ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
June 2, 1988
RICK MOORE, LEONARD MORRIS
and EDITH SIMPSON,
Petitioners,
v.
)
PCB 86—197
WAYNE COUNTY BOARD and
DAUBS LANDFILL, INC.,
Respondents.
JAMES YOHO, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE
PETITIONERS;
C. STEPHEN SWOFFORD, STATE’S ATTORNEY, APPEARED ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT WAYNE COUNTY BOARD; AND
THOMAS 3. IMMEL (IMMEL, ZELLE, OGREN, GERMERAAD & COSTELLO) and
DAVID M. ~7ILLIAMS, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, APPEARED ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT DAUBS, LANDFILL, INC.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by 3. Theodore Meyer):
This matter is before the Board on a November 6, 1986
petition to contest granting of site approval, filed by Rick
Moore, Leonard Morris, and Edith Simpson (hereinafter
“petitioners”). That petition seeks review of a September 30,
1986 decision of respondent Wayne County Board granting site
approval of respondent Daubs Landfill Inc.’s proposed regional
pollution control facility. A public hearing on this petition
for review was held on December 30, 1986.
This is the second time this petition has been before the
Board. On February 19, 1987 the Board vacated the Wayne County
Board’s siting approval. With two members dissenting, this Board
determined that Daubs’ published notice of the filing of its
petition for siting approval was defective, because the accurate
narrative description of the proposed site location did not cure
the defect in the legal description of the site. The Board held
that the defective legal description predominated, so that the
County Board lacked jurisdiction to consider Daubs’
application. Moore v. Wayne County Board, PCB 86—197 (February
19, 1987). One year later, the Fifth District Appellate Court
reversed that decision and remanded the case to the Board. The
court held that the accurate narrative description of the site
met the jurisdictional notice requirements of Section 39.2(b) of
the Environmental Protection Act (Act). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985,
90—21
—2—
ch. 1111/2, par. 1039.2(b). Those notice provisions do not
specifically require the inclusion of a legal description of the
site. Daubs Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board,
____
Ill.
App. 3d
,
117 Ill. Dec. 626, 520 N.E.2d 977 (5th Dist.
1988). Since the jurisdictional issue in this case has been
disposed of, the Board will proceed to the remaining issues
raised by petitioners.
Background
On April 8, 1986 Daubs submitted its application for siting
approval of a non—hazardous solid waste landfill to be located in
Wayne County, Illinois. Daubs proposed construction of a 180
acre landfill located approximately 21/2 miles from Fairfield,
Illinois. The proposed facility is commonly referred to as the
Boyleston landfill. The Wayne County Board held public hearings
on the application on July 15, 16, 17, and 18, 1986, at which
Daubs presented four witnesses. A group of citizens who objected
to the proposal, including the individuals who are petitioners
before this Board, were represented by counsel and presented four
witnesses. These citizen objectors were loosely organized into a
group called People Against Landfills, or P.A.L.S.
The County Board first voted on the application at its
September 9, 1986 meeting. A motion to approve the site location
resulted in a 7—7 tie vote, a~tdno further action was taken at
that time. (PCB Pet. Ex.
1•)i
At a special meeting on September
30, 1986, the County Board again voted on a motion to approve the
site location of the proposed facility. The motion carried by a
vote of 10—4, and site approval was granted. (PCB Pet. Ex. 2.)
Statutory Framework
At the local level, the site location suitability approval
process is governed by Section 39.2 of the Act. Section 39.2(a)
provides that local autho~ities are to consider six criteria when
reviewing an application.’ The six criteria are:
1Exhibits admitted at the Board hearing on this petition for
review are identified as “PCB Ex.
“,
while exhibits from
the County Board hearings are cited as “Ex.
“.
Portions of
the county record are designated “C—
“,
citations from the
transcript taken at the County Board hearings are identified as
“R.
“,
and references to the transcript taken at the Board
hearing are cited as “Tr.
.“
2Section 39.2 of the Act has been amended since the time of the
instant proceedings.
90—22
—3—
1. the facility is necessary to accommodate the waste needs
of the area it is intended to serve;
2. the facility is so designed, located and proposed to be
operated that the public health, safety and welfare will
be protected;
3. the facility is located so as to minimize
incompatibility with the character of the surrounding
area and to minimize the effect on the value of the
surrounding property;
4. the facility is located outside the boundary of the 100
year flood plain as determined by the Illinois
Department of Transportation or the site is floodproofed
to meet the standards and requirements of the Illinois
Department of Transportation and is approved by that
Department;
5. the plan of operations for the facility is designed to
minimize the danger to the surrounding area from fire,
spills, or other operational accidents; and
6. the traffic patterns to or from the facility are so
designed as to minimize the impact on existing traffic
flows.
Section 40.1 of the Act charges this Board with reviewing
the County Board’s decision. Specifically, this Board must
determine whether the County Board’s decision was contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence, and whether the procedures used
at the local level were fundamentally fair. E&E Hauling, Inc. v.
Illinois Pollution Control Board, 116 Ill. App. 3d 586, 451 N.E.
2d 555 (2nd Dist. 1983), aff’d in part 107 Ill. 2d 33, 481 N.E.2d
664 (1985); City of Rockford v. IPCB, 125 Ill .App. 3d 384, 386,
465 N.E.2d 996 (1984); Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., v.
IPCB, 122 Ill. App. 3d 639, 461 N.E.2d 542 (1984). The standard
of manifest weight of the evidence is:
A verdict is
...
against the manifest weight of the
evidence where it is palpably erroneous, wholly
unwarranted, clearly the result of passion or prejudice,
or appears to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and not based
upon the evidence. A verdict cannot be set aside merely
because the jury County Board could have drawn
different inferences and conclusions from conflicting
testimony or because a reviewing court (IPCB would have
reached a different conclusion
...
when considering
whether a verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence, a reviewing court IPCB must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee.
90— 23
—4—
Steinberg v. Petra, 139 Ill. App. 3d 503, 508 (1986).
Consequently, if after reviewing the record, this Board
finds that the County Board could have reasonably reached its
conclusion, the County Board’s decision must be affirmed. That a
different conclusion might also be reasonable is insufficient;
the opposite conclusion must be evident. (See Willowbrook Motel
v. IPCB, 135 Ill. App. 3d 343, 481 N.E.2d 1032 (1st Dist. 1985).
Petitioners raise one challenge to the fundamental fairness
of the County Board’s decision. Petitioners also challenge the
County Board’s finding that criteria two through six were met.
No challenge is made regarding criterion one, which deals with
the need for the facility.
Fundamental Fairness
Petitioners contend that the decision of the County Board
was not fundamentally fair. Petitioners point out that several
County Board members who initially voted to deny the siting
request subsequently voted in favor of the request 27 days
later. Petitioners contend that two County Board members, Mr.
Weaver and Mr. Cable, indicated at the September 30 meeting that
they had been pressured into changing their votes. In support of
this claim, petitioners submitted an audio tape of the September
30 meeting made by petitioner Rick Moore. (PCB Pet. Ex. 3.)
Petitioners allege that on this tape, Mr. Weaver stated that he
had taken a poll in his district and was voting what he believed
to be the views of his constituents. Petitioners further
maintain that Mr. Cable said that he had been pressured to
approve the siting request. Thus, petitioners allege that the
votes of at least two County Board members were based on
considerations other than the six statutory criteria of Section
39.2, and that therefore the County Board improperly considered
the matter. Petitioners admit that even if Mr. Weaver and Mr.
Cable had not changed their votes, the vote would have been 8—6
in favor of approval of the siting request. However, petitioners
assert that having provided clear evidence of inappropriate
considerations and pressures on two County Board members, and
given the fact that the County Board’s position changed in 27
days, they (petitioners) should not be required to prove that
other members who voted to approve the siting request also did so
due to inappropriate considerations. Petitioners submit that the
remedy for this alleged lack of fundamental fairness in the
decision—making process is a remand with instructions that the
County Board vote again, considering only the six statutory
criteria.
In response, Daubs first notes that it objected to the entry
of the audio tape into evidence at the December 30, 1986 Board
hearing, and points out that it has never heard the tape or the
statements attributed to Mr. Weaver and Mr. Cable by
90—24
—5—
petitioners. Nevertheless, Daubs contends that even considering
the tape and the minutes of the County Board meetings in the
aggregate, these exhibits merely show that during the County
Board’s deliberative process, there were debates, arguments,
tentative votes, and the general processes of local government at
work. Daubs suggests that such occurrences are not unusual in a
deliberative body, and maintains that all appellate tribunals,
including this Board, take tentative votes and attempt to achieve
consensus on issues pending before them. Daubs states that the
only difference in this case is that the County Board’s
discussions were held at a public meeting at which one citizen
made an unofficial tape of the proceedings. Daubs argues that
accepting petitioner’s claim, the votes of Mr. ~1eaverand Mr.
Cable could be discounted, and the motion for approval of the
siting request would have carried 8—4. However, Daubs insists
that this result is not fair to the County Board or to the
deliberative process. Daubs states that no County Board member
ever alleged that he had received any pressure from Daubs, and
contends that petitioner’s arguments at least implies that the
pressure came from within the County Board itself. Daubs submits
that such internal persuasion is permitted, and is indeed the
nature of democratic government. In sum, Daubs contends that
there is no real fundamental fairness issue in this case, and
alleges that the County Board’s deliberations and decision were
proper.
The Board agrees with Daubs that the Wayne County Board’s
decision was fundamentally fair. As a threshold issue, the Board
does not believe that the audio tape of the September 30 meeting,
admitted as petitioners’ exhibit 3 at the Board hearing, is
competent evidence. This Board has previously expressed its
discomfort with audio tapes submitted as evidence of what was
said or done at a public hearing or meeting. McLean County
Disposal Company, Inc. v. County of McLean, PCB 87—133, slip op.
at 9—10 (January 21, 1988); see also concurring opinion of 3.
Marlin, slip op. at 3—4 (January 21, 1988). Although the tapes
in McLean County Disposal were offered for the use of the county
board members after the public hearings at the local level, the
Board believes that its concerns about the use of audio tapes
apply equally in this case, where the tape is offered as evidence
to this Board as proof of what was said at the September 30
meeting of the Wayne County Board. The instant tape was made by
petitioner Rick Moore, and not by a certified court reporter.
Except during the roll call vote on the motion to approve the
site, the speakers are not identified by name, so that it is
impossible for a listener to know to whom to attribute
statements. Additionally, despite Mr. Moore’s testimony to the
contrary (Tr. at 24), parts of the tape, including Mr. Cable’s
comments during the vote, are inaudible. The Board is also
bothered by the fact that Daubs, and apparently the Wayne County
Board, were not given an opportunity to hear the tape. In sum,
the Board believes that this tape is not competent evidence of
90—25
—6—
what was said at the September 30 meeting. The Board can think
of very few, if any, instances where audio tapes would be
competent evidence, either before a county board or this Board.
Even if the tape were acceptable, the Board does not believe
that the County Board’s decision was fundamentally unfair. The
Board rejects petitioners’ claim that because they have allegedly
presented “clear” evidence of inappropriate considerations and
pressures upon Mr. Weaver and Mr. Cable, they (petitioners) need
not prove that other members who voted to approve the siting
request also did so due to inappropriate considerations. The
County Board members should be presumed to have based their votes
upon the statutory criteria, and this Board finds nothing in this
record upon which to base any assumptions to the contrary.
Simply because Mr. Weaver and Mr. Cable are alleged to have based
their votes upon inappropriate issues, and even if such a finding
were to be made (which the Board does not do), those “improper”
votes do not necessarily taint the votes of the other members
voting in favor of the siting request. See Waste Management of
Illinois v. Lake County Board, PCB 87—75, slip op. at 21
(December 17, 1987). Any challenge to the propriety of a
county board member’s vote must be accompanied by evidence of the
alleged impropriety. In this case, the mere fact that the County
Board had previously reached no decision on the siting request
provides absolutely no proof that the later decision was
improper. Because there is no evidence in support of
petitioners’ claim that any other votes in favor of the siting
request were improper, even the voiding of Mr. Weaver’s and Mr.
Cable’s votes would result in a 8—4 vote in favor of approval.
The Board stresses, however, that it does not find that Mr.
Weaver and/or Mr. Cable based their votes on improper
considerations.
STATUTORY CRITERIA
As previously noted, petitioners do not contest the County
Board’s finding that criterion one had been met
—
that the
proposed facility is necessary to accommodate the waste needs of
the area it is intended to serve. Petitioners do challenge the
County Board’s findings on the other five criteria of Section
39.2.
Criterion 2
The second criterion to be considered by the County Board is
whether the proposed facility is so designed, located, and
proposed to be operated that the public health, safety and
welfare will be protected. Petitioners contend that this
criterion was not met, and maintain that: (1) Daubs did not
submit a sufficiently detailed design, what details were offered
showed that the design was substandard, and that Daubs’ own
technical witnesses admitted that further work needed to be done
90—26
—7—
on the design; (2) the location is not suitable because the
proposed facility is located near a surface waterway, which may
also cause a sub—surface problem in terms of groundwater
movement; (3) minimal details were presented as to the proposed
operation of the facility and Daubs’ witnesses admitted that
those details were not sufficient to constitute a basis for final
approval; (4) the proposed facility will require expensive post—
closure care which Daubs does not plan to provide; and (5) the
roads to and from the proposed facility have seasonal weight
limits, and the increased traffic generated by the facility will
greatly increase the costs of maintaining those roads.
Petitioners submit that there are other locations for a regional
pollution control facility which would satisfy some of these
problems, but argue that the proposed facility does not satisfy
criterion two.
Daubs responds by first pointing out that petitioners do not
provide any citations to the record in support of their claims,
especially for the assertions that Daubs’ technical witnesses
admitted
that
further work needed to be done on the design and
that the operational details submitted were not sufficient to be
a basis for approval of the site. Daubs points to the testimony
of its two technical witnesses and a corporate officer, and
maintains that that testimony, coupled with the exhibits
submitted at the local hearings, clearly provided the County
Board with a basis upon which it could reasonably conclude that
criterion two had been met.
The Board’s review of the claims made above has been
difficult, in large part because petitioners failed to provide a
single citation to the record, statute or case law. This Board
has previously stated that “wjhere a Cpletitioner fails to make
a significant or detailed showing that a county board
determination is in error, the Board can determine that
petitioner has failed to carry the burden of demonstrating that
the determination is in error.” Valessares v. The County Board
of Kane County, 79 PCB 106, 125 (PCB 87—36; July 16, 1987).
Nevertheless, the Board has reviewed the arguments of both
parties and the record. Based upon the review, the Board does
not believe that the County Board’s decision on criterion two was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Daubs submitted
several exhibits which included maps, diagrams, charts, and
logs. (C—48
—
C—83; C—l07
—
C—2l4.) Daubs presented testimony
from Michael Rapps, a consulting engineer, who designed the
landfill. Mr. Rapps testified that he had made an extensive
evaluation of the subsurface geology, including a water budget
and modeling, and concluded that the site was suitable for a
landfill. Mr. Rapps testified about the daily operations of the
proposed facility (R. at 87—92), and specifically stated three
times that he believed that the facility was designed, located,
and proposed to be operated so that the public health, safety,
and welfare will be protected. (R. at 77, 107, 111.) Daubs also
90—27
—8—
presented testimony from Tim Holcomb, a professional engineer who
operates the soil testing service which was involved in the
design of the facility (R. at 21—60), and testimony from Rex
Daubs, who is vice—president of the applicant, Daubs Landfill,
Inc. (R. at 180—205.) Mr. Daubs testified about the operations
of the facility, the roadways in the area, the traffic generated
by the proposed facility, and post—closure care of the
facility. In regard to post—closure care, Mr. Daubs specifically
stated that the applicant would comply with all requirements of
the regulations of this Board. (R. at 192.) Petitioners did
present three witnesses who, to at least some extent, challenged
some of the conclusions made by Daubs’ witnesses. However, this
Board finds that the Wayne County Board could have reasonably
concluded, based on the evidence before it, that the proposed
facility is designed, located, and proposed to be operated so as
to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. Thus, the
County Board’s decision on criterion two must be upheld.
The Board does wish to note that the designs of this and
other proposed landfills differ in several respects from the
requirements of the Board’s new proposed landfill regulations.
Also, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) may
require changes in or additions to the design before any
developmental or operational permits would be issued.
Criterion 3
The third criterion set forth in Section 39.2 is whether the
facility is located so as to minimize incompatibility with the
character of the surrounding area and to minimize the effect on
the value of the surrounding property. Petitioners argue that
the proposed facility does not meet this criterion. Petitioners
contend that the area surrounding the proposed site is
agricultural and residential in nature and is devoid of
industrial influences. Petitioners maintain that the impact of
the proposed facility should have been minimized by choosing a
location where industrial influences have already been felt.
In response, Daubs contends that petitioners’
characterization of the area as “residential” is not supported by
the record, because all of the maps, drawings, and testimony of
the witnesses demonstrate that the facility is proposed to be
located in a rural area of a rural county. Daubs states that its
expert real estate appraiser, Galen Wells, testified that the
location of the facility would not have an adverse impact on
surrounding property values. Daubs insists that petitioners have
not offered any evidence to controvert that testimony.
Again, the Board’s review of this issue has been complicated
by the lack of citations to the record in support of petitioners’
and Daubs’ positions. However, it is apparent that Mr. Wells did
testify that he believed that the proposed facility would not
90—28
—9—
t~iave an adverse impact on property values in the area (R. at 11),
and that any impact the facility might have on property values
would be negligible (R. at 14). Mr. Wells’ conclusions were
based on a review of the plans for the facility, his
understanding of the proposed operation of the facility, and
visits to an existing landfill and a closed landfill in Wayne
County. (R. at 14—17.) Mr. Wells stated that a number of newer
homes had been built close to those sites, and that this fact led
him to believe that those landfills had not had much effect on
property values. (R. at 9—11.) On the other hand, the Board has
been unable to locate any evidence or testimony presented by
petitioners which would even rebut Mr. Well’s testimony. The
Board cannot find that the County Board’s decision on criterion
three was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Simply
put, there was no evidence against Daubs’ position for the County
Board to even consider. The Board also points out that the
statute requires that the location of the facility minimize
incompatibility and effect on property values. That language
should not be read to ask whether there is a “better” location
for the facility. Section 39.2 provides for a determination of
whether a given site is acceptable, not whether a facility should
be located somewhere else.
Criterion 4
At the time of the instant request for site approval, the
fourth criterion established by Section 39.2 was whether the
facility is located outside the boundary of the 100 year flood
plain as determined by the Illinois Department of Transportation
(IDOT) or the site is floodproofed to meet the standards and
requirements of IDOT and approved by it. Petitioners allege that
the proposed facility does not meet this criterion because IDOT
has not found that the facility is outside the 100 year flood
plain and Daubs did not submit any flood—proofing plans to
IDOT. Petitioners submit that under the statute, only IDOT can
make these determinations, and maintain that no finding was made
on either issue.
Daubs responds by pointing to Exhibit 127, which is a May
28, 1986 letter from IDOT to Daubs’ attorney. That letter states
in part:
Inasmuch as the site is located in a rural area and on a
stream with a drainage area of less than ten square
miles, an Illinois Department of Transportation,
Division of Water Resources permit will not be required
for the landfill.
With regard to Section 39.2 of the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act, this letter constitutes
Illinois Department of Transportation approval upon your
90—29
—10—
receipt of all appropriate Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency approvals. (C—355.)
Daubs contends that this letter demonstrates that IDOT has
approved the site as to flood plain, and that IDOT has not
prepared a flood plain map for the area because it is a rural
area on a Stream with a drainage area of less than ten square
miles. Daubs submits that the May 28, 1986 letter from IDOT
establishes compliance with criterion four.
The statutory mandate of reliance on IDOT determinations to
satisfy criterion four has been a difficult issue, and the
legislature recently amended Section 39.2 so as to remove IDOT
from the statutory language. (P.A. 85—654, effective September
20, 1987.) However, the statute as it existed at the relevant
time gave IDOT the sole power to make determinations on the flood
plain issue. This Board has previously held that criterion four
has been solely delegated by the legislature to IDOT, and that a
county board is required to accept IDOT’s determination. Board
of Trustees of Casner Township v. County of Jefferson, 63 PCB 297
(PCB 84—175; April 4, 1985); see also Concerned Neighbors for a
Better Environment v. County of Rock Island, 67 PCB 427 (PCB 85—
124; January 9, 1986). The letter sent to Daubs’ attorney is the
same type which IDOT has repeatedly issued in landfill siting
cases, and does indeed constitute IDOT’s findings on the
statutory issues. The Wayne County Board was required to accept
IDOT’s determination; thus, it cannot be said that the County
Board’s decision on criterion four was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
Criterion 5
Criterion five of Section 39.2 requires that the plan of
operations for the facility is designed to minimize the danger to
the surrounding area from fire, spills, or other operational
accidents. Petitioners argue that the County Board could not
have reasonably concluded that this criterion was met because
Daubs did not present any details of their plan of operations.
On the other hand, Daubs contends that it presented sufficient
information for the County Board to find that criterion five had
been satisfied.
Daubs presented testimony from Mr. Rapps on this
criterion. Mr. Rapps stated that the facility would guard
against fire by covering the trash with the required daily cover
and by refusing to accept any “hot” loads, and further noted that
city water is available along the road to the east of the
facility. Mr. Rapps stated that he was recommending that Daubs
confer with the local fire protection district and install a fire
hydrant where recommended. (R. at 110.) As to spills, Mr. Rapps
testified that because the facility will not accept liquid waste,
there would be no danger of spills. (R. at 110—111.) Mr. Rapps
90—30
—11—
then specifically stated that he believed that the plan of
operation will minimize the danger to the surrounding area from
fire, spills and other operational accidents. (R. at 111—112.)
Petitioners did not present any testimony to rebut Mr. Rapps’
testimony: indeed their challenge on criterion five is based
upon an alleged lack of “meaningful detail’1 in the plan of
operations •and not upon any claim that Mr. Rapps’ testimony was
unbelievable or flawed. Based upon a review of the record, the
Board finds that the Wayne County Board could reasonably have
accepted Mr. Rapps’ testimony and found that criterion five was
satisfied.
Criterion 6
The final criterion applicable to this case is whether the
traffic patterns to and from the facility are so designed as to
minimize the impact on existing traffic flows. Petitioners
maintain that this criterion was not met because Daubs did not
place a traffic plan into evidence. Petitioners contend that
Daubs’ witness simply gave a prediction of the route which
traffic would travel. Petitioners assert that the legislature
clearly intended that an applicant would require that traffic use
the route with the least impact on existing traffic flows. In
response, Daubs submits that any suggestion that a problem exists
due to seasonal weight limits is a bogus issue.
Rex Daubs testified as to the traffic in the area. He
stated that there are two roads leading to the site: one from
Route 45 and one from Route 15. The access road to the landfill
itself will be off the north—south road that connects with route
15. (R. at 186, 188.) Mr. Daubs testified that these roads are
traveled by oil field equipment, tank trucks, farm machinery, and
personal trucks and cars. (R. at 187.) Mr. Daubs further
testified that he felt that the two roads to the site are
adequate to minimize the impact on existing traffic flows; that
the north—south road off which the access road to the landfill
will be built is not heavily traveled; and that a truck pulling
onto or off of that north—south road would not cause any hazard
to other traffic. (R. at 187—188.) Petitioners presented
testimony from the township road commissioner, who stated that
the north—south road has an oil surface, has a five ton weight
limit from January through April, and that trucks over that
weight would tear up the road. (R. at 257—260.)
It is true that the evidence presented by Daubs on this
criterion is a bit sketchy. However, given the manifest weight
standard of review, the Board cannot say that the County Board
could not have reasonably decided that criteria six had been
satisfied. The record contains evidence on both sides of the
issue, and the County Board apparently chose to give Mr. Daubs’
testimony greater weight.
90—31
—12—
Exhibi
t
s
Finally, the Board notes that Daubs raised objections to the
admission of all of petitioners’ exhibits, admitted at the
December 30, 1986 Board hearing. The Board has previously
discussed exhibit 3, which is the tape of the September 30 County
Board meeting. The other contested exhibits (Pet. Ex. 1, 2, 4,
5) are minutes of four separate County Board meetings which deal
with the County Board’s tie vote on September 9, 1986, the vote
of approval on September 30, and the approval of the minutes of
those meetings. Daubs argues that those minutes are merely the
notes of the deliberative process and have no probative value.
The Board disagrees, and finds that those exhibits were properly
admitted. The minutes are a part of the record of the County
Board proceedings which are being reviewed by this Board. In
addition, it is clear that a petitioner for review of a local
siting decision may introduce evidence relevant to his or her
claim of fundamental unfairness. The minutes relate to
petitioners’ claim that the County Board’s decision was
fundamentally unfair. Thus, the minutes were properly admitted.
Because there was no fundamental unfairness in this
proceeding and because the County Board’s decisions on the
statutory criteria are not against the weight of the evidence,
the Wayne County Board’s decision is affirmed. This Opinion
constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
ORDER
The September 30, 1986 decision of the Wayne County Board
granting site location suitability approval to Daubs Landfill
Inc. is hereby affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
B. Forcade abstained, and J. Anderson concurred.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that the above Opinion and Order was
adopted on the 0’~~dday of
___________________,
1988, by a
vote of
________.
~
~.
Dorothy ?~fGunn, Clerk
Il1inois~PollutionControl Board
90—32
