ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    March 24, 1988
    WASTE MANAGEMENT OF ILLINOIS, INC.,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    )
    PCB 88—39
    MCHENRY COUNTY BOARD,
    Respondent.
    CONCURRING OPINION (by J.D. Dumelle and B. Forcade)
    We concur with the majority decision to dismiss the McHenry
    County Defenders’ petition
    ,
    since the County denied landfill
    siting approval. However, we believe additional explanation is
    appropriate.
    Historically, the Board allowed third parties (anyone other
    than the landfill applicant or the local government decision—
    maker) to appeal a local government decision to approve siting.
    The Board also allowed third parties to cross—appeal or intervene
    in a proceeding brought by the landfill applicant to challenge a
    siting denial. In part, that prior philosophy was based on the
    somewhat vague statutory language and in part it was based on the
    theory that the General Assembly intended to grant third parties
    the right to participate in and to appeal decisions granting
    local siting approval whether those decisions were made by the
    local government or made by this Board in overturning a local
    government denials. That approach to allowing third party cross—
    appeals in siting denials was changed by the Second District’s
    holding in McHenry County Landfill v. IPCB (Second District, Slip
    Opinion, March 30, 1987).
    The court in McHenry County evaluated the statutory language
    of Section 40.1 of the Environmental Protection Act (hereinafter,
    the “Act”) and the factual scenario which brought the case to the
    Second District. In the factual scenario, the County Board of
    McHenry County denied an application of Mdllenry County Landfill
    for site location approval on October 15, 1985 (after a prior
    remand from this Board in PCB 83—56, September 20, 1985), and
    McHenry County Landfill appealed that October denial to this
    Boar~i (PCB 85—192). Several objectors also filed cross—appeals,
    which the Board accepted. On March 14, 1986, this Board affirmed
    the October 15, 1985, denial of site location suitability
    approval. The McHenry County Landfill appealed that decision to
    the Second District and the third parties (also called objectors)
    cross—appealed. Thus, when the case arrived at the Second
    87—221

    —2—
    District, the McHenry County Board had denied site location
    approval and this Board had affirmed denial. With this factual
    background, the Second District reviewed the statutory language
    and concluded the objectors had no standing to appeal to this
    Board or the Second District.
    Section 40.1 of the Act, which governs appeals
    to the Pollution Control Board provides:
    “If the county board
    ...
    refuses to grant
    (site) approval
    ...
    the applicant may
    petition for a hearing before the (PCB) to
    contest the decision...
    (b) If the county board
    ...
    grants (site)
    approval
    ...
    a third party other than the
    applicant
    ...
    may petition the (PCB)
    ...
    for a
    hearing to contest the approval
    ...
    (Ill. Rev.
    Stat. 1985, ch. l1l1/~ par. 1040.1(a), (b)).
    The Act thus does not provide for a third—
    party appeal where the PCB has refused to
    grant site approval. (See. E & E Hauling v.
    Pollution Control Board, (1985), 107 Ill. 2d
    33, 41 (concluding that Section 40.1 as writ-
    ten adequately recognizes and protects the
    rights of third parties).) The PCB is power--
    less to expand its authority beyond that which
    the legislature has expressly granted to it.
    (Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board,
    (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 541, 557—58; see also,
    Schalz v. McHenry County Sheriff’s Department
    Merit Corn. (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 198, 204.) We,
    therefore, conclude that the PCB improperly
    permitted the objectors to become parties to
    the proceeding before it. The objectors
    therefore have no standing to appeal to this
    court under Section 41 of the Act (Ill. Rev.
    Stat. 1985, ch. 11l~-/? par. 1041), and their
    cross—appeals are hereby dismissed.
    The Second District in McHenry County did not dismiss the
    objectors from the Second District proceeding because of the
    action of the County Board, but rather because of the action of
    this Board:
    The Act thus does not provide for a third—
    party appeal where the PCB has refused to
    grant site approval (Citation Omitted). Slip
    Opinion at 7.
    87—222

    —3—
    At page six of the Slip Opinion, the court states that standing
    to appeal a decision of this Board under Section 41(a) of the Act
    depends on whether one is adversely affected by the decision of
    the Board:
    We will first consider Landfill’s motion to
    dismiss the cross—appeals. Due process of law
    does not encompass the right to appeal an
    administrative decision, and affording that
    right is the exclusive prerogative of the
    legislature. (Board of Education v. Gates
    (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 16, 20.) Section
    41(a) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch.
    1ll1/~ par. 1041(a)) permits appeals only by
    those who have been denied a hearing, vari-
    ance, or permit by the PCB
    clearly not
    applicable to the objectors
    or persons who
    are parties to a PCB hearing or are adversely
    affected by a final order or determination of
    the PCB.
    The PCB found that Landfill had met its
    burden in establishing four of the statutory
    criteria for site approval, but had failed to
    establish the remaining two. It then affirmed
    the county board’s denial of Landfill’s site
    approval request. The objectors oppose the
    landfill, and thus cannot have been directly
    adversely affected by that decision. (See
    Dolnick v. Redmond (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d
    1037, 1040 (noting that the adverse effect
    must be direct to confer standing to
    appeal).) The objectors thus have no standing
    to appeal unless they were properly parties to
    the PCB hearing.
    These two sections of Mdllenry County seem to imply that
    third parties may have a right to appeal a decision of this Board
    to an appellate court under Section 41(a) of the Act if this
    Board grants site approval by overturning a County Board
    denial. In this proceeding the County Board denied site approval
    and this Board is being asked to grant site approval. Thus the
    question left open by McHenry County~jnay occur Jr~re.
    87— 223

    —4—
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn, hereby certify that the abov~Concurring
    Opinion was submitted on the ~
    day of
    ___________________
    1988.
    ~
    ~.
    __
    Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
    Illinois Pollution Control Board
    87—22 4

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