ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD

January

5,

1989

RIVERSIDE LABORATORIES,

 INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

)

 PCB 87—62

ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

DISSENTING OPINION

(by

B.

 Forcade):

The majority holds that Riverside Laboratories,

 Inc.

(“Riverside~) is not subject

 to the Board’s paper coating

regulations.

 I disagree.

First,

 I believe

 that many of the arguments raised

 in this

proceeding

 are completely tangential

 to the issue necessarily

before the Board.

 The only issue

 in this proceeding

 is whether

Riverside’s

operation may properly be deemed paper coating.

If

it can, then Riverside’s application did not demonstrate

compliance with the relevant regulations and the

permit should be

denied.

 Riverside’s operations are not paper coating then

a

permit denial premised on those regulations

 is clearly

inappropriate.

The exclusive question

 is whether Riverside meets

the

definition of a paper coater.

 Whether Riverside was informed by

the Agency of its regulatory status in 1985

 is irrelevant

to

whether Riverside meets the definition of

 a paper coater.

Whether

 Riverside provided accurate emissions data

to

 the Agency

is

 irrelevant

 to whether

 Riverside meets

 the definition of

a

paper coater.

 Whether

it

 is technically feasible for Riverside

to meet

 a specific

 numerical emission limitation

 is irrelevant

to

whether Riverside meets

 the definition of

 a paper coater.(

See

Navistar International Transportation Cor~.

EPA

 28 ERC 1533

(CA 6,

 September 23,1988))

 And,

 whether the Agency should have

asked

for

more information

 in lieu of permit denial

is

 irrelevant

to whether

 Riverside meets the definition of

 paper coater.

These ancillary matters obscure rather than clarify the central

issue.

One issue that is on point, however,

 is Riverside’s

assertion that

 it cannot be regulated

as

 a paper

 coater because

it was not specifically identified

 as an affected

 facility in the

regulatory proceeding that adopted the paper coating

 rules.

Further, Riverside asserts that several documents were introduced

95—19

—2—

in that proceeding which did identify named affected facilities

and Riverside was not one of them.

 The Agency counters that the

failure

 to identify Riverside derived from incorrect emissions

data submitted by Riverside.

I believe that the Board can effectively regulate

 a facility

by providing

 a proper description of the activities conducted,

even

 if the name of the facility

 is never specifically mentioned.

Regulation,

 by its nature,

 affects classes and categories of

facilities and activities.

 If there

 is an additional requirement

that the regulated entity be

 identified by name within the record

of the rulemaking,

 then the definition of the regulated activity

becomes superfluous and the list of named

 facilities becomes

controlling.

 Further,

 such

 a requirement would place undo burden

on the quality, veracity and clarity of

 information supplied

to

the Agency by regulated entities.

 I believe

 the regulation

should properly describe what is regulated,

 and anything which

meets that definition should

 be subject

 to regulation even

 if not

identified by name

 in the regulatory docket.

That leaves

 the central issue of whether Riverside’s

activities meet

 the definition of a paper coater.

 Board

regulations governing paper coaters

 are found

at

35

 Ill. Adm.

Code

 215.204

 (c).

 Paper coating

 is defined at

35

 Ill.

 Adm.

 Code

211.121:

“Paper Coating”:

 the application of

 a coating

material

 to paper or pressure sensitive tapes,

regardless

of

 substrate,

 including

web

coatings

on

 plastic

 fibers

and

 decorative

coatings on metal

 foil.

Riverside

 itself describes the material substrate

as

a

paper,

in

 fact,

 a “theromosetting

 laminating paper”.

(R.

 30—33).

Indeed, the “paper”

 of papercoating covers paper, pressure

sensitive tapes, plastic fibers, and metal

 foil. There

 is no

question that

 the “Paper” part of paper coating

 is satisfied.

The question

 is what kind of coating does Riverside do.

Riverside argues that it

 is not

 a surface coater

and

therefore

 it does not meet the definition of

 “coating

 line”

 in 35

Ill. Adm.

 Code 211.122, and therefore

 cannot be

 a paper

coater.

 (Pet.

 Br.,

p.

28)

 Riverside argues that

 it certainly

is

subject to

 the Generic Rule Parts

 PP and QO

 (35 111.

 Adm.

 Code

215.920—215.943)

 which were adopted on

April

 7,1988.

 (Pet.

 Br.,

p.

 47—56)

 Those regulations establish

a

3.5

 lb/gal

 limit for

“coating lines”

(35

 Ill.

 Adm. Code 215.926 (a)(2)

and

 an 81

control system efficiency for other

 sources.

 Since Riverside

argues

 that

it

 is not a “coating line”,

 and therefore

 not subject

to the 3.5

 lb,/gal limitation,

 it must be some other

 type of

process that would be subject

 to the

81

 limit.

 Riverside never

95—20

—3—

explains what “other” type of facility it might

be.

 Certainly,

Riverside cannot

 argue that

 it does not meet the regulatory

definition of “coating

 line” when discussing paper coaters but

that

 it does meet the definition of “coating

 line” when

discussing

 the generic rule.

I think Riverside’s operation is paper coating.

The

activity

 in question

 involves the application of

 a material

to

a

paper

 substrate.

 Riverside admits that in

 its activities,

a

substrate which

 is properly characterized as “paper”

 is being

processed

in

 a fashion that can fairly be called

 “coating”.

 (Pet.

Br., p.54;

P.

 208).

The simple

 facts are that Riverside

is

 a major source of

hydrocarbon emissions

 in an ozone non—attainment area.

 Since the

Clean

 Air Act requires all such sources to be controlled by

a

RACT regulation,

 there are only three options.

 First,

 Riverside

is covered

 by the paper coating rules.

 Alternatively, Riverside

is covered by some other Board RACT regulation.

 Or, finally,

Riverside

 is not covered

 by any Board

 PACT regulation and

the

Illinois Ozone SIP

 is defective for this reason.

 Not even

Riverside argues

 the last option to be

 true.

 I find the

rationale

 for calling Riverside

 a paper coater has superior logic

to

 a determination that Riverside

 is somehow covered by other

regulations.

For these

 reasons,

 I dissent.

I,

 Dorothy

1.

 Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control

Board, hereby certify that the

 abp-ye Dissenting Opinion was

submitted on the

~

 day of

 1989.

~

 ~/2•)~

~

Dorothy

 M~.’1”Gunn,Clerk

Illinois ‘P’ollution Control Board

95—21