ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    July
    27,
    1989
    ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    Complainant,
    v.
    )
    PCB 89—87
    also
    MOLINE CORPORATION,
    an
    )
    PCB 89-44
    Illinois Corporation,
    Respondent.
    DISSENTING OPINION
    (by J. Anderson and J.
    T. Meyer):
    We would have granted Respondent’s Motion for Judgment on
    the Pleadings with respect to the Agency’s Count
    IV noise
    complaint;
    we then would have denied the motion to consolidate
    the PCB 89—87 and PCB 89—44 hearings, since the latter citizens’
    complaint involves noise violations and the former Agency
    complaint, absent Count
    IV,
    involves air violations.
    Section 31(d)
    of the Act
    is quite explicit
    in requiring
    “up—
    front” service of written notice by the Agency of a)
    intent to
    file a formal complaint,
    b)
    the charges alleged, and c) an offer
    to meet within 30 days thereafter
    to provide an opportunity to
    resolve the conflicts.
    Since the Agency admitted
    it did not include in its “31(d)”
    notice of air violations anything about noise violations
    at all,
    and
    if one
    is
    to assume this defect can be cured by other means,
    then one must look at whether all aspects of “31(d)” were later
    addressed.
    We do not believe they were.
    First,
    at
    no point
    in the Agency’s interactions with Moline
    is there any indication that the Agency stated its intent
    to file
    a Count IV formal complaint.
    Nor did the Attorney General.
    The
    majority opinion completely glosses over this defect.
    Second, there
    is
    no
    indication that the Agency told Moline
    exactly what would be
    the
    charges
    it would allege regarding Count
    IV.
    The interactions between the Agency and Moline concerned the
    citizen noise allegations,
    not those initiated by the Agency.
    It
    cannot be assumed
    for purposes of
    31(d),
    that
    these allegations
    are the same,
    or concern the same noise sources or dates
    of
    violation.
    The essence of Section
    31(d)
    is to assure that
    a potential
    respondent knows
    that
    a formal complaint
    is forthcoming and knows
    what the alleged charges are before meeting on them.
    Section
    101—305

    —2—
    31(d)
    is written as explicitly as
    it
    is
    in part to provide an
    opportunity to the potential respondent
    to anticipate
    “up front”
    exactly what the Agency intends to file so as
    to prepare for the
    meeting,
    including the bringing of any experts,
    so as to avoid
    litigation.
    “Backing and filling” efforts to cure the 31(d)
    notice defect should be scrutinized carefully or 31(d) will be
    rendered meaningless.
    Of course, Moline knew of the citizen complaints against
    them;
    that it acknowledged that it discussed the noise issue does
    not constitute a waiver of notice.
    Indeed,
    Moline specifically
    cautioned the Agency that a referral to the Attorney General
    flowing from the discussions would violate Section 31(d).
    Although the Board held
    in IEPA v.
    Mervis,
    (PCB 88—36)
    that the
    31(d)
    notice defect was not fatal,
    the circumstances
    in this case
    do not warrant such a conclusion.
    And we certainly do not
    see
    how the Attorney General’s letter has any bearing on the
    31(d)
    process at all.
    Finally,
    the Agency gives no explanation as
    to why
    it did
    not cure the “31(d)” problem by sending another notice of
    intent
    to file a formal complaint and alleging the additional noise
    violation during the months that elapsed after the
    referral of
    the air complaint to the Attorney General.
    We submit that hindsight suggests that we may have erred
    in
    not strictly applying the Section 31(d) notice provisions
    in
    Mervis.
    We certainly believe that
    the majority here has gone
    well beyond any arguable limits of flexibility
    in construing
    the
    intent of Section 31(d),
    with, we predict,
    a resulting chillinq
    effect on the very resolution process that “31(d)” was
    designed
    to encourage.
    For these reasons we respectfully dissent.
    Joan Anderson
    (J
    J. T.M~yer
    /
    I,
    Dorothy
    M. Gunn,
    Clerk of the
    Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereby certify that
    the above Dissenting Opinion was
    submitted on the
    ~
    day of
    _____________
    1989.
    /2~L
    ~
    L/~7).
    /\~/~‘~~)
    Dorothy M.~unn, Clerk
    Illinois Pollution Control Board
    101—306

    Back to top