiring payment of stipulated

penalties and

imposing compliance

conditions without a

Board finding of

violation, based

either on admissions or

evidence contained

in

the record.

The

legislatively—created

Board derives its

enforcement powers

and duties from the Act and the Administrative

Procedure Act

(APA), Ill, Rev, Stat,

ch.

127 §1001 et

Section 33(a)

of Title VIII:

“Enforcement”

of the Act empowers

and requires the

Board, after hearing,

to “issue and enter such

final order,

.

.

as

it shall deem appropriate

,

.

.

and

shall

file

and publish

a

written opinion

stating the facts and

reasons leading

to its decision.’

The

“written opinion”

requirement of Section

33(a)

has

a counterpart in Section

14

of

the APA, requiring

in contested cases

“findings of fact and

conclusions of

law”,

Section

33(b)

of the Act provides

that “such

Section

32(a)

order may

include a direction to

cease and desist

from

violations of

the Act or of the Board’s

rules,

.

.

.

and/or

the

imposition by

the Board of civil penalties

in accord with

Section

42 of this Act,***n

The pertinent

subsection of the Section,

Section 42(a),

‘~rovidesthat

“Any person

:hat violates any

provisions of this

Act or any

~gu1ation adopted by the

Board, or any

permit or

t

:m or condition thereof,

or

that

violates a~

determination or order

of the Board

pursuant

to this Act, shall be liable to

a civil

penalty

of not to exceed $10,000 for said

violation

and an

additional civil penalty of not

to exceed

$1,000

for each day during which violation

continues;

such penalties may, upon

order of the

Board or a

court of competent jurisdiction, be made

When the

Trust Fund was created,

the legislature obviously

envisioned

that the fund was to receive voluntary

gifts

or

contributions,

to either be used for environmental purposes or to

be returned

so as to avoid frustration of the

intention of

the

donor of the

gift,

Payment of a

penalty for violation of the

Environmental

Protection

Act

is a compulsory, and not a

voluntary,

act.

There

is no right

of recovery for

a penalty paid

into the

Gerurul

Revenue Fund,

In allowing penalty monies to

be paid

incti

nhe

Trust Fund,

the legislature has clearly

implied that such

penalties may,

in essence,

be earmarked for

any appropriate

environmental

purpose.

The Board concludes

that to construe the

Trust Fund

Act as implying a right of recovery

for penalties

deposited into

it runs counter

to the

intention of the

Environmental

Protection Act,

---

payable

to the Environmental Protection Trust Fund,

to be

used in accordance with the provisions of

“An

Act creating

the Environmental Protection

Trust

Fund”,

approved September 22, 1979, as amended.”

The Act

does not specifically mention

settlement

procedures.

However,

pursuant to the authority

granted under

Section 26 of

the Act, the Board has adopted a

procedural rule,

35 Ill. Adm,

Code 103,180, permitting and providing

requirements

for submittal

of a proposed settlement or compromise.

A

written

statement

is to be filed containing, among

other things a “full

stipulation

of al material facts pertaining

to the nature,

extent, and

causts of~thealleged violation”,

a

proposed

compliance

pF

id a proposed penalty,

In line

with the

hearing requL.

ts of Sections 31 and

32 of the Act, the

written propomu;;s

to be presented at public

hearing for citizen

comment on

tha u~~iegedviolations and proposed

settlement

terms,

The Bou~.h

has provided that it shall

“consider such

proposed

settlument or stipulation and the hearing

record” and

may “accept,

suggest revisions

in,

reject the

proposed settlement

or stipulation,

or direct further hearings as it

appears

appropriate.”

Viewing

the Chemetco stipulation

in light

of these various

statutory and

rr~gulatoryrequirements,

it

is

clear that the Board

cannot make

any ~equired findings of fact and

conclusions of law

beyond one that

~theparties wish to settle

the case for $20,000

payable into tI~

Trust Fund,”

To the extent

the Act authorizes

the Board to

oi

~r payment of what Chemetco

admits

is a penalty

(see e.g. Motic

of July 19,

1984 at p. 9),

the authority is

premised on a

finding of violation.

As Chemetco

resists a Board

attempt to

make such a finding, and as the Act

does not authorize

the Board

to accept, on the part of

the State,

“voluntary

contributions”

in settlement of “nuisance suits”,

the penalty

portion

of

the stipulation must be rejected.

As to the proposed

compliance

plan,

in the absence of findings of

violation,

the

Board

is

placed in the position of ordering accomplishment

of

“voluntary

remedial activities”

to correct “non—existant” non-

compliance.

The compliance plan portion of the stipulation

is

also

rejected.

The

parties have not directly addressed the Board’s

statutory

authority to accept this stipulation, forwarding

instead

various policy arguments.

These include

the assertion

that the law

favors settlements

(see Agency Motion of

August

7,

1984, p.

4—5

and cases

nited therein)

and that a

findi~m

violation

destroys the

~ssence of the bargain

here

anu

~~ctracts

litigation

(see Chemetco Motion of July 19, 1984

at p.

8—9), and

that the

Board

has

in

a

few cases imposed fines

without

a finding

of violation

(Id.,

p.

4 note).

While not here articulated,

it

might also

be~arguedthat the effect of the Board’s

decision

interferes

with the Attorney General’s otherwise

broad powers

of

prosecutorial

discretion,

---

While

these

policy arguments might support

a legislative

change,

they run counter

to the Board’s plain reading of the

Act,

The Board recognizes that the courts have accepted

settlements

between two parties without admissions,

The courts,

however, have

inherent common law powers

the Board

does not

possess.

Additionally, the Act inherently recognizes

that

pollution

issues affect the

interest of other persons,

above and

beyond the

parties, as Section 2 of the Act makes clear.

The

Board suggests

that the Act was deliberately framed to require

the Board

to make findings of violations,

so as

to assure that

compliance

and payment of a penalty

is a compulsory,

not a

voluntary,

act,

Existence or lack of findings

of violation may

also be

important in the event of subsequent filing

of

enforcement

actions against the same source:

previous findings

of

violation

may properly be considered as aggravating

circumstances

affecting

penalty deliberations

in later

cases.

The Board

also notes, pursuant

to Section 31,

that complaints may

be filed,

and settlements reached,

by citizens who take on the

status of

“private attorneys general”, and questions

whether

wide

prosecutorial

discretion also accrues to such persons concerning

stipulated

penalties and compliance conditions,

~eal

This “finding of violation”

issue has here twice been

argued,

and pot

ntially has applicability to every

enforcement

case brought

b

~re the Board,

(In fact,

the Board

has today

rejected

sever~

proposed stipulated settlements

requiring

payment of

pen

ties or other “gifts” or “sums” and

timely

performance

of ~ompliance plans,

in all of which cases no

findings of violation could be made:

~

PCB 81—190

($3,000 penalty, $9,500 “voluntary contribution”,

stepped—up

cross—connection enforcement program); IEPAv,

~

PCB 83—23

($300

“sum”,

“prohibition” from violations of the Act); ~

~

PCB

83—83

($8,000

penalty,

$14,000

“payment”, ceast and desist order);

and

IEPAv.

~ILGalv~,

PCB 84—3,

84—4

(consolidated)

($3,375 penalty,

complex

program of system improvements).

In each of these cases

the

Board has certified

a similar question for interlocutory

appeal.

For these reasons,

as well as the fact that a contrary

result would

have ended this action,

the Board on its own motion

hereby

issues a statement

(also known as a Certificate of

Importance)

to allow for immediate interlocutory appellate review

of the

Board’s Order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule

(SCR)

308.

SCR 308(a)

provides,

in pertinent part that

“When

the trial court, in making an interlocutory

order

not otherwise appealable,

finds that the

order

involves a question of law as to which

there

is

substantial ground for difference of opinion

and

that an

immediate appeal from the order may

materially advance the ultimate termination of

the

litigation,

the court shall

so state

in writing,

---

~l0—

identifying

the question of law involved,

The

Appellate

Court may thereupon in its discretion

allow an

appeal from the order,”

The Board

has authority to issue such a

statement

(see Getty

S~ntheticFuel

v.PCB,

104 Ill, App.

3d 285

(1st Dist,

1982).

Pursuant

to 8CR 308,

the Board finds that this

Order

a)

“involves a question

of law as

to which there

is

substantial

ground for difference

of opinion”, and b)

immediate

appeal “may

materially advance

the ultimate termination of

this

litigation”.

The question of law certified for appeal

is

as

follows:

Whether

the Boarh correctly determined

that it

lacks statutory

ahhhority, pursuant to Ill,

Rev,

Stat,

ch, 111

1/2, Sections 1032, 1033 and 1042 as

they relate

to Bca~:d acceptance of stipulations of

fact and

proposals for settlement in enforcement

cases,

to issue Opinions and Orders

in which any

Board

findings of violation are precluded by the

terms

of the stipulation and proposal, but in which

respondent

is ordered

to pay a stipulated penalty

and to

timely perform agreed—upon compliance

activities,

Finally,

the event of an interlocutory

appeal, the Board

will entertain

motion to stay its Order that

hearing.

IT IS

SO ORDERED,

J.

D.

Dumelle dissented,

I, Dorothy N.

Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois

Pollution Control

Board, hereby

certify that the above Order was adopted on

the~o~_day~

1985 by

a vote of

~_/

Dorothy M,JGunn, Clerk

Illinois Pollution Control Board