1. The complaint alleges that respondents violated Section 9(a)
      2. of the Act which provides as follows:
      3. No person shall:
      4. a) Cause or threaten or allow the discharge or emission of

ILLINOIS POLLUTIOt4 CONTROL BOARD
November 7, 1985
MAURINE BACHERT,
an Individual,
Complainant,
V.
)
PCB 85—80
VILLAGE OF TOLEDO ILLINOIS,
a Municipal Corporation and
VICTOR L. WILSON, JOHN SCOTT,
KURT SCOTT, KENNETH MENDENHALL,
Individually,
Respondents.
MS. MAURINE BACHERT, COMPLAINANT, APPEARED PRO SE;
MR. BOBBY SANDERS APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT, VILLAGE
OF TOLEDO;
MR. KURT SCOTT, RESPONDENT, APPEARED PRO SE.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by J. Marlin):
This enforcement case comes before the Board upon the
June 12, 1985 filing of a complaint alleging air pollution
violations of Section 9(a) of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act (Act), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 111 1/2
,
par.
1009(a) arid open burning violations of 35 Ill, Adm. Code 237.102
against the Village of Toledo, Illinois (Village) and individuals
Victor L. Wilson, Lewis Russell, John Scott, Kurt Scott and
Kenneth Mendenhall. The proof of personal service on others is
defective because it is not sworn to or otherwise properly
notarized, even though purportedly signed by a notary
(Complainant’s Exh. 4). On September 20, 1985, the Board denied
the Village’s motions to dismiss the complaint and to make the
complaint more definite and certain as being untimely. Proof of
service on the Village was defective. There are no mail receipts
signed by the Village or its agents and the personal service list
is, as noted above, defective, (See IEPA v. Murray, 21 PCB 337,
May 6, 1976). However, the Village did not raise this issue in
its motion to dismiss and proceeded to submit itself to the
jurisdiction of the Board by filing its answer.
Before reaching the main issues, a few preliminary ones need
to be addressed. At hearing, the Village moved for a directed
verdict before the start of complainant’s case in chief, As
there are no jury trials before the Board, the motion is
denied. To the extent that the motion can be construed as one
tar judgment on the pleadings, it is denied as being late,
Such
a motion should have been submitted to the Board, not to the
hearing officer, sufficiently prior to the hearing to enable the
66-279

2
Board to rule Ofl it. All motions which could dispose of a case
are decided by the Board (35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.140). Thus, to
the extent that the Village’s motion can be construed as a motion
to find for defendant at close of plaintiff’s evidence (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1985, oh. 110, par. 2—1110), it also is denied.
The Village objected to all diary entries in complainant’s
Exhibit 1 (C. Exh. 1) after the date of filing of
the
complaint
(June 12, 1985). The Board sustains the objection and strikes
those portions. There must be a definiteness as to
time
of
alleged violation in order to allow the respondent sufficient
time
to defend against those alleged violations. While the
complainant probably did not know that the proper way is to amend
the complaint or file a motion to incorporate the new dates of
alleged violations in the original complaint, the Board must
adhere to the rules in order to avoid unfairness and undue
surprise to the respondents.
The Village objected to the lack of foundation concerning
the photographs comprising C.Exh.2 and C.Exh.3. The objection is
sustained for complainant’s failure to lay a proper foundation.
To lay a proper foundation, the complainant needed to state at
hearing that each photograph was a true and accurate
representation of what she saw. In addition, each photograph
would need to be connected by the complainant to the facts in the
case. The photographs in question show numerous barrels that are
apparently used for open burning, but the record does not
adequately establish where they are located, when the pictures
were taken, who took them, what they show, and how they relate to
the complaint. Furthermore, some of the photographs were taken
after the filing of the complaint and without a proper motion or
amended complaint, they can not be considered.
Any other motions not addressed are denied and any other
objections not ruled on are overruled.
Maurine Bachert is a resident of the Village of Toledo,
Illinois. The Village is a municipal corporation of the. State of
Illinois and its population is approximately 1,100 people.
Respondents John Scott, Kurt Scott and Kenneth Mendenhall are
individuals who are alleged to have caused or allowed air
pollution and open burning, as is respondent Victor Wilson,
former president of the Board of Trustees of the Village.
The complaint alleges that respondents violated Section 9(a)
of the Act which provides as follows:
No person shall:
a) Cause or threaten or allow the discharge or emission of
any contaminant into the environment in any State so as
to cause or tend to cause air pollution in Illinois,
either alone or in combination with contaminants from
66-280

other sources, or so as to violate regulations or
standards adopted by the Board under the Act;
The complaint further alleges that respondent violated 35
Ill. Adm, Code 237,102 which provides as follows:
a) No person shall cause or allow open burning, except as
provided in this Part,
b) No person shall cause or allow the burning of any refuse
in any chamber or apparatus, unless such chamber or
apparatus is designed for the purpose of disposing of
the class of refuse being burned.
An enforcement proceeding before the Board is civil in
nature. The burden of proof in a civil proceeding is a
preponderance of the evidence, Industrial~~nc,v,~oun~
Board of Marion, PCB 83~~l73(August 2, 1984), citing
~~fl~a_y~
~
30 Ill,App.3d 631, 333
N,E,2d 50 (1975), A proposition is proved by a preponderance of
the evidence when it is more probably true than not, Industrial
~
supra, citing
~9fR!~fl, 79 Ill.App,3d 8 (1979).
It is the complainant~s burden to prove a proposition by a
preponderance of the evidence,
The Board first must determine if the respondents have
caused or allowed the discharge of contaminants into the
environment. A contaminant “is any solid, liquid, or gaseous
matter, any odor, or any form of energy, from whatever source.”
(Section 3(d) of the Act). The Board recently found a municipal
corporation to have caused or allowed the discharge of
contaminants into the environment so as to cause air pollution by
allowing leaf burning through its municipal ordinance, in
contravention of a state statute, Greenland v,Cite
Forest, PCB 84—155, June 13, 1985, on~~i, Second District,
No, 85—541, The Board in Greenland cited the controlling law on
the issue:
Etihe Second District Appellate Court entertained
the cause or allow clause of Section 9(a) and stated
that the respondent must “exercise sufficient control
overCo.
v,theIEPA,sourceet
ofal,,the72pollution.”Ill,
App. 3d
!flis~~
217, 390 N.E.2 2d
~T~dDisEl97~T.
The Fifth District, in construing
identical language in Section 12(a) of the Act,
affirmed the Board and found that the respondent “had
the capability of controlling the pollutional
discharge,” Meadowlark Farms, Inc. v. IPCB,et al., 17
Ill. App, 3d 851, 308 N.E. 2d 826 (5th Dist, 1974);
~
21 Ill, App.
3d 157, 313 N.E. 2d 616 (5th Dist, 1974). In
interpreting the word allow, the Board has found that
one can allow a discharge by poor practices which
contribute to the problem. IEPA v, Bath, Inc. et al,,

4
PCB 71—52; Bath, Inc. et al. v. ISPA, PCB 71—224,
(consol.), 2 PCB 433, September 16, 1971. The Fourth
District, in affirming the Board, noted that to argue
that a violation cannot be predicated upon the
existence of burning in the absence of a finding that
respondent by its affirmative act caused...the burning’
is not persuasive. Bath, Inc. et al. v. IPCB, et al.,
10 Ill. App. 3d 507, 294 N.E. 2d 778 (4th Dist. 1973).
The Board subsequently found that the City did have
sufficient control over the source of the pollution and thus did
cause or allow the discharge of contaminants into the environment
(Greenland, slip op. at 5).
In this case, there is no village ordinance involved and
state law controls. ~The Village is aware of its duty to enforce
the open burning provisions of the
Act
CR. 72) and sends letters
to alleged violators when complaints are received CR. 71,9).
However, the Village stops short of prosecuting for open burning
(R. 92). The evidence shows that when Mrs. Bachert. complained
of burning, the Village responded to check out her complaint CR.
27—9, 32, 63—5, 70, 77—9, 83). The only
time
the Village did not
respond was when the Village policeman was off duty CR. 79). At
such times, the sheriff’s office takes over all calls. 14. In
addition, when the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
(IEPA) sent a letter to the Village advising it that the IEPA had
received an open burning complaint, the Village passed the
information on to the citizenry by publication
in
the ‘local
newspaper (C.Exh. 5, R. 87). Furthermore, a Village Board ‘legal
notice’ was published after the date of the filing of ‘this
complaint requesting that the citizens stop burning domicile
waste (C. Exh. 6, R. 12—13). The Board finds that there is
insufficient evidence to show that the Village caused or allowed
the discharge of contaminants into the environment or had
sufficient control over any alleged burnings. The Board need go
no further in consideration of Section 9(a). Likewise, the Board
finds that there is insufficient evidence to find that the
Village caused or allowed open burning pursuant to Section
237.102.
Testimony was presented regarding only two alleged instances
of open burning. One of the fires was caused by an individual
who was not named in the complaint CR. 26—29, 67). The other
fire was started by Mr. Kurt Scott who testified he was burning
wood
scraps for cookout purposes within the exclusions
of
Section
237.120(e), (R.97). Mrs. Bachert complained that the odor from
the ‘fireplace’ smelled of garbage, tar, turpentine and was
odoriferous. jj. The record does not adequately refute the
cookout contention or document that Mr. Scott burned domicile
waste on other occasions. There is insufficient evidence to find
that Mr. Kurt Scott violated sections 9(a) of the Act or Section
237.102.
86-282

5
As for two other respondents, there was no evidence
presented concerning Mr. John Scott and Mr. Kenneth Mendenhall,
While some photos showing burning were entered into evidence
(former C,Exh. 3), they have been stricken from the record for
lack of foundation. The Board finds that there is insutficient
evidence to find Mr. John Scott and Mr. Kenneth Mendenhall in
violation of Sections 9(a) or 237,102, Likewise, there was no
evidence to show that the former president of the Board of
Trustees, caused or allowed anything. The Board finds that Mr.
Victor Wilson did not violate Sections 9(a) or 237,102,
The Village has requested that the Board assess the
Village’s court costs in defense of this suit against Mrs.
Bachert, yet cites no authority, The Illinois Supreme Court has
held that authority for an administrative agency to award
attorneys fees must be found in its enabling statute, ~
~
65 Ill,2d 108,
357 N,E,2d 1154 (1976), Since no such Board authority exists in
the Act, the request for court costs is denied.
It is clear that State laws exist to protect people from
problems caused by open burning of domestic waste and that
citizens can reasonably expect this law to be enforced, The
Board emphasizes that the decision in this matter is based on a
lack of sufficient evidence, The complainant failed to he
specific about such matters as the time and place of alleged
burning and exactly what was being burned by whom, The Village
has responded to open burning complaints and it is evident that
burning does occur in the Village. The Village Clerk admitted
open burning occurs (R. 88) and it was mentioned that burning is
traditional in the general character and make up of the small
community (R, 47), The Board will not reach a conclusion
regarding the adequacy of the Village’s enforcement of the
State’s open burning prohibition. Given the lack of evidence in
this case, the Board cannot make additional findings,
This Opinion concludes the Board’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law in this matter,
ORDER
1, There is insufficient evidence in the record to show that
respondents Village of Toledo, Victor L, Wilson, John Scott,
Kurt Scott and Kenneth Mendenhall have violated Section 9(a)
of the Act or 35 Ill, Adm, Code 237,102,
2, This proceeding is hereby dismissed,
IT IS SO ORDERED,
Board Member J,D, Dumelle Concurred,
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6
I, Dorothy M, Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that the above OpiniQn and Order was
adoptedonth,2~~~~
day of
)tv~~t..-,
1935
J2~
Dorothy M. dunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control B~nrd
66~284

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