ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
August
31, 1989
AMERICAN NATIONAL CAN
)
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
v.
)
PCB 89—68
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
)
Respondent.
MARK
J. STEGER, OF McBRIDE, BAKER
& COLES, APPEARED ON BEHALF OF
THE PETITIONER.
LISA MORENO APPEARED
ON
BEHALF OF RESPONDENT.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by
J.
Anderson):
This matter comes before the Board upon an Alternate Control
Strategy
(ACS)
permit appeal filed by American National Can
Corporation
(ANC) on April 18,
1989.
ANC seeks review of
an
April
5,
1989 decision
of the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency (Agency)
to reject an ACS permit application
for ANC’s
Hoopeston can body manufacturing
facility.
A hearing was held
in
this matter on June
27,
1989 in Hoopeston.
Initial briefs were
filed
on July
14, 1989 by ANC and July 17,
1989 by the Agency.
ANC’s reply brief was filed on July
21,
1989 and the Agency’s
reply brief was filed on July
24,
1989.
ANC seeks
an ACS permit
for it’s can—body manufacturing
facility located
in Hoopeston, Vermillion County.
The facility
is located
in an attainment area for ozone ambient air quality
standards.
The “end” manufacturing process
is the process which
is the subject of the ACS.
Volatile organic material
(VOM)
is
emitted by “end—sealing” compounds which are applied to can ends
before the ends are attached to the body of the can.
At the time of the apolication for the ACS,
the ANC facility
was operating
under a variance from Section 215.204(b)(6).
Section 2l5.204(b)(6)
prescribes a coating VOM limitation
of
3.7
pounds per gallon
(lb/gal)
for ANC’s end sealing process.
ANC has operated
its process under
a number
of variances.
See American Can Company v.
nvironmental Protection Agency,
PCB
80—213,
40 PCB 433
(February
5,
981) and American Can Company
v.
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
PCB 84—106,
62 PCB 399,
(January
24,
1985).
The most recent variance was granted on
February
25,
1988
in PCB
87—67.
National Can Company
v.
Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency,
PCB
87—67,
(February
25,
102—2
3
1
2
1988).
ANC was granted a variance from 215.204(b)(6), to allow
emissions of 4.4 lb/gal of VOM.
This variance expired on
December
31,
1988.
During the term of that variance,
A.NC
installed a thermal
incinerator
(TR12)
to achieve compliance with 215.204(b)(6).
The
incinerator controls emissions from the single—die and double—die
end presses.
The incinerator provides for more stringent control
of VOM emissions than what would be required under Section
215.204(b) (6)
ANC has constructed
2 gang end presses which are high volume
end presses.
These presses can make up to
12 can ends per stroke
in contrast
to the double—die end presses which make
2 ends per
stroke.
The emissions from the gang end presses cannot be
controlled by the incinerator equipment currently installed in
the facility.
The emission sources
to be covered under
the ACS permit
include the single and double-die end presses
as well
as the two
gang end presses.
ALTERNATE CONTROL STRATEGY
Section 39.1(a) of the Environmental Protection Act
(Act)
states:
Owners
or operators of emission sources may
apply
for and obtain from
the Agency permits
under
this
Section
authorizing
the
construction
and
operation,
or
both,
of
a
source
or
sources
by use of emission control
strategies
alternative
but
environmentally
equivalent
to
emission
limitations
required
of
such
sources
by
Board
regulations
or
by
the terms
of this Act.
The
Agency
shall
issue
such
a
permit
or
permits
upon
a
finding
that:
1)
the
alternative
control
strategy
in
the
permit
provides
for
attainment
in
the
aggregate,
with
respect
to
each
regulated
contaminant,
of
equivalent
or
less
total
emissions
than
would
otherwise
be
required
by
Board
regulations
for
the
sources
subject
to
such
permit;
and
2)
that
air
quality
will
otherwise
be maintained consistent with Board
regulations.
Pursuant
to Section 9.3(c)
of the Act,
the Board has
promulgated rules
to implement the ACS program authorized by
Section 31.1(a)
of the Act.
Those
rules are found
in
35
Ill.
Adm. Code 202.
102—2 32
3
An ACS
is defined by Section 202.110 as:
A
specific program of emissions limitations
and
requirements
which
is
environmentally
equivalent
to
that which
would
otherwise
be
required
by
applicable
statutes
or
regulations,
and
under
which
the
owner
or
operator
of
an
emission
source
increases
emissions of a regulated pollutant beyond the
emission
baseline
at
one
or
more
emission
sources and correspondingly reduces emissions
of
the
same
pollutant
below
the
emission
baseline
at
other
emission
sources.
(emphasis added)
35 Ill.
Adm. Code
202.110.
Section 202.211 states that “a permit application under this
Subpart
(Part
202)
shall provide a comparison of the baseline
emissions and the emissions which would be permitted under the
proposed ACS....”
(emphasis added).
The term “emission baseline”
is defined by Section 202.116 as:
“Tihe
starting point
or reference level from
which
increases
and decreases
are measured.
The
rules
governing
...
evaluation
of
ACS
strategies
specify
the
particular
emission
baseline that applies for that purpose.”
35
Ill. Adm. Code
202.116.
Section 202.201(a)
further expands upon the emission
baseline concept for ACS proposals:
The
baseline
for
reviewing
decreases
or
increases
of
emissions from emission sources
which are
the subject
of an ACS shall
be the
lesser
of
the
actual
emissions
or
the
allowable
emissions
prescribed
by
this
Chapter.
(emphasis added)
35
Ill. Adm. Code
202.201(a).
Section 202.104 defines
“actual emissions”
as:
T)he
actual
rate
of
annual
emissions
of
a
pollutant from an operational emission source
for
a
particular date
equal
to the mean rate
at which
the emission source actually emitted
the
pollutant
during
the
two—year
period
which
immediately
precedes
the
particular
102—233
4
date and which
is determined by the Illinois
Environmental
Protection Agency
(Agency)
to
be
representative
of
normal
emission source
operation; however:
a)
The Agency shall allow the use of a
different
time
period
upon
a
determination
that
it
is
more
representative
of
normal
emission
source operation.
The burden shall
be on
the applicant to demonstrate
that
another
time
period
is
more
representative.
Actual
emissions
shall
be
calculated
using
the
emission source’s
actual
operating
hours,
production
rates,
and
types
of
materials
processed,
stored
or
combusted during
the
selected
time
period.
b)
If the Agency determines that there
is
inadequate
information
to
determine
actual
emissions
as
indicated
in
the
preceding
paragraphs,
the
Agency
shall
use
the
potential
to
emit
of
the
emission source.
35
Ill. Adm. Code
202.104.
Section 202.107 sets forth the definition of “allowable
emissions”:
a)
“Allowable emissions” means
the emission
rate
of
an
emission
source
calculated
using
the maximum
rated capacity
of
the
emission
source
(unless
the
emission
source
is
subject
to
permit
conditions
or
other
enforceable
limits
which
restrict the operating rate, or hours of
operation,
or
both)
and
the
more
stringent of the following:
1)
The applicable emission standard or
limitation
contained
in
this
Ch~pter, including
those
with
a
future compliance date;
or
2)
The
emissions
rate
specified
as
a
permit
condition
including
those
with
a future compliance date.
35
Ill. Adm. Code 202.107
102—234
5
Finally, Section 202.306, Standards
for Issuance, states in
part:
The Agency shall
issue a permit containing an
ACS
if,
and
only
if,
the
permit
applicant
demonstrates that:
a)
The ACS provides,
in
the aggregate
with
respect
to
each
regulated
pollutant,
equivalent or
less total
emissions
than
would
otherwise
be
required.
b)
The
impact
of
the
ACS
is
environmentally
equivalent
to
that
which
would
otherwise
be
achieved
and
maintained
under
existing
requirements.
35
Ill. Mm. Code
202.306.
AGENCY’S REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED ACS
The Agency and ANC agree that
for the purposes of evaluating
ANC’s proposed ACS,
it
is the “actual emission” level,
not the
“allowable emission” level which should be used as an emission
baseline.
(Ag.
Brief, p.4—5).
That
is, the “actual emissions”
(whether calculated according to the Agency’s method or ANC’s)
are less than the “allowable emissions”.
The sole
issue of this
case
is whether the A~ency’scalculation of ANC’s actual
emissions
is correct.
ANC’s proposal
is equivalent to what ANC calculates as the
“actual emission” levels during
1988.
The Agency agrees that
1988
is a representative time period for calculating ANC’s actual
emissions
in terms of source operations factors such as end size
production and end seal compound application weights.
However,
according to the Agency, pure emission data from 1988 does not
represent
“normal” operations because ANC was operating under
a
variance from Section 215.204(b) during
1988.
(Ag. Reply,
p.1-
2).
The Agency takes
the position that the
1988 emission values
for
ANC should be adjusted
to reflect an amount of VOM which
would have been emitted had ANC complied with Section 215.204(b)
during
1988.
1 The Agency denial letter asserts that ANC has incorrectly
calculated annual and daily allowable emissions.
However,
the
Agency has stated that the method of such calculations
is no
longer an issue
in this appeal.
(Ag. Brief, p.3).
102—235
6
In its denial letter the Agency states:
it
is inappropriate2
to use actual emissions
for
the
annual
emissions
baseline
for
this
ACS,
as
it overstates the VOM emissions which
would
be
discharged
to
the
environment
if
ANCC
American
National
Can Corporation
end
coating
lines
complied with
§215.204(b),
as
they would
be
required
to do
in
the absence
of an
ACS.
In
particular,
if
ANCC ~were not
operating under
a Variance or
an ACS it would
be
required
by
rule
to
bring
all
its
operations
into compliance with §215.204(b),
reducing
actual
emissions of
227.9
tons/year
during
the
selected
baseline
period
to
at
least
134
tons/year
(227.9
multiplied
by
a
compliance
ratio
of
0.588,
equals
134).
If
the
ACS
were
to
allow
emissions
of
227.9
tons/year as
requested by ANCC,
it would
not
require
equivalent
emissions
(~202.306(a)).
As
environmental
impact
is
directly
related
to
the
amount
of
emissions,
the
ACS
also
would
not
provide
environmental
equivalence
(S202.306(b))
(Ag. Record, Exh.
#1).
The Agency states that ANC’s position concerning
the
baseline and “actual emissions”
improperly focuses “narrowly on
the literal terms of the definition of
‘actual emissions’”.
The
Agency states that the “underlying assumption
in the definition
of
‘actual emissions’ must necessarily be that the source
is
operating
in compliance with the applicable emission limitations
during the
‘representative’ period”.
It
is the contention of the
Agency that
a contrary reading of the definition of “actual
emissions” would result
in a situation with “a baseline and
proposed emissions under the ACS which are greater
than
‘compliant’ emissions”.
(Ag. Reply,
p.4).
2 While
this may imply that
the Agency takes
the position
that “allowable emissions” are the appropriate baseline
for
evaluating ANC’s proposed ACS,
the Agency asserts
in its brief:
The Agency
does
not disagree
that
the appropriate
baseline
is
actual
rather
than
allowable
annual
emissions,
inasmuch
as
the information supplied
by
ANC
indicates
that
its
actual
emissions
were
less
than its allowable emissions,
and
35
Ill.
Adrn.
Code
202.201(a)
provide~ that
the
baseline
for
an
ACS
shall
be
the
lesser
of
the
actual
or
allowable
emissions.
(Ag.
Brief,
p.4—5).
102—236
7
ANC asserts that
“it
is the emission baseline calculated
in
accordance to Sections 202.201,
202.104 and 202.107 which drives
the evaluation of the ACS under
202.306,
rather than Section
202.306 driving the calculation of the emission baseline”.
(ANC
Reply Brief,
p.2).
ANC states that the Agency’s interpretation
directly conflicts with Section
202.104 and undermines the
flexibility of an ACS system.
ANC urges that the appropriate
baseline should be the amount of VOM which was actually emitted
from the plant, notwithstanding the fact that such emissions
occurred during a time period when ANC was operating under a
variance.
Moreover, ANC asserts that the Agency has recognized that
ANC has complied with Section 202.104 when calculating its actual
emissions.
(ANC Reply,
p.1).
Specifically,
ANC cites
to the
hearing transcript
(R.
59—60) and the Agency’s brief
(p.6).
FINDINGS
In evaluating an ACS the Agency must compare the emissions
under the proposed ACS with the emissions as as defined by an
emission baseline.
35 Ill.
Adm. Code 202.110.
Section 202.201
prescribes that the emission baseline
is the lesser of the actual
emission level or
the allowable emissions level.
As stated
earlier,
the parties agree that the allowable emissions are
greater
than the actual emissions;
therefore,
the actual
emissions should be used as the emission baseline.
The
controversy lies in how “actual emissions”
are computed.
The Agency takes the position that the appropriate “actual
emissions”
level
is equivalent
to the amount which would have
been emitted
if ANC were in compliance with the
3.7 lb/gal
standard during the 1988 representative time period.
In essence,
such a figure would be hypothetical and obviously not reflect the
reality of ANC’s
1988 emissions.
Yet, ANC was operating pursuant to a variance during
1988.
As a result,
it was not utilizing compliant coatings or controls
which would afford compliance.
A variance temporarily relieves
a
person from complying with regulations or Orders
of the Board
while
that person takes actions
to ultimately achieve
compliance.
Variances are not
to be utilized in sucession
indefinitely as
a means
of
attaining defacto permanent relief.
Department of Army
v.
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
PCB 87—38,
81 PCB 257,
266
(September
17,
1987).
Container
Corporation
v.
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
PCB 87—
183,
slip op.
at
3
(June
2,
1988).
Compliance with Board
regulations
is an ultimate goal of the Act.
Monsanto Co.
v.
Illinois Pollution Control Board,
67
Ill.
2d
276,
367 N.E.
2d
684,
688
(1977).
Therefore,
under
the Illinois regulatory
scheme,
a variance period represents a period of emissions which
is atypical with respect
to what
is contemplated by the Act and
regulations promulgated thereunder.
1‘32—237
8
In calculating actual emissions as an emission baseline,
a
“representative”
time period may be utilized.
This period must
be “representative of normal emission source operations”.
(emphasis added).
35
Ill.
Adm. Code 202.104(a).
When the Board adopted its ACS rules,
it discussed the issue
of the “representative
time period”.
It
is clear from that
discussion that the representative time period
is intended to
reflect a historical level of production.
The parties agree that
1988 is a representative time period with respect to ANC’s
level
of production.
However, the Agency asserts that 1988 is not a
representative time period with respect to ANC’s emissions,
because ANC was operating under
the terms of
a variance.
The Board agrees with the Agency’s position.
Emissions
during a variance period should not be utilized as
a baseline by
which one evaluates
a proposal
in terms of environmental
equivalence with what would otherwise be required.
A variance
period
is not normative
in terms of emissions from a source.
While having reached such
a conclusion,
it does not necessarily
follow that the 1988 period needs to be rejected as not being
representative of ANC’s production levels.
The “representative
period” must reflect a time of normal production levels.
To that
extent, 1988 is representative for ANC.
However,
the emissions
resulting from ANC’s
1988 production cannot be utilized since
they were extraordinary and only temporarily allowed.
Because
ANC was operating under
a variance during this time frame,
1988
emissions need to be adjusted to reflect a level of emissions,
based upon 1988 production, which would have existed
if ANC had
been in compliance.
The resulting emission value may then be
used as an emission baseline without frustrating the very purpose
of the Act
——
compliance with prescribed emission limitations.
If ANC were not operating under
a variance and had been
in
compliance during the representative time period, an adjustment
would
not be necessary.
That
is,
in such a situation,
the pure
emissions values
resulting from a representative level
of
production could be used as
a baseline in evaluating an ANC.
ANC
is asking the Board to take a position which would
effectively reward noncompliance.
In other words, ANC advocates
an emission baseline which would be equivalent
to a level of
emissions during
a particular time frame regardless
of whether
that source was operating
in accordance with prescribed emission
limitations at
that time.
When “actual emissions” are used as an
emission baseline,
that baseline should reflect
a normal
production level.
Additionally,
the intent of the Act dictates
that such
a baseline presume compliance with applicable
regulatory emission limitations.
Limitations set forth by
a
variance are only temporary
in nature and are not consistent with
such a presumption.
See Monsanto,
367 N.E.
2d at
688.
Still,
ANC states thatemissions levels resulting from
noncompliance with otherwise applicable emission limitations
102—2 38
9
should be counted
in an emission baseline.
Obviously the larger
the emission baseline, the greater the amount of emissions which
could be emitted pursuant
to an ACS.
Since during the
“representative time period”, ANC used coatings which exceeded
VOM concentrations with respect to what would otherwise be
required by Board regulations, the total emissions values for ANC
during that period have been inflated, notwithstanding the
assertion that the emissions occurred as a result of a normal
level of production.
Correspondingly,
the e.missions under the proposed ACS would
also be inflated and not reflective of the Act’s mandate that an
ACS represent
“equivalent or less total emissions than would
otherwise be required by Board regulations”.
Section 39.1
(a)
of
the Act.
For the above reasons,
the Board will affirm the Agency’s
decision.
Petitioner’s Exhibit
B, which
is a Federal Register notice
of proposed rulemaking by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency
(U.S.
EPA)
was admitted by the hearing officer
without objection by the Agency.
At hearing, ANC stated that
it
propounded the notice to give the Board an indication as
to how
ANC’s ACS would be evaluated by the U.S. EPA if the ACS were
submitted to U.S. EPA as
a State Implementation Plan
(SIP)
revision.
ANC takes the position,
though,
that the ACS is not
required to be submitted to the U.S. EPA as a SIP revision.
(R.
43—44).
Specifically, Petitioner’s Exhibit B
is a notice of proposed
rulemaking by which the U.S. EPA proposes to approve an ACS for
Admiral Division of Magic Chef
(Admiral) as a site—specific SIP
relaxation.
Admiral’s ACS concerned a plant located
in Knox
County which
is an attainment area.
In the notice,
the U.S.
EPA
states:
This
rulemaking
relaxes
a
stationary
source
RACT emission limitation
in an area that has
been
designated
as
attainment/unclassified
for ozone.
Originally,
this RACT limitation
was
imposed
by
the
State,
not
to
satisfy
an
ozone nonattainment
SIP planning
requirement,
but
rather
to
allow
the
State
to
have
an
accommodative
SIP.
This
action,
when
promulgated,
will
remove
the
accommodative
SIP
for
Knox County
for
the
duration
of
the
variance....
54
Fed. Reg.
12653.
The notice also states that “an accomodative ozone SIP for areas
classified as attainment/unclassifiable requires RACT—level
controls on existing sources,
in lieu of
requiring new major
102—239
10
sources of VOC (volatile organic chemical
to do preconstruction
monitoring
as
required by U.S. EPA’s Prevention of Significant
Determination regulations”
Id.
More importantly,
though,
the U.S. EPA classifies Admiral’s
ACS as a “bubble” subject to the requirements of U.S. EPA’S
Emissions Trading Policy Statement,
51 Fed. Reg.
43813
(December
4,
1986).
However, U.S. EPA concludes that Admiral’s ACS
is not
approvable as a “bubble” SIP revision.
54 Fed. Reg.
12652,
12653.
See also, Approval and Promulgation of Implementation
Plans, Ohio 54 Fed.
Reg.
335.31,
335.32
(Nonattainment area
bubble
is not approvable because
it does not comport with US
EPA’s Emissions Trading Policy Statement).
Appendix B of the December
4,
1986 U.S. EPA policy statement
provides definitions
for the terms
“actual emissions”,
“allowable
emissions” and “emissions baseline”.
Specifically, the policy
statement explains how an emission baseline
for
a “bubble” should
be calculated when the bubble
is proposed for an attainment area.
For
bubbles,
a
source’s
“baseline” emissions
are
equal
to
the product
of
its
1)
emission
rate
(“ER”),
specified
in
terms
of
mass
emission per unit of production or throughout
(e.g.,
pounds
SO7
per million
BTU
or
pounds
of
VOC
per
weight
of
solids
applied);
2)
average
hourly
capacity
utilization
(“CU”)
(e.g.,
millions
of
BTU per hour
or weight
of
solids
applied
per
hour);
and
3)
number
of
hours
of
operation
(“H”)
during
the relevant
time period.
I.e.,
baseline emissions
=
ER
x
CU
x
H.
Net baseline emissions
for
a bubble
are
the
sum of
the baseline emissions of
all
sources involved
in the trade.
In
attainment
areas
and
nonattainment
areas
with approved demonstrations of attainment,
a
source’s
baseline
emissions
for
bubble
purposes
must
generally
be
determined
using
the
lower
of
“actual”
or
“allowable”
values
for each of
the three baseline factors.
Actual
values
for
these
factors
are
determined
based
on
the
source’s
average
historical
values
for
the
factors
for
the
two-year
period
preceding
the
source’s
application
,
to
bank
or
trade
emissions
reduction
credits.
As
discussed
above,
another
time
period
may
be
deemed
more
representative of typical operations,
but
the
emissions for
that other period must be shown
to
be
consistent
with
air
quality
planning
for
the
area.
A
source’s
allowable
values
for the three baseline factors are determined
102—240
11
based
on
its
lowest
federally
enforceable
limit
for
those
factors
(i.e.,
the
lowest
limit
specified
in an applicable
SIP, PSD or
other NSR permit
issued under
an EPA—approved
program,
compliance
order,
or
consent
decree),
including
those
with
a
future
compliance date.
The
actual
values
for
any
of
the
three
baseline
factors,
when
higher
than
corresponding
allowable
values,
may
not
be
used
by
a
source
in
calculating
baseline
emissions
(i.e.,
reductions
down
to
compliance levels cannot qualify for emission
reduction credit).
51 Fed. Reg.
at 43855.
Consequently,
in the case at hand the Agency’s calculation
of an emission baseline
-
adjusting
for excess emissions due to
the 1988 variance
—
is consistent with the U.S.
EPA’S policy
in
calculating an emission baseline for a bubble.
During the 1988
variance period, ANC’s actual emission rate (4.4
lb/gal VOM for
its coatings) exceeded the allowable emission rate
(3.7 lb/gal
VOM).
As
a result,
under U.S. EPA’s policy,
the emission
baseline would be based upon a
3.7
lb/gal emission
rate.
The
Agency’s adjustment of
the 1988 emission values,
in calculating
“actual emissions”
for ANC, effectively achieves the same outcome
as that dictated by U.S. EPA policy.
Therefore,
the Board’s decision today upholding the Agency’s
own decision
is supported by U.S. EPA policy as well as by the
Act.
The Board
notes that at the Board hearing the parties
jointly introduced emission data different from that which was
before the Agency when the Agency made its permit decision.
Given the controlling legal issues of
this case, these specific
data have not been determinative of
the outcome of this case.
However,
the Board must oase its permit appeal decisions upon
information which was before the Agency when the Agency made
its
permitting decision.
New information may not
be considered
in
a
permit appeal proceeding.
Alton Packaging Corporation
v.
Pollution Control Board,
162 Ill. App.
3d 741,
516,
N.E.
2d
275,
279,
(5th Dist.
1987);
See also Illinois Power Company
v.
Illinois Pollution Control Board,
100
Ill.
App.
3d
528,
426 N.E.
2d 1258,
1261,
(3rd Dist.
1981)
and
Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency
v. Pollution Control Board,
118
Ill.
App.
3d
772,
455, N.E.
2d 188,
194,
(1st Dist.
1983).
Therefore,
any
information which the Agency considers regarding
a permit
application must be made
a part of the Agency’s record.
Then,
if
the Agency’s decision
is appealed,
the Board will be able
to
properly consider all data upon which the Agency based
its
decision.
102—24 1
12
Finally,
there
is a controversy between the parties as to
whether the Agency should submit the ACS to U.S. EPA as a SIP
revision.
Since the Board has affirmed the Agency’s denial of
ANC’s requested ACS the Board need not address the issue.
Nonetheless,
the Board notes that Section 4(1)
of the Act
designates the Agency as the air pollution agency for the State
for the purposes of the federal Clean Air Act.
That provision
further explains the Agency’s role as follows:
The Agency
is
hereby authorized
to
take all
action
necessary
or appropriate
to secure
to
the State the benefits of
such federal Acts,
provided
that
the
agency
shall
transmit
to
the
United
States
without
change
any
standards
adopted
by
the
Pollution
Control
Board pursuant
to Section
5(c)
of this Act.
Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1987,
ch.
l1l~,par.
1004(1).
With regard
to ACS permits
in particular, Section 39.1(f) of
the Act
further states:
At
the
request
of
the
applicant,
permits
approved
pursuant
to
this
Section
shall
be
submitted
by
the
Agency
to
the
U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency as
revisions
to
the State
Implementation Plan required by
Section 110
of
the Clean Air Act
if and when
necessary to comply with the Clean Air Act.
Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1987,
ch.
lll~,par.
1039.1(f).
Given
the authority granted
to
the Agency under
Section
4(1)
of
the Act, Section 39.1(f)
does not necessarily dictate
the
conclusion that the Agency
is prohibited from submitting an ACS
to the U.S. EPA if the applicant has not requested such
a
submittal.
Moreover,
the Board
is not aware of a provision in the Act
which would provide for Board review of a decision by the Agency
to submit standards to the U.S.
EPA
for review as
a proposed SIP
revision.
ORDER
The April
5,
1989 decision of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency which denied a request by American National Can
Corporation for
an Alternative Control Strategy permit
is hereby
affirmed.
102—242
13
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act, Ill.
Rev.
Stat. 1987 ch. 111 ~
par.
1041, provides for appeal of final
Orders of the Board within 35 days.
The Rules of the Supreme
Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certif,y that the abpve Opinion and Order was
adopted on the
J/~—
day of
~
,
1989, by a vote
of
_____________________.
CI
Dorothy M.
unn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
102—243
