ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
February 23, 1989
ROWE FOUNDRY & MACHINE CO.,
)
Petitioner,
v.
)
PCB 88—21
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
RICHARD J. KISSEL AND JAMES
3.
DENAPOLI, GARDNER, CARTON, &
DOUGLAS, APPEARED ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER;
JAMES O’DONNELL AND JAMES MORRIS, ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, APPEARED ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by 3D. Dumelle):
This matter comes before the Board upon a January 20, 1988,
petition for variance extension filed by Rowe Foundry and Machine
Company (“Rowe”) requesting an extension of the variance granted
in PCB 81—49 until February 1, 1990, pursuant to 35 Iii. Adm.
Code 104 and Section 36(b) of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act. The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
(Agency) filed its Recommendation on May 17, 1988. Proper notice
being given, hearing was held on October 21, 1988; no members of
the public attended. At hearing, Rowe and the Agency jointly
submitted a stipulation and statement of facts. Rowe amended its
variance extension petition to conform to the facts contained in
the stipulation. Further, the Agency indicated its intent that
the stipulation supersede its prior recommendation. Based on the
record, the Board grants Rowe extension of the variance until
August 1, 1989, subject to the conditions set forth in the Order.
As a preliminary matter, the Board notes that the
stipulation and statement of facts submitted by both parties
includes a list of statements which purport to bind Rowe to a
certain course of conduct in the event that the Board accepts and
adopts the stipulation. Further, paragraph No. 29 of the
stipulation states: “this stipulation is expressly conditioned
upon, and effective only with approval hereof in all respects by
the Board.” These statements look very much, to the Board, like
a settlement agreement. A settlement agreement is proper in an
enforcement action pursuant to Section 103.180 of the Board’s
Procedural Rules. However, the Board has stated that it does not
favor the use of a settlement agreement in the context of a
96—147
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variance proceeding is inappropriate. (See Board Order in
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency v. Rowe Foundry and
Machine Company and Rowe Foundry and Machine Company v. Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency, PCB 80—174 and PCB 81—40, Feb.
10, 1983 consolidated.) Further, in Olin Corporation v. Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency, PCB 81—117, February 17, 1982,
the Board stated that in a variance proceeding, findings
concerning the issues of hardship and environmental harm are the
prerogative of the trier of facts and are not an appropriate
subject for stipulation between the parties. The Board also
notes that the stipulation risks being in confl:.ct with the
Agency’s responsibility to file a recommendation; i.e. the
recommendation cannot be withdrawn from Board consideration
because of the terms of an all or nothing stipulation. Thus, for
purposes of this variance extension request, the Board will
construe the stipulation and statement of fact as simply that
——
an agreement as to the facts of the case.
Process Description
The stipulation recites the facts of this case as follows.
Rowe operates a gray—iron foundry located in Martinsville, Clark
County, Illinois. The foundry produces industrial and
agricultural counterweights, formed from non—machinable hard iron
casting. Apart from farming, Rowe is the only major source of
employment in the town and is the largest single employer. Of
the 1,300 people living in the Martinsville community, an
estimated 50 are employed at Rowe.
The cupola identified by Rowe as the Whiting No. 9 cupola is
central to Rowe’s foundry operations. In the cupola, scrap iron
is melted before it is poured into molds. Currently, the cupola
is fired with about 3,300 pounds of foundry coke, 1,400 pounds of
limestone, and 28,000 pounds of scrap iron per hour. A large
volume of air is forced into the melting zone of the cupola to
bring the temperature of the scrap iron to the melting point.
After the load of iron is melted, it is drawn off and poured into
prepared sand molds to form counterweights.
The source of Rowe’s carbon monoxide emissions is its
present cupola, which was constructed in 1969 at a cost of
$22,750. In 1970, the cupola was equipped with a Hydrofilter
“below the charge takeoff” scrubber to control particulates at a
cost of over $80,000. The scrubber is attached to the cupola
about six to eight feet below the charging door. The scrubber is
constructed around the circumference of the stack and draws up
the stack gases immediately above the melting zone during the
melting process, so that the temperature of the stack gases is
almost immediately reduced as the gases are exhausted through th~
scrubber.
Unlike the typical cupola, the gases do not retain the
heat from the melting zone.
The scrubber unit was not designed
to control carbon monoxide emissions. Because the combusting
96—143
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gases are drawn off almost immediately above the melting zone,
the oxidation temperature for carbon monoxide was impossible to
achieve. There were no regulations for carbon monoxide emissions
at the time that the equipment was installed.
Carbon monoxide emissions from Rowe’s foundry operations are
regulated by Section 216.381 of Subtitle B: Air Pollution (35
Ill. Adm. Code 216.381). Section 216.381 imposes a limitation on
the emission of carbon monoxide gases into the atmosphere from
any ~cupola with a manufacturer’s rated melt rate in excess of
five tons per hour. Section 216.381 requires that carbon
monoxide gases be burned in a direct flame afterburner or
controlled by some other pollution control device approved by the
Agency so that the resulting concentration of carbon monoxide in
such gases is less than or equal to 200 parts per million (“ppm”)
corrected to 50 excess air or such gas streams are controlled by
other equivalent pollution control equipment approved by the
Agency.
In June,
1981, an engineering firm
under contract to the
USEPA tested the carbon monoxide emissions from the Rowe cupola
stack. The three carbon monoxide gas samples collected at Rowe’s
whiting No. 9 cupola were found to have carbon monoxide
concentrations, when corrected to 50 excess air, of 44,394 ppm,
75,591 ppm and 56,445 ppm.
Procedural History
Rowe’s foundry operations have been the subject of earlier
proceedings before the Board. On September 29, 1980, the Agency
filed a Complaint docketed as PCB 80—174 against Rowe alleging
certain violations of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act
(“Act”) and the Board’s air pollution control regulations.
Subsequently, on April 2, 1981, Rowe filed a petition for
variance docketed as PCB 81—49 requesting relief from the Board’s
air pollution control regulations. Because of the similarity of
the Agency’s action in PCB 80—174 and Rowe’s variance request in
PCB 81—49, Rowe and the Agency requested that the Board
consolidate the two dockets for purposes of decision. The Board
granted this motion.
On February 10, 1983, the Board granted a variance to Rowe
until February 1, 1988 in Rowe Foundry and Machine Company v.
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (PCB 81—49). In its
Order, the Board determined that it would be an arbitrary and
unreasonable hardship to compel Rowe to comply immediately with
35 Ill. Adm. Code 216.381 for the control of carbon monoxide
emissions from its foundry plant operations. The Board’s
findings were based on considerations involving interruption of
the plant’s activities at a time of high unemployment, the
infeasibility of certain control options, the remaining life of
the cupola, the excessive use of natural gas necessary to operate
96—149
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emission control equipment and the de ininimus potential impact on
the environment from Rowe’s carbon monoxide emissions.
The Board determined that the variance relief requested by
Rowe was warranted. The Board also imposed conditions on Rowe as
part of the Variance, many of which were identical to the
compliance plan outlined in the stipulation between the
parties. However, the Board did not commit to granting a renewal
of the variance for up to five years should Rowe not expend the
useful life of the cupola within the five year variance, stating
that such request would be judged on its own merits.
At the time its variance expired on February 1, 1988, Rowe
had only conducted 260 heat—ups of its cupola.
Based on this
fact and in reliance on the Agency’s agreement to support an
extension of Rowe’s prior variance if Rowe had not used 500 heat—
ups of the cupola, Rowe filed its petition on January 20, 1988
requesting a variance extension from Section 216.381 until
February 1, 1990.
In its variance extension petition, Rowe
proposed a compliance plan for meeting the carbon monoxide
emission limitation of Section 216.381 through the installation
of a new cupola and scrubber system.
Subsequently, on
May 13,
1988 the Agency filed its variance
recommendation in this proceeding. The Agency recommended denial
of Rowe’s variance extension request. In the alternative,
however, the Agency recommended that if the Board should
grant a
variance extension, that the variance extension period end on
February 1, 1989, or when Rowe’s plant has completed the 500
heat—ups of the cupola, whichever occurred first.
Variance Extensions
In the stipulation,
the Agency argues that Section 36 of the
Act allows
the Board to grant an extension of a five year
variance for a period not to exceed one year. Rowe disagrees
with the Agency’s position, and believes the Board does have the
authority to grant variance extensions beyond a one year period
and has done so on several occasions in the past. Rowe believes
it is reasonable for the Board to exercise such authority in this
case where Rowe is requesting an eighteen month extension.
This
eighteen month time period will allow Rowe to achieve compliance
within the variance period requested and will avoid a second
variance extension proceeding for a short six month extension.
The Board is not persuaded to adopt the Agency’s position
that the Board can grant an extension of a variance for only a
one—year period.
The Agency’s position is apparently based on a
literal reading of Section 36(h); no further support or
authority
for this position is advanced. The Board believes
the provision
should be construed liberally, consistent with Section 2(c) of
the Act which states that “The terms and provisions of this Act
96—15q
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shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate the purposes of
this Act as set forth in subsection (b) of this Section...
“
Cf.
Reynolds Metals Company v. Illinois Pollution Control Board and
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 108 Ill. App. 3d 161,
438 N.E.2d 1267, 63 Ill. Dec. 904 (1982) (for the proposition
that
It is generally unnecessary to look beyond the
language of the statute. Yet, where, as here,
different interpretations
are urged, the court
must look to the reasons for enactment of the
statute and the purposes to be gained thereby
and construe the statute in a manner which is
consistent with that purpose.).
Rowe is correct that the Board has in many prior cases
granted variance extensions beyond the one year period.
The
Board granted those extensions without having formally addressed
this issue.
The Agency’s has only recently raised it.
The Board does not believe, and never has, that it is
constrained to granting a variance extension for only a one year
period; rather the Board interprets the Act and its own
longstanding regulations as giving it the authority to grant a
variance extension for longer so long as satisfactory progress
has been shown. The basis for the Board’s belief is first found
in the history of Section 36(b) of the Act.
In 1970, Section
36(b) of the Act stated:
Any variance granted pursuant to the
provisions of this section shall be granted
for such period of time, not exceeding one
year, as shall be specified by the Board at
the time of the grant of such variance, and
upon the condition that the person who
receives such variance shall make such
periodic progress reports as the Board shall
specify.
Such variance may be extended from
year to year by affirmative action of the
Board, but only if satisfactory progress has
been shown.
(Emphasis added.)
In 1989 Section 36(b) states:
Except as provided by Section 38 of this Act,
any variance granted pursuant to the
provisions of this Section shall be granted
for such period of time, not exceeding five
years, as shall be specified
by the Board at
the time of the grant of such variance,
and
upon the condition that the person who
receives such variance shall make such
96—15 1
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periodic progress reports as the Board shall
specify. Such variance may be extended from
year to year by affirmative action of the
Board, but only if satisfactory progress has
been shown. (Emphasis added.)
The 1970 Section 36(b) provided that any variances could be
granted for a period of time “not exceeding one year.” The
second sentence stated “such variance may be extended from year
to~year by affirmative action of the Board,
...“
What doo~ “from
year to year” add to Section 36(b)? To construe, as the A3ency
would have us, “from year to year” as a one year limitation on
variance extensions seems redundant because the first sentence
already limits “any variance” to one year.
The Board believes
that “from year to year” meant in 1970 (and still means now) that
the Board was authorized to grant additional,
successive
variances upon a determination
that satisfactory progress has
been shown from one variance period to the next.
Admittedly,
this construction is not self evident from a plain reading of
Section 36(b) as it exists in 1989.
However, the Board does
believe that that was the General Assembly’s intent in using
“from year to year” in 1970 when it adopted the language, and to
now interpret “from year to year” as imposing a one year
limitation on variance extensions is to misinterpret the intent
of the General Assembly.
Further, the amendment to 5—year
variances occurred during the 1975—1976 fiscal year.
The many
variance extensions granted since that time, without objection,
evidence a long history of Board interpretation along these
lines.
The Board also believes that policy considerations support
this interpretation.
After all, the goal of the system of
granting variances is to fashion the most effective program
possible for achieving timely compliance.
In amending the one
year limitation to five years for variances, the General Assembly
recognized the economy
in permitting more flexible variance terms
without distinguishing
between initial and subsequent
variances.
For example, the Board has often granted a first
variance for periods of time much shorter than five years
because, for example, more data was needed to formulate or verify
the do—ability of a compliance plan, or the compliance plan went
awry; a subsequent variance might, of necessity, need to be of up
to five years duration so as to assure that all steps of the full
compliance plan are firmly articulated
and enforceable.
And in
cases such as this, where the subsequent variance request is for
eighteen months, and eighteen months is reasonable, it conserves
the resources of the state to grant the variance in its entirety
rather than to grant it for one year and require the process to
be repeated again in a year.
The Board also notes that its long--
standing procedural rules regarding extensions of prior variances
buttresses the view that first variances and subsequent variances
are not distinguished
in terms of time, hardship showings, or in
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any other substantive respect. In other words, the “reasonable
further progress” language in the Act is dealt with by the Board
routinely, in terms of whether the asserted hardship is self
imposed; while actions taken during a prior variance would of
course be given special scrutiny, so would unacceptable delays in
taking steps to come into compliance be considered with an
initial variance petition. 35 Ill. Adm. Code 104.123(a) and (b),
Extension of Prior Variance, makes quite clear that a “petition
to extend a prior variance shall be a new petition for variance”
and is subject to all informational requirements and
justifications as would a prior variance, except only that a
petitioner may request that information submitted in the prior
variance be incorporated rather than resubmitted.
For these
reasons, the Board holds that the first sentence of Section 36(b)
means that any variance, whether it be original or extension, may
be granted for a period of time not exceeding five years, and
that the second sentence simply authorizes the Board to grant
successive extensions of an original variance, so long as
satisfactory progress is shown.
Progress During Variance
The stipulation sets forth the compliance efforts undertake
as follows.
June 1987
—
Rowe purchased a scrubber
system for the control of
particulate and carbon monoxide
emissions.
This scrubber
system will be compatible with
the new cupola Rowe intends to
purchase.
July 1987
—
Modern Equipment submits the
detailed specifications for the
new cupola design.
The design
specifications were made to
ensure compliance with Section
216.381.
After receiving the
specifications
from Modern
Equipment, Rowe began searching
for a cupola that met the exact
specifications necessary for
its operations and consistent
with the recommendations of
Modern Equipment.
Feb. 1988
—
Rowe retained a consultant to
prepare the design for a
foundation to support the
cupola.
96-• 153
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June 1988
—
Rowe purchases a cupola which
meets the design specifications
necessary for operation at the
foundry.
July 1988
—
Design of foundation initiated.
Sept. 1988
—
Rowe contracts for the
construction of a stack system
for the cupola and orders a
blower for the cupola.
Oct. 1988
—
Cupola constructed and
delivered to Rowe plant;
installation of foundation
complete.
Rowe has also undertaken additional steps consistent with
the compliance plan contained in the stipulation
filed December
14, 1982, between the Agency and Rowe. Rowe believes it has
complied with every condition of the Board’s order issued
February 13, 1983.
These conditions include the requirement that
carbon monoxide emissions from the cupola shall not violate the
ambient air quality standards for carbon monoxide and that the
cupola operations shall not exceed a production rate of 14 tons
of iron poured per hour.
In addition, Rowe has submitted
quarterly reports to the Agency documenting the number of heats
of the cupola in the prior quarters and implemented a
housekeeping and maintenance plan to control sand and dust on
the
foundry premises.
This housekeeping plan was implemented at the
time the variance was granted and Rowe agrees to accept it as
condition to any future variance granted by the Board.
In its variance recommendation, the Agency alleged that Rowe
did not fully comply with the housekeeping plan that was a
condition
to the prior variance. The Agency’s allegation arose
from an inspection of the plant by the Agency which noted the
accumulation of sand in areas of the plant not used for iron
pouring or cooling.
Rowe contends that under the
terms
of the
housekeeping plan, sand may accumulate in areas of
the foundry
providing it is swept up regularly
or weekly, depending upon the
particular
area.
The area inspected by the Agency where sand was
observed is swept every other day, although weekly sweeping is
all that is required for this area.
The Agency also contended that Rowe failed to timely submit
the second quarter report for 1984.
Although Rowe believes it
did submit this report, Rowe submitted its 1984 second quarter
data as part of its 1984 fourth quarter report to avoid any
confusion over this matter.
The Board believes that Rowe has
demonstrated satisfactory progress during the course of
the
original variance.
96—154
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Environmental Impact
In its opinion in PCB 81—49 granting Rowe a variance, the
Board found that Rowe’s carbon monoxide emissions did not pose a
significant threat of adverse environmental impact. Further, in
June 1981, the Agency modeled the ambient air quality in the Rowe
foundry area based on stack tests conducted by the USEPA on
Rowe’s emissions. This modeling showed there would be no
violation of the ambient air quality standards even under worst
case conditions.
Later analysis by the Agency, using a more
realistic emission rate and average stack exit velocity,
indicated a maximum concentration of 5.5 ppm
——
well below the
daily carbon monoxide air quality standard of 9 ppm. The Board
notes that Agency’s findings were based on a carbon monoxide
emission level of
75,591 ppm corrected to
50 excess air which
corresponded with a production rate of 14 tons of iron poured per
hour in effect on the day of the stack test.
Because Rowe will
lower this production rate to 12.79 tons per hour under the terms
of this Stipulation with the Agency, the conclusions made by the
U.S.EPA arid the Agency continue to support Rowe’s position that
its emissions will not cause a violation of an ambient air
quality standard.
In May, 1982, the Economic Technical Advisory Committee
(“ETAC”) of the Illinois Department of Energy and Natural
Resources issued a report with regard to Rowe’s proposed site—
specific regulations.
The ETAC opinion supported the Agency’s
finding with respect to air quality standards for carbon
monoxide.
After reviewing this information, the Board concluded
as follows:
“It does appear the Rowe’s carbon monoxide emissions
have caused little or no adverse environmental effects.”
Clark County is a designated attainment area for carbon
monoxide.
40 C.F.R. Section 81.314.
Rowe’s operations are
located in air quality control Region 66 which does not have an
air monitor for carbon monoxide.
The nearest Agency monitoring
station for carbon monoxide is in downtown Springfield.
For the
year 1987, no exceedances of the daily or hourly carbon monoxide
air quality standards were recorded at the Springfield monitoring
station.
Rowe’s annual emissions of carbon monoxide have decreased
during the original variance period.
Although Rowe was allowed
to conduct 500 heats during the original variance period, Rowe
has only conducted 260 heats since January 1, 1988.
At the time
of Rowe’s initial variance request, Rowe operated the cupola
every other work day.
Currently, Rowe is operating the cupola on
an
average of
twice
weekly. Therefore, the continued operation
of
Rowe’s foundry will not result in an increase of carbon
monoxide emissions or have an adverse impact on air quality
during the requested variance period.
9 6—155
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Arbitrary and Unreasonable Hardship
The stipulation states that the arbitrary and unreasonable
hardship that the Board found in PCB 81—49 continues to exist.
First, Rowe’s compliance options involving the use of a catalytic
incinerator are still technically infeasible because the size of
the incinerator makes installation
infeasible.
Another
alternative
investigated by Rowe, an afterburner system, would
use excessive amounts of gas that could not be supplied by the
City of Martinsville and that the Board concluded was an
unjustified waste of a natural resource.
Currently, these two
alternatives
are no longer considered viable options because Rowe
has decided to replace the existing cupola with a new cupola and
scrubber system.
Rowe’s proposed compliance alternative
or iginally proved unreasonable because an estimated 500 heats of
the cupola remained in 1981 when variance was granted.
Rowe will discontinue the use of the existing cupola by
August, 1989 and will install a scrubber system and new cupola by
that date.
As is evident from Rowe’s compliance plan, Rowe
cannot comply immediately with Section 216.381.
Rowe must
construct and install a cupola to its specifications,
install the
scrubber system and cupola and conduct the necessary tests and
trial runs to ensure that the system achieves compliance with
Section 216.381.
Therefore, requiring immediate compliance with
Section 216.381 would impose an arbitrary and unreasonable
hardship upon Rowe since Rowe cannot possibly implement the above
compliance schedule by the end of the original variance period
—
February 1, 1988.
If immediate compliance with Section 216.381
were required, Rowe’s only option would be to shut down the
plant. The stipulation states that the continued operation of
Rowe’s foundry is essential to the Martinsville community because
of the jobs and funds Rowe’s business places in the local
community.
Therefore, requiring Rowe to shut down its operations
would impose an arbitrary and unreasonable hardship upon Rowe,
its employee and the Martinsville community.
Based on the facts set forth in the stipulation,
the Board
finds that compliance with 35 Ill. Adrn. Code 216.381 would impose
an arbitrary and unreasonable hardship on Rowe’s Martinsville
plant foundry operations.
Therefore, the Board
will grant the
requested variance.
However, the Board grants the variance
subject to certain conditions,
set forth in the Order below,
which will ensure that Rowe conducts its operations consistent
with the policies set forth in the Act.
This Opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law in this matter.
96—156
—11—
ORDER
The Board, having considered the record in this proceeding,
hereby grants extension of variance to Rowe Foundry Machine
Company from 35 Ill. Adm. Code 216.381 until August 1, 1989,
subject to the following conditions:
1. Rowe will continue to pursue the construction and
installation of a new cupola with a carbon monoxide
control system according to ti~e compliance schedule
outlined in paragraph 12 of the stipulation.
2.
Rowe shall submit quarterly reports on the operation of
the cupola.
3.
Rowe shall implement and maintain the housekeeping and
maintenance plan set forth below:
A.
Insure that the size of the scrap iron
pieces entering the cupola are small
enough so as to prevent clogging of the
cupola, thus necessitating
the momentary
shutdown of the pollution control
equipment.
At no time shall Rowe attempt
to melt pieces of iron longer than 30
inches.
B.
Insure that all of the necessary
replacement parts, including fan blades
and bearing sets, for the pollution
control equipment is on hand.
C.
Implement a detailed housekeeping program
designed to
keep the facility’s roofs,
interior working areas and adjacent
outside areas clean of particular matter
and those areas of the plant free of
foundry sand where the use of the sand is
not required for the molding in cooling
of metal.
The housekeeping program
consists of sweeping all hard outside
surface areas at least weekly.
Foundry
sand is regularly swept up on the inside
of the foundry buildings and is scooped
off the production floors.
Accumulations
of particulate matter are removed from
the roof frequently, both as housekeeping
measures and for protection of the roof
coating.
Rowe shall inform all plant personnel of
the housekeeping and maintenance plan and
9 6—157
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that plan must be complied with at all
times.
4. Rowe shall be limited to operation of the cupola twice
wee k 1 y.
5. Rowe shall be limited to a production of 12.79 tons of
iron poured per hour.
6. Rowe shall dismantle and remove the current cupola upon
completion of construction of the proposed system.
7. Rowe shall verify with documentation to the satisfaction
of the Agency’s Division of Water Pollution Control that
the existing wastewater treatment facility is adequate
to handle the discharge from the proposed cupola and
scrubber system.
8. Rowe shall not violate the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for carbon monoxide.
9. Within 45 days of the date of this Order, Rowe shall
execute a Certificate of Acceptance and Agreement
which
shall be sent to Mark T. Books at the following address:
Mark T. Books
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
Compliance Assurance Section
2200 Churchill Road
Box 19276
Springfield, Illinois 62794—9276
This variance shall be void
if Petitioner fails to
execute and forward the certificate within the forty—
five day period.
The forty—five day period shall be
held in abeyance during any period that this matter is
being appealed.
The form of said Certification
shall be
as follows:
CERTIF ICATION
I, (We), Rowe
Foundry
& Machine Co., having read the Order
of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, in PCB 88—21, dated
February 23, 1989, understand and accept the said Order,
realizing that such acceptance renders all
terms and conditions
thereto binding and enforceable.
96--i 53
—13--
Petitioner
By: Authorized Agent
Title
Date
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act, Ill. Rev.
Stat. l98E ch. 111 1/2 par. 1041, provides for appeal of final
Orders of the Board within 35 days.
The
Rules of the Supreme
Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that the above Op~pionand Order was
adopted on the
_______________
day of
~
,
1989 by a vote
of
7-~
.
Ill
lution Control Board
9 6—159
