ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
October
20,
1988
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Complainant,
v..
)
PCB 84—83
RUSSELL PERKINSON,
)
d/b/a
PORKVILLE,
Respondent..
MR.. JOSEPH ANNUNZIO, ESQ.,
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, APPEARED
ON BEHALF OF THE ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
MARK
J.
ANSEL,
ESQ.,, OF ERWIN, MARTINKUS,
COLE
AND
ANSEL APPEARED
ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT,
RUSSELL PERKINSON
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by
M.. Nardulli):
This matter comes before the Board upon
a June
28, 1984
complaint filed on behalf of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency (hereinafter “Agency”)
against Russell
Perkinson,
doing business as Porkville (hereinafter “Perkinson”
or
“Porkville”)..
The complaint,
as amended on October
10,
1984,
alleges nine counts against the Respondent, his operation of two
swine waste lagoons and the discharge from these lagoons to an
unnamed tributary of Spring Creek
(hereinafter “tributary”)..
Hearings were held on May 19,
1986 and on July 22,
1987
in
Watseka,
Iroquois County..
On May 26, 1987,
the parties
stipulated that
thirty—three documents relevant to
the hearing be
introduced as
evidence..
A second stipulation of facts was
entered on March
9,
1987..
The Complainant filed
a post—hearing
brief on September
28,
1987..
The Respondent filed
a post—hearing
brief on November
2,
1987 and the Complainants responded to the
Respondent’s post—hearing brief on December
9,
1987.
Based on the record,
the Board finds that Respondent has
violated Section 12(a)
of the Illinois Environmental Protection
Act
(hereinafter
“Act”)
as alleged
in Counts
I and II, has
violated
35
Ill..
Adm. Code
302..203 as alleged
in Count III,
has
violated 35
Ill..
Adm..
Code 302.212(a)
and 304.105 as alleged
in
Count IV, has violated 35
Ill..
Mm.. Code 302.212(b)
as alleged
in
Count V, has violated 35
Iii..
Mm.. Code 302.206 as alleged
in
Count VI, has violated
35
Ii. Mm.. Code 50L404(c)
and
(4)
as
alleged in Count VII, has violated 35
Iii.. Mm. Code
50l..404(c)(2)
as alleged in Count VIII and has violated Section
93—123
—2—
12(f)
of
the Act and 35
Ill.. Mm.. Code 309.102 as alleged
in
Count
IX.
The penalties imposed have been reduced from the
amounts
recommended by the Attorney General
in order
to have the
penalty more accurately reflect the evalution of
the events using
the factors listed
in Section 33(a)..
BACKGROUND
Russell Perkinson,
in partnership with his sons, owns and
operates
a swine farm known as Porkville,
located
in Iroquois
County near
the Village of Thawville.
The farm,
which produces
several thousand swine annually,
includes two lagoons
in which
swine waste,
resulting from the operation at the farm,
is
deposited.
Overflows,
spills and leaks from the lagoon travel
to
a low point,
enter
a perforated metal
riser pipe and are
transported by
a field tile which discharges
to the tributary.
The complaint alleges that since June
of 1979, the
Respondent has caused or allowed
the discharge of
a substantial
amount of swine waste into the
tributary..
The complaint centers
on two occurrences.
The first occurrence was on July
7 and
8 of
1983 when the Respondent allowed discharge of approximately
200,000 gallons of swine waste from its lagoons resulting
in the
death of over 100,000 fish in the tributary..
The second
occurrence was on or about July 16,
1984 when the Respondent
caused or allowed the discharge of swine waste into the tributary
killing approximately 4,206
fish.
Besides the killing of the
fish, both discharges altered the chemical and biological
properties of the waters.
The Respondent does not dispute that the discharges of July
8,
1983 and July 16,
1984 occurred..
Perkinson does,
however,
contest the assertion that his operation of the facility failed
to take reasonable precautions
to prevent discharges or
that he
should be held culpable for the damage due
to the discharges..
Perkinson notes his continued communication and cooperation with
the Agency and maintains that the discharge of July 8,
1983 was
the result of “malicious vandalism by a trespasser” and beyond
his control.
The threshhold
issue that must be resolved
in this case
is
the issue
of
liability..
The parties agree that the proper
standard
of liability for violations of the Act and environmental
law
is “malum prohibitum”..
Malum prohibitum does not require the
complainant
to prove that the liable party had
a culpable or
guilty mental state.
The Complainant only needs
to show that the
culpable party was
in the position
to control the wrongful
act..
In ~ieadowLake Farms,
Inc.
v
Illinois Pollution Control Board,
the Appellate Court upheld
the standard by stating:
Petitioner was not charged with creating the
refuse piles or with responsibility for the
operation of the Peabody 43 mine which
93—124
—3--
resulted
in the creation of the refuse pile.
The Pollution Control Board merely found that
the petitioner has ownership of the surface
rights of the property which was the source of
the violation, that the evidence showed that
the pollution had its source on that property
and that fish were killed,
and that the
petitioner had the capability of controlling
the pollutional discharge.
Therefore,
petitioner was found
to have violated section
12(a)
of the Act,
as well
as violating the
other
rules and regulations related to water
pollution.
The findings of the Board were
correct.
Meadow Lark Farms
v. Pollution Control Board,
308 N.E. 2nd
at 836.
However,
in his post—hearing brief,
Perkinson argues that
the Agency
is attempting
to impose
a liability standard
equivalent
to strict liability.
Perkinson maintains that the
discharge
into the tributary on July 8,
1983 resulted from an
independent, intervening cause
in the form of
a trespasser.
As a
result, Perkinson argues, he did not “cause or allow”
the
discharge and therefore,
should not be held liable
for the
results.
The meaning of the phrase “cause or allow”,
as used
in
Section 12(a)
of the Act, has been determined by the Illinois
Appellate Court, Third District,
in Freeman Coal Mining Corp..
v..
Illinois Pollution Control Board,
21 Ill.
App..
3d 157, 313 N.E.,
2d 616
(1974)..
In Freeman,
the petitioner was an owner of
a coal
mine that maintained a mine refuse pile.
Rainfall upon the pile
resulted
in an acidic contaminant which washed into an unnamed
waterway causing water pollution..
Id.
at
618..
The petitioner
argued that it could not be held liable
for “allowing such
discharges because the discharges were the result of a natural
force beyond the control of the petitioner”
Id.
at 619.
In its
decision
in Freeman,. the court restated that the Act
is malum
prohibitum and no proof of guilty knowledge or mens rea
is
necessary to
a finding of guilt.
The court went on
to
say,
that
the fact that the discharges were unintentional, or occurred
despite efforts
to prevent
them,
is not a defense.
The owner of
the property that creates the pollution has a duty,
imposed by
the legislation,
to take all prudent measures
to prevent the
pollution.
The efforts by the landowner to control or treat the
pollution go to the issue of mitigation,
not
to the primary issue
of
liability.
Id.
at
621..
In the present
case,
it has been stipulated that the
Respondent’s property was the source of the subject pollution.
The question of whether Perkinson fulfilled his duty
to take all
prudent measures to prevent pollution can be answered from the
93—125
*4—
facts
in the case.
At hearing,
Perkinsori emphasized
the extent
to which
it cooperated with the Agency
in trying to redesign the
lagoon system and
to operate the system in
a manner that would
not result
in discharges
(R at 50,
68,
116).
However,
Perkinson’s duty extended beyond
a requirement to follow
1~.gency
instructions.
Perkinson failed
to take obvious actions that
could have prevented the discharges into the tributary.
The
Board
is at
a loss to understand why the lagoons could not have
been designed in
a manner that would have guaranteed
that even if
they did overflow or leak the swine waste would not flow to the
drainage tile and into the tributary..
This could have been
accomplished by building
a retaining wall around the entire
lagoon area,
by digging
a drainage system away from the field
drainage tiles or by providing
a means of covering the inlet or
outlet
of the field tiles during discharges from the lagoon.
Further,
Perkinson’s failure to take immediate action when the
leak was discovered
(R..
at 92)
and failure to notify authorities
to mitigate the damages when they were aware that the swine waste
was entering the tributary
(R.
at 101)
also show
a failure to
take all prudent measures to prevent pollution.
Therefore,
Perkinsori may
be held liable on any count shown
to have
originated from his property and shown
to have violated
a
provision of the Act or Board regulations, or other environmental
law
*
COUNT
I
It
is alleged that Perkinsori violated Section 12(a)
of the
Act on or about July 7,
1983, by allowing the discharge of
approximately 200,000 gallons of swine waste from its lagoon to
the tributary and thereby caused the death of approximately
101,219
fish.
Section 12(a)
of the Act provides:
No person shall:
a)
Cause of threaten or allow the
discharge of any contaminants into the
environment in any State so as
to
cause or tend
to cause water pollution
in Illinois, either alone or
in
combination with matter from other
sources, or
so as
to violate
regulations or
standards adopted by
the Pollution Control Board under
this
Act.
In the Stipulation of Facts filed on March 9,
1987,
the
Respondent admitted that the discharge resulted from
a man—made
channel cut through his swic~ewaste
lagoon on his property.
By
causing or
allowing this water pollution of the tributary,
Perkinson violated Section 12(a)
of the Act,
Ill.
Rev..
Stat.
c-~3—126
—5--
1985,
ch. 1111h~ par.
1012(a)..
COUNT
II
It
is alleged that Perkinson violated Section 12(a)
of the
Act on or about July 7, 1983 by causing or
allowing the discharge
of swine waste into the tributary and thereby causing the death
of 4,206
fish..
In the Stipulation of Facts filed with the Board on March 9,
1987,
the Respondent admitted that the discharge resulted from a
temporary obstruction
in the waste water alley which caused
the
system
to back up and drain out of the inlet holes and carried
swine waste
to the rainwater drainage system and subsequently to
the tributary..
By causing or allowing this discharge
to the
tributary,
Perkinson violated Section
12(a)
of the
Act..
COUNT
III
It
is alleged that Perkinson violated
35 Ill. Mm. Code
302.203 and 304.105 by causing
or allowing the discharge of swine
waste from Perkinson’s property on July 7,
1983 causing unnatural
bottom deposits, floating debris, odor, environmental color
and/or turbidity in the tributary..
35 Ill. Adm. Code 302.203
provides the following water quality standard:
Waters of the State shall be free from
unnatural sludge or bottom deposits,
floating debris, visible oil, odor,
unnatural plant or algal growth,
unnatural
color or turbidity, or matter of other
than natural origin in concentrations or
combinations harmful
to human,
animal,
plant or aquatic
life..
35
Ill..
Adin. Code 304.105 provides in pertinent part:
In addition to
the other requirements of
this Part,
no effluent shall, alone or
in
combination with other sources,
cause a
violation of any applicable water quality
standard.
On March
9,
1987,
the parties stipulated
that at the time of
the July 7,
1983 and July 16,
1984, fish kills,
it was found that
a discharge pipe located at the tributary which discharged
Respondent’s swine waste caused that tributary
to be contaminated
with unnatural brown algae growth,
a brown,
black or
reddish
93—127
—6--
color,
floating debris, turbidity, bottom deposits and swine
waste odor.
This
is
a violation of Section 12(a)
of the Act,
Ill. Rev.
Stat..
1985,
ch.
lll4’2,
par. 1012(a),
and
a violation of
35
Ill. Adm. Code 302.203.
COUNT
IV
It
is alleged that Perkinson violated 35
Ill. Mm. Code
302.212(a)
and 304.105 or or about July 8,
1983 by allowing or
causing the discharge of swine waste
so as to cause ammonia
nitrogen concentrations in the unnamed tributary to exceed
applicable water quality standards.
35 Ill. Mm. Code
302.212(a), effective since September 7,
1982, provides the
following water quality standard:
a)
Ammonia nitrogen
(as N:
Storet Number
31616)
shall
in no case exceed 15
mg/i.
In
a Stipulation of Facts filed with the Board on May 6,
1986,
the following ammonia nitrogen concentration measurements
were taken in the tributary:
Ammonia
Nitrogen
Sampling
Concentration
Date
Location
(mg/i)
July 8,
1983
Upstream of Outfall
2.4
July 8,
1983
Approx.
1 and 1/3 miles
41.
downstream of the outfall.
July
8, 1983
Approx.
2 miles downstream
36.
of the outfall.
July 8, 1983
Approx.
3 miles downstream
39.
of the outfall.
July 8,
1983
Approx.
4 miles downstream
44.
of the outfall.
July 8,
1983
Approx.
5 and 1/3 miles
35..
downstream of the outfall.
The data show that the outfall
from Porkville contributed to
the ammonia nitrogen concentration
in the tributary exceeding
15
mg/1.
By causing or allowing the outfall that resulted
in the
ammonia nitrogen levels stated above, Perkinson has violated
Section 12(a)
of the Act,
Ill.
Rev.. Stat.,
1985,
ch..
l11~,2, par.
93—128
—7—
1012(a)
and 35
Ill. Adm. Code 302.212(a)
and 305.105.
COUNT V
It
is alleged that Perkinson violated 35
Ill.. Mm. Code
302.212(b) by causing or allowing the discharge of swine waste
from Porkvilie on July 16,
1984 so
as
to cause concentration of
un—ionized ammonia
in the tributary to exceed applicable water
quality standards.
Section 302.212(b) provides the following
water quality standard:
b)
If ammonia nitrogen
is less than 15 mg/i
and greater than or equal
to 1.5 mg/i,
then un—ionized ammonia
(as N)
shall
exceed 0.04 mg/i.
In
a Stipulation of Facts
filed with the Board on May 6,
1986,
the parties entered information showing that the un—ionized
ammonia concentration in the tributary,
approximately forty yards
downstream from the Porkville discharge,
was 0.54 mg/i on July
17,
1984.
By causing or allowing this discharge,
Perkinson has
violated
35 Ill. Mm.. Code 302.212(b).
COUNT VI
It
is alleged
that on or about July 8,
1983, Respondent
caused or allowed the discharge of swine waste as described above
so as to cause the dissolved oxygen concentration in the
tributary
to exceed
the applicable water quality standards
established in
35
Ill. Mm. Code
302.206..
35 Iii. Mm. Code
302.206 provides the following water quality standard:
Dissolved oxygen (STORET number 00300)
shall not be less than 6.0 mg/i during at
least 16 hours
of any
24 hour period,
nor
less than 5.0 mg/i
at any time.
In
a Stipulation of Facts
filed with
the Board on May 6,
1986,
the following data on dissolved oxygen concentrations were
supplied..
93—129
—8—
Dissolved
Oxygen
Sampling
Concentration
Date
Location
(mg/i)
July 8,
1983
Upstream of Outfall.
13.8
July 8, 1983
Approx.
1 and 1/3 miles
0.2
downstream of the outfall
July 8,
1983
Approx.
2 miles downstream
2.5
of the outfall..
July 8, 1983
Approx..
3 and 1/3 miles
1.6
downstream of the outfall..
July 8,
1983
Approx.
4 miles downstream
2.0
of the outfall..
This data shows that the discharge from Porkville
contributed
to the violation of the dissolved oxygen
concentration standard.
By causing or allowing the discharge,
Perkinson has violated 35
Ill. Adm. Code 302.206.
COUNT VII
It
is alleged that the Respondent has failed to keep the
contents of the livestock waste—hauling facilities
(the lagoons)
at
levels to prevent an overflow when less precipitation than a
25—year, 24—hour storm event occurred and as so not
to cause
water pollution,
in violation of 35
Ill. Adm.
Code 50l.404(c)(3)
and (c)(4).
35
Ill.. Mm. Code 501..404(c)(3) provides:
The contents of livestock waste—hauling
facilities shall be kept at levels such
that there
is adequate storage capacity
so
that an overflow does not occur except
in
the case of precipitation
in excess of
a
25—year,
24—hour storm.
35 Iii Mm. Code 50l.404(c)(4) provides
in pertinent
part:
Existing livestock management facilities
which handle
the waste in
a liquid form
shall have adequate storage capacity
in a
liquid manure—holding tank,
lagoon,
holding pond,
or any combination thereof
so
as not to cause
air or water pollution
~3—13I)
—9—
as defined
in the Act or applicable
regulations.
The fact that the water pollution described above originated
from the Porkville lagoons shows
that the lagoons were
insufficient to hold the water and is sufficient evidence
to find
Perkinson
in violation of
35 Ill.
Adm. Code 50l..404(c)(4)
under
the malum prohibitum liability standard.
Perkinson has violated
35 Ill.
Adm.. Code 50l.404(c)(4) and is therefore liable under
Count VII without requiring
a determination of his liability
under
35 Ill.
Adm..
Code 50l..404(c)(3)..
COUNT VIII
It
it alleged that since on or about July 27, 1982,
Respondent’s lagoon has not been impermeable or sealed as
to
prevent groundwater
or surface water pollution and allowed
seepage of wastewater through the walls
of the lagoons, thereby
violating Section 12(a)
of the Act and 35
Ill. Mm. Code
50l.404(c)(2)..
35
Ill. Adm. Code 50l.404(c)(2) provides:
Holding ponds and
lagoons shall be
impermeable or so sealed as to prevent
groundwater
or surface water pollution.
Facts stipulated
to by the parties on March 9,
1987, as well
as
testimony by David Perkinson
(R.
at
96)
and Eric Ackerman
(R.
at 23),
indicate that there was seepage from the storage
lagoons.
This constitutes
a violation of 35
Iii. Mm. Code
501.404(c) (2).
COUNT
IX
It
is alleged that the Respondent violated Section 12(f) of
the Act by violating Attachment B, paragraphs 1(a),
2(c) and
(3)
conditions
of his NPDES permit, as well as 35 Ill.
Adm. Code
309.102, by allowing
the discharge that occurred on or about July
7,
1983.
Respondent was
issued NPDES Permit No.
IL006161l for
his swine farm on June
26,
1980..
An effective date of July 26,
1980 and an expiration date
of April
30, 1985 were included in
Respondent’s NPDES Permit.
Section 12(f)
of the Act provides
in
pertinent part:
No person shall:
f)
Cause,
threaten, or allow the discharge
of
any contaminant into
the waters of the
State, as defined herein,
including but
not limited
to, waters to any sewage
93—13 1
—10—
works,
or into any well or from any point
source within the State, without NPDES
permit
for point source discharges
issued
by the Agency under Section 39(b),
or
in
violation of any regulations adopted by
the Board with respect
to the NPDES
program.
35
Iii. Mm. Code 309.102 provides:
Except as in compliance with the
provisions of
the Act, Board regulations,
and the CWA (Clean Water
Act), and the
provisions and conditions of the NPDES
permit
issued to the discharger,
the
discharge of any contaminant or pollutant
by any person into the waters
of the State
from a point source or into
a well shall
be unlawful.
Attachment B, paragraph 1(a)
of Respondent’s
NPDES Permit provides the following discharge
limitation:
During the period beginning with the
effective date and lasting through the
expiration date,
the permittee shall not
discharge process wastewater pollutants
to
navigable waters except overflow from
facilities caused by either catastrophic
or chronic precipitation events.
Attachment
B, paragraph 2(c)
of Respondent’s
NPDES Permit provides
the following monitoring
requirements:
The permittee shall monitor and record
the
liquid level of retention facilities daily
when
the available storage
is for less
than
a 25 year,
24 hour precipitation
event.
Attachment B, paragraph
3 of
Respondent’s
NPDES Permit provides
as follows on reporting
of discharges:
When
a discharge occurs,
the permittee
shall notify the permit issuing authority
as follows:
a)
By telephone,
(309) 691—2000, within
24 hours of occurrence or during
the
first business day following
a
discharge that occurs on a weekend
or
93—132
—11—
holiday,
for discharges
resulting from
precipitation events..
b)
By telephone
(217) 782—3637,
and (309)
692—2000, immediately upon occurrence,
for discharge resulting from non—
precipitation events
(e.g., dike or
structural failure, equipment
breakdown, human error).
C)
In writing within
five
(5)
days of
occurrence, with the following
information:
1)
Cause or the discharge;
2)
Period of discharge;
including
exact dates and times;
3)
An estimate of the discharge
volume;
and
4)
Corrective
steps, taken if
appropriate.
d)
The completed report shall be mailed
to the IEPA at the following address.
Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency
Div. of Water Pollution Control
2200 Churchill Road
Springfield, IL
62706
It has been stipulated that the Respondent caused or allowed
the discharge of July 7,
1983,
therefore violating Attachment B,
paragraph 1(a) condition of NPDES Permit
No.. ILOO6l6ll..
Testimony at hearing also showed
that the Respondent failed
to
notify the Agency of the discharge
(R. at
101)
in violation of
Attachment B, paragraph
3 conditions of the NPDCS permit.
The
Board finds that the Respondent was not in violation of
Attachment B, paragraph 2(c)
of the permit.
The testimony of
David Perkinson
CR.
at
94)
and Ken Hanford
(R. at 83)
shows
there
was
a practice
to observe the lagoon on a daily basis.
It was
also shown that Mr.
Hanford kept
a record of the lagoon level
CR.
at 72).
The fact that the records were not discernible by Mr.
Perkinson or
Mr.. Ackerman does not necessarily mean they were not
accurately kept or could not be understood and explained by Mr.
Hanford.
However,
the violation of the NPDES permit show that the
Respondent violated 12(f)
of the Act and 35 Ill. Mm. Code
309.102..
The Respondent
is
therefore liable under Count
IX.
93—133
—12—
PENALTY
To determine the applicable penalty that should
be assessed
for the violations committed by the Respondent, the Board will
review the factors listed in Section 33(c)
of the Act..
The first
criteria
is the character and degree of injury of the health and
general welfare of the people.
It
is unquestioned that the
pollution of
an Illinois waterway has an adverse effect on the
people of Illinois.
In the incident of July 8,
1983,
the
consequential damage
to the tributary and
to Spring Creek was
substantial.
The damage done to the biological and chemical
characteristics of the waterways could
take
a considerable amount
of time to correct..
The continuing problem with seepage and
events like the discharge of July 16,
1984 will prolong the
recovery period and make
it more difficult
to restore vegetation
and fish to the tributary and
to make the water useful
for other
purposes..
Further,
there
is
a foreseeable expense of treating
the water
to allow others
to use
it,
the loss of the game fish,
as well
as the unnecessary expense
in enforcing
the applicable
rules
and prosecuting the violators.
The second factor is the social and economic value of the
pollution source.
While the swine waste lagoon
is an essential
part of
an operation like Porkville, and while efficient farm
operations are an important contributor
to the economy of this
State,
its value
is outweighed by the unacceptable pollution
activity from the operation.
The third factor
is the suitability of the pollution source
to the area it
is located.
While
the swine waste lagoon
obviously needs
to be located
in close proximity to the Porkville
operation,
it should be designed and constructed to prevent
seepage and overflow from readily entering the tributary.
The
runoff should be directed to another lagoon or sump area where
it
can be reclaimed without polluting the tributary.
The fourth factor under Section 33(c)
is the technical
practicability and economic reasonableness of reducing or
eliminating
the deposits resulting from the pollution source.
It
is both technically feasible and economically reasonable
to
eliminate the discharge.
The Respondent could have avoided
pollution by taking reasonable precautions
to ensure that any
discharge from the lagoon would not flow
to the tributary.
It
also may have been possible
to mitigate the damage done by the
discharge if the Respondent had notified the proper authorities,
as required by the NPDES permit,
in
a timely manner.
The final
33(c)
factor
is the economic benefits accrued by
the noncomplying pollution source because of
its delay
in
compliance with pollution control requirements.
There
is no
indication
from the record
that the Petitioner was motivated by
potential economic benefits.
Instead, this situation appears
to
have resulted from
a lack of respect for the Act
arid
a lack of
93—134
—13--
concern for the environment..
However,
there
is undeniably
a
benefit
to
a noncomplying party for the expense and effort he has
not expended
in coming into compliance and Perkinson realized
such a benefit
in this matter.
In the complaint,
the Attorney General recommended the
following penalties be invoked:
In accordance with Section 42(a)
of the
Act, Respondent to pay a monetary penalty
not to exceed $10,000 for each violation
under Counts
I through VIII
found herein,
and an additional penalty of not to exceed
$1,000
for each day during which said
violations shall have continued..
In accordance with Section 42(b)(l)
of the
Act, Respondent pay a monetary penalty not
to exceed $10,000 for each violation under
County IX found herein, and an additional
penalty of not
to exceed $10,000
for each
day during which said violations
shall
have continued.
In accordance with Section 42(c)
of the
Act, Respondent pay the sum of $10,376.48
to the Wildlife and Fish Fund
in the State
Treasury for the fish kill of July 7,
1983.
In accordance with Section 42(c)
of the
Act, Respondent pay the sum of $443.26 to~
the Wildlife and Fish Fund of the State
Treasury for the fish kill of July 16,
1984.
That the Board
order such additional final
relief as
it shall deem appropriate under
the circumstances..
The Board
feels that the Attorney’s General recommendation
may be appropriate
in light of the environmental damage that
resulted from the violation.
However, these penalties would
invoke a conceivably unmanageable burden on the Respondent.
The
Board’s intent in fashioning
a penalty
is
to use the factors from
Section
33(c)
of the Act to both compensate
for environmental
damage and
to deter
the violator
from allowing
further
violations..
The nine counts
in the Complaint center around two instances
on which
the Respondent clearly violated his NPDES permit and
consequently Section 12(a)
of the Act.
As
a result of this
violation of the permit,
the fish kills
in the tributary occurred
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—14—
and
the ammonia nitrogen concentration, the dissolved oxygen
concentration and the unionized ammonia concentrations in the
tributary were disrupted.
The remaining charges of discharging
swine waste because of improperly operating the lagoon and
allowing pollution by not containing seepage from the lagoon are
presented as continuing violations, but are only substantiated at
the time of
the discharges.
By eliminating the violations that
caused the pollution,
the resultant violation of pollution
standards would be avoided..
Therefore,
in formulating
its
penalty the Board will treat
the violations
as two individual
events
it
is trying
to deter.
The Board
imposes
a fine of $10,000 for the violations that
resulted from the discharge of July
7,
1983.
Based on the
factors
in Section 33(a),
this event had
a significant degree
of
injury
to the health,
general welfare and physical property of
the people, with very limited social value and could have been
easily avoided or mitigated.
Other factors besides those listed
in Section 33(c)
also were involved
in the determination of the
penalty..
One of these factors
is the less than commendable
effort put forth by the Petitioner
in avoiding or controlling the
discharges
and the apparent lack of regard
the Petitioner has
shown for preserving
the waterways of the state.
The Board
is
also disturbed by the Petitioner’s failure
to recognize his
responsibility for the problem.
The discharge of July 16, 1984 had a much less significant
degree
of injury to the health, general welfare and physical
property of the people although
it also could have been avoided
by redirecting
the flow.
Consequently,
the fine imposed for the
July 16, 1984 violations will be $1,000.00..
The Board further orders
the Respondent
to pay $10,376.84
for the fish kill of July 7, 1983 and $443.26 for the fish kill
of July 16,
1984
to the Wildlife and Fish Fund of the State
Treasury,
in accordance with Section 42(c)
of
the Act.
The Board also orders
the Petitioner
to cease and desist
from further violation of
its NPDES permit, the Act or Board
regulations..
Because
it has been
four years since
the events
in
this cause occurred,the Board has no way of knowing the present
conditions of
the Porkville operation.
However,
the Board
considers these
four years as
time that the Petitioner should
have used
to redesign his swine—waste system to assure no further
discharges occurred.
Therefore,
the Board will look disfavorably
upon any further enforcement actions brought against the
Petitioner.
This Opinion constitutes
the Board’s finding
of facts and
conclusions of law in this matter..
93—136
—15—
ORDER
Russell Perkinson d/b/a Porkville is hereby found to be
in
violation of Sections 12(a)
and 12(f)
of the Act,
35 Ill.
Adm..
Code Sections 302.203, 302.212(a)
and
(b), 304.105(a), 302.206,
501.404(c)(2) and (4)
and 309.102 as well
as conditions in
paragraphs 1(a) and 3
of the NPDES permit no.
1L0061611..
1)
Within
45 days of the date of this
order, Perkinson shall pay a penalty
in the amount of $11,000.00 which is
to be sent to:
Environmental Protection Trust
P’und
Fiscal Service Division
Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency
2200 Churchill Road
Springfield,
IL
62706
In addition, Perkinson shall pay
a penalty of $10,820.10,
within 45 days of the order, which
is to be sent to:
Wildlife and Fish Fund
Fiscal Service Division
Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency
2200 Churchill Road
Springfield,
IL
62706
2.
Perkirison shall cease and desist
from operating
in violation of its
NPDES permit, and allowing
violation of the Act and Board
regulations.
Section 41
of the Environmental Protection Act,
Ill..
Rev.
Stat. 1985,
ch..
1l)~/2, par..
1041, provides for appeal of
final
Orders of the Board within 35 days.
The Rules of the Supreme
Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
93—137
—16—
I, Dorothy M.
Gut-in, Clerk of
the Illinois Pollution Control
Board,
hereby certtfy that the above Opinion and Order was
adopted on the
~‘O~Z~
day of ______________________,
1988, by
a vote of
7—0
Dorothy M.,4~inn,Clerk
Illinois Pb~.1lutionControl Board
93—138