ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    July 11, 1986
    EVERETT ALLEN, INC.,
    )
    )
    Petitioner,
    )
    )
    v.
    )
    PCB 86-34
    )
    CITY OF MOUNT VERNON,
    )
    )
    Respondent. )
    OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by B. Forcade):
    This matter comes to the Board on a March 6, 1986, Petition
    for Review filed by Everett Allen, Inc., an Illinois Corporation
    d/b/a/ Allen Waste Management (hereinafter “Everett Allen”). The
    petition seeks review of a February 3, 1986, decision by the City
    of Mount Vernon (hereinafter “Mt. Vernon”) denying Everett
    Allen’s August 12, 1985, application for local site location
    approval for a new regional pollution control facility. The
    Pollution Control Board hearing in this matter was held on May 7,
    1986, in the Jefferson County Courthouse. Final briefs ~re
    filed by Everett Allen on May 28 and June 3, and by Mt. Vernon on
    May 29 and June 2, 1986.
    As a threshold issue, Mt. Vernon has raised the question of
    jurisdiction in light of the Second District’s opinion in The
    Kane County Defenders’ Inc~v. Pollution Control Board, 93 Ill.
    Dec. 918, 487 N.E.2d 743 (1985) (hereinafter “Kane County”). Mt.
    Vernon claims that:
    “Allen Waste Management both within the
    publication notice and within the notice to
    adjoining property owners misstated the rights
    of persons to comment on the request and also
    misstated the time requirements for a public
    hearing.” (Brief, p. 3)
    Consequently, the Board must review the requirements for siting
    requests and the facts of this case. Mt. Vernon’s arguments are
    poorly developed in that the Board is left to discover what
    “misstatements” occurred, but the Board will evaluate the matter
    as it is jurisdictional.
    Requests for landfill siting approval are governed by
    Section 39.2 of the Environmental Protection Act (“Act”). That
    section sets certain procedural requirements for filing landfill
    siting applications and local governmental determinations. It
    also establishes certain requirements regarding the timing and
    71-26

    -2--
    content of public notice regarding the process. At the outset,
    the Board notes that, effective July 1, 1985, Sections 39.2(c)
    and (d) were substantially amended regarding the timing of both
    the public comment period and the municipal (or county)
    hearings. Section (b) was not amended. Prior to July 1, 1985,
    the county was required to consider any comment submitted within
    30 days after the filing of the application, and hold at least
    one public hearing within 60 days of the filing of the
    application. Since the application in this proceeding was filed
    after July 1, 1985, the relevant portions of Section 39.2 are as
    follows:
    b. No later than 14 days prior to a request
    for location approval the applicant shall
    cause written notice of such request to
    be served either in person or by
    registered mail, return receipt
    requested, on the owners of all property
    within the subject area not solely owned
    by
    the applicant, and on the owners of
    all property within 250 feet in each
    direction of the lot line of the subject
    property, said owners being such persons
    or entities which appear from the
    authentic tax records of the County in
    which such facility is to be located;
    provided, that the number of all feet
    occupied by all public roads, streets,
    alleys and other public ways shall be
    excluded in computing the 250 feet
    requirements; provided further, that in
    no event shall this requirement exceed
    400 feet, including public streets,
    alleys and other public ways.
    Such written notice shall also be served
    upon members of the ~neral Assembly from
    the legislative district in which the
    proposed facility is located and shall be
    published in a newspaper of general
    circulation published in the county in
    which the site is located. •Such notice
    shall state the name and address of the
    ~pp1icant, the location of the proposed
    site, the nature and size of the
    development, the nature of the activity
    proposed, the probable life of the
    proposed activity, the date when the
    request for site approval will be
    submitted to the county board, and a
    description of the right of persons to
    71-27

    —3-
    comment -on such request as hereafter
    provided.
    c. An applicant shall file a copy of its
    request, accompanied by all documents
    submitted as of that date to the Agency
    in connection with its application except
    trade secrets as determined Under Section
    7.1 of this Act, with the county board of
    the county or the governing body of the
    municipality in which the proposed site
    is located. Such copy shall be made
    available for public inspection at the
    office of the county board or the
    governing body of the municipality and
    may be copied upon payment of the actual
    cost of reproduction.
    Any person may file written comment with
    the county board or governing body of the
    municipality concerning the appropriate-
    ness of the proposed site for its
    intended purpose. The county board or
    governing body of the municipality shall
    consider any comment received -or post-
    marked not later than 30 days after the
    date of the last public hearing~.
    d. At least one public hearing is to be held
    by the county board or governing body of
    the municipality no sooner than 90 day~
    but no later than 120 days from receip~
    of the request for site approval, such
    hearing to be preceded by pu~1ished
    notice in a newspaper of general
    circulation published in the county of
    the proposed site, and notice by
    certified mail to all members of the
    General Assembly from the district in
    which the proposed site is located and to
    the Agency. The public hearing shall
    develop a record sufficient to form the
    basis of appeal of the decision in
    accordance with Section 40.1 of this
    Act. tEmphasis added
    The provisions of the statute relating to notice were first
    interpreted in City of Aurora v. Kane County Board, et al, No.
    84-940 (Ill. App. Second District, December 30, 1985). In the
    Kane County case, the Elgin Sanitary District (“ESD”) filed its
    application August 11, 1983. Newspaper notice was not published
    until August 10. However, as this notice stated only that the
    71.28

    —4—
    application would be filed “within 14 days,” ESD published a new
    notice on August 20 which stated the date the application was
    filed, the last date of the comment period, and the date of the
    public hearing. The petitioners in that case argued that the 14-
    day notice provision of paragraph 1 of Section 39.2(b)
    (individual notice to land owners) applied to paragraph 2
    (newspaper notice), and that ESD violated the notice provisions,
    “thereby substantially shortening the length of the comment
    period available to the general public.” The Board takes
    administrative notice of the fact that, had notice been published
    14 days in advance of a specified filing date, the public would
    have had 44 days to consider and to formulate written comments.
    Because notice of the filing date, from which the comment period
    ran, was not published until August 20, the period was
    effectively reduced from 44 to 22 days.
    The Appellate Court for the Second District held that “ESD’s
    failure to publish appropriate newspaper notice and notice of the
    date it filed the site location request rendered the Kane. County
    Board hearing invalid for lack of jurisdiction,” finding the
    notice requirements of Section 39.2(b) to be “jurisdictional
    prerequisites which must be followed in order to vest the county
    board with the power to hear a landfill proposal.” In reaching
    this result, the court applied the reasoning employed by the
    Third District Appellate Court in Illinois Power Co. v. IPCB, 137
    Ill. App. 3d 449, 484 N.E.2d 898 (1985). In Illinois Power, in a
    situation where the Board had failed to give both the 21-day
    notice to individuals and the newspaper notice to the general
    public required by Section 40(b), the court found that the
    statutory notice requirements were jurisdictional, given the
    statutes’ use of the mandatory term “shall,” and the general
    principle that an administrative agency derives power solely from
    its enabling statute.
    In Kane County, the Second District asserted the Illinois
    Power rationale applied “even more strongly” because
    “This broad delegation of adjudicative
    power to the county board clearly reflects a
    legislative understanding that the county
    board hearing, which presents the only
    opportunity for public comment on the proposed
    site, is the most critical stage of the
    landfill site approval process. We find
    support for this view also in the statutory
    notice requirements themselves, which are more
    demanding at the county board phase of the
    process. In view of the significance of this
    critical stage, we apply the reasoning of the
    Illinois Power Co. court, which recognized
    jurisdictional safeguards at the review stage
    of site approval proceedings, to the county
    71-29

    -5—
    board proceedings. The notice requirements
    contained in Section 39.2(b) of the
    Environmental Protection Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.
    1983, ch. lll’/2, par. 1039.2(b)) are
    jurisdictional prerequisites which must be
    followed in order to vest the county board
    with the power to hear a landfill proposal
    (citations omitted).
    The Board recently applied the Kane Cou~y rationale in City
    of Columbia,-et al., v. County of St. Clair, et al., PCB 85-177,
    flO, 223 (April
    3,
    1986) (hereinafter “Columbia”). In Columbia,
    the Board found that a one day deficiency in notice directives
    rendered the application deficient. The Secor~dDistrict recently
    applied the Kane County decision to a factually similar situation
    involving a one-day deficiency in notice in Concerned Boone
    Citizens v. M.I.G. Investments, No. 85-309 (Ill. App. Second
    District, June 4, 1986). Against this background, the Board must
    consider the facts presented today.
    The site location approval process began when Everett Allen
    prepared a notice of intent to file a site location suitability
    approval application. That notice was mailed, by certified mail,
    to the adjacent property owners on July 25, 1985. The legal
    notice was published in the Mt. Vernon Register-News on July 29,
    1985. The actual application was filed with the City of Mt.
    Vernon on August 12, 1985. Both the notice to adjacent property
    owners and the newspaper notice contained the following language:
    Any person may file written comment with the
    Office of the City Clerk, 1100 Main Street,
    Mount Vernon, Illinois, concerning the
    appropriateness of the proposed site for its
    intended purpose. The City Council of the
    City -of -Mount Vernon
    -
    shall consider a~y~
    comment received or postmarked not later than
    30 days from the date of
    -
    receipt of the
    request in making its final determination.
    Additionally,, at least one public hearing is
    to be held by--the City Council of the City of
    Mount- -Vernon within 60 days of
    receipt of the
    request for site approval, such hearing to be
    preceded by published notice in a newspaper of
    general circulation published in Jefferson
    County, Illinois. (Emphasis added)
    While this notice was published and mailed in a
    timely
    manner, it did not
    accurately describe the right of persons to
    comment on the request.
    At all times relevant to this
    proceeding, the statute has provided for a public
    hearing to be
    held not less than
    90
    days nor more than
    120
    days from filing the
    application and provided that comments postmarked not later than
    71-30

    —6—
    30 days after hearing must be accepted. Under the statute, the
    public and adjacent landowners have a minimum of 104 days to
    prepare for hearing and a minimum of 134 days to provide written
    comment. Under the time frames described in the notice, the
    public and adjacent landowners had a minimum of 14 days to
    prepare for hearing and 44 days to provide written comment.
    The importance of the public comment opportunities before
    the local government body was clearly recognized by the Second
    District in Kane County, supra.
    The Board has previously recognized the importance of the
    public comment opportunities and the key role of proper notice in
    allowing the public adequate time to prepare for hearing and
    comment. “The function of notice and the required time period
    between notice and hearing is first to inform the affected public
    that a landfill site suitability approval process has been
    initiated and, second, to allow time for the public to review the
    application to determine whether, or in what manner, further
    participation is warranted.” McHenry County Landfill, Inc., et
    a?., v. County Board of McHenry et al., PCB 85-56, 61-66
    (September 20, 1985, at 4). Also, the Board has previously held
    that where a defective notice is exclusively the fault of the
    applicant and the defective notice can be cured by an alternative
    mechanism (filing a new application), the site applicant is held
    to the letter of the law regarding notice:
    “...the rationale here is that the intent of
    the Act is to provide a mechanism and a county
    or municipal forum for the consideration of
    site location suitability issues. Where an
    alternative mechanism for resolution and
    review of an issue defective notice exists,
    e.g. filing of a new application, a party may
    be held to the letter of the law, when that
    party alone bears the burden of any
    omission. Where a slight omission may
    substantially impair, if it does not
    extinguish, a right of a party who bears no
    culpability, e.g., a deemed issued approval,
    the Board must look to the spirit of the law.”
    (Id. at 12)
    The Board finds that the incorrect description published by
    Everett Allen constitutes a substantial and material failure to
    state “...a description of the right of persons to comment on
    such request as hereafter provided” (Section 39.2(b) of the
    Act). The magnitude of that failure is apparent when viewed from
    the perspective of a member of the public or adjacent landowner
    who relied on the notice to prepare for hearing or to prepare
    comments.
    71.31

    —7—
    Time to Prepare
    Time to Prepare
    For Hearing
    Public Comments
    Under the Terms
    of the Statute
    Minimum
    104 days
    Maximum
    134 days
    Minimum
    134 days
    Maximum
    164 days
    According to
    the Notice from
    Everett Allen
    14 days 74 days
    44 days 44 days
    After the August 12, 1985, application had been filed,
    Everett Allen republished notice. That notice was mailed to
    adjacent landowners on November 12, 1985, and published in the
    Mt. Vernon Register—News on November 13. That notice more
    accurately reflects the statutory provisions for public comment;
    however, it cannot fulfill the statutory notice requirements
    since it was mailed and published about 90 days after the
    application was filed. Also, while the notice is not required to
    contain the date of public hearing, this notice contained a
    hearing date that was incorrect.
    The notices provided by Everett Allen do not fulfill the
    mandate of Section 39.2(b) of the Act. Consequently, under the
    theory of Kane Cou~L, the application was invalid and Mt. Vernon
    lacked jurT~dI~?T~nto proceed. The Board will, therefore,
    vacate the February 3, 1986, decision by Mt. Vernon in this
    matter.
    ORDER
    The February 3, 1986, decision of the City of Mt. Vernon
    denying Everett Allen’s August 12, 1985, application for site
    location suitability approval is hereby vacated, as the City
    could not exercise jurisdiction over the improperly noticed
    app ii cat ion.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereby certj~y that the abpve40pinion and Order was
    adopted on the
    //(_~~~
    day of
    1986, by a vote
    of
    _______*
    Illi
    Pollu
    Control Board
    71.32

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