ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    October 18, 1989
    CHRISTIAN COUNTY LANDFILL, INC.,)
    Petitioner,
    V.
    )
    PCB 89—92
    CHRISTIAN COUNTY BOARD,
    Respondent.
    DISSENTING OPINION (by J.D. Dumelle):
    I dissent from the Board’s Opinion and Order dated October 18,
    1989, in this proceeding. Although I agree in general with
    the
    Board’s analysis as to whether each of the contested conditions are
    reasonable and necessary to accomplish the purposes of Section 39.2
    of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (Act), I do not agree
    with the Board’s ultimate handling of the proceeding. I believe
    that this proceeding should be remanded to Christian County so that
    it may reevaluate the application for site location approval in
    light of the Board’s reversal of the conditions.
    Section 39.2(e) of the Act states in pertinent part:
    ***In granting approval for a site the county
    board or governing body of the municipality
    may impose such conditions as may be
    reasonable and necessary to accomplish the
    purposes of this Section and as are not
    inconsistent with regulations promulgated by
    the Board.
    ***
    (Emphasis added).
    In granting approval of Christian County Landfill’s application,
    the Christian County Board imposed conditions which it stated it
    believes are reasonable and necessary to accomplish the purposes
    of Section 39.2 of the Act. The language “in granting approval”
    in Section 39.2(e) indicates to me that when a county board or
    governing body of a municipality grants SB172 approval with
    conditions, those conditions become part and parcel of its
    approval. Although the County’s Resolution in this case addresses
    the criteria and the conditions separately, I believe that the
    imposition of these conditions should be considered an essential
    ingredient of the approval, not a separable aspect of the approval
    as the majority apparently believes.
    In fact, I believe that the Christian County Board might not
    have granted its approval but for its belief that the conditions
    were reasonable and necessary and would be enforceable. It is
    entirely possible that the County’s belief, although unstated, was
    that so long as these conditions are complied with, the criteria
    will be satisfied. And conversely, the County may have believed
    that if the conditions are not complied with, the criteria will not
    be satisfied. To allow for this interpretation, I would have
    remanded the proceeding to the County for a reevaluation of the
    record in light of the Board’s holdings on the contested
    conditions.
    Moreover, in simply striking the conditions and not
    remanding, the majority denies to Christian County the opportunity
    to perfect the conditions which it intended to accompany the
    approval. The Christian County Board apparently had concerns which
    it intended to remedy by way of conditional approval. Clearly,
    Section 39.2(e) of the Act permits this manner of remedying the
    decisionmaker’s concerns. While it may be true that Christian
    County has not drafted its conditions as artfully as it could have,
    it is possible that the County’s concerns, if drafted more clearly,
    would be reasonable and necessary. I do not believe it fair or
    just that Christian County’s concerns should be ignored so
    completely simply because the conditions were incorrectly worded.
    I believe that Christian County should have the opportunity to
    perfect the intent of its conditions consistent with the Board’s
    Order.
    Finally, I am concerned that today’s majority’s holding will
    have a chilling effect on the imposition of conditions in future
    SB172 cases. The majority’s decision sends a message to all county
    boards and governing bodies of municipalities that they get one
    attempt at imposing conditions and that if that attempt fails for
    any reason they are without recourse——approval is granted
    unconditionally. I fear that rather than approve site location
    suitability approval with conditions reasonable and necessary to
    accomplish the purposes of Section 39.2, local decisionmakers will
    opt for the safer course and disapprove the application outright.
    If this happens, the goal of Section 39.2, i.e., to site new
    regional pollution control facilities, is frustrated.
    I believe that the appropriate course of action in this case
    is to remand this proceeding to the County for further action
    consistent with the Board’s review of each of the conditions. For
    these reasons, I dissent.
    ~
    •/)7
    I, Dorothy
    M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereb~
    certify
    that the above Dissenting opinion was filed
    on the
    //
    ~
    day of
    __________________,
    1989.
    /
    Dorothy N’! Gunn, Clerk,
    Illinois pollution Control Board
    •acob D. Dumelle
    Board Member

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