ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    January 11, 1990
    McLEAN COUNTY DISPOSAL
    )
    COMPANY, INC.
    )
    Petitioner,
    )
    PCB 89—108
    v.
    )
    (Landfill Siting
    )
    Review)
    THE COUNTY OF
    McLEAN,
    )
    Respondent.
    ORDER OF THE BOARD (by J. Theodore Meyer):
    This matter is before the Board on McLean County Disposal
    Company’s (MCD) motion for rehearing or reconsideration, filed on
    December 13, 1989. Respondent the County of McLean filed its
    response in opposition to MCD’S motion on December 26, 1989.
    On November 15, 1989, this Board affirmed the McLean County
    Board’s June 20, 1989 denial of MCD’S application for siting
    approval of MCD’S proposed regional pollution control facility.
    The County Board had held that MCD did not satisfy three of the
    statutory criteria of Section 39.2(a) of the Environmental
    Protection Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1039.2(a).
    Upon review of that decision, this Board upheld the County Board’s
    decisions on criteria 2 and 6, but reversed the decision on
    criteria 3. The Board also rejected MCD’S challenges regarding the
    Board’s decision deadline.
    MCD now seeks rehearing or
    reconsideration of the Board’s November 15 decision.
    MCD first argues that the Board brushed aside the “enormous
    weight” of technical evidence in support of MCD’s application and
    held that the County Board’s decision was not against the manifest
    weight of the evidence because the County Board heard one witness
    who disagreed, and might have chosen to believe that witness. MCD
    asserts that this decision “effectively relegates the manifest
    weight of the evidence rule to the ashcan because it utterly
    bypasses the inquiry into whether the County could have
    ‘reasonably’ arrived at the conclusion it did.” MCD contends that
    the implication of the Board’s ruling is that if the evidence is
    uncontroverted, the advancing party prevails. MCD then maintains
    that it presented an array of impressive witnesses on the issue of
    public health, safety, and welfare (criterion 2), and that it
    was
    not reasonable for the County Board to accept the testimony of
    objectors’ sole witness over that of MCD’S witnesses. MCD also
    argues that “the role of the Illinois State Geological
    Survey
    ISGS in this matter
    . .
    .has astonishingly been relegated to a role
    of almost no importance by this Board in its decision of November
    15.” MCD contends that the County Board was not reasonable
    in
    rejecting the advice of Beverly Herzog (the ISGS employee
    who
    107—45
    advised the County Board on criterion 2) as well as the testimony
    of all of MCD’s witnesses. MCD thefi argues the County Board’s
    decision that MCD’S plan failed to minimize the impact on existing
    traffic flows (criterion 6) was contrary to the manifest weight of
    the evidence, and that the Board should reconsider its decision
    upholding the County Board.
    In response, the County disagrees with MCD’s claim that the
    County Board could not have reasonably arrived at its conclusions
    because the weight of MCD’S testimony is “heavier” than
    the
    testimony presented by the objectors. The County maintains that
    it is clear that this Board, on administrative review, cannot
    re-
    weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses.
    The County contends that if the evidence at the local level
    presents conflicting testimony and issues of the credibility of
    witnesses, the County Board decision should be sustained. The
    County also argues that MCD has attempted to persuade this Board
    to reconsider its decision by rehashing the testimony and putting
    itself (MCD) in the shoes and minds of the decisionmakers to rule
    on the evidence. The County maintains that MCD’S arguments ignore
    “the wealth of evidence presented by its MCD’s own witnesses that
    raised doubt in the minds of the triers of fact with respect to
    whether or not (criteria sicj 2 was met.” As to criterion 6, the
    County contends that MCD simply did not present sufficient evidence
    to meet its burden of proof. Thus, the County states that the
    Board correctly reviewed the County Board’s decisions on criteria
    2 and 6, and asks the Board to deny MCD’s motion to rehear or
    reconsider its conclusions.
    The Board is not persuaded by MCD’S assertions. Contrary to
    MCD’S claims, this Board did not “brush aside” the technical
    testimony presented by MCD’s witnesses, but instead reviewed that
    testimony under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. As
    the Board noted in its November 15 decision, if this Board finds
    that the County Board could have reasonably reached its conclusion,
    that conclusion must be affirmed. McLean County Disposal Company,
    Inc. v. County of McLean, PCB 89-108, November 15, 1989, at p. 5.
    The Board’s review did not “bypass the inquiry into whether the
    County could have ‘reasonably’ arrived at the conclusion it did.”
    As the County points out, it is not this Board’s function to
    determine credibility of witnesses or resolve conflicts in the
    testimony. The statutory scheme for landfill siting in Illinois
    gives that authority to the local decisionmaker. MCD is also
    mistaken in its contention that the Board’s ruling implies that if
    the evidence is uncontroverted, the advancing party prevails. The
    Board specifically addressed this issue in Waste Management of
    Illinois, Inc. v. Village of Bensenville, PCB 89—28, August 10,
    1989, at pp. 8-9. The Board stated that the lack of evidence in
    opposition to an application is not, in and of itself, grounds for
    reversal of a local decision. The Board continues to believe that
    it properly applied the manifest weight of the evidence standard
    when reviewing the County Board’s decision on criteria 2 and 6, and
    will not reverse those decisions.
    I
    ) 7—46
    Finally, “to avoid any possible suggestion of ‘waiver’”, MCD
    “reasserts” its objections to the manner in which this Board
    docketed and figured the decision deadline in this case. The Board
    must point out that one of the arguments which MCD “reasserts” was
    never raised for the Board’s original consideration of this case.
    On page 9 of MCD’S motion, it contends that if this case is
    regarded as a new case separate from the previous Board docket, the
    case must be deemed to have been filed on July 7, 1989, and not on
    July 20, 1989. Contrary to the implication, MCD never argued that
    this case was filed on July 7, but instead argued that it was
    properly filed on July 17. See Transcript of the August 28, 1989
    Board hearing, at pp. 4-9. A petitioner may not raise for the
    first time any issue on reconsideration which could have been
    raised before the decision on the case. Therefore, the Board finds
    that MCD has waived the specific claim that this case was filed on
    July 7 for purposes of figuring the 120-day decision deadline. As
    to the other procedural issues reasserted by MCD, the Board finds
    that it properly disposed of those claims on November 15 (see pp.
    2-3), and will not reiterate that discussion here.
    MCD’s motion for rehearing or reconsideration is denied on its
    merits.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    I, Dorothy N. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Contrg~
    Board, her~bycertify that the above Order was adopted on the
    //~ -
    day of
    ~
    ,
    1990, by a vote of
    7—c) .
    L
    Dorothy M. G~Ann,
    / )~.
    Clerk
    /I~1~~
    Illinois Po)’lution Control Board
    107—4 7

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