ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    September
    13, 1989
    KATHY WESTERN and
    )
    JEFFREY WESTERN,
    )
    Complainants,
    )
    v.
    )
    PCB 89—44
    (Enforcement)
    MOLINE CORPORATION,
    Respondent.
    ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
    )
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    )
    Complainant,
    V.
    )
    PCB 89—87
    (Enforcement)
    MOLINE CORPORATION,
    Respondent.
    ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by J. Theodore Meyer):
    This matter
    is before the Board on Moline Corporation’s
    (Moline) motion to bifurcate,
    filed on September
    1,
    1989.
    Complainant the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Agency)
    filed
    its response to the motion on September
    8,
    1989.
    Moline’s
    motion was directed to the hearing officer.
    On September 11,
    the
    hearing officer referred the motion to the Board
    for decision.
    Moline’s motion asks that this consolidated enforcement
    proceeding be bifurcated into two phases.
    The first phase would
    deal with liability,
    and
    if necessary,
    the second phase would
    deal with remedy,
    Moline contends that bifurcation would aid
    in
    the efficient administration of this case, and that adjudication
    of remedy at this point
    in the proceedings
    is premature because
    the complainants have not made any specific demands for relief or
    remedy.
    Moline also argues that three of the factors which the
    Board must consider pursuant
    to Section
    33(c) of
    the
    Environmental Protection Act
    (Act),
    Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1987,
    ch.
    1l1—~,par.
    1033(c),
    are relevant
    to the issue of liability,
    103-27
    —2—
    while the other factors are relevant to the issue of remedy.1
    Thus, Moline maintains that bifurcation would best serve the
    interests of economy and efficiency for the parties.
    In response,
    the Agency contends that there is no need to
    bifurcate this proceeding.
    The Agency states that although
    neither
    it nor complainants the Westerns have requested specific
    remedial measures, both the Agency and the Westerns have asked
    that the Board order Moline to cease and desist from violating
    the Act and Board regulations governing air and noise
    emissions.
    Additionally, the Agency has asked the Board to order
    Moline to implement a noise reduction program.
    The Agency states
    that a finding of liability
    is all that is necessary for the
    Board to order Moline to study and implement appropriate remedial
    measures for both air and noise emissions.
    The Agency also
    argues that contrary to Moline’s assertions, all six section
    33(c)
    factors have a bearing upon the Board’s determination of
    the reasonableness of the air and noise emissions, and thus all
    six factors are relevant
    in determining
    liability.
    The Agency
    maintains that bifurcation will not simplify or expedite hearing,
    and
    is therefore unnecessary.
    Moline’s motion
    to bifurcate is denied.
    The Board agrees
    with the Agency that all six section
    33(c) factors have a bearing
    upon the reasonableness of the emissions,
    and that therefore all
    six factors are relevant
    to the issue of liability.
    (This issue
    may be better framed as the question of violation instead of
    liability.)
    Moline’s request seems
    to center on the convenience
    of the parties, while ignoring administrative convenience and
    expeditious determination of all issues in the proceeding.
    Because the Board’s hearing officer does not make any rulings on
    the substance
    of the case,
    to bifurcate this proceeding would
    result
    in holding a hearing and receiving briefs on the issue of
    violation.
    The Board would then make its determination on that
    issue.
    If the Board
    finds any violation,
    the proceeding would
    then continue on the issue
    of
    remedy.
    This
    is an unnecessarily
    circuitous course, especially where all six 33(c)
    factors are
    relevant
    to the determination of violation.
    The Board sees no
    reason why the proceeding should be bifurcated, when all evidence
    and arguments can be made before the Board rules upon the
    complaints.
    The Board believes that bifurcating this proceeding
    would only result
    in delay
    in the ultimate determination of all
    issues.
    Moline’s motion
    is denied.
    IT
    IS SO ORDERED.
    a-The Board notes that although Moline states that
    there are five
    33(c)
    factors,
    there are
    in fact six factors listed
    in that
    section.
    103—28
    —3—
    I,
    Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Order was adopted on
    Board, hereby certify
    the /~~day of
    ~~J~~l989
    by a vote of
    _________
    “I
    ~
    ~.
    J~
    Dorothy M.,4unn, Clefk
    Illinois ~1lution
    Control Board
    103—29

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