ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
June 11,
1986
IN THE MATTER OF:
)
HAZARDOUS WASTE PROHIBITIONS
)
R 86-9
DISSENTING OPINION
(by B.
Forcade):
I dissent from the majority’s action today based on
four
issues.
These are:
1) RCRA permits by rule;
2)
exemption of
underground injection;
3)
allowing wastes
to “cease
to exist”;
and 4)
an overbroad attempt to regulate “good waste management
practices” rather than discouraging waste disposal.
First,
the provisions of Section 703.142 provide a permit by
rule
fot new hazardous waste storage or treatment facilities
when
certain information
is filed with the Agency.
The purported
rationale for
this drastic step
is that the permit process
“takes
too long”
in the majority’s view.
This action clearly goes
beyond
the statutory mandate
of Section 39(h).
This
is
a
blatantly illegal attempt
to vacate Section 3005(a)
of
RCRA which
provides,
in essence:
...after
November
19,
1980
the
treatment,
storage
or
disposal
of
any
such
hazardous
waste
is prohibited
except
in
accordance with
a
RCRA
permit.
One consequence
of today’s language
is
that it would allow
“Joe’s Garage”
to become
a repository
for the most toxic of
hazardous wastes
so long as Joe had filed some papers with the
Agency.
Further,
the process
of Agency evaluation of Joe’s
application, subsequent denial, and Board appeal could
leave
the
facility
in operation for months
if not years without any
violation of state
law.
I doubt any reputable organization would
be willing
to spend
the time and money
to construct and operate
a
competent facility in the hopes
that it “might” later
be granted
a permit by the Agency.
My next concern
is the exemption of underground injection
from the requirements of Section 39(h).
That Section speaks
to
“hazardous waste
site”
and “disposal
site,”
from which
the
majority concludes that “hazardous waste disposal site” does not
include underground
injection.
First, the Act
in Section 3(e)
defines disposal:
70-167
—2—
e.
“DISPOSAL”
means
the
discharge,
deposit,
injection,
dumping,
spilling,
leaking
or
placing
of
any
waste
or
hazardous
waste
into or
on
any land or water
or
into any
well
so
that
such
waste
or
hazardous
waste
or
any
constituent
thereof
may
enter
the
environment
or ‘be emitted
into
the
air
or
discharged
into
any
waters,
including ground waters.
That
language would certainly seem to cover
underground
injection into
a well within the definition of hazardous waste
disposal.
Second,
the Act
in Section
22.8(f)
defines hazardous
waste disposal site:
f.
For purposes of this Section,
a hazardous
waste
disposal
site
consists
of
one
or
more of
the following operation units:
I.
A landfill receiving hazardous waste
for disposal;
2.
A waste pile or surface impoundment,
receiving hazardous
waste,
in
which
residues
which
exhibit
any
of
the
characteristics
of
hazardous
waste
pursuant
to
Board
regulations
are
reasonably
expected
to
remain after
closure;
3.
A land
treatment
facility receiving
hazardous waste;
or
4.
A well injecting hazardous waste.
Again,
the Act seems
to have rather
specifically included
underground injection
into
a well within the definition of
hazardous waste disposal site.
In fact,
the three specific
examples
in Section 709.110 are virtually identical
to three
of
the four specific examples
in Section 22.8(f).
The fourth
specific inclusion
in Section 22.8(f)
of the Act, injection
wells,
is specifically EXCLUDED from the definition of disposal
site
in
the regulations at Section 709.110.
Additionally,
in Section 22.2(b)(2)(C), the Act employs the
term hazardous waste disposal
site:
C.
If
the
hazardous waste
disposal
site
is
an underground
injection well, $2,000 per
year
if
not more than 10,000,000 gallons
per year are injected, $5,000 per year
if
more than 10,000,000 gallons but not more
70-168
—3—
than
50,000,000
gallons
per
year
are
injected,
and
$9,000
per
year
if
more
than
50,000,000
gallons
per
year
are
injected.
Again,
according to the
language of the Act, an underground
injection well
is
a hazardous waste disposal site.
The majority
attempts
to confuse the issue by defining
the sites,
in the
regulations,
as “Land Disposal Units” and then claims confusion
with the landfill provisions of Section 22.6 of the Act.
However,
the word “land”
or
“landfill” never occurs
in Section
39(h).
I perceive this as
a supreme case of
“smoke
and mirrors,”
which attempts
to accomplish
a goal which
the majority concludes
is environmentally acceptable and reflects what the General
Assembly “really”
intended.
I do not have the majority’s gift
to devine what the General
Assembly “really”
intended in Section 39(h).
Unfortunately,
I am
restricted
to reading
the language
they actually enacted.
It
leads
to
a different conclusion.
My third
issue of concern
is the
“cease
to exist” language
of Sections 709.100
(Wastestream) and 729.103
(Wastestream).
These sections attempt
to define who must prepare,
sign and
submit the request
for wastestream authorization and are an
attempt
to minimize paperwork burdens.
I support that concept.
However restricting paperwork by having
wastestrearns “cease
to
exist”
is
a profoundly idiotic
idea the implications
of which are
totally unknown.
Can an original generator of hazardous waste
send
it
to
a legally authorized
treatment facility,
“Joe’s
Garage,”
and be absolved of CERCLA liability for ultimate
improper disposal because the waste “ceased
to exist?”
That
seems
a Draconian consequence
for paperwork reduction, but
is not
totally contrary to these regulations.
These concerns could have
been remedied by simply deleting the offending language,
or
replacement language focusing
on who
signs application.
I am
concerned with the majority’s reluctance
to even consider these
changes
at this early
stage of the proceeding.
My last concern
is more general
in nature and
I do not have
replacement language
to provide.
I believe
the regulations have
lost sight of
the command of Section 39(h)
to minimize “disposal”
of waste,
and
instead
the Board’s proposal
is focused on ensuring
that “good waste management decisions”
are made.
While that
is
a
laudable goal,
it is not the command of Section
39(h).
Were this
my only concern,
I would not have dissented from today’s
action.
Instead,
I would have invited better
approaches
to the
implementation of
Section 39(h).
70-169
—4—
As a last matter,
the role of citizens
in today’s proceeding
is left totally undefined by the majority.
Yet,
few issues
engender
as much citizen interest as hazardous waste disposal.
I
would certainly appreciate comments on the mechanisms and
opportunities for citizen participation as well as specific
language
to implement the concept.
Member of the Board
I,
Dorothy M.
Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that the above Dissenting Opinion was
submitted on the
/J’t~
day of
____________________,
1986.
Dorothy M. G~f~n,Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control
Board
70.170