ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
July
27,
1989
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Complainant,
v.
)
PCB 89—87
also
MOLINE CORPORATION,
an
)
PCB 89-44
Illinois Corporation,
Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
(by J. Anderson and J.
T. Meyer):
We would have granted Respondent’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings with respect to the Agency’s Count
IV noise
complaint;
we then would have denied the motion to consolidate
the PCB 89—87 and PCB 89—44 hearings, since the latter citizens’
complaint involves noise violations and the former Agency
complaint, absent Count
IV,
involves air violations.
Section 31(d)
of the Act
is quite explicit
in requiring
“up—
front” service of written notice by the Agency of a)
intent to
file a formal complaint,
b)
the charges alleged, and c) an offer
to meet within 30 days thereafter
to provide an opportunity to
resolve the conflicts.
Since the Agency admitted
it did not include in its “31(d)”
notice of air violations anything about noise violations
at all,
and
if one
is
to assume this defect can be cured by other means,
then one must look at whether all aspects of “31(d)” were later
addressed.
We do not believe they were.
First,
at
no point
in the Agency’s interactions with Moline
is there any indication that the Agency stated its intent
to file
a Count IV formal complaint.
Nor did the Attorney General.
The
majority opinion completely glosses over this defect.
Second, there
is
no
indication that the Agency told Moline
exactly what would be
the
charges
it would allege regarding Count
IV.
The interactions between the Agency and Moline concerned the
citizen noise allegations,
not those initiated by the Agency.
It
cannot be assumed
for purposes of
31(d),
that
these allegations
are the same,
or concern the same noise sources or dates
of
violation.
The essence of Section
31(d)
is to assure that
a potential
respondent knows
that
a formal complaint
is forthcoming and knows
what the alleged charges are before meeting on them.
Section
101—305
—2—
31(d)
is written as explicitly as
it
is
in part to provide an
opportunity to the potential respondent
to anticipate
“up front”
exactly what the Agency intends to file so as
to prepare for the
meeting,
including the bringing of any experts,
so as to avoid
litigation.
“Backing and filling” efforts to cure the 31(d)
notice defect should be scrutinized carefully or 31(d) will be
rendered meaningless.
Of course, Moline knew of the citizen complaints against
them;
that it acknowledged that it discussed the noise issue does
not constitute a waiver of notice.
Indeed,
Moline specifically
cautioned the Agency that a referral to the Attorney General
flowing from the discussions would violate Section 31(d).
Although the Board held
in IEPA v.
Mervis,
(PCB 88—36)
that the
31(d)
notice defect was not fatal,
the circumstances
in this case
do not warrant such a conclusion.
And we certainly do not
see
how the Attorney General’s letter has any bearing on the
31(d)
process at all.
Finally,
the Agency gives no explanation as
to why
it did
not cure the “31(d)” problem by sending another notice of
intent
to file a formal complaint and alleging the additional noise
violation during the months that elapsed after the
referral of
the air complaint to the Attorney General.
We submit that hindsight suggests that we may have erred
in
not strictly applying the Section 31(d) notice provisions
in
Mervis.
We certainly believe that
the majority here has gone
well beyond any arguable limits of flexibility
in construing
the
intent of Section 31(d),
with, we predict,
a resulting chillinq
effect on the very resolution process that “31(d)” was
designed
to encourage.
For these reasons we respectfully dissent.
Joan Anderson
(J
J. T.M~yer
/
I,
Dorothy
M. Gunn,
Clerk of the
Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that
the above Dissenting Opinion was
submitted on the
~
day of
_____________
1989.
/2~L
~
L/~7).
/\~/~‘~~)
Dorothy M.~unn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
101—306